

III. Respect for Civil Liberties

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Findings

- In contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and China's Constitution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) enhanced control over the press; the internet; the art, literature, and entertainment sectors; and educational and research institutions.
- The government proposed new professional requirements for media organizations and journalists, including mandatory continuing education that includes studying ideological concepts developed by Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as proposed restrictions on the use of private capital to fund news media activities.
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China the world's "biggest jailer of journalists" and "biggest jailer of female journalists" this past year. Hong Kong authorities continued a crackdown on independent reporting that resulted in significant erosion of press freedom. China continued to detain and imprison professional journalists, non-professional "citizen" journalists, and Chinese nationals working for foreign media organizations. Of the journalists in prison this past year documented by the Committee to Protect Journalists, nearly half were Uyghurs.
- Authorities harassed and arbitrarily restricted the press freedom of foreign journalists amid what the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China called a "breakneck speed" decline in press freedom. Authorities tried Australian citizen and China Global Television Network anchor **Cheng Lei** on a "state secrets" charge after 19 months of detention.
- The PRC took steps to control media coverage of the Party's image abroad, including coverage of high-profile events that took place in China. Authorities reportedly supported technology, foreign social media influencers, and academic research to better understand and implement manipulation of public opinion abroad, including countering human rights criticism, advancing disinformation about the origins of COVID-19, and understanding how "key opinion leaders" can help overcome negative international perceptions of Chinese state-affiliated media.
- Freedom House ranked China the "worst environment for internet freedom for the seventh year in a row." The Cyberspace Administration of China took steps to implement Party political guidance, including content controls; enforcement; and new, updated, and proposed regulations that raise concerns about their potential to restrict expression on broadly construed "national security" grounds.
- The PRC continued its campaign to create counternarratives to criticism of Party positions on human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and other

Freedom of Expression

sensitive topics abroad and domestically. Some YouTube content creators who developed content that discussed human rights issues in China reportedly faced harassment attempts and efforts to trigger censorship or demonetization of their content. At the same time, the PRC paid content creators to develop content in support of its priorities and mandated that Uyghurs do the same. Content creators, who have criticized the Chinese government, leaked emails from Chinese companies and state-controlled media that asked them and other creators to produce content supporting PRC interests. U.S. social media platforms were inconsistent in the labeling of content related to Chinese authorities.

- Before and during the 2022 Winter Olympics, authorities restricted press freedom arbitrarily, censored both online and broadcast content that did not align with PRC priorities, threatened athletes about human rights criticism, and implemented preemptive restrictions on high-profile critics, contravening protections for freedom of expression in the ICCPR, UDHR, China's Constitution, and the Host City Contract for the Olympic Games.
- Authorities censored discussion of a variety of topics on the internet; in the entertainment, art, and literature sectors; and in educational and research institutions. Sample topics included COVID-19 lockdown conditions, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and portrayals of gender roles and masculinity.
- Schools in China reportedly began incorporating compulsory education on Xi Jinping's signature political ideology into their curricula, following new guidance from the Ministry of Education.
- Authorities detained and imprisoned individuals in connection with their peaceful expression. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that human rights advocate and China Citizens Movement member **Zhang Baocheng** had been arbitrarily detained.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Give greater public expression, including at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign journalists; and the censorship of foreign media websites. Consistently link press freedom to U.S. interests, noting that censorship and restrictions on journalists and media websites prevent the free flow of information on issues of public concern, including public health and environmental crises and food safety, and act as trade barriers for foreign companies attempting to access the Chinese market.
- Sustain, and where appropriate, expand, programs that develop and widely distribute technologies that will assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society organizations in circumventing internet restrictions—so as to improve their

Freedom of Expression

ability to access and share content protected under international human rights standards—as well as to protect their own information from China’s surveillance and interference. Continue to maintain internet freedom programs for China at the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Global Media to provide digital security training and capacity-building efforts for bloggers, journalists, civil society organizations, and human rights and internet freedom advocates in China.

- Increase media literacy and transparency with regard to Chinese state-sponsored propaganda, censorship, and disinformation, including through greater support and funding for graduate-level area studies programs and language study, and greater support for media literacy efforts for international audiences. Provide forums for scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, and technology experts to discuss and disseminate “best practices” in Chinese media literacy.

- Highlight the fact that content creators who criticize the Chinese government on U.S. social media face the risk of harassment, censorship, and demonetization efforts.

- Consider ways to incentivize social media companies to voluntarily establish pilot programs to improve transparency on social media by labeling content from foreign governments across different social media platforms.

- Urge Chinese officials to end the detention and harassment of rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, and others subjected to reprisals for exercising their right to freedom of expression. Call on officials to release or confirm the release of individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression, such as **Zhang Zhan, Hu Xincheng, Sophia Huang Xueqin, Gulmira Imin, Ekber Eset, Haze Fan, Cheng Lei, Yan Zhihong, Yang Hengjun, Ou Biaofeng, Zhang Baocheng, Guo Feixiong, Xie Yang, Ding Yan, Ilham Tohti**, and other political prisoners mentioned in this Report and documented in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to restrict expression in contravention of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)¹—which China has signed but not ratified²—Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),³ and Article 35 of China’s Constitution.⁴ As documented throughout this chapter, authorities enhanced ideological, regulatory, and technical control across sectors in which the UN Human Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the ICCPR, notes that expression is explicitly protected, including the press, the internet, art, literature, entertainment, and institutions of education and research.⁵ Article 19(3) of the ICCPR allows countries to impose certain restrictions or limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting the “rights or reputations of others” or protecting national security, public order, public health, or morals.⁶ The UN Human Rights Council has specified that restrictions on the “discussion of government policies and political debate,” “peaceful demonstrations or political activities,” “expression of opinion and dissent,” “free flow of information and ideas,” and “access to or use of information and communication technologies, including radio, television and the Internet” are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.⁷ The UN Human Rights Committee cautioned that restrictions on freedom of expression noted in Article 19(3) should be interpreted narrowly so that the restrictions “may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”⁸

Freedom of the Press

PRC CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA

This past year, the PRC enhanced political and ideological control over the media, instructing the media either not to report on—or how to report on—new and previously designated topics.⁹ For example, authorities instructed the media to avoid reporting on a high-profile tax evasion case, the causes of the July 2021 flooding in Henan province (and instead focus on recovery efforts), and authorities’ efforts to block a World Health Organization investigation into the origins of COVID-19.¹⁰

The directives described above are consistent with other high-level guidance from the Party. For example, in December 2021, Huang Kunming—director of the Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee—called on all journalists in China to “[build] a reliable, admirable and respectable image of China.”¹¹ Later, as part of a Lunar New Year campaign, the Central Propaganda Department instructed news media to report so as to promote the Party’s image, such as by focusing on economic and social prosperity, the PRC’s “historic accomplishments,” efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and on popular excitement over the 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games.¹²

Authorities also proposed new requirements that would enhance state control over media organizations and journalists. In October 2021, the government proposed updated regulations that would ban

Freedom of Expression

the use of private capital to fund news media activities, for example, reporting on topics authorities deemed sensitive, and referencing foreign reporting, livestreaming, and holding journalism events.¹³ The government also released draft measures¹⁴ that—if implemented as written—would add to existing journalist certification requirements¹⁵ an annual minimum of 90 hours of continuing education¹⁶ that would include studying ideological concepts developed by Xi Jinping and the Party.¹⁷

CONTROL OVER THE PARTY'S IMAGE ABROAD

This past year, the PRC took steps to control media coverage of the Party's image abroad, including coverage of high-profile events that took place in China. Reports in recent years have documented the PRC's efforts to promote international media "exchange" activities and place state-run media content abroad.¹⁸ This past year, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official emphasized the importance of "media cooperation" as part of "China-Russia strategic coordination and cultural exchange."¹⁹ In his remarks, he advocated for "creating a favorable public opinion environment for the development and revitalization of [China and Russia]," noting that "some countries make waves under the guise of 'democracy' and 'human rights,' openly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries . . ."²⁰ During the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March ("Two Sessions"), Party official news media People's Daily reportedly placed 770 articles in 60 countries using largely reprinted or translated People's Daily content.²¹ The China Media Project estimated those media purchases to be in the "tens of millions of dollars."²² In addition, authorities reportedly supported the development of technology, contracted private companies, recruited foreign social media influencers, and supported academic research to better understand and implement manipulation of public opinion abroad in support of PRC narratives.²³ Those efforts reportedly included countering human rights criticism, advancing disinformation about the origins of COVID-19, and better understanding how "key opinion leaders" can help overcome negative international perceptions of Chinese state-affiliated media.²⁴

HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND IMPRISONMENT OF JOURNALISTS

This past year, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China the world's "biggest jailer of journalists."²⁵ RSF noted an "exceptional surge" in arbitrary detentions of journalists worldwide, due in significant part to developments in Hong Kong,²⁶ where authorities continued a crackdown on independent reporting that resulted in significant erosion of press freedom.²⁷ Hong Kong authorities harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists and other media professionals—in some cases denying bail or charging them with national security offenses²⁸—closed and co-opted independent media; created a chilling effect on independent reporting; and restricted the activities of foreign journalists.²⁹ [For more information, see Section XII—Hong Kong and Macau.]

Freedom of Expression

Other selected cases follow:

- **Citizen Journalists:** RSF's detention data included "citizen journalists,"³⁰ non-professionals who publish independently to circumvent official restrictions.³¹ This past year, citizen journalist **Zhang Zhan** remained in prison for independent reporting on COVID-19 conditions in China and reportedly suffered from poor health.³² Authorities in Shanxi province detained citizen journalist and former professional journalist **Hu Xincheng** after he collected signatures for a public health campaign advocating free medical care in cases of serious illness.³³ Authorities in Sichuan province detained citizen journalist and former editor **Song Yangbiao** after he reported on alleged official misconduct in a construction project.³⁴
- **Female Journalists:** RSF noted that China was the "biggest jailer of female journalists, with 19 currently detained."³⁵ In one case, authorities charged journalist **Sophia Huang Xueqin**—who previously reported on sexual harassment and pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong—with "inciting subversion of state power."³⁶
- **Uyghur Journalists:** Of the journalists in prison this past year documented by the Committee to Protect Journalists, nearly half were Uyghurs.³⁷ Uyghur news website administrator **Gulmira Imin** continued to serve a prison sentence of 19 years and 8 months for posting an announcement that called for Uyghurs to demonstrate in 2009.³⁸
- **Employees of Foreign Media Organizations:** This past year, authorities harassed, intimidated, and held in detention Chinese nationals working for foreign news organizations, and in some cases harassed and intimidated their families.³⁹ In January 2022, authorities reportedly released on bail pending trial Chinese national **Haze Fan**—who worked for multiple international news agencies—after detaining her in December 2020 on suspicion of crimes related to "national security."⁴⁰

DETERIORATING CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

Amid ongoing deterioration of conditions for foreign journalists in China,⁴¹ the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC) reported that press freedom declined at "breakneck speed" this past year.⁴² In the FCCC's 2021 annual survey of foreign journalists in China, 99 percent of respondents indicated that reporting conditions did not meet international standards.⁴³ Following an unprecedented number of journalist expulsions last year, the FCCC reported this year that "[f]or a second straight year, [foreign journalists] had to find ways to cover China almost entirely from outside the mainland."⁴⁴

The FCCC reported a variety of abusive practices against foreign journalists, including increasing threats of lawsuits by authorities or sources as reprisal for negative reporting;⁴⁵ online harassment—particularly against "female journalists of East Asian ethnic descent" and "Chinese employees of foreign news organizations"—that in some cases included threats of sexual violence; online harassment carried out or encouraged by authorities or official media;⁴⁶ and obstruction by public security officials and unidentified individuals.⁴⁷ On March 31, 2022, the Beijing No. 2 Inter-

Freedom of Expression

mediate People’s Court tried Australian citizen and state-owned China Global Television Network (CGTN) anchor **Cheng Lei** behind closed doors for “illegally providing state secrets for overseas entities,” 19 months after authorities detained her.⁴⁸ Authorities reportedly denied Australian consular officials access to the trial and continued to deny Cheng’s family—including her two young children—any communication with Cheng.⁴⁹ Cheng previously wrote openly on Facebook about concerns with the Chinese government’s response to COVID-19, among other topics.⁵⁰ The FCCC reported multiple instances of harassment and intimidation of foreign journalists covering the July 2021 flooding in Henan province, including one case in which the Party-run Communist Youth League of China encouraged “its 1.6 million followers on Chinese social media site Weibo to report the whereabouts of BBC Shanghai reporter Robin Brant”⁵¹

Authorities also implemented arbitrary or inconsistent restrictions on foreign journalists’ access to reporting locations. For example, authorities in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region reportedly temporarily denied access to foreign journalists attempting to report on the crash of China Eastern flight MU5375.⁵² Authorities reportedly maintained strict control over foreign journalists’ access to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),⁵³ “ambiguous” access requirements for Tibetan areas outside the TAR,⁵⁴ restrictions on access to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),⁵⁵ and surveillance and harassment of journalists who reported in the XUAR.⁵⁶ [For more information, see Section IX—Tibet.]

PRC Control over the Internet

This past year, Freedom House ranked China the “worst environment for internet freedom for the seventh year in a row,”⁵⁷ as high-level Party authorities called for increased control over the internet to serve the Party’s political goals. The Party’s 14th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization—an authoritative document outlining priorities for the development of China’s technology sector—called for “upholding comprehensive Party leadership,”⁵⁸ as well as “increasing international discourse power,”⁵⁹ a concept commonly linked to China’s international influence and image.⁶⁰

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)⁶¹ took steps to implement and enforce Party political guidance. Selected examples follow:

- **Content Controls:** The CAC announced a Lunar New Year “purification” campaign targeting “unhealthy” behavior and culture online,⁶² requiring Party authorities to punish selected platforms and accounts and mobilize news coverage to create a “deterrent effect.”⁶³ Within three days of that announcement, microblog Weibo reportedly blocked 21 accounts in connection with the campaign.⁶⁴ The CAC called for advances in an integrated national mechanism by which internet users would report “illegal and unhealthy information” online,⁶⁵ building on efforts from last year.⁶⁶ The China Media Project described the “mechanism” as an attempt to “leverage the eyes and ears of the general population to ensure that websites and platforms comply with Party-state mandates on information

Freedom of Expression

control,”⁶⁷ and CAC head Zhuang Rongwen linked it to “welcoming the successful convening of the 20th Party Congress.”⁶⁸

- **Enforcement:** Between January and November 2021, the CAC fined social media company Douban—which the South China Morning Post noted had a reputation for “relatively liberal online discussions”⁶⁹—20 times in connection with the “unlawful release of information.”⁷⁰ In March 2022, the CAC “stationed” a “work supervision group” at Douban in response to “severe online chaos.”⁷¹

- **New Regulations:** This year, the CAC passed, updated, or proposed updating various regulations on digital content and services,⁷² raising concerns about the regulations’ potential to restrict expression. Several cite as a basis national security,⁷³ which experts note that Chinese authorities have interpreted broadly to punish speech or actions that do not conform to PRC priorities.⁷⁴ Several establish requirements based on content’s “relation to public opinion” or “capacity to mobilize society.”⁷⁵

In addition, the National Religious Affairs Administration issued the Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services,⁷⁶ which codify broad prohibitions on unregistered and foreign groups posting religious content on the internet,⁷⁷ ban a wide range of online religious material and activities,⁷⁸ require permits to host or share content online,⁷⁹ and mandate identity verification and real name registration.⁸⁰ [For more information, see Section III—Freedom of Religion.]

This past year, authorities censored online discussion of selected topics in which sources criticized or contradicted official policy or positions. Selected examples follow:

- **Shanghai Lockdown:** In April 2022, authorities took steps to remove online criticism of the COVID-19 lockdown in Shanghai municipality, including “Voices of April,” a viral video containing apparent audio samples of residents expressing frustration and desperation regarding lockdown conditions.⁸¹ CAC authorities in Beijing municipality and Guangdong province reportedly instructed authorities to remove references to the video.⁸²

- **Russia and Ukraine:** Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, observers reported that most online speech in China was nationalist or pro-Russian, but that some academics, students, and others in China called for the Chinese government to support Ukraine or de-escalate the conflict.⁸³ A Party news outlet reportedly published a Weibo post—later deleted—that ordered staff to avoid posting “anything unfavorable to Russia or pro-Western,” submit drafts for publication permission, filter comments, and use only certain state-approved hashtags.⁸⁴ Chinese authorities also reportedly amplified Russian disinformation and removed social media posts and comments—both pro-Russian and anti-Russian—but targeted more intensively content that countered official positions.⁸⁵

- **Secretary Blinken’s Speech:** Authorities reportedly censored U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s May 2022 speech outlining the Biden Administration’s approach to China.⁸⁶

Freedom of Expression

- **Gender Roles:** The PRC targeted content that contradicted official conceptions of gender roles and masculinity. As part of its ongoing suppression of feminist content, Weibo continued to delete accounts related to women’s rights issues.⁸⁷ In July 2021, social media platform WeChat reportedly closed “dozens” of accounts connected to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) communities at Chinese universities, without warning.⁸⁸ Also this past year, WeChat closed an account that reported the closure of an “LGBTQ-friendly” hostel in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province;⁸⁹ social media platform QQ blocked certain LGBTQ search terms;⁹⁰ and LGBTQ dating app Grindr disappeared from app stores in China during the Lunar New Year “purification” campaign.⁹¹ [For more information, see Section VI—Status of Women and Section III—Civil Society.]

China’s Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism on Social Media

CONTINUED CENSORSHIP FROM TIKTOK AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE

The Commission observed reports of TikTok, a social media platform owned by the China-based parent company ByteDance, blaming technical difficulties for the censoring of English-language content related to the Black Lives Matter movement and German-language content related to LGBTQ rights, the internment of Uyghurs, and the disappearance of tennis player Peng Shuai.⁹² In June 2022, leaked audio recordings revealed that engineers in China could access U.S. data, contradicting TikTok’s testimony to Congress.⁹³ During an October 2021 Senate hearing, a TikTok executive denied that TikTok had ever turned over user data to the PRC government, further specifying at a later point in the hearing that TikTok had never turned over data on “Chinese persons in the United States” to the PRC government.⁹⁴ The TikTok executive also emphasized multiple times that U.S. user data is stored in the United States and claimed that a “world-renowned, U.S.-based security team . . . handles access to U.S. data.”⁹⁵ According to BuzzFeed, however, leaked audio from internal TikTok meetings provided evidence that TikTok staff in China accessed U.S. user data “far more frequently and recently than previously reported” and therefore indicates “the company may have misled lawmakers . . .”⁹⁶

SUPPRESSION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON CHINESE AND U.S. SOCIAL MEDIA

During the reporting period, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued provisions requiring social media platforms to publicly display users’ locations and verify their accounts and credentials.⁹⁷ Additional CAC draft provisions—if implemented as written—would require social media companies to pre-screen all comments, including “bullet chats,” in which comments run in real time across the user’s screen.⁹⁸ In June 2022, the National Radio and Television Administration and Ministry of Culture and Tourism released standards of conduct listing the punishment for livestreamers who “spread false terrorist information” and “disrupt

Freedom of Expression

social stability.”⁹⁹ Those standards also require livestreamers to submit to social media platforms their “relevant practice qualifications” before talking about law or other “highly professional” topics.¹⁰⁰ The standards were released after authorities censored the feed of livestreamer Li Jiaqi, after he displayed images suggestive of a tank the day before the 33rd anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests—reportedly sparking concerns about associations with the iconic 1989 “tank man” image¹⁰¹—although the CAC had previously issued a guiding opinion regarding livestreaming.¹⁰²

During the reporting year, the New York Times, the Associated Press, and Miburo reported that the Chinese government paid foreigners on social media to create counternarratives to reporting critical of the government, such as on genocide in the XUAR.¹⁰³ The Associated Press reported that U.S. Department of Justice documents revealed that the Chinese consulate in New York paid a New Jersey-based media firm US\$300,000 for a social media influencer campaign that reached “roughly 4 million” people and included an interview with China’s Consul General in New York that discussed the 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games.¹⁰⁴ In May 2022, the Brookings Institution and the German Marshall Fund of the United States concluded that content reflecting PRC positions on its human rights record and the origins of COVID-19 regularly appeared among top results on Google, Bing, and YouTube.¹⁰⁵

This past year, international observers reported that some YouTube content creators who created content that discussed human rights issues in China faced harassment and efforts to trigger censorship or demonetization of their content.¹⁰⁶ Observers did not conclude definitively who was responsible for those efforts, but some described those responsible as “pro-Beijing online influencers” or “pro-China groups.”¹⁰⁷ In one case, YouTube briefly removed Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights’ channel—which published thousands of videos regarding human rights abuses in the XUAR—after receiving complaints for revealing personal identifiable information that the channel published in connection to their advocacy for political prisoners.¹⁰⁸ Shortly afterward, YouTube reportedly delisted the organization’s earlier testimonials about people detained or imprisoned in the XUAR, for violating YouTube’s “violent criminal organizations policy” and “to allow administrators to make edits.”¹⁰⁹ YouTube also demonetized a video about Peng Shuai because “it wasn’t suitable for all advertisers,” and upheld its decision on appeal.¹¹⁰

Other content creators shared experiences of harassment or email requests from Chinese companies to publish sponsored videos matching PRC priorities.¹¹¹ One content creator confirmed that the Chinese government had paid him, saying, “It’s not different than taking out an advertisement . . .”¹¹² In December 2021, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute identified the role of state-owned media outlet CGTN in sponsoring videos that showcase positive depictions of “‘exotic’ Uyghur culture” and deny the use of forced labor in the XUAR.¹¹³

In April 2022, the intelligence firm Nisos reported on 648 “inauthentic” Twitter accounts engaged in a coordinated campaign

Freedom of Expression

to counter accusations of forced labor and genocide in the XUAR, noting that over 90 percent of “inauthentic posts” were published during regular business hours in China Standard Time.¹¹⁴ Some posts reportedly contained videos with XUAR residents praising conditions in the XUAR or denouncing international criticism of conditions in the XUAR,¹¹⁵ consistent with earlier reporting about authorities’ efforts to coordinate state-mandated videos of Uyghurs expressing anger at former U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.¹¹⁶

This past year, social media platforms were inconsistent in their labeling of accounts as state controlled.¹¹⁷ For example, Twitter labeled a CGTN reporter’s personal Twitter account as state media, but YouTube did not label her personal channel as state media.¹¹⁸ The reporter said that the YouTube channel was a personal account with her personal views, but later posted a CGTN video to her personal YouTube account, having cropped out the CGTN logo.¹¹⁹

2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games

Before and during the 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games (“Olympics”), authorities restricted press freedom arbitrarily, censored online and broadcast content that did not align with PRC priorities, threatened athletes over human rights criticism, and implemented preemptive restrictions on high-profile critics. Such actions—examples of which are discussed below—contravened protections for freedom of expression in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,¹²⁰ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,¹²¹ and China’s Constitution,¹²² as well as the Host City Contract for the Olympic Games, which protects “independent news coverage” of the Olympics.¹²³

Restrictions on Press Freedom: The FCCC reported that the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (“Organizing Committee”) repeatedly released insufficient, delayed, or no information about press events and contacts, and authorities reportedly imposed arbitrary restrictions on interviews and access to reporting sites, including restrictions imposed as reprisal for reporting on human rights.¹²⁴ For an interview with Peng Shuai—who appeared to be under restrictions imposed by authorities after accusing a former senior official of sexual assault¹²⁵—authorities reportedly required French newspaper L’Equipe to submit questions in advance, conduct the interview with a Chinese Olympic Committee representative present, and publish the interview in the form of questions and verbatim translations of Peng’s responses.¹²⁶ In another case, an unidentified individual wearing a “public safety volunteer” badge physically removed Dutch journalist Sjoerd den Daas from his reporting location during a broadcast, reportedly with no explanation.¹²⁷ In another case, Feature Story News journalist Patrick Fok said authorities told him he was not allowed to ask pedestrians in Beijing “how they are enjoying the Olympics.”¹²⁸

Freedom of Expression

2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games—Continued

Control of Online and Broadcast Content: Ahead of the Olympics, multiple “pro-China” Twitter accounts of unknown origin reportedly engaged in “hashtag flooding,” publishing large numbers of posts with a hashtag to dilute the visibility of posts that used that hashtag genuinely.¹²⁹ On February 9, 2022, the South China Morning Post reported that Weibo removed over 41,000 posts and banned 850 accounts in connection with online criticism of Olympic athletes, which Weibo characterized as “creating trouble.”¹³⁰ After International Paralympic Committee President Andrew Parsons spoke out against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in his opening ceremony speech, state-run broadcaster China Central Television reportedly altered some of his anti-war content in its Chinese-language interpretation and appeared to reduce the volume during a portion of the speech.¹³¹

Censorship of Athletes: Prior to the Olympics, a member of the Organizing Committee reportedly said, “Any behavior or speech that is against the Olympic spirit, especially against the Chinese laws and regulations, are [sic] also subject to certain punishment,”¹³² contradicting IOC guidance on athletes’ freedom of expression under the Olympic Charter.¹³³ A Citizen Lab report found that MY2022, an app required for all Olympics attendees, contained a censorship list for “politically sensitive” keywords.¹³⁴ Authorities reportedly ordered Finnish skier Katri Lyytynperä to delete photos she posted online of unsafe conditions in an athlete lodging space.¹³⁵ After Olympic skier Eileen Gu posted a comment on Instagram stating, “anyone can download a vpn its [sic] literally free on the App Store,” authorities censored a screenshot of her comment that was shared widely on Weibo.¹³⁶

Preemptive Restrictions on Critics: Ahead of the Olympics, authorities in Beijing reportedly ordered rights advocate **Hu Jia**¹³⁷ to stay in his home and threatened to restrict access to his ill mother if he spoke out.¹³⁸ Former lawyer Liang Xiaojun—who previously represented prominent legal advocate **Xu Zhiyong**¹³⁹ and whose license was revoked¹⁴⁰—said officials visited him in January and told him “China was entering its ‘Olympic security period,’ ” subsequently calling to check his location repeatedly.¹⁴¹ Authorities also reportedly restricted social media access for prominent critics Zhang Yihe, **Gao Yu**,¹⁴² Guo Yuhua, and He Weifang¹⁴³ ahead of the Olympics.¹⁴⁴

Entertainment, Art, and Literature

This past year, the PRC called for greater control over the entertainment, art, and literature sectors. In a December 2021 meeting with the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the China Writers Association—official organizations under Party leadership¹⁴⁵—Xi Jinping called on “literature and art workers” to align their creative work with authorities’ political priorities,¹⁴⁶ consistent with remarks he had made years prior,¹⁴⁷ and warned attendees not to “misbehave.”¹⁴⁸ Consistent with Xi’s instructions, PRC organizations called for “earnestly studying” Xi’s instructions on literature and art;¹⁴⁹ and for literary, artistic, and cultural works to “enhance propaganda work,” “strengthen [Party] leader-

Freedom of Expression

ship,” and follow controls over their moral, political, aesthetic, and cultural content.¹⁵⁰

Authorities censored book, film, television, and game content that did not conform to PRC priorities. Selected examples follow:

- Reuters reported that Amazon’s Chinese website continued to disable reviews and ratings of a collection of Xi’s writings, because of authorities’ prior concerns about “anything under five stars.”¹⁵¹
- The version of the U.S. film “Fight Club” released on Chinese streaming platform Tencent Video this past year featured a revision to the original ending in which a criminal plot takes place, instead having U.S. law enforcement authorities prevail.¹⁵² It was unclear who was responsible for the change, but one Hollywood producer attributed it to sensitivity over “anything that might create instability in society,” including depicting bad behavior with no punishment.¹⁵³ Tencent reportedly restored the original ending after public criticism.¹⁵⁴
- Amid a reportedly restrictive environment for video game content,¹⁵⁵ U.S. video game company Roblox Corporation—which observers said faced censorship risks because of its “user-generated content” model¹⁵⁶—published a 64-point review checklist for content on its Roblox China platform that included, for example, “no content that disrespects Chinese history and traditional culture,” “no references to social media sites or offshore services that are prohibited or otherwise blocked in China,” “no political content,” and “China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau should not be referred to as separate countries.”¹⁵⁷

Targeting of gender roles and conceptions of masculinity—discussed above—extended to art, entertainment, and literature. Authorities called for “resolutely putting an end to ‘sissy’ and other abnormal aesthetics”—which they described as “unhealthy”—in literature and art.¹⁵⁸ In January 2021, the Beijing Municipal Radio and Television Bureau head announced that the bureau would end “boys love” dramas—or “*dangai*”—a popular genre that features intimate relationships between men.¹⁵⁹ In a re-release of U.S. television series “Friends” for streaming platforms in China, censors reportedly removed or altered content relating to a lesbian character, orgasms, and a same-sex kiss.¹⁶⁰ [For more information, see Section III—Civil Society.]

Party Control over Educational and Research Institutions

This past year, the PRC took steps to increase control over educational and research institutions. Selected examples follow:

- Authorities censored critical online speech from law professor Lao Dongyan and scholar Hu Wei.¹⁶¹ In addition, authorities reportedly warned Lao and other academics in China not to comment on the case of a woman found chained in Jiangsu province that drew widespread attention.¹⁶² [For more information, see Section VI—Status of Women, Section VI—Human Trafficking, and Section VIII—Public Health.]
- In early 2022, a Peking University report reportedly disappeared from the university’s website “a few days” after pub-

Freedom of Expression

lication.¹⁶³ According to Chinese and international media, the report found that should China and the United States engage in a technology “decoupling,” China would experience greater negative consequences than would the United States.¹⁶⁴

- In early 2022, an academic publisher affiliated with public institution Renmin University of China reportedly launched a “political content review committee” charged with ensuring that content of publications accord with the Party’s political guidance.¹⁶⁵

- The Association of Asian Studies reported that some scholars from China were “pressured” to withdraw from the Association’s 2022 annual conference, although its statement did not provide further details.¹⁶⁶ One scholar commented that the withdrawals appeared to be related to Chinese authorities’ increasing efforts to restrict academic freedom.¹⁶⁷

- This past year, scholars of Islamic and ethnic minority studies based in China reportedly said that authorities increased restrictions on their academic work.¹⁶⁸

The PRC released new guidance intended to strengthen Party control over education and further integrate Party ideology into education. In Fall 2021, schools in China reportedly began incorporating compulsory education on Xi Jinping’s signature political ideology,¹⁶⁹ following new guidance from the Ministry of Education.¹⁷⁰ That guidance reportedly requires various educational institutions—including primary education, vocational education, and higher education—to “comprehensively integrate” and “guide” students to “establish faith” in Marxism and “belief” in socialism with Chinese characteristics.¹⁷¹ In January 2022, the Party Central Committee General Office issued a trial opinion that, among other things, requires heads of schools to operate in accordance with Party political ideology, as well as to “educate people for the Party . . .”¹⁷² In addition, provincial and local authorities in at least 12 locations reportedly required schoolteachers to attend government-organized training on how to speak to students about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.¹⁷³ [For more information about control over education, see Section VI—Ethnic Minority Rights, Section V—Governance, Section X—Xinjiang, and Section IX—Tibet.]

Detention and Imprisonment in Connection with Free Speech

This past year, authorities detained, tried, and held in prison individuals in connection with their peaceful expression. Illustrative examples appear below. [For more information about detention and imprisonment, see Section IV—Criminal Justice. For more information about detentions in Hong Kong, see Section XI—Hong Kong and Macau.]

- **Health Concerns:** Naturalized Australian citizen and former Chinese diplomat, author, and blogger **Yang Hengjun** remained in prison on espionage charges and reportedly suffered from deteriorating health without adequate care from authorities.¹⁷⁴

- **Trials:** Authorities in Hainan province sentenced former investigative journalist **Luo Changping** to seven months in prison for “infringing on the reputation and honor of national

Freedom of Expression

heroes or martyrs” after Luo negatively referred to a military unit featured in a Chinese film about the Korean War.¹⁷⁵ Authorities reportedly released Luo in May 2022.¹⁷⁶ Authorities in Zhuzhou municipality, Hunan province, reportedly held a closed-door trial for rights defender **Ou Biaofeng** for “inciting subversion of state power” after he spoke out in support of **Dong Yaoqiong**—whom authorities detained after she criticized Xi Jinping online—and in support of Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily.¹⁷⁷

• **Detentions:** This past year, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined that human rights advocate and China Citizens Movement member **Zhang Baocheng**—whom Beijing authorities imprisoned for “terrorism”-related charges and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”—was arbitrarily detained [“as] a result of his peaceful exercise of his rights to freedom of expression and of association . . .”¹⁷⁸ Authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, formally arrested rights activist **Guo Feixiong** on a charge of “inciting subversion of state power,” in apparent connection with his publishing of an open letter requesting that authorities allow him to visit his terminally ill wife, who later died of cancer while Guo was in detention, in the United States.¹⁷⁹ Authorities in Changsha municipality, Hunan, detained and formally arrested lawyer **Xie Yang** on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” after he posted a video online calling for the release of pregnant school teacher **Li Tiantian**.¹⁸⁰ Officials detained Li for five days in a psychiatric hospital in Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Hunan, after she expressed support for another teacher who was terminated for questioning the official death toll of a historical event known as the Nanjing Massacre.¹⁸¹ Officials in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong, detained **Yan Zhihong** on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” for adding Chinese subtitles to a video of a man complaining about lockdown conditions in English and posting it online.¹⁸² Officials in Luhe district, Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, forcibly committed **Ding Yan** to a psychiatric hospital after she criticized COVID-19 lockdown measures in an open letter to Xi Jinping on social media platform WeChat.¹⁸³ [For more information on detention in psychiatric facilities, see Section VIII—Public Health.]

Notes to Section III—Freedom of Expression

¹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19.

²United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed April 7, 2022.

³Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 19.

⁴*PRC Constitution*, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 35.

⁵UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion and Expression), CCPR/C/GC/34, September 12, 2011, paras. 11–12.

⁶International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, May 16, 2011, para. 24.

⁷Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by UN Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, October 12, 2009, para. 5(p)(i)–(iii).

⁸UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion and Expression), CCPR/C/GC/34, September 12, 2011, para. 21.

⁹Reporters Without Borders, “The Great Leap Backward of Journalism in China,” December 7, 2021, 8.

¹⁰Reporters Without Borders, “The Great Leap Backward of Journalism in China,” December 7, 2021, 8; “Minitrue: Focus on Henan Flood Recovery; Do Not Report on Celebrity Tax Case or COVID Origins Press Conference,” *China Digital Times*, July 23, 2021.

¹¹“Xi Meets Journalist Representatives,” *Xinhua*, December 15, 2021.

¹²“Zhongxuan bu yaoqiu ge xinwen danwei renzhen zuzhi kaizhan 2022 nian ‘Xinchun zou jiceng’ huodong” [Central Propaganda Department requires all news units to earnestly organize and carry out 2022 “New Year’s going to the grassroots” activities], *Xinhua*, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, January 16, 2022.

¹³National Development and Reform Commission, “Shichang Zhunru Fumian Qingdan (2021 nianban gongkai zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Market Entry Negative List (2021 draft for public comment)], October 8, 2021, item 6; “Fagaiwei zhengqiu yijian: Feigongyou ziben bu dei congshi xinwen caibian bofa yewu” [NDRC solicits comments: Private capital should not engage in news collection, editing, or broadcasting work], *China News*, October 9, 2021; Mary Hui, “China Wants an Even More Dominant State Monopoly on the Media,” *Quartz*, October 11, 2021.

¹⁴National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan Jixu Jiaoyu Zanzing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Interim Provisions on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public comment)], October 15, 2021.

¹⁵National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan Jixu Jiaoyu Zanzing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Interim Provisions on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 1; National Press and Publication Administration, *Xinwen Jizhe Zheng Guanli Banfa* [Management Measures for Journalist Certification], passed December 9, 2004, effective March 1, 2005, art. 1.

¹⁶National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan Jixu Jiaoyu Zanzing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Interim Provisions on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 11.

¹⁷National Press and Publication Administration and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Xinwen Zhuanye Jishu Renyuan Jixu Jiaoyu Zanzing Guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Interim Provisions on Continuing Education for News Professionals (draft for public comment)], October 15, 2021, art. 4(1); Xi Jinping, “Strengthen Commitment to the Four Consciousnesses, the Four-Sphere Confidence, and the Two Upholds: October 25, 2017–May 31, 2019,” in *The Governance of China*, Volume 3 (Foreign Languages Press: Beijing, 2020), reprinted in *Seeking Truth*, updated January 14, 2022. See also Stella Chen, “Telling the Story of the CCP Journalist,” *China Media Project*, March 22, 2022.

¹⁸See, e.g., Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, International Federation of Journalists, “Telling China’s Story: Reshaping the World’s Media,” June 2020, 3–6; Sarah Cook, “China’s Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence,” National Endowment for Democracy, International Forum for Democratic Studies, February 2021, 2–3; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 46.

¹⁹“Zhang Weili: shenhua meiti hezuo shi Zhong’E zhanlue xiezuo he renwen jiaoliu de zhongyao zucheng bufen” [Zhang Weili: deepening media cooperation is an important component of China-Russia strategic coordination and cultural exchange], *China Daily*, November 22, 2021.

²⁰“Zhang Weili: shenhua meiti hezuo shi Zhong’E zhanlue xiezuo he renwen jiaoliu de zhongyao zucheng bufen” [Zhang Weili: deepening media cooperation is an important component of China-Russia strategic coordination and cultural exchange], *China Daily*, November 22, 2021.

²¹“Tricks of the External Propaganda Trade,” *China Media Project*, March 16, 2022. For examples, see “Touguo Liang Hui, shijie dudong Zhongguo” [Through the Two Sessions, the world reads and understands China], *People’s Daily*, March 16, 2022.

²²David Bandurski, “Inside China’s Global Media Blitz,” *China Media Project*, March 17, 2021.

²³Muyi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Gray Beltran, “Buying Influence: How China Manipulates Facebook and Twitter,” *New York Times*, December 20, 2021; Olivia Solon, Keir Simmons, and

Freedom of Expression

Amy Perrette, “China-Linked Disinformation Campaign Blames Covid on Maine Lobsters,” *NBC News*, updated October 22, 2021; Albert Zhang, “China’s Cultural Industry Is Being Co-Opted for Disinformation Operations,” *Strategist* (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 8, 2022; Fergus Ryan et al., “Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021; “Elephants Must Learn to Street Dance: The Chinese Communist Party’s Appeal to Youth in Overseas Propaganda,” *Insikt Group*, Recorded Future, February 3, 2022, 15.

²⁴ Muvi Xiao, Paul Mozur, and Gray Beltran, “Buying Influence: How China Manipulates Facebook and Twitter,” *New York Times*, December 20, 2021; Olivia Solon, Keir Simmons, and Amy Perrette, “China-Linked Disinformation Campaign Blames Covid on Maine Lobsters,” *NBC News*, updated October 22, 2021; Albert Zhang, “China’s Cultural Industry Is Being Co-Opted for Disinformation Operations,” *Strategist* (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 8, 2022; Fergus Ryan et al., “Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021. “Elephants Must Learn to Street Dance: The Chinese Communist Party’s Appeal to Youth in Overseas Propaganda,” *Insikt Group*, Recorded Future, February 3, 2022, 15.

²⁵ Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 5–6.

²⁶ Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 5. See also “Hong Kong Prosecutors Play a Key Role in Carrying Out Political Prosecutions,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, July 2022.

²⁷ See, e.g., International Federation of Journalists, “Lights Out: Is This the End for Hong Kong’s Media? An IFJ Report on Press Freedom in Hong Kong 2022,” February 2022; Chris Yeung et al., Hong Kong Journalists Association, *2021 Annual Report: Freedom in Tatters*, 2021.

²⁸ See, e.g., Tang Huiyun, “Xianggang Pingguo Ribao Guo’an Fa xia shoujia shouya guanbi meiti yu qian shimin lingchen paidui qianggou tingkanhao” [Hong Kong Apple Daily is the first media company to shut under the National Security Law, over a thousand residents line up to buy the last issue], *Voice of America*, June 25, 2021; Brian Wong, “Hong Kong National Security Law: Ex-Apple Daily Chief Accused of Colluding with Foreign Forces Denied Bail for Second Time,” *South China Morning Post*, August 13, 2021.

²⁹ International Federation of Journalists, “Lights Out: Is This the End for Hong Kong’s Media? An IFJ Report on Press Freedom in Hong Kong 2022,” February 2022; Chris Yeung et al., Hong Kong Journalists Association, *2021 Annual Report: Freedom in Tatters*, 2021.

³⁰ Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 24.

³¹ See, e.g., Yumeng Luo and Teresa M. Harrison, “How Citizen Journalists Impact the Agenda of Traditional Media and the Government Policymaking Process in China,” *Global Media and China* 4, no. 1 (2019): 72, 74.

³² Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 11; Vivian Wang, “Chinese Citizen Journalist Sentenced to 4 Years for Covid Reporting,” *New York Times*, updated October 8, 2021. For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00175.

³³ “Hubei meitiren Hu Xincheng zao qiangpo shizong 36 tian” [Hubei journalist Hu Xincheng forcibly disappeared for 36 days], *Radio Free Asia*, January 9, 2022; “Hubei meitiren Hu Xincheng shilian yuyue yi zao kuasheng zhuabu” [Hubei journalist Hu Xincheng incommunicado for over a month, cross-provincial detention suspected], *Radio Free Asia*, January 10, 2022; “She shandong kongbu huodong, meitiren Hu Xincheng zao Shanxi dangju xingshi juliu” [For inciting terrorist activities, journalist Hu Xincheng criminally detained by Shanxi authorities], *Radio Free Asia*, January 12, 2022. For more information on Hu Xincheng, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00015.

³⁴ “Meitiren Song Yangbiao zao xingshi juliu, youren: yin jielu Chengdu guanshang goujie” [Journalist Song Yangbiao criminally detained, friend: due to collusion between Chengdu officials and business], *Radio Free Asia*, January 20, 2022; “Jie Chengdu bieshu weijian hou, dalu meitiren Song Yangbiao zao xingju” [After exposing illegal villa construction in Chengdu, mainland journalist Song Yangbiao criminally detained], *Epoch Times*, January 21, 2022; Rights Defense Network, “Dalul meitiren, qian diaocha jizhe Song Yangbiao yin yan huozui zao Chengdu jingfang xingshi juliu 48 xiaoshi hou qubao huoshi” [Mainland journalist, former investigative journalist Song Yangbiao released on bail 48 hours after being incriminated for speech and criminally detained by Chengdu police], January 22, 2022. For more information on Song Yangbiao, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00020.

³⁵ Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 6.

³⁶ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China: Immediately Release #MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,” September 21, 2021; Rights Defense Network, “Duli gongyi ren Wang Jianbing, nuquan jizhe Huang Xueqin jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu” [Family of independent public interest advocate Wang Jianbing and women’s rights journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin receive notice of formal arrest], November 5, 2021; Yuan Yang (@YuanfenYang), “Journalist Sophia (Xueqin) Huang was leaving China on her way . . .,” Twitter, November 5, 2021, 11:04 a.m. For more information on Sophia Huang Xueqin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00454.

³⁷ Committee to Protect Journalists, “293 Journalists Imprisoned in 2021,” accessed June 1, 2022.

³⁸ Reporters Without Borders, “2021 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” updated December 21, 2021, 6. For more information on Gulmira Imin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00238.

Freedom of Expression

³⁹Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 16.

⁴⁰Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, "Press Freedom' Should Not Become a Pretext for Interference in Other Countries' Judicial Sovereignty," May 6, 2022; "Haze Fan, Bloomberg News Assistant, Charged with Jeopardizing National Security," *China Digital Times*, December 11, 2020; One Free Press Coalition, "Cases of Injustice against Journalists: 10 Most Urgent, January 2022," January 3, 2022; "Australian Journalist Faces China Trial on State Secrets Charges," *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *France 24*, March 31, 2022. For more information on Haze Fan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00316.

⁴¹Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Track, Trace, Expel: Reporting on China amid a Pandemic*, March 1, 2021, 1; Reporters Without Borders, "The Great Leap Backward of Journalism in China," December 7, 2021; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 49–51.

⁴²Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 3.

⁴³Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 1.

⁴⁴Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 2.

⁴⁵Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 1, 7.

⁴⁶Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 7–8.

⁴⁷Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 9.

⁴⁸Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "2022 nian 3 yue 31 ri Waijiaobu fayanren Wang Wenbin zhuchi lixing jizhe hui" [Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin hosts regular press conference on March 31, 2022], March 31, 2022; Eva Dou, "Beijing Holds Closed-Door Trial for Australian Journalist Cheng Lei," *Washington Post*, March 31, 2022; *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa* [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021, art. 111. For more information on Cheng Lei, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00246.

⁴⁹Eva Dou, "Beijing Holds Closed-Door Trial for Australian Journalist Cheng Lei," *Washington Post*, March 31, 2022; "Journalist Detained in China Denied Calls, Partner Says," *Associated Press*, reprinted in *Washington Post*, June 2, 2022.

⁵⁰Eryk Bagshaw, "From Suburban Melbourne to Detention in Beijing: The Rise of a TV Anchor," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 1, 2020.

⁵¹Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (@fccchina), "1/ FCCC Statement on Harassment of Reporters Covering Henan Floods . . ." Twitter, July 27, 2021, 5:02 a.m. For an example of Brant's reporting on the flooding, see "China Floods: Drone Footage Shows the Scale of Damage as Clean Up Begins" [Video file], *BBC*, July 22, 2021.

⁵²"China Reinforces Tight Control over Plane Crash Mystery," *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *Radio France Internationale*, April 21, 2022.

⁵³Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 Note)," March 16, 2022, 1–2, 4; Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 12.

⁵⁴Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas: Section 4 of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 Note)," March 16, 2022, 3.

⁵⁵Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 6.

⁵⁶Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, *Locked Down or Kicked Out: Covering China*, January 31, 2022, 10.

⁵⁷Freedom House, "Key Findings," in *Freedom on the Net 2021: The Global Drive to Control Big Tech*, September 2021, 1.

⁵⁸Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, "'Shisi Wu' Guojia Xinxihua Guihua" ["14th Five-Year" Plan for National Informatization], issued December 2021, chap. 2, sec. 2.

⁵⁹Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, "'Shisi Wu' Guojia Xinxihua Guihua" ["14th Five-Year" Plan for National Informatization], issued December 2021, chap. 1, sec. 2.

⁶⁰See, e.g., Nadège Rolland, "China's Vision for a New World Order," National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020, 7–13.

⁶¹Observers have characterized the CAC as increasingly powerful in recent years. See, e.g., AJ Caughey and Shen Lu, "How the CAC Became Chinese Tech's Biggest Nightmare," *Protocol*, March 11, 2022; CECC, *2016 Annual Report*, October 6, 2016, 66–67. The CAC is supervised by a Party organization, the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission. See, e.g., "CPC Releases Plan on Deepening Reform of Party and State Institutions," *People's Daily*, March 22, 2018; Ryan Fedasiuk, "Buying Silence: The Price of Internet Censorship in China," *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2021; Susan V. Lawrence and Mari Y. Lee, "China's Political System in Charts: A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress," Congressional Research Service, November 24, 2021, 19.

⁶²Cyberspace Administration of China, "Guanyu kaizhan 'Qinglang • 2022 nian Chunjie Wangluo Huanjing Zhengzhi' zhuanxiang xingdong de tongzhi" [Circular regarding the launch of the "Purification • 2022 Lunar New Year Internet Environment Rectification" special operation], January 22, 2022. See also Ryan McMorro, "China Launches Internet 'Purification' Campaign for Lunar New Year," *Financial Times*, January 25, 2022.

⁶³Cyberspace Administration of China, "Guanyu kaizhan 'Qinglang • 2022 nian Chunjie Wangluo Huanjing Zhengzhi' zhuanxiang xingdong de tongzhi" [Circular regarding the launch

Freedom of Expression

of the “Purification • 2022 Lunar New Year Internet Environment Rectification” special operation], January 22, 2022.

⁶⁴Iris Deng, “China Steps Up Drive against Cyberbullying, Fake News, Online Scams during Lunar New Year Holiday,” *South China Morning Post*, January 25, 2022.

⁶⁵Cyberspace Administration of China, “Quanguo hulianwang weifa he buliang xinxi jubao shouli chuzhi yitihua jizhi jianshe tuijin hui zai Jing zhaokai” [Meeting to advance construction of a national integrated mechanism for receiving and processing illegal and unhealthy internet information convenes in Beijing], reprinted in *Legal Daily*, January 28, 2022.

⁶⁶Cyberspace Administration of China, “Jubao wangshang lishi xuwuzhuyi cuowu yanlun qing dao ‘12377’—jubao zhongxin ‘she lishi xuwuzhuyi you hai xinxi jubao zhuanqu’ shang xian” [Go to “12377” to report incorrect historical nihilism online—reporting center’s “dedicated reporting area for suspected historical nihilist and harmful information” now online], April 9, 2021; “Zhonggong Wangxinban kaiting rexian jubao ‘lishi xuwu’ yanlun yanjin huaiyi Zhonggong lishi” [Party’s CAC opens hotline to report expressions of “historical nihilism,” strictly forbidden to doubt Party history], *Voice of America*, April 12, 2021; CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 52.

⁶⁷“Empowering China’s Digital Informants,” *China Media Project*, February 7, 2022.

⁶⁸Cyberspace Administration of China, “Quanguo hulianwang weifa he buliang xinxi jubao shouli chuzhi yitihua jizhi jianshe tuijin hui zai Jing zhaokai” [Meeting to advance construction of a national integrated mechanism for receiving and processing illegal and unhealthy internet information convenes in Beijing], reprinted in *Legal Daily*, January 28, 2022.

⁶⁹Coco Feng, “China Tech Crackdown: Internet Watchdog Visits Social Media Firm Douban to Correct ‘Severe Online Chaos.’” *South China Morning Post*, March 15, 2022.

⁷⁰Cybersecurity Administration of China, “Guojia Wangxinban yifa yuetan chufa Doubanwang” [Cybersecurity Administration of China speaks with and punishes Douban], December 2, 2021; “China Fines Social Media Firm Douban for ‘Unlawful’ Release of Information,” *Reuters*, December 2, 2021.

⁷¹Cyberspace Administration of China, “Wangxin bumen gongzuo dudao zu jinzhu Doubanwang” [Cyberspace Administration work supervision group stationed at Douban], reprinted in Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, March 15, 2022.

⁷²See, e.g., Cyberspace Administration of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, State Administration for Market Regulation, National Radio and Television Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Administration of State Secret Protection, and National Cryptography Administration, *Wangluo Anquan Shencha Banfa* [Cybersecurity Review Measures], passed November 16, 2021, effective February 15, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State Administration for Market Regulation, *Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding* [Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, effective March 1, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, *Yidong Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding* [Mobile Internet Application Information Service Management Provisions], issued June 14, 2022, effective August 1, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, “Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions (revised draft for public comment)], issued June 17, 2022.

⁷³Cyberspace Administration of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, State Administration for Market Regulation, National Radio and Television Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Administration of State Secret Protection, and National Cryptography Administration, *Wangluo Anquan Shencha Banfa* [Cybersecurity Review Measures], passed November 16, 2021, effective February 15, 2022, arts. 1, 2, 5; Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State Administration for Market Regulation, *Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding* [Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, arts. 1, 6; Cyberspace Administration of China, *Yidong Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding* [Mobile Internet Application Information Service Management Provisions], issued June 14, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, arts. 1, 11; Cyberspace Administration of China, “Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions (revised draft for public comment)], issued June 17, 2022, art. 1.

⁷⁴See, e.g., Raphaël Viana David, “China’s Abuse of National Security to Curtail Human Rights: 4 Things You Need to Know,” *International Service for Human Rights*, January 27, 2022; Helena Legarda, “China’s New International Paradigm: Security First,” *Mercator Institute for China Studies*, June 15, 2021; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN Rights Chief Concerned by ‘Broad Scope’ of China’s New Security Law,” July 7, 2015.

⁷⁵Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and State Administration for Market Regulation, *Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding* [Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions], passed November 16, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, art. 23; Cyberspace Administration of China, *Yidong Hulianwang Yingyong Chengxu Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding* [Mobile Internet Application Information Service Management Provisions], announced June 14, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, art. 14; Cyberspace Administration of China, “Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Internet Comment Service Management Provisions (revised draft for public comment)], issued June 17, 2022, art. 2.

Freedom of Expression

⁷⁶National Religious Affairs Administration, *Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa* [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022.

⁷⁷National Religious Affairs Administration, *Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa* [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, chap. 3, art. 17.

⁷⁸National Religious Affairs Administration, *Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa* [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, chap. 3, art. 14.

⁷⁹National Religious Affairs Administration, *Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa* [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, chap. 2, art. 6.

⁸⁰National Religious Affairs Administration, *Hulianwang Zongjiao Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa* [Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], issued December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, chap. 2, art. 7(1).

⁸¹Nectar Gan and CNN Beijing Bureau, “‘Voices of April’: China’s Internet Erupts in Protest against Censorship of Shanghai Lockdown Video,” *CNN*, updated April 25, 2022; “Minitrue: Silence the ‘Voices of April’ Viral Video on Shanghai Lockdowns [Includes Full English Subtitles and Transcript],” *China Digital Times*, April 22, 2022.

⁸²“Minitrue: Silence the ‘Voices of April’ Viral Video on Shanghai Lockdowns [Includes Full English Subtitles and Transcript],” *China Digital Times*, April 22, 2022.

⁸³Lily Kuo, “Amid the Roar of Nationalism, a Few Antiwar Voices in China Emerge over Ukraine Crisis,” *Washington Post*, February 28, 2022; Zhifan Luo and Muyang Li, “Online Posts May Not Reflect Chinese Opinion When It Comes to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” *The Conversation*, March 30, 2022.

⁸⁴“Minitrue: Keep Weibo Posts on Ukraine Favorable to Russia; Control Comments,” *China Digital Times*, February 22, 2022. See also Xiaoshan Huang, Chingman, and Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “China Bans Online Criticism of Russia, Blames U.S. for Fueling Ukraine ‘Tensions,’” *Radio Free Asia*, February 23, 2022.

⁸⁵Kai Wang, “Ukraine: How China Is Censoring Online Discussion of the War,” *BBC*, March 12, 2022; Zhifan Luo and Muyang Li, “Online Posts May Not Reflect Chinese Opinion When It Comes to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” *The Conversation*, March 30, 2022; Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, “China’s Echoes of Russia’s Alternate Reality Intensify around the World,” *New York Times*, April 11, 2022.

⁸⁶John Feng, “Blinken’s China Speech Sparks 25,000-Word Rebuttal, Media Censoring,” *Newsweek*, June 22, 2022. For the original speech, see Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022.

⁸⁷Zhang Wanqing, “Weibo Shuts Down User Accounts for ‘Gender Opposition,’” *Sixth Tone*, December 8, 2021.

⁸⁸Pak Yiu, “WeChat Deletes Chinese University LGBT Accounts in Fresh Crackdown,” *Reuters*, July 7, 2021.

⁸⁹“Translation: LGBTQ Site’s WeChat Account Shuttered after Report on Homophobic Backlash against Hostel,” *China Digital Times*, August 20, 2021.

⁹⁰Zeyi Yang, “Tencent’s Messaging Platform Blocks LGBTQ Search Terms,” *Protocol*, August 30, 2021.

⁹¹“Grindr Disappears from App Stores in China amid Olympics Crackdown,” *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *Guardian*, January 31, 2022.

⁹²Alistair Walsh, “TikTok Censoring LGBTQ, Nazi Terms in Germany: Report,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 23, 2022; Cameron Jenkins, “TikTok Blocked Creators From Using ‘Black Lives Matter’ in Bios,” *The Hill*, July 8, 2021; Sebastian Meineck, “TikTok hat das Wort ‘Umerziehungslager’ zensiert” [TikTok censored the word “reeducation camp”], *Netzpolitik*, February 10, 2022.

⁹³Emily Baker-White, “Leaked Audio from 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows That U.S. User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from China,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 17, 2022; *Protecting Kids Online: Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate*, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Michael Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Public Policy, Americas, TikTok).

⁹⁴*Protecting Kids Online: Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, U.S. Senate*, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Michael Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Public Policy, Americas, TikTok); “Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube Executives Testify at Senate Hearing—10/26” [Video file], *Washington Post*, reprinted in YouTube, 1:46:29–1:47:18, 2:15:37–2:15:42; Emily Baker-White, “Leaked Audio from 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from China,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 17, 2022.

⁹⁵Emily Baker-White, “Leaked Audio from 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from China,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 17, 2022; “Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube Executives Testify at Senate Hearing—10/26” [Video file], *Washington Post*, reprinted in YouTube, accessed September 30, 2022, 1:46:29–1:47:18, 2:15:37–2:15:42; *Protecting Kids Online: Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, U.S. Senate*, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of Michael Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Public Policy, Americas, TikTok).

⁹⁶Emily Baker-White, “Leaked Audio from 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows that US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed from China,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 17, 2022.

Freedom of Expression

⁹⁷ Cyberspace Administration of China, *Hulianwang Yonghu Zhanghao Xinxi Guanli Guiding* [Provisions on the Management of Internet User Account Information], issued June 9, 2022, effective August 1, 2022, arts. 11, 12.

⁹⁸ Zeyi Yang, “Now China Wants to Censor Online Comments,” *MIT Technology Review*, June 18, 2022; Cyberspace Administration of China, “Hulianwang Gentie Pinglun Fuwu Guanli Guiding (xiuding cao’an zhengqiu yijian gao)” [Internet Thread Commenting on Services Management Provisions (Revised Draft Seeking Comments)], June 17, 2022, art. 4.

⁹⁹ National Radio and Television Administration and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, *Wangluo Zhubo Xingwei Guifan* [Standards for the Behavior of Livestreamers], issued June 8, 2022, art. 14.

¹⁰⁰ National Radio and Television Administration and Ministry of Culture and Tourism, *Wangluo Zhubo Xingwei Guifan* [Standards for the Behavior of Livestreamers], issued June 8, 2022, art. 13.

¹⁰¹ Nectar Gan, “China Censored a Top Livestreamer on the Eve of June 4. Now His Fans Are Asking about the Tiananmen Square Massacre,” *CNN*, updated June 6, 2022; Zheping Huang, “What Happened in China When the Cake Looked Like a Tank,” *Bloomberg*, June 14, 2022; Xinchang, “Li Jiaqi Xiaoshi Hou De Di 26 Tian” [The 26th day after Li Jiaqi’s disappearance], *163.com*, June 30, 2022.

¹⁰² Cyberspace Administration of China, *Guanyu Jiaqiang Wangluo Zhibo Guifan Guanli Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian* [Guiding Opinion on Strengthening the Standardization and Management of Online Live Broadcasting], February 9, 2021.

¹⁰³ Nick Monaco, “Cotton the Act: Large-Scale Network of CCP-Aligned Facebook Accounts Deny Mass Atrocity in China’s Xinjiang Province,” *Miburo*, December 22, 2021; Amanda Seitz, Mike Catalini, and Eric Tucker, “China Used TV, TikTok Stars in Discreet Olympics Campaign,” *Associated Press*, April 8, 2022; Paul Mozur et al., “How Beijing Influences the Influencers,” *New York Times*, December 13, 2021. See also Fergus Ryan et al., “Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021; Jessica Brandt et al., “Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19,” Brookings Institution and German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 2022; Kerry Allen and Sophie Williams, “The Foreigners in China’s Disinformation Drive,” *BBC*, July 11, 2021.

¹⁰⁴ Amanda Seitz, Mike Catalini, and Eric Tucker, “China Used TV, TikTok Stars in Discreet Olympics Campaign,” *Associated Press*, April 8, 2022.

¹⁰⁵ Karen Hao, “China Tops Google, YouTube Results on Covid Origins and Beijing’s Human Rights Record,” *Wall Street Journal*, updated May 27, 2022; Jessica Brandt et al., “Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19,” Brookings Institution and German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 2022, 1–2.

¹⁰⁶ Frankie Vetch, “Threatened, Harassed, Punished: The Uyghur Translators Defying China to Tell Xinjiang’s Story,” *Coda*, February 17, 2022; Eileen Guo, “How YouTube’s Rules Are Used to Silence Human Rights Activists,” *MIT Technology Review*, June 24, 2021; Victoria Waldersee and Paresh Dave, “Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,” *Reuters*, June 25, 2021; Santi Ruiz, “YouTube Strips Ad Revenue From Channel for Video on Disappeared Chinese Tennis Star,” *Washington Free Beacon*, November 19, 2021; Tom Parker, “YouTube Caught Auto-Censoring Some Comments That Criticize China’s Propaganda Pushers (Again),” *Reclaim the Net*, July 8, 2021.

¹⁰⁷ Frankie Vetch, “Threatened, Harassed, Punished: The Uyghur Translators Defying China to Tell Xinjiang’s Story,” *Coda*, February 17, 2022; Victoria Waldersee and Paresh Dave, “Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,” *Reuters*, June 25, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Eileen Guo, “How YouTube’s Rules Are Used to Silence Human Rights Activists,” *MIT Technology Review*, June 24, 2021; Victoria Waldersee and Paresh Dave, “Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,” *Reuters*, June 25, 2021.

¹⁰⁹ Eileen Guo, “How YouTube’s Rules Are Used to Silence Human Rights Activists,” *MIT Technology Review*, June 24, 2021; Victoria Waldersee and Paresh Dave, “Exclusive: YouTube Takes Down Xinjiang Videos, Forcing Rights Group to Seek Alternative,” *Reuters*, June 25, 2021.

¹¹⁰ Santi Ruiz, “YouTube Strips Ad Revenue from Channel for Video on Disappeared Chinese Tennis Star,” *Washington Free Beacon*, November 19, 2021; Saagar Enjeti (@esaagar), “Sorry @YouTube. We Meant to Say Peng Shuai [sic] Is Safe and Sound . . .,” Twitter, November 19, 2021, 11 a.m.

¹¹¹ China Uncensored, “YouTube Helps Cover Up China’s Atrocities” [Video file], YouTube, April 17, 2021; Serpentza, “Traitors Working for Communist Chinese Government?” [Video file], YouTube, January 16, 2021; Laowhy86, “China Bribed Me to Post Propaganda” [Video file], YouTube, June 8, 2022; Serpentza, “China Tried to Pay Me to Lie about Covid” [Video file], November 2021; Laowhy86, “China Bribed Me to Post Propaganda” [Video file], YouTube, June 8, 2022.

¹¹² Gweilo 60, “New York Times vs Gweilo 60” [Video file], YouTube, November 20, 2021.

¹¹³ Fergus Ryan et al., “Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021, 10–11.

¹¹⁴ Nisos, “Twitter: Xinjiang Inauthentic Network,” April 25, 2022, 3–4; “Report: Fake Twitter Accounts Spread Chinese Propaganda,” *Associated Press*, April 25, 2022.

¹¹⁵ Nisos, “Twitter: Xinjiang Inauthentic Network,” April 25, 2022, 9.

¹¹⁶ Dake Kang, “Chinese Authorities Order Video Denials by Uyghurs of Abuses,” *Associated Press*, May 20, 2021. See also Dake Kang (@dakekang), “1/Three days after @FDrinov sent me a screenshot . . .,” Twitter, May 20, 2021, 2:36 a.m.

¹¹⁷ Amanda Seitz, Eric Tucker, and Mike Catalini, “How China’s TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push Propaganda,” *Associated Press*, March 30, 2022; Fergus Ryan et al., “Borrowing Mouths

Freedom of Expression

to Speak on Xinjiang,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2021, 29–33; Jessica Brandt et al., “Winning the Web: How Beijing Exploits Search Results to Shape Views of Xinjiang and COVID-19,” Brookings Institution and German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 27, 2022, 36; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (@Chinawaijiao), Twitter, accessed August 8, 2022; Zhang Meifang (@CGMeifangZhang), Twitter, accessed August 8, 2022; Jingjing Li (@Jingjing—Li), Twitter, accessed August 8, 2022; CCTV Chinese, (CCTV Zhongwen), Facebook, accessed August 8, 2022; CGTN, Facebook, accessed August 8, 2022; “Talk It Out with Li Jingjing,” Facebook, accessed August 8, 2022; Tiktok News (@cgtntiktok), TikTok, accessed August 8, 2022.

¹¹⁸Li Jingjing (@Jingjing—Li), Twitter, accessed August 8, 2022; Li Jingjing, “A Talk on AUKUS, the West’s Propaganda Tactics, and Its Hybrid War on China with Vijay Prashad” [Video file], YouTube, September 23, 2021; “Li Jingjing,” *CGTN*, accessed August 8, 2022; Li Jingjing, “Freedom for Muslims in Xinjiang—the Stories That Western Media Won’t Show You” [Video file], YouTube, May 31, 2022.

¹¹⁹Li Jingjing, “Expose the West’s Smear Campaign on China’s Investments in Africa & Latin America & Asia” [Video file], YouTube, June 23, 2022; Li Jingjing, “I’m Being Targeted by the New York Times! Here’s What I Want to Say . . .” [Video file], YouTube, December 14, 2021; Li Jingjing, “U.S.-Backed Smear Campaign Created ‘Debt Trap’ Narrative to Defame BRI,” *CGTN*, June 27, 2022.

¹²⁰International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed April 7, 2022.

¹²¹Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 19.

¹²²*PRC Constitution*, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), art. 35.

¹²³International Olympic Committee, city of Beijing, and Chinese Olympic Committee, *Host City Contract XXIV: Olympic Winter Games in 2022*, executed July 31, 2015, sec. IX(53)(1).

¹²⁴Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (@fccchina), “1/ Statement on Olympic Coverage . . .,” Twitter, November 2, 2021, 12:53 a.m.

¹²⁵Vincent Ni, “Peng Shuai Retracts Sexual Assault Claims as Fears over Well-being Persist,” *Guardian*, December 19, 2021.

¹²⁶William Yang, “Chinese Tennis Star Peng Shuai’s Interview Leaves Unanswered Questions,” *Deutsche Welle*, February 8, 2022.

¹²⁷“Chinese Official Drags Dutch Reporter Away during Live Olympics Report—Video,” *Reuters* and *NOS*, reprinted in *Guardian*, February 5, 2022; Brendan Cole, “Reporter Covering Winter Olympics Dragged Away by Chinese Officials Live on Air,” *Newsweek*, February 5, 2022.

¹²⁸Patrick Fok (@PaddyFok), “Stopped by security at Wangfujing . . .,” Twitter, February 6, 2022, 10:31 p.m.

¹²⁹Liza Lin and Georgia Wells, “Pro-China Twitter Accounts Flood Hashtag Critical of Beijing Winter Olympics,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 8, 2022.

¹³⁰Tracy Qu, “Chinese Microblogging Service Weibo Deletes over 41,000 Posts for ‘Creating Trouble’ during Beijing Winter Olympics, Asks Users to Keep Calm When Commenting on the Games,” *South China Morning Post*, February 9, 2022.

¹³¹Weilun Soon, “Chinese Translators Offered a Watered-Down Version of the Paralympic Committee President’s Anti-War Speech during the Games’ Opening Ceremony,” *Business Insider*, March 7, 2022; “Paralympic Committee Asks Beijing Why Anti-War Speech Censored,” *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *France 24*, March 5, 2022.

¹³²Eva Dou, “China Warns Foreign Olympic Athletes Against Speaking Out on Politics at Winter Games,” *Washington Post*, January 19, 2022.

¹³³International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, in force August 8, 2021, rule 50(2); International Olympic Committee, “Rule 50.2 Guidelines—Olympic Winter Games Beijing 2022,” November 2021, 2.

¹³⁴Jeffrey Knockel, “Cross-Country Exposure Analysis of the MY2022 Olympics App,” Citizen Lab, January 18, 2022.

¹³⁵Sam Goodwin, “China Orders Athlete to Delete Photos in Ugly Winter Olympics Furor,” *Yahoo! Sport Australia*, February 12, 2022.

¹³⁶Shen Lu, “Eileen Gu Defends China’s Internet Freedom. Her Message Is Censored,” *Protocol*, February 10, 2022.

¹³⁷For more information on Hu Jia, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05295.

¹³⁸“Beijing jiajin zhenya yi yi, jinggao Dong Ao Hui yundongyuan wei renquan fasheng hui you chengchu” [Beijing intensifies repression of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for speaking out on human rights], *Voice of America*, February 1, 2022; Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, “Ahead of Winter Olympics, Beijing Moves to Quash Dissent,” *New York Times*, January 31, 2022.

¹³⁹For more information on Xu Zhiyong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00199.

¹⁴⁰Vincent Ni and Rhoda Kwan, “‘This Is Not Justice’: Chinese Activists Held for Two Years Await Trial,” *Guardian*, February 1, 2022.

¹⁴¹“Beijing jiajin zhenya yi yi, jinggao Dong Ao Hui yundongyuan wei renquan fasheng hui you chengchu” [Beijing intensifies repression of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for speaking out on human rights], *Voice of America*, February 1, 2022; Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, “Ahead of Winter Olympics, Beijing Moves to Quash Dissent,” *New York Times*, January 31, 2022.

¹⁴²For more information on Gao Yu, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05037.

Freedom of Expression

¹⁴³“Li Xianting and Zhang Yihe: Ai Weiwei Is a Creative Artist,” *China Digital Times*, June 2, 2011; Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, “Journalist Missing ahead of Tiananmen Anniversary,” *New York Times*, April 29, 2014; Ian Johnson, “Ruling through Ritual: An Interview with Guo Yuhua,” *New York Review of Books*, June 18, 2018; Chris Buckley, “Chinese Legal Maverick, Facing Political Gales, Bides His Time,” *New York Times*, May 18, 2018.

¹⁴⁴“Beijing jiajin zhenya yiwei, jinggao Dong Ao Hui yundongyuan wei renquan fasheng hui you chengchu” [Beijing intensifies repression of dissent, warns Winter Olympic athletes there will be punishment for speaking out on human rights], *Voice of America*, February 1, 2022; Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers, and John Liu, “Ahead of Winter Olympics, Beijing Moves to Quash Dissent,” *New York Times*, January 31, 2022; “Winter Olympics: China Restricts Activists’ Social Media ahead of Games,” *Agence-France Presse*, reprinted in *South China Morning Post*, January 26, 2022.

¹⁴⁵China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, “Zhongguo Wenxue Yishu Jie Lianhe Hui jianjie” [Introduction to the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles], accessed April 8, 2022; China Writers Association, “Zhongguo Zuojiia Xiehui jianjie” [Introduction to the China Writers Association], June 12, 2009.

¹⁴⁶“Xi Stresses Cultural Confidence at Major Conference of Artists, Writers,” *Xinhua*, reprinted in State Council, December 15, 2021.

¹⁴⁷“Xi Jinping: wenyi bu neng zai shichang jingji dachao zhong mishi fangxiang” [Xi Jinping: literature and art cannot lose its way in the tidal wave of the market economy], *Xinhua*, October 15, 2014.

¹⁴⁸“Xi Stresses Cultural Confidence at Major Conference of Artists, Writers,” *Xinhua*, reprinted in State Council, December 15, 2021.

¹⁴⁹Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode jianshe gongzuo” [Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues circular and convenes conference to emphasize further enhancing education management and moral construction work for literary and artistic workers], August 30, 2021.

¹⁵⁰Central Propaganda Department, *Guanyu kaizhan wenyu lingyu zonghe zhili gongzuo de tongzhi* [Circular on launching literature and entertainment sector overall governance work], September 2, 2021; General Office of the National Radio and Television Administration, *Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi* [Circular on further enhancing management of literary and artistic programs and personnel], September 2, 2021; Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode jianshe gongzuo” [Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues circular and convenes conference to emphasize further enhancing education management and moral construction work for literary and artistic workers], August 30, 2021.

¹⁵¹Steve Stecklow and Jeffrey Dastin, “Special Report: Amazon Partnered with China Propaganda Arm,” *Reuters*, December 18, 2021.

¹⁵²Shuai Zhang, “‘Fight Club’ Is Now Available to Stream (Legally) in China, but Wait Until You See How This Story Ends,” *CBS News*, January 26, 2022; Mike Ives, “The End of ‘Fight Club’ Was Cut in China. The Pattern Goes Back Decades,” *New York Times*, updated February 8, 2022.

¹⁵³Mike Ives, “The End of ‘Fight Club’ Was Cut in China. The Pattern Goes Back Decades,” *New York Times*, February 8, 2022; Shuai Zhang, “‘Fight Club’ Is Now Available to Stream (Legally) in China, but Wait until You See How This Story Ends,” *CBS News*, January 26, 2022.

¹⁵⁴“China’s Tencent Restores Fight Club Ending after Backlash,” *BBC*, February 7, 2022.

¹⁵⁵Guan Cong, “In Depth: China’s Game Studios Face Long March as Titles Languish Unapproved,” *Caixin*, February 28, 2022.

¹⁵⁶Eleanor Olcott, “Roblox to Rebuild China App after Going Offline,” *Financial Times*, January 7, 2021; Eleanor Olcott, “Roblox’s China Ambitions Risk Falling Flat,” *Financial Times*, November 20, 2021.

¹⁵⁷“China UGC Submission Checklist,” Roblox, accessed April 8, 2022.

¹⁵⁸Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Wenhua he Luyou Bu yinfa tongzhi bing zhaokai zuotanhui qiangdiao jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi gongzuozhe jiaoyu guanli he daode jianshe gongzuo” [Ministry of Culture and Tourism issues circular and convenes conference to emphasize further enhancing education management and moral construction work for literary and artistic workers], August 30, 2021; General Office of the National Radio and Television Administration, *Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wenyi jiemu ji qi renyuan guanli de tongzhi* [Circular on further enhancing management of literary and artistic programs and personnel], September 2, 2021.

¹⁵⁹“Beijing Shi Guangbo Dianshi Ju: quanmian jiaoting ouxiang yangchenglei wangzong, ‘dangai’ tcai wangluo yingshi ju” [Beijing Municipal Radio and Television Bureau: comprehensively end idol cultivation-style online entertainment, “boys love”-themed online movies], *CCTV*, January 7, 2022.

¹⁶⁰“Chinese Sites Accused of Censoring LGBT Content from Friends,” *BBC*, February 13, 2022; Patrick Brzeski, “‘Friends’ Re-Released in China, but LGBTQ Storylines Get Censored,” *Hollywood Reporter*, February 14, 2022; Robert Burton-Bradley, “China’s Censors Increasingly Play the Part of Morality Police with the Conservative Values of 1950’s America, Experts Say,” *South China Morning Post*, February 24, 2022.

¹⁶¹David Cowhig, “2022: Chinese Law Prof’s Lament and Encouragement,” *David Cowhig’s Translation Blog*, January 29, 2022; Chris Buckley, “Defying China’s Censors to Urge Beijing to Denounce Russia’s War,” *New York Times*, March 18, 2022. Authorities also censored analysts outside of academia for posting independent policy analysis publicly. See, e.g., Luna Sun, “Chinese Economist Ren Zeping Banned from Posting on Weibo after Comments on Financing Child-birth Stir Controversy,” *South China Morning Post*, January 13, 2022; Simon Leplatre, “China Censors Its Economists in the Name of Zero-Covid,” *Le Monde*, May 5, 2022.

¹⁶²Mimi Lau, “China Silences Trafficking Debate Sparked by ‘Chained Woman’ Scandal,” *South China Morning Post*, February 22, 2022.

Freedom of Expression

¹⁶³ Shen Lu, “A Report Detailed the Tech Gap between China and the U.S. Then It Disappeared,” *Protocol*, February 9, 2022.

¹⁶⁴ Shen Lu, “A Report Detailed the Tech Gap between China and the U.S. Then It Disappeared,” *Protocol*, February 9, 2022.

¹⁶⁵ David Bandurski, “University Press Creates Political Review Team,” *China Media Project*, March 8, 2022.

¹⁶⁶ Board of Directors, Association for Asian Studies, “AAS Statement on Participation of PRC Scholars at AAS 2022 Annual Conference,” March 29, 2022.

¹⁶⁷ Pola Lem, “Chinese Academics ‘Pressured’ into Conference Withdrawal,” *Times Higher Education*, March 30, 2022.

¹⁶⁸ “Yisilan xueshu zao daya, Zhongguo xuezhe: minzu yanjiu fabiao bu liao” [Scholars of Islam oppressed, Chinese scholars: ethnic minority research can’t get published], *Radio Free Asia*, February 24, 2022.

¹⁶⁹ Ministry of Education, “Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Xuesheng duben’ yu jinjian qiujie xueqi qi zai quanguo tongyi shiyong” [“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Textbook” will be used across the country beginning this fall semester], July 8, 2021; Shih-Wen Sue Chen and Sin Wen Lau, “Little Red Children and ‘Grandpa Xi’: China’s School Textbooks Reflect the Rise of Xi Jinping’s Personality Cult,” *The Conversation*, November 22, 2021.

¹⁷⁰ Zhang Xin and Lin Huanxin, “Fahui peigen zhuhun de sixiang weili: Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jin Kecheng Jiaocai Zhinan’ fabu” [Bring into play the ideological power of cultivating the roots and molding the soul: “Guide for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era Entering the Curriculum” released], *China Education Times*, reprinted in Ministry of Education, August 25, 2021.

¹⁷¹ Zhang Xin and Lin Huanxin, “Fahui peigen zhuhun de sixiang weili: Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jin Kecheng Jiaocai Zhinan’ fabu” [Bring into play the ideological power of cultivating the roots and molding the soul: “Guide for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era Entering the Curriculum” released], *China Education Times*, reprinted in Ministry of Education, August 25, 2021.

¹⁷² Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office, *Guanyu Jianli Zhongxiao Xuexiao Dang Zuzhi Lingdao de Xiaozhang Fuze Zhi de Yijian (Shixing)* [Trial Opinion on Establishing a Head of School Responsibility System for Party Group Leadership in Primary and Secondary Schools], issued January 26, 2022, sec. 1, art. 1(1), sec. 2, art. 4.

¹⁷³ Mimi Lau, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: China Schools Its Teachers with Classroom Guide to Beijing’s Messaging,” *South China Morning Post*, March 30, 2022.

¹⁷⁴ Ben Doherty, “They Treat Me Like Dirt and Tortured Me: Australian Activist on Three Years in Chinese Prisons,” *Guardian*, January 17, 2022. For more information on Yang Hengjun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00083.

¹⁷⁵ Zhang Chen, “Luo Changping qin hai ying xiong lieshi mingyu, rongyu ji xingshi fudai minshi gongyi susong yi an yi shen xuanpan” [Sentence announced in trial of first instance in the criminal case plus public interest civil suit for Luo Changping harming the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs], *Legal Daily*, May 6, 2022; Chen Zifei and Hwang Chun-mei, “Chinese Journalist Sentenced in Hainan for Smearing Reputation of CCP Heroes,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 6, 2022; Anthony Kuhn, “China’s Few Investigative Journalists Face Increasing Challenges,” *NPR*, August 6, 2017; “Luo Changping bei pizhun daibu” [Luo Changping’s formal arrest approved], *People’s Daily*, reprinted in *Sina*, October 22, 2021; “[Wang Weiluo zhuanfang] ‘Changjin Hu’ dianying de xujia yu Luo Changping de zhenshi (shipin)” [(Wang Weiluo exclusive interview) The falsehood of “Battle at Lake Changjin” and Luo Changping’s truth (video)], *Vision Times*, October 28, 2021. For more information on Luo Changping, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00515.

¹⁷⁶ “Luo Changping xingman chuyu shou le 18 jin” [Luo Changping released from prison after completing sentence, loses 9 kilograms], *Radio Free Asia*, May 8, 2022.

¹⁷⁷ “Chinese Activist Who Supported Apple Daily in Secret Trial for ‘Subversion’: Wife,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 28, 2022; Linda Lew, “China Charges ‘Ink Girl’ Supporter with Subversion as Room for Dissent Narrows Further,” *South China Morning Post*, August 1, 2021. For more information on Ou Biaofeng, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00008. For more information on Dong Yaoqiong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00343.

¹⁷⁸ UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 54/2021 concerning Zhang Baocheng (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2021/54, February 16, 2022, paras. 5, 17, 67, 75, 82, 84. For more information about Zhang Baocheng, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00132.

¹⁷⁹ “Bingzhong Zhang Qing huhuan zhangfu, Guo Feixiong qingqiu Li Keqiang fang ta chu guo” [Gravely ill Zhang Qing calls for husband, Guo Feixiong asks Li Keqiang to let him leave the country], *Radio Free Asia*, November 29, 2021; “Qizi Zhang Qing zai Mei shen huan juezheng lairi wuduo, Zhongguo weiquan renshi Guo Feixiong yu Li Keqiang fangxing tanishi” [With wife Zhang Qing terminally ill on death bed in the United States, Chinese human rights advocate Guo Feixiong calls on Li Keqiang to let him go see her], *Voice of America*, December 1, 2021; Rights Defense Network, “Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) jia shu shoudao Zhonggong dangju zhengshi daibu Guo Feixiong de tongzhishu” [Family of Guo Feixiong (Yang Maodong) receive notice of Guo Feixiong’s formal arrest from Chinese Communist Party authorities], January 17, 2022. For more information on Guo Feixiong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00143.

¹⁸⁰ “China Rights Lawyer Held for ‘Inciting State Subversion,’” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *South China Morning Post*, January 19, 2022; Safeguard Defenders, “The Abrupted Video Call and Xie Yang’s Detention,” January 28, 2022; Rights Defense Network, “Hunan zhuming renquan lushi Xie Yang zao dangju qiangpo shizong” [Famous Hunan human rights lawyer Xie Yang forcibly disappeared by authorities], January 13, 2022; Rights Defense Net-

Freedom of Expression

work, “Bei qiangpo shizong de Hunan renquan lushi Xie Yang yi zao xingshi juliu” [Forcibly disappeared Hunan human rights lawyer Xie Yang criminally detained], January 17, 2022. For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.

¹⁸¹ Chris Buckley, “Fury in China after an Outspoken Teacher Disappears,” *New York Times*, December 23, 2021. For more information on Li Tiantian, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00001.

¹⁸² Rights Defense Network, “Yin yan huozui zao zhuabu de Shenzhen nianqing Jidutu Yan Zhihong de anqing tongbao” [Update on the case of young Shenzhen Christian Yan Zhihong, guilty for speaking out and detained], May 13, 2022. For more information on Yan Zhihong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00128.

¹⁸³ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “Ding Yan zhixin Xi Jinping bei songru jingshenbing yuan” [Ding Yan sends letter to Xi Jinping regarding her being forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution], June 8, 2022; Rights Defense Network, “Bei Zhonggong dangju qiangzhi song jingshenbing yuan de Jiangsu Nanjing nu renquan hanweizhe Ding Yan de jianli” [Bio of Nanjing, Jiangsu women’s human rights defender Ding Yan, who was forcibly committed to a psychiatric institution by Chinese Communist Party authorities], June 11, 2022. For more information on Ding Yan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00126.