

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The Chinese Communist Party Asserts Greater Control Over State and Society

In China's one-party, authoritarian political system,¹ the Chinese Communist Party maintains what one rights organization calls a "monopoly on political power."² The Party plays a leading role in state and society,³ restricting Chinese citizens' ability to exercise civil and political rights.⁴ Observers noted that the central role of the Party in governing the state appears to have strengthened since Xi Jinping became the Party General Secretary and President in November 2012 and March 2013, respectively,⁵ further "blurring" the lines between Party and government.⁶ In March 2017, Wang Qishan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) and the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said that "under the Party's leadership, there is only a division of labor between the Party and the government; there is no separation between the Party and the government."⁷

During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, under Xi's leadership, the Party demanded absolute loyalty from its members,⁸ directing and influencing politics and society at all levels, including in the military,⁹ economy,¹⁰ Internet,¹¹ civil society,¹² and family life.¹³ Furthermore, the Party continued to exert power over the judiciary,¹⁴ undermining the independence of courts and the rule of law in China, despite legal reform efforts.¹⁵ In September 2016, the State Council Information Office released the 2016–2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP).¹⁶ The HRAP subordinates the Chinese government's human rights policy to the ideological guidance of the Party,¹⁷ which the international organization Human Rights in China said is part of the Chinese government's efforts "to modify international human rights standards to fit China's conditions."¹⁸ In the HRAP, the Chinese government pledged to "continue to advance related legal preparations and pave the way for ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)."¹⁹ China signed the ICCPR in 1998²⁰ but has yet to ratify it, despite the government's expressed intent to do so.²¹

XI JINPING NAMED "CORE" OF THE PARTY

The Commission observed a continued emphasis on Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's leading role in guiding decisionmaking this past year. Following the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Sixth Plenum) in October 2016, the plenum communiqué named Xi the "core" (*hexin*) of the Party.²² Some observers viewed the Sixth Plenum as a "victory for Xi" over internal political opposition.²³ At the Sixth Plenum, the Party also announced that the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (19th Party Congress) would take place in Beijing municipality during the second half of 2017.²⁴ At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 2017, Premier Li Keqiang affirmed Xi as the "core" of the Party in his delivery of the State Council's report on the work of the govern-

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ment in 2016.²⁵ He noted that with the 19th Party Congress approaching, this would be “a year of great significance for advancing the cause of the Party,” and that the government would “put into practice the principles from . . . Xi Jinping’s major addresses and his new vision, thinking, and strategies for China’s governance.”²⁶ According to reports, the “core” title confers status to Xi as the foremost leader of China, signals to lower cadres to follow Xi’s policy guidance, and—despite reported signs of insecurity among the Party leadership²⁷—strengthens Xi’s ability to influence the appointment of the next generation of cadres at the 19th Party Congress.²⁸ One scholar, however, contended that Xi’s new “core” status signaled a strengthening of the Party’s collective leadership.²⁹ The composition of the Politburo Standing Committee is expected to change significantly at the 19th Party Congress as five of seven members reach the retirement age—based on precedent, not formal Party rules³⁰—of 68 or older in 2017.³¹

Anticorruption Campaign: Consolidating Party Discipline

This past year, President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping called for “strict governance” of the Party.³² Regulations and guidelines on intraparty supervision and behavioral standards released after the Sixth Plenum stressed that cadres at all levels must comply, especially those who hold leadership positions—including high-level officials in the Party Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee.³³ The Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) continued punishing high- and low-level Party officials for misconduct, targeting officials in the government,³⁴ military,³⁵ and state security apparatus.³⁶ In July 2017, CCDI authorities placed Sun Zhengcai, Party Secretary of Chongqing municipality and a Politburo member, under investigation for suspected discipline violations³⁷—a move that some international observers called a political decision by Xi to consolidate power ahead of the 19th Party Congress.³⁸ The CCDI also tightened supervision of its anticorruption investigators and staff to ensure stricter oversight of disciplinary enforcers.³⁹ In 2016, CCDI authorities reportedly administered disciplinary penalties for nearly 415,000 individuals.⁴⁰ The Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported that in 2016, a total of 47,650 people were investigated for crimes of professional misconduct.⁴¹ Courts at all levels reportedly finished adjudicating 45,000 cases involving 63,000 individuals related to corruption and bribery.⁴² In July 2017, the Party Central Committee amended the Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Inspection Work,⁴³ shifting the focus of Party supervision and inspection from fighting corruption to enforcing Party ideology and loyalty.⁴⁴

The Party and government are spearheading efforts to establish a new national supervisory commission for enforcing antigraft measures, a move that may result in further blurring and integration of Party and government functions.⁴⁵ In December 2016, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved a pilot project to set up supervisory commissions to oversee government conduct in Beijing municipality, Shanxi province, and Zhejiang province.⁴⁶ This multicity pilot project aimed to integrate corruption control officials from different institutions into one agen-

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cy to increase effectiveness.⁴⁷ Following the pilot projects, in January 2017, the CCDI announced plans to establish a new national commission in order to integrate all government officials who have authority to conduct Party and government disciplinary inspection into one institution.⁴⁸ The plan also called for the NPCSC to oversee the creation of a new leading small group (*lingdao xiaozu*) on deepening reform of national supervisory institutions.⁴⁹ A Chinese legal scholar said that the new commission may help to delineate the roles of investigators and prosecutors handling corruption cases and make anticorruption efforts “more systematic.”⁵⁰ The new commission, designed to “strengthen the Party’s united leadership over anticorruption work,”⁵¹ will merge anticorruption functions of the CCDI, Ministry of Supervision, and Supreme People’s Procuratorate and integrate roles among Party, government, and judicial institutions.⁵² Reports raise questions as to whether the new institution will administer *shuanggui*, the non-transparent and extralegal Party disciplinary process that requires Party members to appear for interrogation at a designated time and place.⁵³ Reports this past year indicate that officials tortured individuals detained under *shuanggui*;⁵⁴ and that authorities reportedly used confessions extracted through extralegal procedures during *shuanggui* in subsequent legal proceedings.⁵⁵ [For more information on *shuanggui*, see Section II—Criminal Justice.]

CORRUPTION REMAINS PREVALENT IN CHINA

Despite the anticorruption efforts directed by central Party officials, 83 percent of Chinese citizens reportedly perceived corrupt officials as a “big problem,” according to a 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center.⁵⁶ Transparency International ranked China 79 out of 176 countries in its 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, and gave China a score of 40 for its level of clean governance, with 100 being the highest possible score.⁵⁷ Local-level corruption reportedly remains common in rural China.⁵⁸ Local officials reportedly engaged in embezzlement,⁵⁹ land expropriation,⁶⁰ and forced demolition of homes.⁶¹ Some officials reportedly had ties to criminal syndicates that used intimidation and violence to extort money from villagers.⁶² In January 2017, at separate high-level meetings for their respective agencies, Wang Qishan, the Secretary of the CCDI,⁶³ and Cao Jianming, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP),⁶⁴ acknowledged problems of village-level corruption and indicated plans to tackle corruption among village officials and related criminal activities. The SPP subsequently issued an official directive instructing lower-level prosecutors to work with other government agencies and Party organizations to target “village tyrants,” a term that the SPP used to describe officials who are involved in corruption and violence against villagers.⁶⁵

Continued Crackdown on Free Speech, Association, and Assembly

Chinese authorities continued to harass, detain, and imprison advocates who exercised their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and demonstration. The following are representative cases from this reporting year:

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- Prior to the G20 Summit in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, in September 2016, authorities forcibly disappeared, detained, and sent on forced travel dozens of rights advocates, reportedly to prevent advocacy activities around the event.⁶⁶ On August 20, domestic security protection officers from Yueqing city, Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang, seized rights advocate **Chen Zongyao** (also known as Chen Chen) and his son **Chen Zhixiao** in Yueqing.⁶⁷ The two were preparing to travel to Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, prior to the G20 Summit in spite of authorities' requests that they not go to Suzhou or Hangzhou.⁶⁸ On August 22, officials criminally detained both men on suspicion of "obstructing official business," and formally arrested them on September 27.⁶⁹ On January 25, 2017, the Yueqing Municipal People's Court sentenced Chen Zongyao to 10 months' imprisonment, suspended for 1 year and 6 months, and Chen Zhixiao to 6 months' detention, suspended for 10 months.⁷⁰ Chen Zongyao reportedly had engaged in rights advocacy activities in the past.⁷¹

- In November 2016, authorities detained **Liu Feiyue**, founder of rights monitoring website Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW) and **Huang Qi**, founder of rights monitoring website 64 Tianwang.⁷² Authorities in Suizhou municipality, Hubei province, detained Liu on November 17 for allegedly accepting foreign funding to support CRLW⁷³ and arrested him on the charge of "inciting subversion of state power" on December 23.⁷⁴ Authorities from Mianyang and Neijiang cities and Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, detained Huang on November 28 and arrested him on the charge of "illegally providing state secrets overseas" on December 16.⁷⁵ Liu founded CRLW in 2006 to create a platform for reporting on prohibited topics, such as the detention of rights advocates, human rights violations, and political protests.⁷⁶ Established in 1998, 64 Tianwang is reportedly the first known Chinese human rights website and is an important source for independent reports on government conduct and human rights violations.⁷⁷

- **Zhao Suli**, the wife of **Qin Yongmin**, a founder of the banned China Democracy Party and chair of the domestic NGO China Human Rights Watch, remains missing after authorities in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, detained Zhao and Qin in January 2015.⁷⁸ In March 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that Zhao's family filed lawsuits in Wuhan and in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province, Zhao's birthplace, in attempts to determine her whereabouts.⁷⁹ Authorities in Wuhan have charged Qin with "subversion of state power" but have not tried him as of August 2017.⁸⁰

Authorities Arrest Author of Open Letter Recommending Replacement of Xi Jinping at 19th Party Congress

In April 2017, state security officials from Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, detained Zi Su, a Communist Party member and retired Yunnan Provincial Committee Party School instructor,⁸¹ and in June, formally arrested him on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power” after he published an open letter calling for direct intraparty elections and the replacement of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress.⁸² In May, authorities reportedly criminally detained Huang Jianping, Zhang Ai, and Shao Zhongguo on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”⁸³ and forcibly disappeared Huang Xiaomin⁸⁴ in connection with their support of Zi by writing essays or sharing the open letter online. Authorities also administratively detained Zhu Delong, former Capital Normal University professor who reportedly signed on to Zi’s open letter, in August after he criticized Xi Jinping on a social media platform.⁸⁵ Chengdu authorities previously detained Zi in October 2016 on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” for suspected ties to “foreign forces,”⁸⁶ later releasing him on bail in November 2016.⁸⁷

This past year, authorities persecuted individuals for participating in memorial events in remembrance of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Cases from this past year included:

- In April 2017, the Chengdu Municipal Procuratorate in Sichuan prosecuted **Fu Hailu, Chen Bing, Luo Fuyu, and Zhang Juanyong** for “inciting subversion of state power” in connection with images Fu posted online in 2016 showing satirically labeled liquor bottles commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen protests.⁸⁸ The four men have been in pretrial detention for over a year.⁸⁹
- On June 4, 2017, authorities from Zhuzhou municipality, Hunan province, summoned at least 10 individuals including **Guo Min, Guo Sheng, Chen Xiaoping, Chen Siming, Li Ming, Liu Zhen, Sun Huazhu, Wen Bo, Tang Yuchun, and Tang Xueyun** after they participated in an artistic commemoration of the 1989 Tiananmen protests,⁹⁰ later ordering 6 of them to serve 7 to 10 days’ administrative detention.⁹¹
- On June 5, 2017, authorities in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province, criminally detained **Shi Tingfu** and formally arrested him on July 6 on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” reportedly for giving a speech in front of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall while wearing a shirt that read “Don’t Forget June Fourth.”⁹² As of July, authorities detained Shi at the Yuhuatai District PSB Detention Center in Nanjing, where he reportedly suffered torture such as beating, sleep deprivation, and inadequate food.⁹³
- On June 4, 2017, police in Beijing municipality detained **Li Xiaoling** and later criminally charged her with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,”⁹⁴ for standing in front of Tiananmen Square while holding a sign that said “June 4th Journey To Shine a Light” and a picture of her eye, which she said was injured and rendered nearly blind by police in May.⁹⁵

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- On June 12, 2017, police in Beijing municipality detained petitioner **Ding Yajun** for posting a photo online of herself and other petitioners commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen protests.⁹⁶ A court in Heilongjiang province reportedly tried Ding on July 31 for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” but did not issue a judgment.⁹⁷

Lack of Substantial Political Liberalization

This past year, central Party authorities did not take any substantial steps toward political liberalization.⁹⁸ China’s Constitution declares China’s political system to be a socialist democracy with “multi-party cooperation” and “political consultation” under the leadership of the Communist Party.⁹⁹ This past year, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping praised the consultative system as uniquely “Chinese” and “socialist,” having developed under the Party’s leadership.¹⁰⁰ In the past, types of “consultation” have included intraparty input on decisions about Party cadre appointments, development projects at grassroots levels, and some comments on draft laws, as well as discussions between Party representatives and the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the eight “democratic” minor parties.¹⁰¹ According to one scholar, the CPPCC’s political influence is “minimal” and primarily serves to “legitimize” Party rule.¹⁰² Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, observed after a mission to China in August 2016 that, “Public participation . . . is a notion to which Chinese officials continue to subscribe, but it is invariably described very much in terms of participating in the implementation of pre-determined Party policies, rather than in the formulation or monitoring of those policies.”¹⁰³ Xinhua reported that at the annual political advisory meetings of the CPPCC and the National People’s Congress (“Two Sessions”) in March 2017, delegates “whole-heartedly” upheld the Party Central Committee with Xi as “core.”¹⁰⁴ International media and analysis reported that the 2017 Two Sessions “followed a tight script” with “no surprises,” and delegates affirmed their “unswerving loyalty” to Xi as “core” of the Party in the lead-up to the 19th Party Congress.¹⁰⁵

Local Elections in China’s One-Party State

Sources from this past year highlighted multiple instances in which officials interfered with or inhibited meaningful public participation in local elections,¹⁰⁶ demonstrating that China’s political institutions do not meet the standards for “genuine” elections outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁰⁷ and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.¹⁰⁸ This past year, villages and counties across China held local-level elections that take place once every five years.¹⁰⁹ A report from Rights Defense Network highlighted an increase in citizen participation, organizing, and rights awareness, but also noted official interference with local elections, including incidents where independent candidates were administratively and criminally detained, restricted in their freedom of movement, beaten, harassed, kidnapped, and held in soft detention.¹¹⁰ For example, on September 19, 2016, domestic

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security protection officers in Qidong county, Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, detained democracy advocate Guan Guilin, ordering him to serve 10 days' administrative detention on suspicion of "obstructing elections" after he reportedly attempted to register as an independent candidate for the Qidong County People's Congress election.¹¹¹ Following Guan's administrative detention, authorities did not release him and instead criminally detained him on suspicion of "organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law,"¹¹² releasing him on October 29.¹¹³ In November 2016, public security officials in Dongxihu district, Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, ordered Gao Hongwei, Jia Fuquan, and Zeng Shouyun to serve nine days' administrative detention on the basis of "harming voters' ability to exercise their right to vote" and "disrupting the order of elections."¹¹⁴ Gao, Jia, and Zeng had set up a booth in Dongxihu to distribute flyers and campaign for votes as independent candidates in the local people's congress election.¹¹⁵ In November 2016, police from Shanghai municipality administratively detained five campaign assistants of Shanghai candidate Feng Zhenghu for five days, accusing them of "disrupting the order of elections."¹¹⁶

Crackdown on Wukan Village Protesters

Public security authorities and riot police cracked down on protests that arose after authorities detained Lin Zulian, chief of Wukan village, Donghai subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province, in June 2016.¹¹⁷ Wukan residents elected Lin, an advocate for the return of land to villagers, to the village committee in 2012 in a special election¹¹⁸ and reelected him in 2015.¹¹⁹ On and around September 13, 2016, international news media reported that security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters, a move reportedly ordered by Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua,¹²⁰ that resulted in serious injuries to villagers.¹²¹ Police forces interrogated, expelled, or barred reporters from the village,¹²² blocked access to the village,¹²³ and detained villagers,¹²⁴ including at least one Internet user.¹²⁵ Reports from a Party-run news media outlet characterized international reporting on events in Wukan as "foreign forces" conducting "public opinion warfare,"¹²⁶ while other provincial media outlets published alternative narratives on events in Wukan that downplayed the violence and unrest.¹²⁷ In December 2016, the Haifeng County People's Court tried and convicted¹²⁸ nine Wukan residents for their participation in the protest and imposed prison sentences ranging from 2 years to 10 years and 6 months.¹²⁹ Those imprisoned included Wei Yonghan,¹³⁰ Hong Yongzhong,¹³¹ Yang Jinzhen,¹³² Wu Fang,¹³³ Cai Jialin,¹³⁴ Zhuang Songkun,¹³⁵ Li Chulu,¹³⁶ Chen Suzhuan,¹³⁷ and Zhang Bingchai.¹³⁸ In March 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that Wukan residents were under constant surveillance by authorities and feared speaking to outsiders.¹³⁹ In August 2017, officials reportedly canceled the household registration (*hukou*) of exiled Wukan activist Zhuang Liehong and threatened his family in China, in apparent attempts to stop his advocacy in the United States.¹⁴⁰

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Implementation of Open Government Information Regulations and Citizen Access to Information

During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to work towards increasing citizens' access to official information. In June 2017, the State Council released draft revisions to the 2008 Open Government Information (OGI) Regulations and solicited public comments.¹⁴¹ The draft revisions clarified the scope of OGI and defined the types of information not subject to OGI.¹⁴² Areas not subject to OGI requirements include local-level information that "endangers public safety or social stability" or that involves ethnicity and religion.¹⁴³ The draft revisions also included a set of new provisions calling for all levels of government to promote and establish mechanisms for OGI work.¹⁴⁴ One U.S.-based expert noted that while the Chinese government's efforts to advance greater citizen access to official information have resulted in considerable progress in recent years, "government transparency remains uneven and often unsatisfactory," with few OGI requests granted, few wins for OGI lawsuits, and detentions of some citizens who submit OGI requests.¹⁴⁵ The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found that 73 out of 100 county-level governments scored lower than 60 points for transparency, with Nang county, Linzhi (Nyingtri) municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, scoring the lowest at 12.75 points.¹⁴⁶ The study found that municipal governments overall scored significantly higher for transparency than county governments, with Xiamen municipality, Fujian province, and Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, ranking as the top two.¹⁴⁷ Despite moves in the past year to update the OGI regulatory framework, Chinese authorities continued to deny OGI requests in cases related to human rights defenders, including cases of those petitioning,¹⁴⁸ advocating for civil society,¹⁴⁹ and requesting information on the use of "black jails" and other secret detention sites.¹⁵⁰

Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance

¹Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2017—China,” last visited 11 April 17; Jidong Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April 2016), 385; David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 98, 115, 121–22; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 3 March 17, 1.

²Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2017—China,” last visited 11 April 17.

³David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 98–99. See also Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, Congressional Research Service, “Understanding China’s Political System,” 20 March 13, summary; Chinese Communist Party Constitution [Gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, General Program. For an English translation, see “Constitution of Communist Party of China,” *Xinhua*, 18 November 12, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, 29 March 13. The Party Constitution states that, “Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding levels.” PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, Preamble; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, amended and effective 15 March 15, art. 3.

⁴Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2017—China,” last visited 11 April 17.

⁵David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 115, 121–22; “Chairman of Everything,” *Economist*, 2 April 16; “Xi Jinping: Party, Government, Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center: The Party Leads Everything” [Xi Jinping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao yiqie de], *The Paper*, 30 January 16.

⁶Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, “China’s Un-Separation of Powers: The Blurred Lines of Party and Government,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24 July 15.

⁷“Wang Qishan: Build an Integrated Party-Led Anticorruption System, Improve Governing Capacity, Perfect the Governance System” [Wang qishan: goujian dang tongyi lingdao de fanfubai tizhi tigao zhizheng nengli wanshan zhili tixi], *Xinhua*, 5 March 17. See also Shi Jiangtao, “No Separation of Powers’: China’s Top Graft-Buster Seeks Tighter Party Grip on Government,” *South China Morning Post*, 6 March 17; Ben Blanchard and Philip Wen, “Nothing To See but Comfort for Xi at China’s Annual Parliament,” *Reuters*, 15 March 17.

⁸Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Certain Guidelines Regarding Intraparty Political Life Under New Circumstances” [Guanyu xin xingshi xia dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan zhunze], *Xinhua*, 2 November 16. See also Chen Yannan, “People’s Daily New Lessons and Reflections: Solidifying Political Character With Absolute Loyalty Toward the Party” [Renmin ribao xinzhishi xinjue: zhujie dui dang juegui zhongcheng de zhengzhi pin’ge], *People’s Daily*, 15 March 17; “Xi Jinping Wants Officials To Declare Allegiance to Himself,” *Economist*, 6 April 17.

⁹Liang Pengfei and Zhou Yuan, “Absolute Loyalty, Unified Military Command” [Juedui zhongcheng junling guiyi], *Liberation Army News*, 12 March 17.

¹⁰See, e.g., National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2016 National Economy Established Good Start to the ‘13th Five-Year Plan’” [2016 nian guomin jingji shixian “shisan wu” lianghao kajul], 20 January 17; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “2016: A Good Start for China’s Economy During the 13th Five-Year Plan Period,” 20 January 17.

¹¹See, e.g., Cyberspace Administration of China, “National Cyberspace Security Strategy,” [Guojia wangluo kongjian anquan zhanlue], reprinted in *Xinhua*, 27 December 16. See also Joyce Huang, “China Launches Corruption Crackdown on Social Media Ahead of Party Congress,” *Voice of America*, 24 April 17; Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, “Media Censorship in China,” 17 February 17.

¹²See, e.g., Ministry-Administered Leading Small Group on the Work of Party-Building in Social Organizations, Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Key Work Points for Ministerial Management of Party-Building in Social Organizations in 2017” [Bu guan shehui zuzhi 2017 nian dangjian gongzuo yaodian], 6 March 17, 1(1)–(2), 2(5)–(7), 3(9). See also Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Ministry of Civil Affairs Convenes Meeting on Promoting the ‘Two Comprehensive Coverages’ Work for Social Organization Management” [Minzhengbu zhaokai bu guan shehui zuzhi “liang ge quan fugai” gongzuo tuijin hui], 10 March 17.

¹³See, e.g., National Health and Family Planning Commission, “December 12, 2016, National Health and Family Planning Commission Regular Press Conference Transcript” [2016 nian 12 yue 12 ri guojia weisheng jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12 December 16; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “Chinese Communist Party 18th Party Congress Fifth Plenum Announcement” [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 29 October 15; State Council, Circular Regarding National Population Development Plan (2016–2030) [Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016–2030 nian) de tongzhi], issued 25 January 17, 2(1), 3(1). See also Ananya Roy, “Strict Birth Control Measures in China Force Parents To Abandon Child or Go Into Hiding,” *International Business Times*, 28 October 16.

¹⁴“Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission Meeting Convenes in Beijing” [Zhongyang zhengfa gongzuo huiyi zai jing zhaokai], *Xinhua*, reprinted in *China Law Society*, 13 January 17; Zhang Ziyang, “Zhou Qiang: Dare To Draw the Sword Against Erroneous Western Thought” [Zhou qiang: yao ganyu xiang xifang cuowu sichao liangjian], *China News*, 14 January 17.

¹⁵Zheping Huang, “China’s Top Judge Is One of the Country’s Most Vocal Critics of Judicial Independence,” *Quartz*, 18 January 17; Michael Forsythe, “China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wincede,” *New York Times*, 18 January 17.

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¹⁶State Council Information Office, “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020),” August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 September 16.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Human Rights in China, “The China Challenge to International Human Rights: What’s at Stake?” November 2016, 14–16.

¹⁹State Council Information Office, “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020),” August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 September 16, sec. V.

²⁰International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 21, 22(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 10 September 17. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.

²¹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/25/5, 4 December 13, para. 153. During the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record in October 2013, the Chinese government representative stated “China is making preparations for the ratification of ICCPR and will continue to carry out legislative and judicial reforms.”

²²Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sixth Plenum Communiqué” [Zhongguo gongchangdang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 27 October 16.

²³Chris Buckley, “China’s Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping ‘Core’ Leader,” *New York Times*, 27 October 16; J.P., “Why It Matters That Xi Jinping Is Called the ‘Core’ of China’s Communist Party,” *Economist*, 16 November 16; Kazuyuki Suwa, Tokyo Foundation, “Xi Jinping’s China: Concentrating and Projecting Power,” 19 January 17.

²⁴Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sixth Plenum Communiqué” [Zhongguo gongchangdang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 27 October 16; Chris Buckley, “China’s Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping ‘Core’ Leader,” *New York Times*, 27 October 16.

²⁵State Council, “Government Work Report” [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 5 March 17; State Council, “Report on the Work of the Government,” 5 March 17.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping May Be ‘Core Leader’ of China, but He’s Still Really Nervous,” *New York Times*, 1 November 16.

²⁸Chris Buckley, “China’s Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping ‘Core’ Leader,” *New York Times*, 27 October 16; Kazuyuki Suwa, Tokyo Foundation, “Xi Jinping’s China: Concentrating and Projecting Power,” 19 January 17; J.P., “Why It Matters That Xi Jinping Is Called the ‘Core’ of China’s Communist Party,” *Economist*, 16 November 16; Michael Martina and Benjamin Kang Lim, “China’s Xi Anointed ‘Core’ Leader, On Par With Mao, Deng,” *Reuters*, 27 October 16.

²⁹Alice Miller, “What Would Deng Do?” *China Leadership Monitor*, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, No. 52 (Winter 2017), 6–8.

³⁰Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping, Seeking To Extend Power, May Bend Retirement Rules,” *New York Times*, 2 March 17; “Will Xi Bend Retirement ‘Rule’ To Keep Top Officials in Power?” *Bloomberg*, 31 October 16.

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