V. Tibet

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

There has been no formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials since the ninth round of dialogue was held in January 2010. In its 2017 Report on Tibet Negotiations, the U.S. State Department reiterated the policy of the U.S. Government “to encourage meaningful and direct dialogue between Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to lead to a settlement that resolves differences.” In keeping with the Chinese government’s longstanding policy, executive deputy head of the Party’s United Front Work Department Zhang Yijiong stated on October 21, 2017, that the Chinese government opposes meetings between foreign officials and the Dalai Lama, calling him “a leader of a separatist group that is engaging in separatist activities.” At a November 23, 2017, meeting of the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Kolkata, the Dalai Lama reaffirmed the Middle Way Approach of seeking autonomy for Tibet within the People’s Republic of China, stating that the Tibetan people “are not seeking independence” and that they “want to stay with China.” On April 3, 2018, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) President Lobsang Sangay stated that “back channel talks” continue between the Chinese government and the CTA.

Reincarnation and the 14th Dalai Lama

The Chinese central government maintains that only it has the right to decide the Dalai Lama’s successor, a policy at odds with international standards of religious freedom. The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who reached the age of 83 in July 2018, has stated that he will “consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other concerned people who follow Tibetan Buddhism, and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not,” and has hinted that he may select a successor while he is still alive.

The Chinese government continues to suppress expression of devotion to or support for the Dalai Lama. In February 2018, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Public Security Department issued a circular encouraging people to report illegal activities of “criminal groups connected to the Dalai clique.” Despite these and other measures attempting to undermine the stature of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhists continue to revere him as their spiritual leader and take great risks to access his teachings, possess an image of him, or express their devotion in other ways. For example, on May 8, 2018, public security officials in Chiduo (Trido) township, Suo (Sog) county, Naqu (Nagchu) municipality, TAR, detained a father of two for possession of books and audio recordings of the Dalai Lama.

Chinese authorities also continued to expand the public profile of their chosen Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, whom Party and government officials selected as the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995, shortly after declaring the Dalai Lama’s recognition of then six-
year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima to be “illegal and invalid.” According to observers, Gyaltsen Norbu is likely to play a significant role in the Party and government’s selection of their endorsed successor to the 14th Dalai Lama. Chinese authorities abducted Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his parents on May 17, 1995, three days after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama, and have refused to permit an independent expert to visit him. The Panchen Lama and his parents’ whereabouts remain unknown.

Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

The Party and government continued to regulate Tibetan Buddhism and its practices in an effort to strengthen their control over Tibetan Buddhists. During Saga Dawa, a month-long celebration of the Buddha’s life and enlightenment that fell between May 15 and June 15, 2018, TAR authorities set up “service centers” for worshippers and barred current and retired government employees from participating in religious activities. Authorities in Chengguan (Chamdo) township, Changdu (Chamdo) municipality, TAR, forbade students attending the Second Kindergarten School, as well as their parents, from participating in religious activities or visiting monasteries during Saga Dawa. [For information on relevant laws relating to religious freedom in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion.]
Further Clampdown on Larung Gar

In July 2016, provincial authorities in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, began the process of demolishing dwellings and expelling monks and nuns at Larung Gar Buddhist Institute (Larung Gar), in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan.24 Government control of Larung Gar continued during the Commission’s 2018 reporting year.25 An October 2017 report by Free Tibet and Tibet Watch shows that by the end of May 2017 authorities had leveled at least 4,725 homes and forced at least 4,828 residents to leave Larung Gar since July 2016.26 Human Rights Watch (HRW) obtained a brochure that authorities issued in August 2017, which laid out “standardization” procedures at Larung Gar in the name of security.27 According to the brochure, the government will install cadres at every level and section of the monastery, many in top-level roles, while officials will surveil the monastery as a whole using a grid management system,28 instituting real-name registration for all visitors and residents, and requiring monks, nuns, and laypeople to wear colored tags indicating their status within the institute.29 According to HRW’s January 2018 report, 40 percent of the monastery’s curriculum must include politics and other non-religious subjects.30 On October 29, 2017, authorities in Sichuan abruptly cancelled observance of the prayer festival Dechen Shedrub at Larung Gar for the second consecutive year, reversing an earlier decision to permit celebrations.31 HRW China Director Sophie Richardson said the government’s actions “show a pernicious intent to exercise extreme control over religious practice.”32 According to the International Campaign for Tibet and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, the expulsions and demolitions at Larung Gar are also driven by the Chinese government’s plans to increase business and tourism in the area.33

Self-Immolations

Self-immolations by Tibetans as a form of protest continued during this past year,34 including three known self-immolations in Tibetan autonomous areas35 of China. All three were confirmed to be fatal, bringing the total number of such self-immolations by Tibetans living in China to 147 since 2009, 130 of which were reportedly fatal.36 Since 2009, many Tibetan self-immolators have called for the long life of the Dalai Lama, his return from exile, and freedom for Tibet.37

• **Tenga**, a 63-year-old monk, self-immolated in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan, on November 26, 2017, while calling for freedom for Tibet.38 Armed police quickly came and confiscated his body.39 Authorities cut off telephone lines and social media services in Ganzi TAP following Tenga’s death, while police were stationed at Tenga’s family home.40

• **Konpe**, a former monk in his thirties, set himself on fire on December 23, 2017, near Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan.41 The police quickly extinguished the fire and brought Konpe to a hospital in Maerkang (Barkham) county, Aba T&QAP.42 Konpe died of his injuries on December 24.43 Around that time,
Tibet

authorities detained his father, Gyakyab, on unknown charges.44 According to the International Campaign for Tibet, 24 current and former Kirti monks have self-immolated since 2009.45

- **Tsekho Tugchag (Tsekho Tugchak),** a former monk at No. 4 (Namtsoma) village, Mai’erma (Me’uruma) township, Aba, self-immolated and died on March 7, 2018, in Aba.46

Tibetans have also faced detention for sharing information about self-immolations. For instance, in October 2017, authorities in Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai province, detained seven Tibetans47 for posting to the messaging service WeChat a two-year-old video about the lives of self-immolators.48

**Security, Surveillance, and Party Policy**

The government and Party continued implementing repressive policies in Tibetan autonomous areas of China through the use of extensive and intrusive surveillance, stringent measures that restrict Tibetans’ fundamental rights, and pervasive displays of police and military force.49 Domestic security spending in two Tibetan prefectures in Sichuan increased nearly 300 percent between 2007 and 2016, while the TAR’s domestic security spending grew 404 percent over the same time period, compared to a 215 percent increase nationwide.50 Under Chinese President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) has assumed the primary role of administering religious and ethnic affairs, making it the locus of management of Tibetans within China as well as of relations with overseas Tibetans.51

Security measures markedly increased around the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (19th Party Congress) in October 2017.52 The central government reportedly banned foreigners from visiting the TAR between October 18 and 2853 and deployed security forces to the TAR and other Tibetan areas as the 19th Party Congress began, with public military drills reported in the TAR and in Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai province.54 In Shannan (Lhokha) municipality, TAR, “temple management cadres” went to monks’ quarters to conduct “one-on-one study” of the “19th Party Congress spirit.”55 After the congress concluded, reports emerged of mandatory “patriotic re-education” in Tibetan areas, with abbots and monastery teachers told to organize “training courses” on the “19th Party Congress spirit.”56

In a report submitted for the November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government’s human rights record, the International Federation for Human Rights and International Campaign for Tibet warned that “the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China has significantly worsened” since the UN Human Rights Council’s last UPR of China in 2013.57 The TAR government has reportedly constructed a “mass surveillance” system powered by humans and technology,58 posting security officials to “convenience police stations” and Party cadres to villages and monasteries,59 while also incentivizing Tibetans to police each other. The Naqu
Tibet

(Nagchu) Municipal Public Security Bureau in Naqu municipality, TAR, issued a circular on March 13, 2018, promising cash rewards for tips on a number of alleged offenses, from illegal possession of firearms to “the abuse of religion, power, and family connections to illegally encroach on property.” The circular, reprinted in Radio Free Asia (RFA), indicates that public security officers will offer 50,000 yuan (US$7,300) for certain tips, and up to 100,000 yuan (US$14,700) for tips on “criminal gangs” advocating for “separatism,” which RFA reported may implicate the promotion of Tibetan cultural and religious practices or support for the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach.

Status of Tibetan Culture

China’s 2016–2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) provides both that “the cultural rights of ethnic minorities shall be guaranteed” and that “[t]he right of ethnic minorities to learn, use and develop their own spoken and written languages shall be respected and guaranteed,” echoing provisions of China’s Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and the PRC Education Law. Tibetan culture and language face increasing marginalization, however, particularly as the Chinese government and Party continue to promote Mandarin Chinese as the main language of instruction in Tibetan areas.

Nearly two years after the New York Times interviewed him and published a short film about his advocacy for Tibetan language education, Tashi Wangchug (Tashi Wangchuk) stood trial at the Yushu (Yulshul) Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court in Qinghai province on January 4, 2018. Tashi Wangchug denied the charge of “inciting separatism,” arguing that he was “exercising his right as a citizen to criticize” the local government concerning the preservation of Tibetan culture and language. Authorities permitted only three of his relatives into the courtroom, and denied entry to diplomats from the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. On May 22, the court found Tashi Wangchug guilty and sentenced him to five years in prison. The Qinghai High People’s Court reportedly rejected his appeal in August 2018.

Freedom of Expression

This past year, Tenzin Tethong, Tibetan Service Director for Radio Free Asia, testified before the U.S. Congress that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) “ranks among the world’s worst media environments after North Korea.” In certain Tibetan areas, censorship further tightened around the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, including a digital communications blackout imposed by the TAR government during the Party Congress.

Public security bureaus (PSB) in some Tibetan areas of China introduced local directives to control and censor social media groups, operationalizing features of the PRC Cybersecurity Law as well as the Provisions on the Administration of Internet Group Information Services, which took effect on October 8, 2017. The provisions hold social group creators and administrators responsible for con-
Tibet

tent shared among public and private groups. Selected examples follow.

- In Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province, the Machu County PSB issued directives forbidding chat group administrators and WeChat public account owners from sharing nine different categories of information, from “state secrets” and “rumors” to “other illegal information,” noting that violators “will be dealt with by the relevant departments in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.”

- In advance of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, PSB officials in Zeku (Zekog) county, Huangnan TAP, Qinghai province, forced 248 Tibetan WeChat group administrators to undergo legal training and write statements of responsibility for group chat content as part of an effort to resist “illegal criminal activity” and “harmful information.”

- Authorities reportedly forced monks at Tsang Monastery in Tongde (Gepasumdo) county, Hainan (Tsolho) TAP, Qinghai, to attend a March 2018 “legal education” session during which monks received instruction on the PRC Cybersecurity Law’s provisions against sharing “illegal content” online.

The Commission observed one significant case of a high-profile political prisoner whose detention contravened international standards of freedom of expression. On January 10, 2018, the Haibei Intermediate People’s Court in Haibei (Tsojang) TAP, Qinghai, sentenced Tsegon Gyal to three years in prison for “inciting separatism.” According to a February 18 statement by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, authorities detained Tsegon Gyal on December 9, 2016, apparently in connection to a blog post he wrote criticizing the Chinese government for failing to truly support its policy of “ethnic unity.”

Authorities released at least four political prisoners during the reporting year. On March 19, 2018, popular Tibetan writer and intellectual Drukar Gyal (pen name Shogjang) completed a three-year prison sentence for “inciting separatism” in connection to his writing. Around August 2, authorities released popular singer Gonpo Tenzin upon completing a sentence of three years and six months. Authorities detained him in 2013, apparently in connection with his hit song “How Can We Have New Year’s Celebrations in Tibet?” which encouraged Tibetans to preserve their culture and language. On August 10, Namkha Jam finished a nearly six-year sentence for “inciting separatism.” The Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court of Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai, convicted him and three other Tibetans in connection with the sharing of information about self-immolations and protests with allegedly “separatist” Tibetan organizations. Authorities also released Gonpo Tseten on August 13, one year and six months before the end of his 12-year sentence for “inciting separatism” for leading a protest in Awangcan (Bhelpan) township, Maqu (Machu) county,
Tibet

Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province in March 2008. All four men still face from two to four years’ deprivation of political rights.

Filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen (Dhondup Wangchen), who had served six years in prison and three years’ deprivation of political rights for “inciting separatism,” fled China in fall 2017 and reunited with his family in San Francisco on December 25, 2017. Authorities detained Dondrub Wangchen in March 2008 for his role in making the documentary “Leaving Fear Behind,” in which ordinary Tibetans in China shared their feelings about a range of issues, including the Dalai Lama and the August 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing municipality.

**Censorship of Social Media and Reporting on Jokhang Fire**

Limited access to information about a fire that broke out at the Jokhang temple complex in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), on February 17, 2018, raised concerns among Tibetan communities and experts about the extent of the damage at the site. Tibetans posted distressed messages and video of the fire to the messaging service WeChat, including some messages questioning why the fire department did not immediately arrive. Within hours, the TAR government reportedly imposed a ban on discussion of the fire on social media, while the state-run media outlet Xinhua reported that the fire had been extinguished. A leaked document later revealed that the authorities took 30 minutes to respond, even though in December 2017 China reported to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Committee that the temple had a fire brigade stationed on premises “for the safety and protection of cultural relics.” The temple remained open on February 18, but drapes covered the site of the central Jowo Shakyamuni statue, the namesake of the temple and one of the most sacred statues in Tibetan Buddhism. The State Administration of Cultural Heritage reported that the fire did not damage the Jowo Shakyamuni statue.

According to scholar Robert Barnett, “almost total suppression of information” quickly followed the fire at the 1,300-year-old Jokhang temple complex, which is a sacred site for Tibetans, Mongolians, and other Buddhists in the Himalayas and Central Asia. Barnett indicated that the restriction of information about the fire caused many Tibetans to fear that the damage was far worse than had been reported. In June, the advocacy organization Free Tibet published satellite images showing damage to the Jowo Rinpoche Chapel, which houses the Jowo Shakyamuni statue.

**Freedom of Movement**

The Chinese government severely restricts the ability of Tibetans to travel abroad, often in relation to religious pilgrimage. For example, this past year Radio Free Asia reported that Chinese authorities threatened the families of Tibetans traveling to attend the Dalai Lama’s teachings in Bodh Gaya, India, and that Chinese immigration authorities destroyed some of their passports upon their return to China and failed to reissue new passports. According to international advocacy organization Free Tibet, in March 2018,
Chinese authorities detained 60 Tibetans upon their return from pilgrimage to India and Nepal, and reportedly sent them to a “re-education” program.\textsuperscript{114}

Authorities also continued to restrict movement of Tibetans within Tibetan areas of China. This past year, Tibetans making pilgrimage to Lhasa on foot reportedly faced a fine of 3,000 yuan (US$440) per day.\textsuperscript{115} In April 2018, plainclothes officers in Dali (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, detained and interrogated a 60-year-old pilgrim on her way to Lhasa.\textsuperscript{116} The pilgrim, Lhamo Drolma (Lhamo Dolkar), from Bora village, Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, remained missing as of April 13, 2018.\textsuperscript{117}

Chinese officials increasingly seek to restrict the freedom of movement of Tibetans in neighboring Nepal with the cooperation of Nepalese authorities. The Chinese government has stationed Chinese police on the Nepali side of the border to capture Tibetan refugees.\textsuperscript{118} The Chinese government reportedly provided funding for a new training academy for the Nepal Armed Police Force, which allegedly plays an important role in preventing Tibetan refugees from entering Nepal.\textsuperscript{119} Nepal has hosted Tibetan refugees since the 1950s\textsuperscript{120} and currently has a population of around 20,000 Tibetans.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{Economy, Environment, and Development}

The Commission observed no evidence during its 2018 reporting year that the Party or government solicited systematic or representative input from the Tibetan population on economic development in Tibetan autonomous areas of China.\textsuperscript{122} Chinese officials reportedly used environmental protection regulations to restrict the land use of Tibetan herders\textsuperscript{123} and in one instance detained at least 30 people who protested a mining project located on a mountain considered a sacred site, while one protester went missing.\textsuperscript{124} Other infrastructure projects may threaten environmental damage and the livelihood and safety of Tibetans.\textsuperscript{125}

On November 27, 2017, Chinese authorities announced that only security and other authorized officials would have access to the Hoh Xil Nature Reserve, which spans Qinghai province, the TAR, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Qiangtang (Chang Tang) National Nature Reserve in the TAR; and Altun Shan Nature Reserve in the XUAR.\textsuperscript{126} UNESCO approved the nomination of Hoh Xil as a World Heritage site in July 2017,\textsuperscript{127} the highest and largest plateau in the world\textsuperscript{128} and China’s largest World Heritage site at 3.74 million hectares (14,423.35 square miles), with a buffer zone of 2.29 million hectares (8,845.23 square miles).\textsuperscript{129} The Chinese government estimated that 50,000 people herd in the reserve’s buffer zone,\textsuperscript{130} and stated that it would “fully respect the will of the local herders and their traditional culture, religious beliefs, and lifestyle.”\textsuperscript{131} A white paper released by the State Council Information Office in June 2018, however, claimed that Hoh Xil is “free of human activity.”\textsuperscript{132}

Infrastructure projects in the TAR could further impact the local people and the environment, as well as communities beyond the TAR. For example, a proposed 1,000-kilometer (621.37-mile) water tunnel from the TAR to the XUAR\textsuperscript{133} would divert the Yarlung
Tsangpo River, which becomes the Brahmaputra downstream in Bangladesh and India. Some observers fear this is a sign that the Chinese government is attempting to expand its influence over neighboring countries. Fan Xiao, a senior engineer at the Sichuan Bureau of Geological Exploration, warned that the scheme willfully ignores the environmental, social, and cultural costs of diverting a major water source, including flooding and displacement of local residents.

This past year, TAR officials continued to promote tourism, efforts allegedly connected to the demolition of Tibetan religious and cultural centers. According to the state-run Xinhua news agency, the TAR received 1.2 million tourists during the National Day holiday in October 2017, up 16.5 percent from the previous year, in part as the result of the opening of a new highway connecting Lhasa municipality and Linzhi (Nyingchi) municipality. In May 2018, about 60 Tibetan nomad families in the village of Lhadul in Nimu (Nyemo) county, Lhasa, TAR, made a video that circulated online appealing to officials beyond their township to regain access to pastureland which Chinese authorities had designated for tourism.
Notes to Section V—Tibet

Tibet

11

Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 125. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301–02. For more information on the Panchen Lama and China’s likely model for selecting the next Dalai Lama, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189.


15 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 20 April 18, 76; “Tibet’s Exile Community Observes the 33rd-Year Anniversary of the Panchen Lama’s Disappearance” [Xizang liuwang shequ jinian banchan lama shizong ershan nian], Voice of Tibet, 17 May 18. For more information on Gedun Choekyi Nyima, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner database record 2004-00835.


24 Roseanne Gerin, “Report Details Destruction at Sichuan’s Larung Gar Buddhist Academy,” Radio Free Asia, 19 October 17. For more information on the demolitions and expulsions at Larung Gar that took place during the previous reporting year, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 303–04.


26 Free Tibet and Tibet Watch, “Destroying Heaven: China’s Campaign of Destruction at Larung Gar” 20 October 17, 11.


31 International Campaign for Tibet, “Major Religious Festival Cancelled and New Police Checkpoints at Larung Gar,” 3 November 17; Radio Free Asia, 1 November 17.


40 “Tibetan Monk Burns to Death in Sichuan Calling for Tibetan Freedom,” Radio Free Asia, 29 November 17.
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], passed 18 March 95, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, arts. 12, 16, 20, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council. The PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended and effective 28 February 01.


Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], passed 18 March 95, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, arts. 12, 16, 20, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council. The PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended and effective 28 February 01.


Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], passed 18 March 95, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, arts. 12, 16, 20, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council. The PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended and effective 28 February 01.


Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa], passed 18 March 95, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, arts. 12, 16, 20, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council. The PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended and effective 28 February 01.
The State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin and "bilingual" education and bilingual teaching staff.  


U.S. Policy Toward Tibet: Access, Religious Freedom, and Human Rights, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 December 17, Testimony of Tenzin Tethong, Director of the Tibetan Service, Radio Free Asia, 1.

248 WeChat Group Organizers Forced To Go Through Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai” [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin quanzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018—Tibet,” last visited 3 September 18.

Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al., “Managing the Message: What You Can’t Say About the 19th National Communist Party Congress on WeChat,” University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 6 November 17; “248 WeChat Group Administrators Forced To Go Through Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai” [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin quanzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018—Tibet,” last visited 3 September 18.

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Issues Vague and Overbroad Rules on Internet Censorship in Tibet,” 17 November 17; Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17.

Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17, art. 11; Lulu Yilun Chen and Keith Zhai, “China’s Latest Crackdown on Message Groups Chills WeChat Users,” Bloomberg, 12 September 17.


248 WeChat Group Administrators Forced To Go Through Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai” [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin quanzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17.


Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Chinese Authorities Detain Two Tibetan Monks for Sharing ‘Illegal’ Contents on Social Media,” 18 April 18; “Two Monks From Tongde County, Qinghai’s Tsang Monastery Detained” [Qinghai tongde xian shizang si liang seng bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18; “Tsang Monastery Monk Oechung Gyatso Detained by Chinese [Authorities]” [Gtsang dgon-pa’i sde-dun pa ‘od-chung rgya-mdzho rgya-nag gis ‘dzin-bzung byas-dug], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18. For more information on Oechung Gyatso, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00167.

Byas-'dug], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18. For more information on Oechung Gyatso, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00167.

248 WeChat Group Administrators Forced To Go Through Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai” [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin quanzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018—Tibet,” last visited 3 September 18.


U.S. Policy Toward Tibet: Access, Religious Freedom, and Human Rights, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 December 17, Testimony of Tenzin Tethong, Director of the Tibetan Service, Radio Free Asia, 1.
Tibet

67Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

68International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of the ICCPR holds that freedom of expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”


70Dui Hua Foundation, “Dui Hua Digest, March 2016,” 16 March 16. According to the US-based Dui Hua Foundation, in December 2015, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court convicted Namkha Jam’s sentence from six years to five years and eight months.

71“Tibetan Freed After Serving Six Years on ‘Separatism’ Charge,” Radio Free Asia, 14 August 16; “Tibetan Former Political Prisoner in Qingshai Leaves Prison After Finishing Sentence for ‘Inciting Separatism’,” 15 April 15; “Tibetan Author Druglo Released After Completing a Six Year Prison Term,” 14 August 15. For more information on Namkha Jam, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner database record 2013-00141.


74Dondrub Wangchen, “Putting Tibet Back on the Agenda,” Project Syndicate, 15 May 18; Tibet “From All Angles”: Protecting Human Rights, Defending Strategic Access, and Challenging China’s Export of Censorship Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 February 18, Testimony of Dondrub Wangchen, Tibetan filmmaker and recently escaped political prisoner. For more information on Dondrub Wangchen’s case, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00586.


78Ibid.


80Ibid.

81Ibid.

82Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

83International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of the ICCPR holds that freedom of expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

84Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

85International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of the ICCPR holds that freedom of expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

86International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of the ICCPR holds that freedom of expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”


88Dui Hua Foundation, “Dui Hua Digest, March 2016,” 16 March 16. According to the US-based Dui Hua Foundation, in December 2015, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court convicted Namkha Jam’s sentence from six years to five years and eight months.

89Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.


91Dondrub Wangchen, “Putting Tibet Back on the Agenda,” Project Syndicate, 15 May 18; Tibet “From All Angles”: Protecting Human Rights, Defending Strategic Access, and Challenging China’s Export of Censorship Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 February 18, Testimony of Dondrub Wangchen, Tibetan filmmaker and recently escaped political prisoner. For more information on Dondrub Wangchen’s case, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00586.


97Ibid.

98Ibid.

99Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

100Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

101Ibid.


103Dui Hua Foundation, “Dui Hua Digest, March 2016,” 16 March 16. According to the US-based Dui Hua Foundation, in December 2015, the Huangnan Intermediate People’s Court convicted Namkha Jam’s sentence from six years to five years and eight months.

104Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

105Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

106Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

107Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on ‘Silent Protest’,” 29 December 16. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00094.

Heritage Committee Inscribes Three Natural Sites and One Extension on UNESCO’s World Heritage List," 7 July 17.

"Qinghai Hoh Xil," last visited 1 June 18.


"Unesco Heritage Listing Sparks Tibetan Resettlement Fears," BBC, 10 July 17.

Tibet

ural beauty—free of human activity—describing it as ‘an amazing scene to behold.’ The World Conservation Union, which is also called the International Union for Conservation of Nature, stated that the ‘World Heritage listing unequivocally supports the rights of the Tibetan pastoralists in the area,’ thus acknowledging human activity there.

133 Stephen Chen, “Chinese Engineers Plan 1,000km Tunnel To Make Xinjiang Desert Bloom,” South China Morning Post, 30 October 17
139 “Tibet Receives 1.2 Mln Tourists During Holiday,” Xinhua, 9 October 17.