

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Findings

- China’s one-party authoritarian political system remains out of compliance with international human rights standards because authorities deprived citizens of the right to meaningfully participate in the electoral process and in public affairs in general.
- As Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping continued to promote rule-based governance, the Party passed a series of rules to formalize the manner and extent of the Party’s control over the government and society. These rules reinforced the all-encompassing authority of the Party and centralized personal leadership of Xi Jinping. One set of rules formalized the Party’s longstanding control over “political-legal” work covering the judiciary, the procuratorate, public security agencies, national security agencies, and judicial administration agencies. The rules focused on protecting the Party’s political security and preserving its absolute control.
- Central authorities also issued rules to regulate personnel management in the government by requiring civil servants to receive political indoctrination and by imposing political considerations as criteria for career advancement. In one instance, the Party Central Committee issued an opinion prohibiting officials from expressing views inconsistent with the Party’s policy or “improperly discussing” central Party policy even outside of work hours.
- While the Chinese government used technology to facilitate citizens’ access to public services, it continued to employ a combination of “big data, artificial intelligence, recognition technology and other police techniques” to impose social and political control. Data collection became more centralized and coordinated, as an increasing number of province-level jurisdictions have established “Big Data Bureaus.” In particular, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region used apps to track and target Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims for investigation, which often would result in the detention of the targeted individuals for non-criminal conduct.
- Citizens’ opportunities to participate in limited local elections diminished this past year. Chinese authorities reduced the frequency of elections for grassroots-level committees—from once every three years to once every five years—in order to synchronize with the terms of the corresponding Party offices, thereby “complementing the Party’s complete leadership.”
- On the international stage, China categorically denied accountability for human rights violations despite evidence of human rights abuse. It further rejected recommendations to cease the practice of arbitrary detention and rejected calls to release political prisoners. Domestically, the Party and the government continued to carry out an anticorruption campaign, resulting in the discipline or criminal prosecution of some officials on corruption-related charges. Outside of the anti-corruption campaign, some courts awarded compensation to victims who were tortured by government officials, but reporting indi-

Institutions of Democratic Governance

cated that officials sometimes failed to hold perpetrators accountable.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Support U.S. research programs that document and analyze the governing institutions and ideological campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as its influence over companies, government agencies, legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- Employ a “whole-of-government” approach to encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and release individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising their rights to freedom of speech, association, and assembly. These individuals include those mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, such as **Huang Qi, Liu Feiyue, and Qin Yongmin.**
- Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to develop independent village committee and people’s congress election monitoring systems. Encourage central and local Party and government leaders to implement free and fair elections across China. Continue to fund, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of democracy promotion and rule of law programs in China.
- Support organizations working in China that seek to work with local governments and NGOs to improve transparency, especially with regard to efforts to expand and improve China’s open government information initiatives. Urge Party officials to further increase the transparency of Party affairs.
- Call on the Chinese government to improve procedures through which citizens may hold their officials accountable outside of the internal Party-led anticorruption campaign. Urge Party and government officials to establish and improve public participation in government affairs. Encourage top-level officials to reform governing institutions to promote an authentic multi-party system with protections for freedom of speech, association, and assembly.

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Governance in China's One-Party System

China's one-party authoritarian political system remains out of compliance with the standards defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)¹ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),² which China has signed and declared an intention to ratify.³ These standards require that citizens be allowed to freely choose their representatives⁴ and to hold their officials accountable through fair and impartial elections regardless of political party membership.⁵ During the 2019 reporting year, the Commission observed reports of authorities depriving citizens of the right to meaningfully participate in the electoral process and in public affairs in general.

The Chinese Communist Party further curtailed the limited space for democratic participation as it moved to further formalize and tighten its control over government and social institutions.⁶ Echoing language used at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017,⁷ official media continued to emphasize complete dominance of the Party,⁸ which in turn remained subject to the personal leadership of President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.⁹

Communist Party Centralized and Expanded Control

The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee asserted the Party's control in the Opinion on Strengthening Party Political Building, issued in January 2019.¹⁰ The opinion demanded absolute loyalty from leading cadres and emphasized the importance of protecting the Party's leadership with Xi Jinping as the core leader and of adhering to "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,"¹¹ which is a political ideology incorporated into China's Constitution in 2018.¹²

Beyond reaffirming the Party's authority in the opinion, the Central Committee issued substantive rules that had the effect of centralizing and expanding the Party's control. The Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party's Political-Legal Work, for example, institutionalized the Party's longstanding de facto control over "political-legal work" (*zhengfa gongzuo*)¹³ which covers the judiciary, the procuratorate, public security agencies, national security agencies, and judicial administration agencies.¹⁴ The regulations invoked the authority of both the Party Constitution as well as China's Constitution,¹⁵ and it was the first time that the Party described its political-legal functions by way of Party rules.¹⁶ The regulations repeatedly emphasized the Party's absolute control and tasked political-legal committees with devising strategies to ensure political security and social stability.¹⁷ A U.S.-based scholar and former rights lawyer in China observed that the Party used the regulations as a way to assert the Party's control and to forestall attempts to promote division of political power or judicial independence.¹⁸

The Regulations on Requesting Instructions and Making Reports on Important Issues, effective in January 2019, established a command structure with Xi Jinping at the core, requiring local Party entities to obtain approval or guidance from a higher-ranking Party

Institutions of Democratic Governance

entity for ten categories of “important matters,” such as those necessitating policy changes.¹⁹ Also, the provisional Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Branch Operations, effective in October 2018, expanded the Party’s reach in society²⁰ by requiring the establishment of Party branches or joint Party branches in rural cooperatives and commercial organizations to promote Party policies.²¹ These provisional regulations were promulgated after the Party amended its Constitution in 2017 in part to delineate the nature and functions of Party branches, which previously were not governed by written rules.²²

Communist Party Formalized Control Over Personnel Management in Government

Central Party authorities further strengthened the Party’s control over civil servants and Party-government leadership positions. In November 2018, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee issued a plan requiring personnel in leadership positions to be trained at facilities²³ such as the new Central Party School (Chinese Academy of Governance), a Party entity established in March 2018 to take over the function of training government officials.²⁴ The plan covers seven categories of personnel, including Party-government leaders, civil servants, and leaders of enterprises and public institutions.²⁵ A minimum of 70 percent of the training at Party schools must center on “Xi Jinping Thought.”²⁶

In December 2018, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee revised the PRC Civil Servant Law to require every civil servant to support and obey the Party’s leadership,²⁷ an addition to the existing provisions for compliance with the constitution and the law.²⁸ The Standing Committee also added political considerations as criteria for training, examination, appointment, and supervision of civil servants.²⁹ Under the revised law, civil servants are prohibited from disseminating speech harmful to the Party’s reputation, “damaging ethnic relations,” or “joining activities that divide ethnic groups.”³⁰ Previously, authorities prosecuted citizens on the charge of “inciting ethnic hatred” for peacefully expressing views on the government’s ethnic policies.³¹ Furthermore, the Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Party Building in Central Authority and Government Agencies, issued in March 2019, prohibited officials from expressing views inconsistent with the Party’s policy or “improperly discussing” central Party policy (*wangyi zhongyang*) even outside of work hours.³² According to one scholar’s analysis, the political assessment requirement under the revised PRC Civil Servant Law may negatively impact non-governmental organization (NGO) operations in China, as officials try to demonstrate political loyalty by interacting with NGOs in ways that are consistent with the Party’s policy of limiting the scope of public interest activities.³³

In March 2019, the Party issued Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres³⁴ to “steadfastly prioritize political standards.”³⁵ The regulations require that all cadres holding leadership positions in the government or the Party must “resolutely safeguard General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core leadership and uphold the centralized and unified leadership

Institutions of Democratic Governance

of the Central Committee.”³⁶ The new regulations supersede the 2014 version, which lacks specific reference to Xi Jinping.³⁷

Some observers claimed that centralization and tightening of control has stalled democratic progress and political reform³⁸ and could result in the implementation of policies that are insensitive to local conditions.³⁹ A Germany-based scholar estimated that “the number of provincial experiments”—such as initiatives for building free markets and allowing private land ownership—“fell from 500 in 2010 to about 70 in 2016.”⁴⁰ According to some Chinese officials, emphasis on loyalty and “political performance” had led civil servants to become increasingly reluctant to act independently and had caused many to leave their jobs.⁴¹

Use of Technology to Control Citizens

While the Chinese government used technology to facilitate citizens’ access to public services,⁴² it continued to employ a combination of “big data, artificial intelligence, recognition technology and other police techniques” to impose social and political control.⁴³

SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

The Chinese government demonstrated its technological capacity⁴⁴ to implement advanced surveillance systems. For example, authorities installed facial recognition systems at sites with a high volume of human traffic, such as at an airport in Shanghai municipality,⁴⁵ four subway stations in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province,⁴⁶ and the border crossing of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge.⁴⁷ Despite having the potential to speed up the security screening process,⁴⁸ the technology has raised privacy concerns.⁴⁹

Examples of surveillance systems implemented during this reporting year, including those that emerged from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), demonstrate that the Chinese government has a policy of using technology for repression.⁵⁰ One official who worked in a mass internment camp in the XUAR said that authorities could constantly monitor each room through a system of surveillance cameras, which they used to control detainees’ activities including bathroom usage.⁵¹ In another example, authorities required members of a government-sanctioned Christian church in the XUAR to verify their identity and go through a facial recognition system, which effectively prevented some of them from participating in the church service due to the time involved in being processed.⁵² In May 2019, non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch released a report in which it documented Chinese authorities’ use of apps as part of the “Integrated Joint Operations Platforms” to track and target Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims for investigation, which often resulted in the detention of the targeted individuals for non-criminal conduct.⁵³ [For more information on surveillance practices in the XUAR, see Section II—Business and Human Rights and Section IV—Xinjiang.]

PROVINCES CREATED BIG DATA ADMINISTRATION BUREAUS

Authorities’ efforts to collect information became more coordinated and centralized this past year. Following the restructuring of

Institutions of Democratic Governance

central government agencies in March 2018,⁵⁴ local governments also underwent reorganization,⁵⁵ with a number of them creating new provincial- and prefectural-level bureaus designed to manage big data,⁵⁶ adding to the existing 21 similar agencies.⁵⁷ These bureaus, seen as instrumental to building smart cities,⁵⁸ are tasked with coordinating data collection and sharing among different government agencies to improve transparency and the capacity of governance.⁵⁹ While big data bureaus have the potential to improve citizens' access to government services,⁶⁰ observers noted the lack of adequate privacy protection and expressed concerns that these bureaus can serve as the Chinese government's instrument of surveillance.⁶¹

In one example, a plan issued by a local government in Henan province indicated that the provincial government was gathering, auditing, and entering information of religious followers into a database, according to an online magazine focusing on religious freedom in China.⁶² The database—called the “Henan Province Religious Affairs Management and Service Platform”—began operation in May 2018,⁶³ and the data-gathering efforts may be part of the ideological “rectification measures” issued by the Henan Provincial Party Committee around September 2018.⁶⁴ Some religious practitioners expressed concern that databases like this one would facilitate “the Chinese Communist government to carry out further monitoring, restriction, or even crack down” on religious followers.⁶⁵

In August 2018, China Digital Times reposted an online article by an anonymous source claiming to be an experienced public security official who disclosed the manner in which authorities categorized individuals using information collected through big data systems.⁶⁶ Targeted people included Uyghurs in the XUAR, Tibetans returning from abroad, Falun Gong practitioners, veterans, NGO workers, and foreign journalists.⁶⁷ The source also provided photographs of computer screens suggesting that public security officials not only collect biographical information, but they also track travel and internet usage history and have the ability to link records of a person's neighbors, relatives, and people traveling on the same airplane.⁶⁸ The original article has since become unavailable.

Citizen Participation

SUPPRESSION OF POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES

While the official Party news outlet People's Daily continued to operate a message board through which local officials may respond to citizens' complaints and suggestions on issues concerning personal matters and local policies, political content posted on the board was subject to censorship.⁶⁹ Beyond the officially maintained platform, authorities criminally detained people who engaged in speech or advocacy work that had broader social and political implications: In one example, authorities in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province, detained Wei Zhili in March 2019 on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in connection to his online advocacy for factory workers who contracted pneumoconiosis due to the lack of occupational safety measures.⁷⁰ In an-

Institutions of Democratic Governance

other example, authorities in Xinxiang municipality, Henan province, arrested He Fangmei in April 2019 on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” because she protested and organized a support group for parents with children who were rendered disabled or paralyzed after receiving substandard vaccines.⁷¹ [For more information on Chinese authorities’ use of the criminal justice system and extralegal measures to suppress rights activities, see Section II—Criminal Justice.]

ELECTIONS

The Commission did not observe progress in expanding the scope of direct elections, which Chinese law limits to people’s congresses of local jurisdictions⁷² and grassroots-level committees.⁷³ In December 2018, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee amended two sets of laws to decrease the frequency of grassroots-level elections from once every three years to once every five years, affecting elections for village committees in rural areas and residents committees in urban areas.⁷⁴ The new five-year term of office for these committees synchronized with the term of Party committees at the corresponding levels specified in a Party opinion issued earlier in July 2018.⁷⁵ According to an official news article, the longer term would be beneficial to implementing policy plans and improving stability,⁷⁶ and Minister of Civil Affairs Huang Shuxian said the change would complement the Party’s complete leadership.⁷⁷

Rights Defense Network, a human rights monitoring group, documented instances in which officials suppressed meaningful participation in or speech regarding elections this past year,⁷⁸ demonstrating that China’s political institutions do not meet the standards for elections outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁷⁹ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁸⁰ For example, in September 2018, officials in Qianshan county, Anqing municipality, Anhui province, disqualified two candidates who, in a preselection, were leading or in close contest with another two candidates selected by the township Party committee.⁸¹ The township leaders also reportedly hired a known gang member to physically assault individuals who opposed the selected candidates.⁸²

Accountability

CHINA DENIED COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

In international forums, China categorically denied that it had committed human rights violations. As Xi Jinping’s political ideology continued to guide China’s human rights practices,⁸³ the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2018 dismissed as baseless⁸⁴ reports of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities being held in incommunicado detention, as noted in the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.⁸⁵

After the Universal Periodic Review held in November 2018, China likewise asserted that “[t]here is no such problem as arbitrary detention,” in response to multiple calls by UN members for China to cease all forms of arbitrary detention, including mass in-

Institutions of Democratic Governance

ternment camps in the XUAR.⁸⁶ China also rejected recommendations to cease the persecution of human rights defenders and lawyers,⁸⁷ claiming that requests to release those detained “in accordance with law is an interference in China’s judicial sovereignty.”⁸⁸

ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

Domestically, Chinese authorities continued to carry out the anticorruption campaign,⁸⁹ which began in 2012 with the stated goals of restoring Party discipline and punishing official corruption and is viewed as Xi Jinping’s signature initiative.⁹⁰ According to some observers, the campaign may not be effective in combating corruption because it does not strengthen institutional supervision such as by the press, civil society, and other political parties.⁹¹

The National Supervisory Commission (NSC)—an anticorruption body created in March 2018 with authority to detain people without judicial oversight⁹²—has demonstrated thus far that its operations were subordinate only to the Chinese Communist Party. Director Yang Xiaodu of the NSC said in February 2019 that the commission was supervised by the Party Central Committee and therefore would not release a report separate from the one issued by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), a Party entity.⁹³ In January, the CCDI issued its work report internally and addressed it to CCDI’s own standing committee at a plenary meeting.⁹⁴ The NSC did not submit a separate work report to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2019 during the annual meetings, although the law subjects supervisory commissions to the oversight of the corresponding people’s congresses.⁹⁵

Furthermore, while the NSC hired its first cohort of “special supervisors” in December 2018 with the stated purpose of improving supervision by the public,⁹⁶ these supervisors are required to submit themselves to the Party’s leadership, and their duties do not go beyond making suggestions and promoting the Party’s policies.⁹⁷

Institutions of Democratic Governance

Possible Political Motivations Behind Detaining Interpol President

Among those detained as part of the anticorruption campaign was Meng Hongwei,⁹⁸ who was Vice Minister of Public Security when he was elected in November 2016 to lead the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the international police agency headquartered in Lyon, France.⁹⁹ Meng disappeared upon arriving in China on a trip from France in October 2018, according to his wife.¹⁰⁰ In March 2019, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) expelled Meng from the Party and stripped him of his official position for a number of alleged wrongdoings, including abusing his power, not adhering to Party rules, and receiving bribes; the article did not detail any specific act, however.¹⁰¹ In addition, the article reported that Meng lacked “Party spirit” and refused to carry out orders from the Party’s Central Committee.¹⁰² Meng’s wife maintained that the detention was politically motivated, adding that Meng “was well-known in China for his reformist views and had in March 2017 tendered his resignation to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.”¹⁰³ Sources told the Wall Street Journal that Meng, in his capacity as the head of the international police agency, did not fully carry out Chinese central authorities’ instructions to issue “red notices,” which would help them target dissidents outside of China.¹⁰⁴

CASES OUTSIDE THE ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

In some examples, Chinese authorities displayed a willingness to hold officials accountable outside the anticorruption campaign in cases involving official malfeasance:

- In October 2018, the Tianjin Municipal No. 1 Intermediate Court sentenced nine former procuratorate officials from Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, to terms of imprisonment ranging from 1 year and 3 months to 13 years on charges including “intentional assault,” “extorting confession by torture,” and “dereliction of duty,” after they tortured and caused the death of a Hong Kong businessman during an interrogation that lasted over four days.¹⁰⁵
- In November 2018, the public security bureau in Quanzhou municipality, Fujian province, issued an apology and suspended one officer for harassing a female journalist who was reporting on a biochemical leakage incident in that locality.¹⁰⁶ The article reporting the event characterized the government’s response as rare, however.¹⁰⁷

In contrast, other examples showed a lack of commitment to hold officials accountable:

- In November 2018, the Shandong Province People’s Government appointed Ma Yuenan as the director of the provincial Big Data Bureau,¹⁰⁸ one month after she was reprimanded for failing to prevent the distribution of substandard vaccines in Shandong.¹⁰⁹ The appointment reportedly violated a Party rule that prohibits the promotion or appointment of a Party member to an important post within six months of a reprimand.¹¹⁰

Institutions of Democratic Governance

- In January 2019, the Liaoyuan Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Jilin province awarded compensation to an individual who served over 25 years in prison for a homicide conviction based on confessions reportedly extracted through torture.¹¹¹ Yet neither the court that awarded him compensation nor the court that reversed his conviction found that torture took place, and sources did not indicate that authorities had held the perpetrators accountable.¹¹²

Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance

¹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of December 10, 1948.

² International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976.

³ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed June 7, 2019; State Council Information Office, “Guojia Renquan Xingdong Jihua (2016–2020 nian)” [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5.

⁴ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of December 10, 1948, art. 21. According to Article 21 of the UDHR, “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

⁵ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 25.

⁶ See, e.g., Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhengfa Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party Political-Legal Work], effective January 13, 2019; Christian Shepherd, “China’s Peking University Tightens Party Control, Curbs Activism,” *Reuters*, November 14, 2018.

⁷ “Xi Jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli” [Xi Jinping: secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era], October 18, 2017, *Xinhua*, October 27, 2017, sec. 3.

⁸ See, e.g., Han Qingxiang, “Bixu jianchi dang dui yiqie gongzuo de lingdao” [Party leadership over every type of work must be steadfastly maintained], *Qiushi* (Seeking Truth), December 22, 2018; “Renmin Ribao pinglun yuan: tigao dang lingdao jingji gongzuo nengli he shuiping—liu lun guanche luoshi zhongyang jingji gongzuo huiyi jingshen” [People’s Daily commentator: Improve ability and standard of Party leadership in economy—six points on thoroughly actualizing spirit of central committee meeting concerning economy], *People’s Daily*, December 27, 2018.

⁹ Chang’an Street Book Club, “‘Dangjian zhixue’ Liu Hanjun: mingque lingdao hexin shi dang zixin yu jianing de biao zhi” [“Study of Party building and governance” Liu Hanjun: clearly identifying core leadership is symbol of Party’s confidence and determination], *The Paper*, October 25, 2018; Guan Ling, “Chunqiu bi: Xi hexin yi chao Jiang hexin” [Comparing history: Xi’s core has surpassed Jiang’s core], *Duwei*, February 28, 2019.

¹⁰ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jiaqiang Dang de Zhengzhi Jianshe Yijian* [Opinion on Strengthening the Party’s Political Building], January 31, 2019.

¹¹ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jiaqiang Dang de Zhengzhi Jianshe Yijian* [Opinion on Strengthening the Party’s Political Building], January 31, 2019, secs. 1, 6(18). The components of “Xi Jinping Thought” include Xi’s speeches and writings generated after 2012, when Xi became the Party Secretary. See Tao Wenzhao and Lin Jianhua, “Weihe xue xue shenme zenme xue” [The why, what, and how of studying], *Beijing Daily*, June 24, 2019; *Xi Jinping guanyu qingshaonian he Gongqingtuan gongzuo lunshu zhaibian* [Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s speeches regarding youth and the Communist Youth League], Collected Works for the Study of Xi (Beijing: Central Publishing House, 2017), *People’s Daily*, accessed May 14, 2019.

¹² Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, “Yitu dudong: ‘Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng’ xiugai duibi yilanbiao” [Understanding through one picture: Table illustrating changes to the “Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party”] October 31, 2017. “Xi Jinping Thought” is an ideology that aims at “building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing [the] nation by law, and tightening Party discipline.” John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, “Xi Jinping Thought,” *China Perspectives*, no. 2018/1–2 (June 1, 2018): 99, citing “Renmin Ribao shouci quanwei dingyi Xi Jinping ‘Sige Quanmian’” [People’s Daily first-ever authoritative definition of Xi Jinping’s “Four Comprehensives”], *People’s Daily*, February 24, 2015.

¹³ “Xi Jinping zhuchi zhongyang zhengzhiju huiyi shenyi ‘Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhengfa Gongzuo Tiaoli’” [Xi Jinping presides over meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, reviews the Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party’s Political-Legal Work], *Xinhua*, December 27, 2018.

¹⁴ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhonggong Gongchandang Zhengfa Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party Political-Legal Work], effective January 13, 2019, art. 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, art. 1.

¹⁶ Zhou Bin, “Dang qi yinling xin shidai zhengfa shiye puxie xin pianzhang” [Party’s banner leading political-legal work in new age, writes new chapters], *Legal Daily*, January 30, 2019.

¹⁷ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhonggong Gongchandang Zhengfa Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party Political-Legal Work], effective January 13, 2019, arts. 1, 5, 6(1), 7, 12(1), 15(1), 18.

¹⁸ Teng Biao, “Xi Jinping de fan falu zhanzheng” [Xi Jinping’s war against law], *Radio Free Asia*, February 4, 2019.

¹⁹ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongda Shixiang Qingshi Baogao Tiaoli* [Regulations on Requesting Instructions and Making Reports on Important Issues], effective January 31, 2019, art. 13.

²⁰ Nectar Gan, “Xi Jinping Targets Grass Roots in Push to Extend Communist Party Control,” *South China Morning Post*, November 29, 2018.

Institutions of Democratic Governance

²¹Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhibu Gongzuo Tiaoli (Shixing)* [Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Branch Operations (Provisional)], effective October 28, 2018, arts. 5, 9.

²²Cao Ying and Han Jiahui, “Dang zhang xiugai le naxie? Zhuanjia bang ni quan zhongdian” [What is amended in the Party Constitution? Experts give you the highlights], *Xinhua*, October 31, 2017; “Quanmian tigao xin shidai dangzhibu jian she zhiliang—Zhongyang Zuzhibu fuzeren jiu yinfa ‘Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhibu Gongzuo Tiaoli (Shixing)’ da jizhe wen” [Comprehensively improve Party-building quality in new era—head of Central Committee’s Organization Department answers reporters’ questions about “Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Branch Operations (Provisional)”, *Xinhua*, November 26, 2018.

²³Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “2018–2022 nian quanguo ganbu jiaoyu peixun guihua” [2018–2022 education and training plan for cadres nationwide], reprinted in *Xinhua*, November 1, 2018, sec. 4.

²⁴“Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ‘Shenhua Dang He Guojia Jigou Gaige Fang’an” [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee issues ‘Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies’], *Xinhua*, March 21, 2018, secs. 1(6), (7); “Zhongzu buzhang chen xi jian guojia xingzheng xueyuan yuanzhang tuo zhen ren renmin ribao zongbianji” [Head of Central Committee’s Organization Department Chen Xi to head Chinese Academy of Governance, Tuo Zhen becomes chief editor of People’s Daily], *Radio Free Asia*, April 4, 2018.

²⁵Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “2018–2022 nian quanguo ganbu jiaoyu peixun guihua” [2018–2022 education and training plan for cadres nationwide], reprinted in *Xinhua*, November 1, 2018, secs. 1(3), 4(1)–(7).

²⁶*Ibid.*, sec. 1(3)3.

²⁷*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongwuyuan Fa* [PRC Civil Servant Law], passed April 27, 2005, amended September 1, 2017, revised December 29, 2018, effective June 1, 2019, arts. 13(3), 14(1).

²⁸*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongwuyuan Fa* [PRC Civil Servant Law], passed April 27, 2005, effective January 1, 2006, amended September 1, 2017, arts. 11, 12.

²⁹*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongwuyuan Fa* [PRC Civil Servant Law], passed April 27, 2005, amended September 1, 2017, revised December 29, 2018, effective June 1, 2019, arts. 7, 13, 35, 57, 67.

³⁰*Ibid.*, art. 59(1), (3).

³¹See, e.g., “Qizi tanjian cai dezhi: Xinjiang qian faguan Huang Yunmin bei pan shi nian” [Wife learns during prison visit: former Xinjiang judge Huang Yunmin sentenced to 10 years], *Radio Free Asia*, November 16, 2018; Jane Perlez, “Chinese Rights Lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, Is Given Suspended Prison Sentence,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2015.

³²Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Guojia Jiguan Dang de Jianshe Yijian” [Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Party Building in Central Party and Government Agencies], issued March 2019, art. 4.

³³Holly Snape, “Re-Writing the Rules,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 1, 2019.

³⁴Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Dang Zheng Lingdao Ganbu Xuanba Renyong Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres], effective March 3, 2019. These regulations replace the 2014 version. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Dang Zheng Lingdao Ganbu Xuanba Renyong Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres], issued and effective, January 15, 2014.

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Institutions of Democratic Governance

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Institutions of Democratic Governance

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Institutions of Democratic Governance

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Institutions of Democratic Governance

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