

POPULATION CONTROL

Findings

- People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities rejected calls to end birth restrictions, even though experts raised demographic, economic, and human rights concerns about official population control policies. In August 2021, the National People’s Congress amended the PRC Population and Family Planning Law from a two-child policy to a three-child policy based on a policy change announced by the Chinese Communist Party in May 2021. The amended law also abolished “social maintenance fees,” onerous government fines for exceeding birth limits under the one- and two-child birth limit policies. The government’s enforcement of birth limits has included forced abortion and sterilization.
- PRC authorities have used draconian population control measures targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), including detention in mass internment camps, forced abortions, and forced sterilizations. This past year, research by scholar Adrian Zenz found that policies implemented since 2017 had “drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic [minority] groups.” A historian said the government’s claim of a regional population increase from 2010 to 2020 was a “distortion” aimed at masking population suppression. At the same time that PRC authorities have encouraged higher birth rates among Han Chinese women, they have continued to perform forced abortions and sterilizations among ethnic minority women in the XUAR, a practice that one expert described as carrying a “strong undertone of eugenics.”
- The government’s population control policies have exacerbated China’s sex ratio imbalance; these policies have been linked to the ongoing trafficking of women for purposes of forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. The plight of trafficked women received considerable public attention following media reports in January 2022 about a woman found chained and malnourished in a shed in Jiangsu province, who reportedly was a victim of bride trafficking.
- A 2022 report found that many women, perhaps thousands, who suffered injuries from botched or untested sterilization and other procedures under the one-child policy, had sought redress for their injuries to no avail.
- Observers posited that, consistent with the coercive nature of the PRC’s past population policies, new policies aimed at raising birth rates might give rise to coerced procreation which would be a violation of human rights.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- In bilateral meetings, urge PRC government officials to abolish and forgo all birth restrictions on families, and instead employ an approach based on international human rights law and

Population Control

norms, including treaties signed or ratified by China, to provide the Chinese people the freedom to build their families as they wish.

- Urge PRC authorities to end all coercive population control practices targeting Uyghur and other ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and elsewhere. Use authorities provided in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law No. 106-113) and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328) to deny Chinese officials entry into the United States and impose sanctions on officials involved in the formulation, implementation, or enforcement of coercive population control policies, including those officials who have forced women to undergo sterilizations and abortions in the XUAR and elsewhere.

- Support the Uyghur Stop Oppressive Sterilizations Act (H.R. 3306), which imposes sanctions on individuals responsible for or complicit in forced sterilizations and forced abortions in the XUAR.

- Call on PRC central and local governments to provide redress to citizens who suffered adverse health effects from procedures performed under the one-child policy.

- Publicly link and address in bilateral dialogues the sex ratio imbalance exacerbated by PRC population control policies with regional humanitarian and security concerns—human trafficking, crime, increased internal and external migration, and other social, economic, and political problems.

- Urge PRC officials to reform the household registration (*hukou*) system in order to extend public services to the millions of persons born outside of the one- or two-child policies who still lack access to education, medical care, legal protection of their human rights, and other government services.

POPULATION CONTROL

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party and government began to relax the country's population control policy around 2012–2013.¹ A decade of incremental loosening of the policy with the expectation of raising the birth rate, however, has not brought the forecasted increase in new births. After years of warnings by experts, the government now acknowledges that the aging population combined with the below-replacement birth rate over the past five years presents a “serious challenge.”² To address this, the central government adopted a three-child policy in 2021, but its implementation at the local levels thus far seems uneven. While the policy seeks to increase the majority Han Chinese population, the government is concurrently implementing birth control methods against ethnic minority communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as part of its broad policy to repress Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups.

International Standards and the PRC's Coercive Population Policies

Despite calls in recent years from experts and other observers to remove all birth limits in China on both demographic and human rights grounds³ and domestic proposals aimed at increasing the number of births,⁴ the Party and government continued to implement a coercive birth limit policy—the new three-child policy—that violates international standards.⁵ Coercive controls imposed on women and their families, as well as additional abuses engendered by the PRC population and family planning system, violate standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development.⁶ China was a state participant in the negotiation and adoption of both documents.⁷ Acts of official coercion committed in the implementation of population control policies also contravene provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,⁸ which China has ratified.⁹

In response to demographic concerns,¹⁰ the Party Central Committee Political Bureau announced a new three-child policy in May 2021—a change from the two-child policy that had been in effect since 2016¹¹—and in August 2021 the National People's Congress Standing Committee amended the 2015 PRC Population and Family Planning Law, allowing couples to have three children and abolishing “social maintenance fees,” onerous fines that were imposed on couples who had children in violation of the one- and two-child birth policies.¹² The one-child policy, in force from 1980 until 2016, restricted most couples to one child.¹³ It was enforced by the National Health and Family Planning Commission, often using fines, forced sterilizations, and forced abortions.¹⁴

Population Control

Suppression of Population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

In recent years, Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Turkic Muslim women who were formerly detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR have reported being subjected to coercive birth control measures, including forced insertion of intrauterine devices (IUDs), forced sterilization, and forced abortion.¹⁵ This past year, research by scholar Adrian Zenz found that policies implemented by authorities since 2017 had “drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic [minority] groups.”¹⁶ Two authors who published research in 2021 on population suppression in the XUAR observed that as Party officials are loosening population control rules on Han women, they are simultaneously “cracking down” on the rights of Uyghur and other ethnic minority communities to have children, because of “perceived fears of instability and uneven growth.”¹⁷ A historian commented that the State Council Information Office’s claim in a white paper published in September 2021, that the Uyghur population in Xinjiang increased from 2010 to 2020, is a “distortion” that ignores the decline from 2017 onwards when “Uyghur births were brutally suppressed.”¹⁸ At the same time that the PRC has encouraged higher birth rates among Han Chinese women, it has continued to perform forced abortions and sterilizations among ethnic minority women in the XUAR, a practice that one expert described as carrying a “strong undertone of eugenics.”¹⁹ [For more information on forcible population control measures used against ethnic minority families in the XUAR, see Section X—Xinjiang.]

The Three-Child Policy

On May 31, 2021, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau announced plans for a three-child policy in response to demographic concerns,²⁰ replacing the two-child policy in effect since 2016, which had not significantly increased birth rates.²¹ In July 2021, the State Council released a more detailed decision, clarifying that the policy allows married couples to have three children and will “cancel restrictive measures,” “cleanup and abolish relevant penalties,” and “implement active childbearing support measures,” in an effort to increase birth rates.²² The decision also said the new policy aims to achieve a more balanced sex ratio and population structure by 2025.²³ The National People’s Congress Standing Committee in August 2021 amended the 2015 PRC Population and Family Planning Law, allowing couples to have three children and abolishing “social maintenance fees,” onerous fines that were imposed on couples who had children in violation of the one- and two-child birth policies.²⁴

The Three-Child Policy—Continued

Following the new policy announcement, experts asked why the government refused to completely remove birth limits;²⁵ demographers pointed to several factors including government concerns about uneven regional growth and the growth of ethnic minority populations.²⁶ One expert commented, “Despite all the overwhelming demographic evidence, they’re saying, ‘We need to control you.’”²⁷ The human rights non-governmental organization Amnesty International said that the PRC’s adoption of a three-child policy in response to the demographic crisis is still a violation of people’s right to decide how many children to have.²⁸

The State Council’s decision further specified that the government would enact tax breaks, provide other support services, lower costs for raising children, and protect the rights of women in employment.²⁹ Sources noted that many couples, urban and rural, said that even with the policy change they did not plan to have more children, as many found the financial difficulties involved in raising a child prohibitive.³⁰ Some women said that the likelihood of negative effects on their careers also discouraged them from having children.³¹ Observers noted that permission to have children remained limited to married couples; although unmarried women are not explicitly prohibited from giving birth, they cannot obtain official permission to do so.³² According to the most recent report observed by the Commission, Guangdong province was the only location that allowed unmarried women to submit applications for maternity insurance, while in other places unmarried women could still be fined or penalized for having a child.³³ [For more information on official restrictions on childbearing for unmarried women, see Section VI—Status of Women.]

Government Efforts to Increase Births

Central and local-level officials held discussions and made proposals on ways to implement the new three-child policy, including language for possible propaganda aimed at increasing births.³⁴ Some of these proposals elicited negative reactions on social media from citizens.³⁵ One county reportedly collected information from single women to be used in a matchmaking database.³⁶ A study from a research institute in India found that many rural women in China do not want to get married, but officials “encourage” young women to be “baby makers” and “bring warmth” to unmarried, aging rural men.³⁷ Some international commenters posited that the government may introduce forced procreation to achieve its demographic goals;³⁸ thousands in China responded with “shock and indignation” online to an opinion piece that said Party members have an obligation to marry and have three children.³⁹ During the March 2022 meeting of the PRC National People’s Congress, delegates reportedly made numerous proposals to increase the birth rate, some of which were mocked on Chinese social media.⁴⁰ Noting the inconsistency of birth-limit policies over time, one social media user reportedly commented, “This is crazy . . . forced sterilization and abortion . . . now three children. Are women just machines?”⁴¹

Population Control

Authorities' plans to increase the birth rate were linked to women's and men's fertility and reproductive health. The State Council in September 2021 issued an Outline on the Development of Women (2021–2030) that included a section on women's reproductive health, promoting more health checkups for women before and after getting married, and increasing sex education in the schools.⁴² Additionally, the Outline included a directive stating the aim of reducing "medically unnecessary" abortions,⁴³ but did not specify how to accomplish this goal.⁴⁴ The China Family Planning Association, in its 2022 work plan, directed its offices throughout the country to conduct educational outreach to young people and people of childbearing age, one goal of which is to reduce the number of abortions among unmarried young people.⁴⁵ A U.S.-based commentator cautioned that the government would need to launch a range of reform-oriented government measures in order to reduce the number of abortions among young people, and raised a concern that fostering an increase in the birth rate would not necessarily prevent illegal sex-selective abortions and abandoned children.⁴⁶ The lack of specific guidance on raising the birth rate reportedly has fostered uncertainty among hospitals and medical practitioners regarding men's fertility and reproductive health, as demonstrated by reports that some regional hospitals in China had stopped performing vasectomies as a result of the three-child birth policy.⁴⁷ While vasectomies are not explicitly prohibited by the three-child policy, observers raised concerns that the government might turn to coercive measures to increase births in the future.⁴⁸ Mei Fong of Human Rights Watch testified before the Commission in March 2022 that "Beijing's early approach to a demographic decline appear to be more stick than carrot, with growing curbs on divorce and abortion."⁴⁹

After the release of the national policy decision in July 2021, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference called for equal treatment for children born to single women and advocated for permission for all women over 30 to freeze their eggs.⁵⁰ At the subnational level, officials in various locations implemented or proposed specific plans to encourage more births, including:

- Exceeding the national baseline of 98 days of maternity leave, at least two provinces (Henan and Hainan) gave 190 days, others 158 days,⁵¹ while some increased these amounts for second or third children;⁵²
- Some local governments offered financial incentives, including cash and housing subsidies, for couples who gave birth to second and third children;⁵³ and
- Officials in Xiangyin county, Yueyang municipality, Hunan province, aimed to change rural practices by discouraging expensive wedding customs, encouraging young women to stay in rural areas, creating matchmaking services, helping couples obtain housing, and improving wages and training for workers.⁵⁴

Population Control

Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy

The legacy of the one-child policy continues to negatively affect many in China. A 2021 sociological study that focused on the human impact of the policy concluded, “[T]he one-child policy was an unnecessary and catastrophic blunder, and because of it, many did not get the chance to be born to see the world today.”⁵⁵ Some Chinese people in July 2021 spoke of the still painful memories of abuses suffered under the one-child policy, including forcible abortions, having their children killed just after live birth, being beaten, kidnapped, or threatened with violence to force them to abort their children, or going into hiding to give birth; one expressed fear of harassment for speaking of past abuses.⁵⁶ Another story that emerged in December 2021, in which a man in his 30s who was abducted at age 4 was reunited with his family after more than three decades, also pointed to a link between the one-child policy and an increased incidence of child abduction.⁵⁷

The following are some additional long-term harmful effects of the enforcement of, and social pressures created or exacerbated by, China’s population control policies.

CHILDREN DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES

A 2019 study found that about 13 million people—at least 60 percent (approximately 7.8 million) of whom were born in violation of China’s population control policies—did not have official registration (*hukou*), and therefore lacked access to public services and faced difficulties in protecting their rights.⁵⁸ Of these, the majority were children, who were blocked from accessing medical care, education, and other services.⁵⁹ Many of these unregistered children were born to migrant worker parents who left them in rural villages while they worked in cities where the children could not be registered in schools, giving rise to the phenomenon of “left-behind children.”⁶⁰ Studies have described hardships faced by these children, including educational and societal discrimination, and mental health challenges, among others.⁶¹ [For information on the status of children born in China to North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers, see Section VIII—North Korean Refugees.]

DENIAL OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY

Government authorities continued to deny access to justice to women who suffered harm under the one- and two-child policies. Under the one-child policy, botched procedures and poor medical care caused permanent disabilities including loss of fertility for many women.⁶² The hardships of avoiding detection by officials during pregnancy meant forgoing adequate medical care.⁶³ One source reported that IUD removals, a practice encouraged under the two-child policy, also carried risks.⁶⁴ An April 2022 report said that many Chinese women, possibly in the thousands, who suffered adverse health effects resulting from sterilizations or other botched or untested procedures administered under the one- and two-child policies, had sought redress for their injuries to no avail.⁶⁵ One woman reported that among hundreds of women she knew who were injured from forced or coerced sterilization drugs, some died, and others, like herself, were permanently disabled and unable to

Population Control

care for their children.⁶⁶ In one case, a woman in Anhui province suffered perforated internal organs during a botched IUD insertion in 2013, but no hospital would help her “because of the association with the family planning regime.”⁶⁷ Two women interviewed by Radio Free Asia said they gave up petitioning for redress, one because of “exhaustion” and “official violence,” and one from fear of harm to her children’s careers.⁶⁸

CONTINUING EFFECTS OF THE SEX RATIO IMBALANCE

The government’s restrictive population control policies have exacerbated the sex ratio imbalance in China caused by the cultural preference for having a son, which has led to the abortion of unborn females.⁶⁹ This has caused a shortage of women of marriageable age—referred to as “missing women”—that observers have linked to the trafficking of women within China and from abroad into China for purposes of forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.⁷⁰

A study published in September 2021 found that the phenomenon of millions of missing women created competition for potential brides that has led parents whose sons were of marriageable age to seek higher paying, more dangerous jobs for themselves in order to help their sons attract a mate.⁷¹ In response, some employers have neglected workplace safety, resulting in more workplace fatalities.⁷² One writer said that the sex ratio imbalance has led to higher property prices in cities because many parents have bought apartments for their sons to help them attract a spouse in a marriage market with “millions of missing women.”⁷³ The writer predicted that these deleterious economic effects “will be felt in the generation ahead.”⁷⁴

The plight of trafficked women in China, including women with disabilities, received widespread media coverage this past year. Reports in January 2022 about a woman who was found chained and malnourished in a shed in Jiangsu province prompted widespread discussion of the treatment of women, including the role of the one-child policy in engendering the trafficking of women.⁷⁵ The woman reportedly had been forced to marry a local farmer in rural Jiangsu province with whom she had eight children.⁷⁶ [For more information, see Section VI—Status of Women and Human Trafficking, and Section VIII—Public Health.]

Declining Birth Rates

Experts and economists continued to predict that declining birth rates, which fell for a fifth straight year to new lows in 2021,⁷⁷ would bring a demographic crisis—one called it a “long-term time bomb”—unless the trend is reversed.⁷⁸ At least six provincial-level regions experienced a decline in the number of permanent residents in 2021, caused in part by fewer births.⁷⁹ These include Beijing municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Henan, Hebei, Jiangxi, and Gansu provinces.⁸⁰ The greatest decline in the number of births occurred in Shandong province, which in 2016 saw the highest number of births nationwide, but has dropped by 57.6 percent in five years.⁸¹ The former Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and member of the Monetary Pol-

Population Control

icy Committee of the People's Bank of China, Cai Fang, said that China's population growth was near zero, and that the total population may peak in 2022.⁸² The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported an overall population increase of 480,000 people in 2021, totaling 1.4126 billion, up from 1.412 billion a year ago.⁸³ One expert expressed shock that the natural growth rate dropped to 0.34 per thousand, falling below 1.0 for the first time, indicating that the population is aging faster than expected.⁸⁴

Notes to Section VI—Population Control

¹Sui-Lee Wee, “China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2021.

²State Council, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding* [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021.

³Ren Zeping, “Ren Zeping: quanmian er hai hou faner chuxian shengyu duanya, ying liji quanmian fangkai bing guli shengyu” [Ren Zeping: following the universal two-child policy, a fertility drop-off nevertheless appears; [the policy] should be fully relaxed immediately and fertility should be encouraged], *Yicai*, February 3, 2021; Keith Zhai, “China Considers Lifting All Childbirth Restrictions by 2025,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 18, 2021; Amnesty International, “China: ‘Three-Child Policy’ Still a Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,” May 31, 2021; Sui-Lee Wee, “China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2021.

⁴Luna Sun, “Chinese Economist Ren Zeping Banned from Posting on Weibo After Comments on Financing Childbirth Stir Controversy,” *South China Morning Post*, January 13, 2022; “Political Advisor Proposes to Allow Unmarried Women Aged Over 30 with One Child to Gain Access to Maternity Leave, Insurance,” *Global Times*, March 5, 2022.

⁵Amnesty International, “China: ‘Three-Child Policy’ Still a Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,” May 31, 2021; Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, paras. 9, 17, 96. The Beijing Declaration states that governments that participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their commitment to “[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Annex I, para. 9); and “[t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment” (Annex I, para. 17); and “[t]he human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.” (Annex I, para. 96). United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 1.15, 7.2, 7.6, 8.25. Paragraph 1.15 states, “While the International Conference on Population and Development does not create any new international human rights, it affirms the application of universally recognized human rights standards to all aspects of population programmes.” Paragraph 7.2 states, “Reproductive health therefore implies that people . . . have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice” Paragraph 7.6 states, “Reproductive health care in the context of primary health care should, inter alia, include: family-planning counselling, information, education, communication and services; education and services for prenatal care, safe delivery and post-natal care, especially breast-feeding and infant and women’s health care; prevention and appropriate treatment of infertility; abortion as specified in paragraph 8.25, including prevention of abortion and the management of the consequences of abortion” Paragraph 8.25 states, “In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.”

⁶Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by UN General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 23, 1996, Annex I, paras. 9, 17; United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25.

⁷United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev. 1, September 15, 1995, chap. II, para. 3; chap. VI, para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the Fourth World Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. United Nations, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), A/CONF.171/13/Rev. 1, September 13, 1994, chap. II, sec. C; chap. VI, para. 1.

⁸Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987, art. 1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at Its 1391st and 1392d Meetings (2–3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 2016, para. 51. In 2016, the UN Committee against Torture noted its concern regarding “reports of coerced sterilization and forced abortions, and . . . the lack of information on the number of investigations into such allegations . . . [and] the lack of information regarding redress provided to victims of past violations.” For acts of coercion committed in the implementation of population planning policies, see, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid Association, “Xinjiang Muslim woman in Xinjiang underwent forced abortion, her brother, a Muslim imam, detained as retaliation,” February 4, 2018.

⁹United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, last visited July 5, 2022. China signed the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.

¹⁰“Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile” [Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], *Xinhua*, May 31, 2021; Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

Population Control

¹¹“Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile” [Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], *Xinhua*, May 31, 2021; Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

¹²*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa* [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended and effective August 20, 2021; Laney Zhang, “China: Three-Child Policy Becomes Law, Social Maintenance Fee Abolished,” *Global Legal Monitor*, Library of Congress, September 23, 2021; Peter Ford, “As China Ends One-Child Policy, Illegally Born Kids Ask: ‘What About Us?’,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 8, 2015.

¹³Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

¹⁴Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022. The National Health and Family Planning Commission was preceded by the National Population and Family Planning Commission. Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

¹⁵See, e.g., Amy Qin, “China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, May 10, 2021; Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone: Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,” *BBC*, February 2, 2021; Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “Allegations of Shackled Students and Gang Rape inside China’s Detention Camps,” *CNN*, February 19, 2021; “Kazakhs Speak Out about Rape in China’s Xinjiang Camps,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 10, 2021; Asim Kashgarian, “China Uses Rape as Torture Tactic against Uighur Detainees, Victims Say,” *Voice of America*, February 9, 2021. XUAR authorities have also used coercive birth control measures on minority women who have not been detained in camps. See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, “End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang,” *Central Asian Survey* 40, no. 3 (2021): 293–94.

¹⁶Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 5.

¹⁷Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, “Family De-planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *Policy Brief Report* No. 44 (2021): 3. See also Amy Qin, “China Targets Muslim Women in Push to Suppress Births in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, updated September 23, 2021.

¹⁸“China’s Xinjiang Population Growth Report Raises Eyebrows,” *Radio Free Asia*, September 30, 2021; Rian Thum (@RianThum), “Chinese gov has a new white paper out focused on Xinjiang population. Its central distortion is to say Uyghur pop. increased from 2010 to 2020 (it did), when” Twitter, September 26, 2021, 5:42 p.m.; State Council Information Office, “Xinjiang de Renkou Fazhan” [Xinjiang’s Population Development], September 2021, reprinted in *Xinhua*, September 26, 2021.

¹⁹*The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender Inequality, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 117th Cong. (2022) (testimony of Dr. Leta Hong Fincher, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Columbia University), 3.

²⁰“Quanwei kuaibao: san hai shengyu zhengce laile” [Authoritative announcement: three-child policy has arrived], *Xinhua*, May 31, 2021.

²¹Sui-Lee Wee, “China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2021.

²²State Council, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding* [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], *Xinhua*, July 20, 2021.

²³State Council, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding* [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021.

²⁴*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa* [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended and effective August 20, 2021; Laney Zhang, “China: Three-Child Policy Becomes Law, Social Maintenance Fee Abolished,” *Global Legal Monitor*, Library of Congress, September 23, 2021; Peter Ford, “As China Ends One-Child Policy, Illegally Born Kids Ask: ‘What About Us?’,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 8, 2015.

²⁵Cissy Zhou, “China Population: Why Did Beijing Opt for a Three-Child Policy When It Could Scrap Birth Caps Altogether?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 4, 2021; Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021.

²⁶Cissy Zhou, “China Population: Why Did Beijing Opt for a Three-Child Policy When It Could Scrap Birth Caps Altogether?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 4, 2021.

²⁷Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021.

²⁸Amnesty International, “China: ‘Three-Child Policy’ Still a Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,” May 31, 2021.

²⁹State Council, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding* [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021; “Xinhua Headlines: China Unveils Details of Three-Child Policy, Support Measures,” *Xinhua*, July 21, 2021.

³⁰Greg James, “Average Cost of Raising a Child in Urban China Hits Almost \$100,000,” *SupChina*, February 23, 2022; Liang Jianzhang et al., “Liang Jianzhang: Zhongguo shengyu

Population Control

chengben baogao 2022 ban” [Liang Jianzhang: China’s childbearing cost report 2022 edition], *Sina Finance*, February 22, 2022; Kang Bing, “Many Challenges Facing New Family Planning Policy,” *China Daily*, November 2, 2021. See also Ni Dandan, “What China’s Parents Really Think about the Three-Child Policy,” *Sixth Tone*, August 30, 2021.

³¹Luna Sun, “China’s Working Mothers Struggle with Career Setbacks and Discrimination, Finding ‘Balance Is a False Premise,’” *South China Morning Post*, July 29, 2021. See also Wang Qingkai, “Baogao cheng jin jiucheng shou diaoyan yihun nuxing qiuzhi bei wenguo shengyu jihua” [Report says nearly 90 percent of the surveyed married women were asked about their family planning when applying for jobs], *China News Service*, November 16, 2020; Greg James, “Motherhood Is Still a Career Killer for Chinese Women, New Research Finds,” *SupChina*, November 16, 2020.

³²Alice Yan, “Call for China to Support Single Women Over 30 to Give Birth to One Child as Country’s Population Ages,” *South China Morning Post*, March 8, 2022.

³³Vivian Wang, “For China’s Single Mothers, a Road to Recognition Paved with False Starts,” *New York Times*, May 31, 2021.

³⁴See, e.g., State Council, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu Youhua Shengyu Zhengce Cujin Renkou Changqi Junheng Fazhan de Jueding* [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-Term Balanced Development of the Population], July 20, 2021; Zhu Ningning, “Ruhe youhua shengyu baozhang jianshao houguozhiyou” [How to optimize maternity safeguards and reduce worries about future consequences], *Legal Daily*, December 28, 2021; Sui-Lee Wee, “China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up from 2,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2021; He Huifeng, “China Population: Economic Powerhouse Guangdong Aims to Add 1 Million Residents a Year, Even as Birth Rate Keeps Falling,” *South China Morning Post*, February 23, 2021.

³⁵Ji Siqi, “China Population: County Sparks Uproar by Telling ‘Leftover’ Women to Marry Unemployed Men,” *South China Morning Post*, January 28, 2022; Phoebe Zhang, “‘Have Babies or Go to Jail’: China’s Internet Mocks 3-Child Policy Slogan Call,” *South China Morning Post*, August 6, 2021.

³⁶Ji Siqi, “China Population: County Sparks Uproar by Telling ‘Leftover’ Women to Marry Unemployed Men,” *South China Morning Post*, January 28, 2022.

³⁷Hemant Adlakha, “Women in China: ‘Baby Makers’ and ‘Bed Warmers?’,” Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, November 2021, 15. See also Zhu Yonghua, “Shei jie nongcun daling nan qingnian ze’ou nan” [Who can solve the difficulty of choosing a mate for older men in rural areas?], *Voice of China*, October 7, 2021.

³⁸Adam Minter, “As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What’s Next,” *Bloomberg*, December 16, 2021; Gordon Chang, “Opinion: Is Forced Procreation Coming to China?,” *Newsweek*, June 8, 2021. See also answers posted by users on March 28, 2018 and December 25, 2021, “Weile shengyulu: shifou keyi caiqu qiangzhi jihua shengyu cuoshi, zuizhong dadao shengyulu zengzhang mubiao . . .” [For the sake of birth rates, might [the government] adopt forcible family planning measures, finally achieve its fertility growth target . . .?], Zhihu [a Chinese Q&A website modeled on Quora], accessed May 5, 2022.

³⁹Luna Sun, “China Population: Article Demanding Communist Party Members Have Three Children Goes Viral,” *South China Morning Post*, December 9, 2021.

⁴⁰Brenda Goh and Albee Zhang, “Union Matchmakers a Turn-off, Say Chinese Web Users as Birth Rate Debate Heats Up,” *Reuters*, March 9, 2022.

⁴¹Brenda Goh and Albee Zhang, “Union Matchmakers a Turn-off, Say Chinese Web Users as Birth Rate Debate Heats Up,” *Reuters*, March 9, 2022.

⁴²State Council, “Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021–2031 nian)” [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021–2030)], issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6).

⁴³State Council, “Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021–2030 nian)” [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021–2030)], issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6); Vivian Wang, “China’s Vow to Reduce Abortions Sparks Public Worries,” *New York Times*, September 27, 2021; Zhong Yuhao, “Zhongguo Jishengxie: Jinnian kaizhan weihun renqun rengong liuchan ganyu zhuanxiang xingdong” [China Family Planning Association: This year, we will launch a special campaign for abortion intervention for unmarried people], *The Paper*, February 9, 2022; Mimi Lau, “China’s Family Planning Agency Says It Will ‘Intervene’ in Abortions for Unmarried Women, Teens,” *South China Morning Post*, February 11, 2022.

⁴⁴State Council, “Zhongguo Funu Fazhan Gangyao (2021–2030 nian)” [Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021–2030)], issued September 8, 2021, sec. 2(1.6).

⁴⁵“Zhongguo Jihua Shengyu Xiehui 2022 nian gongzuo yaodian” [China Family Planning Association key work for 2022], January 27, 2022; Qiao Long and Chingman, “China Orders ‘Interventions’ to Prevent Teen and Single-Parent Abortions,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 10, 2022; Zhong Yuhao, “Zhongguo Jishengxie: Jinnian kaizhan weihun renqun rengong liuchan ganyu zhuanxiang xingdong” [China Family Planning Association: This year, we will launch a special campaign for abortion intervention for unmarried people], *The Paper*, February 9, 2022.

⁴⁶Yi Fuxian, “China’s Abortion Problem Can’t Be Regulated Away,” *Project Syndicate*, April 14, 2022.

⁴⁷Adam Minter, “As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What’s Next,” *Bloomberg*, December 16, 2021. See also Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, and Lily Kuo, “In Need of a Baby Boom, China Clamps Down on Vasectomies,” *Washington Post*, October 9, 2021.

⁴⁸Adam Minter, “As China Limits Vasectomies, Many Ask What’s Next,” *Bloomberg*, December 16, 2021. See also Alicia Chen, Lyric Li, and Lily Kuo, “In Need of a Baby Boom, China Clamps Down on Vasectomies,” *Washington Post*, October 9, 2021.

⁴⁹*The Future of Women in China: #MeToo, Censorship, and Gender Inequality*, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Congress, (2022) (testimony of Mei Fong, Chief Communications Officer, Human Rights Watch).

Population Control

⁵⁰Alice Yan, “Call for China to Support Single Women Over 30 to Give Birth to One Child as Country’s Population Ages,” *South China Morning Post*, March 8, 2022; “Political Advisor Proposes to Allow Unmarried Women Aged Over 30 with One Child to Gain Access to Maternity Leave, Insurance,” *Global Times*, March 5, 2022.

⁵¹Luna Sun, “China’s Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,” *South China Morning Post*, January 1, 2022.

⁵²Luna Sun, “China’s Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,” *South China Morning Post*, January 1, 2022.

⁵³Luna Sun, “China’s Population Crisis: 5 Ways Beijing Is Trying to Tackle a Worryingly Low Birth Rate,” *South China Morning Post*, January 1, 2022; “Chinese City Offers Subsidies to Families with Multiple Children,” *Xinhua*, July 28, 2021.

⁵⁴Zhong Yuhao, “Xiangyin, Hunan huiying ‘nongcun daling nan qingnian ze’ou nan’: guli nu qingnian liu zai jiaxiang” [Xiangyin, Hunan, responds to the ‘difficulty in choosing a spouse for older men in rural areas’: encouraging young women to stay in their hometowns], *The Paper*, October 5, 2021.

⁵⁵Yong Cai and Wang Feng, “The Social and Sociological Consequences of China’s One-Child Policy,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 47, no. 1 (2021): 601.

⁵⁶Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021.

⁵⁷Zhu Xuan, “Nanzi 4 sui bei guai 33 nian hou shouhui ditu zhaodao mama: xiang huijia shi yi zhong benneng” [Thirty-three years after being kidnapped as four-year-old boy, man uses a hand-drawn map to find his mom: wanting to return home is an instinct], *The Paper*, December 30, 2021; Jessie Yeung, “Map Drawn from Memory Helps Man Reunite with Family Decades after Abduction,” *CNN*, January 3, 2022.

⁵⁸Samantha A. Vortherms, “China’s Missing Children: Political Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,” *China Quarterly* 238 (June 2019): 309.

⁵⁹Samantha A. Vortherms, “China’s Missing Children: Political Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,” *China Quarterly* 238 (June 2019): 309.

⁶⁰Samantha A. Vortherms, “China’s Missing Children: Political Barriers to Citizenship through the Household Registration System,” *China Quarterly* 238 (June 2019): 309; Kam Wing Chan, “China’s Hukou Reform Remains a Major Challenge to Domestic Migrants in Cities,” *World Bank Blogs*, December 17, 2021. See also John James Kennedy and Yaojiang Shi, *Lost and Found: The “Missing Girls” in Rural China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 8–12.

⁶¹Calvin Oliver, “The Hukou Impact on the Welfare of Children,” *European Guanxi*, November 8, 2021.

⁶²Ayushi Singh Ahluwalia, “Impact of China’s One-Child Policy on Women,” *The Geopolitics*, July 23, 2021; Yong Cai and Wang Feng, “The Social and Sociological Consequences of China’s One-Child Policy,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 47 (2021): 593.

⁶³Ayushi Singh Ahluwalia, “Impact of China’s One-Child Policy on Women,” *The Geopolitics*, July 23, 2021; Yong Cai and Wang Feng, “The Social and Sociological Consequences of China’s One-Child Policy,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 47 (2021): 593.

⁶⁴Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022.

⁶⁵Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022.

⁶⁶Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022.

⁶⁷Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022.

⁶⁸Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 8, 2022.

⁶⁹Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021; Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2021.

⁷⁰Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, “Deadly Discrimination: Implications of ‘Missing Girls’ for Workplace Safety,” *Journal of Development Economics* 152, (September 2021): 1, 8; Cheryl Heng, “China Home to 30 Million Men in Search of a Bride, Census Shows,” *South China Morning Post*, May 17, 2021; Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Chained Woman Exposes Horror of Beijing’s One-Child Policy,” *Financial Times*, March 7, 2022. See also Heather Barr, “China’s Bride Trafficking Problem,” *The Diplomat*, October 30, 2019.

⁷¹Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, “Deadly Discrimination: Implications of ‘Missing Girls’ for Workplace Safety,” *Journal of Development Economics* 152, (September 2021): 1, 8.

⁷²Zhibo Tan, Shang-Jin Wei, and Xiaobo Zhang, “Deadly Discrimination: Implications of ‘Missing Girls’ for Workplace Safety,” *Journal of Development Economics* 152, (September 2021): 1.

⁷³Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021.

⁷⁴Emily Feng, “China’s Former 1-Child Policy Continues to Haunt Families,” *NPR*, July 4, 2021.

⁷⁵Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Chained Woman Exposes Horror of Beijing’s One-Child Policy,” *Financial Times*, March 8, 2022.

⁷⁶Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Chained Woman Exposes Horror of Beijing’s One-Child Policy,” *Financial Times*, March 8, 2022.

⁷⁷Orange Wang and Luna Sun, “China’s Population Up Less than Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,” *South China Morning Post*, February 4, 2022; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Wang Pingping: renkou zongliang baochi zengzhang

Population Control

chengzhenhua shuiping wenbu tisheng” [Wang Pingping: Total population has steadily increased and the level of urbanization has steadily risen], January 18, 2022; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Diqi ci quanguo renkou pucha zhuyao shuju qingkuang” [Main data of the seventh national census], May 11, 2021. For the total number of births reported for 2019, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2019 nian guomin jingji yunxing zongti pingwen fazhan zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiaohao shixian” [National economy was generally stable in 2019 with main projected targets for development achieved], January 17, 2020. For the total number of births reported for 2018, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2018 nian jingji yunxing baochi zai heli qujian fazhan de zhuyao yuqi mubiao jiao hao wancheng” [The economy moved within reasonable range in 2018, main expected development targets were reached], January 21, 2019. For the total number of births reported for 2017, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2017 nian jingji yunxing wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi” [The economy was stable in 2017, exceeding expectations], January 18, 2018. See also Robin Brant, “China Census: Data Shows Slowest Population Growth in Decades,” *BBC*, May 11, 2021.

⁷⁸Orange Wang and Luna Sun, “China’s Population Up Less than Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,” *South China Morning Post*, February 4, 2022; Sui-Lee Wee, “China’s ‘Long-Term Time Bomb’: Falling Births Stunt Population Growth,” *New York Times*, May 31, 2021; Ren Zeping, Xiong Chai, and Zhou Zhe, “Ren Zeping: Jianyi liji quanmian fangkai bing guli shengyu” [Ren Zeping: [(We) recommend immediate and complete liberalization and encouragement of childbearing], *Zeping Hongguan*, reprinted in *China Finance Online*, April 6, 2020; Fuxian Yi, “China’s Population Numbers Are Almost Certainly Inflated to Hide the Harmful Legacy of Its Family Planning Policy,” *South China Morning Post*, July 20, 2019.

⁷⁹“At Least 6 Chinese Provincial-Level Regions Show Declining Population in 2021,” *Global Times*, March 15, 2022.

⁸⁰“At Least 6 Chinese Provincial-Level Regions Show Declining Population in 2021,” *Global Times*, March 15, 2022.

⁸¹Lin Xiaozhao, “16 shengfen qunian chusheng renkou shuju chulu: Shandong 5 nian xiajiang 57.6%” [Last year’s birth data for 16 provinces released: Shandong dropped by 57.6 percent in 5 years], *China Business News*, March 20, 2022.

⁸²Yang Zhijin, “Yanghang huobi zhengce weiyuanhui weiyuan Cai Fang: 2022 nian Zhongguo renkou zongliang huo da fengzhi” [Cai Fang, member of the Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee: China’s population may peak in 2022], *21jingji.com*, March 19, 2022.

⁸³“Wang Pingping: renkou zongliang baochi zengzhang chengzhenhua shuiping wenbu tisheng” [Wang Pingping: Total population has steadily increased and the level of urbanization has steadily risen], *Economic Daily*, January 18, 2022; Orange Wang and Luna Sun, “China’s Population Up Less than Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,” *South China Morning Post*, January 17, 2022.

⁸⁴Orange Wang and Luna Sun, “China’s Population Up Less than Half a Million in 2021, Births Plunge Again as Crisis Deepens,” *South China Morning Post*, January 17, 2022. See also Orange Wang, “China Population: Forget 2 or 3 Kids, Getting Couples to Have the First ‘Most Pressing Problem,’” *South China Morning Post*, January 6, 2022.