

#### IV. Xinjiang

##### *Mass Internment in “Political Reeducation” Centers*

During the Commission’s 2018 reporting year, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) intensified an integrated state surveillance and security apparatus that reportedly targeted members of the region’s predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations, resulting in detention and severe limits on their freedom of movement,<sup>1</sup> expression,<sup>2</sup> and religion.<sup>3</sup> XUAR officials reportedly arbitrarily detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in extrajudicial facilities known as “political reeducation” centers or camps.<sup>4</sup> Reports from international rights groups, scholars, and media organizations indicated that as many as 800,000 to 1.1 million individuals had been or remained detained at such facilities since around April 2017,<sup>5</sup> after the XUAR People’s Congress adopted the region’s first anti-extremism regulations.<sup>6</sup> U.S.-based scholar Rian Thum noted in August 2018 that initial estimates of over 1 million detainees were based on information observers obtained in early 2018, but that Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others “have continued to disappear,” and officials have continued to plan the construction of additional “political reeducation” facilities, making current figures potentially higher.<sup>7</sup> Security personnel reportedly detained people in “reeducation” facilities based on factors such as praying in a certain way or engaging in “religious extremism”;<sup>8</sup> having “politically incorrect” views;<sup>9</sup> wanting to travel abroad;<sup>10</sup> or having foreign connections, such as previous travel abroad or relatives living in another country.<sup>11</sup> Security personnel at these facilities reportedly subjected detainees to political indoctrination and forced marching;<sup>12</sup> overcrowding;<sup>13</sup> poor quality food;<sup>14</sup> and torture,<sup>15</sup> including in the forms of medical neglect and maltreatment,<sup>16</sup> waterboarding,<sup>17</sup> sleep deprivation,<sup>18</sup> lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures,<sup>19</sup> and other forms of abuse.<sup>20</sup> Extralegal and extrajudicial forms of detention violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>21</sup> and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.<sup>22</sup>

In May 2018, Germany-based scholar Adrian Zenz published research documenting the existence of online information posted by the Chinese government, including government procurement documents and construction bids for “political reeducation” centers in the XUAR valued at about 680 million yuan (approximately US\$108 million).<sup>23</sup> Zenz described how the mass detentions of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz in “political reeducation” centers began soon after Chen Quanguo took office as XUAR Party Secretary in August 2016, although “reeducation” facilities existed in the XUAR beginning in 2014.<sup>24</sup> The bids are for projects involving both the construction of new facilities and the addition of security elements such as walls, fences, barbed wire, watchtowers, and guard rooms to existing facilities; several planned facilities were to exceed 10,000 square meters in size.<sup>25</sup> In August 2018, Zenz estimated that “up to 1,300” “political reeducation” centers existed throughout the XUAR.<sup>26</sup> An American scholar noted in May 2018 that a bid invitation posted on the XUAR Development and Reform Commission website on April 27 indicated that additional “reeducation” facilities were being built.<sup>27</sup> In August, the Wall Street Jour-

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nal reported it had analyzed satellite images, with the help of an expert in satellite imagery analysis, which revealed ongoing construction of “reeducation” facilities in the XUAR, and that one facility in Turpan municipality had expanded within the previous month.<sup>28</sup> A Canada-based law student also analyzed satellite images that he said showed the existence and continued construction of “political reeducation” camps.<sup>29</sup>

International observers expressed alarm over the scope and nature of “political reeducation” facilities. In written testimony presented at a July 2018 Commission hearing, U.S.-based scholar Rian Thum stated that “[t]he situation of the Uyghurs and Kazakhs in China is an emergency that calls for immediate action.”<sup>30</sup> At an August review of China’s compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)<sup>31</sup> by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, committee member Gay McDougall said Chinese officials had turned the XUAR into “something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort of no-rights zone.”<sup>32</sup> The Chinese government has publicly denied the existence of facilities used for arbitrary detention in the XUAR, with senior Communist Party official Hu Lianhe telling the committee: “The argument that 1 million Uighurs are detained in re-education centres is completely untrue . . . [t]here are no such things as re-education centers.”<sup>33</sup>

A Western researcher and rights advocate presented a case that the severity and extent of “political reeducation” detentions and other rights abuses in the XUAR are consistent with “crimes against humanity,” as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In a CNN opinion piece, the researcher argued that the situation in the XUAR “fits the textbook definition of crimes against humanity.”<sup>34</sup> Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides a list of 11 acts that may constitute “crimes against humanity,” “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”<sup>35</sup>

Regional government authorities reportedly ordered officials in some XUAR jurisdictions to meet quotas to detain a certain percentage or number of the local population in “political reeducation” camps.<sup>36</sup> Officials in Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, told Radio Free Asia (RFA) that they had received orders to detain 40 percent of local residents in “political reeducation” centers, but they were having difficulties meeting this quota.<sup>37</sup> XUAR authorities reportedly placed the children of individuals detained in “political reeducation” centers in orphanages in some jurisdictions in such high numbers that the orphanages became overcrowded, and in some instances officials responded by sending some children to facilities in provinces outside of the XUAR.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to “reeducation” facilities detaining inmates 24 hours a day, reports from rights groups and media documented other types of “reeducation” facilities and programs.<sup>39</sup> In August 2018, international non-governmental organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reported the findings of a survey it conducted with the China-based NGO Equal Rights Initiative (ERI) on “reeducation” programs in the XUAR, including informa-

tion on both detentions and forced attendance of “education sessions” during the day or evening.<sup>40</sup> According to the report, based partly on interviews conducted with Uyghurs living in rural areas in southern XUAR, county or municipal authorities administered “reeducation” camps, and township or village government officials administered day and evening “study sessions” or “open camps.”<sup>41</sup> CHRD and ERI estimated that as of June 2018, authorities may have forced around 2.2 million XUAR residents to attend day or evening “education sessions.”<sup>42</sup> The groups reported that “study session” attendees consisted mostly of women and elderly individuals whose family members had been detained or had traveled abroad.<sup>43</sup>

The Commission observed numerous reports regarding individuals detained at “political reeducation” centers, some of which are described below.

- **Detention-related deaths; detentions of the elderly, minors, and the ill.** Elderly people,<sup>44</sup> minors,<sup>45</sup> and ill individuals<sup>46</sup> were reportedly among those detained in the centers. Renowned Uyghur Islamic scholar, 82-year-old Muhammad Salih Hajim, reportedly died in January 2018, either in a “political reeducation” camp or another type of detention facility.<sup>47</sup> In May, Ayhan Memet, the elderly mother of World Uyghur Congress president Dolkun Isa, died in a “political reeducation” camp, following years of official harassment in connection with her son’s rights advocacy.<sup>48</sup> In November 2017, 88-year-old Uyghur religious scholar Abdulnehed Mehsum died in a “political reeducation” center in Hotan prefecture.<sup>49</sup> In June 2018, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that more than two dozen Uyghurs had died in “political reeducation” centers in Qaraqash county, Hotan, most of whom were elderly individuals who had suffered complications from high blood pressure.<sup>50</sup> RFA reported that four people died in “political reeducation” centers in Yengisar (Yingjisha) county, Kashgar prefecture, between August and October 2017, including 71-year-old Hesen Imin<sup>51</sup> and Sawut Raxman,<sup>52</sup> who was in his 60s.<sup>53</sup> The four deaths were reportedly due in part to the “poor conditions and psychological pressure” at the “political reeducation” centers.<sup>54</sup> Uyghur teenager Yaqupjan Naman reportedly died in a “political reeducation” center in or around late February 2018.<sup>55</sup> A 34-year-old Uyghur cook in Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (KAP), Abdughappar Abdujappar, reportedly died in a hospital in late 2017 after he became ill while detained for nearly six months in a “political reeducation” center.<sup>56</sup> An elderly Uyghur woman reportedly died in March 2018 due to being “unable to cope with the pressure and terrible conditions” at a “political reeducation” center in Ghulja (Yining) county, Ili KAP, where she was detained in connection with having relatives living in Egypt.<sup>57</sup> A 65-year-old Uyghur businessman from Ghulja (Yining) municipality, Ili KAP, Abdulreshit Seley Hajim, reportedly died in or around June 2018 after being detained for nine months in a “political reeducation” center, and his brother told RFA those who saw his body said “he was hit with a blunt object on his head.”<sup>58</sup> Additional deaths reported to have occurred in or after detention at

“political reeducation” camps included 24-year-old Nurimangul Memet, in Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture,<sup>59</sup> and Adalet Teyip, the mother of Canada-based Uyghur Abdulaziz Sattar.<sup>60</sup>

• **Detentions of Uyghur officials, their family members, and other prominent Uyghur individuals.** Uyghur officials and their family members<sup>61</sup> were among those whom authorities held in “political reeducation” centers or detained in relation to “political reeducation” efforts, as were other prominent members of Uyghur society. In January 2018, authorities reportedly detained Pezilet Bekri, the Party Secretary of a sub-district committee in Kashgar prefecture, in a “political reeducation” center, after she had expressed sympathy toward people detained in the centers.<sup>62</sup> Bekri’s responsibilities as Party Secretary had included overseeing the detention of individuals and their transfer to “political reeducation” centers.<sup>63</sup> In May 2017, authorities sentenced two officials in Hotan, Omerjan Hesén and Elijan Ehmet, to 11 years in prison, reportedly in large part for failing to send Uyghurs to “political reeducation” centers.<sup>64</sup> In August 2018, the *New York Times* reported that Rahile Dawut, a Uyghur scholar well regarded for her research on traditional Uyghur culture, had disappeared in December 2017, and her family and friends expressed the belief that authorities had detained her in a “reeducation” camp or another type of detention facility.<sup>65</sup> Authorities also targeted other prominent Uyghur individuals for detention in “political reeducation” centers,<sup>66</sup> including Kashgar city-based Uyghur businessmen Abdujelil Hajim,<sup>67</sup> Gheni Haji,<sup>68</sup> Memet Tursun Haji,<sup>69</sup> and Imin Hajim<sup>70</sup> for displaying signs of “religious extremism”; hotelier Obulkasim Haji, whom authorities took into custody in December while he was undergoing treatment at a hospital in Urumqi municipality;<sup>71</sup> Urumqi-based Uyghur scholar and poet Abduqadir Jalalidin;<sup>72</sup> Uyghur pop singer Ablajan Ayup;<sup>73</sup> and Uyghur soccer player Erfan Hezimjan (also known as Erfan Hezim)—formerly a member of China’s national youth soccer team—reportedly for “visiting foreign countries,” after he trained and competed abroad.<sup>74</sup>

• **Detentions in the XUAR of family members of U.S.-based Uyghurs.** XUAR authorities detained dozens of XUAR-based family members of six U.S.-based Uyghur RFA journalists in “political reeducation” camps and other locations, and otherwise harassed their family members.<sup>75</sup> Authorities reportedly sentenced some of the family members to prison terms; subjected some elderly and other family members to medical maltreatment and neglect; and refused to provide information on the whereabouts and health conditions of some family members.<sup>76</sup> In written testimony submitted at a July 2018 Commission hearing, RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja stated that “more than two dozen of my relatives in China are missing.”<sup>77</sup> XUAR authorities reportedly also detained dozens of family members of U.S.-based rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer, including her children and grandchildren, and possibly detained at least some of them in “political reeducation” centers.<sup>78</sup> Those detained reportedly included sons Ablikim and Alim Abdureyim,

whom authorities have previously detained and subjected to torture.<sup>79</sup> In addition, U.S.-based Uyghur poet and filmmaker Tahir Hamut told the Wall Street Journal that Chinese authorities had detained his brother in the XUAR after the newspaper published an article in late 2017 that included comments from Hamut.<sup>80</sup>

• **Detentions of Kazakh citizens; testimony of an ethnic Kazakh forced to teach at a “political reeducation” camp.** XUAR authorities also detained Kazakh citizens who had previously held Chinese citizenship in “political reeducation” centers when they traveled back to the XUAR. In one such case, authorities detained Kayrat Samarkan from October 2017 to February 2018, during which authorities subjected him to severe maltreatment.<sup>81</sup> Samarkan said authorities forced detainees to study political subjects, sing Communist songs, and participate in military-style training.<sup>82</sup> According to Samarkan, authorities punished rule-breakers, people who were late for studies, and others by placing them in handcuffs and ankle cuffs, subjecting them to waterboarding, or strapping them into a “tiger chair.”<sup>83</sup> In another case, authorities detained Omir Bekali in both a prison and a “political reeducation” center for a total of more than seven months without charge, initially shackling him to a bed and refusing to provide him with medication for his high blood pressure.<sup>84</sup> In the “political reeducation” center, where he was detained for several weeks, authorities placed him in solitary confinement for part of the time, and deprived him of food for 24 hours.<sup>85</sup> According to Bekali, authorities punished detainees with “solitary confinement, beatings and food deprivation” for refusing to “criticize the people and things they love.”<sup>86</sup> Bekali said authorities also punished some detainees by forcing them to eat pork in spite of their Muslim faith, and likewise forced detainees accused of being “religious extremists” to drink alcohol.<sup>87</sup> In July 2018, a court in Kazakhstan tried Chinese citizen Sayragul Sauytbay (also known as Sairagul Sawytbai), an ethnic Kazakh, on the charge of “illegally crossing the border” after she fled China in April 2018.<sup>88</sup> Sauytbay told the court that in 2018, Chinese authorities sent her to work “in a political reeducation camp in the mountains,” which she said held over 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs.<sup>89</sup> She also told the court that Chinese authorities would consider her public discussion of XUAR “reeducation” facilities as “revealing state secrets,” and that they would sentence her to death if Kazakh government officials deported her to China.<sup>90</sup> On August 1, the court released Sauytbay from custody, giving her a six-month suspended sentence, but lawyers expressed concern that Chinese officials could still ask the government of Kazakhstan to extradite her.<sup>91</sup>

#### *Intensified Security Measures*

During this reporting year, central and regional government authorities implemented intense security measures throughout the XUAR, using security personnel, surveillance technology, mass detentions, and other methods to tighten state control over predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in the XUAR. International

observers highlighted the leading role of XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo in heightening repressive security measures.<sup>92</sup> In October 2017, Chen was selected as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo),<sup>93</sup> likely a signal that high-level officials approved his work in the XUAR and previously in the Tibet Autonomous Region.<sup>94</sup>

XUAR authorities carried out the mass, involuntary collection of DNA and other biometric information from XUAR residents;<sup>95</sup> conducted widespread and frequent checks of residents' cell phones and required residents to install monitoring applications on their cell phones;<sup>96</sup> maintained checkpoints and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations;<sup>97</sup> operated "convenience police stations," a form of street-level management that enhances authorities' ability to closely surveil and police local communities;<sup>98</sup> and installed cameras in and around mosques and homes, in order to monitor residents' religious and private activities.<sup>99</sup> Rights advocates indicated that officials appeared to be focused on using much of the surveillance and data collection to monitor and repress Uyghurs.<sup>100</sup> XUAR authorities reportedly use a centralized system called the "Integrated Joint Operations Platform" (IJOP) to gather and analyze data from closed-circuit cameras, computers, smartphones, license plates, and identification cards, as well as individuals' family planning, banking, and travel records.<sup>101</sup> Authorities used such data to identify individuals they would later subject to investigation and detention, including in "political reeducation" camps.<sup>102</sup> [For more information on authorities' use of surveillance technology in the XUAR, see Section III—Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights.]

Both XUAR and central government officials increased spending on security in the region. According to research into official data on security expenditures compiled by Germany-based scholar Adrian Zenz, XUAR authorities increased their spending on security measures by nearly 93 percent in 2017 compared to 2016; a sample of 18 Chinese provinces and regions saw an average increase of just under 12 percent in 2017.<sup>103</sup> Zenz also detailed evidence showing that central government authorities likely spent billions of yuan to fund the deployment of People's Armed Police in the XUAR in recent years.<sup>104</sup>

Analysis of Chinese government data that was published by international non-governmental organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) in July 2018 showed that 21 percent of all criminal arrests in China in 2017 took place in the XUAR, which is home to only 1.5 percent of China's population.<sup>105</sup> CHRD reported that, according to the research it conducted with the China-based NGO Equal Rights Initiative, the number of criminal arrests in the XUAR increased by 731 percent in 2017 over 2016, coinciding with policies implemented by XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to enhance regional security following his appointment to the XUAR in August 2016.<sup>106</sup> These figures do not include detentions in "reeducation" camps, which are carried out extrajudicially, though authorities reportedly transferred some "re-education" camp detainees to prison after a period of time.<sup>107</sup>

XUAR authorities implemented security measures at the grassroots level in order to combat "separatism." In January 2018,

XUAR government chairperson Shohrat Zakir stated that continued “terrorist” activity and “an intense struggle against separatists” in the XUAR necessitated an extended security crackdown.<sup>108</sup> He said authorities would continue to carry out measures to guarantee security in the XUAR, including the *fang hui ju* program, in which officials conduct mandated visits to rural ethnic minority families, as well as measures to combat “double-faced” people, referring to those who “pretend to support national unity but secretly spread separatism and extremism.”<sup>109</sup> Under the *fang hui ju* program, teams of police officers or officials visit Uyghurs’ homes to compile dossiers of their personal information, reporting on “extremist” behavior such as fasting during Ramadan or abstaining from alcohol.<sup>110</sup>

#### Intrusive Homestay Programs

Under programs similar to the *fang hui ju* program, such as “pairing relatives” (*jiedui renqin*) and “pairing assistance” (*jiedui bangfu* or *jiedui fubang*), authorities assign cadres and government workers (usually of Han ethnicity) to live with ethnic minority families in their homes for certain periods of time, in part, according to official rhetoric, to contribute to stability and security in the XUAR.<sup>111</sup> According to a December 2017 report in the Party-run newspaper Xinjiang Daily, under one such program, begun in 2017, XUAR officials sent nearly 1 million cadres and workers to live with local families from targeted ethnic groups.<sup>112</sup> In April 2018, international rights NGO ChinaAid Association reported that authorities had sent male “working group personnel” between the ages of 25 and 45 to live with Kazakh women and children in the XUAR while officials detained the men in these families in “political reeducation” centers.<sup>113</sup> According to an April Agence France-Presse report, authorities sent a “work team” comprised of staff members from a university in the XUAR on a similar program, to a village in Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture.<sup>114</sup> Officials sent more than 100 people, one-fifth of the village’s adult population, to “political reeducation” centers, after compiling dossiers identifying them as having engaged in “religious extremism” or other types of “untrustworthy” behavior.<sup>115</sup> According to a May Human Rights Watch report, under the “pairing relatives” program, cadres spend at least five days every two months in families’ homes, during which they carry out political indoctrination, make the families participate in activities such as singing the Chinese national anthem, and document online the families’ domestic activities.<sup>116</sup>

XUAR authorities undertook additional efforts to collect residents’ information during this reporting year. Officials in the XUAR, including from the Urumqi Municipal Public Security Bureau, reportedly issued a registration form requiring individuals working in Urumqi who were not in possession of an Urumqi household registration permit (*hukou*)<sup>117</sup> to provide information on their personal details, such as whether they had visited any of 26 countries officials had linked to terrorism.<sup>118</sup> According to one of these forms, which an exiled Uyghur provided to the Wall Street Journal, certain sections on the form ask officials to rate individuals on a six-point scale, and to classify them as “safe,’ ‘average,’

or ‘unsafe.’”<sup>119</sup> According to Human Rights Watch, one Urumqi resident said authorities required him to submit a similar form to the IJOP system in 2017, including information about travel to the 26 “sensitive” countries, how many times he prayed each day, and the name of his regular mosque.<sup>120</sup>

### *Freedom of Religion*

XUAR officials continued to use measures that narrowed the scope of Muslim residents’ ability to peacefully practice their religious faith and express their Muslim cultural identity, including through the following actions:

- **Restrictions on the Quran.** Authorities in the XUAR imposed restrictions on the Quran, including through confiscations and prohibitions on the study of the Quran. In early 2018, in Sa’ertamu township, Qaba (Habahe) county, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (KAP), local officials reportedly asked residents to sign a pledge stating that neither they nor their family members would study the Quran or learn Arabic.<sup>121</sup> In September 2017, officials in locations throughout the XUAR reportedly confiscated Qurans, prayer mats, and other items of Islamic significance from local Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz residents.<sup>122</sup> In November, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that a court in Burultokay (Fuhai) county, Altay (Aletai) prefecture, sentenced ethnic Kazakh Manat Hamit, a government employee, to 16 years and 6 months in prison in May 2017 on charges related to “disseminating terrorism-related audiovisual material” and “inciting ethnic hatred,” after authorities found files containing Quranic recitations on his computer.<sup>123</sup> In December, RFA reported that the Ministry of Public Security had designated the storage of Quranic audiovisual material on cell phones as “terrorist” in nature.<sup>124</sup>
- **Targeting religious leaders.** Officials throughout the XUAR detained individuals for violating laws and regulations regarding religion. According to a January 2018 RFA report, the number of imams detained in “political reeducation” camps and other locations was so large that in some locations, no imams were available to preside over funerals.<sup>125</sup> In November 2017, public security officials in Sa’ertamu criminally detained ethnic Kazakh imam Salheti Haribek, allegedly because he had carried out religious activities without a required government permit.<sup>126</sup>
- **Obstructing burial and other religious practices.** In April 2018, RFA reported that authorities in two counties in Hotan prefecture had set up “burial management centers” that Uyghur exiles believed would prevent Uyghurs from performing religious funerary rites.<sup>127</sup> Reports emerging in recent months also indicated that officials in the XUAR were building crematoria in order to eliminate Uyghurs’ funerary and burial traditions.<sup>128</sup> In February 2018, RFA reported that officials in Kashgar prefecture had launched a campaign about two months earlier through local police stations to urge local Muslim residents not to believe in religion.<sup>129</sup>



• **Controlling the observance of Ramadan.** As in previous reporting years,<sup>130</sup> XUAR officials reportedly imposed controls on Muslims' observance of Ramadan. In Ili KAP and Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, authorities reportedly forced restaurants to stay open and students to eat at school during Ramadan.<sup>131</sup> In Peyziwat (Jiashi) county, Kashgar, a student told RFA that officials at his school had required all students to sign agreements stating that they would not fast during the Ramadan period.<sup>132</sup>

### *Freedom of Expression*

#### MOBILE PHONE AND INTERNET USE

Central and regional officials placed restrictions on communication tools and implemented strict controls on internet activity. Officials in multiple XUAR jurisdictions reportedly continued to order residents to install an application (app) called “Web-Cleansing Guard” (*jingwang weishi*) on their cell phones that enables the government to surveil their online activities, monitoring “terrorist” and “illegal religious” content.<sup>133</sup> The app reportedly served as one of the mechanisms of the integrated surveillance and security network police operated to monitor residents, with the capacity to send all of the file names from a mobile device to a government server.<sup>134</sup> [For more information on internet restrictions in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.]

Members of predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in the XUAR were at risk of detention for sharing or storing “extremist” or other types of online content, or for possessing a certain type of communications device. Security personnel manning checkpoints reportedly detained Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minority individuals throughout the XUAR if they carried an iPhone, holding them in custody for up to several weeks.<sup>135</sup> Authorities reportedly detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others for storing and sharing items on mobile devices that officials said promoted terrorism or extremism.<sup>136</sup> Measures aimed at countering “extremism” in the XUAR in recent years reportedly have often threatened to criminalize Uyghurs' peaceful practice of religious faith and other peaceful activities.<sup>137</sup> In November 2017, state media, citing official figures, reported that officials in various locations in the XUAR had detained 15 people, including 9 Uyghurs, a Hui individual, a Kazakh individual, and 4 Han Chinese individuals, on suspicion of using the internet to promote, store, and transmit material involving terrorism and violence, religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and fabricating rumors.<sup>138</sup> Among the laws and regulations authorities said those detained had violated were regulations the XUAR People's Congress issued in December 2016 that provided for punishment for residents who spread “false” or “harmful” information on the internet.<sup>139</sup> In addition, in September 2017, a U.S.-based news and commentary website reported that authorities had sentenced the 25-year-old niece of imprisoned Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti to 10 years in prison after security personnel inspecting her cell phone in early 2016 found photographs of Tohti and two RFA articles about him.<sup>140</sup>

## FOREIGN JOURNALISTS OBSTRUCTED IN THE XUAR

Foreign journalists reported facing increased official restrictions on reporting from the XUAR in 2017. According to a report published by the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) in January 2018,<sup>141</sup> 73 percent of journalists completing an FCCC survey who traveled to the XUAR in 2017 said officials and security personnel told them their work was “prohibited or restricted,” an increase of 31 percent over the previous year’s responses.<sup>142</sup> The FCCC report noted the detention of a Globe and Mail correspondent whom security officials held for three hours in the XUAR in August 2017, after he tried to interview residents of a township in Yarkand (Shache) county, Kashgar prefecture.<sup>143</sup> The FCCC reported that XUAR authorities detained an anonymous American journalist for 11 hours.<sup>144</sup> [For more information on obstruction of foreign journalists in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.]

*Freedom of Movement*

As in past reporting years,<sup>145</sup> XUAR officials continued to restrict Uyghurs’ and Kazakhs’ ability to travel freely, in violation of Chinese law and international legal standards.<sup>146</sup> Beginning in October 2016, authorities in many locations throughout the XUAR reportedly ordered residents to turn their passports in to police, with varying deadlines of up to four months.<sup>147</sup> In October 2017, authorities reportedly broadened the passport recall to include Uyghurs living in areas of China outside the XUAR, requiring them to submit their passports to the nearest police station or to their school.<sup>148</sup> Officials also reportedly required XUAR residents and those with a household registration permit (*hukou*) registered in the XUAR to submit to the collection of their biometric information prior to applying for passports or conducting other “*hukou*-related business.”<sup>149</sup>

*Labor*

According to an October 2017 RFA report, in recent months, government authorities had sent hundreds of women and children from Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, to Aksu prefecture, to engage in forced agricultural labor and other heavy labor.<sup>150</sup> A police officer in Qaraqash reportedly said authorities had detained the men from these families in “political reeducation” centers, and that if the women and children refused to participate in the forced labor, authorities could detain some of them in the “political reeducation” centers as well.<sup>151</sup> Forced labor violates the International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.<sup>152</sup> [For more information on forced labor in China, see Section II—Human Trafficking.]

*Language Policy and “Bilingual Education”*

XUAR government authorities continued to expand Mandarin-focused “bilingual education” in the region, a policy that contravenes international law.<sup>153</sup> Under “bilingual education,” class instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin, largely replacing instruction in

languages spoken by ethnic minority groups.<sup>154</sup> In October 2017, the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department reported that the total number of ethnic minority students at all levels in the XUAR who had received “bilingual education” had increased from 1.22 million in 2012 to 1.92 million in 2016, and between 2013 and 2016, authorities had invested 6 billion yuan (approximately US\$954.98 million) to build 3,075 rural “bilingual kindergartens” in the XUAR.<sup>155</sup> Official media reported in April 2018 that XUAR authorities planned to construct additional kindergartens during the year, in order to improve students’ Mandarin skills.<sup>156</sup> The plans continued a regional government initiative to expand “bilingual education” at the preschool level between 2016 and 2020 using central government funds.<sup>157</sup> [For more on language policy toward ethnic minority populations, as well as information on the United Front Work Department and ethnic policy, see Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

#### Notes to Section IV—Xinjiang

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., “Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs ‘Wanting To Travel Abroad,’” Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18; “China Expands Recall of Passports to Uyghurs Outside of Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, 8 December 17; Mercy A. Kuo, “Uyghur Biodata Collection in China,” *The Diplomat*, 28 December 17.

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., PEN America, “Forbidden Feeds: Government Controls on Social Media in China,” 13 March 18; “China Detains Five More Ethnic Kazakhs Over ‘Ethnic Hatred,’ ‘Terrorist’ Content,” Radio Free Asia, 19 December 17; Nithin Coca, “China’s Xinjiang Surveillance Is the Dystopian Future Nobody Wants,” *Engadget*, 22 February 18.

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., “China Detains Five More Ethnic Kazakhs Over ‘Ethnic Hatred,’ ‘Terrorist’ Content,” Radio Free Asia, 19 December 17; Joyce Huang, “Stepped-up Surveillance of Uyghurs Sends ‘Relatives’ Into Homes,” *Voice of America*, 26 December 17; “Chinese Police Order Xinjiang’s Muslims To Hand in All Copies of the Quran,” Radio Free Asia, 27 September 17.

<sup>4</sup>Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” 10 September 17; Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” *Associated Press*, 18 May 18; Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Jamestown Foundation, China Brief*, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18; Bruce Pannier, “Kazakhstan Confronts China Over Disappearances,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 1 June 18. For examples of the various terms that official and unofficial sources have used to refer to “political education” centers or camps, see, e.g., Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Jamestown Foundation, China Brief*, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18 (“anti-extremism education training centers” (*qu jiduanhua jiaoyu peixun zhongxin*) and “educational training centers” (*jiaoyu peixun zhongxin*)); “Uyghur Businessman Flees Abroad, Family Members Suffer Abuse in [Training Center]” [*Weiwu’er shangren tao wang haiwai jieren guan ‘peixun zhongxin’ canzao nuedai*], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 18 (“training centers” (*peixun zhongxin*)); Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” 10 September 17 (“anti-extremism training classes” (*qu jiduanhua peixun ban*) and “education and transformation training centers” (*jiaoyu zhuanhua peixun zhongxin*)); “Ten Ethnic Kazakhs Detained in Karamay, Xinjiang, Nearly 100 Uyghurs Fined for Refusing To Stop Fasting” [*Xinjiang kelamayi 10 ming hasake zu ren bei bu jin bai weiwu’er zu ren ju fengzhai bei fakuan*], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 17 (“anti-extremism training schools” (*qu jiduanhua peixun xuexiao*)); “Ethnic Cleansing in Xinjiang, a Large Number of Uyghurs Are Detained in ‘Reform Centers’” [*Xinjiang zhongzu qingxi daliang weizu ren bei guan ‘gaizao zhongxin’*], Radio Free Asia, 28 March 18 (“education and reform centers” (*jiaoyu gaizao zhongxin*)); Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, “Over a Hundred Ethnic Minority Christians in Xinjiang Sent to ‘Training Center’” [*Xinjiang yu bai ming shaoshu minzu jidu tu bei song ‘peixun zhongxin’*], 3 February 18 (“vocational skills training centers” (*zhiye jineng peixun zhongxin*), “political study centers” (*zhengzhi xuexi zhongxin*), and “study centers” (*xuexi zhongxin*)); Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, “90-Year-Old Man Exposes ‘Training Center’ Torture Beyond Human Imagination” [*Jiu xun laoren pu ‘peixun zhongxin’ kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang*], 24 March 18 (“wild imam training centers” (*ye ahong peixun zhongxin*)); “Islamic Imams in Xinjiang Are Gradually Disappearing, There Is a Lack of Imams To Preside Over Funerals When Muslims Pass Away” [*Xinjiang yisilan jiao ahong zhujian xiaoshi musilin qushi que ahong zhuchi zangli*], Radio Free Asia, 6 January 18. (“wild imam education centers” (*ye ahong jiaoyu zhongxin*)). See also Jeremy Daum, “XJ Education Centers Exist, but Does Their Legal Basis?” *China Law Translate* (blog), 14 August 18.

<sup>5</sup>“Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs ‘Wanting To Travel Abroad,’” Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18; “A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Foreign Policy*, 28 February 18; Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Jamestown Foundation, China Brief*, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced Into Re-Education Programs,” 3 August 18.

<sup>6</sup>Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations [*Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli*], issued 29 March 17, effective 1 April 17; “Xinjiang Rolls Out China’s First Law To Purge Religious Extremism,” *Xinhua*, 30 March 17. See also Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, “China’s Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing Widens the Dagnet,” *Wall Street Journal*, 17 August 18. For more information on the XUAR Anti-Extremism Regulations, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 283, 286.

<sup>7</sup>Rian Thum, “China’s Mass Internment Camps Have No Clear End in Sight,” *Foreign Policy*, 22 August 18.

<sup>8</sup>“New Guidelines on Uyghur ‘Signs of Extremism’ Issued to Xinjiang Authorities,” Radio Free Asia, 7 November 17; “Elderly Among Thousands of Uyghurs Held in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps,” Radio Free Asia, 26 October 17.

<sup>9</sup>“Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs ‘Wanting To Travel Abroad,’” Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>“Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18; Gohar Abbas and Ben Dooley, “Pakistanis Distressed as Uighur Wives Vanish Into China’s Shadowy Network of ‘Reeducation Centres,’” *Hong Kong Free Press*, 26 March 18; “Chinese Police Detain Kazakhs With Overseas Ties, Send Them for ‘Re-education,’” Radio Free Asia, 30 October 17.

<sup>12</sup>“A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Foreign Policy*, 28 February 18; “Interview: I Lost All Hope of Surviving,” Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” 10 September 17.

<sup>13</sup>See, e.g., “Overcrowded Political Re-Education Camps in Hotan Relocate Hundreds of Uyghur Detainees,” Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; “Uyghur Inmates in Xinjiang’s Korla City Endure Overcrowded Re-Education Camps,” Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18; “Children of De-

tained Uyghurs Face ‘Terrible’ Conditions in Overcrowded Xinjiang Orphanages,” Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17.

<sup>14</sup>See, e.g., “A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag,” Foreign Policy, 28 February 18; ChinaAid, “90-Year-Old Man Exposes ‘Training Center’ Torture Beyond Human Imagination” [Jiu xun laoren pu “peixun zhongxin” kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18.

<sup>15</sup>See, e.g., ChinaAid, “90-Year-Old Man Exposes ‘Training Center’ Torture Beyond Human Imagination” [Jiu xun laoren pu “peixun zhongxin” kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18; “Interview: ‘I Lost All Hope of Surviving,’” Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18.

<sup>16</sup>See, e.g., “Uyghur Inmates Suffer Health Complications Due to Neglect in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” Radio Free Asia, 18 January 18; “Interview: ‘I Lost All Hope of Surviving,’” Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18; Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist’s Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,” 16 March 18.

<sup>17</sup>Emily Rauhala, “New Evidence Emerges of China Forcing Muslims Into ‘Reeducation’ Camps,” Washington Post, 10 August 18.

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g., “Interview: ‘I Lost All Hope of Surviving,’” Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18; ChinaAid, “90-Year-Old Man Exposes ‘Training Center’ Torture Beyond Human Imagination” [Jiu xun laoren pu “peixun zhongxin” kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18.

<sup>19</sup>See, e.g., “Uyghur Inmates in Xinjiang’s Korla City Endure Overcrowded Re-Education Camps,” Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18; “Uyghur Inmates Suffer Health Complications Due to Neglect in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” Radio Free Asia, 18 January 18.

<sup>20</sup>See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” 10 September 17; “A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag,” Foreign Policy, 28 February 18.

<sup>21</sup>Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9.

<sup>22</sup>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1). See also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 81; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 17 June 18. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principle 4; International Justice Resource Center, “Increased Oppression of Chinese Human Rights Defenders Draws International Criticism,” 22 February 16.

<sup>23</sup>Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18; Adrian Zenz, “Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy Heart Attitude—China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 11.

<sup>24</sup>Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18; Adrian Zenz, “Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy Heart Attitude—China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 3, 4, 6.

<sup>25</sup>Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15 May 18.

<sup>26</sup>Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, “China’s Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing Widens the Dragnet,” Wall Street Journal, 17 August 18.

<sup>27</sup>Rian Thum, “What Really Happens in China’s ‘Re-Education’ Camps,” New York Times, 15 May 18.

<sup>28</sup>Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, “China’s Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing Widens the Dragnet,” Wall Street Journal, 17 August 18.

<sup>29</sup>Jessica Batke, “What Satellite Images Can Show Us About ‘Re-education’ Camps in Xinjiang: A Q&A With Shawn Zhang,” Asia Society, ChinaFile, 23 August 18; Shawn Zhang, “List of Re-Education Camps in Xinjiang,” Medium (blog), last visited 19 August 18.

<sup>30</sup>Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang’s Human Rights Crisis, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 26 July 18, Written Statement Submitted by Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans, 1.

<sup>31</sup>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 65, entry into force 4 January 69.

<sup>32</sup>Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps,” New York Times, 10 August 18. See also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,” 13 August 18.

<sup>33</sup>Stephanie Nebehay, “China Rejects Allegations of Detaining Million Uighurs in Camps in Xinjiang,” Reuters, 13 August 18. According to the Reuters article, Hu described the existence of “vocational education and employment training centres” and “education” programs for “criminals,” telling the committee “[t]hose deceived by religious extremism . . . shall be assisted by resettlement and education.” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the Report of China,” 13 August 18.

<sup>34</sup>Michael Caster, “China’s Crimes Against Humanity You’ve Never Heard Of,” CNN, 26 July 18. See also China Digital Times, “‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in Xinjiang Draw Attention,” 30 July 18; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 98, entry into force 1 July 02, art. 7.

<sup>35</sup>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 98, entry into force 1 July 02, art. 7. According to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, any of the following acts may constitute a “crime against humanity” when committed

as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act described herein or any crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. See also Michael Caster, “China’s Crimes Against Humanity You’ve Never Heard Of,” CNN, 26 July 18; China Digital Times, “‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in Xinjiang Draw Attention,” 30 July 18.

<sup>36</sup>Nearly 10 Percent of Residents of a Xinjiang Township Detained by Chinese Authorities,” Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17; “Xinjiang Authorities Up Detentions in Uyghur Majority Areas of Ghulja City,” Radio Free Asia, 19 March 18; Adrian Zenz, “Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy Heart Attitude—China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 6, 15; Rian Thum, “What Really Happens in China’s ‘Re-Education’ Camps,” New York Times, 15 May 18; Mercy A. Kuo, “Uyghur Biodata Collection in China,” The Diplomat, 28 December 17.

<sup>37</sup>“Nearly 10 Percent of Residents of a Xinjiang Township Detained by Chinese Authorities,” Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17.

<sup>38</sup>“Children of Detained Uyghurs Face ‘Terrible’ Conditions in Overcrowded Xinjiang Orphanages,” Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17; James A. Millward, “What It’s Like To Live in a Surveillance State,” New York Times, 3 February 18.

<sup>39</sup>See, e.g., “Authorities in Xinjiang’s Kashgar Detain Uyghurs at ‘Open Political Re-Education Camps,’” Radio Free Asia, 9 May 18.

<sup>40</sup>Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced Into Re-Education Programs,” 3 August 18.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>“Elderly Among Thousands of Uyghurs Held in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps,” Radio Free Asia, 26 October 17.

<sup>45</sup>“Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18.

<sup>46</sup>Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist’s Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,” 16 March 18.

<sup>47</sup>“Uyghur Muslim Scholar Dies in Chinese Police Custody,” Radio Free Asia, 29 January 18; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Uyghur Human Rights Project Condemns Death in Custody of Scholar Muhammad Salih Hajim,” 29 January 18. For more information on Muhammad Salih Hajim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00107.

<sup>48</sup>“Uyghur Exile Group Leader’s Mother Died in Xinjiang Detention Center,” Radio Free Asia, 2 July 18; “Interview: ‘The Most Painful Part of Losing My Mother,’” Radio Free Asia, 13 June 18.

<sup>49</sup>World Uyghur Congress, “Press Release: WUC Confirms Death in Custody of Yet Another Uyghur Religious Scholar Abdulehed Mehsum,” 29 May 18.

<sup>50</sup>“More Than Two Dozen Uyghurs From One Xinjiang County Perished in Re-Education Camps,” Radio Free Asia, 27 June 18.

<sup>51</sup>For more information on Hesen Imin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00153.

<sup>52</sup>For more information on Sawut Raxman, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00154.

<sup>53</sup>“In Saghan, Yengisar, Reports of 4 Deaths in ‘Education Centers’ Emerge” [Yéngisar saghanda az degénde 4 kishining “terbiyelesh merkizi” de ölgenliki ashkarilandi], Radio Free Asia, 30 October 17.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>“Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18; “In Yopurgha, ‘Education Center’ Death of 17-Year-Old Yaqupjan Naman Confirmed” [Yopurghida 17 yashliq yaqupjan namanning “terbiyilesh merkizi” de ölgenliki ashkarilandi], Radio Free Asia, 9 March 18. For more information on Yaqupjan Naman, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00267.

<sup>56</sup>“Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, 12 April 18. For more information on Abdughappar Abdujappar, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00175.

<sup>57</sup>“Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang ‘Political Re-Education Camp,’” Radio Free Asia, 24 May 18.

<sup>58</sup>“Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang Reeducation Camp Death,” Radio Free Asia, 8 June 18.

<sup>59</sup>“24-Year-Old Nurimangul Memet Dies in ‘Education Center’ in Bügür” [24 yashliq nuriman’göl memet bügürdiki “terbiyelesh merkizi” de ölüp ketken], Radio Free Asia, 4 June 18. For more information on Nurimangul Memet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00395.

<sup>60</sup>Nathan VanderKlippe, “Exporting Persecution: Uyghur Diaspora Haunted by Anxiety, Guilt as Family Held in Chinese Camps,” Globe and Mail, 12 August 18. For more information on Adalet Teyp, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00431.

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., “Interview: ‘I Thought I Had Completed My Duty as a Father,’” Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18. See also “Families of Uyghur Police Officers Among Those Detained in Xinjiang’s Kashgar,” Radio Free Asia, 6 November 17.

<sup>62</sup> “Uyghur Official Arrested for Sympathizing With Political ‘Re-Education Camp’ Detainees,” Radio Free Asia, 3 April 18. For more information on Pezilet Bekri, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00160.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> “Xinjiang Jails Uyghur Civil Servants Over Lack of Enthusiasm for Anti-Extremist Campaigns,” Radio Free Asia, 30 May 18. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00264 on Omerjan Hesen and 2018-00265 on Elijan Ehmet.

<sup>65</sup> Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China,” *New York Times*, 10 August 18. See also PEN America, “Disappearance of Uyghur Scholar an Example of Attempts To Erase Uyghur Culture,” 10 August 18; Nick Holdstock, “Where Is Rahile Dawut?” *London Review of Books*, LRB Blog, 16 August 18.

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g., “Chinese Authorities Jail Four Wealthiest Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s Kashgar in New Purge,” Radio Free Asia, 5 January 18.

<sup>67</sup> For more information on Abdujelil Hajim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00093.

<sup>68</sup> For more information on Gheni Haji, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00090.

<sup>69</sup> For more information on Memet Tursun Haji, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00091.

<sup>70</sup> For more information on Imin Hajim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00092.

<sup>71</sup> “Chinese Authorities Detain Uyghur Hotelier in Xinjiang’s Kashgar City,” Radio Free Asia, 7 May 18.

<sup>72</sup> “Prominent Uyghur Scholar Detained in Xinjiang Capital Urumqi: Official,” Radio Free Asia, 25 April 18. For more information on Abduqadir Jalalidin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00268.

<sup>73</sup> Rachel Harris and Aziz Isa Elkun, “Uyghur Pop Star Detained in China,” *Freemuse*, 11 June 18; “Popular Uyghur Singer’s Whereabouts Unknown, Believed Detained in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, 18 May 18.

<sup>74</sup> “Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghur Pro Footballer for ‘Visiting Foreign Countries,’” Radio Free Asia, 13 April 18. See also FIFPro, “FIFPro Statement: Chinese Player ‘Detained,’” 13 June 18. For more information on Erfan Hezimjan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00313.

<sup>75</sup> “The Families Left Behind: RFA’s Uyghur Reporters Tell the Stories of Their Family Members’ Detentions,” Radio Free Asia, last visited 15 June 18; Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, “Beijing Squeezes Exiles in U.S. by Detaining Family Back Home,” *Wall Street Journal*, 30 March 18; Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist’s Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,” 16 March 18; Ben Dooley, “US Journalists Fear China Detained Their Families,” *Agence-France Presse*, 5 March 18; Srinivas Mazumdar, “Uighur Journalist Gulchehra Hoja: ‘I Have My Own Sad Story To Tell,’” *Deutsche Welle*, 5 March 18; Austin Ramzy, “After U.S.-Based Reporters Exposed Abuses, China Seized Their Relatives,” *New York Times*, 1 March 18; “Rights Groups Condemn China’s Detention of RFA Reporters’ Relatives,” Radio Free Asia, 1 March 18; Simon Denyer, “China Detains Relatives of U.S. Reporters in Apparent Punishment for Xinjiang Coverage,” *Washington Post*, 28 February 18. For more information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Gulchehra Hoja, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00373 on Elshat Abduweli, 2018-00382 on Gheyret Abdurahman, 2018-00383 on Daniyar Abdukerim, 2018-00384 on Gulpiya Almas, 2018-00385 on Izhar Almas, 2018-00386 on Madina Mutalip, 2018-00387 on Mirzat Mutalip, 2018-00388 on Mehray Kahar, 2018-00392 on Kaiser Keyum, 2018-00393 on Chimangul Zikri, and 2018-00394 on Abduqeyum Hoja. For more information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Shohret Hoshur, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2015-00471 on Tudaxun Hoshur, 2016-00002 on Shawket Hoshur, 2016-00003 on Rexim Hoshur, 2018-00367 on Arzigul, 2018-00369 on Ilshat Shawket, 2018-00370 on Ilyar Shawket, 2018-00371 on Tursun, and 2018-00372 on Saniye. For more information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Jilil Kashgari, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00352 on Seidiehet Yunus, 2018-00354 on Tursunmemet Yunus, 2018-00355 on Kerim Yunus, 2018-00356 on Nurmemet, 2018-00357 on Asiya Yasin, 2018-00358 on Abduhamit Ablet, and 2018-00359 on Abdurusul Ablet. For more information on the detained brother of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Kurban Niyaz, see the following record in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00360 on Hasanjan Niyaz. For more information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Mamatjan Juma, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00361 on Abduqadir Juma and 2018-00362 on Ahmetjan Juma. For more information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Eset Sulaiman, see the following records in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00363 on Ehet Sulaiman, 2018-00364 on Saadet Kichik, and 2018-00365 on Memteli Sopi.

<sup>76</sup> “The Families Left Behind: RFA’s Uyghur Reporters Tell the Stories of Their Family Members’ Detentions,” Radio Free Asia, last visited 21 May 18; Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, “Beijing Squeezes Exiles in U.S. by Detaining Family Back Home,” *Wall Street Journal*, 30 March 18; Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist’s Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,” 16 March 18; Srinivas Mazumdar, “Uighur Journalist Gulchehra Hoja: ‘I Have My Own Sad Story To Tell,’” *Deutsche Welle*, 5 March 18.

<sup>77</sup> Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 26 July 18, Written Testimony of Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service Journalist, Radio Free Asia, 1.

<sup>78</sup> "More Than 30' Relatives of Uyghur Exile Leader Rebiya Kadeer Detained in Xinjiang," Radio Free Asia, 27 October 17; Ben Blanchard, "Amnesty Says China Detains 30 Relatives of Exiled Uighur Leader," Reuters, 14 November 17; Amnesty International, "Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained," 14 November 17. For more information on the detained family members of Rebiya Kadeer, see the following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2006-00071 on Alim Abdureyim, 2006-00084 on Ablikum Abdureyim, 2006-00091 on Kahar Abdureyim, 2018-00028 on Aygul, 2018-00035 on Aydidar Kahar, 2018-00036 Zulpikar Kahar, and 2018-00037 on Dildar Kahar.

<sup>79</sup> "More Than 30' Relatives of Uyghur Exile Leader Rebiya Kadeer Detained in Xinjiang," Radio Free Asia, 27 October 17; Amnesty International, "Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained," 14 November 17.

<sup>80</sup> Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, "Beijing Squeezes Exiles in U.S. by Detaining Family Back Home," Wall Street Journal, 30 March 18. See also Jonathan Hiskes, Simpson Center for the Humanities, University of Washington, "Ethnography of a Surveillance State," reprinted in Medium, 5 June 18; Darren Byler, "Another Scene in the Fight Against Islamophobia," anthro(dendum) (blog), 14 March 18.

<sup>81</sup> Bruce Pannier, "Kazakh Man Recounts 'Reeducation' in Western Chinese Camp," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 April 18. For more information on Kayrat Samarkan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00453.

<sup>82</sup> Simon Denyer, "Former Inmates of China's Muslim 'Reeducation' Camps Tell of Brain-washing, Torture," Washington Post, 17 May 18.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> "Interview: 'I Lost All Hope of Surviving,'" Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18; Gerry Shih, "China's Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution," Associated Press, 18 May 18. Media organizations have also rendered Omir Bekali's name as Omurbek Eli. For more information on Omir Bekali, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00449.

<sup>85</sup> Gerry Shih, "China's Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution," Associated Press, 18 May 18.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Simon Denyer, "Former Inmates of China's Muslim 'Reeducation' Camps Tell of Brain-washing, Torture," Washington Post, 17 May 18.

<sup>88</sup> Almaz Kumenov, "Ethnic Kazakh's Life in Balance as Deportation to China Looms," Eurasianet, 17 July 18.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> "China's 'Prison-Like Re-Education Camps' Strain Relations With Kazakhstan as Woman Asks Kazakh Court Not To Send Her Back," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 17 July 18; Almaz Kumenov, "Ethnic Kazakh's Life in Balance as Deportation to China Looms," Eurasianet, 17 July 18.

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<sup>103</sup>Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 12 March 18. The average increase of 11.9 percent for security expenditures was based on budgeted figures for 5 provinces or regions and on actual spending in the other 13 provinces and regions. See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 282.

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