

CECC Annual Report 2021

KEY FINDINGS

WORKER RIGHTS

- Chinese authorities continued to restrict the ability of civil society organizations to work on labor issues, by means such as detaining and harassing labor advocates across China. Examples include labor advocate **Chai Xiaoming**, who attempted to organize a trade union in 2018 and was tried for “inciting subversion of state power” in August 2020, and delivery worker and labor advocate **Chen Guojiang**, who conducted online advocacy highlighting the working conditions of delivery workers and was detained in February 2021. In addition, authorities continued to surveil and harass blogger and citizen journalist **Lu Yuyu** after he was released in June 2020.
- The Hong Kong-based non-governmental organization (NGO) China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on worker actions collected from traditional news sources and social media, documented 800 strikes and other labor actions in 2020. CLB estimates that they are able to document between 5 and 10 percent of total worker actions. Protests across China against wage arrears included employees of YouWin Education, workers in factories producing masks, and delivery workers. In addition, thousands of factory workers protested as part of a pay dispute with Pegatron, an electronics manufacturing company.
- The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization permitted under Chinese law, and workers are not allowed to establish independent unions. In a joint submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and China Labor Watch said that local unions under the ACFTU “are often unaware of labor violations, strikes, and accidents that have occurred within their respective jurisdictions, and they are reluctant to provide assistance to workers.”

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Findings

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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- In meetings with Chinese officials, raise the trial of labor advocate **Chai Xiaoming**; the detention of delivery worker and labor advocate **Chen Guojiang**; and the harassment of blogger and citizen journalist **Lu Yuyu**.
- Call on the Chinese government to respect internationally recognized rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining and allow workers to organize and establish independent labor unions. Raise concern in all appropriate trade negotiations and bilateral and multilateral dialogues about the Chinese Communist Party’s role in collective bargaining and elections of trade union representatives, emphasizing that wage rates should be determined by free bargaining between labor and management.

- Call on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to ensure that all official sponsors, including Chinese companies, comply with internationally recognized rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Consider specifically requesting that the IOC conduct an investigation of labor abuses involving Chinese companies and their affiliates that have supply chains in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as well as Alibaba Group and other companies that benefit from workers in the informal economy sector.
- Promote and support bilateral and multilateral exchanges among government officials, academics, legal experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor issues such as freedom of expression, collective bargaining, employment discrimination, occupational health and safety, and wage arrears. Seek opportunities to support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations defending the rights of workers.
- When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society participation into bilateral and multilateral dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite international unions and labor NGOs and domestic civil society groups from all participating countries to observe relevant government-to-government dialogues.
- Encourage compliance with fundamental International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Request that the ILO increase its monitoring of core labor standards in China, including freedom of association and the right to organize.

WORKER RIGHTS

Introduction

In this section, the Commission examines the Chinese government and Communist Party's suppression of the internationally recognized rights of Chinese workers, as well as the status and working conditions of Chinese workers. While this chapter does not examine in detail Chinese government-sponsored forced labor, an examination of forced labor can be found in other sections of this report. [For information on forced labor, see Section II—Human Trafficking, Section II—Business and Human Rights, Section IV—Xinjiang, and Section V—Tibet.]

Absence of Independent Trade Unions

The Chinese government and Communist Party's laws and practices continue to contravene international worker rights standards, including the right to create or join independent trade unions.¹ The Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization permitted under Chinese law.² Outside the ACFTU, workers are unable to create or join independent trade unions.³ Workers and others that do seek to create trade unions—even within the ACFTU—have faced retaliation such as detention and disappearance.⁴ In addition, observers have critiqued the response of the ACFTU to violations of the rights of Chinese workers.⁵ In a joint submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and China Labor Watch said that local unions under the ACFTU “are often unaware of labor violations, strikes, and accidents that have occurred within their respective jurisdictions, and they are reluctant to provide assistance to workers.”⁶

Continued Suppression of Labor Advocacy

During the Commission's 2021 reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to restrict the ability of civil society organizations to work on labor issues, by means such as detaining and harassing labor advocates across China. After a series of nationwide and coordinated crackdowns beginning in 2015,⁷ and a subsequent crackdown in 2018 and 2019,⁸ Chinese labor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been less active,⁹ and authorities continued to detain some labor advocates.¹⁰ Labor advocates disappeared or held in detention this past year include the following:

- **Chai Xiaoming.** In August 2020, the Nanjing Intermediate People's Court in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, reportedly tried Chai Xiaoming, former editor of *Red Reference (Hongse Cankao)*, on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power,” in a closed proceeding.¹¹ Chai has been an advocate for the rights of factory workers who tried to organize a trade union at Shenzhen Jasic (*Jiashi*) Technology Co. Ltd. (Jasic) in 2018.¹²
- **Chen Guojiang.** In February 2021, police in Chaoyang district, Beijing municipality, detained delivery worker and labor advocate Chen Guojiang, also known as Mengzhu or Xiong Yan, after he conducted online advocacy highlighting the work-

ing conditions of delivery workers and called for a work stoppage to protest against companies' withholding of driver bonuses.¹³ Authorities detained Chen on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and formally arrested him prior to April 2.¹⁴

In addition, while authorities released blogger and citizen journalist **Lu Yuyu** from prison in June 2020 upon completion of a four-year sentence, police subsequently surveilled and harassed him.¹⁵ In March 2021, security personnel forced him to leave Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, where he lived, and asked him to deactivate his Twitter account.¹⁶ Lu's prison sentence was connected with his work documenting protests in China, including wage disputes.¹⁷

Worker Strikes and Protests

The Chinese government does not publicly report on the number of worker strikes and protests, making it difficult to obtain comprehensive information on worker actions.¹⁸ China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on worker actions collected from traditional news sources and social media, documented 800 strikes and other labor actions in 2020, compared to 1,385 strikes and other labor actions in 2019, and 1,706 strikes and other labor actions in 2018.¹⁹ CLB estimates that they are able to document approximately 5 to 10 percent of total worker actions, and cautions against drawing firm conclusions from year-to-year comparisons.²⁰ The majority of the labor actions documented by CLB were small in scale: in 2020, 629 incidents (78.6 percent) involved 100 people or fewer, and only 11 (1.4 percent) involved over 1,000 people.²¹ During this reporting year, wage arrears in China continued to be a significant source of worker unrest.²² In 2020, 660 of the strikes and other labor actions that CLB was able to document (82.5 percent) involved wage arrears.²³

PERCENTAGE OF WORKER STRIKES AND OTHER LABOR ACTIONS BY SECTOR

Year	Manufacturing	Construction	Transportation	Services	Other	Total number documented
2020	10.9% (87)	44.8% (358)	19.5% (156)	18% (144)	6.9% (55)	800
2019	13.8% (191)	42.8% (593)	12.3% (171)	23.0% (319)	8.0% (111)	1,385
2018	15.4% (263)	44.8% (764)	15.9% (272)	16.8% (286)	7.1% (121)	1,706
2017	21.1% (265)	41.4% (521)	9.2% (116)	20.7% (261)	7.6% (95)	1,258

Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions documented that year.²⁴

While Chinese law does not explicitly prohibit Chinese workers from striking, authorities have accused Chinese workers who participated in legitimate strikes and worker demonstrations of vio-

lating laws that prohibit the disturbance of public order.²⁵ Examples of strikes and worker actions this past year include the following:

- **Beijing municipality.** Reporting from Caixin, a commercial media outlet known for its investigative reports, CLB, and the South China Morning Post found that beginning in February 2020, staff began to protest wage arrears from the company YouWin Education (YouWin).²⁶ In October 2020, more than 1,000 protesters—both former staff and customers of YouWin—protested in Beijing municipality against wage arrears and the failure to return tuition fees.²⁷ According to Caixin, some of the wage arrears have remained unpaid since the summer of 2019.²⁸
- **Henan province.** In July 2020, CLB reported that workers in factories of the Shengguang Group in Henan province protested wage arrears after the factories, which produced face masks, suddenly closed.²⁹ According to CLB, the individuals in charge of the factory disappeared before paying their staff.³⁰ In 2020, CLB found 8 cases of protests related to wage arrears in factories producing masks throughout China.³¹
- **Shanghai municipality.** In December 2020, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that thousands of temporary workers protested as part of a pay dispute with a factory in Shanghai municipality owned by electronics manufacturing company Pegatron.³² Pegatron had planned on sending workers from its Shanghai factory to a facility in Kunshan municipality, Jiangsu province.³³ Workers who refused the transfer would have their contracts terminated and part of their remuneration packages forfeited.³⁴ According to RFA, protesters and police clashed before managers agreed to let workers maintain their benefits.³⁵
- **Multiple locations in China.** Throughout the reporting year, CLB reported that delivery workers across China protested against wage arrears.³⁶ In early 2021, a food delivery worker for the Alibaba food delivery website Ele.me set himself on fire after the company withheld his wages when he tried to switch to a new delivery company.³⁷ A September 2020 article on food delivery workers in the Chinese magazine Renwu highlighted the problems drivers face, such as decreasing wages, delivery times, traffic accidents, and even death.³⁸

Social Insurance

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that China has a labor force of approximately 771.25 million workers,³⁹ and based on government statistics, less than half of these individuals have social insurance coverage. According to the PRC Social Insurance Law, workers are entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic pension insurance, basic health insurance, work-related injury insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity insurance.⁴⁰ Under the law, employers and workers are required to contribute to basic pension, health, and unemployment insurance; in addition, employers are required to contribute to work-related injury and maternity insurance on behalf of workers.⁴¹ According to

the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the number of people covered by work-related injury insurance increased by 12.91 million in 2020 to a total of 267.7 million.⁴² NBS reported that work-related injury insurance coverage increased for migrant workers by 3.18 million people to 89.34 million out of 285.6 million total migrant workers in China.⁴³ Unemployment and maternity insurance numbers increased to 216.89 million and 235.46 million respectively, for all workers.⁴⁴ According to NBS, at the end of 2020, 2.7 million people were receiving unemployment insurance payments.⁴⁵

In 2020, Chinese social insurance funds recorded a deficit for the first time, reportedly because of a temporary reduction in policy premiums paid for by companies during the COVID-19 pandemic.⁴⁶ Observers warn that this, along with China's decreasing working-age population and increasing number of retirees, could be a sign of the potential instability of the current social insurance system in China.⁴⁷

Migrant Workers and Youth Face High Unemployment as Overall Unemployment Stabilizes

The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) reported that the overall unemployment situation had stabilized in 2020, with the surveyed urban unemployment rate at 5.2 percent in December, the same as in December 2019.⁴⁸ Experts warn, however, that the official unemployment rate significantly undercounts migrant workers and does not include most rural residents and self-employed individuals.⁴⁹ According to NBS, 11.86 million new jobs were created in urban areas in 2020, 1.66 million fewer than the previous year, but higher than the official target of 9 million.⁵⁰ The national job market was reportedly weaker in the fourth quarter of 2020 than a year earlier, with the number of job offers falling by 17 percent and the number of job applicants falling by 7 percent.⁵¹ Migrant workers reportedly bore the brunt of job losses in China in 2020, with the number of migrant workers dropping by more than five million in 2020, the first reported annual decrease.⁵² Jobs available to migrant workers tended to offer low pay, long working hours, and dangerous working conditions, such as in facilities producing face masks.⁵³ In addition, the unemployment rate for people aged 16 to 24 was 13.1 percent in February 2021, the same rate as in the first quarter of 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 epidemic in China.⁵⁴ The unemployment rate rose to 13.8 percent in May 2021,⁵⁵ reflecting the pressure young people faced in competing for jobs.

Employment Relationships

This past year, several categories of workers were unable to benefit fully from protections provided under Chinese law.⁵⁶ The PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor Contract Law only apply to workers who have an "employment relationship" (*laodong guanxi*) with their employers.⁵⁷ Categories of workers who do not have an "employment relationship" with their employers include dispatch and contract workers, student interns, and workers above the retirement age.⁵⁸

DISPATCH LABOR AND CONTRACT LABOR

The Commission continued to observe reports of dispatch labor and contract worker abuse during this reporting year, in violation of domestic laws and regulations.⁵⁹ Firms have long used dispatch labor—workers hired through subcontracting agencies—to cut costs, and some firms have replaced dispatch labor with contract labor to further reduce the employee relationship and costs.⁶⁰ In one example of dispatch labor abuse, China Labor Watch and Radio Free Asia reported in December 2020 that a Pegatron factory in Kunshan municipality, Jiangsu province, did not pay in full the bonuses promised to dispatch workers.⁶¹ The PRC Labor Contract Law requires that dispatch workers be paid the same as full-time workers doing similar work and that they only perform work on a temporary, auxiliary, or substitute basis.⁶²

INTERN LABOR

During this reporting year, reports continued to emerge of labor abuses involving vocational school students working at school-arranged “internships.” In one example, China Labor Watch and the Financial Times reported that workers and student interns at Pegatron, a supplier of Apple, faced restricted movement, withheld wages, and threats.⁶³ Student interns worked in the factory despite regulations against students performing factory work unrelated to their studies.⁶⁴ Furthermore, based on documents and interviews with former Apple employees, the Information, a digital media company that provides news reporting on the technology industry, revealed in December 2020 that Apple waited 3 years to end its partnership with Suyin Electronics after the supplier was found to be employing underage workers.⁶⁵ According to a former Apple employee interviewed by the Information, despite the breach of Chinese labor laws, Apple was reluctant to shift orders to new suppliers because doing so would have created delays and increased costs.⁶⁶

WORKERS ABOVE THE RETIREMENT AGE

As the number of individuals in China over 60 continued to increase,⁶⁷ Chinese workers above the legal retirement age continued to lack certain legal protections afforded to other workers under Chinese law. The PRC Labor Contract Law and its implementing regulations provide that workers’ labor contracts are to be terminated once they reach the retirement age or begin receiving pensions.⁶⁸ The inability of workers above the retirement age to establish a formal employment relationship with their employers leaves them without the protections provided for in Chinese labor laws in cases of work-related injury, unpaid overtime, and other labor issues.⁶⁹ Although in March 2021 the Chinese government announced that it would raise the retirement age,⁷⁰ workers above the new age would continue to lack the same protections as workers below the retirement age.⁷¹

Work Safety and Industrial Accidents

During this reporting year, government data showed a continued decline in workplace deaths, although inadequate safety equipment

and training continued to be a significant problem.⁷² According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 27,412 people died in workplace accidents in 2020,⁷³ compared to 29,519 deaths the previous year.⁷⁴ In 2020, there were 225 officially reported coal mining deaths,⁷⁵ a decrease from 316 in 2019.⁷⁶ A November 2020 coal mining accident in Leiyang city, Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, which resulted in the deaths of 13 people, was the second coal mining accident in the city within 40 days and led officials to suspend production at all of the city's coal mines.⁷⁷ The accident was one of several major coal mining accidents reported in China in 2020.⁷⁸ China Labour Bulletin noted that officials had made few efforts to create a work culture in the coal mining industry that prioritizes safety, and coal mine accidents remained common.⁷⁹ In December 2020, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, together with seven other government agencies, jointly issued a five-year plan aimed at preventing work-related injuries, including a reduction of about 20 percent in key industries and a reduction in the incidence of pneumoconiosis.⁸⁰

Management of Chinese companies and factories often did not provide adequate safety equipment or required safety training, and government oversight was often limited. In a December 2020 report, China Labor Watch (CLW) detailed disturbing conditions in two toy factories in Dongguan city, Guangdong province, that make toys for Mattel, Chicco, Fisher-Price, and Tomy, including inadequate pre-job safety training and inadequate safety equipment.⁸¹ Investigators observed workers at the factories who had sustained work-related injuries for which they received no or inadequate treatment, and an investigator burned her own hands because of a lack of training at Chang'an Mattel.⁸²

Occupational Health

Although the Chinese government reported a decrease in the number of occupational disease cases, significant concerns remained. In late 2019, the Chinese government announced a new plan expanding work-related injury insurance in industries in which there is a high risk for pneumoconiosis, and requiring local government departments to assess the risks of the disease and provide information about employers in relevant industries.⁸³ Pneumoconiosis, a group of lung diseases caused by the inhalation of dust that can occur during mining and construction, is the most prevalent type of officially reported occupational disease in China.⁸⁴ According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “[T]hese conditions are entirely man-made, and can be avoided through appropriate dust control.”⁸⁵ The Chinese NGO Love Save Pneumoconiosis reported in March 2021 that migrant workers suffering from pneumoconiosis had an average monthly per capita income of 393 yuan (US\$61) in 2020, far below the average of 4,072 yuan (US\$630) for migrant workers in China.⁸⁶ The group estimated that only 3.5 percent of workers with pneumoconiosis had work injury insurance, and said three out of four workers with the disease did not sign labor contracts, which are required for workers seeking to claim work injury insurance.⁸⁷ According to the state-funded media outlet the Paper, it is especially difficult for workers with a rural household registration (*hukou*) who are suffering from

pneumoconiosis to obtain documentation that they contracted the disease at the workplace, and to obtain work-related injury insurance.⁸⁸ In November 2020, official news outlet Legal Daily reported that workers still faced challenges in obtaining work-related injury insurance payments in advance, with workers having to wait up to five years to receive payment for treatment of their injuries.⁸⁹

Notes to Section II—Worker Rights

¹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 19, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed February 25, 2021. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8; FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7.

² *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa* [PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9–11; Freedom House, “China,” in *Freedom in the World: Democracy Under Siege*, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, “Holding China’s Trade Unions to Account,” February 17, 2020; International Labour Organization, Interim Report—Report No. 392, Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, para. 481.

³ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa* [PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9–11; International Labour Organization, Interim Report—Report No. 392, Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, para. 485; FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7.

⁴ International Labour Organization, Interim Report—Report No. 392, Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, paras. 451(f), 481; FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7.

⁵ FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7; China Labour Bulletin, “The Changing Face of Worker Protest in Northeast China,” August 17, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, “Trade Union Officials Seek to Deflect Responsibility after Truck Driver Suicide,” June 11, 2021.

⁶ FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7.

⁷ See, e.g., Kevin Lin, “State Repression in the Jasic Aftermath: From Punishment to Preemption,” *Made in China Journal* 4, no. 1 (January–March 2019): 16–19.

⁸ Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions et al., “Statement of ‘18–19 Chinese Labor Rights Mass Crackdown’ from Various Circles in Hong Kong,” reprinted in China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, August 7, 2019; China Labor Crackdown Concern Group, “One Year, One Hundred Arrested, What You Need to Know about China’s Labor Crackdown,” July 27, 2019.

⁹ China Labour Bulletin, “Workers’ Rights and Labour Relations in China,” August 13, 2020.

¹⁰ See, e.g., “Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de yanxu Beida ji zuopai laoshi Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan” [The suppression of the Shenzhen Jasic workers’ movement continues, Beijing University extreme leftist teacher Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], *Radio Free Asia*, August 18, 2020; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Immediately Release Frontline Delivery Worker Chen Guojiang,” March 18, 2021; Guo Rui, “China Arrests Girlfriend of Detained Legal Activist Xu Zhiyong on Subversion Charge,” *South China Morning Post*, March 15, 2021.

¹¹ “Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de yanxu Beida ji zuopai laoshi Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan” [The suppression of the Shenzhen Jasic workers’ movement continues, Beijing University extreme leftist teacher Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], *Radio Free Asia*, August 18, 2020; “China: State Repression Against Left Activists Escalates,” *Chinaworker.info*, November 6, 2020.

¹² “China: State Repression Against Left Activists Escalates,” *Chinaworker.info*, November 6, 2020; “Zhenya Shenzhen Jiashi gongyun de yanxu Beida ji zuopai laoshi Chai Xiaoming mimi shenpan” [The suppression of the Shenzhen Jasic workers’ movement continues, Beijing University extreme leftist teacher Chai Xiaoming secretly tried], *Radio Free Asia*, August 18, 2020; Sue-Lin Wong and Christian Shepherd, “China’s Student Activists Cast Rare Light on Brewing Labor Unrest,” *Reuters*, August 14, 2018. For more information on Jasic employees’ attempts to organize a union in 2018, and authorities’ subsequent crackdown on employees and worker rights’ advocates, see CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 61–62. For more information on Chai Xiaoming, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019–00126.

¹³ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Immediately Release Frontline Delivery Worker Chen Guojiang,” March 18, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, “Food Delivery Worker Activist Accused of Picking Quarrels,” March 25, 2021; Emily Feng, “He Tried to Organize Workers in China’s Gig Economy. Now He Faces 5 Years in Jail,” *NPR*, April 13, 2021.

¹⁴ Rights Defense Network, “Beijing Waimai Qishi Lianmeng ‘Mengzhu’, waimai xiaoge weiquanzhe Chen Tianhe (Chen Guojiang) de anqing tongbao: yi bei zhengshi daibu” [Case report of Chen Tianhe (Chen Guojiang), the ‘Leader’ of Beijing’s Food Delivery Riders League and the rights defender of food delivery guys: [he has] already been formally arrested], April 5, 2021. For more information on Chen Guojiang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021–00061.

¹⁵ Chun Han Wong, “‘Their Goal Is to Make You Feel Helpless’: In Xi’s China, Little Room for Dissent,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 27, 2020; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Police Repeatedly Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,” March 9, 2021.

¹⁶ Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Police Repeatedly Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,” March 9, 2021.

¹⁷ Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Police Repeatedly Harass Journalist Lu Yuyu Since His Release from Prison,” March 9, 2021. For more information on Lu Yuyu, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016–00177.

¹⁸ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, “An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map,” January 10, 2020; Freedom House, “China,” in *Freedom in the World: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy*, 2020.

¹⁹ China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021.

²⁰ China Labour Bulletin, “An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map,” January 10, 2020.

²¹ China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, “The State of Labour Relations in China, 2019,” January 13, 2020.

²² China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021; China Labour Bulletin, “The State of Labour Relations in China, 2019,” January 13, 2020.

²³ China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021.

²⁴ China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021.

²⁵ China Labour Bulletin, “Workers’ Rights and Labour Relations in China,” August 13, 2020; International Labour Organization, “Interim Report—Report No 392: Case No. 3184 (China),” October 2020; FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7. See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8(1)(d); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed June 8, 2021. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 27, 1997 and March 27, 2001, respectively.

²⁶ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, “Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei” [YouWin Education collapses], *Caixin*, October 26, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, “Private Education Companies Are a New Focus of Worker Protests in China,” November 9, 2020; Frank Tang, “China’s Uneven Virus Recovery Stirs Protest in Beijing,” *South China Morning Post*, October 19, 2020.

²⁷ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, “Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei” [YouWin Education collapses], *Caixin*, October 26, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, “Private Education Companies Are a New Focus of Worker Protests in China,” November 9, 2020; Frank Tang, “China’s Uneven Virus Recovery Stirs Protest in Beijing,” *South China Morning Post*, October 19, 2020.

²⁸ Ding Jie and Su Huixian, “Yousheng Jiaoyu baolei” [YouWin Education collapses], *Caixin*, October 26, 2020.

²⁹ China Labour Bulletin, “China’s Mask Production Goes from Boom to Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,” July 6, 2020.

³⁰ China Labour Bulletin, “China’s Mask Production Goes from Boom to Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,” July 6, 2020.

³¹ China Labour Bulletin, “China’s Mask Production Goes from Boom to Bust Leaving Workers Out of a Job,” July 6, 2020.

³² “Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay Protest,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2020.

³³ “Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay Protest,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2020.

³⁴ “Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay Protest,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2020.

³⁵ “Thousands of Apple Supplier Workers Turn Out in Shanghai Pay Protest,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2020; China Labour Bulletin, “Temporary Workers Stage Mass Protests at Electronics Factories in China and India,” December 22, 2020.

³⁶ China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed June 7, 2021.

³⁷ Yuan Yang and Ryan McMorro, “Chinese Courier Sets Fire to Himself in Protest over Unpaid Alibaba Wages,” *Financial Times*, January 12, 2021; Alice Su, “Why a Takeout Deliveryman in China Set Himself on Fire,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 8, 2021.

³⁸ Renwu (@renwumag1980), “Waimai jishou, kun zai xitong li” [Delivery drivers, stuck in the system], *WeChat*, September 8, 2020. See also China Labour Bulletin, “Single’s Day Reveals Harsh Reality of China’s Express Delivery Industry,” November 30, 2020.

³⁹ “Labor Force, Total—China,” World Bank, DataBank, accessed June 16, 2021.

⁴⁰ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa* [PRC Social Insurance Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011, art. 2. For information on workers’ low levels of social insurance coverage in previous reporting years, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 74; CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 65–66; CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 10, 2018, 90.

⁴¹ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa* [PRC Social Insurance Law], passed October 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011, arts. 10, 23, 33, 44, 53. See also Gidon Gautel and Zoey Zhang, “Social Insurance in China: Some Exemptions for Foreigners in China,” Dezan Shira and Associates, *China Briefing News*, February 1, 2021.

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