

## CECC Annual Report 2021

### KEY FINDINGS

#### HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY

- During and prior to the Commission’s 2021 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party, as well as individuals and entities acting with their encouragement or at their direction, conducted a global campaign to silence criticism or chill the expression of political views considered unacceptable by the Party on a range of issues, including events in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and Taiwan.
- The effects of this campaign fell heavily on Uyghurs living outside China who chose to speak out about abuses in the XUAR. Uyghurs in the United States and elsewhere reported threats and intimidation as well as threats to family members still inside China.
- During this reporting period, the Commission noted increased efforts by the Party and government to harass and intimidate researchers, journalists, and think tanks overseas, especially those working on issues related to the XUAR.
- The Party and government continued to use informal, undeclared forms of extraterritorial economic coercion and intimidation to silence international criticism of its actions and avoid accountability for human rights violations, particularly the ongoing genocide in the XUAR. This economic coercion included undeclared economic sanctions against countries or individual foreign industries; threats to restrict foreign businesses’ or institutions’ access to China; and the use of state-controlled media outlets to signal to individuals, businesses, and institutions inside China which foreign targets merit retaliation.
- The Commission also observed increasing use of formal sanctions by the Chinese government to punish criticism of China, particularly criticism of Chinese government policies in the XUAR and Hong Kong. Among those China formally sanctioned during this reporting period were the Commission and two of its members.
- China’s new National Security Law for Hong Kong—passed by the National People’s Congress in June 2020—contains an extraterritorial provision potentially criminalizing speech pertaining to Hong Kong, Tibetan areas of China, or the XUAR by persons outside Hong Kong. Following the law’s passage, Hong Kong authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of a U.S. citizen for his support of pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong.
- During this reporting period, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued a longstanding global campaign to discredit universal rights in international institutions, particularly by impeding or redirecting the work of United Nations human rights bodies, in what Human Rights Watch described in 2017 as “a systematic attempt to subvert the ability of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in China and beyond.” These activities seek to reshape international consensus

around human rights in ways that diminish the power of the individual to seek redress from the state.

- During and immediately prior to this reporting period, the Commission noted the use or threat of economic coercion against countries considering restrictions on Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei. Countries that responded to concerns regarding potential violations of privacy and free expression rights and surveillance vulnerabilities facilitated by the use of Huawei internet equipment and infrastructure in their 5G networks were met with threats of economic retaliation by Chinese government officials, or pressure from their own business communities prompted by the fear of retaliation.

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY

### *Findings*

- During and prior to the Commission’s 2021 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party, as well as individuals and entities acting with their encouragement or at their direction, conducted a global campaign to silence criticism or chill the expression of political views considered unacceptable by the Chinese Communist Party on a range of issues, including events in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and Taiwan.
- The effects of this campaign fell heavily on Uyghurs living outside China who chose to speak out about abuses in the XUAR. Uyghurs in the United States and elsewhere reported threats and intimidation as well as threats to family members still inside China.
- During this reporting period, the Commission noted increased efforts by the Party and government to harass and intimidate researchers, journalists, and think tanks overseas, especially those working on issues related to the XUAR.
- The Party and government continued to use informal, undeclared forms of extraterritorial economic coercion and intimidation to silence international criticism of its actions and avoid accountability for human rights violations, particularly the ongoing genocide in the XUAR. This economic coercion included undeclared economic sanctions against countries or individual foreign industries; threats to restrict foreign businesses’ or institutions’ access to China; and the use of state-controlled media outlets to signal to individuals, businesses, and institutions inside China which foreign targets merit retaliation.
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#### *Recommendations*

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Call on officials in the Chinese government and Communist Party to abide by internationally accepted norms on freedom of expression—particularly those contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—and to encourage China-domiciled companies and entities to do the same. Emphasize that failure to respect these widely accepted international norms can erode trust and reduce the appeal of China as a partner and as a market for foreign governments and businesses.
- Prepare a strategy for countering harassment or surveillance by representatives or agents of the Chinese government and other authoritarian governments within the United States, including harassment or surveillance of members of Turkic Muslim communities. This should include the establishment of a dedicated task force within the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on and respond to harassment or surveillance of individuals inside the United States by agents of the Chinese government or other authoritarian governments.
- Develop a strategy to blunt the Chinese government’s coercive use of economic power to chill speech globally and avoid accountability for its human rights abuses. This could involve one or more of the following:
  - Coordination with allies and like-minded partner nations to diversify their global economic footprint away from China, to reduce the risk of Chinese economic coercion;
  - The creation of a pool of funds to compensate individuals or entities subject to economic coercion by the Chinese government or entities under its direction; and
  - Other coordinated efforts to assist countries facing economic coercion by China, to reduce the impact of such coercion on targeted companies and industries.
- Continue efforts to encourage other countries to limit or to eliminate their use of Huawei technology in their national wireless networks.
- Ensure broad, sustained U.S. engagement in UN bodies with human rights functions, including the General Assembly, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Consultative Group, and the Economic and Social

Council's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, to ensure that these bodies remain true to their founding principles. This engagement should include putting forth qualified American candidates to serve on these and other UN bodies with human rights functions, as well as encouraging allies and like-minded partner nations to do the same, and building coalitions to support the candidates they put forth.

○ Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that incentivize the study of languages spoken within China, the deep study of China's political system, and the Chinese Communist Party's tools of external influence. The ability to anticipate and understand China's human rights violations within the United States and at the UN—and to generate consensus around timely, effective, and culturally appropriate responses—must be informed by greater understanding of China's political and legal system and of the languages, religions, and cultural diversity within China.

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY

### *Overseas Harassment and Intimidation*

#### HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF UYGHURS OVERSEAS

During the 2021 reporting year, the Commission continued to observe state-backed harassment and intimidation of Uyghurs living outside China, including those Uyghurs who have chosen to speak out about atrocities committed by the Chinese government in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Uyghur individuals in the United States and other countries have reported threats and intimidation through electronic media, and threats—both direct and implied—to family members still inside China.<sup>1</sup> Since 2017, this intimidation and harassment has taken place alongside the mass persecution of Uyghurs within China, backed by pervasive electronic and physical surveillance and widespread reported incidents of arbitrary detention and torture.<sup>2</sup> [For more information on human rights violations against Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in the XUAR, see Section IV—Xinjiang.]

In some cases, the intimidation and harassment of Uyghurs living outside China was conducted by individuals who identified themselves as members of the Chinese government, including police and members of security agencies.<sup>3</sup> In one example, Qelbinur Sedik, a Uyghur woman living in the Netherlands, recorded a video call from a man identifying himself as a police officer, calling from the phone of a sister still in the XUAR.<sup>4</sup> During the call the officer told her, “You must bear in mind that all your family and relatives are with us. You must think very carefully about that fact.”<sup>5</sup> He also encouraged her to report on the “friends” she had made abroad, and to proceed to her nearest Chinese embassy for repatriation, telling her that China “opens its arms to you.”<sup>6</sup> During and prior to this reporting period, the Chinese government placed many Uyghurs returning to China from overseas into various forms of detention.<sup>7</sup> The Chinese Communist Party and government also used social media platforms banned in China, such as Facebook and Twitter, in their campaign against outspoken Uyghurs overseas.<sup>8</sup>

#### HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF RESEARCHERS AND THINK TANKS OVERSEAS

During this reporting period, the Commission noted increased efforts by the Chinese Communist Party and government to harass and intimidate researchers, journalists, and think tanks overseas, especially those working on issues related to the XUAR.<sup>9</sup> These efforts included formal sanctions and visa bans,<sup>10</sup> state media condoning or reposting threats against family members still in China,<sup>11</sup> direct harassment and intimidation through spokespersons and state-controlled media outlets,<sup>12</sup> and a defamation lawsuit against a prominent researcher.<sup>13</sup> The right of academics and researchers to research and write freely is protected by international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.<sup>14</sup>

In one such case, state media and diplomatic spokespersons targeted German researcher Adrian Zenz for his work on mass intern-

ment camps and birth restrictions in the XUAR.<sup>15</sup> China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also endorsed a defamation lawsuit brought against Zenz in the XUAR by Chinese companies doing business there,<sup>16</sup> and announced sanctions prohibiting companies and institutions associated with Zenz from doing business with China.<sup>17</sup> In another case, state media and propaganda officials targeted Australia-based researcher Vicky Xu for her research on forced labor in the XUAR, inspiring further attacks on her by ordinary Chinese internet users.<sup>18</sup> The attacks on Xu—which included social media accounts linked to a state propaganda official spreading defamatory materials on major Chinese social media platforms<sup>19</sup>—built on previous rounds of state harassment that included pressure on her family from police.<sup>20</sup>

*Chilling of Free Speech Through Informal Economic Coercion and Intimidation*

During and prior to this reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party and government have used informal, undeclared forms of extraterritorial economic coercion and intimidation to silence international criticism of their actions and avoid accountability for human rights violations, particularly severe human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). These forms of informal coercion included undeclared economic sanctions against countries or individual foreign industries;<sup>21</sup> threats—either stated or implicit—to restrict foreign businesses’ or institutions’ access to China;<sup>22</sup> and the use of state-controlled media outlets to signal to individuals, businesses, and institutions inside China which foreign targets merit retaliation.<sup>23</sup>

**Informal Economic Coercion: Distinct From Traditional Sanctions and Tariffs**

“Informal” coercion is distinct from “formal” coercion in that the Chinese government and Communist Party appear to take action to punish targets without a formal declaration—or even acknowledgement—that retaliation is occurring.<sup>24</sup> One study of such practices assessed that the government and Party may prefer the use of informal tools because they offer plausible deniability and flexibility, and because the government and Party’s “use of informal measures and selective application of domestic legal regimes match [their] regulatory practice across domestic economic policy.”<sup>25</sup> This approach began to take shape under former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao<sup>26</sup> and has been employed with increasing frequency under Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.<sup>27</sup> Both within and outside China, the ambiguity and uncertainty engendered by this approach can chill free expression by encouraging targets to self-censor.<sup>28</sup> Just as is the case within China, the Party and government’s use of the tools of “public opinion management” can encourage economic retaliation against overseas targets by Chinese businesses and individuals not directly affiliated with the state, chilling speech overseas without the need for obvious action by the government or Party.<sup>29</sup>

One of the most important tools of informal economic coercion is the use of undeclared economic sanctions against countries that

criticize China, including aspects of its human rights record. In 2010, for example, China instituted a ban on imports of Norwegian salmon after a non-governmental committee in Norway awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the late Chinese writer, poet, and advocate of political reform Liu Xiaobo.<sup>30</sup> In other instances since then, the government appeared to employ undeclared economic sanctions to encourage collective silence through collective punishment, sanctioning a country's export industries for unrelated criticism of China by its politicians, journalists, and academics, including criticism related to PRC espionage and human rights violations.<sup>31</sup>

In one example during this past year, the Chinese government escalated an ongoing campaign of undeclared economic sanctions against Australia, levied in apparent retaliation for "anti-China" research by Australian think tanks on subjects such as forced labor in the XUAR, "unfriendly or antagonistic" reporting on China by Australian journalists, new Australian laws meant to shield universities and Chinese diaspora communities from covert or coercive PRC interference, and the Australian prime minister's call for a transparent, independent investigation of COVID-19's origins.<sup>32</sup> In another example, the threat of Chinese government retaliation appeared to prompt the Canadian government to tell a major international security forum in Halifax that it would strip the forum of funding if it presented an award to Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen.<sup>33</sup>

During and immediately prior to this reporting period, the Commission also noted the repeated use—or threatened use—of economic coercion against countries considering restrictions on the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei. Media reports have linked Huawei to violations of privacy, free expression, and the right to free political participation in China and in other countries through its business as a supplier of internet equipment and infrastructure, and the U.S. Government has accused the company of close cooperation with Chinese military and intelligence agencies that reportedly surveil and harass Uyghurs, Tibetans, and pro-democracy advocates overseas.<sup>34</sup> In some cases, countries that responded to these and other concerns by limiting the use of Huawei equipment in their 5G networks were met with threats of economic retaliation by Chinese government officials, or pressure from their own business communities prompted by the fear of retaliation. Such incidents included:

- **Germany.** In December 2019, the Chinese Ambassador to Germany appeared to threaten consequences for German businesses in China—including German auto firms—if the German government decided to exclude Huawei from the country's 5G network.<sup>35</sup>
- **United Kingdom.** In July 2020, after the United Kingdom announced it would ban Huawei from its 5G networks, two spokespersons for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs threatened to retaliate against the United Kingdom, including through worse treatment for U.K. companies in China.<sup>36</sup>
- **Sweden.** In Sweden, the CEO of Ericsson, one of Huawei's largest competitors in the 5G market, told Sweden's trade minister that Ericsson might have to move its headquarters from Sweden to another country over Sweden's decision to ban



Huawei from its 5G networks.<sup>37</sup> The company's CEO lobbied for a reversal of the ban, out of an apparent concern that Ericsson could face retaliatory restrictions in China, one of its largest markets.<sup>38</sup>

*Increasing Use of Formal Sanctions Against Individuals and Institutions Overseas*

During this reporting period, in addition to undeclared, informal economic pressure, the Commission also observed increasing use of formal sanctions by the Chinese government to punish criticism of China, particularly criticism of Chinese government policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Hong Kong. Among those the government formally sanctioned during this reporting period were the Commission and two of its members during the 116th and 117th Congresses, Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Chris Smith.<sup>39</sup>

Between December 2, 2019 and March 27, 2021, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced sanctions on 78 individuals or entities.<sup>40</sup> The sanctions were often, but not always, applied in a one-to-one fashion following foreign countries' imposition of sanctions against China, with China sanctioning one individual or entity in retaliation for each Chinese individual or entity sanctioned.<sup>41</sup> Despite a growing toolkit of PRC laws with extraterritorial dimensions, the MFA did not cite any formal legal basis when announcing any of the sanctions.<sup>42</sup> Three of the sanctions rounds announced by the MFA related to Hong Kong. These were:

- **December 2019** sanctions against five major American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in retaliation for the United States' enactment of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.<sup>43</sup> All of the NGOs sanctioned work to monitor human rights abuses or support civil society in China and Hong Kong;<sup>44</sup>
- **August 2020** sanctions against the heads of several major United States-based NGOs that support civil society inside China, and several U.S. lawmakers;<sup>45</sup> and
- **November 2020** sanctions against four employees of Washington, DC-based NGOs with programs fostering civil society in Hong Kong and elsewhere.<sup>46</sup>

Four of the sanctions rounds related to the XUAR. These were:

- **July 2020** sanctions against the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and four U.S. officials;<sup>47</sup> and
- Three **March 2021** sanctions rounds against officials, think tanks, government entities, businesses, and independent academics from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union in retaliation for sanctions against China for human rights abuses in the XUAR. Many of the targets are outspoken critics of Chinese government policy, or have conducted research that documents the negative impacts of Chinese government policy in the XUAR and elsewhere.<sup>48</sup>

In an act of collective punishment, the MFA sanctioned the U.K. law firm Essex Court Chambers for an opinion written by four of the firm's barristers, which stated that there was a "credible case" that acts committed in the XUAR might constitute genocide.<sup>49</sup> Fol-

lowing the sanctions, the firm immediately removed the opinion from its website,<sup>50</sup> reportedly experienced difficulty recruiting senior staff, and spun off its Singapore office into a separate firm.<sup>51</sup>

*Extraterritorial Application of the Hong Kong  
National Security Law*

The Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) criminalizes advocacy by persons outside Hong Kong related not only to Hong Kong, but—as described by the Congressional Research Service—to “peaceful actions or speech related to the political status of Hong Kong, and also of Tibet, Xinjiang, and such jurisdictions as Taiwan and disputed maritime territories over which China claims sovereignty.”<sup>52</sup> [For more information on the passage and application of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, see Section VI—Hong Kong.]

Since the law’s passage, its extraterritorial provision has been invoked on two occasions:

- On **July 31, 2020**, state media reported that Hong Kong police cited the National Security Law in issuing arrest warrants for Nathan Law and Samuel Chu, both of whom were not in China at the time.<sup>53</sup> Chu is an American citizen who has lived and worked in the United States since 1990.<sup>54</sup>
- In **January 2021**, Hong Kong Secretary for Security John Lee confirmed that his department was investigating National Security Law charges against Danish politicians who assisted pro-democracy campaigner Ted Hui in fleeing Hong Kong for Denmark.<sup>55</sup>

The National Security Law’s extraterritorial provision also has had a documented chilling effect on speech related to China at universities in the United States and elsewhere. These incidents include:

- Harvard Business School excusing students worried about potential prosecution from discussion of sensitive subjects;<sup>56</sup>
- Professors at the University of Pennsylvania and Princeton University placing warning labels on their courses on Chinese politics, or altering their grading practices to protect the anonymity of students submitting assignments on potentially sensitive subjects;<sup>57</sup> and
- Students from Hong Kong at universities in the United Kingdom expressing hesitance to speak freely in courses related to sensitive subjects, for fear of potential prosecution.<sup>58</sup>

Alongside the National Security Law, the Commission has also observed an emerging body of laws and regulations that could potentially be used to punish criticism or chill speech outside China. These new or amended laws and regulations include the PRC Export Control Law, the Unreliable Entities List, and the Ministry of Commerce’s Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures.<sup>59</sup> In June 2021, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.<sup>60</sup> The law provides a legal basis for retaliatory measures against individuals and organizations with direct or indirect involvement in the implementation of foreign sanctions; such measures include visa denial, exit bans, and

the confiscation of property and freezing of assets.<sup>61</sup> The law further allows for lawsuits against individuals or organizations that “implement or help implement” such sanctions.<sup>62</sup> Observers interpreted this new law to mean that both domestic and foreign companies could face legal liability within China for complying with export restrictions and other sanctions imposed by foreign countries.<sup>63</sup> According to Hofstra University Law professor Julian Ku, the law “prohibit[s] any companies operating in China from complying with EU or US sanctions.”<sup>64</sup>

*Impeding UN Human Rights Bodies and Redefining  
Global Human Rights Norms*

During this reporting period, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued a longstanding campaign to impede or redirect the work of United Nations human rights bodies and to reshape international consensus around human rights.<sup>65</sup> These are part of the Party’s efforts to build what it calls “international discourse power” (*guoji huayu quan*), a term that scholar Nadège Roland says reflects the Party leadership’s desire “to alter the norms that underpin existing institutions and put in place the building blocks of a new international system coveted by the Chinese Communist Party.”<sup>66</sup>

The Commission noted an increase in reports of direct harassment of UN personnel engaged in human rights work objectionable to the Chinese government and its diplomats. The Chinese delegation in Geneva attacked one UN special rapporteur for alleged “racist statements” and “ignorance toward China” after a report on the cultural impacts of COVID-19 globally mentioned China several times.<sup>67</sup> The Chinese delegation also criticized the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief after his report on global Islamophobia discussed human rights atrocities in the XUAR.<sup>68</sup> The latter exchange led to a Chinese delegate calling for reform of the UN special procedures mechanism by which special rapporteurs are appointed.<sup>69</sup>

## Notes to Section II—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

<sup>1</sup>John Phipps, “‘If I Speak Out, They Will Torture My Family’: Voices of Uyghurs in Exile,” *1843 Magazine, Economist*, October 15, 2020; Joel Gunter, “The Cost of Speaking Up against China,” *BBC*, March 30, 2021; Rebecca Wright and Ivan Watson, “She Tweeted from Sweden about the Plight of Her Uyghur Cousin. In Xinjiang, the Authorities Were Watching,” *CNN*, December 17, 2020; Omer Kanat, “China’s Cross-Border Campaign to Terrorize Uyghur Americans,” *The Diplomat*, August 29, 2019; Colm Quinn, “‘We’re a People That Are Grieving’: Local Uyghurs Have Escaped China, But Still Fear Repression,” *DCist*, March 14, 2019; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil,” *Daily Beast*, August 14, 2018.

<sup>2</sup>Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” *New York Times*, November 16, 2019; Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 11 (November 24, 2019); Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” *New York Times*, opinion, November 24, 2019. See also CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 263–77.

<sup>3</sup>Joel Gunter, “The Cost of Speaking Up against China,” *BBC*, March 30, 2021; Max Fisher, “As Dictators Target Citizens Abroad, Few Safe Spaces Remain,” *New York Times*, June 4, 2021. See also Megha Rajagopalan, “They Thought They’d Left the Surveillance State Behind. They Were Wrong,” *BuzzFeed News*, July 9, 2018; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Repression Across Borders: The CCP’s Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans,” August 28, 2019.

<sup>4</sup>Joel Gunter, “The Cost of Speaking Up against China,” *BBC*, March 30, 2021.

<sup>5</sup>Joel Gunter, “The Cost of Speaking Up against China,” *BBC*, March 30, 2021.

<sup>6</sup>Joel Gunter, “The Cost of Speaking Up against China,” *BBC*, March 30, 2021.

<sup>7</sup>Alexandra Ma, “From Growing a Beard to Complaining about Porn: Here Are the Flimsy Excuses China Uses to Throw Uyghur Muslims into Prison Camps,” *Business Insider*, November 25, 2019; Raffi Khatchadourian, “Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang,” *New Yorker*, April 5, 2021; Amnesty International, “Hearts and Lives Broken: The Nightmare of Uyghur Families Separated by Repression,” ASA 17/3798/2021, March 29, 2021.

<sup>8</sup>Rebecca Wright and Ivan Watson, “She Tweeted from Sweden about the Plight of Her Uyghur Cousin. In Xinjiang, the Authorities Were Watching,” *CNN*, December 17, 2020. See also Donie O’Sullivan, “Chinese Hackers Targeted Uyghurs Living in US, Facebook Security Team Finds,” *CNN*, March 25, 2021. Even in instances where direct attribution to Chinese officials is difficult, such campaigns often carry the hallmarks of Chinese government priorities: for example, in March 2021 Facebook announced it had disrupted a China-based hacking group targeting Uyghur journalists and advocates in the United States and other countries.

<sup>9</sup>“Chinese Sanctions on Newcastle Academic ‘Counter-Productive,’” *BBC*, March 26, 2021; International Federation of Journalists, “Sweden: Chinese Embassy Threatens Swedish Journalist,” April 15, 2021; Sébastien Seibt, “Wolf Warriors and a ‘Crazed Hyena’: French Researcher ‘Not Intimidated’ after Clash with China Envoy,” *France 24*, March 23, 2021; Annabelle Timsit, “Beijing’s European Sanctions Are Also a Bid to Control Who Tells the China Story,” *Quartz*, March 23, 2021.

<sup>10</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant EU Entities and Personnel,” March 22, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant UK Individuals and Entities,” March 26, 2021.

<sup>11</sup>Lily Kuo and Gerry Shih, “China Researchers Face Abuse, Sanctions as Beijing Looks to Silence Critics,” *Washington Post*, April 7, 2021. See also Jennifer Feller and Susan Chenery, “From ‘Perfect Chinese Daughter’ to Communist Party Critic, Why Vicky Xu Is Exposing China to Scrutiny,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, March 9, 2020.

<sup>12</sup>Lily Kuo and Gerry Shih, “China Researchers Face Abuse, Sanctions as Beijing Looks to Silence Critics,” *Washington Post*, April 7, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 22, 2021,” February 22, 2021; “Who Are Those on China’s Sanctions List against EU, and Why These Sanctions Are Justified?,” *Global Times*, March 23, 2021.

<sup>13</sup>Eva Dou, “Academic Faces Chinese Lawsuit for Exposing Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” *Washington Post*, March 10, 2021.

<sup>14</sup>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education,” E/C.12/1999/10, December 8, 1999, paras. 38–39; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed June 28, 2021; “Free to Think 2020,” Scholars at Risk Network, November 18, 2020, 15–17.

<sup>15</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February 22, 2021,” February 22, 2021; “Who Are Those on China’s Sanctions List Against EU, and Why These Sanctions Are Justified?,” *Global Times*, March 23, 2021.

<sup>16</sup>Eva Dou, “Academic Faces Chinese Lawsuit for Exposing Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” *Washington Post*, March 10, 2021.

<sup>17</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant EU Entities and Personnel,” March 22, 2021.

<sup>18</sup>Lily Kuo and Gerry Shih, “China Researchers Face Abuse, Sanctions as Beijing Looks to Silence Critics,” *Washington Post*, April 7, 2021; Zeyi Yang, “The Anatomy of a Chinese Online Hate Campaign,” *Protocol*, April 9, 2021.

<sup>19</sup>Lily Kuo and Gerry Shih, “China Researchers Face Abuse, Sanctions as Beijing Looks to Silence Critics,” *Washington Post*, April 7, 2021; Zeyi Yang, “The Anatomy of a Chinese Online Hate Campaign,” *Protocol*, April 9, 2021.

<sup>20</sup>Jennifer Feller and Susan Chenery, “From ‘Perfect Chinese Daughter’ to Communist Party Critic, Why Vicky Xu Is Exposing China to Scrutiny,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, March 9, 2020.

<sup>21</sup>Kath Sullivan, “China’s List of Sanctions and Tariffs on Australian Trade Is Growing. Here’s What Has Been Hit So Far,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, December 16, 2020; Rod Nickel and Hallie Gu, “‘Like Gold’: Canadian Canola Prices Spike as Shippers Find Back Door to China,” *Reuters*, August 9, 2020.

<sup>22</sup>John Ross, “China Warns Australia of Student Boycott,” *Inside Higher Ed*, May 1, 2020; Katrin Bennhold and Jack Ewing, “In Huawei Battle, China Threatens Germany ‘Where It Hurts’: Automakers,” *New York Times*, January 16, 2020.

<sup>23</sup>Xuanmin Li, “China Will Not ‘Sit Idle’ if Huawei Is Excluded from Germany’s 5G Rollout: Official,” *Global Times*, January 5, 2021; Hong Chen, “Hostile Rhetoric Will Further Hurt Australian Trade,” *Global Times*, March 30, 2021.

<sup>24</sup>Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, Center for New American Security, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” June 11, 2018.

<sup>25</sup>Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, Center for New American Security, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” June 11, 2018.

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<sup>27</sup>Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, Center for New American Security, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” June 11, 2018.

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