

SPECIAL TOPIC: MIGRANT NEIGHBORHOODS A TARGET OF ANTI-CRIME AND VICE CAMPAIGN

Findings

- An anti-crime campaign launched by central authorities in 2018 is being used to target marginalized groups in China. Called the “Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice,” the stated aims of the three-year campaign include guaranteeing China’s lasting political stability and consolidating the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritative power.
- The Commission observed reports of local governments invoking this anti-crime campaign to target groups of people including petitioners (individuals who seek redress from the government), religious believers, village election candidates, lawyers, and internal migrants.
- Municipal governments carried out large-scale evictions and demolitions of internal migrant neighborhoods in the name of the anti-crime campaign. These localities appear to be using the campaign to achieve the goals of a central government plan to “renovate” urban villages across China by 2020. Urban villages are municipal neighborhoods that are categorized as rural under China’s household registration (*hukou*) system. Registered residents of these urban villages often rent to internal migrants, who have *hukou* from other localities and face discrimination in housing, education, and the provision of government services.
- In addition to evictions and demolitions of internal migrant neighborhoods, local governments have also invoked the anti-crime campaign to justify increasing monitoring and surveillance of internal migrant neighborhoods. For example, in Xi’an municipality, public security officers investigated over 800 internal migrant communities and over 400 urban villages under the local “2019 Thunder Strike and Iron Fist Anti-Crime and Vice Operation.”

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Call on Chinese authorities to end forced evictions, demolitions, and heightened surveillance of internal migrant communities across China, and to follow both international and Chinese law in providing adequate notice, compensation, and assistance to residents when public safety requires demolishing dangerous structures.
- Encourage the Chinese government to expand both the rights of migrant workers in China, and the space for civil society organizations that provide social services and legal assistance to internal migrants. Note that improving the rights of internal migrants and expanding their access to social services would likely lower the chances of spontaneous, large-scale protests, while large-scale forced evictions, demolitions, and surveillance could increase the likelihood of such protests.

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

- Call on Chinese authorities to accelerate reforms to the *hukou* system, including lowering restrictions on migration to major cities and centers of economic opportunity; equalizing the level and quality of public benefits and services tied to local hukou and residence permits; and implementing laws and regulations to provide equal treatment for all Chinese citizens, regardless of place of birth, residence, or *hukou* status.
- Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in research and outreach to migrants, in order to advance legal and anti-discrimination assistance for migrants and their families, and to encourage policy debates aimed at eliminating inequality and discrimination connected to residence policies, including the *hukou* system.

SPECIAL TOPIC: MIGRANT NEIGHBORHOODS A TARGET OF ANTI-CRIME AND VICE CAMPAIGN

Introduction

This past year, the Commission observed reports of local authorities in jurisdictions across China targeting internal migrants, petitioners, religious groups, and others with increased monitoring and other forms of repression. In many cases, local authorities tied these actions to a central-level Chinese Communist Party and government campaign called the “Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice” (*Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng*, or the “anti-crime and vice campaign”). This section will examine the origins and broad application of this campaign, with a special focus on how lower-level Party and government officials used the campaign to justify increased monitoring of internal migrants and large-scale evictions and demolitions of migrant neighborhoods.

On January 23, 2018, the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council announced the commencement of a three-year national anti-crime and vice campaign in the form of a centrally issued circular. Authorities did not make the circular publicly available, but the central government news agency Xinhua provided a summary of the circular.¹ According to that summary, the four stated aims of the campaign are:

- guaranteeing the people’s contentment in life and work,
- social stability and orderliness,
- China’s lasting political stability,² and
- further consolidating the foundation of Communist Party rule.³

A Chinese academic observed that the campaign is intended to bring greater legitimacy to the Party’s governance by increasing central Party and government officials’ control over local government, which is often otherwise dominated by “grass-roots leaders” of villages and enterprises.⁴ A Party official announced that by the end of March 2019, authorities had prosecuted 79,018 people as part of the campaign.⁵

According to state-run media outlet Xinhua, the Party has directed the campaign to focus on “key areas, key industries, and key sectors with prominent problems of crime and vice,”⁶ and the Ministry of Public Security emphasized that the campaign must include the “modernization of social management at the grassroots level to eradicate the breeding grounds of crime and vice” (*chanchu hei’e shili zisheng turang*).⁷ This broad mandate has provided local authorities with large discretion to target various types of groups and conduct, leading international media⁸ as well as the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection to openly criticize the broad application of the campaign at the local level.⁹

Local authorities across China have invoked the campaign to restrict the freedoms of a wide range of marginalized groups. For example, a number of local governments have specifically named petitioners—individuals with grievances seeking redress from the government—as targets of the campaign.¹⁰ Some local governments reportedly increased monitoring and suppression of religious groups

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

in the name of the anti-crime and vice campaign, with officials asking residents to report on members of religious groups that are not officially registered.¹¹ Authorities excluded 51,000 individuals from running in village elections as part of the anti-crime and vice campaign, claiming some of these individuals had suspected ties to organized crime or “did not meet criteria” such as “excellent political quality.”¹² Authorities have also used the campaign to suppress ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region.¹³ [For more information on how government officials have used this campaign against religious believers, ethnic minority groups, petitioners, and other groups, see Section II—Freedom of Religion, Section IV—Xinjiang, and Section V—Tibet.]

Also as part of the campaign, some local governments increased monitoring of “urban villages” (*chengzhong cun*) that are often areas with large populations of internal migrants.¹⁴ Local municipal governments have sought to demolish these urban villages, sometimes referred to as “slums” (*penghu qu*) by government sources, as part of a national plan to “renovate” (*gaizao*) all urban villages by 2020.¹⁵ Some local government documents specifically point to urban villages and neighborhoods with large numbers of migrant workers as areas with “crime and vice forces” (*hei e shili*).¹⁶ One example of increased monitoring of migrant communities this past year as part of the anti-crime and vice campaign is Xi’an’s “2019 Thunder Strike and Iron Fist Anti-Crime and Vice Operation” (*lei ting tie wan saohai chu’e xingdong*) that involved public security officers investigating over 800 internal migrant communities and over 400 urban villages.¹⁷

Urban Village Eviction, Demolition, and Surveillance under the Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign: Yuhuazhai in Xi’an

In October 2018, local officials of the Xi’an Hi-Tech Industries Development Zone (Xi’an Hi-Tech Zone), Xi’an municipality, Shaanxi province, initiated an eviction and demolition campaign followed by a large-scale inspection and registration of remaining businesses and residents as part of local implementation of the national “anti-crime and vice campaign” in February 2019.¹⁸ The campaign targeted Yuhuazhai village in Yanta district, Xi’an, itself a collection of eight urban villages¹⁹ with a local official reporting more than 100,000 internal migrant residents compared with 9,000 residents with local residence permits—leading to numerous rights abuses and several deaths.²⁰ The campaign was led by the Xi’an Hi-Tech Zone Management Committee and largely state-owned education technology company China Hi-Tech Group,²¹ acting jointly with over 20 government agencies to “thoroughly renovate, evict, and demolish” residences and local enterprises within the village.²² China Business News reporters observed that in October 2018, the Xi’an Hi-Tech Zone Management Committee reportedly held a competition among ten districts and townships over the acquisition of more than 33 square kilometers of land, scoring them on categories including whole-village demolition, barrier removal, and pollution reduction.²³

Urban Village Eviction, Demolition, and Surveillance under the Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign: Yuhazhai in Xi'an—Continued

Local officials reportedly hired several thousand people—some allegedly members of criminal syndicates—to harass and assault residents,²⁴ resulting in at least one death,²⁵ as well as to demolish commercial establishments in October.²⁶ Officials gave businesses and residents notice on the same day of the demolition, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to seek judicial or administrative review and denying entrance to those without residence permits so that many were unable to recover their personal property.²⁷ In November, residents reportedly protested continued demolitions and faced violence from people in local security uniforms.²⁸ Demolition campaigns reportedly were also planned for 116 villages in and around Xi'an, with 62 scheduled to begin within 2019.²⁹

Vulnerability of Internal Migrants and Household Registration Policies

Chinese authorities have a history of carrying out forced evictions³⁰ that affect migrant workers in particular. International rights organizations documented widespread forced evictions prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Expo 2010 in Shanghai municipality.³¹ In late 2017 and early 2018, in response to two fatal fires in migrant neighborhoods,³² authorities in Beijing municipality and the surrounding areas launched a campaign of large-scale forced evictions and demolitions in migrant neighborhoods across the region.³³ Residents reportedly were given days or hours to leave.³⁴

Chinese migrant workers continued to be marginalized because of their residency status under the household registration (*hukou*) system. The *hukou* system, established in 1958,³⁵ classified Chinese citizens as being urban or rural and effectively tied them to a locality.³⁶ According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2018, 286 million people in China did not live in their *hukou* location.³⁷ Yet provision of certain government services, such as education, remains tied to one's *hukou* location, which is, in general, inherited from one's parents.³⁸ The *hukou* system reportedly also exacerbates these migrants' vulnerability to exploitation in China's workforce.³⁹ [For more information on forced labor, see Section II—Human Trafficking.]

In 2014, the government began to reform the *hukou* system to gradually eliminate the urban-rural distinction and allow some migrants to obtain *hukou* in smaller cities.⁴⁰ In April 2019, the National Development and Reform Commission required cities with populations of 1 to 3 million to eliminate all restrictions on obtaining *hukou*, yet restrictions remained in cities with populations above 3 million, such as Xi'an and Beijing,⁴¹ and the government continues to use the *hukou* system to restrict internal migration.⁴²

In 2014, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights urged China “to ensure that any relocation necessary for city renewal is carried out after prior consultation with the affected individuals . . .”⁴³ In 2018, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was concerned by reports that changes to the *hukou* system “have not made substantial positive changes for many rural migrants, including ethnic minorities.”⁴⁴

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

Actions taken by Chinese government officials enforcing the eviction campaign throughout China contravene both international standards⁴⁵ and Chinese law.⁴⁶ Restrictions on movement and discrimination arising from the *hukou* system contravene international human rights standards guaranteeing freedom of residence.⁴⁷

Notes to Section II—Special Topic: Migrant Neighborhoods a Target of Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

¹“Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu ‘Guanyu Zhankai Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi’” [Party Central Committee and State Council issue “Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice”], *Xinhua*, January 24, 2018.

²These three concepts originally appeared in Xi Jinping’s inaugural address to the study session of the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau at the 18th Party Congress’s in 2012. Xi Jinping, “Jinjin weirao jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi xuexi xuanchuan guanche Dang de Shiba Da jingshen” [Focus on upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics; study, disseminate, and implement the spirit of the 18th Party Congress], November 17, 2012, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, November 19, 2012; “Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu ‘Guanyu Zhankai Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi’” [Party Central Committee and State Council issue “Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice”], *Xinhua*, January 24, 2018.

³“Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu ‘Guanyu Zhankai Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi’” [Party Central Committee and State Council issue “Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice”], *Xinhua*, January 24, 2018.

⁴Guo Rui, “China’s War on Organised Crime, Corrupt Officials Sees 79,000 People Detained,” *South China Morning Post*, April 14, 2019.

⁵“Saohei ban: jiezhi sanyue di quanguo qisu shehui she’e fanzui an 14226 jian” [Crime and vice office: number of suspected crime and vice cases prosecuted nationwide reaches 14,226 by end of March], *Xinhua*, April 9, 2019.

⁶“Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan fachu ‘Guanyu Zhankai Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng De Tongzhi’” [Party Central Committee and State Council issue “Circular Regarding the Launch of the Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice”], *Xinhua*, January 24, 2018.

⁷“Tigao zhengzhi zhanwei zhongshen tuijin saohai chu’e gongjianzhan” [Raise the status of political thought in deepening and promoting the tough battle to eliminate crime and evil], *People’s Public Security Daily*, reprinted in Ministry of Public Security, October 17, 2018.

⁸“Zhongguo san nian saohai chu’e ying ‘zhongkao’: baolu de wenti yu qianjing” [China’s three-year [campaign to] eliminate crime and vice meets “midterm test”: exposed problems and future possibilities], *BBC*, April 10, 2019; “China Is Waging a Nationwide Campaign against Gang Crime,” *Economist*, February 28, 2019.

⁹Zhang Yan, “Saohei chu’e bixu jingzhun shibie jingzhun daji” [Eliminate crime and vice campaign requires precise distinctions and precise attacks], *China Discipline and Inspection Daily*, April 17, 2019.

¹⁰See, e.g., “Yongzhou shi saohai chu’e zhuanxiang douzheng dudao zu gonggao” [Yongzhou Municipal Specialized Struggle to Eliminate Crime and Vice Supervisory Group public announcement], Yongzhou Municipal People’s Government, April 12, 2019; Rights Defense Network, “Hei shehui dingyi zao dianfu, Hubei Qianjiang Zhouji Nongchang duli houxuanren Peng Feng shoudao difang saohai wenjian” [Definition of organized crime radically changed, Zhouji farm, Qianjiang, Hubei independent candidate Peng Feng receives local anti-crime document], August 15, 2018; Rights Defense Network, “Neimenggu E’erduosi Hangjin Qi zhengfu ba shangfang gaozhuang wangshang fatie deng xingwei dou lieru saohai chu’e de fanchou” [In Ordos, Inner Mongolia, Hangjin Banner government lists petitioning, online posting as categories in scope of eliminate crime and vice campaign], March 19, 2018.

¹¹Feng Gang, “Saohei chu’e xingdong maotou zhizhi zongjiao xintu” [“Anti-crime and vice” campaign spearhead aimed at religious believers], *Bitter Winter*, November 16, 2018; Gu Qi, “Saohei shize zhenya xinyang” [“Anti-crime” in reality suppresses religious faith], *Bitter Winter*, February 18, 2019.

¹²Xiong Feng, “Rang renmin qunzhong daizhe manman de anquan gan juesheng quanmian xiaokang—quanguo saohai chu’e zhuanxiang douzheng kaiju zhi nian zongshu” [Let the masses carry a sense of safety while achieving comprehensive moderate prosperity—national eliminate crime and vice campaign year summary], *Xinhua*, December 27, 2018; Zhang Yang, “Saohei chu’e wuzhuo shouhu tian lang qi qing” [Eliminate the filth of crime and vice, protect clear skies and fresh air], *People’s Daily*, February 26, 2019.

¹³“Sao hei chu’e’ ru jiang shaoshu minzu bei ‘hei’?” [“Anti-Crime and Vice” comes to Xinjiang, have ethnic minorities become “criminalized?”], *Radio Free Asia*, April 16, 2019; “China Is Waging a Nationwide Campaign against Gang Crime,” *Economist*, February 28, 2019. See also “Hei shili goujie Dalai Lama Xizang saohai mingque qingli mubiao” [Organized crime forces collusion with the Dalai Lama, Tibet makes clear its goal of cleansing], *Duowei*, February 10, 2018.

¹⁴Ma Li, “Why China’s Migrants Can’t Just Leave Poverty Behind,” *Sixth Tone*, September 1, 2018; “Saohei chu’e zhuanxiang douzheng youguan wenti” [Questions regarding the specialized struggle to sweep away organized crime and eliminate vice], Yong’an Municipal People’s Government, November 16, 2018; “Saohei chu’e zhexie shi yao zhidao!” [Things you need to know about the anti-crime and vice campaign!], Guizhou Finance Bureau, March 15, 2019.

¹⁵Tom Hancock, “Chinese Slum Demolitions Reveal Government Debt Strains,” *Financial Times*, April 22, 2019; He Huifeng, “China’s Mass Urbanisation Projects Mean the End for Guangzhou’s 800-Year-Old Urban Villages,” *South China Morning Post*, April 16, 2019; State Council, “Guojia Xinxing Chengzhenhua Guihua (2014–2020 nian)” [National Plan for New Model of Urbanization (2014–2020)], March 16, 2014, table 5.

¹⁶“Zhi quan qu guangda renmin qunzhong guanyu saohai chu’e zhuanxiang douzheng de gongkai xin” [Open letter to the people of the district regarding the specialized struggle to sweep away organized crime and eliminate vice], Guangfeng District People’s Government, March 4,

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

2019; “Saohei chu’e zhexie shi yao zhidao!” [Things you need to know about the anti-crime and evil campaign!], Guizhou Finance Bureau, March 15, 2019; Wang Ruolin, “Woshi hangye lingyu zhengzhi qude jieduanxing chengxiao” [Shenzhen business management achieving results in phases], *Shenzhen News*, April 9, 2019; “Saohei chu’e zhuanxiang douzheng youguan wenti” [Questions regarding the specialized struggle to sweep away organized crime and eliminate vice], Yong’an Municipal People’s Government, November 16, 2018.

¹⁷“Quanmian tuijin ‘2019 leiting tie wan saohai chu’e xingdong’ woshi gong’an jiguan ‘tie chui xingdong’ quanmian zhili she huang she du” [Full-scale promotion of “2019 Thunderclap Iron Fist Anti-Crime and Vice Operation” Xi’an public security agencies’ “Iron Hammer Operation” comprehensively managed suspected obscenity and gambling], *Xi’an Evening Post*, reprinted in Xi’an People’s Government, March 28, 2019.

¹⁸Xie Tao, “Xi’an Gaoxin jingfang zuzhi kazhan Yuhuazhai da guimo qingcha xingdong” [Police in Gaoxin, Xi’an, organize large-scale inspection operation in Yuhuazhai], *China Business News*, February 22, 2019.

¹⁹“Gaobie chengzhong cun bainian Yuhua yin ‘xinsheng’” [Bidding farewell to 100-year-old urban village Yuhua and ushering in “new era”], *Development Zone Report*, October 26, 2018; Real Estate Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), “Zaijian le, Yuhuazhai!” [Goodbye, Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018.

²⁰Li Jing, Zhao Bin, and Zhang Pengkang, “Yuhuazhai yuedi chaiqian? gongye yuanqu kaichai, cunzi cengcai hai wei qidong” [Yuhuazhai to be demolished at the end of the month? industrial park district begins demolition, village demolition yet to begin], *China Business News*, October 22, 2018. See also Li Yunfeng, “Xi’an Yuhuazhai tuijin zhengcun chaiqian, bainian chengzhong cun jiu mao huan xin yan” [Yuhuazhai, Xi’an, advances with demolition of entire village, hundred-year-old urban village gets a facelift], *Phoenix New Media*, December 4, 2018; Xiong Bin and Chen Jie, “Xi’an Yuhuazhai cunmin kangyi qiangsu zao zhenya” [Villagers in Yuhuazhai, Xi’an, protesting forced demolition are oppressed], *New Tang Dynasty*, December 6, 2018.

²¹Real Estate Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), “Zaijian le, Yuhuazhai!” [Goodbye, Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018; Wang Feng, “Zhuanxing zhiye jiaoyu: Zhongguo Gaoke Jituan chengli quanqiu jiaoyu fazhan yanjiu yuan” [Transforming professional education: China Hi-Tech Group Co. establishes global education development research center], *21st Century Economic Report*, April 28, 2017.

²²Li Yunfeng, “Xi’an Yuhuazhai tuijin zhengcun chaiqian, bainian chengzhong cun jiu mao huan xin yan” [Yuhuazhai, Xi’an, advances with demolition of entire village, hundred-year-old urban village gets a facelift], *Phoenix New Media*, December 4, 2018.

²³Li Jing, Zhao Bin, and Zhang Pengkang, “Yuhuazhai yuedi chaiqian? gongye yuanqu kaichai, cunzi cengcai hai wei qidong” [Yuhuazhai to be demolished at the end of the month? industrial park District begins demolition, village demolition yet to begin], *China Business News*, October 22, 2018.

²⁴“Xi’an yu qian cunmin kangyi qiangchai zao zhenya” [Xi’an represses more than a thousand villagers protesting forced demolitions], *Radio Free Asia*, December 5, 2018.

²⁵Xiong Bin and Chen Jie, “Xi’an Yuhuazhai cunmin kangyi qiangsu zao zhenya” [Villagers in Yuhuazhai, Xi’an, protesting forced demolition are oppressed], *New Tang Dynasty Television*, December 6, 2018.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷“Feifa chaiqian yan de minxin yifa zhiguo zhongyu minsheng” [How can illegal demolition gain the people’s support, when rule of law is prioritized over people’s livelihood], *China Guangdong Web*, November 12, 2018.

²⁸“Feifa chaiqian yan de min xin yifa zhiguo zhongyu minsheng” [How can illegal demolition gain the people’s support, when rule of law is prioritized over people’s livelihood], *China Guangdong Web*, November 12, 2018; “Xi’an yu qian cunmin kangyi qiangchai zao zhenya” [Xi’an represses more than a thousand villagers protesting forced demolitions], *Radio Free Asia*, December 5, 2018.

²⁹Real Estate Elder Sister S (dichanSjie), “Zaijian le, Yuhuazhai!” [Goodbye, Yuhuazhai!], Zhihu, October 17, 2018.

³⁰See, e.g., Amnesty International, “Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face Violent Eviction in China,” ASA 17/001/201, October 2012, 11–23; Human Rights Watch, “Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants’ Rights Movement in China,” March 25, 2004, 6–11.

³¹Amnesty International, “Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face Violent Eviction in China,” ASA 17/001/201, October 2012, 11–12, 31–32; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, “One World, Whose Dream? Housing Rights Violations and the Beijing Olympic Games,” July 2008, 7–8; UN Watch, “38 Rights Groups Urge U.N. to Investigate Shanghai Expo Eviction of 18,000 Families,” July 22, 2010.

³²“Beijing Daxing huozai yu’nanzhe mingdan gongbu jingfang xingju 18 ren” [List of victims of fire in Daxing, Beijing, made public, police criminally detain 18], *People’s Daily*, November 20, 2017; Guo Chao, “Quanshi kaizhan anquan yinhuan da paicha da qingli da zhengzhi” [City-wide launch of major inspections, major sweeps, and major rectifications of safety risks], *Beijing News*, November 20, 2017; Jiang Chenglong and Cui Jia, “Beijing Continues Its Safety Crackdown in Wake of Fire,” *China Daily*, November 27, 2017; Zheping Huang, “What You Need to Know about Beijing’s Crackdown on Its ‘Low-End Population,’” *Quartz*, November 27, 2017; “Beijing Shibalidian xiang huozai hou ‘diduan renkou’ zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu Cai Qi cizhi” [After fire in Beijing’s Shibalidian township, more violent evictions of the low-end population, citizens jointly sign letter urging Cai Qi to resign], *Radio Free Asia*, December 14, 2017.

³³Beijing Municipality Administration of Work Safety Committee, *Beijing Shi Anquan Shengchan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Kaizhan Anquan Yinhuan Da Paicha Da Qingli Da Zhengzhi Zhuanxiang Xingdong De Tongzhi* [Circular on Launch of Special Campaign of Major Investigations, Major Cleanup, and Major Rectification of Safety Risks], issued November 19, 2017, sec.

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

4; Matt Rivers and Serenitie Wang, “Beijing Forces Migrant Workers from Their Homes in ‘Savage’ Demolitions,” *CNN*, December 9, 2017; “Sensitive Word of the Week: Low-End Population,” *China Digital Times*, November 30, 2017; “Beijing Shibalidian xiang huozai hou ‘diduan renkou’ zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu Cai Qi cizhi” [After fire in Beijing’s Shibalidian township, more violent evictions of the ‘low-end population,’ citizens jointly sign letter urging Cai Qi to resign], *Radio Free Asia*, December 14, 2017; “Chinese Artist Who Filmed Beijing’s Mass Evictions Now Faces Eviction Himself,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 1, 2018. See also Shen Fan and Li Rongde, “Beijing’s Migrant Eviction Frenzy Spills Over to Hebei,” *Caixin*, December 27, 2017; “Beijing ‘diduan’ xingdong manyan Hebei Sanhe baoli qugan wailai renkou” [Beijing ‘low-end’ campaign spreads, migrants violently driven out of Sanhe, Hebei], *Radio Free Asia*, December 30, 2017.

³⁴ Shen Fan and Li Rongde, “Beijing’s Migrant Eviction Frenzy Spills Over to Hebei,” *Caixin Global*, December 27, 2017; Emily Wang and Yi-Ling Liu, “Beijing Evictions of Migrant Workers Stir Widespread Anger,” *Associated Press*, November 29, 2017; Jun Mai, “They Came Banging and Kicking: Beijing Airport Workers Swept Up in Fire Safety Crackdown,” *South China Morning Post*, November 29, 2017. For more information on past forced evictions, see CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 10, 2018, Section II—Special Topic: Forced Evictions in Beijing Municipality.

³⁵ National People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli* [PRC Regulations on Household Registration], issued and effective January 9, 1958.

³⁶ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., “Human Capital and China’s Future Growth,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 28; Yang Song, “Hukou-Based Labour Market Discrimination and Ownership Structure in Urban China,” *Urban Studies* 53, no. 8 (2016): 1658; Spencer Sheehan, “China’s Hukou Reforms and the Urbanization Challenge,” *The Diplomat*, February 22, 2017. For more information on China’s hukou system, see CECC, *2017 Annual Report*, October 5, 2017, 169–70.

³⁷ National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2018 nian jingji yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiaohao wancheng” [The economy moved within a reasonable range in 2018, main expected development targets are accomplished well], January 21, 2019.

³⁸ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., “Human Capital and China’s Future Growth,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 28; Yang Song, “Hukou-Based Labour Market Discrimination and Ownership Structure in Urban China,” *Urban Studies* 53, no. 8 (2016): 1658; China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” accessed July 26, 2019; Eli Friedman, *Insurgency Trap: Labor Politics in Postsocialist China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 14.

³⁹ Ma Li, “Why China’s Migrants Can’t Just Leave Poverty Behind,” *Sixth Tone*, September 1, 2018; China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” accessed July 26, 2019.

⁴⁰ State Council, *Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Huji Zhidu Gaige De Yijian* [Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration System Reform], issued July 30, 2014, paras. 4–9; “China to Help 100m Settle in Cities,” *Xinhua*, reprinted in *China Daily*, July 30, 2014; State Council General Office, “Tuidong 1 yi fei huji renkou zai chengshi luohu fang’an” [Plan promoting city hukou registration for 100 million individuals without household registration], issued October 11, 2019, paras. 4–6; “Beijing to Scrap Urban-Rural Residency Distinction,” *China Digital Times*, September 21, 2016.

⁴¹ Cheng Siwei and Timmy Shen, “Residency Restrictions to Be Scrapped in Many of China’s Cities,” *Caixin*, April 8, 2019; National Development and Reform Commission, “2019 nian xinxing chengzhenhua jianshe zhongdian renwu” [Key tasks of new urbanization construction in 2019], April 8, 2019; “Hukou Difficulty Index,” *MacroPolo*, Paulson Institute, accessed July 26, 2019. See also “About On the Road,” *MacroPolo*, Paulson Institute, accessed July 26, 2019.

⁴² State Council, *Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Tuijin Huji Zhidu Gaige De Yijian* [Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration System Reform], issued July 30, 2014, paras. 6–7. See also “About On the Road,” *MacroPolo*, Paulson Institute, accessed July 26, 2019.

⁴³ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th Meeting, May 23, 2014, E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, June 13, 2014, para. 30.

⁴⁴ UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 2675th Meeting, August 28, 2018, CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, September 19, 2018, paras. 34–35.

⁴⁵ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), E/1992/23, December 13, 1991, paras. 8(a), 18. Note that this finding is reaffirmed in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, 20 May 20, 1997, para. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 11(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed February 13, 2019. China has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, May 20, 1997, paras. 15–16.

⁴⁶ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Qiangzhi Fa* [PRC Administrative Enforcement Law], passed June 30, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, arts. 43–44. For analyses of the legality of the evictions in Beijing under Chinese law, see “Jiang Ping, He Weifang deng xuezhe lushi dui Beijing shi zhengfu qugan wailai jumin de xingdong ji qi yiju de xingzheng wenjian xiang Quanguo Rendahui Changweihui tiquing hexianxing shencha de quanwen” [Full text of request from Jiang Ping, He Weifang, and other scholars and lawyers to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee for a review of the constitutionality of the Beijing government’s campaign

Anti-Crime and Vice Campaign

to expel nonresidents and relevant administrative documents], December 19, 2017, reprinted in Rights Defense Network, December 24, 2017; Wang Liuyi, “Beijing shi “dongji qingli xingdong” de hefaxing fenxi” [Analyzing the legality of Beijing’s “winter cleanup campaign”], WeChat post, reprinted in *China Digital Times*, November 28, 2017.

⁴⁷International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 2, 13(1); UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, June 13, 2014, para. 15; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, March 28, 2017, paras. 27–28. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “From Forced Evictions of Migrant Workers to Abused Children: Violations of Social & Economic Rights in China Refute the ‘China Development Model,’” December 7, 2017.