

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY

Findings

- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-year campaign of transnational repression against critics, Uyghurs, and others to stifle criticism and enhance control over emigrant and diaspora communities. Authorities and those acting at their direction engaged in digital and in-person harassment and surveillance, harassment and intimidation of China-based relatives of overseas targets, and attempted repatriation—in some cases coercive—to China, where UN and other experts argued they would face significant risk of torture. In June 2022, Freedom House reported that it had counted 229 cases of “physical transnational repression”—which can include “detention, assault, physical intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or suspected assassination”—originating from China since 2014.
- The PRC used economic coercion against foreign governments and companies to stifle criticism of China’s human rights conditions and other issues Chinese authorities deemed sensitive. Authorities used unacknowledged, informal economic coercion, such as a campaign against Lithuania—which resulted in economic losses—and economic coercion against Intel, Sam’s Club, and Walmart—which reportedly resulted in some consumers in China canceling their Sam’s Club memberships. The government also introduced new authorities in Chinese law for carrying out economic coercion and formally sanctioned officials of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.
- Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in multiple regions experienced worker rights violations, environmental problems, corruption, and opacity in project debt and project agreements with host country institutions. Those developments were consistent with reports of systemic problems in recent years as the scale of BRI investment, as well as Chinese government support and involvement in BRI, has increased.
- The PRC continued longstanding global campaign to discredit universal rights in international institutions and reshape international consensus around human rights, in what Human Rights Watch described in 2017 as “a systematic attempt to subvert the ability of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in China and beyond.” The PRC took steps to impede UN bodies in their work to hold Russia accountable for human rights violations committed in its invasion of Ukraine, and the government attempted to weaken human rights protections in a draft instrument that would create legally binding human rights obligations for transnational and other businesses.

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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Include as part of the comprehensive strategy with respect to the PRC required by the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act a strategy to counter China's transnational repression within the United States and globally. This should integrate U.S. Government capabilities that relate to identification of transnational repression, law enforcement, protection of victims, appropriate sanctions, and prevention of the use of technology for transnational repression.
- Develop a strategy to counter China's use of economic coercion to chill criticism and avoid accountability for its human rights abuses, as part of the comprehensive strategy required by the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. This could include, for example, coordination with allies and partners to diversify economic footprints away from China to reduce risk of coercion, the creation of a fund to compensate targets of China's economic coercion, or other coordinated efforts.
- Call on BRI host governments and the United Nations to insist that Chinese entities provide increased transparency in BRI projects. This should include publication of—at a minimum—rigorous assessments of potential impacts on human rights and rule of law conditions; detailed data regarding PRC involvement; terms of agreements for projects (especially those with state involvement), including transparency in ownership and lending commitments; measures taken to ensure human rights; and detailed information about labor standards and working conditions. Engage relevant allies, partners, and U.S. embassies and consulates in order to better understand conditions in BRI projects.
- Ensure broad, sustained U.S. engagement in UN bodies with human rights functions to ensure that these bodies remain true to their founding principles. This engagement should include putting forth qualified U.S. candidates to serve on those bodies, encouraging allies and partners to do the same with their candidates, and building coalitions to support those candidates.
- Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that incentivize the study of languages spoken within the PRC (including ethnic minority languages), the deep study of China's political system, and the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to violate and undermine human rights globally. The effort to counter these violations—and generating consensus around timely, effective, and culturally appropriate responses—must be informed by greater understanding of China's political and legal system and its linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity.
- Employ existing sanctions authorities, or create new authorities if needed, that will hold foreign government officials accountable for returning individuals to countries, including the PRC, where they are at risk of torture and other human rights abuses, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

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Transnational Repression

During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-year campaign of transnational repression against critics, Uyghurs, and others to stifle criticism and enhance control over emigrant and diaspora communities.¹ “Transnational repression” refers to transnational efforts to stifle dissent or independent organizing from emigrant or diaspora communities,² and Freedom House has called China’s transnational repression campaign “the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive . . . in the world.”³ In June 2022, Freedom House reported that “the Chinese government uses transnational repression more than any other country,” counting 229 cases of “physical transnational repression” originating from China since 2014.⁴ In the category of “physical transnational repression,” Freedom House includes “detention, assault, physical intimidation, unlawful deportation, rendition, or suspected assassination.”⁵ [For more information about transnational repression against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, see Section X—Xinjiang.]

This past year, authorities and those acting at their direction engaged in digital and in-person harassment and surveillance, harassment and intimidation of China-based relatives of overseas targets (“coercion by proxy”⁶), and other forms of transnational repression. As a result, some observers and victims reported lasting emotional trauma or a chilling effect in the form of self-censorship.⁷ Selected examples of transnational repression follow:

- **Digital Harassment and Surveillance.** Reports documented authorities’ multi-year efforts to procure and use technology to—among other objectives—track online discussion overseas of issues authorities deemed sensitive, identify social media users overseas, and surveil the online activity of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities overseas.⁸
- **In-Person Harassment and Surveillance.** The Index on Censorship reported that two self-identified Chinese individuals followed a Uyghur woman attending a World Uyghur Congress meeting in Athens and waited for her “with [people she] suspected to be undercover agents.”⁹
- **Targeting Family Members.** Chinese public security officials reportedly visited relatives of Netherlands-based Chinese national Gao Ronghui after he posted comments online in support of Ukraine.¹⁰ Officials reportedly called him and warned him that “If there is a problem with your political stance, it will affect your family for generations . . .”¹¹ This past year, U.S.-based Uyghur and American citizen Rushan Abbas reported that her sister, retired Uyghur doctor **Gulshan Abbas**, continued to serve a 20-year sentence for the alleged crimes of “participating in a terrorist organization,” “aiding terrorist activities,” and “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” after Chinese authorities detained her in 2018 in apparent retaliation for Rushan Abbas’s advocacy work.¹²
- **Extraterritorial Application of Law.** Hong Kong authorities reportedly ordered London-based non-governmental orga-

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nization (NGO) Hong Kong Watch chief executive Benedict Rogers to remove the organization's website or face potential imprisonment under the PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.¹³

• **Educational Institutions.** An article in the Party-run media outlet Global Times, authored by two George Washington University (GWU) alumni, criticized GWU's president¹⁴ after he said posters on campus designed by dissident artist Badiucao¹⁵ protesting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games were not "racist," but rather were "political statements."¹⁶ GWU's chapter of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association—a larger organization with ties to Chinese authorities¹⁷—had previously urged GWU leadership to remove the posters, calling them "slanderous" and "racist."¹⁸ In another case, Istanbul authorities reportedly closed a Uyghur elementary school after Chinese officials alleged that it violated Turkish regulations and may be providing "anti-China" education, allegations the school head refuted.¹⁹

EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE CRITICS AND OTHERS DEEMED SENSITIVE

As part of their transnational repression efforts, the PRC continued a multi-year campaign to repatriate critics, Uyghurs, and others²⁰—in some cases through coercive means—to China, where UN and other experts argued they would face significant risk of torture.²¹ According to a senior Party official, in 2021 authorities "returned" 1,273 "fugitives" through Operation Skynet.²² Operation Skynet is part of multi-year efforts that, in some cases, reportedly targeted corruption suspects and, in others, critics and members of ethnic minority emigrant and diaspora communities.²³ In 2018, the Party and government explicitly authorized "irregular measures," including "kidnapping" and "entrapment,"²⁴ and international observers have documented cases of kidnapping, harassment of targets' families, and other coercive practices.²⁵ Selected cases from this past year follow:

- According to Safeguard Defenders, Chinese authorities—some unidentified and some "from the . . . embassy"—obstructed Chinese national Liu Lingshuang outside a courthouse in Cyprus and warned her to stop assisting her partner **Ma Chao**, the subject of an extradition request from China.²⁶ As extradition proceedings continued, authorities reportedly detained relatives of Liu in China and refused to renew the passports of Liu's children.²⁷
- In early 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that Saudi authorities were preparing to extradite Uyghurs Nurmemet Rozi and Hemdulla Weli (or Abduweli) to China after detaining them since November 2020 without charge.²⁸ UN experts expressed concern at the lack of "proper legal justification or implementation of fundamental safeguards, reportedly on the basis of an extradition request made by China."²⁹ In March 2022, Saudi authorities reportedly detained Rozi's ex-wife Buhelchem Abla and their 13-year old daughter and indicated they would be deported to China.³⁰
- Chinese authorities reportedly harassed the family and ex-husband of Kazakhstan-based ethnic Kazakh and Chinese na-

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tional Ulnur Bozhykhan after she wrote publicly about abuses she suffered in a Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) detention facility, to pressure her to return to China.³¹

- Chinese national Wu Huan reported that individuals including Chinese consular officials held her for 10 days in a converted villa in the United Arab Emirates and pressured her to incriminate her fiancé Wang Jingyu.³² Wang previously questioned the Chinese government’s reporting on the conflict between the Indian and Chinese militaries.³³

This past year, a Moroccan court ruled to extradite to China Idris Hasan, a Uyghur who documented human rights violations in the XUAR while living in Turkey, and who was detained in Morocco in July 2021 under a since-canceled Red Notice from China.³⁴ Upon member state request, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) publishes Red Notices, requests that authorities in other countries “provisionally arrest” subjects.³⁵ Red Notices of a “political, military, religious or racial character” violate INTERPOL rules,³⁶ but experts have documented Chinese authorities’ abuse of Red Notices to trigger detentions of transnational repression targets in prior years.³⁷ Of the 1,273 “fugitives” discussed above, authorities reportedly “returned” 22 under Red Notices.³⁸ The Commission did not observe disaggregated data for those 22 cases. In February 2022, the South China Morning Post reported that “dozens” of Red Notices for Chinese subjects disappeared from public view.³⁹ The Commission did not observe reports confirming why they disappeared, or whether they were canceled.

Transnational Repression Charges in the United States

In March and May 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice reported criminal charges against 10 individuals accused of engaging in transnational repression in the United States.⁴⁰ The accusations included spying on and conspiring to harass dissidents and others, as well as pressuring individuals to return to China.⁴¹ Those allegedly targeted included a congressional candidate,⁴² democracy advocates,⁴³ a U.S. Olympic figure skater, the skater’s father, and a dissident artist whose sculpture—which depicted Xi Jinping’s head as a coronavirus molecule and was titled “CCP VIRUS”—was burned down.⁴⁴ Chinese authorities reportedly held the pregnant daughter—a U.S. national—of another victim of transnational repression against her will in China to pressure that victim to return to China.⁴⁵

Economic Coercion

This past year, the PRC used economic coercion against foreign governments and companies to stifle criticism of China’s human rights conditions and other issues Chinese authorities deemed sensitive.⁴⁶ “Economic coercion” refers to the threat or actual imposition of economic costs to extract concessions in areas other than trade policy itself.⁴⁷

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USE OF INFORMAL ECONOMIC COERCION TO PUNISH OR SILENCE CRITICS

Chinese authorities used unacknowledged, informal economic coercion to prevent and punish unwanted speech. Experts have noted that informal measures lend a degree of plausible deniability, flexibility with targeting and implementation, and protection from legal countermeasures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or other authorities.⁴⁸ The following are illustrative examples:

- **Australia.** Authorities continued a multi-year campaign of economic coercion against Australia⁴⁹ that began in response to Australian authorities' calls for an independent investigation into the origins of coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) and the Chinese government's initial handling of the pandemic; speech about conditions in the XUAR, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; and other issues.⁵⁰ One study estimated trade restrictions on Australian imports including barley, wine, timber, lobster, coal, beef, cotton, and copper caused a loss of AU\$6.6 billion (US\$4.5 billion) to Australia over the period of July 2020 to February 2021.⁵¹
- **Intel, Sam's Club, and Walmart.**⁵² Chinese authorities, Party-run media, and internet users in China publicly criticized U.S. companies Intel, Sam's Club, and Sam's Club's parent company Walmart after Intel asked suppliers to stop sourcing from the XUAR and Sam's Club products sourced from the XUAR disappeared from shelves and online shopping sites in China.⁵³ The Party-run Communist Youth League reportedly called for a boycott of Sam's Club, and some consumers in China canceled their Sam's Club memberships.⁵⁴ The Global Times and the PRC's highest-level disciplinary bodies—the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC)—publicly criticized the companies, encouraged boycotts, and warned of potential economic consequences.⁵⁵ In an article posted on the joint website of the CCDI and NSC, the author criticized Intel and Sam's Club's actions, referencing a prior case involving the Swedish apparel brand H&M, in which the company's information disappeared from apps and websites in China, reportedly as a result of the company's stance on the XUAR.⁵⁶
- **7-Eleven.** A Japanese-owned operator of 7-Eleven stores in Beijing municipality apologized after Beijing municipal authorities fined the company 150,000 yuan (US\$22,000) after finding that the company's website listed Taiwan as a country, did not use Chinese names for islands in the South China Sea that China claims, and contained "mistakes" in its depiction of borders along the XUAR and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).⁵⁷

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Economic Coercion against Lithuania

This past year, the Chinese government launched a comprehensive campaign of economic coercion against Lithuania after the Lithuanian government allowed the opening of a “Taiwanese Representative Office”—a name chosen by Taiwan’s government—in Vilnius.⁵⁸ Following that decision, Chinese authorities reportedly took various steps to punish Lithuania; for example:

- Chinese authorities banned all Lithuanian imports, as well as imports from other countries containing Lithuanian components;⁵⁹
- The Global Times encouraged China to “join hands with Russia and Belarus” and “punish” Lithuania;⁶⁰
- Chinese customs officials reportedly found “additional microorganisms” in Lithuanian dairy and meat exports,⁶¹ echoing similar claims in past cases of economic coercion;⁶² and
- Chinese authorities reportedly pressured German company Continental not to use Lithuanian-made parts.⁶³

Five months after the decision to allow the opening of a “Taiwanese Representative Office” in Vilnius, Lithuanian exports to China in December 2021 reportedly dropped more than 90 percent as compared to December 2020.⁶⁴ In response to China’s economic coercion, the European Union (EU) brought a dispute settlement case before the WTO, to which China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian reportedly replied, “[t]he problem between China and Lithuania is a political problem, not an economic problem.”⁶⁵

In some cases, companies appeared to self-censor or adopt positions consistent with the PRC’s political priorities without an explicit demand. For example:

- **Prague Marriott.** The Marriott Hotel in Prague declined to host a meeting of the World Uyghur Congress on the basis of “political neutrality.”⁶⁶
- **Octopus and Quarto.** British publishers Octopus and Quarto reportedly censored and revised content related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, artist **Ai Weiwei**,⁶⁷ and the TAR in books intended to be printed in China and sold to audiences outside of China.⁶⁸
- **Moleskine.** Italian notebook manufacturer Moleskine reportedly erased all references to Taiwan from its journals—after previously changing “Taiwan” to “Taiwan (Province of China)” —which Newsweek characterized as “a consequence of the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘disturbing micromanagement’ as it combs global markets for perceived challenges to its territorial claims.”⁶⁹

LAWS THAT PROVIDE A FORMAL BASIS FOR ECONOMIC COERCION

This past year, the PRC took steps to provide new authorities in Chinese law for carrying out economic coercion to punish or chill criticism outside China, or otherwise demand compliance with their political priorities.

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- In September 2021, the PRC Data Security Law came into effect.⁷⁰ The Data Security Law applies extraterritorially,⁷¹ classifies data according to factors including “national security”⁷²—which experts noted Chinese authorities have interpreted broadly in other contexts to punish speech or actions that do not conform to PRC priorities⁷³—allows for data export controls,⁷⁴ and authorizes civil and criminal penalties for those who fail to fulfill data security obligations outlined in the Data Security Law.⁷⁵
- In August 2021, the government passed the PRC Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL).⁷⁶ The PIPL applies extraterritorially,⁷⁷ cites “national security” as a basis,⁷⁸ and allows for retaliatory measures against countries that implement “discriminatory” measures against China.⁷⁹ While the PIPL appears to mirror some privacy protections in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, observers expressed concern about the latitude the PIPL gives authorities to investigate and punish those who handle data, as well as to seize personal data.⁸⁰
- During the controversy over Intel, Walmart, and Sam’s Club described above, a Global Times article discussed the possibility of using the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, passed in June 2021.⁸¹ The Commission did not observe reports that authorities used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against those companies, but this past year, authorities used the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law against four officials of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as two U.S. companies that sold arms to Taiwan.⁸² The Commission did not observe reports of specific penalties applied to those officials or companies under the PRC Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law this past year.

Concerns Surrounding Belt and Road Projects

This past year, international experts reported that Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in multiple regions experienced worker rights violations, environmental problems, corruption, and opacity in project debt and project agreements with host country institutions.⁸³ Multiple expert sources have reported concerns about systemic problems in those areas in recent years⁸⁴ as the scale of BRI investment, as well as Chinese government support and involvement in BRI, has increased.⁸⁵ The following are illustrative examples from this past year:

- **Worker Rights.** Angolan security forces reportedly killed three people and injured five workers protesting conditions at a construction project with Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) involvement.⁸⁶ The European Parliament expressed concerns about substandard and abusive conditions for Vietnamese workers at the Linglong Tire factory,⁸⁷ a project initiated under an agreement between China and Serbia⁸⁸ with Chinese SOE involvement.⁸⁹ In another case, the New York Times reported an alleged “dramatic decline in worker safety” in a Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cobalt mine under the ownership of China Molybdenum—now known as CMOC—which reportedly received Chinese state-backed financing.⁹⁰

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According to reporting from this past year, in recent years CMOG impeded inspectors from the mine site; and Chinese companies involved in that and at least one other DRC cobalt mine have increasingly used subcontracting to provide “lower pay, minimal or no benefits, and precarious job security.”⁹¹

• **Environment.** In Argentina, experts and observers voiced concerns over the environmental assessment, lack of indigenous community consultation, and potential social and environmental impact of a dam project with Chinese SOE involvement.⁹² In Peru, locals demonstrated after a Chinese SOE’s⁹³ activities reportedly depleted lakes, affecting grazing and irrigation.⁹⁴ International NGO Environmental Investigation Agency reported that expansion of traditional Chinese medicine companies through BRI, which the Chinese government identified as a priority for 2016–2030,⁹⁵ posed a threat to Africa’s biodiversity.⁹⁶

• **Corruption and Transparency.** In the DRC case above, China Molybdenum employees reportedly attempted to bribe and assaulted safety inspectors,⁹⁷ and Congolese authorities reported that China Molybdenum authorities “failed to declare” copper and cobalt reserves, thus avoiding required payments to Congolese authorities.⁹⁸

Exporting Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism through Surveillance and Profiling Technology

This past year, the Commission observed reports that some Chinese companies, which previously created or helped create surveillance technology that can be used to profile Uyghurs and target other marginalized communities in China,⁹⁹ exported surveillance technology and equipment. In December 2021, the surveillance research firm IPVM reported that Chinese company Tiandy sold surveillance equipment, including networked video recorders with Intel chips, to Iran’s security services.¹⁰⁰ In another case, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that a “predominantly Serb provisional authority in southeastern Kosovo” agreed to purchase—with Serbian government funding—Dahua equipment including 196 surveillance cameras and 30 DVR recorders for use in “about 30 facilities, mostly schools, in 12 Kosovar communities.”¹⁰¹ A February 2022 report from UK nonprofit Big Brother Watch reported that “almost 800” of the 1,300 public organizations that responded to its requests for information said they had equipment made by either Hikvision or Dahua, and Big Brother Watch found over 164,000 “Hikvision IP cameras” and over 14,000 “Dahua tagged products” connected to the internet in the United Kingdom.¹⁰² In addition, this past year, Privacy International and Stanford University’s Hoover Institution published reports documenting the multi-year procurement and implementation of Huawei surveillance and facial recognition technology in Mauritius, Burma (Myanmar), Uganda, and Serbia.¹⁰³

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s (USCC) 2020 Annual Report provided information on PRC exports of surveillance technology and equipment under the Digital Silk Road project to promote its concept of “internet sovereignty” by giving certain countries the ability to control their domestic inter-

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net.¹⁰⁴ In its 2021 Annual Report, the USCC reported the PRC had previously sold surveillance, facial recognition, and “integrated social tracking” technologies to multiple governments, including Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, and Venezuela.¹⁰⁵ The Venezuela case was notable for the sale of an in-development social credit system called the “Fatherland Card” that monitors social media, rations food and supplies, and tracks voting patterns, and may have the capability of distributing COVID-19 vaccines.¹⁰⁶

Impeding UN Human Rights Bodies and Redefining Global Human Rights Norms

This past year, the PRC continued a longstanding global campaign to discredit universal rights in international institutions and reshape international consensus around human rights, in what Human Rights Watch described in 2017 as “a systematic attempt to subvert the ability of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in China and beyond.”¹⁰⁷ As scholar Nadège Rolland observed, the PRC has taken steps to “[expand] its international institutional power” as part of its efforts to advance a new order that excludes universal human rights, an order that Rolland notes Chinese leader Xi Jinping has associated with a concept the Party calls a “community of common human destiny” (*renlei mingyun gongtongti*).¹⁰⁸ Several reports published by experts this past year documented those efforts,¹⁰⁹ concluding that in recent years China took a leading role in undermining the participation of NGOs and civil society organizations—“especially those focused on human rights and North Korea”¹¹⁰—in UN processes,¹¹¹ acting together with other authoritarian states to inhibit human rights scrutiny¹¹² and using its influence in the United Nations to promote BRI projects without appropriate human rights guarantees.¹¹³

Chinese authorities took steps consistent with those efforts this past year. For example:

- Following reports that Russia committed human rights violations after invading Ukraine in February 2022,¹¹⁴ China abstained from a UN vote to establish a commission to investigate potential human rights violations committed by Russia in Ukraine¹¹⁵ and voted “no” to a UN vote to suspend Russia’s membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in light of “reports of [Russia’s] gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights.”¹¹⁶ Regarding the alleged human rights violations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that “humanitarian issues shouldn’t be politicized,”¹¹⁷ and Chinese authorities took steps to amplify Russian narratives on human rights conditions in Ukraine.¹¹⁸ [For more information on those efforts, see Section III—Freedom of Expression.]
- The Chinese government attempted to weaken human rights protections in a draft UN instrument that would create legally binding obligations for transnational and other businesses. In February 2022, the UNHRC released a third draft of that instrument with proposals for textual changes submitted by states.¹¹⁹ China proposed to—among other things—remove

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some references to “human rights defenders”; remove guarantees for “effective, adequate and timely remedy” for victims; remove States Parties’ obligation to prevent “unlawful interference” with human rights and fundamental freedoms; and remove States Parties’ obligation to investigate and address human rights abuses.¹²⁰

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¹This past year, multiple reports documented the PRC's multi-year transnational repression efforts. See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, "No Room to Run: China's Expanded (Mis)use of INTERPOL since the Rise of Xi Jinping," 2021; Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, "Your Family Will Suffer: How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies," 2021; Safeguard Defenders, "Pursued for Life: Hong Kong's Global Hunt for Fugitives, the National Security Law, and Risk of INTERPOL Misuse," 2021; Cate Cadell, "China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets, Documents Show," *Washington Post*, December 31, 2021; Muyi Xiao and Paul Mozur, "A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track Critics on Twitter and Facebook," *New York Times*, December 31, 2021; Safeguard Defenders, "Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force 'Fugitives' Overseas Back Home," January 2022; Index on Censorship, "China's Long Arm: How Uyghurs Are Being Silenced in Europe," February 2022; Safeguard Defenders, "Hide and Seek: China's Extradition Problem," February 2022; Safeguard Defenders, "Returned without Rights: State of Extradition to China," February 2022; Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett et al., Citizen Lab, "Psychological and Emotional War: Digital Transnational Repression in Canada," March 1, 2022; Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China's Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, DC: Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2022). For more information, see *The Threat of Transnational Repression from China and the U.S. Response, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 117th Cong. (2022).

²See, e.g., Dana M. Moss, *The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 5; Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression," February 2021, 1; Safeguard Defenders, "Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force 'Fugitives' Overseas Back Home," January 2022, 8–9; Dana M. Moss, "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization, and the Case of the Arab Spring," *Social Problems* 63 (2016): 480, 481–82; Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Transnational Repression," accessed June 27, 2022.

³Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression," February 2021, 15.

⁴*The Threat of Transnational Repression from China and the U.S. Response, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 117th Cong. (2022) (statement for the record of Freedom House). For more information, see Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression," February 2021, 15–21.

⁵Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression," February 2021, 1.

⁶Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach: the Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression," February 2021, 2.

⁷Noura Al-Jizawi, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett, et al., Citizen Lab, "Psychological and Emotional War: Digital Transnational Repression in Canada," March 1, 2022, 15–18, 23–24; Muyi Xiao and Paul Mozur, "A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track Critics on Twitter and Facebook," *New York Times*, December 31, 2021; Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, "Your Family Will Suffer: How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies," 2021, 7.

⁸Cate Cadell, "China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets, Documents Show," *Washington Post*, December 31, 2021; Muyi Xiao and Paul Mozur, "A Digital Manhunt: How Chinese Police Track Critics on Twitter and Facebook," *New York Times*, December 31, 2021; Natalie Hall and Bradley Jardine, Uyghur Human Rights Project and Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, "Your Family Will Suffer: How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, and Intimidating Uyghurs in Liberal Democracies," 2021, 10–17.

⁹Index on Censorship, "China's Long Arm: How Uyghurs Are Being Silenced in Europe," February 10, 2022, 12.

¹⁰"Chinese National Living in the Netherlands Forced to Shut Down Twitter Account," *Radio Free Asia*, April 22, 2022.

¹¹"Chinese National Living in the Netherlands Forced to Shut Down Twitter Account," *Radio Free Asia*, April 22, 2022.

¹²Austin Ramzy, "They Have My Sister: As Uyghurs Speak Out, China Targets Their Families," *New York Times*, updated November 9, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on December 31, 2020," December 31, 2020. See also CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 84, 277. For more information on Gulshan Abbas, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00002.

¹³Elaine Yu, "Hong Kong Officials Threaten British Activist with National Security Law," *Wall Street Journal*, March 14, 2022; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia Anquan Fa* [Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], passed and effective June 30, 2020.

¹⁴Zhang Sheng and Bao Haining, "Freedom of Speech as the Last Refuge of Racist Hater: GWU Asylum for Racism Reflects Double Standard of US Society," *Global Times*, February 10, 2022.

¹⁵Badiucao (@badiucao), "1/GWtweets George Washington University Chinese Students and Scholars Association (GWUCSSA) . . .," Twitter, February 4, 2022, 10:44 p.m.

¹⁶Office of the President, George Washington University, "Message Regarding Posters Displayed on Campus," February 7, 2022. George Washington University staff reportedly removed the posters prior to the publication of this statement.

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