II. Human Rights

Freedom of Expression

International Standards on Freedom of Expression

The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to restrict expression in contravention of international human rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to the ICCPR—which China signed but has not ratified—and as reiterated in 2011 by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, countries may impose certain restrictions or limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting the “rights or reputations of others” or protecting national security, public order, public health, or morals. An October 2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution declared restrictions on the “discussion of government policies and political debate,” “peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy,” and “expression of opinion and dissent” are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. The UN Human Rights Committee specified in a 2011 General Comment that restrictions on freedom of expression specified in Article 19(3) should be interpreted narrowly and that the restrictions “may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”

Reinforcing Party Control Over the Media

Institutional Restructuring of Party and Government Agencies

In March 2018, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee issued a large-scale plan to restructure the functional authority and managerial responsibilities of Party entities and Chinese government agencies, provisions of which reinforced the Party’s ideological control of the press (including radio, television, and online platforms), publishing, and film. The plan, titled the “Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies” (Plan), placed the Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) in a “leadership” role with direct management responsibilities for news media, publishing, and film. While the CPD and its lower level bureaus have long coordinated ideological messaging through media censorship and control, the CPD’s enhanced managerial role breaks with the “guiding hand” role that emerged in the post-Mao era during which the CPD was not to “engage in practical or administrative tasks.” This break reflects Party efforts to rein in increasingly complex digital news, communications, and entertainment platforms and its goals to disseminate a unified message about China within and outside of China, as well as to reduce bureaucratic barriers in the way of Party control. [For more information on the sweeping reorganization of Party and government institutions, see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.] The Plan requires central-level institutional changes to be
completed by the end of 2018, including the following items that concern freedom of expression:

- Disbanding the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, the government agency that had been in charge of managing the press, film, and television. With the CPD's direct management of press, publication, and film via two newly named entities located within the CPD, the National News and Publishing Administration (also known as the National Copyright Office) and National Film Bureau, the Plan also established a functionally leaner agency to manage radio and television, the State Administration of Radio and Television;

- Bringing together the three major broadcast news entities—China Central Television, China National Radio, and China Radio International—under a newly formed “mega” agency called China Media Group to be known as Voice of China internationally. The merged broadcast agency will be classified as a “public institution” (shiyedanwei) under the State Council and directly subordinate to CPD “leadership”; and

- Elevating the Party’s Central Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group to “Committee” status. According to experts associated with New America’s DigiChina project, the upgrade represents an increase in power for this Party entity by adjusting a short-term policy mechanism (the leading small group) to a longer term “bureaucratic solution” (the committee) with centralized resources and authority over cyberspace and the digital economy. The change may also serve to strengthen the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)—the government agency with oversight of cyberspace governance, including control of online news content.

MEDIA AS MOUTHPIECE: THE PARTY’S “VOICE”

The Party has historically ascribed a “mouthpiece” role to Chinese media, and high-level official publications highlighted this obligation during the Commission’s 2018 reporting year. In June 2018, the Central Propaganda Department issued the first collection of President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s talks about news media over the past five years, including his February 2016 speech to state and Party news outlets that the media in China “are surnamed Party.” The Plan to restructure Party and government agencies issued in March 2018 specified that the State Administration of Radio and Television shall “fully use broadcast news as the Party’s mouthpiece” and the combined broadcasting agency will “propagate the theories, political line, and policies of the Party.” The official explanation for the new broadcasting agency’s international name of Voice of China emphasized “telling China’s story well” to international audiences. International news reports juxtaposed the name Voice of China (Zhongguo zhi sheng) with the U.S. Government-funded broadcaster Voice of America (Meiguo zhi yin), though an unnamed source told Radio Free Asia that Voice of China likely is modeled on Russia’s government-funded global broadcast platform RT in its authoritarian ambitions. The April 2018 appointment of Tuo Zhen, a Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department, as
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editor-in-chief of the Party “mouthpiece” People’s Daily recalled a January 2013 incident in which Tuo substituted an editorial that extolled the Party for a reform-oriented one at Southern Weekend, one of the leading investigative newspapers in China at the time. Positive coverage of Xi Jinping saturated domestic news this past year, but a series of three editorials from July 2018 in People’s Daily censured “boastful” news reporting, which some experts linked to incipient criticism in China of the nationalistic rhetoric associated with Xi Jinping amid growing concerns about U.S.-China trade issues.

Freedom of the Press

Reporters Without Borders continued to rank China among the five worst countries in the world for press freedom in its annual Press Freedom Index. Press freedom assessments this past year from Freedom House, the International Federation of Journalists, and the Committee to Protect Journalists similarly criticized the lack of press freedom in China. In a 2018 survey, Hong Kong journalists identified the Chinese central government as a major reason for a decline in press freedom in Hong Kong. Although freedom of speech and the press are guaranteed in China’s Constitution, the legal parameters for the protection of the news media in gathering and reporting the news are not clearly defined in the absence of a national press law. Yet complex regulatory provisions allow officials to exert arbitrary control over journalists and news coverage in China.

Reports on adverse events, including accidents and disasters, are not out of bounds for official media, but as a commentator has noted, “selected party news outlets or government organs are deftly using state-controlled and social media tools to take the lead in shaping the Chinese government’s own version of these events.” The government and Party often suppress critical reporting while “advancing a positive narrative” to broaden public support for official policies. For example, this past year, censorship instructions limited the manner and scope of media reports on a November 2017 fatal fire in Beijing municipality, framing the subsequent forced evictions of thousands of non-local residents and large-scale building demolition as public health and fire safety measures.

To mark the 10th anniversary of the earthquake in Wenchuan county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, state media praised the government’s rebuilding efforts and generosity to promote the Wenchuan government’s announcement of a day of “thanksgiving” rather than a day of mourning for the tens of thousands who died. On the other hand, authorities have used official media as a “weapon” against government and Party critics, according to the international non-governmental organization Safeguard Defenders. Safeguard Defenders highlighted the “active participation” of Chinese and Hong Kong media outlets involved in the broadcasts of televised—and likely coerced—“confessions” of wrongdoing by rights defenders, journalists, and Uyghurs, among others, which were aired between July 2013 and February 2018.

Ideological pressures, organizational changes, and financial concerns at news media outlets this past year contributed to the ongo-
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...ing decline of Chinese investigative journalism. A December 2017 academic survey on investigative journalism in China reported a 58-percent fall in the number of domestic investigative journalists from 2011 to 2017, and a decrease in the number of media outlets with journalists doing front-line reporting from 74 in 2011 to 44 in 2017. Journalism experts have attributed the decline to multiple factors, including regulatory and legal obstacles, low wages, market competition from new digital platforms, and alleged corruption and ethical lapses. In one incident reported this past year, some 40 editors and journalists from Legal Evening News reportedly quit in connection with organizational changes at the newspaper, including the closure of the paper’s well-known investigative unit. In a different incident, in July 2018, Hunan province detained freelance journalist Chen Jieren and several of his family members and associates on suspicion of extortion and illegal business activity apparently in connection with Chen's criticism of a local official. Three official media outlets subsequently denounced Chen’s online work as spurious “supervision by public opinion,” a term Chinese authorities previously have used to signify the functions of “watchdog” or investigative journalism.

HARASSMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS

The Chinese government continued to be one of the worst jailers of journalists in the world, with estimates of individuals in detention or imprisoned ranging from 41 to more than 50. Among the journalists detained or imprisoned in China are citizen journalists and volunteers who worked outside of mainstream state or official media, many of whom are of Uyghur ethnicity. Citizen journalism in China provides information on local news and incidents that the government restricts or censors in most media, such as information on labor protests, migrants’ concerns, petitioning the government for redress of grievances, and rights defense activities. A PEN America report on social media censorship observed that the government’s prohibition on mainstream journalists from publishing “unverified” reports on social media highlights the government’s awareness that it is not fully able to control content posted by citizen journalists.

Ongoing harassment and detention of citizen journalists continued this past year and is contemporaneous with the suppression of civil society groups and human rights lawyers and defenders. On September 1, 2017, for example, public security authorities from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province, detained Zhen Jianghua, executive director of the website Human Rights Campaign in China that is known for monitoring human rights violations, including the harassment and criminal prosecution of rights defenders. Authorities formally arrested Zhen on March 30, 2018, on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power.” On August 10, 2018, the Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court reportedly tried Zhen without informing either Zhen’s defense lawyers or his family members. Authorities also continued to detain Liu Feiyue and Huang Qi, founders of the websites Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch and 64 Tianwang, respectively, as part of the crackdown on rights monitoring websites and their founders and volunteers. Liu’s case went to court on August 7, 2018, without an immediate...
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court decision, whereas authorities have postponed Huang’s trial and refused him medical parole despite his deteriorating health. Staff and volunteers from those two websites also remained in detention during this reporting year, including Ding Lingjie, Jiang Chengfen, Wang Jing, Chen Tianmao, and Yang Xuqiong.

This past year, the Commission observed reports of censorship, disciplinary measures, dismissal, and detentions of mainstream journalists who covered financial or political issues, or whose reporting implied a lack of government action. Official media covered incidents of threats and a physical attack on reporters covering environmental pollution and an attack against another while reporting on hospital malfeasance. In February 2018, Southern Weekend, a market-driven newspaper based in Guangdong province, reportedly withdrew from publication two investigative reports about Hainan Airlines (HNA) Group—a private company with large debts, which the central government has placed under strict economic controls—and removed the magazine’s editor-in-chief in connection to those reports. On February 25, 2018, the English-language branch of state-run media agency Xinhua prematurely released the news about the proposed constitutional amendment to eliminate presidential term limits, a change that effectively permits Xi Jinping to hold his leadership positions for life. Senior officials reportedly considered the early announcement a “serious political error,” resulting in disciplinary measures for Xinhua staff. Professional ramifications were not reported for the journalist whose unscripted “epic eye-roll” in reaction to a lengthy question posed at a National People’s Congress press conference in March 2018 received domestic and international coverage. The Commission also observed reports of detentions of two journalists who reported on an absent dairy company executive and a reporter who wrote about dozens of missing university students in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.

HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN MEDIA OUTLETS AND JOURNALISTS

According to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) 2017 survey, working conditions for foreign reporters in China generally deteriorated in 2017. The FCCC supported this claim with accounts of official harassment of reporters, news assistants, and sources; attempts to interfere with the coverage of issues that authorities deemed “sensitive”; restrictions on travel to areas along China’s border and ethnic minority autonomous regions; and visa renewal delays and denials. At two press conferences following the release of the FCCC survey results, however, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson rejected the FCCC’s findings. Additionally, in a July 2018 statement in response to Swedish media coverage of the case of Hong Kong bookseller Gui Minhai, the Chinese ambassador to Sweden referred to the “so called” FCCC as an “unregistered illegal organization” and stated that it “lacks all legitimacy . . . and the reports it released are totally unreliable.” [For more information on Gui Minhai, see text box titled “Hong Kong Bookseller Gui Minhai Detained Again” in Section VI—Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.] Additional instances of official harassment against foreign journalists continued in 2018, with reports of temporary detentions,
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physical assaults, and cancelling or refusing to issue visas. The government continued to block selected foreign media outlets’ websites, and to obstruct some foreign media outlets from opening an office in China. Chinese officials abroad reportedly visited headquarters of foreign media outlets to reprimand these outlets for reporting they deemed to be unfavorable to China. Chinese authorities also detained China-based family members of journalists who report on China from abroad, acts that an American journalist described as aiming to “mute criticism of China across the world . . .” In September 2017, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly took into custody Li Huaiping, wife of Chen Xiaoping—the editor-in-chief of a Chinese-language media outlet in New York—allegedly in connection with Chen’s interviews with businessman Guo Wengui. Authorities in China also targeted six U.S.-based journalists who work for the Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia (RFA), a news outlet in Washington, D.C., with the detention of more than two dozen of their family members who reside in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). International advocacy groups and RFA linked the detentions in the XUAR to RFA Uyghur Service coverage of intensifying political control in the region. [For additional information on these detentions, see Section IV—Xinjiang.]

Sharpening Cyberspace Goals, Regulating Online News and Expression

Official statistics reported 772 million internet users in China as of December 2017, 97.5 percent of whom access the internet from mobile devices and use social media applications for communications, e-commerce, gaming, and video-streaming, among other functions. Senior government and Party officials linked control of cyberspace to social stability, national security, economic development, and global power ambitions. U.S.-based experts emphasized “the systems being put in place, . . . should be seen as a long-term effort to ensure that no online domain remains free from oversight.” This past year, authorities continued to formulate new regulations to control and censor online news and media outlets, technology companies, and users of social media, and in the process, operationalize the PRC Cybersecurity Law. A media expert in Hong Kong observed that new regulations to consolidate Party power over cyberspace and expand control over individual users of social media are “one of the most specific indications we have yet of the Party’s atomization and personalization of censorship, of the way the relationship between propaganda and the public is being transformed by digital communications.” Examples from these regulatory measures include the following:

- Under Article 4 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services, both social media companies and individual users are responsible for a “correct orientation, promoting socialist core values, actively cultivating healthy internet culture, and safeguarding a wholesome internet environment.”
- The Provisions on the Administration of Internet Group Information Services stipulate in Article 9 that administrators
and creators of social media groups are responsible for managing the group chat, particularly the content expressed by members of their respective chat groups.\textsuperscript{126} [For information on “legal education classes” about these provisions held at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, see Section V—Tibet.]

- The Measures for the Administration of Content Management Practitioners Working for Internet News Information Service Providers require 40 hours of government-run training on “socialist values,” with at least 10 hours of company-run training on “Marxist news values.”\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{Censored Content}

Chinese authorities continued to censor a broad range of news, academic and other publications, and social media discussion of topics which the government and Party deem to be politically “sensitive.”\textsuperscript{128} The Commission observed reports about censorship of topics relating to the ethnic minority autonomous areas of Tibet\textsuperscript{129} and Xinjiang;\textsuperscript{130} Taiwan\textsuperscript{131} and Hong Kong;\textsuperscript{132} the spiritual movement Falun Gong;\textsuperscript{133} and anniversaries of past events and persons.\textsuperscript{134} In November 2017, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on censorship directives instructing local media to first seek permission from provincial-level propaganda bureaus before publishing reports on topics such as elder care, healthcare, housing issues, education, and the stock market.\textsuperscript{135} Political perspectives that veered from the Party’s ideological mainstream also were subject to censorship.\textsuperscript{136} In May 2018, authorities shut down Utopia, a website that espoused political positions aligned with Maoist or extreme “leftist” nationalism.\textsuperscript{137} Similarly, in July 2018, authorities ordered the closure of liberal think tank Unirule’s office in Beijing municipality.\textsuperscript{138} and early in 2017 had shut down several websites and social media accounts linked to Unirule.\textsuperscript{139} Nevertheless, an essay written by a Tsinghua University professor that not only criticized Xi Jinping but also urged rectification of the 1989 Tiananmen protests was posted in late July to Unirule Perspectives, a Unirule website only available through circumvention tools.\textsuperscript{140}

Censorship of the news and social media commentary on the news was particularly intense this reporting year in connection with two major political events—the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (19th Party Congress) in October 2017\textsuperscript{141} and the annual meetings (Two Sessions) of the National People’s Congress and its advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, in March 2018.\textsuperscript{142} Official censorship of both events restricted coverage of a wide range of political issues concerning policy, personnel changes in senior Party and government leadership, and constitutional amendments.\textsuperscript{143} The lack of in-depth domestic coverage or government transparency in China led one foreign journalist to proclaim the impossibility of “know[jing] anything about high-level Chinese politics.”\textsuperscript{144} China Digital Times (CDT), a U.S.-based Web portal which provides translations of leaked censorship directives from the Central Propaganda Department and other government entities, observed a decrease in the number of directives it received from contacts within China in 2017.\textsuperscript{145} One factor of the decline, according to CDT, was the po-
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potential jeopardy media professionals with access to such information might encounter.146

Citizens’ Free Expression

PUBLIC OPINION PUSHES BACK

Social media platforms continued to be an everyday channel of expression for Chinese citizens, particularly a more socially and technically engaged younger generation,147 to discuss concerns about a range of news events and public interest issues.148 As China law scholar Eva Pils has argued, the Party’s emphasis on control of expression through “persuasion, coercion and intimidation”149 reflects, in part, the realization that it cannot entirely control public opinion.150 This past year, social media users raised a broad range of concerns, such as sexual harassment on Chinese university campuses;151 racism on television;152 and the forced eviction of thousands of non-local residents from Beijing municipality.153 Social media users objected to the removal of presidential term limits from China’s Constitution, with many posts in protest of President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power.154 In April 2018, Sina Weibo, a Twitter-like messaging platform, rescinded a plan155 to censor LGBT content as part of an online “clean-up” campaign after drawing considerable public criticism online.156 In contrast, following official censure of the humor shared among its users,157 the technology company ByteDance shut down its popular application Neihan Duanzi,158 and pledged to adhere to ideological values and regulatory standards.159 [For more information on technology companies’ compliance with censorship controls, see Section III—Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights.]

PUNISHING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The Commission observed a wide range of cases that illustrated the Chinese government and Communist Party’s violations of international human rights standards and provisions in China’s Constitution on the right to freedom of expression discussed earlier in this section. In addition to freedom of speech concerns, the following cases intersect, respectively, with violations of the right to freedom of movement;160 the right to freedom of association, including online association;161 the right to enjoy the use of one’s own ethnic minority language;162 and—in connection to yet another case in which a Chinese advocate died while “released” on medical parole163—the right to medical treatment while in detention.164

• Restricted overseas travel. Authorities reportedly prevented novelist Jia Pingwa from traveling to New York City in January 2018 to attend the Modern Language Association’s (MLA) annual conference.165 An interview with Jia and a conference panel featuring his literary work in translation, including his previously banned novel “Ruined City,” had been scheduled for the MLA conference.166

• Detentions. In April 2018, public security authorities from multiple locations in China criminally detained 8 administrators of the National Tourism Chat Group—a group of more
than 100 members hosted on social media platform WeChat that reportedly organized humanitarian support for family members of political prisoners. Authorities had formally arrested Guo Qingjun, one of the WeChat group’s administrators.

- **Criminal sentence.** In May 2018, the Yushu (Yulshul) Intermediate People’s Court in Yushu (Kyegudo) municipality, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, sentenced Tashi Wangchug, a Tibetan language rights advocate, to five years in prison on the charge of “inciting separatism.”

A New York Times video from November 2015 that portrayed his advocacy efforts reportedly was used in trial as evidence against him. The Qinghai High People’s Court in Xining municipality reportedly rejected Tashi Wangchug’s appeal on August 13, 2018.

- **Death while on medical parole.** Yang Tongyan (pen name: Yang Tianshui) died on November 5, 2017, of brain cancer while on medical parole. At the time of his death, Yang was nearing completion of a 12-year prison sentence on the charge of “subversion of state power” in connection to his writing and democracy activities. Yang reportedly did not receive adequate medical care during his years in detention.

Like Liu Xiaobo, authorities cremated Yang’s body and buried him at sea.

**DETENTIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF LIU XIAOBO’S DEATH**

The July 2017 death of writer and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo—while serving an 11-year prison sentence—continued to reverberate in the detentions of his widow Liu Xia and persons who attempted to honor his life. Liu Xia, an artist and poet, remained under forced confinement at home until July 10, 2018, when she left China and traveled to Germany. Numerous reports documented the worsening of Liu Xia’s physical and emotional health during the nearly eight years authorities held her in arbitrary, extrajudicial detention. While welcoming her release, rights advocates nevertheless expressed concern that Liu’s freedom of speech outside of China might be compromised because the Chinese government did not allow her brother Liu Hui to leave China with her. In the months after Liu Xiaobo’s death, authorities detained at least 14 persons who participated in “sea memorials” in memory of Liu Xiaobo in Guangdong, Fujian, and Liaoning provinces. Authorities also detained others who paid tribute to Liu Xiaobo, including poet Wu Mingliang and his associate Peng Heping; songwriters Xu Lin and Liu Sifang; and artist and French citizen Hu Jiamin.
Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression

1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 48, art. 19.


5 Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/10, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(9).

6 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para. 21.


11 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 14–16.

12 “China’s Communist Party Takes (Even More) Control of the Media,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, 11 April 18.

13 Ibid. See also Xia Kanglian, “Three Outlets Merging Into One Consistent With Broadcasting Trends” [San tai huiying de yinxiang quanbu jiu shi], People’s Daily, Central Kitchen, 21 March 18.

14 “Major Reshuffle at SAPPRTF, Tight Unification Under Central Propaganda Department” [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi di xipai zhongxuanbu yanmi da yitong], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18; Roger Creemers et al., “China’s Cyberspace Authorities Set To Gain Clout in Reorganization,” New America, DigiChina (blog), 26 March 18.


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22 Ibid., sec. 1(4); Zheng Yanzi, “‘Small Groups’ Become ‘Commissions,’ It’s Transcendence as Much as Status Elevation!” [“Xiaozu” bian “weiyuanhui,” jishi shengge, gengshi shenghua!], People’s Daily, 29 March 18.
25 “Party Media Is Surnamed Party and Politicians Run Newspapers, Xi Jinping’s News Thought Fully Baked” [Dangmei xing dang yu zhengzhijia banbao xi jiping xinwen sixiang chulu], Duwei, 14 June 18; David Bandurski, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22 February 16; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 46. According to Bandurski, former Chinese Communist Party leaders’ pronouncements, such as Mao Zedong’s injunction that “politicians run the newspapers,” Jiang Zemin’s “guidance of public opinion,” and Hu Jintao’s “channeling of public opinion,” illustrate the Party’s expectation that the media serve as its “mouthpiece” and shaper of public opinion. Brady, moreover, notes that in the wake of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, newly appointed Central Propaganda Department head Li Ruihuan repeated the mandate that “politicians run newspapers.” See also Luwei Rose Luqiu, “How To Be a Journalist in China: A Personal Reflection,” University of Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 2 May 17.
26 “Xi Jinping’s Talks on the Media (2018 Edition) Published and Released” [“Xi jiping xinwen sixiang jiangyi (2018 nian ban)” chuanhui fang’an], Xinhua, 14 June 18.
28 “Party Media Is Surnamed Party and Politicians Run Newspapers, Xi Jinping’s News Thought Fully Baked” [Dangmei xing dang yu zhengzhijia banbao xi jiping xinwen sixiang chulu], Duwei, 14 June 18.
29 Ibid., sec. 3(36). For an unofficial translation of the media-related items, see David Bandurski, “When Reform Means Tighter Controls,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22 March 18.
33 “News Tyrant Tuo Zhen Appointed ‘People’s Daily’ Editor-in-Chief” [“Meiti baojun” tuo zhen shengren “renmin ribao” zongbian], Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18. “Tuo Zhen: New People’s Daily Editor-in-Chief Made His Name by Rectifying the Media” [Tuo zhen: yi zhengdun meiti wenming de renmin ribao xin zongbian], BBC, 4 April 18.
37 “Lin Feng, “People’s Daily Three Critiques of Hyperbolic and Boastful Writing, Number 1: Don’t You Know How To Write an Essay?” [Rennmin wang san ping fukua zida wenfeng zhi yi: wenzhang buhui xie le ma?], People’s Daily, 2 July 18; You Guan, “People’s Daily Three Critiques of Hyperbolic and Boastful Writing, Number 2: Do the Chinese Lack Self-Confidence?” [Rennmin wang san ping fukua zida wenfeng zhi er: zhongguo ren bu xizheng li ma?], People’s Daily, 3 July 18; Ai Wu, “People’s Daily Three Critiques of Hyperbolic and Boastful Writing, Number 3: Is Style a Trivial Matter?” [Rennmin wang san ping fukua zida wenfeng zhi san: wenfeng shi xiaosheng shi ma?], People’s Daily, 4 July 18. For unofficial translations of and commentary on the three People’s Daily articles, see Geremie R. Barme “Mendacious, Hyperbolic...
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63 Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Public Evaluation of Hong Kong Press Freedom Drops to New Low,” 11 April 18. The survey was conducted in January and February 2018.

64 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 35.


66 Luwei Rose Luqiu, “How To Be a Journalist in China: A Personal Reflection,” University of Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 2 May 17.

67 Matt Schrader, “Pre-suasion: How the PRC Controls the Message on a Sino-US Trade War,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 6, 9 April 18, 1–3. See also UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, 25 March 10, art. 1(a). In the UN HRC’s Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration on freedom of expression, international experts cautioned that media serving “as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the public interest” are a major challenge to free expression.


73 Safeguard Defenders, “Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes of China’s Forced TV Confessions,” April 2018, 10. 15. According to Safeguard Defenders, “They are people whom the CCP typically perceives as its enemies or critics and are usually charged with national security crimes ... or social order violations ...” See also Verna Yu, “China’s New Media Strategy: The Case of Liu Xiaobo,” The Diplomat, 28 July 17.


77 Initial Release of ‘Chinese News Professionals’ Annual Observers’ Report for 2017’ [“Zhongguo xinwen chuanbo niandu guancha baogao 2017” shoufa], NetEase Journalism Institute, 26 August 18; “Too Much Government Interference, China’s Investigative Journalists’ Predicament That Both Advancing and Retreating Are Difficult” [Zhengfu ganyu tai duo zhongguo diaochao jizhe jintui liang nan], Radio Free Asia, 4 December 17.

78 Helen Gao, “The Demise of Watchdog Journalism in China,” New York Times, 27 April 18; “Too Much Government Interference, China’s Investigative Journalists’ Predicament That Both...
Advancing and Retreating Are Difficult" [Zhengfu ganyu t'ai duozhonggou diaocha jizhe jintui liang nan], Radio Free Asia, 4 December 17.


63Mainland ‘Legal Evening News’ Investigative Unit Faces Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit [Dalu “fazhi wangbao” shendu bu chuan zao caiche dai jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; Graeme Smith, “The Thought and Messaging of Xi Jinping,” Lowry Institute, The Interpreter, 8 August 17.

64See, e.g., “Mainland ‘Legal Evening News’ Investigative Unit Faces Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit” [Dalu “fazhi wangbao” shendu bu chuan zao caiche dai jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; “China Spikes In-Depth Section of Top Legal Newspaper,” Radio Free Asia, 29 May 18.

65“Current Affairs Commentator Chen Jieren’s Articles Blew Whistle on Officials, Subsequently Six Detained, Including Family and Friends” [Shiping ren chen jieren zhuawen juhao guanyuan zhulan giniyu liu ren bei zhuah], Radio Free Asia, 11 July 18. For more information on Chen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00318 on Chen Jieren, 2018-00319 on Deng Jiangxiu, 2018-00320 on Chen Weiren, and 2018-00321 on Chen Minren.

66Detained Journo Confesses He’s ‘Internet Pest’ That Exaggerated Government’s Problems,” Global Times, 16 August 18; “From Internet Big V to ‘Internet Pest’—Examination of Case of Chen Jieren, Suspected of Extortion and Illegal Business Activities” [Cong “wanghuo da V” dao “wangluo haichong”], duowei zhixi de jigeren zhuan’an xiaoshen xiaoshen [chui zhuan’an xianzheng zhi jineren hai], People’s Daily, 17 August 18. For an English translation of the People’s Daily article with commentary on Chen Jieren’s case, see David Bandurski, “Trial By Inventive,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 18 August 18.

67David Bandurski, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22 February 16; Li-Fung Cho, “The Emergence of China’s Watchdog Reporting,” in Investigative Journalism in China: Eight Cases in Chinese Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 18 August 18.


69See, e.g., “Mainland ‘Legal Evening News’ Investigative Unit Faces Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit” [Dalu “fazhi wangbao” shendu bu chuan zao caiche dai jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; “China Spikes In-Depth Section of Top Legal Newspaper,” Radio Free Asia, 29 May 18.

70Committee to Protect Journalists, “41 Journalists Imprisoned in China in 2017,” last visited 26 April 18. The Committee to Protect Journalists identified 14 ethnic Uyghurs in its list of 41 detained or imprisoned journalists in China.

71UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para. 44. The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that, “Journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors, including professional full-time reporter and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or elsewhere.”


73Rights Defense Network, “Beijing Artist Hua Yong on the Run in China ‘Only for Doing What Journalists Should Do but Dare Not Do’” [Beijing huajia hua yong “zhai yin ganle jizhe yanggai gan er bugan gan de huo’ er congcong taowang zai zuguo de dadi shang], 9 December 18.

74“Year-End Report: Over Past Year, China Severely Cracked Down on Rights Defenders’ Websites and Online Speech” [Nianzhong baodao: zhongguo guoqu yi nian yanli fengsha weiquan wangzhan ji wangyan], Voice of America, 4 December 17.

75Not Released 37 Days After Criminal Detention, Many Rights Defenders Subjected to Stability Maintenance Measures Due to 19th Party Congress” [Zhen jianghua xinju 37 tian qiman wei huoshu duo wei weiquan renshi yin shijiu da bei weiwen], China Free
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90 Human Rights Watch, “China’s Free Anti-Censorship Activist,” 19 November 17; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Anti-Censorship Activist,” 15 October 17; Rights Defense Network, “Detained Editor of ‘Civil Rights and Livelihood’ Ding Lingjie Finally Able To Meet With Lawyer” [Ding lingjie zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong'anju zhong de xi nei de chu xin].

91 Rights Defense Network, “CRLW Founder Liu Feiyue’s Case Goes to Court Today, Many Citizens Who Came To Watch Were Seized and Sent Back” [Minsheng guancha chuangban ren liu feiyue jin kaiting zhong gongmin qianweng weiguan zao kao yu quan].

92 Rights Defense Network, “Huang Qi Trial Continues To Be Postponed, Suffering Life-Threatening Illness Without Medical Parole. His Mother Pu Wenchang Again Faces Probe by Original Work Unit, Calls Out That She Wants To Live To See Son” [Huang qi an jiu tu bai shou hu jin jing shi fei zao ouda: yuanzhang bei tingzhi liu ren bei ju].


94 “Southern Weekend” Immediately Withdraws Special Coverage of HNA, Exposing Financial Crisis, Author Posted Online [Nanzhou” haihang zhuanti zao linshi chegao jie caiwu yangshi jizhe anfang zao yan].


97 Wang Xiangwei, “Why China’s Silence on Xi’s Term Limits Move Portends Trouble,” South China Morning Post, 12 March 18; “English News Brief on Presidential Term Change Angers Leaders,” University of Hong Kong, Media & Journalism Studies Centre, China Media Project, 1 March 18.

The page contains a list of references and citations related to issues of freedom of expression, specifically concerning the incidents of harassment and detention of journalists in China. The text mentions several incidents, including cases of journalists being detained, harassed, or mistreated by authorities. It highlights the efforts of organizations to document these incidents and the responses of various governments and journalists to these cases.

Some key points from the page include:

- The detention of Faguang jizhe shimite beijing jietou caifang xiuxian yiti zao duanzan juliu, Radio France Internationale, 9 March 18;
- The denial of access to Wang Min, who wrote about missing Wuhan students.
- The detention of Voice of America (VOA) reporters.
- The detention of a New York Times reporter.
- The detention of Wang Tao for reporting on cases of missing Wuhan University students.
- The detention of Tiffany May, a Hong Kong i-Cable TV journalist.
- The detention of John Pomfret, an American journalist.
- The detention of German journalist David Missal after making human rights report.
- The detention of a German student who researched rights lawyers.

The page also includes references to organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, and the International Federation of Journalists. The text mentions the importance of protecting journalists' rights and the need for international cooperation to address these issues.
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118 Ibid., 35–36.

119 “Progress Report of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee Enforcement Inspection Group Regarding Inspection of the PRC Cybersecurity Law” and ‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision Concerning Strengthening the Protection of Online Information’ [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui zhongyang zhongyang hulian wangluo guanli banfa], issued 30 October 17, effective 1 December 17. See also Paul Mozur, “China’s Top Ideologue Calls for Tight Control of Internet,” New York Times, 3 December 17; “China’s Xi Says Internet Control Key to Stability,” Reuters, 21 April 18; Rogier Creemers et al., “Lexicon: Wangguo Qiangguo,” New America, DigiChina (blog), 31 May 18.


121 Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services [Hulianwang yongyu zhongyang zhangzhao xinxu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17; Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions of the Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang xunwei xinwen xinxi fuwu danwei guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17; Cyberspace Administration of China, Measures for the Administration of Content Management Practitioners Working for Internet News Information Service Providers [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu danwei neirong guanli yu yan guanli banfa], issued 30 October 17, effective 1 December 17.

122 David Bandurski, “The Great Hive of Propaganda,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 16 September 17; King-wa Fu et al., “Weibo Whack-a-Mole,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, 8 March 18.


124 David Bandurski, “The Great Hive of Propaganda,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 16 September 17. See also Samm Sacks and Paul Triolo, “Shrinking Anonymity in Chinese Cyberspace,” Lawfare (blog), 25 September 17.

125 Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services [Hulianwang yongyu zhongyang zhangzhao xinxu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17; Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services [Hulianwang yongyu zhongyang zhangzhao xinxu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17, art. 4.

126 Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services [Hulianwang yongyu zhongyang zhangzhao xinxu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17, art. 9.

127 Cyberspace Administration of China, Measures for the Administration of Content Management Practitioners Working for Internet News Information Service Providers [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu danwei neirong guanli yu yan guanli banfa], issued 30 October 17, effective 1 December 17, art. 11; Liza Lin and Josh Chin, “Chinese Internet Regulators Target Social Media Use,” Wall Street Journal, 30 October 17. For an explanation of the “Marxist view of journalism,” see Wen Hua, “Clearly Seeing the Essence of the Western Concept of Journalism” [Ranjing xifang xinwen guan de benzhi], Seeking Truth, 31 December 17. For an unofficial translation of the article in Seeking Truth, see David Bandurski, “Journalism Denied: How China Views the News,” University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 1 February 18.


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142 Nectar Gan and Sarah Zheng, “What To Watch for at China’s Two Sessions,” South China Morning Post, 4 March 18.


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