

CECC Annual Report 2021

KEY FINDINGS

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

- The Chinese Communist Party's efforts to extend control over all sectors of society violate citizens' right to fully participate in public affairs. As the Party's dominance permeates society, the space for institutions of democratic governance diminishes, thereby weakening citizens' ability to hold authorities accountable for human rights violations.
- In anticipation of its centenary, the Party further strengthened its members' political alignment with Party General Secretary Xi Jinping by launching a series of political campaigns with the aim of removing disloyal members from the Party and from political-legal bodies such as the judiciary and procuratorate. For example, the police force, generally regarded as a government body, is overtly being politicized as Xi Jinping conferred to it a new flag with a design symbolizing the Party's leadership.
- The Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau issued regulations governing the operations of the Party Central Committee. The rules required the Committee, which is one of the two highest political bodies in China, to protect Xi Jinping's position as the core leader, despite the Committee's constitutional duty to appoint the General Secretary, a position currently held by Xi.
- The Party declared that it had eliminated absolute poverty as part of its centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous society. Said declaration, however, does not address poverty and widening income disparity relative to China's overall economic status. Furthermore, centrally imposed economic development plans aiming to alleviate poverty have had negative effects particularly in ethnic minority communities, where environmental damage and forced relocations have harmed their way of life and rendered some homeless.

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ferred to it a new flag with a design symbolizing the Party's leadership.

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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Support U.S. research programs that document and analyze the governing institutions and ideological campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as its relationship with companies, government agencies, legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

- Employ a "whole-of-government" approach to encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and release individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising their rights to freedom of speech, association, and assembly.

- Support and pass Senate bill S. 413, 117th Congress (2021) (a bill to establish the China Censorship Monitor and Action Group) or similar legislation aimed at monitoring and protecting political speech of U.S. citizens and companies from censorship and other restrictions by the Chinese government.

- Call on Chinese officials to stop and reverse Party encroachment on grassroots-level elections. Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to develop independent village committee and people's Congress election monitoring systems. Encourage central and local Party and government leaders to implement free and fair elections across China. Continue to fund, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of democracy promotion and rule of law programs in China. Support organizations working in and outside China that seek to work with local governments and NGOs to improve transparency, especially with regard to efforts to expand and improve China's open government information initiatives. Urge Party officials to further increase the transparency of Party affairs.

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction

China's one-party authoritarian political system remains out of compliance with the standards defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹ The Chinese Communist Party and government—with Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping at the apex of political power—employs a top-down system of governance that exerts control over the population through advanced digital technologies.² Official rhetoric promoting rule-based governance is premised on the Party's leadership role in the drafting and interpretation of the law, including China's Constitution.³ Reports from the Commission's 2021 reporting period continue to indicate that the Party seeks to control every sector of society, exert ideological control, suppress political activity, surveil citizens, and violate their fundamental rights.

Party's Centenary and Continued Expansive Control

The year 2021 marks the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party.⁴ This past year, authorities launched a series of ideological initiatives in anticipation of the centenary, such as delivering political study classes intended to exert tighter ideological control over cadres, proposing rules for Party building in high schools, and establishing a hotline for citizens to report internet users who “distort” the Party's history.⁵ A new version of the Party's history was published in February 2021 with a strong focus on Xi's ideology.⁶

The Chinese Communist Party likewise continued to expand and strengthen its control in different sectors of society. It did so partly through its “united front work,” which aims to co-opt domestic and foreign non-Party elements of society and to prevent the independent organization of civil society.⁷ In January 2021, the Party amended and finalized the provisional Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work.⁸ The amendments emphasized the Party's centralized leadership, specifically referenced General Secretary Xi Jinping's ideology on united front work, and added two groups of targeted sectors, namely, overseas individuals and persons from new social strata (such as freelancers and workers from private businesses and new media).⁹

Examples of the Party's attempts to consolidate Party control over different sectors of society include the following:

BUSINESS SECTOR

- The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission issued a memorandum in January 2021 calling for stronger “Party building” in the financial sector, using the corruption conviction and death sentence of business executive Lai Xiaomin as an example of “punishing very few to educate and save the majority.”¹⁰ The term “Party building” refers to a multi-faceted approach for enhancing the Party's governance capabilities through ideological, organizational, and disciplinary means.¹¹ The Party's General Office similarly demanded the obedience of private enterprises to the

Party, and called for Party building in the private enterprise sector.¹²

- In November 2020, the Shanghai Stock Exchange postponed the initial public offering of Ant Technology Group, citing the fact that the company’s executives—including Jack Ma Yun—had been summoned by regulators for talks over unspecified matters.¹³ The postponement came shortly after Ma advocated for more relaxed financial regulation in a speech that appeared to have contradicted Vice President Wang Qishan’s position.¹⁴ After his speech, Ma disappeared from public view for nearly three months, during which authorities launched an antitrust investigation into Alibaba Group Holding, Ltd., an e-commerce company founded by Ma.¹⁵ In March 2021, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese authorities had ordered Alibaba to divest its media assets, including the Hong Kong-based news outlet South China Morning Post, which had “published stories that appeared unfavorable to the Chinese leadership.”¹⁶

EDUCATION

- Reuters reported in July 2020 that educators in 30 out of 33 province-level jurisdictions had removed “illegal” and “inappropriate” books from schools pursuant to a Ministry of Education directive issued in October 2019.¹⁷ A political analyst quoted by Reuters said that “[t]his is the first movement targeted at libraries since the Cultural Revolution.”¹⁸ The directive requires educators to use a list of recommended books when selecting books and identifies “illegal books” as those that would endanger State security or damage social stability and further defines “inappropriate books” as including those that contravene core socialist values.¹⁹

- In October 2020, the Party Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued a plan to reform the evaluation system for schools, educators, and students with the goal of actualizing the Party’s comprehensive leadership.²⁰ In particular, obedience to the Party and “inheritance of the red gene” are listed as areas of a student’s moral education.²¹ Following the plan, the Ministry of Education issued an opinion in December discouraging philosophers and social scientists from using international data and publishing materials that would “vilify” China.²² This plan followed a September meeting of the Central Committee for Deepening Comprehensive Reform, in which Party leaders decided to further regulate the development of private compulsory education in order to implement the Party’s education objectives.²³

ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

- Authorities issued documents aimed at regulating the morality and ideology of performing artists. In February 2021, the state-supervised China Association of Performing Arts issued the provisional Measures on Managing the Self-Discipline of Performers in the Performance Industry.²⁴ Among the requirements were performers’ support of the Party and adherence to core socialist values.²⁵ The measures further prohibit per-

formers from engaging in conduct that would harm social morals or damage the Nation's traditions.²⁶ Violations are subject to review by the newly established "moral-building committee," which may result in reprimand, disqualification from receiving awards, and potentially permanent industry-wide boycott.²⁷ In March, the National Radio and Television Administration solicited public comments for the draft PRC Television Broadcast Law, which contains similar political and moral restrictions on television shows.²⁸

[For information on the Party's control over civil society organizations, religious groups, and ethnic minority communities, see Section II—Freedom of Religion, and Ethnic Minority Rights, Section III—Civil Society, Section IV—Xinjiang, and Section V—Tibet.]

Intra-Party Governance

In a move that may further consolidate Xi Jinping's political power, the Party launched a campaign to remove members considered politically disloyal. It also adopted internal regulations containing provisions that may infringe on Party members' right to political speech and opinion.

- In July 2020, the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission launched a campaign for the education and rectification of the political-legal system.²⁹ The term "political-legal" generally refers to institutions in the judiciary, procuratorate, public security, State security, and judicial administration, all of which are under the supervision of the Party's political-legal committee at the corresponding level.³⁰ The campaign's first stated objective is to remove disloyal Party members, with a target completion date of the first quarter of 2022.³¹
- In August 2020, Xi Jinping conferred upon the People's Police a new flag with a design representing the Party's absolute and comprehensive leadership.³² The Ministry of Public Security, however, is a government agency, not a political body.³³ A senior writer for Nikkei Asia speculated that the flag conferral symbolized Xi's taking direct control of a branch of law enforcement, as he did with the People's Armed Police in 2018.³⁴ Shortly after the flag conferral ceremony, Vice Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong published an article calling for "resolutely removing 'two-faced people,'" referring to people who outwardly obey but secretly resist orders from the Party.³⁵
- The Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) issued regulations in October 2020 governing the operations of the Party Central Committee, which is one of the two highest political bodies in China.³⁶ Among its political mandates, the Party Central Committee is required to protect General Secretary Xi Jinping's position as the core leader and to align with him.³⁷ This requirement is in conflict with the Party's constitution, which provides that the general secretary (the position currently held by Xi Jinping) is selected by the Party Central Committee.³⁸
- In February 2021, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee issued the trial Provisions on Handling

Matters within the Organization, which govern how the Party handles cadres' misconduct through measures such as suspension, demotion, or removal.³⁹ Besides corrupt practices and poor performance, the regulations also target actions that may indicate disloyalty to the Party, such as speech inconsistent with the Party's ideology, wavering faith in Marxism, and failure to align with the Central Committee's position.⁴⁰ The Chinese human rights organization Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch observed that the provisions discriminated against Party members and violated their right to free speech, free thought, and religious freedom as protected by China's Constitution.⁴¹

Lack of Genuine Political Participation

The Chinese Communist Party holds exclusive political power, and China's Constitution contains language that effectively prohibits acts that would damage the Party's leadership.⁴² Eight satellite parties are formally recognized, but their funding and operations are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.⁴³ Although the Party declares that it represents "the fundamental interests of the greatest possible majority of the Chinese people,"⁴⁴ citizens' direct electoral participation is limited to sub-provincial legislative bodies⁴⁵ and village and residents committees,⁴⁶ the latter of which are semi-autonomous grassroots bodies outside of the State bureaucracy.⁴⁷ Elections for these local offices, however, are subject to political interference, such as through candidate selection and harassment of independent candidates.⁴⁸

The October 2020 amendment of the PRC Election Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses adds seats to local legislative bodies but does not improve political plurality.⁴⁹ The amendment increases the number of seats for people's congresses at the county and township levels, with a stated goal of increasing the representative ratio from 1 delegate per 530 persons in 1997 to 1 delegate per 490 persons.⁵⁰ However, the amendment adds language requiring that election work must unwaveringly support the Party's leadership.⁵¹

Radio Free Asia observed that fraudulent practices are frequently reported in grassroots-level elections.⁵² In one instance, the Party secretary of Shangdong village in Huizhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly ordered candidate Tian Ruidi to withdraw from the village group election to ensure that an officially designated candidate could be re-elected.⁵³ Local police summoned Tian for questioning, prompting her to go into hiding for fear of being detained.⁵⁴ Previously, Tian had been critical of the village group leader for being opaque in managing the village's resources.⁵⁵

Amendment of the PRC Organic Law of the National People's Congress

China's legislative body, the National People's Congress (NPC) amended the PRC Organic Law of the National People's Congress in March 2021—the first time since the law was passed in 1982—in a manner that further formalizes the NPC's subservience to the

Chinese Communist Party.⁵⁶ While the amended law reiterates the constitutional provision that the NPC is the highest office of State power, it adds that the NPC must steadfastly support the Party's leadership.⁵⁷ This amendment was made pursuant to a Party document requiring that Party leadership be written into laws.⁵⁸

The amended law additionally may contain unconstitutional provisions. In particular, whereas China's Constitution grants the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) authority to determine appointments and removals of positions up to the rank of minister, the amended law's language has the effect of expanding this authority above the minister position to include State councilors and vice premiers.⁵⁹ In contrast to the NPC, which has 2,980 delegates and generally convenes once a year, the NPCSC is a smaller body consisting of 175 delegates and may convene at any time the NPC is not in session.⁶⁰ The amendment thus allows for a smaller number of State leaders to make more frequent personnel changes involving high-ranking State Council officials, which is an arrangement not reflected in China's Constitution.⁶¹

Technology-Based Social Control: Surveillance, Data Collection, and Big Data

In its 14th Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, the State Council reiterated plans to continue the development of smart cities, digital villages, and a "safe China"—a concept encompassing State, social, and economic security—through the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, cloud computing, and a centralized big data system.⁶² Chinese authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have employed these technologies to monitor citizens' activities and movement through a surveillance system consisting of networks of cameras and thousands of security checkpoints and surveillance hubs (also known as "convenience police stations").⁶³ In addition, Chinese authorities used the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to employ increasingly invasive surveillance measures in different parts of China.⁶⁴ These developments have prompted concerns that systems similar to those in the XUAR are being expanded to other parts of China and exported globally, enabling states to exert social control and stifle political freedom.⁶⁵

The number of surveillance cameras in China continued to increase. In a report updated in July 2020, the U.K.-based website Comparitech found that 18 of the 20 cities with the most surveillance cameras were located in China, which was estimated to have approximately 415.8 million cameras, with projected growth to 540 million in 2021.⁶⁶ While Chinese authorities have cited crime reduction as the justification for the use of surveillance cameras, the report found that an increase in surveillance cameras only minimally correlates to a reduced crime rate.⁶⁷

Companies with ties to the Chinese government are collecting data on individuals, domestically and abroad. For example, in September 2020, several media outlets obtained information that China Zhenhua Electronics Group (a company indirectly owned by a state-owned enterprise) had collected information on approximately 2.4 million individuals of different nationalities.⁶⁸ While the database was mainly based on public information, some of it was

obtained from non-public sources, according to a scholar who had reviewed the data.⁶⁹ In another example, Reuters reported in August 2020 that BGI Group (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute) had sold 35 million COVID-19 test kits to 180 countries, and called on researchers to deposit patient samples in the National GeneBank, a Chinese government-funded “biorepository of 20 million plant, animal and human genetic samples.”⁷⁰ A BGI Group subsidiary and dozens of companies also collected DNA samples for public security bureaus in China.⁷¹ The Australian Strategic Policy Institute concluded that the Chinese government’s nationwide DNA collection campaign that began in 2017 “violates Chinese domestic law and global human rights norms.”⁷² The Institute further warned that “when combined with other surveillance tools, it will increase the power of the Chinese State and further enable domestic repression in the name of stability maintenance and social control.”⁷³

While Chinese authorities proposed legislation relating to privacy and data security, it is unlikely that it will provide adequate protection for the right to privacy and freedom from government intrusion.⁷⁴ The draft PRC Data Security Law, published in July 2020, obligates government agencies to collect and store data securely and do so within the agency’s legally defined scope of duties.⁷⁵ The draft PRC Personal Information Protection Law, published in October, contains similar provisions applicable to personal information.⁷⁶ A lawyer noted, however, that the law may have limited practical effect since authorities are in a position to both define and interpret the scope of the government’s authority.⁷⁷

Social and Development Policies

POVERTY ALLEVIATION

As the Chinese Communist Party approached its centenary, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that China had become a “moderately prosperous society,” one aspect of which is poverty elimination.⁷⁸ Some experts acknowledged improvements in the livelihood of a large number of people in China, but they also recognized the limited scope of the stated accomplishment, urging sustained efforts in this area.⁷⁹ Among the factors experts highlighted are that the Chinese government targeted only rural poverty, overlooked worsening income inequality, forcibly relocated rural populations, and applied an income benchmark too low for China’s economic status.⁸⁰ In March 2021, central authorities declared in the 14th Five-Year Social and Development Plan that over 55 million of the rural poor had escaped poverty and that the problem of absolute poverty had been completely solved.⁸¹

The government’s economic development schemes have negatively impacted ethnic minority communities, according to a series of articles published by Radio Free Asia in November 2020.⁸² One such scheme is called “poverty alleviation through relocation,” wherein, according to an official report, the government relocates people away from inhospitable areas and does so with their informed consent and full consideration.⁸³ However, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, for example, authorities forced Uyghurs to work in factories away from their homes, which, ac-

ording to an NGO worker, had the effect of keeping them in poverty by rendering them homeless.⁸⁴ The Los Angeles Times reported incidents in which officials in Gansu province used violence to force villagers to sign land transfer contracts.⁸⁵ In another example, a non-governmental organization (NGO) worker said that authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region constructed large-scale pig farms and ordered herders to resettle in cities in the name of poverty alleviation, thereby damaging the environment and the nomadic culture.⁸⁶

DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND FORCIBLE DEMOLITION

The 14th Five-Year Social and Development Plan also laid out schemes for rural and urban development that discourage large-scale demolition and construction.⁸⁷ It is unclear, however, whether policy pronouncement will be effective in ending the longstanding practice of forcible demolition of citizens' residences.⁸⁸ This past year, multiple reports emerged showing that citizens across China lost their homes because of demolition actions that they said were unlawful.⁸⁹ Some incidents involved the use of physical threats, termination of utilities, and the participation of men wearing black outfits who refused to identify themselves.⁹⁰

Forced demolitions violates the universal right to adequate housing, which entails "legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats."⁹¹ Under Chinese law, authorities may not cutoff utilities as a way to enforce administrative decisions; they are further required to compensate a person affected by demolition if the person was a bona fide purchaser of a property that was constructed pursuant to an approval erroneously issued in violation of zoning regulations.⁹² In a model case issued in July 2020, the Supreme People's Court further illustrated the principle that the government must obtain court approval and compensate the affected person before demolition may take place, even if the affected person has been relocated or has no legal basis to resist relocation.⁹³

GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Chinese Communist Party's sustained censorship and control over the government are inconsistent with "the right to truth, the right to justice, and the right to an effective remedy and reparation," which are essential to holding the government accountable for human rights violations.⁹⁴ The Plan for Building a Rule-Based China (2020–2025)—issued by the Party Central Committee and the State Council in January 2021—calls for improvement of accountability systems for administrative agencies, the judiciary, and the procuratorate, but it prioritizes political compliance and is silent on private actions against public entities.⁹⁵ The plan also describes transparency as a criteria for achieving rule-based governance, specifically urging government bodies to welcome media and public oversight.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, reports of persecution of government critics, journalists, and social activists continued to emerge this past year.⁹⁷

In February 2021, over 300 citizens signed an open letter urging the passage of a "government law" to prevent wrongful convictions and to hold officials accountable for misconduct.⁹⁸ The co-signers included citizens from across China who suffered mistreatment in

the course of unsuccessfully seeking redress from the government.⁹⁹ A scholar noted that the joint letter underscored the systemic problem of political influence over the judiciary.¹⁰⁰ [For more information on persecution of government critics, journalists, and social activists, see other sections of this report, such as Section II—Freedom of Expression, The Environment and Climate Change, and Section III—Civil Society.]

Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance

¹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 25.

² Martin Hála, “China, 2021: In Its Centenary Year, the Chinese Communist Party Is Eager to Redesign the Future of Mankind,” International Centre for Defence and Security February 26, 2021.

³ Martin Hála, “China, 2021: In Its Centenary Year, the Chinese Communist Party Is Eager to Redesign the Future of Mankind,” International Centre for Defence and Security, February 26, 2021; Feng Ke, “Dangda haishi fada, Xi Jinping yong xianfa huida” [Xi Jinping uses the constitution to answer the question of whether the Party is above the law], WeChat, reprinted on Communist Party of China website, February 6, 2015.

⁴ “China, 2021: In Its Centenary Year, the Chinese Communist Party Is Eager to Redesign the Future of Mankind,” International Centre for Defence and Security, February 26, 2021.

⁵ “Zhonggong zai jiangdang bainian qian qianghua yi Xi sixiang zhidao gaoxiao dangjian” [CCP strengthens Party building in colleges according to the guidance of Xi’s ideology ahead of Party centenary], *Voice of America*, March 8, 2021; Xiao Xiong Fenxiang Gongwen, “Dangke da heji, baohan jiangdang 100 zhounian, jingshi jiaoyu, yishi xingtai, jingdian dang ke deng zhuanli dang ke gong 105 pian” [Party lecture compilation includes a total of 105 lectures on special topics such as the Party’s 100 centenary, cautionary education, ideology, and classic Party lectures], April 28, 2021; “[Shuguang, zhuanli] Jiandang bai nian: Jianshe juyou qiangda ningjuli he yinlingli de shehui zhuyi yishixingtai, laozhu dangyuan ganbu sixiang genji—. . .” [Dawn rays, special topic] Party’s centenary: Building a socialist ideology with strong converging and leading power, buttressing the foundation of Party cadres’ minds—. . .], *The Paper*, February 23, 2021; “China Launches Hotline for Netizens to Report ‘Illegal’ History Comments,” *Reuters*, April 11, 2021.

⁶ “Xinban ‘Dangshi’ danhua Wenge, song Xi neirong zhan si fen zhi yi” [New “Party History” skims Cultural Revolution, one quarter of content praises Xi], *Radio Free Asia*, April 14, 2021.

⁷ Gerry Groot, “The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work Department Under Xi,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, April 24, 2018; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work], issued April 30, 2015, amended November 30, 2020, effective December 21, 2020, art. 5.

⁸ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work], issued April 30, 2015, amended November 30, 2020, effective December 21, 2020.

⁹ Wang Xiaohong, “Fabao de fagui baozheng—Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Tiaoli’ de liangdian” [Legal protection of the magic weapon—Highlights of the “Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work”], *China News*, January 11, 2021; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhanxian Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party United Front Work], issued April 30, 2015, amended November 30, 2020, effective December 21, 2020, arts. 1–4, 6, 31–33, 37–38.

¹⁰ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervision Commission, “Lai Xiaomin an yi’an chugai gongsuo qishi” [Using Lai Xiaomin’s case as an insight to hasten reform], January 18, 2021.

¹¹ “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhengzhi jianshe de yijian” [Opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on strengthening the Party’s political building], *Xinhua*, January 31, 2019.

¹² Chinese Communist Party General Office, “Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai mingying jingji tongzhan gongzuo de yijian” [Opinion on strengthening united front work in the private enterprise economy in the new era], September 15, 2020.

¹³ Shanghai Stock Exchange, “Guanyu zanhuan Mayi Keji Jituan Gufen Youxian Gongsu Ke Chuang Ban shangshi de jue ding” [Decision on postponing the initial public offering of Ant Technology Group Limited Company on the Science and Technology Innovation Board], November 3, 2020; China Securities Regulatory Commission, “Si bumen lianhe yuetan Mayi Jituan youguan renyuan” [Four departments jointly schedule a talk with relevant personnel of Ant Group], November 3, 2020.

¹⁴ “Ma Yun cheng quanqiu jinrong tixi bixu gaige shuzi huobi yuan wei dao qiang biao zun shihou” [Ma Yun says global financial system must reform, digital currency has not reached the stage of standardization], *Reuters*, October 24, 2020; “Wang Qishan zai di’er jie Waitan Jinrong Fenghui kaimushi shang fabiao zhichi” [Wang Qishan delivers speech at the second Bund Summit opening ceremony], *Xinhua*, October 24, 2020; Rob Davies and Helen Davidson, “The Strange Case of Alibaba’s Jack Ma and His Three-month Vanishing Act,” *Guardian*, January 23, 2021.

¹⁵ State Administration for Market Regulation, “Shichang Jianguan Zongju yifa dui Alibaba Jituan shexian longduan xingwei li’an diaocha” [The State Administration for Market Regulation launched an investigation on Alibaba Group’s suspected monopoly], December 24, 2020; Rupert Neate, “Chinese Billionaire Jack Ma Makes First Public Appearance in Months,” *Guardian*, January 20, 2021.

¹⁶ Jing Yang, “Beijing Asks Alibaba to Shed Its Media Assets,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 2021.

¹⁷ Huizhong Wu, “In Echo of Mao Era, China’s Schools in Book-Cleansing Drive,” *Reuters*, July 9, 2020.

¹⁸ Huizhong Wu, “In Echo of Mao Era, China’s Schools in Book-Cleansing Drive,” *Reuters*, July 9, 2020.

¹⁹Foundational Education Division, Ministry of Education, “Guanyu kaizhan quanguo zhongxiaoxue tushuguan tushu shencha qingli zhuanxiang xingdong de tongzhi” [Notice regarding the specialized action on reviewing and clearing up books in primary and secondary school libraries nationwide], October 15, 2019; “2019 nian quanguo zhongxiaoxue tushuguan (shi) tuijian shumu” [2019 recommended book list for primary and secondary school libraries (reading rooms) nationwide], October 22, 2019; “Zhongxiaoxue tushuguan tushu shencha qingli biaoqun (shixing)” [Standards for reviewing and clearing up primary and secondary school library books (provisional)], October 15, 2019, secs. 1, 2.

²⁰Party Central Committee and State Council, “Shenhua xin shidai jiaoyu pingjia gaige zongti fang’an” [Summary plan for deepening reform of the education evaluation system of the new era], reprinted in Ministry of Education’s website, October 13, 2020.

²¹Party Central Committee and State Council, “Shenhua xin shidai jiaoyu pingjia gaige zongti fang’an” [Summary plan for deepening reform of the education evaluation system of the new era], reprinted in Ministry of Education’s website, October 13, 2020.

²²Ministry of Education, “Guanyu pochu gaoxiao zhexue shehui kexue yanjiu pingjia zhong ‘wei lunwen’ buliang daoxiang de ruogan yijian” [Several opinions on correcting the wrong direction of using a “research paper-centric” approach to evaluate university-level philosophy and social science research], December 7, 2020.

²³Xi Jinping zhuchi zhao kai Zhongyang Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Weiyuanhui Dishiwu ci Huiyi qiangdiao: tuidong gengshen cengci gaige shixing genggao shuiping kaifang wei goujian xin fazhan geju tigong qianda dongli [Xi Jinping convenes and presides over the 15th Meeting of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Deepening Reform with this emphasis: Promoting a deeper reform and implement a higher level opening-up to provide strong impetus for building a new development environment], *Xinhua*, September 1, 2020.

²⁴“Zhongguo Yanchu Hangye Xiehui: Lieji yiren fuchu chengxu mingque, tiqian sangeyue shengqing” [China Association of Performing Arts: Clarification of procedures for performers with a bad track record on returning to work, 3-month advance application required], *The Paper*, February 5, 2021; *Yanyi Hangye Yanyi Renyuan Congye Zilu Guangli Banfa (Shixing)* [Measures on Managing the Self-Discipline of Performers in the Performance Industry (Trial)], issued February, 5, 2021, effective March 1, 2021; China Association of Performing Arts, “Xiehui jianjie” [Overview of the Association], accessed March 31, 2021.

²⁵*Yanyi Hangye Yanyi Renyuan Congye Zilu Guangli Banfa (Shixing)* [Measures on Managing the Self-Discipline of Performers in the Performance Industry (Trial)], issued February, 5, 2021, effective March 1, 2021, arts. 7, 8.

²⁶*Yanyi Hangye Yanyi Renyuan Congye Zilu Guangli Banfa (Shixing)* [Measures on Managing the Self-Discipline of Performers in the Performance Industry (Trial)], issued February, 5, 2021, effective March 1, 2021, arts. 7, 8.

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