

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

- During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
- During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced language and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority language instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, “[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.”
- Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities this past year which were aimed at “sinicizing” Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
- Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian language instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass “rectification” and “re-education” campaigns, including through “patriotism courses,” to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Develop programming, both in the United States and around the world, to preserve threatened cultures and languages. The Administration should expand grant programs to assist Uyghur, Mongol, and other ethnic and religious minorities in cultural and linguistic preservation efforts and leverage the tools available in the Tibet Policy and Support Act (Public Law 116-260) to help sustain Tibetan religion, language, culture, and identity. The Administration should prioritize, and Congress should fund, research, exhibitions, and education related to these efforts.
- Urge the PRC government to abide by the protections guaranteed to ethnic minorities to speak, use, and receive an education in their mother tongue, under China’s Constitution, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and international laws such as the ICCPR and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Urge Chinese authorities to repeal policies that infringe upon the rights of ethnic minorities to teach and learn in their own language. Press Chinese officials to release political prisoners who were detained for their advocacy of language education rights.

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- Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter of their right to religious freedom, and in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, as well as China's Constitution, which prohibit discrimination based on religion.
- The U.S. Agency for Global Media should consider establishing a Mongolian language service to provide a reliable, accurate, and timely source of information to Mongols in China.

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Party and State Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

During the Commission's 2022 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law¹ and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.² At the Party's Central Work Conference on Ethnic Affairs held in Beijing municipality in August 2021, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping told top officials of the necessity of "guiding all ethnic groups to always put the interests of the Chinese nation first."³ Several scholars and analysts said Xi's speech represented a policy of forced assimilation at the expense of ethnic minorities' languages and cultures.⁴ In a March 2022 speech that was held during the annual meeting of the National People's Congress, Xi similarly called on government officials to build a "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*," a term that also encompasses notions of ethnicity and race),⁵ saying, "[a]ny activity that is harmful to fostering such a sense should be resolutely forbidden."⁶

INVESTIGATION OF WANG ZHENGWEI REFLECTS OFFICIAL CONCERN OVER ETHNIC POLICIES

In March 2022, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that authorities had launched a rare investigation into a senior official, which reflected Xi Jinping's push for assimilation and desire to eliminate resistance to his ethnic policies.⁷ The Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection reportedly launched an investigation into whether Wang Zhengwei, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, had engaged in abuse of power and corruption.⁸ According to the WSJ report, the investigation represented the concerns of senior Party officials that Wang—an ethnic Hui who formerly served as head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and chairman of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region—had been too aggressive in his promotion of Muslim culture while serving in those positions.⁹ His advocacy of legislation on halal food certification and the construction of mosques reportedly conflicted with the goals of Xi Jinping to downplay ethnic differences in favor of assimilation.¹⁰ [For more information on Party and state policy toward ethnic minorities in China, see Section IX—Tibet and Section X—Xinjiang.]

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Language and Education Policies Marginalize Ethnic Minorities

During this reporting year, PRC officials implemented language and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority language instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold observed, “[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China,” noting that “[g]roups like the Mongols, Uyghurs and Tibetans must disown their constitutionally protected languages and cultural traditions in the name of [sic] in upholding the party’s regime security and a Han-centric nation.”¹¹ In July 2021, the Ministry of Education published a plan to establish mandatory Mandarin Chinese-based instruction in preschools throughout China, beginning in fall 2021.¹² Although preschool enrollment is not itself mandatory, a separate plan issued in February 2019 by the Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council set universal preschool attendance as a goal by 2035.¹³ Scholars Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud concluded in a Jamestown Foundation analysis that the 2021 plan would likely reduce the ability of ethnic minority children to learn school subjects in their native languages, and that this would in turn hinder intergenerational language transmission and the use of these languages more broadly.¹⁴ According to Grey and Baioud, under current education policies toward ethnic minorities, “[I]t is no longer accepted that good students and citizens can be bicultural and bilingual in minority languages.”¹⁵

Reports this past year documented the coercive placement of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minority children in boarding schools that serve official goals of displacing children from their families, communities, and cultures.¹⁶ In Tibetan areas of China, around three out of every four Tibetan children between the ages of six and eighteen were educated in boarding schools, which the advocacy group Tibet Action Institute described as “colonial” in design and practice.¹⁷ Reports highlighted the high incidence of violence and abuse at such schools, and the lasting mental trauma this caused students.¹⁸ [For more information on boarding schools for ethnic minorities in China, see Section IX—Tibet and Section X—Xinjiang.]

Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at “sinicizing” Islamic practices,¹⁹ a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.²⁰ Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to “sinicize” the mosques and eradicate “Saudi and Arabic influence.”²¹ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province.²² The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui community.²³ In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries.²⁴ According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-

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wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of “Saudi and Arabic influence.”²⁵ CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.²⁶

An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another example of official actions to “sinicize” Islamic practices.²⁷ Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to “promote a Chinese communal national consciousness” and “guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the government.”²⁸ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into “believers in the Party.”²⁹ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]

Authorities Tighten Controls over Dissent, Mongolian Identity in the IMAR

Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian language instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region.³⁰ Officials launched mass “rectification” and “re-education” campaigns, including through “patriotism courses,” to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.³¹ According to testimony from U.S.-based Mongol rights advocate Enghebatu Togochoog at a Commission hearing in April 2022, an IMAR resident who had been subjected to two months of “training” mandated by the IMAR bureau of education following the implementation of the new language policy said he and his coworkers had been required to confess past “mistakes” such as the wearing of traditional Mongolian clothing.³² Authorities’ efforts to eliminate dissent extended to government and Party officials in the region whom they viewed as having been too protective of Mongolian language and identity and too reticent to enforce reforms promoting a Han Chinese identity.³³ The “rectification,” dismissal, and punishment of such officials included the apparent dismissal of IMAR chairwoman Bu Xiaolin in August 2021 and the dismissal of two education officials who had worked to preserve Mongolian-language instruction.³⁴

In the wake of the 2020 protests, IMAR authorities issued new regulations regarding language, education, and ethnic unity that solidified official control and assimilation efforts.³⁵ Two regional regulations on language and education that came into force in January 2022 invalidated regulations enacted in 2005 and 2016 which protected and promoted the use of the Mongolian language in government and education.³⁶ The 2005 regulations protected Mongolian as a common language in the IMAR, requiring its use alongside Mandarin Chinese by government organs; the 2016 regulations provided incentives for supporting education using Mongolian-based instruction.³⁷ The two new regulations enforce the priori-

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tization of Mandarin Chinese over Mongolian in education and emphasize the primacy of Mandarin Chinese in order to promote Chinese culture and “ethnic unity.”³⁸

After regional officials implemented education reforms in primary and secondary schools, reforms were extended to the university level.³⁹ In fall 2021, the University of Inner Mongolia reduced its quota for social science majors taught in the Mongolian language by nearly half, and in 2021 also eliminated several majors taught in the Mongolian language.⁴⁰ In September 2021, regional education authorities announced plans to eventually eliminate the extra points ethnic minorities had previously been awarded on the university entrance exam.⁴¹

Notes to Section VI—Ethnic Minority Rights

¹The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyue Zizhi Fa* [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53.

²Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed October 4, 2022. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed July 15, 2020. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4; *Jiaoyubu Bangongting guanyu Shishi Xueqian Ertong Putonghua Jiaoyu “Tong Yu Tong Yin” Jihua de Tongzhi* [Ministry of Education General Office Circular on Implementing the “Children Speak in Unison” Plan for Mandarin Education for Preschool Children], issued July 21, 2021; Tibet Action Institute, “Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the World: China’s Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools Inside Tibet,” December 2021; “Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in ‘Welfare Schools’ in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 16, 2021; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

³“Xi Jinping zai Zhongyang Minzu Gongzuo Huiyi shang qiangdiao yi zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi wei zhuxian tuidong xin shidai Dang de minzu gongzuo gao zhiliang fazhan Li Keqiang zhuchi Li Zhanshu Wang Huning Zhao Leji Han Zheng chuxi Wang Yang jianghua” [At the Central Ethnic Work Conference, Xi Jinping stressed the primacy of building the common consciousness of the Chinese nation in order to promote the high-quality development of the Party’s ethnic work in the new era. Li Keqiang presided, Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng attended, Wang Yang gave a speech], *Xinhua*, August 28, 2021; “Xi Focus: Xi Stresses High-Quality Development of Party’s Work on Ethnic Affairs,” *Xinhua*, August 28, 2021; “Ethnic Groups Fear More Repression After Chinese President’s Speech on Minorities,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 3, 2021.

⁴“Ethnic Groups Fear More Repression After Chinese President’s Speech on Minorities,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 3, 2021.

⁵See, e.g., Uradyn Bulag, “Nationality/Minzu,” *China Columns, Made in China Journal*, September 4, 2020. Uradyn Bulag discusses the complex historical and political forces that have influenced Chinese leaders’ use and promotion of the concepts of nation, nationality, race, and ethnicity denoted by the terms “minzu” and “Zhonghua minzu.” See also “Minzu,” Xinjiang Documentation Project, University of British Columbia, accessed September 30, 2022.

⁶“Xi Warns Missteps on Ethnic Issues Would ‘Destabilize’ China,” *Bloomberg*, March 7, 2022; “Xi Jinping canjia Nei Menggu daibiao tuan shenyl” [Xi Jinping participates in the deliberations of the Inner Mongolia delegation], *Xinhua*, March 5, 2022.

⁷Josh Chin, “China Launches Investigation into Official Who Promoted Respect for Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2022.

⁸Josh Chin, “China Launches Investigation into Official Who Promoted Respect for Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2022.

⁹Josh Chin, “China Launches Investigation into Official Who Promoted Respect for Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2022.

¹⁰Josh Chin, “China Launches Investigation into Official Who Promoted Respect for Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2022. See also Shen Pengda, “Zhongguo gaoguan Wang Zhengwei xianshen ceng bei zhi xuanyang Musilin wenhua zao cha” [Chinese senior official Wang Zhengwei appears [in public], accused of promoting Muslim culture, now under investigation], *Central News Agency*, March 30, 2022.

¹¹“Xi Warns Missteps on Ethnic Issues Would ‘Destabilize’ China,” *Bloomberg*, March 7, 2022. See also PRC Constitution, passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended March 11, 2018), arts. 4, 30, 34, 52, 59, 65, 70, 89, 95, 97, 99, 102, 107, 112–22, 139.

¹²*Jiaoyubu Bangongting guanyu Shishi Xueqian Ertong Putonghua Jiaoyu “Tong Yu Tong Yin” Jihua de Tongzhi* [Ministry of Education General Office Circular on Implementing the “Children Speak in Unison” Plan for Mandarin Education for Preschool Children], issued July 21, 2021, sec. 1; Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 23; “China Imposes Mandarin-Language Teaching on Kindergartens in Ethnic Minority, Rural Areas,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 6, 2021. See also Yang Yiming and Yuan Wei, “Tong yu tong yin, zhu meng weilai” [Children speak in unison, building a dream for the future], *Guangming Daily*, October 10, 2021.

¹³Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 23; “Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan yinfa ‘Zhongguo Jiaoyu Xiandaihua 2035’” [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council Issue “China’s Education Modernization 2035”], *Xinhua*, February 23, 2019.

¹⁴Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 28.

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¹⁵Alexandra Grey and Gegentuu Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021, 27.

¹⁶Tibet Action Institute, “Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the World: China’s Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools Inside Tibet,” December 2021; “Children of Detained Uyghur Parents Held in ‘Welfare Schools’ in China’s Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 16, 2021; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

¹⁷Tibet Action Institute, “Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the World: China’s Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools Inside Tibet,” December 2021, 22.

¹⁸Tibet Action Institute, “Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the World: China’s Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools Inside Tibet,” December 2021, 1, 28–29, 41, 44, 51–52; Emily Feng, “Uyghur Kids Recall Physical and Mental Torment at Chinese Boarding Schools in Xinjiang,” *NPR*, February 3, 2022.

¹⁹David R. Stroup, “China: Removing ‘Arab-Style’ Features from Country’s Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,” *The Conversation*, September 28, 2021.

²⁰James Jennion, “China’s Repression of the Hui: A Slow Boil,” *The Diplomat*, June 15, 2021; Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” *NPR*, September 26, 2019; “Hui Muslims and the ‘Xinjiang Model’ of State Suppression of Religion,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 2021.

²¹Emily Feng, “China Is Removing Domes from Mosques as Part of a Push to Make Them More ‘Chinese,’” *NPR*, October 24, 2021; David R. Stroup, “China: Removing ‘Arab-Style’ Features from Country’s Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,” *The Conversation*, September 28, 2021. See also Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” *NPR*, September 26, 2019.

²²David R. Stroup, “China: Removing ‘Arab-Style’ Features from Country’s Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,” *The Conversation*, September 28, 2021; Emily Feng, “China Is Removing Domes from Mosques as Part of a Push to Make Them More ‘Chinese,’” *NPR*, October 24, 2021.

²³David R. Stroup, “China: Removing ‘Arab-Style’ Features from Country’s Biggest Mosques the Latest Move in Campaign of Muslim Assimilation,” *The Conversation*, September 28, 2021.

²⁴Christian Solidarity Worldwide, “China: Hui Muslims Beaten as Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,” June 21, 2022.

²⁵Christian Solidarity Worldwide, “China: Hui Muslims Beaten as Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,” June 21, 2022.

²⁶Christian Solidarity Worldwide, “China: Hui Muslims Beaten as Officials Demolish Mosque Domes and Minarets,” June 21, 2022.

²⁷“Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu ‘Yisilan Zhongguohua’” [The government organizes an Islamic preaching group to enter mosques to accelerate the “sinicization of Islam”], *Radio Free Asia*, October 26, 2021.

²⁸Chinese Islamic Association, “Qinghai sheng Yisilan jiao jie zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi ji disi jie ‘wo’erzi’ xunhui xuanjiang huodong qidong” [The Islamic community in Qinghai province strongly forges the common consciousness of the Chinese nation, and the fourth “wo’erzi” tour propaganda event was launched], October 18, 2021; “Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu ‘Yisilan Zhongguohua’” [The government organizes an Islamic preaching group to enter mosques to accelerate the “sinicization of Islam”], *Radio Free Asia*, October 26, 2021.

²⁹“Zhengfu zuzhi Yisilan xuanjiang tuan jinzhu qingzhensi jiasu ‘Yisilan Zhongguohua’” [The government organizes an Islamic preaching group to enter mosques to accelerate the “sinicization of Islam”], *Radio Free Asia*, October 26, 2021.

³⁰James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. See also Alexandra Grey and Gegentuu Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021. For more information on the fall 2020 protests, see CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 117–19.

³¹Alexandra Grey and Gegentuu Baioud, “Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021; Liselotte Mas, “Cultural Assimilation of Mongolians in China: ‘We Could Be the Next Uyghurs,’” *Observers—France* 24, September 3, 2021.

³²*Growing Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in Today’s China*, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Enghedatu Toghochog, Director, Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center).

³³James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.

³⁴James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. See also Linda Lew, “Inner Mongolia’s Old Order Makes Way as Outsider Takes Over as Chairwoman,” *South China Morning Post*, August 5, 2021.

³⁵James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu shishi “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzhi Fa” Banfa* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the “PRC Standard Spoken and Written Language Law”], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022.

³⁶Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Menggu Yuyan Wenzhi Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations

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on Mongolian Spoken and Written Language Work], passed November 26, 2004, effective May 1, 2005; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Minzu Jiaoyu Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Ethnic Education], passed September 29, 2016, effective November 1, 2016; James Leibold, "The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown," *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.

³⁷Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Menggu Yuyan Wenzhi Gongzuo Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Mongolian Spoken and Written Language Work], passed November 26, 2004, effective May 1, 2005, arts. 16–29; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Minzu Jiaoyu Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Ethnic Education], passed September 29, 2016, effective November 1, 2016, arts. 22–27, 36–47; James Leibold, "The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown," *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.

³⁸Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Jiaoyu Tiaoli* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Regulations], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, arts. 8–10; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Shishi "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongyong Yuyan Wenzhi Fa" Banfa* [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Measures on the Implementation of the "PRC Standard Spoken and Written Language Law"], passed September 29, 2021, effective January 1, 2022, arts. 1–4, 7–15, 18–26; James Leibold, "The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown," *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.

³⁹Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, "Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC," *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; James Leibold, "The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown," *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021. See also Liselotte Mas, "Cultural Assimilation of Mongolians in China: 'We Could Be the Next Uyghurs,'" *Observers—France* 24, September 3, 2021. For more information on education reforms in primary and secondary schools in the IMAR, see CECC, *2021 Annual Report*, March 2022, 117–19.

⁴⁰Alexandra Grey and Gegentuul Baioud, "Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC," *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2021; Inner Mongolia University Admissions Network, "Nei Menggu Daxue 2020 nian benke zhaosheng laiyuan jihua biao" [Inner Mongolia University sourcing plan chart for undergraduate admissions in 2020], June 29, 2020; Inner Mongolia University Admissions Network, "Nei Menggu Daxue 2021 nian benke zhaosheng laiyuan jihua biao" [Inner Mongolia University sourcing plan chart for undergraduate admissions in 2021], June 16, 2021.

⁴¹"Nei Menggu chutai shenhua gaozhuan jiafen gaige gongzuo shishi fang'an" [Inner Mongolia issues an implementation plan for deepening the reform of college entrance examination bonus points], Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Bureau of Education, reprinted in *The Paper*, September 15, 2021; James Leibold, "The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping's Mongolian Crackdown," *China Leadership Monitor* 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021.