

GOVERNANCE

Findings

- The Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to extend control over all sectors of society violate citizens’ right to fully participate in public affairs. As the Party’s dominance permeates society, the space for institutions of democratic governance diminishes, thereby weakening citizens’ ability to hold authorities accountable for human rights violations.
- Central authorities issued a policy plan with a stated goal of promoting the rule of law in China for the next five years. While the plan outlines strategies to improve bureaucratic efficiency and standardize administrative actions, it makes no mention of developing a mechanism to check the Party’s power. The Party further monopolized the narrative of the past, as it adopted an official version of its historical contribution to China’s development, portraying events in a way that served to legitimize government policies, tighten political control, and bolster Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s personal authority, preparing him to serve at least one additional five-year term as General Secretary.
- The central and local governments issued plans to institutionalize the existing practice of mobilizing citizens through “social organizations,” whose members are sometimes paid to further government objectives. Recent examples show that the government has used social organization members to harass independent candidates who planned to run for local election, and to boycott businesses that allegedly tried to comply with sanctions related to the Chinese government’s use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
- This past year, central authorities took a series of actions against businesses that had the effect of increasing the Party’s power to intervene in the economy so as to advance its objectives in politics, security, and ideology. Substantial fines were imposed on leading technology companies for alleged monopolistic activities. Those companies made contributions to support the “common prosperity” wealth redistribution policy as an apparent hedge against further penalties.
- The Commission observed a whole-of-government approach by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in establishing stricter control over its population through its surveillance and “zero-COVID” policies during this reporting year. The Chinese government passed a new law on data that authorized the government’s access to individuals’ personal data, with some protections for the “rights and interests” of PRC citizens. The PRC continued to invest in surveillance systems and big data analysis programs that enhanced its ability to monitor citizens and implement social controls, which resulted in discrimination and violations of the right to privacy.

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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Support U.S. research programs that document and analyze the governing institutions and ideological campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as its relationships with companies, government agencies, legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- Encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and release individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising their rights to freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
- Support organizations working in and outside China that seek to work with local governments and NGOs to improve transparency, especially with regard to efforts to expand and improve China's open government information initiatives.
- Support technological development that respects privacy, protects sensitive personal information, and defends against censorship. Establish an initiative to help countries around the world implement governing regulations for the procurement and use of technology consistent with civil and political rights.

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Introduction

China's one-party authoritarian political system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party remains out of compliance with the standards defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹ According to some observers, the political climate in the People's Republic of China (PRC)—with General Secretary Xi Jinping at the apex of political power—has regressed to that of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and '70s.² One scholar highlighted some recent developments supporting this view: “Xi has revived one-man rule, escalated political repression to its worst level since Mao Zedong died in 1976, reintroduced ideological indoctrination, and launched an aggressive foreign policy that openly challenges the theory and practice of a liberal, rules-governed international order.”³ Reports from the Commission's 2022 reporting period continue to indicate that the Party seeks to control every sector of society with little regard for citizens' fundamental rights.

Rule-Based Governance: Plans and Practice

In assessing rule of law developments in China, a scholar noted that recent trends show increasingly distinctive characteristics of personal rule, partly because “the restriction of administrative powers did not touch on the Party's supreme status [as] a ruler above any legal constraints.”⁴ In particular, “the 2018 amendment [to China's constitution] explicitly entrenched the leadership of the Party in the main text of the Constitution,” creating “a legal foundation for Party domination.”⁵ In addition, the creation of the National Supervisory Commission, through the 2018 amendment and accompanying legislation, had the effect of bringing the entire public sector under the Party's jurisdiction and legalizing a form of detention that was illegal when it was previously carried out under informal rules.⁶ As the Party increasingly uses the law to achieve its political goals, the scholar observed, it has moved farther away from the core elements of the rule of law.⁷

Recent policy announcements do not indicate that the Party is moving in a different direction. For example, in August 2021, central authorities issued a plan for implementing a rule-based government for the next five years,⁸ the second such plan since 2015.⁹ The document opens with a mandate to implement Xi Jinping Thought and to guard the leadership of Xi and the Party; it ends with a call to propagandize the success story of the project.¹⁰ The balance of the document outlines objectives such as improving bureaucratic efficiency, standardizing administrative actions, and requiring public hearings on major projects.¹¹ The document describes the Party as having a dominant role in supervising administrative actions and does not propose plans to place any legal constraints on the Party itself.¹²

Xi Jinping's Personal Power

Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the Party laid down a version of history that would legitimize Xi ruling indefinitely and further re-

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inforced his personal power through institutions and education. In November 2021, the Party adopted a resolution summarizing its version of Party history since its establishment a century ago.¹³ The resolution was adopted ahead of the First Plenum of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, expected to be held in the second half of 2022,¹⁴ when senior Party members would select a person to fill the General Secretary position, the highest political office.¹⁵ The Party previously adopted two similar resolutions—in 1945 and 1981 under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—to fashion history in furtherance of their respective political goals.¹⁶ According to some interpretations, the 2021 resolution created an official narrative that serves to legitimize government policies, tighten political control, and bolster Xi Jinping’s personal authority, preparing him to serve at least one additional five-year term as General Secretary.¹⁷

Substantial coverage and praise given to Xi Jinping in the resolution is consistent with other official actions that some observers characterize as steps to build a personality cult around Xi.¹⁸ Such actions include the establishment of ideological “research centers” beginning in October 2017,¹⁹ the most recent one being the Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center located in Beijing municipality, bringing the total number of similar centers to 18 as of July 2021.²⁰ The center is tasked with “talking politics” and promoting central authorities’ strategic plans.²¹

Evidence of a personality cult also is seen in the introduction of ideological textbooks in schools. Beginning in September 2021, primary and secondary school students were required to use a new series of standardized textbooks outlining Xi Jinping Thought.²² Two authors who wrote about this development compared prior textbooks, which focused on the Party in general, with this new series, which focused on Xi himself.²³ The authors further observed that “the growing personality cult of Xi Jinping [is] eerily reminiscent of the days of China’s founding father Mao Zedong,” with the qualification that current propaganda has not yet advocated violence or deified Xi.²⁴

Lack of Genuine Political Participation

The Party holds exclusive political power, and China’s Constitution contains language that effectively prohibits acts that would damage the Party’s leadership.²⁵ Eight satellite parties are formally recognized, but their funding and operations are controlled by the Party.²⁶ Although the Party declares that it represents “the fundamental interests of the greatest possible majority of the Chinese people,”²⁷ citizens’ direct electoral participation is limited to sub-provincial legislative bodies²⁸ and village and residents committees,²⁹ the latter of which are semi-autonomous grassroots bodies outside of the state bureaucracy.³⁰ Elections for these local offices, however, are subject to political interference, such as through candidate selection and harassment of independent candidates.³¹ Furthermore, people who participate in elections are required by law to support the Party’s leadership unwaveringly.³²

Elections for local-level people’s congresses took place across China beginning in the second half of 2021.³³ Elections in Beijing municipality, for example, concluded in November 2021 and gen-

erated nearly 4,900 newly elected delegates at the district level, about 69 percent of whom were Party members.³⁴ In October 2021, rights defenders **Wang Qiaoling, Li Wenzu, Ye Jinghuan**, and 11 other independent candidates announced that they would run for the district-level people's congress in Beijing, intending to improve representation of people's needs.³⁵ After the announcement, Wang was unable to take a call from what she believed was a media inquiry originating from Hong Kong and instead received an official warning message.³⁶ Two weeks later, the candidates announced that they were aborting their plans, citing personal liberty and safety concerns.³⁷ They said police harassed them almost every day by summoning them for questioning, forcing them to travel to another location, or threatening to demolish their homes.³⁸ Li said that her landlord, possibly pressed by authorities, retracted an agreement to renew her lease and asked her to move out.³⁹

It is against this backdrop that the Chinese government claimed in a December 2021 white paper that it has a robust "whole-process people's democracy" that "has been fully tested through wide participation."⁴⁰ The white paper proceeds to claim that China's political system is a "people's democratic dictatorship" with no opposition party, where "[a] tiny minority is sanctioned in the interests of the great majority, and 'dictatorship' serves democracy."⁴¹ It further presents China's system as a "new model of democracy" that always prioritizes economic development.⁴² One observer expressed concern that the government's unfounded claim of having attained democracy is indicative of a loss of institutional resiliency necessary for democratic reforms.⁴³

Party Control

MOBILIZATION OF CITIZENS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Recent official actions indicate an attempt to institutionalize the existing practice of mobilizing citizens to further the government's objectives, which include fighting crime, suppressing citizens' civic engagement, and countering international criticism of the PRC's human rights violations. In September 2021, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations (*shehui zuzhi*), a national plan aiming to install a centralized system of registration and management by 2025 to strengthen the Party's control over social organizations and to increase the number of Party members dedicated to working in this sector.⁴⁴ The plan requires social organizations to write Party-building into their charters and to follow the Party's orders.⁴⁵ Supervision over these groups is exercised through official bodies and the social credit system.⁴⁶ In addition to performing community services, social organizations are tasked with facilitating the PRC's national and international policies, such as to "augment social organizations' capacity to participate in global governance and enhance . . . China's 'soft power.'"⁴⁷

Following the national plan, the Beijing municipal government issued an implementation plan in October 2021 with a goal of establishing at least 15 social organizations in each urban community and 8 in each rural community by 2023.⁴⁸ Under the ideological guidance of local Party organizations, these social organizations are

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to build a platform for grassroots-level governance encompassing areas such as community services, law and order, dispute settlement, and drug rehabilitation.⁴⁹ To enhance public appeal and influence, each community is required to develop its own “branding” of social organization.⁵⁰

One such branding is Chaoyang Masses based in Beijing’s Chaoyang district, which has a total of 190,000 registered social organization members and a population of 3.45 million, representing a ratio of about 1 member in every 20 residents.⁵¹ The Chaoyang district government pays a monthly stipend of between 300 and 500 yuan (approximately US\$40 to \$70) to members who actively assist in policing.⁵² The government also reportedly hands out rewards in amounts ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 yuan (approximately US\$3,000 to \$6,000) or more for tips that help crack major cases.⁵³ Members of Chaoyang Masses, however, carry out assignments beyond combating crimes; for example, they were among those who harassed rights defenders including the 14 independent candidates who tried to run for local election, a case described in more detail above.⁵⁴

On a broader scale, authorities mobilized the general public and internet users to carry out political objectives:

- **Reporting Religious Activities.** Some local governments, for example, enacted measures in recent years to give out monetary rewards for citizens who report on religious activities that are deemed illegal by the government.⁵⁵
- **Targeting the “Unpatriotic.”** In October 2021, an official military newspaper called for a “people’s war” to hunt down U.S. spies in China, which according to two analysts could encompass anyone deemed “unpatriotic,” given the broad and vague definition of the term “national security” used by Chinese authorities.⁵⁶
- **Boycotting U.S. Companies.** In December 2021, Party-run newspaper Global Times and the Communist Youth League initiated a social media campaign, calling on Chinese citizens to boycott U.S. companies accused of refusing to source goods from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in light of anti-forced labor legislation passed in the United States.⁵⁷

BUSINESS SECTOR

This past year, central authorities took a series of actions against businesses that resulted in the loss of approximately US\$1.1 trillion in the top six technology stocks alone, suggesting that they were in part motivated by non-economic considerations.⁵⁸ According to one expert, these actions represented a “pivot to the state” and had the effect of increasing the Party’s power to intervene in the economy so as to advance its objectives in politics, security, and ideology.⁵⁹

COMMON PROSPERITY

In August 2021, Xi Jinping presided over the 10th meeting of the Party Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, announcing that common prosperity (*gongtong fuyu*) would be the next phase of development, given the Party’s claim of having elimi-

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nated poverty and having established a moderately prosperous society.⁶⁰ The policy aims to expand the middle class and adjust the low- and high-income groups' earnings through a three-tiered distribution system.⁶¹ In this system, the first distribution refers to spending; the second refers to taxation, social security, and transfer payments; and the third refers to charitable donations, either voluntary, incentivized by estate and gift tax, or encouraged by the government's socialist appeal.⁶²

After the policy announcement, Chinese companies including Alibaba, Tencent, and Pinduoduo separately pledged to contribute 100 billion yuan each (approximately US\$15 billion) by 2025 to support the common prosperity initiative.⁶³ Reuters reported that the fund set up by Alibaba, about two-thirds of the company's earnings in 2020, would be managed by a committee led by the company's chief executive, but "outsiders have limited visibility into how shareholder earnings will be used."⁶⁴ The companies' contributions, according to a researcher, "are clearly hedges against potential punitive actions taken by the government 'against the unfettered action of capitalist interests.'"⁶⁵

ANTI-MONOPOLY ACTIONS

The punitive actions mentioned above included penalties imposed in the name of anti-monopoly measures, but those penalties did not extend to state-owned enterprises. Beginning in late 2020, the government imposed substantial penalties for alleged monopolistic conduct and unreported mergers on at least 60 companies in areas including technology, gaming, and food delivery.⁶⁶ To further strengthen enforcement, central authorities allocated additional resources for the State Anti-Monopoly Bureau and planned to amend the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, proposing to increase penalties and prohibit using data, algorithms, and technologies to impede competition.⁶⁷ One economist observed that the series of actions had the effect of weakening the position of private enterprises, while authorities had not taken similar actions against monopolies created by state-owned banks and enterprises.⁶⁸

DATA SECURITY

Authorities likewise exerted control in data security practices through intrusive administrative actions. In July 2021, two days after Didi Chuxing (a transportation service company) had listed its stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),⁶⁹ the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) suspended new user registration and ordered online platforms to take down the company's application (app) pending investigation, which involved government officials being stationed in the company's office.⁷⁰ While official notices did not specify the nature of the underlying conduct, the CAC's actions could be linked to concerns over the potential disclosure of government employees' travel history and the company's ability to apply big data technology to analyze the information it had gathered.⁷¹ In December 2021, Didi Chuxing delisted from the NYSE, hours after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a rule requiring foreign companies listed in the United States to submit to open-book audits.⁷² This series of events took place before relevant legal provisions became effective—the PRC

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Data Security Law, which created a system to review data practices that may affect national security,⁷³ and the Cybersecurity Review Measures, which require online platform operators with over one million users to undergo security review before listing in overseas stock exchanges.⁷⁴

TUTORING INDUSTRY

Concerned about population decline, the government encouraged childbearing, in part by cracking down on the tutoring industry in an attempt to reduce the cost of rearing children.⁷⁵ In July 2021, central authorities announced a policy aiming to alleviate students aged 6 to 15 from the burden of homework and private tutoring.⁷⁶ The policy restricts the amount of homework that schools may assign and requires private tutors and tutoring organizations to re-register as non-profit organizations under strict standards.⁷⁷ Seven months after the announcement, the South China Morning Post reported that while the policy had resulted in fewer homework assignments, it did not reduce students' burdens, as parents continued to seek additional extracurricular activities and tutoring classes, which were rebranded in a way to circumvent the rules.⁷⁸ With the passage of the new PRC Family Education Promotion Law, however, parents may be breaking the law if they overburden their children with studies.⁷⁹

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The PRC Family Education Promotion Law, which aims to cultivate the next generation of socialists, brings a private family matter within the purview of state regulation. ⁸⁰ The law obligates parents to avoid overburdening their children with schoolwork and to prevent their children from becoming addicted to the internet; they also must teach their children to love the Party, form an intention to protect national unity, develop a healthy aesthetic, and ensure that they have enough sleep. ⁸¹ Parents who refuse to carry out family education or whose child has engaged in “seriously inappropriate behavior” are punished by means of criticism or admonition, or ordered to receive family education guidance, terms that are not defined in the law. ⁸² Punishing parents for their children’s misconduct may amount to collective punishment, ⁸³ and, according to ChinaAid, the law signifies the government’s reach into people’s homes to exert control over minor children. ⁸⁴

ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

Beginning in late August 2021, the Party started a campaign to further regulate the entertainment industry and fandom culture. The Propaganda Department of the Party Central Committee issued a notice announcing a campaign to comprehensively manage the entertainment sector, seeking to address a range of issues relating to celebrities, including tax evasion, contract fraud, “distorted” aesthetics, moral corruption, and fan club activities.⁸⁵ The notice calls for ideological control, supervision of public opinion, and guidance on aesthetics.⁸⁶ Simultaneously, the National Radio and Television Administration declared a determination to get rid of effeminate aesthetics and promote revolution and socialist cul-

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ture.⁸⁷ The Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) also issued a notice stating its continued efforts to disband fan clubs that collect funds and influence online commentaries and to shut down online forums that allow fans to gather and discuss celebrity scandals.⁸⁸

Technology-Enhanced Social Control

In a March 2021 policy document covering the period between 2021 and 2025, central authorities outlined the next phase of digitalization strategy, known as “Digital China,” as a key component of China’s long-term economic and social development.⁸⁹ Previously, the CCAC called for the construction of an integrated data system encompassing image recognition, big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and other technologies,⁹⁰ which can be used to enhance the PRC’s authoritarian control.⁹¹

SURVEILLANCE

Since the conceptual development of the smart city in 2009, the PRC’s surveillance program has evolved to include broader economic and social management concerns.⁹² The surveillance industry implemented by the PRC government uses surveillance cameras, behavioral analysis, biometrics, and other technologies including cellphone trackers which have the ability to connect a person’s digital footprint, identity, and physical location.⁹³ Cases of concern from this reporting year include the following:

- Authorities in Tianjin municipality in 2022 purchased “combat platform” software from Hikvision that tracks petitioners in real time and uses a “social attribute” score to predict the chances of individuals entering Beijing municipality to file complaints with the government.⁹⁴ Hikvision is one of eight companies that the U.S. Government identified in October 2019 as having been “implicated in human rights violations . . . against members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.”⁹⁵
- In September 2021, police in Henan province awarded technology company Neusoft a contract to build a tracking system using a range of technologies, including facial recognition, smartphone monitoring, and cross-platform data analysis to target people, such as journalists, international students, and foreign women illegally staying in the province.⁹⁶ An expert noted that the procurement tender “illustrates the first known instance of the PRC building custom security technology to streamline state suppression of journalists.”⁹⁷
- A January 2022 bidding document from public security officials in Jingzhou municipality, Hubei province, sought to build a public security video platform that is integrated into the province-wide system of local-level “Sharp Eye” surveillance platforms.⁹⁸ The proposed project calls for a network of 3,500 new and modified security cameras, 200 biometric collection terminals, and big data processing capabilities that can track people using facial and vehicle recognition and behavior analysis.⁹⁹

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[For more information on commercial firms' role in government data collection and surveillance across China, see Section VIII—Business and Human Rights.]

ENHANCED SOCIAL CONTROL UNDER ZERO-COVID

Since 2020, officials have used technologies such as drones and health code apps to facilitate coercive enforcement of the “zero-COVID” policy in ways that violated citizens’ fundamental rights.¹⁰⁰ Local governments used health code apps to control people’s movement based on their exposure to the virus.¹⁰¹ While the algorithms used by different health apps were similar, how strictly the information was applied varied among local governments, as some officials chose to take drastic actions to prevent outbreaks, reportedly in fear of being terminated or disciplined.¹⁰² In Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, for example, police defined close contact as having been within 800 meters (2,600 feet) of a confirmed infection for a period of time, leading to 82,000 people being considered as at risk.¹⁰³ In another example, authorities halted two trains traveling to Beijing and placed nearly 350 passengers in centralized quarantine because a single passenger on each train was considered a close contact of a confirmed case.¹⁰⁴

According to a June 2022 article posted by a data resource management bureau, citizens continued to experience inconsistent or erroneous enforcement as a result of health code data being used differently across localities.¹⁰⁵ The article further noted that the lack of oversight could lead to the health code system being abused, and highlighted an example from Henan province.¹⁰⁶ Beginning in April 2022, customers of at least four rural banks operating in Henan experienced difficulty making withdrawals, as the banks had frozen their deposits.¹⁰⁷ Some customers reported that their health codes had been changed from green to red for no apparent reason, which prevented them from traveling to the banks to make inquiries or join protests to seek redress.¹⁰⁸ They accused authorities of tampering with the health code system to restrict people’s movement for purposes unrelated to public health.¹⁰⁹ [For more information on China’s zero-COVID policy, see Section VIII—Public Health.]

NEW DIGITAL PRIVACY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STANDARDS RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

New legal and judicial standards on digital rights were issued this past year, the content of which raised concerns about the power of the government to infringe on the right to privacy given legal exceptions on consent.¹¹⁰ In August 2021, the National People’s Congress passed the PRC Personal Information Protection Law, a legislative framework that maintains government access to personal data while ostensibly safeguarding the “rights and interests” of persons within the PRC from unlawful commercial handling of private information.¹¹¹ According to Michael Caster, Asia Digital Programme Manager at the human rights organization Article 19, the law’s private sector protections are inadequate because they contain exceptions to the requirement to obtain consent, such as for “safeguarding public security,” that can be exploited by government authorities to collect personal information.¹¹² Companies

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must store personal data in China under an expansive view of national security, and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) must issue a favorable security assessment before data can leave China.¹¹³ In July 2021, the Supreme People’s Court issued an interpretation requiring companies to disclose how they use facial and biometric information and prohibiting them from requiring customers to consent to companies’ processing of facial information as a condition to use their services if it is not necessary for the provision of such services, with exemptions for public health and public security purposes.¹¹⁴ [For more information on the Chinese government’s view of data security abroad, see Section XII—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

New standards on AI and online algorithms lack anti-discrimination protections for consumers. In April 2022, the Netherlands-based think tank Leiden Asia Centre noted that the Ministry of Science and Technology’s draft of the “Ethical Norms of New Generation Artificial Intelligence” initially contained text discouraging the use of discriminatory tools in AI, but the final draft replaced that text, stating “[AI should] offer alternative products and services based on the need[s] of the underprivileged.”¹¹⁵ The Leiden Asia Centre expressed concern that this change in wording indicates that future AI ethical standards may promote ethnic and socio-economic discrimination.¹¹⁶ In December 2021, the CAC, together with several other state agencies, released final regulations that also omitted a prohibition on “discriminatory or biased user tags” in algorithmic recommendation systems, which had been included in the draft version.¹¹⁷

Notes to Section V—Governance

¹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 25.

² “Zhongguo guanmei: Yichang ‘shenke biange’ zhengzai fasheng Cai Xia: Wenge huilai le” [China’s official media: “A deep transformation” is taking place; Cai Xia: Cultural Revolution has returned], *Radio Free Asia*, August 30, 2021; Daniel Kwan, “From Mao to Now: David Shambaugh Compares and Contrasts China’s Leaders,” *South China Morning Post*, October 10, 2021.

³ Minxin Pei, “China: Totalitarianism’s Long Shadow,” *Journal of Democracy* 32, no. 2 (April 2021): 6.

⁴ Ruiping Ye, “Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China’s Journey Toward Socialist Rule of Law,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1880.

⁵ Ruiping Ye, “Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China’s Journey Toward Socialist Rule of Law,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1876–77.

⁶ Ruiping Ye, “Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China’s Journey Toward Socialist Rule of Law,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1878–79.

⁷ Ruiping Ye, “Shifting Meanings of Fazhi and China’s Journey Toward Socialist Rule of Law,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 19, no. 5 (December 2021): 1860, 1861, 1879, 1881.

⁸ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, “Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021–2025 nian)” [Outline for the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021–2025)], issued August 11, 2021.

⁹ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, “Fazhi Zhengfu jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2015–2020 nian)” [Outline for the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2015–2020)], issued December 28, 2015.

¹⁰ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, “Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021–2025 nian)” [Outline for the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021–2025)], issued August 11, 2021, secs. 1(1), 10(35).

¹¹ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, “Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021–2025 nian)” [Outline for the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021–2025)], issued August 11, 2021, secs. 2(4), 4(11), 7(22), 8(24).

¹² Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, “Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2021–2025 nian)” [Outline for the Implementation of a Rule-Based Government (2021–2025)], issued August 11, 2021, secs. 8(24), (25).

¹³ “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Dang de bai nian fendou zhongda chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi” [Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the major achievements and historical experience of the Party’s struggles over the past century], passed November 11, 2021.

¹⁴ Wu Jiatong, “Zhongguo fabu: Zhongguo Gongchandang Di’ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao dahui 2022 nian xiabannian zhaokai” [Announcement from China: Chinese Communist Party 20th National Congress to be convened in the second half of 2022], *China Release*, November 11, 2021.

¹⁵ Chris Buckley, “A Succession Drama, Chinese Style, Starring Xi Jinping,” *New York Times*, February 14, 2022. See also *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng* [Chinese Communist Party Constitution], adopted September 6, 1982, amended October 24, 2017, art. 23.

¹⁶ “Zhonggong Liu Zhong Quan Hui tongguo disan ge lishixing jueyi, gonggu Xi Jinping diwei” [CCP’s Sixth Plenum passes the third historical resolution, bolstering Xi Jinping’s position], *BBC*, November 12, 2021.

¹⁷ Jesse Turland, “China’s Sixth Plenum Report Proclaims Bright Future under Xi,” *The Diplomat*, November 16, 2021; Jin Zhe, “Zhuanfang xuezhe Ni Lingchao: Tan Zhonggong lishi jueyi yu Zhongguo gongzong zhishang” [Exclusive interview with scholar Ni Lingchao: A discussion of the CCP’s historical resolution and Chinese public’s intelligence], *Voice of America*, November 30, 2021; Chris Buckley et al., “China’s Xi Jinping Remakes the Communist Party’s History in His Image,” *New York Times*, March 10, 2022.

¹⁸ Jin Zhe, “Zhuanfang xuezhe Ni Lingchao: Tan Zhonggong lishi jueyi yu Zhongguo gongzong zhishang” [Exclusive interview with scholar Ni Lingchao: A discussion of the CCP’s historical resolution and Chinese public’s intelligence], *Voice of America*, November 30, 2021; Song Ren, “Beijing gongbu 3 wan 6 qian zi Zhonggong bai nian zhongda chengjiu jueyi wei Xi Jinping di 3 renqi tajijiao mingluo” [Beijing announces 36,000-word resolution on the important successes of the CCP’s past 100 years, harbinger of Xi Jinping’s third term], *Voice of America*, November 16, 2021.

¹⁹ Gu Li, “Zhongguo chengli di 18 ge Xi Jinping Sixiang yanjiu zhongxin” [China establishes the 18th Xi Jinping Thought research center], *Radio France Internationale*, July 9, 2021.

²⁰ “Xi Jinping Jingji Sixiang Yanjiu Zhongxin chengli” [Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center is established], *People’s Daily*, July 7, 2021; Su-Lin Tan, “Economic Thought of China’s Xi Jinping to Be Immortalised in Newly Established Research Centre,” *South China Morning Post*, July 6, 2021; Gu Li, “Zhongguo chengli di 18 ge Xi Jinping Sixiang yanjiu zhongxin” [China establishes the 18th Xi Jinping Thought research center], *Radio France Internationale*, July 9, 2021.

²¹ “Xi Jinping Jingji Sixiang Yanjiu Zhongxin chengli” [Xi Jinping Economic Thought Research Center is established], *People’s Daily*, July 7, 2021.

²² Ministry of Education, “Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang xuesheng duben’ yu jin nian qiujie xueqi qi zai quanguo tongyi shiyong” [“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era textbook” will be used across the country beginning this fall semester], July 8, 2021.

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²³ Shih-Wen Sue Chen and Sin Wen Lau, “Little Red Children and ‘Grandpa Xi’: China’s School Textbooks Reflect the Rise of Xi Jinping’s Personality Cult,” *The Conversation*, November 22, 2021.

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