

## XINJIANG

### *Findings*

- Key findings from a cache of tens of thousands of files obtained from public security bureaus in two counties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) included: the key role of senior Communist Party and central government officials in carrying out the mass detention and other persecution of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR; the highly securitized nature of detention in the region's camps and prisons; the high rate of imprisonment in Konasheher (Shufu) county in Kashgar prefecture, XUAR, as authorities increasingly sentenced Turkic Muslims to formal imprisonment; and arbitrary deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.
- Reports published during the Commission's 2022 reporting year indicated that XUAR officials increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following their detention in mass internment camps. According to international reporting and analysts' review of satellite imagery, officials have converted many former mass internment camps into prisons or other types of formal detention facilities.
- International researchers and journalists found evidence that authorities continued to expand detention facilities, including mass internment camps. Based on research and analysis of leaked official documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News journalists estimated in July 2021 that authorities in the XUAR had enough space in detention facilities in the region, including prisons and mass internment camps, to detain more than one million people at the same time.
- Authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved former mass internment camp detainees and other Turkic and Muslim individuals. In its annual report released in February 2022, the International Labour Organization expressed "deep concern" over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted that the "extensive use of forced labor" involving Turkic and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated the Employment Policy Convention of 1964.
- In September 2021, official media in the XUAR announced a new plan pairing Uyghur children with children from across the country, a move that observers believe is designed to control Uyghurs' lives and eliminate Uyghurs' cultural identity. Called the "Pomegranate Flower Plan," the initiative matched Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a village in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han Chinese children from other parts of China, in order to establish "kinship" ties between the children.
- During the 2022 Ramadan period, which lasted from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures reportedly enforced quotas for local Muslims allowed to fast during the holiday, and required them to register with officials. Reports published this past year showed that authorities have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the

## Xinjiang

XUAR, including members of the clergy, to lengthy prison terms.

- Turkic women who had been detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the Uyghur Tribunal that many female detainees were raped in the camps. One former camp detainee testified that unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were raped in a camp where she was detained and that men paid to come to camps to rape female detainees.

### *Recommendations*

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Coordinate with allies and partners to advocate for the formation of a UN commission of inquiry to investigate forced labor abuses involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents.
- Urge Chinese authorities to immediately cease all programs involving the forced labor of mass internment camp detainees and prisoners in the XUAR, along with programs involving the forced labor of other ethnic minority individuals within and outside the XUAR.
- Work with allies and partners in the United Nations to establish a coalition to request a special session to address human rights violations against Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim people from the XUAR.
- Work together with allies and partners to raise awareness about the transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims from the XUAR, including through discussion of digital rights. Seek ways to ensure that Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the United States and other countries can be free from surveillance, intimidation, and harassment by Chinese Communist Party and government actors.
- Work with allies and partners to counter third countries' cooperation with China in conducting transnational repression, including the refolement, surveillance, and harassment of Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim Chinese nationals. Impose sanctions, including through freezing assets and restricting travel, on officials in China and third countries who participate in such transnational repression. Advocate for the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on transnational repression.
- Prioritize the resettlement of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic and Muslim refugees in the United States, including by granting them Priority 2 status in the United States' refugee program. Urge other like-minded countries to implement similar refugee resettlement programs for Turkic and Muslim refugees from China. Identify countries likely to deport Turkic and Muslim refugees from China and engage these countries through diplomatic channels to prevent such deportations.
- Urge People's Republic of China (PRC) officials to allow foreign diplomats and journalists to travel freely to and within the XUAR.
- Direct the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development to create programming to provide care

## **Xinjiang**

for former mass internment camp detainees, to include such psychosocial counseling and other assistance as may be necessary to address the trauma these detainees have faced.

- Work with groups and through forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) to advocate for improved human rights and fair labor practices in the XUAR; work with allies to raise the issue of human rights in the XUAR in discussions with ASEAN and APEC members, as well as with Muslim countries in other forums. Work with allies and partners to support public events and civil society organizations in ASEAN and APEC Member States in order to raise awareness of human rights conditions in the XUAR.

- Work with officials at American universities to protect Uyghur and other Turkic and Muslim students who hold a Chinese passport and/or who speak out about human rights abuses in the XUAR, to ensure that they enjoy freedom of expression and are protected from harassment and threats to their safety.

## XINJIANG

### *Internal Documents Show Brutality of Mass Detention and Other Forms of Repression in the XUAR*

#### **The Xinjiang Police Files**

In May 2022, international researchers and journalists reported new findings on the nature and scope of mass detention in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), based on information contained in a cache of tens of thousands of files obtained from public security bureaus in two counties in the XUAR.<sup>1</sup> The files, containing documents, images, spreadsheets, and speeches mainly from 2017 and 2018, were provided to scholar Adrian Zenz by an unnamed individual who accessed internal computer systems in Konasheher (Shufu) county in Kashgar prefecture and Tekes (Tekesi) county in Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in the XUAR.<sup>2</sup> The files, which Zenz then shared with 14 news agencies, included more than 5,000 images of individuals from Konasheher county, 2,800 of whom researchers confirmed had been detained.<sup>3</sup> The youngest detainee was 15 years old, and the oldest was 73.<sup>4</sup> Key findings include:

- **The role of senior Communist Party and central government officials in carrying out the mass detention and other persecution of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR.**<sup>5</sup> In a classified speech delivered in June 2018, Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi describes Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s knowledge, support, and direction of mass detentions and other repressive policies in the region.<sup>6</sup> Zhao’s speech outlines a five-year plan for achieving “comprehensive stability” in the XUAR, beginning around the time mass internment camps<sup>7</sup> appeared in 2017 and ending in 2021, and roughly concurrent with the tenure of XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo.<sup>8</sup>
- **The highly securitized nature of detention in the region’s camps and prisons.**<sup>9</sup> Internal documents and a speech delivered by former XUAR Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo instruct security personnel to “shoot to kill” anyone attempting to escape camp facilities; security personnel stationed in camp watchtowers were armed with machine guns and sniper rifles; and documents instruct security personnel to blindfold and shackle detainees when transferring them between different locations.<sup>10</sup> Images from detention facilities show security personnel armed with guns, clubs, and/or batons, some while wearing combat gear, while carrying out security drills and monitoring detainees.<sup>11</sup>

**The Xinjiang Police Files—Continued**

- **The high rate of imprisonment in Konasheher county, as authorities increasingly sentenced Turkic Muslims to formal imprisonment.**<sup>12</sup> According to the Associated Press (AP), nearly 1 in every 25 people in the county had been sentenced to prison on charges related to terrorism—the highest imprisonment rate in the world.<sup>13</sup> The AP reported that more than 10,000 people in Konasheher, most of whom were arrested in 2017, had been sentenced to lengthy prison terms.<sup>14</sup> Internal spreadsheets show that in 2018, more than 12 percent of ethnic minority adults in the county were held in some type of detention facility, which was more than 64 times the national detention rate.<sup>15</sup>
- **Arbitrary deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.**<sup>16</sup> Reasons for imprisonment included studying Islamic scripture with a relative seven years earlier, installing encrypted apps on one’s cell phone, and inactivity on one’s cell phone.<sup>17</sup> Zhao Kezhi’s characterization of cultural and religious heritage as traits that determined millions of Turkic Muslims to be threats in need of “re-education” indicates that authorities detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others primarily because of their cultural and religious identity.<sup>18</sup> Intake guidelines for mass internment camps listed 21 categories of detainees, including people with a connection to another country and husbands of women who were pregnant in violation of population planning policies.<sup>19</sup>

THE XINJIANG PAPERS

Another set of highly sensitive documents, leaked in September 2021 to a London-based independent tribunal known as the Uyghur Tribunal,<sup>20</sup> which included records of speeches delivered by Xi Jinping, shows the role of Xi, Premier Li Keqiang, and other top PRC officials in directing and guiding repressive policies in the XUAR.<sup>21</sup> The documents, dated between 2014 and 2018, detail the role of these officials in shaping policies such as mass internment, forced labor, population control, homestay programs, and forced placement in boarding schools targeting Uyghur and other ethnic minority communities in the XUAR in subsequent years.<sup>22</sup> The documents are part of what are known internationally as the Xinjiang Papers, a cache of internal government and Party documents that the New York Times reported on in 2019.<sup>23</sup> According to new analysis of the Xinjiang Papers published by scholar Adrian Zenz, two of Xi’s speeches contained in the documents authorized the drafting of the region’s first anti-extremism regulations.<sup>24</sup> Official Chinese media portrayed the regulations, which the XUAR People’s Congress revised in October 2018, as justification for mass internment camps, but the camps remained illegal under both Chinese and international law.<sup>25</sup> The documents, and Zenz’s analysis, also reveal a previously unreported link between clear demands made by Xi Jinping and a subsequent push to assimilate ethnic minority children in the XUAR in Chinese-language boarding schools, as well as an initiative to assign primarily Han Chinese cadres to live with and surveil ethnic minority families in their homes.<sup>26</sup> [For

## Xinjiang

more information on the Xinjiang Papers and PRC involvement in forced labor, see Section VI—Human Trafficking.]

### *Expansion of Mass Detention Facilities*

International researchers and journalists found evidence during this reporting year that authorities continued to expand detention facilities in the XUAR, including mass internment camps.<sup>27</sup> Based on research and analysis of leaked official documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News journalists estimated in July 2021 that authorities in the XUAR had enough space in detention facilities in the region, including prisons and mass internment camps, to detain more than one million people at the same time.<sup>28</sup> The journalists noted that this figure likely underestimated the true capacity of detention facilities in the XUAR, because it did not account for the overcrowded conditions reported by many former detainees.<sup>29</sup> In addition, this estimate did not include the capacity of the more than 100 facilities built prior to 2016.<sup>30</sup>

#### **Kyrgyz Christian Ovalbek Turdakun and Mass Detention in the XUAR**

The case of an ethnic Kyrgyz Christian who was detained in a mass internment camp in 2018 and who arrived in the United States in April 2022 illustrates several unique and significant aspects of mass detention in the XUAR. Authorities detained **Ovalbek Turdakun**, a Chinese national, for 10 months in a camp in Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, accusing him of having overstayed a visa on a trip to Kyrgyzstan and criticizing him for his marriage to a Kyrgyz national and for visiting mosques abroad.<sup>31</sup> Ovalbek Turdakun is the first Christian formerly detained in a mass internment camp to publicly speak out about his detention, and is a member of the Kyrgyz ethnic group, whose numbers in the XUAR are smaller than those of Uyghurs or Kazakhs and whose plight has received less international attention.<sup>32</sup> His legal background strengthened his ability to document details of his detention, including details regarding torture, surveillance cameras, and camp layout.<sup>33</sup> In addition, observers believe the harassment and risk of deportation Ovalbek Turdakun faced after fleeing to Kyrgyzstan following his detention demonstrates a pattern of harassment of ethnic minorities fleeing to Central Asia from the XUAR that could help strengthen a case being submitted by international lawyers to the International Criminal Court regarding the repression of XUAR residents in Tajikistan.<sup>34</sup>

### *Rise in Formal Detention of Turkic Muslims*

Reports published this past year indicated that XUAR officials increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following their detention in mass internment camps.<sup>35</sup> According to reporting by the Associated Press (AP), officials have converted some former mass internment camps into prisons or other types of formal detention facilities.<sup>36</sup> The AP reported in July 2021 that, based on an in-person tour conducted in April 2021, Urumqi No. 3 Detention Center in Dabancheng dis-

tract, Urumqi municipality, had been converted from a mass internment camp into a pretrial detention facility.<sup>37</sup> Satellite imagery showed that new buildings added in 2019 to the facility—the largest detention facility in China, and possibly the world—reached nearly a mile in length.<sup>38</sup> Analysis of two reports released by XUAR judicial authorities in March 2022 also indicates a shift in the detention of Uyghurs from mass internment camps to prisons, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA).<sup>39</sup>

Chinese authorities' lack of transparency often makes it difficult for relatives of detained Turkic Muslims to obtain confirmation of their sentences and other information.<sup>40</sup> In July 2021, RFA reported that Xinjiang University sources confirmed that authorities had sentenced Uyghur ethnographer **Rahile Dawut** to a prison term of unknown length, possibly in 2020.<sup>41</sup> Chinese authorities did not provide public information about Rahile Dawut's case following her disappearance in December 2017 and likely detention in a mass internment camp.<sup>42</sup>

Cases of Uyghurs sentenced to long-term imprisonment that were reported this past year include:

- **Yusupjan Memtimin.**<sup>43</sup> In March 2022, RFA reported that in late 2018, authorities in the XUAR sentenced businessman and philanthropist Yusupjan Memtimin (also known as Yusup Saqal) to 14 years in prison, reportedly in connection with “taking criminals under his wing.”<sup>44</sup> Authorities detained Yusupjan Memtimin in 2017 because he had driven the family members of a detained Uyghur man to visit him at his detention facility in 2014.<sup>45</sup>
- **Nurmemet Omer Uchqun.**<sup>46</sup> XUAR authorities sentenced Uyghur literature professor and translator Nurmemet Omer Uchqun to 10 years in prison on charges related to “separatism” and “promoting Western culture.”<sup>47</sup> Security personnel detained Nurmemet Omer Uchqun in Urumqi in early 2018 and transferred him to Keriye (Yutian) Prison in Keriye (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture, after sentencing him.<sup>48</sup>
- **Almire Erkin.**<sup>49</sup> In May 2022, RFA reported that in 2017, XUAR authorities detained 32-year-old nurse Almire Erkin and subsequently sentenced her to 10 years in prison for watching Turkish movies on her cell phone.<sup>50</sup> Authorities held Almire Erkin at a women's prison in Urumqi municipality.<sup>51</sup> Her father, a police officer in Kashgar prefecture, once received an award from the municipal government for detaining 2,000 individuals for “re-education.”<sup>52</sup>
- **Meryem Emet.**<sup>53</sup> In 2022, RFA and National Public Radio reported that in 2017, authorities in Urumqi had detained Meryem Emet and later sentenced her to 20 years in prison.<sup>54</sup> Her sentence was reportedly connected to her having met and spoken with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when he visited Urumqi in 2012, and to her having married a foreigner.<sup>55</sup> Authorities held Meryem Emet in a prison in Kucha (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture.<sup>56</sup> After she was detained, officials placed her two young children in state-run boarding schools in Urumqi for more than a year and a half.<sup>57</sup> [For more information on Meryem Emet's children, see Forcible

## Xinjiang

Displacement and Assimilation of Ethnic Minority Children in this section.]

Reports published throughout the year documented authorities' continued use of torture and other forms of mistreatment against prisoners and camp detainees.<sup>58</sup> As in the past reporting year,<sup>59</sup> reports emerged documenting the deaths of individuals in mass internment camps and prisons or after they were held in camps or prisons. Examples include the following:

- **Yaqup Haji**, a 45-year-old Uyghur businessman and philanthropist from Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, who died in or around September 2021 after being tortured in a mass internment camp or prison, where he had been held since 2018.<sup>60</sup> A friend of Yaqup Haji told RFA that authorities had detained him for making contributions to religious causes, and that authorities had tortured him, including by holding him in solitary confinement.<sup>61</sup>
- **Zeynephan Memtimin**, a 40-year-old Uyghur woman who died in 2020 in a prison in Keriye (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture, where she was serving a 10-year sentence for violating family planning policies.<sup>62</sup> Authorities previously held Zeynephan Memtimin in a mass internment camp beginning in 2017, for having fled a hospital where she was due to undergo a forced abortion in 2014.<sup>63</sup> Officials did not disclose the cause of her death to relatives.<sup>64</sup>
- **Yaqup Hesen**, a 43-year-old goldsmith who died on May 1, 2022, 20 days after being released from a prison in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, where he had been held for three years.<sup>65</sup> A neighborhood committee official told RFA that authorities had detained him for praying.<sup>66</sup> Family members sought medical treatment for Yaqup Hesen for an unspecified illness at multiple hospitals following his release.<sup>67</sup> Yaqup Hesen's 20-year-old son died, reportedly of grief, at his father's funeral.<sup>68</sup>

### *Detention of 2008 Olympics Torchbearers*

Reports this past year highlighted the detention of at least eight Uyghurs<sup>69</sup> who had served as torchbearers at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, including the following:

- In early 2018, authorities detained cardiac surgeon **Abduqeyyum Semet**, who had served as director of the Kashgar Prefecture Health Department, and later sentenced him to 18 years in prison.<sup>70</sup> Authorities reportedly detained Abduqeyyum Semet for his failure to carry out government directives and policies.<sup>71</sup>
- In or around 2017, authorities detained Uyghur civil servant **Adil Abdurehim** for watching "counterrevolutionary" videos, and in 2018, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court in Urumqi municipality, XUAR, tried and sentenced him to 14 years for attempted "separatism."<sup>72</sup> Adil Abdurehim led a local culture and sports bureau, and reportedly received many awards for his work, including for being an exemplary member of the Chinese Communist Party and a model of "ethnic unity."<sup>73</sup>



## Xinjiang

- In 2017, authorities detained Uyghur volleyball coach **Alimjan Mehmud** for being in contact with Muslim Uyghurs whom they deemed suspicious, and later sentenced him to eight years in prison.<sup>74</sup> Alimjan Mehmud, who was viewed as a leader in sports and activism in the Uyghur community, was one of at least six or seven instructors at the Kashgar Sports School in Kashgar prefecture whom authorities detained in recent years.<sup>75</sup>

### *International Observers Condemn Bachelet Visit to the XUAR*

The U.S. Government,<sup>76</sup> human rights groups,<sup>77</sup> and scholars<sup>78</sup> around the world were highly critical of the May 2022 visit to the XUAR by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, saying she failed to hold Chinese authorities accountable for their repression of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the region. In advance of her visit, officials in the XUAR warned residents not to speak out about mass internment camps or other rights abuses.<sup>79</sup> As of August 8, 2022, Bachelet's office had yet to issue a long-awaited report on human rights in the XUAR, despite Bachelet having told the UN Human Rights Council in late 2021 that her office was finalizing the report.<sup>80</sup>

### *Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents*

During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved former mass internment camp detainees and other Turkic and Muslim individuals.<sup>81</sup> In its annual report released in February 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) expressed “deep concern” over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted that the “extensive use of forced labor” involving Turkic and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated the Employment Policy Convention of 1964.<sup>82</sup> In April 2022, the National People's Congress Standing Committee ratified the ILO's Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957.<sup>83</sup> In June, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada were among countries who called on the ILO to establish a mission to investigate labor abuses in the XUAR.<sup>84</sup> Scholar Adrian Zenz wrote that “Beijing's ratification of these conventions is likely a calculated strategy to allay criticism.”<sup>85</sup>

According to research Zenz published in June 2022, XUAR authorities intensified and institutionalized the placement of Turkic Muslims in forced labor, likely forcing hundreds of thousands of mass internment camp detainees to work within the XUAR and transferring millions of “rural surplus laborers” within and outside of the XUAR.<sup>86</sup> Zenz's research indicates that authorities increased “the scope and scale” of forced labor transfers in 2021 and published plans to move increasing numbers of rural laborers into industrial work, as well as to train workers for coercive labor programs involving higher skilled labor.<sup>87</sup>

## Xinjiang

### XINJIANG COTTON CONTINUES TO BE, AND TOMATO PRODUCTS LIKELY CONTINUE TO BE, EXPORTED TO UNITED STATES

Reports published this past year by international scholars, analysts, and journalists documented the continued presence of products containing cotton originating in the XUAR, and products containing tomatoes possibly originating in the XUAR, in the international supply chain and in goods imported into the United States. In a report published in November 2021, researchers from Sheffield Hallam University documented how cotton products, often cotton-based apparel, entered the United States and other countries, after the raw cotton and semi-finished cotton goods were processed in intermediary countries.<sup>88</sup> These cotton products were imported into the United States in spite of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's January 2021 ban on cotton and tomato products from the XUAR prompted by the prevalence of forced labor in the region.<sup>89</sup> An investigative report published by non-profit research organization C4ADS in August 2021 showed that cotton and tomato products likely made with forced labor by companies owned by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)<sup>90</sup> may have continued to be sold in the United States, in the wake of the January 2021 ban on cotton and tomato products from the XUAR and in violation of sanctions placed on the XPCC by the U.S. Treasury Department in July 2020.<sup>91</sup> In a report published in January 2022, BuzzFeed News reporters described shipment records from between January 2021 and December 2021, showing that Hugo Boss, Ralph Lauren, and PVH Corporation had imported shipments from Esquel Group, which gins and spins cotton in the XUAR, into the United States.<sup>92</sup> BuzzFeed's report cited procurement records and company statements showing that a Guangdong province-based subsidiary of Esquel Group that had been exporting clothes to the United States had been working with cotton spinning factories in the XUAR, although the U.S. Government had restricted trade with a XUAR-based Esquel subsidiary in July 2020 over concerns of forced labor.<sup>93</sup> Hugo Boss removed Esquel companies from its list of suppliers following the publication of BuzzFeed's report.<sup>94</sup> [For more information on forced labor involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents, see Section VIII—Business and Human Rights.]

#### *Persecution of Ethnic Minority Women in the XUAR*

##### ACCOUNTS OF RAPE IN MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS

The London-based independent tribunal known as the Uyghur Tribunal found in its December 2021 judgment that rape, other sexual violence, and forced sterilization perpetrated against Turkic Muslims in the XUAR constitute crimes against humanity, and said that it was “beyond reasonable doubt” that population control measures imposed in the XUAR constitute genocide.<sup>95</sup> Turkic women who had been detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the Tribunal that many female detainees were raped in the camps.<sup>96</sup> Ethnic Kazakh Gulzira Awulqanqizi, also known as Gulzira Auelhan, who was detained in four different camps beginning in July 2017, testified that unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were raped in one of the camps

where she was detained.<sup>97</sup> Gulzire Awulqanqizi said that she was responsible for helping the women shower after they were raped, and that men paid to come to camps to rape the women.<sup>98</sup>

GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER AND POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES

The State Council Information Office issued a white paper in September 2021 on XUAR population developments that made unsupported claims about population growth and failed to address the documented decrease in birth rates in southern areas of the XUAR, which resulted from forced population control measures.<sup>99</sup> The white paper reports that according to census data, the population of five prefectures in the southern part of the XUAR, an area dominated by ethnic minority populations, experienced an absolute growth rate of more than two million people.<sup>100</sup> At the same time as authorities heightened population control measures for ethnic minority women in the XUAR, officials throughout China had relaxed the enforcement of population control measures for the majority Han Chinese population, and recently a number of public hospitals in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou municipalities reportedly stopped performing vasectomies in response to government pressure.<sup>101</sup>

*Forcible Displacement and Assimilation of  
Ethnic Minority Children*

Reports published during the past year described authorities' systematic separation of ethnic minority children in the XUAR from their families and their forcible placement in state-run orphanages, boarding schools, or other facilities.<sup>102</sup> This forcible displacement of children has been carried out in violation of the PRC Law on the Protection of Minors<sup>103</sup> and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the PRC has signed and ratified.<sup>104</sup> Many of the children placed in these facilities reportedly had at least one parent in detention,<sup>105</sup> and authorities placed some children in orphanages or other state-run facilities while forcing or coercing their parents to work.<sup>106</sup> According to American researcher Elise Anderson, the removal of Uyghur children from their families for placement in such facilities, "where Mandarin is the predominant language," "ensures their acculturation into a linguistically and culturally Chinese world."<sup>107</sup> In its December 2021 judgment regarding mass atrocity crimes committed against Turkic Muslims in the XUAR, the United Kingdom-based Uyghur Tribunal described acts of forcible placement of children in state-run institutions as "grave threats to the integrity of the Uyghur group [that] could be a means by which the State could effect its destruction over the longer term."<sup>108</sup>

Two Uyghur children now living in Turkey who were forced into boarding schools in Urumqi municipality in February 2018 described undergoing harsh mistreatment at two separate boarding schools in the city.<sup>109</sup> Age four and six at the time authorities placed them at the schools, the children said teachers often hit them, confined them in dark rooms, and forced them into stress positions as punishment during their nearly 20 months at the schools.<sup>110</sup> Now suffering from mental trauma, they said students

## Xinjiang

who spoke in the Uyghur language were hit with rulers; the two children left school no longer able to communicate in Uyghur.<sup>111</sup> Authorities sent the children to the schools after officials deported their father to Turkey and detained their mother, later sentencing her to 20 years in prison.<sup>112</sup>

### *Pomegranate Flower Plan*

In September 2021, official media in the XUAR announced a new plan pairing Uyghur children with children from across the country, a move that observers believe is designed to control Uyghurs' lives and eliminate Uyghurs' cultural identity.<sup>113</sup> Called the "Pomegranate Flower Plan," the initiative matched Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a village in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han Chinese children from other parts of China, which officials said was designed to establish "kinship" ties between the children.<sup>114</sup> The coerced familial relationships assigned by officials under the plan, under which mainly Han Chinese "relative" children would place phone calls and make visits to the XUAR, bear similarities to the forced family relationships assigned under the "Becoming Family" homestay program implemented in recent years, under which cadres and government workers, usually of Han Chinese ethnicity, live with ethnic minority families in their homes to conduct surveillance and compile information on family members.<sup>115</sup> In addition, the plan appears to encourage the celebration of Han Chinese cultural norms among the paired children, such as Chinese holiday celebrations, but not the exchange of Uyghur cultural norms.<sup>116</sup>

### *Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures*

Authorities used both technological and human surveillance to comprehensively monitor and control Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic and Muslim groups in the XUAR.<sup>117</sup> Facial recognition and mobile phone technology were key aspects of the digital surveillance system.<sup>118</sup> According to American scholar Darren Byler, based on a government manual from 2018, at the time of its publication, more than 100,000 people had been either questioned or detained after authorities detected religious content or other "untrustworthy" content on their cell phones through a digital scan.<sup>119</sup> Chinese artificial intelligence company DeepGlint, which the United States sanctioned in 2021,<sup>120</sup> cooperated with security personnel in the XUAR to integrate facial recognition technology that can identify ethnic characteristics into systems used to surveil and detain Uyghurs.<sup>121</sup> Public security personnel surveilled local Uyghurs through centralized camera feeds monitored at "command centers" located in counties and cities in the XUAR.<sup>122</sup> Officials also integrated data gathered from surveillance technology and other forms of policing into a system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which automatically identifies people for detention.<sup>123</sup>

Reports this past year indicated that authorities used surveillance technology such as IJOP and human surveillance to conduct "predictive policing," preventatively identifying behaviors considered dangerous or disloyal to the PRC by analyzing large quantities

of video and other surveillance data.<sup>124</sup> American journalist and technology writer Geoffrey Cain testified at a Commission hearing that the surveillance technologies employed in the XUAR constituted a “system of mass psychological torture,” telling Commissioners that residents of the XUAR had a “feeling of constantly being watched, not by humans, but by crude software algorithms designed to predict future crimes and acts of terrorism with great inaccuracy.”<sup>125</sup>

Former mass internment camp detainees described being under intense surveillance both while in detention, with cameras placed throughout camp facilities, and following their release from detention.<sup>126</sup> Former camp detainee Ovalbek Turdakun said cameras placed in cells constantly monitored detainees, whom authorities punished if they did something that violated the rules, such as talking with cellmates, and he said detainees had to face the camera to request permission to use the cell’s crude toilet.<sup>127</sup> Authorities continued to closely monitor former camp detainees following their release from detention—they fitted Ovalbek Turdakun with a GPS tracker and tracked his movements through the many cameras installed in his neighborhood; **Baqitali Nur**, an ethnic Kazakh former camp detainee, said authorities placed him under home confinement and installed a camera inside his home.<sup>128</sup>

*Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims*

Reports published this past year documented the PRC’s continued transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through in-person and digital methods, in order to prevent them from seeking refuge outside China or to stop them from conducting advocacy on behalf of detained relatives and on other human rights issues.<sup>129</sup> A report published by the Wilson Center in April 2022 indicated that, according to publicly available reports, more than 400 Uyghurs were refouled to China, primarily from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, between 1997 and 2022.<sup>130</sup> This figure is likely a small fraction of the total number of Uyghurs deported to China from other countries, since many refoulements go unreported.<sup>131</sup> During this reporting year, observers expressed concern about reports that four Uyghurs in Saudi Arabia and a Uyghur man in Morocco were at risk of imminent deportation to China.<sup>132</sup> In Saudi Arabia, authorities reportedly planned to extradite Hemdulla Weli (or Abduweli), Nurmemet Rozi, and Nurmemet Rozi’s ex-wife Buhelchem Abla and their 13-year-old daughter.<sup>133</sup> In Morocco, authorities reportedly planned to extradite Uyghur computer engineer Idris Hasan, in connection with a bilateral extradition treaty signed in 2016 that was tied to economic cooperation between the two countries.<sup>134</sup> If they deported these individuals to China, Morocco and Saudi Arabia would be violating the customary international law principle of non-refoulement.<sup>135</sup> In addition, as States Parties to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Morocco and Saudi Arabia are required to refrain from repatriating individuals if there are “grounds for believing that [they] would be in danger of being subject to torture.”<sup>136</sup> A body of evidence from international organizations indicates there is a high likelihood they would face torture upon their return to China.<sup>137</sup>

## Xinjiang

In addition to the detention of Uyghurs in, and their deportation from, other countries, which security agencies in host countries in some cases carried out under pressure from Chinese officials, authorities have in recent years carried out transnational repression through methods including “asset freezes; passport controls; cyberattacks and malware; intimidation and surveillance from . . . embassies and consulates; pressure on families and coercion-by-proxy; spying through informants; [and] smear campaigns.”<sup>138</sup> A September 2021 Coda report illustrated the varied methods of transnational repression used by Chinese authorities and described the methods organizers of the London-based Uyghur Tribunal suspect were used by Chinese authorities to intimidate individuals who were participating in the Tribunal.<sup>139</sup> In addition, a person identifying himself as a Kazakh state security agent harassed by telephone an ethnic Kazakh in Kazakhstan who had been detained in a mass internment camp in the XUAR after he agreed to provide testimony at the Tribunal; a border official in Almaty, Kazakhstan subsequently refused to allow him to board the flight he was taking to attend the Tribunal.<sup>140</sup> Other actions taken by Chinese authorities to disrupt the Tribunal included the imposition of sanctions against the Tribunal and its organizers, pressure placed on the host venue, possible hacking attempts targeting organizers and participants, and a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference aimed at contradicting witnesses’ testimony.<sup>141</sup> [For more information on the transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

### *Freedom of Religion*

XUAR government officials curtailed Muslim residents’ freedom to practice their religious beliefs, including by implementing restrictions on prayer<sup>142</sup> and detaining, continuing to hold in detention, and sentencing Uyghurs for practicing Islam.<sup>143</sup> As in previous reporting years,<sup>144</sup> XUAR officials reportedly imposed controls on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan.<sup>145</sup> During the 2022 Ramadan period, from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures reportedly enforced quotas for the number of local Muslims who were allowed to fast during the holiday, and required them to register with officials.<sup>146</sup> In July 2021, during the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, also known as Qurban Heyt, in Aykol township, Aksu city, Aksu prefecture, police detained more than 170 Uyghurs for questioning after they violated regulations related to the holiday stipulating that they must be at least 50 years old in order to pray.<sup>147</sup> During the Eid al-Adha holiday, in a move a Uyghur and an ethnic Uzbek living abroad described as propaganda, officials held a news conference in Urumqi during which Uyghurs from different parts of the XUAR spoke of ethnic unity and how happy their lives were, and a live feed showed Uyghurs in Aksu and Hotan celebrating the holiday.<sup>148</sup>

Reports published this past year showed that authorities have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the XUAR to lengthy prison terms<sup>149</sup> and have also sentenced many Muslim clergy members to prison.<sup>150</sup> In one example, according to a January 2022 Radio Free

## Xinjiang

Asia report, in 2019, authorities in Korla (Ku'erle) city, Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, jointly sentenced five Uyghur women from one family to long prison terms for engaging in “illegal religious activities.”<sup>151</sup> The Korla Municipal People's Court reportedly sentenced 78-year-old **Helchem Pazil**, her three daughters, and a daughter-in-law on charges including “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” and “inciting ethnic hatred” after they held family gatherings to talk about practicing Islam and to talk about their children.<sup>152</sup> According to a July 2021 Radio Free Asia report, in early 2018, authorities detained seven clergy members from one mosque in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, later sentencing them to prison, and leaving the local community without any clergy able to officiate at religious ceremonies.<sup>153</sup> In recent years, the detention and imprisonment of religious leaders from other mosques in the city have similarly led to an absence of clergy able to conduct weddings and funerals, and authorities have forbidden clergy members' relatives from disclosing information about their prison terms.<sup>154</sup> [For more information on official restrictions on Muslims' right to practice their faith throughout China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion.]

## Notes to Section X—Xinjiang

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022; John Sudworth and Visual Journalism Team, “Xinjiang Police Files: Inside a Chinese Internment Camp,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022; “The Xinjiang Police Files,” Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, accessed June 1, 2022; Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 1–56; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022; Scilla Alecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Scilla Alecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.

<sup>3</sup> Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 4; Scilla Alecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022.

<sup>4</sup> John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>5</sup> Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 7, 11; Zhao Kezhi, “Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiq gong’an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua” [Speech given while listening to the report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, translated in Xinjiang Police Files, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Chen Quanguo, “5 yue 28 ri Chen Quanguo Shuji zai Zizhiq Weiwen Zhihui Bu shipin tiao du hui shang de jianghua” [Secretary Chen Quanguo’s speech during a video management meeting of the Autonomous Region Stability Maintenance Headquarters], May 28, 2017, translated in Xinjiang Police Files, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.

<sup>6</sup> Zhao Kezhi, “Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiq gong’an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua” [Speech given while listening to the report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, translated in “Xinjiang Police Files,” Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> Sources cited in this report sometimes use other terms to refer to mass internment camps, including “re-education’ camps,” “detention camps,” and “internment camps.”

<sup>8</sup> Zhao Kezhi, “Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiq gong’an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua” [Speech given while listening to the report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, translated in “Xinjiang Police Files,” Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.

<sup>9</sup> Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 1, 12–16, 22, 26; John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>10</sup> Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 12–16, 22; John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>11</sup> John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022; Scilla Alecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022.

<sup>12</sup> Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022; “China Database Reveals the Thousands Detained in Xinjiang,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *France 24*, May 13, 2022; Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, “Uyghur County in China Has Highest Prison Rate in the World,” *Associated Press*, May 16, 2022. See also Xinjiang Victims Database (@shahitbiz), “Today, we finished importing a list of 10294 Uyghur prisoners . . .,” Twitter, April 11, 2022, 1:32 p.m.

<sup>13</sup> Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, “Uyghur County in China Has Highest Prison Rate in the World,” *Associated Press*, May 16, 2022.

<sup>14</sup> Huizhong Wu and Dake Kang, “Uyghur County in China Has Highest Prison Rate in the World,” *Associated Press*, May 16, 2022.

<sup>15</sup> Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Police Files: Re-Education Camp Security and Political Paranoia in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* 3 (May 24, 2022): 3.

<sup>16</sup> John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> John Sudworth, “The Faces from China’s Uyghur Detention Camps,” *BBC*, May 24, 2022.

<sup>18</sup> Zhao Kezhi, “Zai tingqu Xinjiang Zizhiq gong’an he wending gongzuo huibao shi de jianghua” [Speech given while listening to the report on public security and stability work on the Xinjiang Autonomous Region], June 5, 2018, translated in Xinjiang Police Files, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; Adrian Zenz, “Public Security Minister’s Speech Describes Xi Jinping’s Direction of Mass Detentions in Xinjiang,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, May 24, 2022.

<sup>19</sup> Scilla Alecci, “The Faces of China’s Detention Camps in Xinjiang,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 24, 2022.



<sup>20</sup>Uyghur Tribunal, “About,” accessed March 22, 2022; Tara John, Nectar Gan, and Steve George, “Uyghur Tribunal Rules That China ‘Committed Genocide’ against the Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities,” *CNN*, December 10, 2021. The Tribunal’s panel of jurors comprised lawyers and academics.

<sup>21</sup>Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 2–3, 9–10; David Tobin, “The ‘Xinjiang Papers’: How Xi Jinping Commands Policy in the People’s Republic of China,” University of Sheffield, accessed June 9, 2022, 10–19; Adrian Zenz, “Evidence of the Chinese Central Government’s Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang’s Re-Education Internment Campaign,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 14, 2021, 8, 16–17.

<sup>22</sup>Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 3, 5; Patrick Wintour, “Leaked Papers Link Xinjiang Crackdown with China Leadership,” *Guardian*, November 29, 2021.

<sup>23</sup>Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 2. See also Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” *New York Times*, November 16, 2019; Austin Ramzy, “5 Takeaways from the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” *New York Times*, November 16, 2019; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 298–99.

<sup>24</sup>Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 3, 18–19, 42; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers—Document No. 1, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Speeches while Inspecting Xinjiang (April 28–30, 2014), Introduction, Authentication and Transcription,” November 27, 2021, 10; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers—Document No. 2, Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28–29, 2014), Introduction, Authentication and Transcription,” November 27, 2021, 15, 16; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers—Document No. 1, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Speeches While Inspecting Xinjiang (April 28–30, 2014), Transcript,” December 13, 2021, 8; Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers—Document No. 2, Speeches by Comrades Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Yu Zhengsheng at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May 28–30, 2014), Transcript,” December 13, 2021, 9; Adrian Zenz, “Evidence of the Chinese Central Government’s Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang’s Re-Education Internment Campaign,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 14, 2021, 12, 14–17.

<sup>25</sup>Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu Jiduanhua Tiaoli* [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, amended and effective October 9, 2018; “Xinjiang Rolls Out China’s First Law to Purge Religious Extremism,” *Xinhua*, March 30, 2017; Liu Caiyu and Liu Xuanzun, “Xinjiang Revises Its Anti-Extremism Regulation,” *Global Times*, reprinted in Wayback Machine, October 10, 2018; Cui Jia, “Xinjiang Fighting Extremist Thought,” *China Daily*, October 12, 2018. International law also prohibits the mass detention taking place in mass internment camps. UN Human Rights Council, “Followup Report on the Joint Study (2010) on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Fionnuala Ni Aoláin,” A/HRC/49/45, March 25, 2022, para. 33. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human Rights, “[t]he assertion that mass detention and incommunicado detention is justified by ‘re-education’ to prevent extremism is inconsistent with the governments’ international law obligations. The Special Rapporteur has consistently held that the term ‘extremism’ has no purchase in binding international legal standards, and when operative as a criminal legal category is irreconcilable with the principle of legal certainty and is therefore, per se, incompatible with the exercise of certain fundamental human rights.” Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) prohibits the forced internment of Uyghurs on the basis of their ethnicity. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969, art. 1; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, accessed May 15, 2022. The Chinese government acceded to ICERD on December 29, 1981. Mass internment camps also remained illegal under the following international legal instruments: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed May 15, 2022. China signed and ratified the ICESCR. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, arts. 7, 24; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed June 16, 2022. China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in these articles. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, arts. 1, 2; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed June 16, 2022. China signed the CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. Mass internment camps also remained illegal under domestic legal instruments. Hilary Hurd, “China’s Human Rights Abuses against Uighurs in Xinjiang,” *Lawfare* (blog), October 9, 2018; Donald Clarke, “No, New Xinjiang Legislation Does Not Legalize Detention Centers,” *Lawfare* (blog), October 11, 2018; Jeremy Daum, “Explainer on Xinjiang Regulations,” *China Law Translate* (blog), October 11, 2018. Daum’s analysis includes a chart titled “Decision to Revise the ‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification,’”

## Xinjiang

which juxtaposes provisions in the 2017 version of the regulations with changes in the 2018 revised version. Jeremy Goldkorn, “China Explicitly Acknowledges, Tries to Justify Concentration Camps in Xinjiang,” *SupChina*, October 10, 2018; Nectar Gan and Mimi Lau, “China Changes Law to Recognise ‘Re-education Camps’ in Xinjiang,” *South China Morning Post*, October 13, 2018; Eva Dou, “China Acknowledges Re-Education Centers for Uighurs,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2018. See also *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa* [PRC Legislation Law], passed March 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended March 15, 2015, arts. 7, 8, 9; “New Law Aims to Justify Xinjiang Camps,” *China Digital Times*, October 10, 2018; CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 267; CECC, *2017 Annual Report*, October 5, 2017, 286.

<sup>26</sup> Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 3, 5, 6, 38, 40; David Tobin, “The ‘Xinjiang Papers’: How Xi Jinping Commands Policy in the People’s Republic of China,” University of Sheffield, accessed June 9, 2022, 33.

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, “China Can Lock Up a Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,” *BuzzFeed News*, July 21, 2021; Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000: Inside China’s Largest Detention Center,” *Associated Press*, July 22, 2021.

<sup>28</sup> Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, “China Can Lock Up a Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,” *BuzzFeed News*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>29</sup> Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, “China Can Lock Up a Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,” *BuzzFeed News*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>30</sup> Megha Rajagopalan and Alison Killing, “China Can Lock Up a Million Muslims in Xinjiang at Once,” *BuzzFeed News*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>31</sup> Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, “Former Xinjiang Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,” *Axios*, April 12, 2022; Chao Deng, “Former Xinjiang Detainee’s Arrival in U.S. Marks Rare Escape from China’s Long Reach,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,” *Guardian*, April 12, 2022.

<sup>32</sup> Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, “Former Xinjiang Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,” *Axios*, April 12, 2022; Chao Deng, “Former Xinjiang Detainee’s Arrival in U.S. Marks Rare Escape from China’s Long Reach,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,” *Guardian*, April 12, 2022.

<sup>33</sup> Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, “Former Xinjiang Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,” *Axios*, April 12, 2022; Chao Deng, “Former Xinjiang Detainee’s Arrival in U.S. Marks Rare Escape from China’s Long Reach,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 2022.

<sup>34</sup> Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, “Former Xinjiang Prisoner Arrives in U.S. as Key Witness to Abuses,” *Axios*, April 12, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,” *Guardian*, April 12, 2022. For more information on Ovalbek Turdakun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00118.

<sup>35</sup> Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Ben Westcott, “Uyghurs in Xinjiang Are Being Given Long Prison Sentences. Their Families Say They Have Done Nothing Wrong,” *CNN*, August 2, 2021; Mihray Abdilim and Alim Seytoff, “Court Cases Signal Shift from ‘Re-Education’ to Prison for Uyghurs,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 8, 2022; “Zizhiq Gaoji Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao” [Work report of the XUAR High People’s Court], *Tianshan Net*, March 3, 2022; “Zizhiq Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao” [Work report of the XUAR People’s Procuratorate], *Tianshan Net*, March 3, 2022; Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000: Inside China’s Largest Detention Center,” *Associated Press*, July 22, 2021; “(Ab)Use of Law: Criminal Proceedings in Xinjiang,” *The Rights Practice*, February 2022, 2, 3, 15.

<sup>36</sup> Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000: Inside China’s Largest Detention Center,” *Associated Press*, July 22, 2021.

<sup>37</sup> Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000: Inside China’s Largest Detention Center,” *Associated Press*, July 22, 2021. See also John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 24, 2018. The BBC report cites analysis by an architectural firm which found that the Dabancheng facility had a maximum capacity of 130,000 detainees. CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 266.

<sup>38</sup> Dake Kang, “Room for 10,000: Inside China’s Largest Detention Center,” *Associated Press*, July 22, 2021.

<sup>39</sup> Mihray Abdilim and Alim Seytoff, “Court Cases Signal Shift from ‘Re-Education’ to Prison for Uyghurs,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 8, 2022. See also “Zizhiq Gaoji Renmin Fayuan gongzuo baogao” [Work report of the XUAR High People’s Court], *Tianshan Net*, March 3, 2022; “Zizhiq Renmin Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao” [Work report of the XUAR People’s Procuratorate], *Tianshan Net*, March 3, 2022.

<sup>40</sup> Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, and Ben Westcott, “Uyghurs in Xinjiang Are Being Given Long Prison Sentences. Their Families Say They Have Done Nothing Wrong,” *CNN*, August 2, 2021; “Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 13, 2021.

<sup>41</sup> “Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 13, 2021. For more information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00552.

<sup>42</sup> “Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 13, 2021; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “Star Scholar Disappears as Crack-down Engulfs Western China,” *New York Times*, August 10, 2018.

<sup>43</sup> Shohret Hoshur, “Qaramaydiki jama’et erbabi yusup saqalning yetim-yésirlargha ige chiqqanliqi uchün 14 yilliq kesiwetilgenliki delilendi” [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 14 years for taking care of orphans], *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022; Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, “Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022. For more information on Yusupjan Memtimin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00107.

## Xinjiang

<sup>44</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Qaramaydiki jama’et erbabi yüsüp saqalning yétim-yésirlargha ige chiqqanliqi üçün 14 yilliq késiwetilgenliki delillendi” [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 14 years for taking care of orphans], *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022; Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, “Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022.

<sup>45</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Qaramaydiki jama’et erbabi yüsüp saqalning yétim-yésirlargha ige chiqqanliqi üçün 14 yilliq késiwetilgenliki delillendi” [Karamay public figure Yusup Saqal confirmed sentenced to 14 years for taking care of orphans], *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022; Shohret Hoshur and Alim Seytoff, “Uyghur Businessman Jailed for 14 Years for Allegedly Helping Families of Detainees,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 24, 2022.

<sup>46</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Shinjang pädagogika uniwersitetining oqutquchisi nurmemet ömer uchqunning 10 yilliq késiwetilgenliki delillendi” [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun confirmed sentenced to 10 years], *Radio Free Asia*, March 4, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence in Xinjiang for Translations,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 7, 2022. For more information on Nurmemet Omer Uchqun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00108.

<sup>47</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Shinjang pädagogika uniwersitetining oqutquchisi nurmemet ömer uchqunning 10 yilliq késiwetilgenliki delillendi” [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun confirmed sentenced to 10 years], *Radio Free Asia*, March 4, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence in Xinjiang for Translations,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 7, 2022. See also “Nurmuhemmet Omer, Entry 2295,” Xinjiang Victims Database ([www.shahit.biz](http://www.shahit.biz)), accessed April 11, 2022.

<sup>48</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Shinjang pädagogika uniwersitetining oqutquchisi nurmemet ömer uchqunning 10 yilliq késiwetilgenliki delillendi” [Xinjiang Normal University lecturer Nurmemet Omer Uchqun confirmed sentenced to 10 years], *Radio Free Asia*, March 4, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur University Lecturer Serving 10-Year Sentence in Xinjiang for Translations,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 7, 2022.

<sup>49</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Cop’s Daughter Serving 10 Years in Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 31, 2022. For more information on Almir Erkin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00123.

<sup>50</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Cop’s Daughter Serving 10 Years in Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 31, 2022.

<sup>51</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Cop’s Daughter Serving 10 Years in Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 31, 2022.

<sup>52</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Cop’s Daughter Serving 10 Years in Xinjiang Prison for Viewing Turkish Films,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 31, 2022.

<sup>53</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 22, 2022; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022. For more information on Meryem Emet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00124.

<sup>54</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 22, 2022; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>55</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 22, 2022.

<sup>56</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 22, 2022; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>57</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghur Woman Serving 20-Year Sentence for Speaking to Turkish PM 10 Years Ago,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 22, 2022; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>58</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Death of Detained Uyghur Imam Underscores Harsh Conditions in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 22, 2021; “Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in Xinjiang’s Ghulja,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 27, 2021; Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom Booth, “Some Are Just Psychopaths: Chinese Detective in Exile Reveals Extent of Torture against Uyghurs,” *CNN*, October 5, 2021.

<sup>59</sup>CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 275–76.

<sup>60</sup>“Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in Xinjiang’s Ghulja,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 27, 2021.

<sup>61</sup>“Uyghur Businessman, Philanthropist Confirmed Dead in Xinjiang’s Ghulja,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 27, 2021. For more information on Yaqup Haji, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00120.

<sup>62</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion Said to Have Died in Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 29, 2022.

<sup>63</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion Said to Have Died in Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 29, 2022.

<sup>64</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Who Escaped Forced Abortion Said to Have Died in Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 29, 2022. For more information on Zeynephan Memtimin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00121.

<sup>65</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Goldsmith’s Death after Release from Prison Is Followed by Son’s Demise,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 23, 2022.

<sup>66</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Goldsmith’s Death after Release from Prison Is Followed by Son’s Demise,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 23, 2022.

<sup>67</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Goldsmith’s Death after Release from Prison Is Followed by Son’s Demise,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 23, 2022.

## Xinjiang

<sup>68</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Goldsmith’s Death after Release from Prison Is Followed by Son’s Demise,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 23, 2022. For more information on Yaqub Hesen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00122.

<sup>69</sup>Uyghur Hjelp, “Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer Olympic,” February 21, 2022.

<sup>70</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Another Uyghur Torchbearer at 2008 Beijing Olympics Said to Be Detained,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 25, 2022; Uyghur Hjelp, “Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer Olympic,” February 21, 2022. For more information on Abduqeyyum Semet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00110.

<sup>71</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Another Uyghur Torchbearer at 2008 Beijing Olympics Said to Be Detained,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 25, 2022.

<sup>72</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Torchbearer for 2008 Beijing Olympics Serving 14-Year Sentence in Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 11, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Sabiq mesh’el kötürgüchi adil abdurëhimning ‘Döletni parchilashqa urunush jinayiti’ bilen 14 yilliq kesilgenliki delillendi” [Former torchbearer Adil Abdurehim confirmed sentenced to 14 years in prison for “attempted separatism”], *Radio Free Asia*, February 14, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Sabiq mesh’el yetküzgüchi, aktip emeldar adil abdurëhimning tutqunda ikenliki delillendi” [Former torchbearer, active official Adil Abdurehim’s reported detention confirmed], *Radio Free Asia*, February 9, 2022. See also “Adiljan Abdurehim, Entry 15897,” Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), accessed February 18, 2022. For more information on Adil Abdurehim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00045.

<sup>73</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Torchbearer for 2008 Beijing Olympics Serving 14-Year Sentence in Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 11, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Sabiq mesh’el kötürgüchi adil abdurëhimning ‘Döletni parchilashqa urunush jinayiti’ bilen 14 yilliq kesilgenliki delillendi” [Former torchbearer Adil Abdurehim confirmed sentenced to 14 years in prison for “attempted separatism”], *Radio Free Asia*, February 14, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Sabiq mesh’el yetküzgüchi, aktip emeldar adil abdurëhimning tutqunda ikenliki delillendi” [Former torchbearer, active official Adil Abdurehim’s reported detention confirmed], *Radio Free Asia*, February 9, 2022.

<sup>74</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Volleyball Coach Gets 8 Years in Jail for ‘Befriending Bearded Men,’” *Radio Free Asia*, March 16, 2022; Uyghur Hjelp, “Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer Olympic,” February 21, 2022. For more information on Alimjan Mehmud, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00111.

<sup>75</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Volleyball Coach Gets 8 Years in Jail for ‘Befriending Bearded Men,’” *Radio Free Asia*, March 16, 2022; Uyghur Hjelp, “Imprisoned Uyghur Torch Carriers for 2008 Summer Olympic,” February 21, 2022.

<sup>76</sup>Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, “Concerns with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” May 28, 2022.

<sup>77</sup>“Dozens of NGOs Call on UN Rights Chief to Resign after China Visit,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *News24*, June 8, 2022.

<sup>78</sup>Rachel Cheung, “UN Human Rights Chief Is Silent on China’s Abuses in Xinjiang, and Scholars Are Fuming,” *Vice*, June 8, 2022.

<sup>79</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Authorities Warn Uyghurs Not to Talk about ‘Re-Education’ with UN Team,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 11, 2022; Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, “Concerns with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” May 28, 2022.

<sup>80</sup>Vincent Ni, “West Demands Publication of UN’s Long-Awaited Xinjiang Report,” *Guardian*, June 1, 2022.

<sup>81</sup>See, e.g., Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 6, 9, 10; Adrian Zenz, “Early Warning Brief—Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “After 4 Years in Detention, Uyghur Brothers Forced to Work at Factories in Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 12, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Chinese Company Transfers Thousands of Uyghurs from Xinjiang to Nanjing,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 13, 2021.

<sup>82</sup>International Labour Organization, “Application of International Labour Standards 2022: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,” 2022, 515, 520; Jamey Keaten, “UN Labor Agency Cites Concerns about China’s Xinjiang Region,” *Associated Press*, February 11, 2022; Emma Farge, “China’s Labour Policies in Xinjiang Are Discriminatory, ILO Body Says,” *Reuters*, February 11, 2022. See also International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 122) Concerning Employment Policy, July 9, 1964, entry into force July 15, 1966, art. 1(2).

<sup>83</sup>“Shisan jie Quanguo Renda Changwei Hui disanshisi ci huiyi zai Jing bimu biaoque tongguo Qihuo he Yansheng Pin Fa xin xiuding de Zhiye Jiaoyu Fa deng Xi Jinping qianshu zhuxi ling Li Zhanshu zhuchi huiyi” [The 34th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress concludes in Beijing, voted to pass the Futures and Derivatives Law, the newly revised Vocational Education Law, etc., Xi Jinping signed the Presidential decree and Li Zhanshu presided over the meeting], *Xinhua*, reprinted in National People’s Congress, April 20, 2022; Nadya Yeh, “China Ratifies Two International Treaties on Forced Labor,” *SupChina*, April 20, 2022; “China Ratifies International Forced Labor Conventions,” *Deutsche Welle*, April 20, 2022. See also International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, entry into force May 1, 1932; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, entry into force January 17, 1959.

<sup>84</sup>Emma Farge, “U.S. and Others Seek ILO China Mission to Probe Alleged Xinjiang Abuses,” *Reuters*, June 2, 2022; U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Statement by Ambassador Crocker at the International Labor Conference,” June 2, 2022; Government of the

United Kingdom, “ILO Committee on the Application of Standards: UK Statement (June 2022),” June 2, 2022.

<sup>85</sup> Adrian Zenz, “Early Warning Brief—Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.

<sup>86</sup> Adrian Zenz, “Early Warning Brief—Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.

<sup>87</sup> Adrian Zenz, “Early Warning Brief—Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, June 5, 2022.

<sup>88</sup> Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2, 3, 6, 7, 25, 26; Eva Dou, “China’s Xinjiang Cotton Is Banned in the U.S. but Still Making It to Store Shelves, Report Says,” *Washington Post*, November 17, 2021.

<sup>89</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” January 13, 2021; Laura T. Murphy et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton Is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021, 2, 3, 6, 7, 25, 26.

<sup>90</sup> The XPCC is an entity under the administration of both the central government and the XUAR government that plays a key role in development and urbanization in the XUAR. State Council Information Office, “The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps,” October 5, 2014, sec. II; Wade Shepard, “The Complex Impact of Urbanization in Xinjiang,” *The Diplomat*, December 16, 2015. For more information on the XPCC and its links to human rights abuses and international supply chains, see CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 240–41.

<sup>91</sup> Irina Bukharin, “Long Shadows: How the Global Economy Supports Oppression in Xinjiang,” C4ADS, 2021, 4, 20, 21, 24, 26; Megha Rajagopalan, “Goods Linked to a Group that Runs Chinese Detention Camps May Be Ending Up in US Stores,” *BuzzFeed News*, August 10, 2021. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang,” January 13, 2021; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,” July 31, 2020.

<sup>92</sup> Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “Hugo Boss and Other Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China—but These Shipping Records Raise Questions,” *BuzzFeed News*, January 13, 2022.

<sup>93</sup> Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “Hugo Boss and Other Big Brands Vowed to Steer Clear of Forced Labor in China—but These Shipping Records Raise Questions,” *BuzzFeed News*, January 13, 2022; Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entries on the Entity List,” July 22, 2020.

<sup>94</sup> Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “Was This Shirt Made with Forced Labor? Hugo Boss Quietly Cut Ties with the Supplier,” *BuzzFeed News*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>95</sup> Uyghur Tribunal, “Uyghur Tribunal Judgment,” December 9, 2021, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7(1); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 1948, art. 2(d).

<sup>96</sup> Uyghur Tribunal, “Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,” September 13, 2021, 3, 4, 9, 13, 17; Uyghur Tribunal, “Witness Statement: Gulbahar Jelilova,” June 6, 2021, 8, 9, 14, 16, 21. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00119 on Gulzire Awulqanqizi and 2019-00032 on Gulbahar Jelilova.

<sup>97</sup> Uyghur Tribunal, “Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,” September 13, 2021, 3, 4, 8–10, 15, 17, 19. For Gulzire Awulqanqizi’s ethnicity and alternate name, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00119.

<sup>98</sup> Uyghur Tribunal, “Witness Statement: Gulzire Awulqanqizi,” September 13, 2021, 4, 9, 10, 13, 17, 18.

<sup>99</sup> State Council Information Office, “‘Xinjiang de Renkou Fazhan’ baiqi shu” [White paper on “Xinjiang’s Population Development”], September 26, 2021; “China’s Xinjiang Population Growth Report Raises Eyebrows,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 30, 2021; Rian Thum (@RianThum), “Chinese gov has a new white paper out focused on Xinjiang population . . .,” Twitter, September 26, 2021, 5:42 p.m.; Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, “Family De-Planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 12, 2021, 4, 7, 11, 13, 16, 25. See also CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 280–81.

<sup>100</sup> State Council Information Office, “‘Xinjiang de Renkou Fazhan’ baiqi shu” [White paper on “Xinjiang’s Population Development”], September 26, 2021; Adrian Zenz, “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang,” Social Science Research Network, June 3, 2021, 4, 17. See also CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 280–81.

<sup>101</sup> Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, and Lily Kuo, “In Need of a Baby Boom, China Clamps Down on Vasectomies,” *Washington Post*, December 9, 2021; “CCP Gestures toward Women’s Rights to Sweeten Pro-Natalist Shift,” *China Digital Times*, February 18, 2022; Adrian Zenz, “A Response to the Report Compiled by Lin Fangfei, Associate Professor at Xinjiang University,” *Medium* (blog), October 6, 2020; Sigal Samuel, “China’s Genocide against the Uyghurs, in 4 Disturbing

## Xinjiang

Charts,” *Vox*, March 10, 2021; Amy Qin, “China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, September 23, 2021. See also CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 280.

<sup>102</sup>“Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in ‘Welfare Schools’ in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 16, 2021; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022; Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 1, 2, 10, 11; Mihray Abdilim, “Uyghurs See Assimilation as China Touts Investment in Xinjiang Preschools,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2021; Darren Byler, “‘Ethnic Extinction’ in Northwest China,” *Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia* (blog), February 14, 2022.

<sup>103</sup>*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wei Chengnian Ren Baohu Fa* [PRC Law on the Protection of Minors], passed September 4, 1991, revised December 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007, art. 43; Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019.

<sup>104</sup>Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force September 2, 1990, arts. 5, 9, 10, 29, 30; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, accessed June 15, 2022. China signed the Convention in 1990 and ratified it in 1992. Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019.

<sup>105</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 10; “Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in ‘Welfare Schools’ in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 16, 2021.

<sup>106</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 10.

<sup>107</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 11.

<sup>108</sup>Uyghur Tribunal, “Uyghur Tribunal Judgment,” December 9, 2021, 55.

<sup>109</sup>Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>110</sup>Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>111</sup>Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

<sup>112</sup>Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022. For more information on the children’s mother, Meryem Emet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00124.

<sup>113</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12. Gulchehra Hoja, “Chinese Government Targets Uyghur Children with ‘Pomegranate Flower’ Policy,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, “Nanjiang xiaocun kaichu 36 dui ‘shiliu hua’ [36 pairs of ‘pomegranate flowers’ bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], *Tianshan Net and Xinjiang Daily*, September 24, 2021.

<sup>114</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 2, 3; Gulchehra Hoja, “Chinese Government Targets Uyghur Children with ‘Pomegranate Flower’ Policy,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, “Nanjiang xiaocun kaichu 36 dui ‘shiliu hua’ [36 pairs of ‘pomegranate flowers’ bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], *Tianshan Net and Xinjiang Daily*, September 24, 2021.

<sup>115</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 8, 9; Gulchehra Hoja, “Chinese Government Targets Uyghur Children with ‘Pomegranate Flower’ Policy,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 21, 2021; Kang Haoyan, “Nanjiang xiaocun kaichu 36 dui ‘shiliu hua’ [36 pairs of ‘pomegranate flowers’ bloom in a small village in southern Xinjiang], *Tianshan Net and Xinjiang Daily*, September 24, 2021. See also Ruth Ingram, “Sexual Abuse of Uyghur Women by CCP Cadres in Xinjiang: A Victim Speaks Out,” *Bitter Winter*, September 19, 2020; Nathan VanderKlippe, “China’s New Demands for ‘National Unity’ Take the State Deeper into Xinjiang Homes,” *Globe and Mail*, February 21, 2021; Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “The Chinese Policy That Makes Uyghurs Feel Like Hostages in Their Own Homes,” *CNN*, May 8, 2021. For more information on homestay programs in the XUAR, see “Blogging Fanghuiju: State Surveillance, Propaganda Work, and Coerced Gratitude,” Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British Columbia, accessed June 15, 2022; Timothy A. Grose, “Hosting the Hostage: Looking beneath China’s Policy to Infiltrate Uyghur Homes,” *SupChina*, July 24, 2020; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 279–80; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 305.

<sup>116</sup>Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 4, 9.

<sup>117</sup>See, e.g., Helen Davidson and Vincent Ni, “Chinese Effort to Gather ‘Micro Clues’ on Uyghurs Laid Bare in Report,” *Guardian*, October 19, 2021; Isobel Cockerell, “‘Surveillance’ Doesn’t Begin to Describe What Beijing Is Doing to Uyghurs,” *Coda Story*, November 2, 2021; Michael Clarke, “Turning Ghosts into Humans: Surveillance as an Instrument of Social Engineering in Xinjiang,” *War on the Rocks*, November 2, 2021; Johana Bhuiyan, “There’s Cameras Everywhere: Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in China,” *Guardian*, September 30, 2021; Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato, “The Architecture of Repression,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19, 2021, 5, 6, 24, 26; Charles Rollet, “DeepGlint: Uyghur Detection, Race Analytics, PRC Police Deals,” *IPVM*, April 7, 2022.

<sup>118</sup>Darren Byler, “Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against Humanity,” *SupChina*, December 1, 2021.

## Xinjiang

<sup>119</sup>Matthias Sander, “China Uses Digital Surveillance to Repress Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 28, 2022; Darren Byler, “Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against Humanity,” *SupChina*, December 1, 2021; “The ‘Four Together’ and ‘Three Gifts’ Handbook,” Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British Columbia, accessed May 12, 2022.

<sup>120</sup>Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entry on the Entity List; Removal of Entity from the Unverified List; and Addition of Entity to the Military End-User (MEU) List,” July 12, 2021.

<sup>121</sup>Charles Rollet, “DeepGlint: Uyghur Detection, Race Analytics, PRC Police Deals,” IPVM, April 7, 2022.

<sup>122</sup>Charles Rollet, “Hikvision Dominant Provider of Xinjiang Command Centers,” IPVM, May 10, 2022.

<sup>123</sup>Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato, “The Architecture of Repression,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19, 2021, 6, 24–26.

<sup>124</sup>Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato, “The Architecture of Repression,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 19, 2021, 24; Helen Davidson and Vincent Ni, “Chinese Effort to Gather ‘Micro Clues’ on Uyghurs Laid Bare in Report,” *Guardian*, October 19, 2021. See also Darren Byler, “The Covid Tech That Is Intimately Tied to China’s Surveillance State,” *MIT Technology Review*, October 11, 2021; Jordi Pérez Colomé, “Xinjiang Is the First Great Model in the Era of Digital Mass Surveillance. Nothing Like It Has Ever Been Seen,” *El País*, May 7, 2022.

<sup>125</sup>*Techno-Authoritarianism: Platform for Repression in China and Abroad, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Geoffrey Cain, author of *The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey into China’s Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future*) (20:53–21:18); Roseanne Gerin and Alim Seytoff, “China’s Persecution of Uyghurs Is Preview of Wider Surveillance Scheme, Lawmakers Say,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 17, 2021; “The Perfect Police State: An Undercover Odyssey into China’s Terrifying Surveillance Dystopia of the Future” (web page), PublicAffairs, accessed May 12, 2022. See also Darren Byler, “Xinjiang: On Technology and Crimes against Humanity,” *SupChina*, December 1, 2021.

<sup>126</sup>Zack Whittaker, “‘Always On and Watching’: A Former Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China’s Detention Camps,” *TechCrunch* (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,” *Guardian*, April 12, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “‘There’s Cameras Everywhere’: Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in China,” *Guardian*, September 30, 2021.

<sup>127</sup>Zack Whittaker, “‘Always On and Watching’: A Former Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China’s Detention Camps,” *TechCrunch* (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “Former Xinjiang Detainee Arrives in US to Testify over Repeated Torture He Says He Was Subjected To,” *Guardian*, April 12, 2022.

<sup>128</sup>Zack Whittaker, “‘Always On and Watching’: A Former Xinjiang Prisoner Describes Life inside China’s Detention Camps,” *TechCrunch* (blog), April 13, 2022; Johana Bhuiyan, “‘There’s Cameras Everywhere’: Testimonies Detail Far-Reaching Surveillance of Uyghurs in China,” *Guardian*, September 30, 2021; Uyghur Tribunal, “Uyghur Tribunal—Fact Witness Statement: UTFW2-008—Baqitali Nur,” accessed May 13, 2022, 9. For more information on Baqitali Nur, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00117.

<sup>129</sup>See, e.g., Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii, xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvi, 74, 75; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Uyghurs Surveilled and Harassed in 22 Countries, New Research Reveals,” November 10, 2021; Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, “Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky: China’s Hunt for Pakistan’s Uyghurs,” 2021, 4–5, 19, 24, 59–60; Isobel Cockerell, “Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,” *Coda Story*, September 16, 2021. For reporting from past years on the transnational repression of Uyghurs, see, e.g., Eva Xiao, “Exiled Uyghurs in Turkey Fear China’s Long Reach—‘We Are All Panicking Now,’” *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2021; Ben Fox and Christina Larson, “Targets of Crackdown in China Fear Government’s Reach in US,” *Associated Press*, March 8, 2020; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 140; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 154–55.

<sup>130</sup>Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii.

<sup>131</sup>Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii.

<sup>132</sup>Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of Uyghur Detainees,” January 10, 2022; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL SAU 3/2022, March 3, 2022; Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, “IPAC Calls for Saudi Arabia to Block Forcible Return of Uyghurs to China: Letter,” March 31, 2022; Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four ‘Facing Deportation’ and Torture in China,” April 4, 2022; Amnesty International, “Morocco: Detained Uyghur Must Not Be Transferred to China,” September 21, 2021.

<sup>133</sup>Jilil Kashgary, “Uyghurs Detained in Saudi Arabia Face Risk of Deportation to China,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 25, 2022; Jilil Kashgary and Alim Seytoff, “Two More Uyghurs Detained in Saudi Arabia Face Risk of Deportation to China,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 5, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of Uyghur Detainees,” January 10, 2022; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the Special

## Xinjiang

Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL SAU 3/2022, March 3, 2022; Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, “IPAC Calls for Saudi Arabia to Block Forcible Return of Uyghurs to China: Letter,” March 31, 2022; Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four ‘Facing Deportation’ and Torture in China,” April 4, 2022. Some sources write Hemdulla Weli (or Abduweli)’s name as “Hemdullah”; some sources write Buhelchem Abla’s name as “Buhelchem Abdullah.”

<sup>134</sup>Ehsan Azigh, “Moroccan Court Rules in China’s Favor to Extradite Uyghur Accused of ‘Terrorism,’” *Radio Free Asia*, December 16, 2021; Mariam Kiparoidze, “Authoritarian Regimes Are Using Interpol to Target Minorities and Pro-Democracy Activists,” *Coda Story*, September 28, 2021; Amnesty International, “Morocco: Detained Uyghur Must Not Be Transferred to China,” September 21, 2021.

<sup>135</sup>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement under International Human Rights Law,” accessed May 10, 2022, 1. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “[u]nder international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

<sup>136</sup>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, art. 3; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed May 10, 2022. Saudi Arabia acceded to the Convention on September 23, 1997, and Morocco signed the Convention on January 8, 1986, and ratified it on June 21, 1993.

<sup>137</sup>See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Imminent Deportation of Uyghur Detainees,” January 10, 2022; Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: Uyghur Girl, 13, among Four ‘Facing Deportation’ and Torture in China,” April 4, 2022; Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, “‘Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky’: China’s Hunt for Pakistan’s Uyghurs,” 2021, 9–10, 24, 25, 45, 46, 57, 58; Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xviii, xxvi, xxxi, xlii, 63, 65, 74.

<sup>138</sup>Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022), xxii, 108, 115. See also Isobel Cockerell, “Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,” *Coda Story*, September 16, 2021; Austin Ramzy, “They Have My Sister’: As Uyghurs Speak Out, China Targets Their Families,” *New York Times*, July 27, 2021; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Chinese Government Transnational Repression Violates US Laws and US-based Uyghurs’ Rights,” August 11, 2021, 1, 2.

<sup>139</sup>Isobel Cockerell, “Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,” *Coda Story*, September 16, 2021.

<sup>140</sup>Isobel Cockerell, “Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,” *Coda Story*, September 16, 2021.

<sup>141</sup>Isobel Cockerell, “Hacks, Threats and Propaganda: How China Tried to Discredit the Uyghur Tribunal,” *Coda Story*, September 16, 2021.

<sup>142</sup>“Police in China’s XUAR Question Uyghurs for Attending Eid Prayers without Permission,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 30, 2021.

<sup>143</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Retiree Serving 10 Years for ‘Illegal Religious Activities’ in Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 2, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Sisters Jailed for ‘Illegal’ Religious Activities in Xinjiang Women’s Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 24, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghurs Jailed for Religious ‘Crimes’ Believed to Be in Xinjiang Women’s Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 1, 2022.

<sup>144</sup>For information on official religious restrictions enforced during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 283; CECC, *2020 Annual Report*, December 2020, 306; CECC, *2019 Annual Report*, November 18, 2019, 277.

<sup>145</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Chinese Officials Restrict Number of Uyghurs Observing Ramadan,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 1, 2022.

<sup>146</sup>“Shohret Hoshur, Chinese Officials Restrict Number of Uyghurs Observing Ramadan,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 1, 2022.

<sup>147</sup>“Police in China’s XUAR Question Uyghurs for Attending Eid Prayers without Permission,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 30, 2021.

<sup>148</sup>“China Stages Dancing, Happy Talk for Uyghur Religious Holiday Celebrations,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 21, 2021.

<sup>149</sup>See, e.g., Shohret Hoshur, “Five Women from Uyghur Family Sentenced to Long Prison Terms in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 21, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Retiree Serving 10 Years for ‘Illegal Religious Activities’ in Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 2, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Sisters Jailed for ‘Illegal’ Religious Activities in Xinjiang Women’s Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 24, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghurs Jailed for Religious ‘Crimes’ Believed to Be in Xinjiang Women’s Prison,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 1, 2022.

<sup>150</sup>“Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang’s Ghulja Leaves Nobody Left to Conduct Ceremonies,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 16, 2021.

<sup>151</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Five Women from Uyghur Family Sentenced to Long Prison Terms in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 21, 2022.

<sup>152</sup>Shohret Hoshur, “Five Women from Uyghur Family Sentenced to Long Prison Terms in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 21, 2022; Shohret Hoshur, “78 yashliq xelchem pazilning 17 yilliq késilgenliki we sanji ayallar türmiside jaza mudditini ötewatqanliqi



## Xinjiang

delillendi” [Helchem Pazil, 78, confirmed sentenced to 17 years in prison and to be serving her sentence in Changji Women’s Prison], *Radio Free Asia*, January 24, 2022. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00112 on Helchem Pazil, 2022-00135 on Melikizat Memet, 2022-00136 on Patigul Memet, 2022-00137 on Zahire Memet, and 2022-00138 on Bostan Ibrahim.

<sup>153</sup>“Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang’s Ghulja Leaves Nobody Left to Conduct Ceremonies,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 16, 2021.

<sup>154</sup>“Purge of Mosque Clergy in Xinjiang’s Ghulja Leaves Nobody Left to Conduct Ceremonies,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 16, 2021.