

## BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

### *Findings*

- Chinese and international businesses continue to be at risk of complicity in—and of profiting from—the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) use of forced labor to repress ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). A report investigating Xinjiang cotton and the global supply chain concluded that “human rights due diligence is [currently] inadequate in identifying and addressing Uyghur forced labor in supply chains of manufacturers outside of China and enforcement mechanisms are not currently responding to the export of those goods internationally.”
- The PRC continued to threaten for-profit and non-profit organizations with loss of revenue or other forms of punishment if they mentioned human rights violations in the XUAR. In one case, authorities closed down an affiliate of labor auditor Verité, Inc., after it reportedly investigated reports of forced labor in the XUAR. In another case, pro-Chinese Communist Party and Party-affiliated organizations criticized, and insinuated potential retaliation against, Kodak for posting pictures by a photographer who described the XUAR as “an Orwellian dystopia.”
- The Chinese government restricted freedom of expression this reporting year, and corporations continued to take part in censorship. Instances include the following examples:
  - Apple removed a globally used Quran app from the Apple app store in China.
  - Chinese companies removed media content of foreign individuals whose speech or actions did not conform with PRC narratives.
  - Disney Plus Hong Kong removed an episode of “The Simpsons” that satirically referenced human rights violations committed by the Party, including the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
  - Apple and two British publishing firms, Octopus Books and Quarto, censored products intended for sale outside of mainland China.
- The Washington Post reported that, based on presentations obtained from Huawei’s website, Huawei marketed surveillance technology to the Chinese government—including surveillance technology used in the XUAR.
- The Commission observed reports that a labor rights whistleblower was tortured prior to being sentenced to two years in prison for exposing labor rights violations. The violations took place in a factory producing the Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, and the Amazon Kindle.

### *Recommendations*

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Work with like-minded governments and legislatures to encourage implementation of policies and legislation similar

## **Business and Human Rights**

to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law No. 117-78), which prohibits the importation of goods made in whole or in part in the XUAR.

- Consider actions, including through legislation as needed, that bolster supply chain transparency, including by requiring supply chain mapping, disclosure, comprehensive human rights due diligence, and country of origin labels for goods purchased and sold online.

- Increase Customs and Border Protection funding to bolster its ability to monitor imported goods for links to forced labor.

- Update as appropriate the Xinjiang and Hong Kong business advisories issued by the U.S. Government, and consider issuing advisories on other regions or sectors in China.

- Impose Global Magnitsky sanctions on both Chinese government officials carrying out severe human rights abuses in the XUAR and on companies directly complicit in those abuses.

- Work together and with like-minded governments to decrease reliance on imports from China that could be linked to human rights abuses, including in supply chains and industries such as solar panel production and medical equipment manufacturing.

- Members should engage U.S. companies on human rights issues in China such as forced labor in the XUAR, government surveillance, government censorship, and worker rights. Such engagement should include:

- Encouraging companies such as Amazon that source a significant percentage of their products from China to trace the supply chain of these goods to ensure that they are not produced in the XUAR or in Chinese factories that subject their workers to labor abuse. Members should encourage such companies to protect both workers and whistleblowers at their factories and facilities in China and worldwide;

- Encouraging companies in their districts to change their approach to conducting due diligence in China, moving beyond codes of conduct and third-party factory audits, which have proven to be ineffective and even harmful; and

- Holding public hearings and private meetings with companies from their districts to raise awareness of the risk of complicity in human rights abuses and privacy violations that U.S. companies working in China face. Topics of meetings could include complicity in the use of artificial intelligence technology and surveillance equipment to monitor human rights advocates, religious believers, and ethnic minority groups in China, as well as corporate complicity in Chinese government censorship.

## BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

### *Introduction*

Chinese and international businesses are directly complicit in or at risk of being complicit in human rights abuses committed by the Chinese government. These abuses include the severe repression of ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), government surveillance of citizens without adequate privacy protections, government censorship, and lack of protection for Chinese workers. Companies complicit in such abuses contravene the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which state that businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and should seek to avoid “contributing to adverse human rights impacts . . . .”<sup>1</sup> [For information on China’s efforts to weaken international standards relating to business and human rights, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

### *Corporate Involvement in Mass Atrocities in the XUAR*

Companies that do business in, source from, or work with companies in the XUAR continue to be at great risk of complicity in the human rights abuses being committed in the region.<sup>2</sup> The PRC’s actions in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity<sup>3</sup> and genocide.<sup>4</sup> Experts have documented the arbitrary detention of up to 1.8 million individuals from predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups since 2017 in a network of mass internment camps in the XUAR.<sup>5</sup> Authorities have subjected individuals from ethnic minority groups in the XUAR to extreme levels of surveillance; deprivation of freedom of movement and residence; destruction of religious sites; invasive population control methods such as forced sterilization, forced insertion of intrauterine devices (IUDs), and forced abortion; forced placement of children in state-run orphanages and boarding schools; and forced labor.<sup>6</sup>

Companies are particularly at risk of complicity in crimes against humanity and genocide in the XUAR if they do business with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), its affiliate companies, or any other companies that have close ties to the XPCC.<sup>7</sup> In July 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce sanctioned the XPCC, a paramilitary organization, for its contributions to human rights abuses in the XUAR.<sup>8</sup>

In December 2021, **Tesla** announced it would open a new showroom in the XUAR.<sup>9</sup> Several organizations criticized the announcement,<sup>10</sup> and National Communications Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations Ibrahim Hooper said that “[n]o American corporation should be doing business in a region that is the focal point of a campaign of genocide targeting a religious and ethnic minority.”<sup>11</sup>

As of April 2022, **Airbnb** had offered hundreds of listings in both the XUAR and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).<sup>12</sup> In addition, a November 2021 Axios report found that more than a dozen Airbnb listings in the XUAR were located on land owned by the XPCC.<sup>13</sup> Further reporting found that throughout China, Airbnb hosts had discriminated against potential guests based on ethnicity—in some cases citing pressure from local authorities as the

## Business and Human Rights

reason they could not host ethnic minorities.<sup>14</sup> In May 2022, Airbnb reportedly planned to remove “listings for hosted experiences in China” starting in the summer of 2022 because of a “decline in business” after two years of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) restrictions.<sup>15</sup> [For more information on human rights violations in the XUAR, see Section X—Xinjiang. For more information on human rights violations in the TAR, see Section IX—Tibet.]

### STATE-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR

Reports continued to highlight evidence that potentially linked the supply chains of international corporations to forced labor in the XUAR.<sup>16</sup> Some affected products include:

- **Tomato products.** An August 2021 investigative report published by non-profit research organization C4ADS showed that tomato products potentially made by XPCC-owned companies using forced labor may have been sold in the United States and elsewhere.<sup>17</sup>
- **Electronics.** An October 2021 Reuters article reported that American remote control manufacturer **Universal Electronics Inc.** (UEI), participated in labor transfers of Uyghurs from the XUAR.<sup>18</sup> Labor transfer programs in and from the XUAR are Chinese government programs that move large numbers of ethnic minorities into forced labor.<sup>19</sup> From May 2019 to February 2020, UEI employed “at least 400 Uyghur workers” from the XUAR at their factory in Qinzhou, Guangxi Autonomous Region.<sup>20</sup> According to Reuters, workers were subjected to police surveillance, restricted movement, and “education activities.”<sup>21</sup> Due diligence was reportedly conducted by a “third-party agent working with the Xinjiang government”<sup>22</sup>—which is problematic given the fact that the government is the implementer of forced labor in the XUAR.<sup>23</sup>
- **Cotton products.** Multiple reports this year linked cotton products from the XUAR to international supply chains.<sup>24</sup> A November 2021 report entitled “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” by Sheffield Hallam University’s Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, reviewed publicly accessible customs data in order to trace cotton produced in the XUAR to the products of international brands.<sup>25</sup> The report examined five Chinese textile companies connected with cotton produced in the XUAR.<sup>26</sup> These companies’ problematic connections to the XUAR included: 1) owning a subsidiary in the XUAR; 2) purchasing cotton produced in the XUAR;<sup>27</sup> 3) working with the XPCC;<sup>28</sup> 4) participating in state-sponsored labor transfers;<sup>29</sup> and 5) receiving government subsidies in the XUAR.<sup>30</sup> By tracing the supply chains of the above-mentioned Chinese companies connected with forced labor in the XUAR, the report identified “53 intermediary manufacturers” outside of China and 103 international brands that are “at high risk of having Xinjiang cotton in their supply chains.”<sup>31</sup> The report concludes that the high risk of Xinjiang cotton being used in the products of international brands indicates “that human rights due diligence is [currently] inadequate in identifying and addressing

## Business and Human Rights

Uyghur forced labor in supply chains of manufacturers outside of China and enforcement mechanisms are not currently responding to the export of those goods internationally.”<sup>32</sup>

In December 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law No. 117-78).<sup>33</sup> The Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that all goods made in whole or in part in the XUAR have been made with forced labor, and that the importation of such goods is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.<sup>34</sup> A May 2022 C4ADS report found that a significant amount “of the world’s cotton, tomato products, pepper products, walnuts, rayon, calcium carbide, polysilicon, wind turbines, and beryllium” were produced in the XUAR.<sup>35</sup> [For information on how government-sponsored forced labor violates international standards prohibiting human trafficking and forced labor, see Section VI—Human Trafficking. For more information on cotton and tomato products likely made with forced labor and exported to the United States, see Section X—Xinjiang.]

### FIRMS, AUDITS, AND COMPLICITY IN FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR

Firms cannot rely on factory audits to ensure that their supply chains are free of forced labor in the XUAR.<sup>36</sup> When sourcing goods alleged to be made in whole or in part with forced labor, international brands often point to their use of audits to ensure compliance with corporate codes of conduct prohibiting involvement in forced labor.<sup>37</sup> Due diligence organizations, human rights and labor experts, and national government agencies, however, have pointed to the unreliability of audits conducted in the XUAR.<sup>38</sup> Reasons cited by the above-mentioned observers for the unreliability of audits conducted in the XUAR include:

- the inability of workers subjected to forced labor to speak freely;<sup>39</sup>
- the harassment and detention of auditors conducting due diligence in the XUAR;<sup>40</sup>
- the inability of auditors to obtain the information needed to conduct an audit;<sup>41</sup> and
- the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which deters auditors from speaking about the XUAR.<sup>42</sup>

## Business and Human Rights

### Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It Reportedly Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR

According to August 2021 reporting from the Wall Street Journal, authorities closed Shenzhen Verité, an affiliate of U.S.-based labor auditor Verité, Inc.<sup>43</sup> In April, Chinese authorities interrogated and restricted the movement of staff, froze bank accounts, and raided the offices of Shenzhen Verité.<sup>44</sup> In March, the Party-run media outlet Global Times had published an article criticizing reports of forced labor in the XUAR and particularly the social compliance organization Better Cotton Initiative (BCI).<sup>45</sup> The article was critical of Shenzhen Verité for reportedly conducting an investigation into forced labor in the XUAR commissioned by BCI.<sup>46</sup> An August Global Times article further lambasted Shenzhen Verité, claiming that the company “cited untenable claims from anti-China organizations and [came to] a predetermined guilty conclusion.”<sup>47</sup> The August article was reportedly based on information obtained by authorities who investigated Shenzhen Verité in April and interviews from former Shenzhen Verité employees.<sup>48</sup>

Chinese authorities’ closure of Shenzhen Verité, one of the recent actions taken against companies in response to claims regarding forced labor in the XUAR, indicates the risk involved to companies making such claims. According to the sourcing and labor editor of Sourcing Journal, Jasmin Malik Chua,<sup>49</sup> there is evidence that the closing of Shenzhen Verité “is another pointed act of retaliation on the part of [the Chinese government], which previously stoked nationalist fervor to trigger a wave of consumer boycotts against Western brands such as Adidas, Nike and H&M for cutting business relationships in Xinjiang over forced-labor concerns.”<sup>50</sup> According to the Wall Street Journal, “[s]upply-chain experts say China’s closure of Shenzhen Verité is likely to discourage Chinese factories and auditors from cooperating with multinational brands seeking to comply with U.S. rules on forced labor, due to fear of possible retribution by the Chinese government.”<sup>51</sup> [For information on cases in which Chinese authorities threatened or punished foreign companies whose speech or actions related to human rights abuses in the XUAR did not align with PRC narratives, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally and the text box in this chapter entitled “PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and Human Rights Violations in the XUAR.”]

### *Commercial Firms’ Role in Government Data Collection and Surveillance across China*

During the 2022 reporting year, the Commission observed reports linking Chinese tech firms with human rights abuses. In December 2021, the Washington Post reported that **Huawei** likely marketed surveillance technology to the Chinese government that the government could use to identify, monitor, manage, and track individuals.<sup>52</sup> The report was based on 100 confidential marketing presentations from 2016 to 2018 obtained from Huawei’s website that outlined various Huawei surveillance products.<sup>53</sup> The Huawei presentations included information regarding voice recording analysis technology to be used for broadly defined “national security” purposes, and facial recognition technology used in the XUAR.<sup>54</sup> These technologies were co-developed with **iFlytek** and

## Business and Human Rights

**DeepGlint**, respectively, both of which the U.S. Department of Commerce sanctioned for involvement in human rights abuses in the XUAR.<sup>55</sup> [For more information on corporate involvement in the export of Chinese surveillance technology abroad, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

### *Role of Commercial Firms in Government Censorship*

Companies were both targets and enablers of Chinese government censorship. Examples of corporate censorship in China during the reporting year include the following cases:

- **Censorship of globally used Quran app.** On October 15, 2021, the BBC reported that **Apple** had removed a Quran app, Quran Majeed, from its app store in China.<sup>56</sup> According to the app’s creator, Apple said that Quran Majeed was “removed from the China app store because it includes content that requires additional documentation from Chinese authorities.”<sup>57</sup> According to the website Apple Censorship, of 155 Apple app stores around the world, China is the only country in which the app Quran Majeed is unavailable.<sup>58</sup>
- **Disney Plus censors content in Hong Kong.** In November 2021, the New York Times reported that an episode of “The Simpsons” was removed from **Disney Plus** in Hong Kong, which launched in Hong Kong in November.<sup>59</sup> The episode satirically references Mao Zedong and the censorship of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.<sup>60</sup> According to a media regulation expert, Disney likely preemptively self-censored “The Simpsons” episode.<sup>61</sup>
- **Chinese companies remove media content in retaliation for the speech or action of foreign individuals.** In March 2022, the Los Angeles Times reported that Chinese streaming services including **Bilibili, iQiyi, Migu Video, Tencent Video, Xigua Video,** and **Youku** had removed films starring Canadian actor Keanu Reeves from their streaming platforms.<sup>62</sup> In January of the same year, Tibet House, an organization that was founded at the request of the Dalai Lama in order to promote Tibetan culture, announced that Reeves would perform during a March benefit concert.<sup>63</sup> In another case, music streaming services in China removed the music of Australian singer Kimberley Chen and Malaysian rapper Namewee after the release of “Fragile,” a song critical of the PRC.<sup>64</sup> According to the Party-run media outlet Global Times, **Weibo** also blocked Chen’s account after the song was released.<sup>65</sup>

In addition, foreign companies exported Chinese censorship outside of mainland China. Such censorship included the following cases:

- **Apple censors content of engravings.** In an August 2021 analysis piece about **Apple**,<sup>66</sup> Citizen Lab found that Apple disallowed customer requests in Hong Kong and Taiwan to have engraved on Apple products phrases related to Chinese political topics.<sup>67</sup> Apple censored the keywords “human rights” and “Dalai” in mainland China; “freedom of the press,” “double universal suffrage,” and “Ai Weiwei” in Hong Kong and main-

## Business and Human Rights

land China; and “Chairman Mao” and “Falun Gong” in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China.<sup>68</sup>

- **Publishing firms remove book content.** In another case, according to a March 2022 article by the Financial Times, publishing firms **Octopus Books** (an affiliate of **Hachette UK**)<sup>69</sup> and **Quarto**<sup>70</sup> censored books intended for sale in foreign markets in order to be able to print the books in China, where printing was cheaper.<sup>71</sup> Octopus Books removed references to Taiwan, and Quarto removed or altered references to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, and Tibet.<sup>72</sup>

- **Bing censors autofill results.** A May 2022 Citizen Lab report concluded that the U.S. version of Microsoft’s Bing search engine had censored autofill results related to Chinese political figures, Chinese dissidents, Falun Gong, and the violent suppression of the Tiananmen protests in June 1989, autofill results that were also censored through the version of Bing only available in China.<sup>73</sup> In June 2021, Reuters reported that Bing searches for images using the phrase “tank man” did not yield any image results.<sup>74</sup> The searches for “tank man” were made in the United States and elsewhere around the anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.<sup>75</sup> In its report on Bing, Citizen Lab said that it “may be fundamentally untenable” for an internet platform to facilitate free speech in one region and simultaneously apply political censorship in another region (e.g., China).<sup>76</sup>

[For more information on Chinese government censorship inside China, see Section III—Freedom of Expression. For more information on Chinese government censorship outside of China, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

<b>PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and Human Rights Violations in the XUAR</b>
<p>The PRC continued to threaten corporations with loss of revenue or other forms of punishment if they mentioned human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). On July 10, 2021, Patrick Wack, a French photographer who took photos in the XUAR from 2016 to 2020, posted about the release of his book on Instagram.<sup>77</sup> In his post, Wack referenced the “mass-incarceration of [the XUAR’s] Uyghur population and other Muslim minorities”<sup>78</sup> and said that his book “captures a visual narrative of the region and is a testimony to its abrupt descent into an Orwellian dystopia.”<sup>79</sup> Wack took the photos using <b>Kodak</b> film and Kodak shared 10 of Wack’s images on Instagram.<sup>80</sup></p> <p>On July 18, 2021, Chinese nationalist news site Guancha posted an article criticizing the Instagram posts of Kodak and Wack.<sup>81</sup> The article said both Kodak and Wack were attempting to give the XUAR a bad name by adding prejudiced captions to photos of daily life in the XUAR.<sup>82</sup> On the same day, the Communist Youth League of China posted the article on the Chinese social media app Weibo.<sup>83</sup> The Communist Youth League also initiated social media campaigns against U.S. companies in March 2021 and December 2021.<sup>84</sup></p>



**PRC Economic Coercion, Corporate Censorship, and Human Rights Violations in the XUAR—Continued**

On July 19, 2021, Kodak apologized for its Instagram post and said that its Instagram page was “not intended to be a platform for political commentary.”<sup>85</sup> Kodak also posted a statement on WeChat and its website blaming loopholes in supervision that may have allowed the original post to be approved.<sup>86</sup> The Party-run media outlet Global Times published an article quoting a Chinese professor who warned that the PRC would retaliate against companies that contradicted the PRC’s narrative on the XUAR.<sup>87</sup> He said that “[c]ompanies should know that Xinjiang-related issues are the bottom line of China, and for those who cross the line, we should use the law to defend our rights.”<sup>88</sup>

Such statements are consistent with other cases of economic coercion, in which Chinese authorities threatened or punished foreign companies such as H&M, Intel, Walmart, Sam’s Club, an affiliate of U.S.-based labor auditor Verité, Inc., and others, for speech or actions related to human rights in the XUAR that did not align with PRC narratives.<sup>89</sup> Among the threats aimed at Intel, Walmart, and Sam’s Club was a Global Times article that discussed the possibility of using the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, passed in June 2021,<sup>90</sup> which provides a legal basis for retaliatory measures against individuals and organizations with direct or indirect involvement in the implementation of foreign sanctions.<sup>91</sup> The Commission did not observe reports that authorities used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against the companies mentioned in this text box, but this past year authorities did use the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against four officials of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as two U.S. companies that sold arms to Taiwan, in response to sanctions imposed on Chinese officials for their involvement in human rights abuses in China.<sup>92</sup> [For more information on cases in which Chinese authorities threatened or punished foreign organizations whose speech or actions related to human rights abuses in the XUAR did not align with PRC narratives, see the text box in this chapter entitled “Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It Reportedly Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR,” and the Commission’s April 2022 analysis piece entitled “Case Study: China’s Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart.”]

*Worker Exploitation, Corporate Supply Chains, and Limited Legal Right to Freedom of Association*

Outside the XUAR, the lack of protection for Chinese workers under Chinese law, as well as a lack of enforcement of existing Chinese laws, allowed for continued abusive practices toward workers in the supply chains of Chinese and international businesses. The Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization permitted under Chinese law,<sup>93</sup> and Chinese law does not grant Chinese workers the right to freedom of association or permit them to form or join independent unions.<sup>94</sup> In a 2020 joint submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and China Labor Watch (CLW) stated that the “lack of enforcement of labor laws and regulations is the single greatest

## Business and Human Rights

factor limiting individuals' right to just and favorable conditions of employment. Despite strong legislation, government labor bureaus and labor inspectorates are not equipped to enforce the provisions, giving employers wide latitude to disregard the law."<sup>95</sup>

In one example, authorities punished a labor rights advocate for revealing labor violations at a factory in China that made **Amazon** devices.<sup>96</sup> According to a January 2022 Guardian article, public security officials tortured labor rights advocate Tang Mingfang<sup>97</sup> before he confessed to "leaking confidential company information,"<sup>98</sup> and authorities sentenced him to two years in prison and fined him 10,000 RMB (approximately US\$1,500) on the same charge.<sup>99</sup> In 2019, Tang, a former employee of **Hengyang Foxconn** affiliate **Hengyang Futaihong Precision Industrial Co., Ltd.**, leaked company documents to the Guardian and CLW.<sup>100</sup> The documents revealed that student interns were required to work overtime and on night shifts at Amazon's supplier Hengyang Foxconn, in some cases against their will.<sup>101</sup> Hengyang Foxconn produced Amazon devices such as the Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, and the Amazon Kindle.<sup>102</sup> [For more information on torture in the Chinese criminal justice system, see Section IV—Criminal Justice. For more information on the right of Chinese workers to form trade unions, and information on additional labor rights advocates in China, see Section VII—Worker Rights.]

### Notes to Section VIII—Business and Human Rights

<sup>1</sup>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, June 16, 2011, principle 13.

<sup>2</sup>CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 213–15; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 237–41.

<sup>3</sup>Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7; Human Rights Watch, “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots,” April 19, 2021; Naomi Kikoler, “Simon-Skjoldt Center Director Delivers Remarks on China’s Systematic Persecution of Uyghurs,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, March 6, 2020; Gene A. Bunin, “Detainees Are Trickling Out of Xinjiang’s Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2019; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Universal Children’s Day 2018: China Must Reunite Uyghur Children and Parents. Forcible Placement of Children of Living Parents in State-Run Facilities Constitutes a Crime Against Humanity,” November 19, 2018. See also CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 300–01.

<sup>4</sup>“The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, March 2021, 50; Jackson Neagli, “The Importance of ‘Biological Destruction’ in Responsible Coverage of Xinjiang,” *Lawfare* (blog), April 14, 2021; Beth Van Schaack, “Genocide Against the Uyghurs: Legal Grounds for the United States’ Bipartisan Genocide Determination,” *Just Security*, January 27, 2021; Joanne Smith Finley, “Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Genocide Research* (November 19, 2020): 1–23; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 1948; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, accessed August 1, 2022.

<sup>5</sup>See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, “Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 11 (November 2019); Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, and Christo Buschek, “China Secretly Built a Vast New Infrastructure to Imprison Muslims,” *BuzzFeed News*, August 27, 2020; Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” *New York Times*, November 24, 2019; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘Re-Education’ Camps,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018. See also CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 213; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 298–300.

<sup>6</sup>See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims,” December 9, 2020; Adrian Zenz, “Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program: A Process-Oriented Evaluation,” Jamestown Foundation, March 2021, 17, 49; Sigal Samuel, “China’s Genocide Against the Uyghurs, in 4 Disturbing Charts,” *Vox*, March 10, 2021; Isobel Cockerell, “Revealed: New Videos Expose China’s Forced Migration of Uyghurs During the Pandemic,” *Coda Story*, July 9, 2020; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China Is Erasing Mosques and Precious Shrines in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, September 25, 2020; “How Xinjiang’s Gulag Tears Families Apart,” *Economist*, October 17, 2020.

<sup>7</sup>CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 240–41; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Issues Detention Order on Cotton Products Made by Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Using Prison Labor,” December 2, 2020; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” July 31, 2020.

<sup>8</sup>The XPCC is a paramilitary organization that advances Chinese Communist Party control over the XUAR. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” July 31, 2020. For a discussion of the XPCC and its links to human rights abuses in the XUAR from the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 240–41.

<sup>9</sup>Helen Davidson, “Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,” *Guardian*, January 4, 2022.

<sup>10</sup>Helen Davidson, “Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,” *Guardian*, January 4, 2022; Ivana Saric, “Tesla Opens Showroom in Xinjiang Province, despite China’s Human Rights Abuses,” *Axios*, January 4, 2022.

<sup>11</sup>Helen Davidson, “Tesla Criticised for Opening Showroom in Xinjiang despite Human Rights Abuses,” *Guardian*, January 4, 2022.

<sup>12</sup>“Olympic Sponsor Airbnb Profits from Xinjiang, Tibet Listings,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *France 24*, February 18, 2022; “Places to Stay: Xinjiang, China,” Airbnb, accessed April 15, 2022; “Places to Stay: Tibet, China,” Airbnb, accessed April 15, 2022. According to a CNN article, Airbnb plans to remove “listings for hosted experiences in China” in the summer of 2022 due to a “decline in business” after two years of Covid-19 restrictions. Sahar Akbarzai and Michelle Toh, “Airbnb Is Closing Its Listings Business in China,” *CNN*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>13</sup>Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Jacque Schrag, “Airbnb Hosts Xinjiang Rentals on Land Owned by Sanctioned Group,” *Axios*, November 29, 2021.

<sup>14</sup>Sophia Yan, “Uyghurs and Tibetans Locked Out of Airbnb in China’s Latest Crackdown on Ethnic Minorities,” *Telegraph*, July 27, 2021; Charles Rollet, “Airbnb Listings in China Are Littered with Racist Discrimination,” *Wired UK*, March 5, 2019. See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, June 16, 2011, principles 12, 13; Airbnb, “Nondiscrimination Policy,” February 10, 2022.

## Business and Human Rights

<sup>15</sup>Sahar Akbarzai and Michelle Toh, “Airbnb Is Closing Its Listings Business in China,” *CNN*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>16</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021; Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “Hugo Boss and Other Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China—but These Shipping Records Raise Questions,” *BuzzFeed News*, January 13, 2022; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 214, 215.

<sup>17</sup>Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, “Long Shadows: How the Global Economy Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,” August 10, 2021, 20–21. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” January 13, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” July 31, 2020. For a discussion of the XPCC, Cofco Tunhe, and their links to forced labor in the XUAR from the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 240–41.

<sup>18</sup>Cate Cadell, “Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,” *Reuters*, October 8, 2021.

<sup>19</sup>See, e.g., “‘To Make Us Slowly Disappear’: The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs,” Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2021, 32; John Sudworth, “‘If the Others Go I’ll Go’: Inside China’s Scheme to Transfer Uighurs into Work,” *BBC*, March 2, 2021; Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., “Uyghurs for Sale: ‘Reeducation,’ Forced Labour and Surveillance beyond Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 21, 2022, 3, 6.

<sup>20</sup>Cate Cadell, “Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,” *Reuters*, October 8, 2021.

<sup>21</sup>Cate Cadell, “Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,” *Reuters*, October 8, 2021.

<sup>22</sup>Cate Cadell, “Exclusive: U.S. Electronics Firm Struck Deal to Transport and Hire Uyghur Workers,” *Reuters*, October 8, 2021.

<sup>23</sup>Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” Uyghur Tribunal, February 10, 2022, 2, 3; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 164, 166, 167.

<sup>24</sup>See, e.g., Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, “Long Shadows: How the Global Economy Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,” August 10, 2021, 25–26; Megha Rajagopalan, “Goods Linked to a Group That Runs Chinese Detention Camps May Be Ending Up in U.S. Stores,” *BuzzFeed News*, August 10, 2021; Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “Hugo Boss and Other Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China—but These Shipping Records Raise Questions,” *BuzzFeed News*, January 13, 2022.

<sup>25</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2.

<sup>26</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2, 26. The five Chinese textile companies are Huaifu Fashion Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co. Ltd., Luthai Textile Co. Ltd., Texhong Textile Group, and Weiqiao Textile Co. Ltd. For more information on Huaifu Fashion Co. Ltd., see pages 34–37; for more information on Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 30–33; for more information on Luthai Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 38–42; for more information on Texhong Textile Group, see pages 43–46; and for more information on Weiqiao Textile Co. Ltd., see pages 47–50.

<sup>27</sup>For more information on the coercive nature of cotton harvesting in the XUAR, see Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 14, 16, 17; Adrian Zenz, “Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton,” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, December 2020, 13–16; John Sudworth, “China’s ‘Tainted’ Cotton,” *BBC*, December 2020.

<sup>28</sup>For a discussion of the XPCC and its links to human rights abuses in the XUAR from the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 240–41.

<sup>29</sup>For information on the coercive nature of labor transfers, see “‘To Make Us Slowly Disappear’: The Chinese Government’s Assault on the Uyghurs,” Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2021, 31–32.

<sup>30</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 27, 30, 35, 38. For more information on the connection between government subsidies and forced labor in the XUAR, see CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 214.

<sup>31</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2.

<sup>32</sup>Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 3.

<sup>33</sup>Human Rights Watch, “China: U.S. Should Fully Apply New Forced Labor Law,” March 11, 2022. See also Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78).

<sup>34</sup>Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78). See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” January 13, 2021; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational Guidance for Importers,” June 13, 2022.

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<sup>35</sup> Irina Bukharin, C4ADS, “Everybody’s Business: The Xinjiang Goods Entering Global Supply Chain,” May 19, 2022, 12–16.

<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of audits in the XUAR from the Commission’s 2020 reporting year, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 239.

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<sup>39</sup> “Interview: Laura Murphy on Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” *China Digital Times*, March 21, 2022; Beth Timmins, “France Investigates Retailers Over China Forced Labour Claims,” *BBC*, July 2, 2021; Eva Xiao, “Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China’s Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 2020.

<sup>40</sup> United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “Overseas Business Risk: China,” March 11, 2022; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Risks and Considerations for Businesses with Supply Chain Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and Other Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” July 1, 2020; Eva Xiao, “Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China’s Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 2020.

<sup>41</sup> Beth Timmins, “France Investigates Retailers Over China Forced Labour Claims,” *BBC*, July 2, 2021; Eva Xiao, “Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China’s Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 2020.

<sup>42</sup> “Interview: Laura Murphy on Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” *China Digital Times*, March 21, 2022; Eva Xiao, “Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China’s Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 2020. See also *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa* [PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective June 10, 2021; “Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fa Gong Wei fuzeren jiu Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa da jizhe wen” [The head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee answers reporters’ questions regarding the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], *Xinhua*, June 10, 2021; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Seychelles, “NPC Standing Committee Approves Bill to Better Safeguard National Security,” June 11, 2021.

<sup>43</sup> Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, “China Closes U.S. Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 2021.

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<sup>45</sup> Liu Xin, Fan Lingzhi, and Yang Ruoyu, “Exclusive: How U.S. Forces ‘Xinjiang Forced Labor’ Narrative on Enterprises, Industry Agencies,” *Global Times*, March 27, 2021.

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<sup>49</sup> Jasmin Malik Chua (@jasminchua), “Sourcing + labor editor @sourcingjournal . . .,” Twitter, accessed April 22, 2022.

<sup>50</sup> Jasmin Malik Chua, “New China Auditor Drama: Authorities Shut Down Shenzhen Verité After Raid,” *Sourcing Journal*, August 19, 2021. For more information on Chinese government retaliation against H&M and other companies for statements and actions regarding forced labor in the XUAR, see CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 218; “Case Study: China’s Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022.

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## Business and Human Rights

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<sup>66</sup> Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, “Engrave Danger: An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,” August 18, 2021.

<sup>67</sup> Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, “Engrave Danger: An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,” August 18, 2021.

<sup>68</sup> Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, “Engrave Danger: An Analysis of Apple Engraving Censorship across Six Regions,” August 18, 2021.

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<sup>76</sup> Jeffrey Knockel and Lotus Ruan, Citizen Lab, “Bada Bing, Bada Boom: Microsoft Bing’s Chinese Political Censorship of Autosuggestions in North America,” May 19, 2022, 40–41.

<sup>77</sup> Patrick Wack (@patwack), “The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link in bio . . .,” Instagram, July 10, 2021.

<sup>78</sup> Patrick Wack (@patwack), “The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link in bio . . .,” Instagram, July 10, 2021.

<sup>79</sup> Patrick Wack (@patwack), “The pre-sale for DUST is Live. Link in bio . . .,” Instagram, July 10, 2021. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Wack said that the photos show how the region has radically changed over the years. “Muslim symbols,” “golden domes,” and “women wearing veils” he saw in 2016 had “disappeared” by 2019. Mike Ives, “Kodak Deletes Post by Photographer Who Called Xinjiang an ‘Orwellian Dystopia,’” *New York Times*, July 21, 2021.

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<sup>81</sup> Ju Feng, “Xinjiang zhome mei, Keda que pianyao jiadai sihuo” [Xinjiang is so beautiful, but Kodak tries to sneak in its own bias], *Guancha*, reprinted in *Sina*, July 18, 2021. *Guancha* published similar nationalist articles around the same time as early social media criticism of Sam’s Club and H&M appeared, in December 2021 and March 2021, respectively. “Shanmu Huiyuan shangdian huiying xiajia Xinjiang shangpin: mei kucunle, you huo hui chongxin shangjia” [Sam’s Club responds to its removal of Xinjiang products: products are out of stock, and will be restocked when available], *Guancha*, December 24, 2022; “H&M fabu shengming, jubu rencuo” [H&M releases statement, but refuses to admit its mistake], *Guancha*, March 24, 2021.

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## Business and Human Rights

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<sup>86</sup> Rhoda Kwan, “Kodak Deletes Xinjiang Photo from Instagram, Vows to ‘Respect Chinese Gov’t,’” *Hong Kong Free Press*, July 21, 2021; Mike Ives, “Kodak Deletes Post by Photographer Who Called Xinjiang an ‘Orwellian Dystopia,’” *New York Times*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>87</sup> Lu Yameng, “Kodak Apologizes over Instagram Post That Claims Xinjiang Is under ‘Acute Repression’” *Global Times*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>88</sup> Lu Yameng, “Kodak Apologizes over Instagram Post That Claims Xinjiang Is under ‘Acute Repression’” *Global Times*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>89</sup> Lingling Wei, Eva Xiao, and Trefor Moss, “China Closes U.S. Auditor as Tensions Mount Over Forced Labor Allegations,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 2021. The Commission documented the case of H&M and other Better Cotton Initiative affiliates in its *2021 Annual Report*, documented the cases of H&M, Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart in its April 2022 analysis piece entitled “Case Study: China’s Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart,” and documented the case of Shenzhen Verité, affiliate of U.S.-based labor auditor Verité Inc., in the text box in the Business and Human Rights chapter in this year’s report entitled “Authorities Close Labor Auditor after It Reportedly Investigates Forced Labor in the XUAR.” See CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 218; “Case Study: China’s Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022.

<sup>90</sup> Fan Lingzhi and Liu Xin, “[Jiejie] Meiguo jie suowei ‘qiangpo laodong’ dui Xinjiang jichu efa, women gai ruhe yingdui?” [Analysis: When the United States uses so-called ‘forced labor’ as excuse to produce malicious law against Xinjiang, how should we respond?], *Global Times*, December 24, 2021; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa* [PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed June 10, 2021, effective June 10, 2021. See also “Case Study: China’s Economic Coercion Against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, April 14, 2022.

<sup>91</sup> Measures authorized under the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law include visa denial, exit bans, and the confiscation of property and freezing of assets. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa* [PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law], passed and effective June 10, 2021, arts. 4–6.

<sup>92</sup> Ma Ziqing, “Zhongfang xuanbu yiju ‘Fanwaiguo Zhicai Fa’ dui 4 ming Meifang renyuan jinxing duideng zhicai” [China announces reciprocal sanctions against 4 Americans under the “Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law”], *China Youth Daily*, December 21, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Abuse on International Human Rights Day,” December 10, 2021; “Beijing Sanctions Lockheed, Raytheon Again over Taiwan Arms Sales,” *Reuters*, February 21, 2022. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “2021 nian 12 yue 21 ri wajiaobu fayarenren Zhao Lijian zhuchi liexing jizhehui” [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s regular press conference on December 21, 2021], December 21, 2021.

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<sup>94</sup> *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa* [PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended August 27, 2009, arts. 9–11; FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 3. For relevant international standards regarding the right to freely form and join independent unions, see International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 4, 1950, arts. 2, 3, 5; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 22.1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8.1.

<sup>95</sup> FIDH and China Labor Watch, “Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 3. For information on the role of labor rights advocates in uncovering labor rights abuses in Chinese factories against a backdrop of potentially unreliable labor auditing practices, see CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 219, 220.

<sup>96</sup> For a discussion of the protection of whistleblowers under international law, see Dimitrios Kaferanis, “The International Legal Framework on Whistle-Blowers: What More Should Be Done?,” *Seattle Journal for Social Justice* 19, no. 3 (May 1, 2021): 747, 753–57.

<sup>97</sup> For more information about Tang Mingfang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00379.

<sup>98</sup> Gethin Chamberlain, “Alexa Whistleblower Demands Amazon Apology After Being Jailed and Tortured,” *Guardian*, January 30, 2022. Coercing a detainee to confess to wrongdoing is a violation of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, and torture is a violation of the Chinese government’s international human rights obligations as a State Party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa* [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts. 52, 56; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987. China signed the CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), accessed August 1, 2022.

## Business and Human Rights

<sup>99</sup>Hengyang Zhengxiang People's Court, "Hunan sheng Hengyangshi Zhengxiangqu Renmin Fayuan xingshi panjue shu" [People's Court in Zhengxiang district, Hengyang City, Hunan Province: criminal judgment], July 1, 2020.

<sup>100</sup>Hengyang Zhengxiang People's Court, "Hunan sheng Hengyangshi Zhengxiangqu Renmin Fayuan xingshi panjue shu" [People's Court in Zhengxiang district, Hengyang City, Hunan Province: criminal judgment], July 1, 2020; Gethin Chamberlain, "Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices," *Guardian*, August 8, 2019.

<sup>101</sup>Gethin Chamberlain, "Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices," *Guardian*, August 8, 2019; China Labor Watch, "Amazon's Supplier Factory Foxconn Recruits Illegally: Interns Forced to Work Overtime," August 8, 2019. Making students work night shifts is against Chinese regulations. Ministry of Education, *Zhiye Xuexiao Xuesheng Shixi Guanli Guiding* [Regulations on the Management of Vocational School Student Internships], issued and effective April 12, 2016, art. 16.

<sup>102</sup>Gethin Chamberlain, "Schoolchildren in China Work Overnight to Produce Amazon Alexa Devices," *Guardian*, August 8, 2019; China Labor Watch, "Amazon's Supplier Factory Foxconn Recruits Illegally: Interns Forced to Work Overtime," August 8, 2019.