IV. Xinjiang

Security Measures and Conflict

During the Commission’s 2017 reporting year, central and regional government authorities introduced new security measures and expanded implementation of existing security controls targeting Uyghur communities and individuals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). According to official statistics, XUAR authorities spent 30.05 billion yuan (approximately US$4.43 billion) on public security in 2016, nearly 20 percent more than the previous year.1 After Chen Quanguo became XUAR Communist Party Secretary in August 2016, replacing Zhang Chunxian,2 regional authorities implemented a number of new security measures.3 These included, but were not limited to, the installation of “convenience police stations” throughout the region, including 949 in the regional capital Urumqi alone;4 the convening of mass anti-terrorism rallies;5 the recruitment of tens of thousands of security personnel from both within and outside of the XUAR;6 the implementation of a “double-linked household” (shuanglian hu) system;7 and the mandatory installation of satellite-tracking devices on vehicles in one prefecture in the XUAR.8 Chen previously implemented some of these measures in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where he served as Party Secretary for five years,9 and many international observers expressed the view that central government and Party authorities sought, through Chen’s appointment, to enhance “stability” and security in the XUAR, using a more hardline approach than his predecessor.10 Australian scholar James Leibold criticized recent security measures in the XUAR as “counterproductive” and “disproportional to the actual threat posed,” and said such measures “[threaten] to make China’s problem with terror far more serious and complex in the future.”11

• “Convenience police stations.” Among the security initiatives that Chen Quanguo introduced to the XUAR was the establishment of “convenience police stations” (bianmin jingwu zhan).12 The stations enhance authorities’ ability to closely surveil and police local communities, in what two international scholars described as “Orwellian levels of securitization.”13 In the latter part of 2016, authorities recruited close to 30,000 security personnel to staff the stations, which provide “convenient” services to the community—including medical supplies and mobile phone charging stations.14 In the first seven months of 2017, authorities reportedly advertised more than 53,000 additional security positions in the XUAR, which a European researcher connected to the establishment of the stations.15

• Mass rallies. Beginning in December 2016, XUAR authorities held mass rallies reportedly as a show of force and to emphasize the need to fight terrorism and violence.16 In February 2017, tens of thousands of security personnel participated in “anti-terror” rallies in four cities in the XUAR.17 On May 29, during the Ramadan period, officials throughout the XUAR reportedly held simultaneous mass anti-terrorism rallies involv-
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ing more than six million people.\textsuperscript{18} Scholar James Leibold called the February rallies “political theatre” showing that “the party is in firm control in Xinjiang and those who seek to resist will be crushed.”\textsuperscript{19}

- **“Double-linked household” system.** Officials in multiple jurisdictions in the XUAR have begun implementing this system, which divides households into groups of 10 for the dual purposes of “watch[ing] over each other” and poverty relief.\textsuperscript{20} The system is reportedly aimed in part at using local communities to curb security threats and “religious extremism” and supervise individuals designated “key persons” of interest to security authorities.\textsuperscript{21}

- **DNA collection.** According to research conducted by Human Rights Watch and reporting by the journal Nature, security personnel have been collecting DNA samples from Uyghurs in the XUAR and from other people throughout China on a massive scale, in many cases without consent.\textsuperscript{22} International observers raised the concern that officials may misuse the collected biometric data to heighten security controls on the Uyghur population, as officials build a database of citizens’ biometric information not limited to those with a criminal background, as in other countries, and lacking the kinds of legal safeguards other countries implement to manage their DNA databases.\textsuperscript{23}

Several violent incidents involving ethnic or political tensions reportedly took place in the XUAR between December 2016 and February 2017.\textsuperscript{24} These included a December attack in Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, in which several attackers—who reportedly had Uyghur names—killed a Communist Party official and a security guard and injured three other individuals using knives and an explosive device;\textsuperscript{25} a January attack in Guma (Pishan) county, Hotan, in which police killed three individuals whom official media outlets described as “terror suspects”;\textsuperscript{26} and a February attack in Guma, in which three Uyghur men stabbed five Han Chinese pedestrians to death and injured five others.\textsuperscript{27} According to a Radio Free Asia report, two of the three suspects in the February attack were angry at local officials for clamping down on an “illegal” prayer service their family had held in their home.\textsuperscript{28}

**Legal and Counterterrorism Developments**

On March 29, 2017, the XUAR People’s Congress adopted the region’s first anti-extremism regulations.\textsuperscript{29} The regulations categorize 15 actions as “extremism,” and according to a Chinese legal scholar, “[draw] a clear line between legal religion and illegal religion.”\textsuperscript{30} While the XUAR People’s Congress adopted regional measures in July 2016 to implement the PRC Counterterrorism Law that also described how authorities should work to counter religious extremists,\textsuperscript{31} the 2017 regional regulations provide more detailed descriptions of the responsibilities of XUAR government authorities to eliminate “extremism.”\textsuperscript{32} Measures aimed at countering “extremism” in the XUAR in recent years reportedly have often threatened to criminalize Uyghurs’ peaceful practice of religious faith.\textsuperscript{33}
International rights groups expressed concern over Chinese authorities’ lack of transparency in reporting information regarding terrorism convictions and executions. According to research Human Rights Watch (HRW) published in March 2017, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) annual work report for 2016 did not provide information on terrorism cases, including the number of people convicted on terrorism charges, as it had in previous years. As noted by HRW, the opacity of Chinese authorities’ reporting on terrorism prosecution in the XUAR provides leeway for officials to silence critics and repress religious identity. Both HRW and Amnesty International criticized Chinese authorities’ implementation of the PRC Counterterrorism Law, which took effect in January 2016, with regard to the latitude the law’s wording provides officials in punishing individuals for “terrorism” and “extremism.” A report Amnesty International published in April 2017 documented a discrepancy between death penalty cases reported in the Chinese media and those included in China Judgements Online, a publicly accessible database created by the SPC in July 2013. According to Amnesty International, while Chinese media provided information on the executions of 27 people for incidents related to terrorism in 2014 and 2015, the SPC database only included approved death sentences for 10 of these people. Amnesty International also noted that while Uyghurs make up 0.7 percent of China’s total population, 4 percent of the death penalty cases included in China Judgements Online were of Uyghurs.

As in the previous reporting year, XUAR officials in some locations reportedly offered substantial monetary rewards for information on suspected terrorist activity. In March 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in Guma (Pishan) county, Hotan prefecture, offered up to 500,000 yuan (approximately US$74,000) for tips on “suspicious terrorist activity or suspicious individuals,” such as “double-faced” cadres, Party members, and religious clergy, referring to those who “pretend to support national unity but secretly spread separatism and extremism.” Officials in several other counties in Hotan also reportedly offered rewards: for instance, in Chira (Cele) county, officials announced they would reward tip providers with 10,000 yuan (approximately US$1,500) for information on “the suspicious activities of individuals returning from overseas travel.”

XUAR Party and government authorities punished or criticized local officials for what they called failures to effectively combat religious extremism and terrorism. In April 2017, Party authorities announced that they had punished 97 cadres in Hotan, including those who reportedly failed to carry out surveillance of residents’ worship at local mosques or who did not regulate ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals, according to Party policy. Among the 97 cadres was Jelil Matniyaz, a village Party chief, whom authorities demoted in part because he refused to smoke in front of religious figures. One Hotan official reportedly said Matniyaz’s refusal to smoke “conforms with extreme religious thought.” Another one of the cadres was Salamet Memetimin, a village Party official, whom authorities reportedly punished for holding her marriage ceremony at home, instead of at a government office. In April, a senior Uyghur official criticized local cadres in Kashgar
Development Policy

During this reporting year, central and regional government and Party officials continued to promote the XUAR as an important center for Belt and Road (B&R) (also known as One Belt, One Road) Initiative development projects. A U.S.-based Uyghur rights organization criticized the economic inequality exacerbated by official development projects, as well as the enhanced securitization officials employed to accompany such projects.

Chinese officials have expressed the belief that development and the reduction of poverty will lessen security threats. An article published by an Australian think tank in March 2017 cites a former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, who said the economic gains of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, one of the B&R’s most important initiatives, will help “[tackle] the incubator of terrorism, namely poverty.” The same article cites the head of the XUAR branch of the People’s Bank of China as stating that enhancing transport connections between the XUAR and Central Asia will bring both “economic and national security dividends.”

In March 2017, Zhu Weiqun, currently Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee and formerly a senior Party official, cautioned that due to increased cross-border exchanges along the Silk Road economic belt, authorities must seek to prevent “religious extremism” from arising in areas of northwest China with a large ethnic minority population. Although Zhu did not specifically mention Uyghurs in his speech, international media and other observers have reported that authorities’ actions aimed at preventing “religious extremism” have frequently targeted Uyghurs’ peaceful Islamic religious practices. Zhu stressed that the “sinicization” of Islam was vital to the success of the Silk Road economic belt, and Chinese authorities must cooperate with relevant countries to enhance security and prevent terrorism for China’s own interest and the economic interest of these countries.

According to research published in March 2017 by a U.S.-based Uyghur rights organization, development initiatives in the XUAR have disproportionately benefited Han Chinese residents and simultaneously marginalized Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. In its report, the organization asserted that central and regional government authorities used development projects associated with the Silk Road and B&R strategies to enhance securitization and state control over minority populations in the XUAR, and to facilitate Han migration to areas previously dominated by Uyghur communities.

Freedom of Religion

XUAR officials continued to use new legislation and other measures that narrowed the scope of Uyghur Muslims’ ability to peacefully practice their religious faith and express their Muslim cultural identity. On September 29, 2016, the XUAR People’s Con-
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gress adopted two new regulations, effective November 1, limiting the role of religion in education. Article 9 of the XUAR Regulations on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency provides that parents or guardians may not “organize, lure or force minors into attending religious activities,” and may not “force them to dress in extremist clothing or other extremist symbols.” Article 17 of the regulations stipulates that educational authorities must teach students “to resist ethnic separatism, extremist ideology and the infiltration of religion on campus.” Article 25 of the XUAR Regulations on the Popularization of High School Education in Southern Parts of the Region stipulates that “no organization or individual” may “coerce, lure, or in the name of religion obstruct or interfere with” the high school education of students of a relevant age, causing them to miss school or drop out of school.

On March 29, 2017, the XUAR People’s Congress adopted the XUAR Anti-Extremism Regulations, the region’s first anti-extremism regulations, defining 15 actions as “religious extremism” and containing provisions for government officials and the public to constrain such actions. Article 9 of the regulations classifies the 15 “extremist” actions, including the wearing of burqas with face coverings, spreading religious fanaticism through “irregular” beards or name selection, and not allowing children to receive public education. A U.S.-based Uyghur rights organization said authorities sought to use the regulations to “codify repressive actions” in order to “provide a veneer of legality.”

During the reporting period, regional officials introduced policies regulating some of the most personal expressions of Uyghurs’ religious faith. The Global Times, a Party-run media outlet, reported in November 2016 that in September, authorities established new local religious and residential committees in some locations in the XUAR to “manage religious practices.” According to a Chinese scholar cited in the report, under the new pilot practice, authorities required local residents “to report their religious activities or activities attended by religious people, including circumcision, weddings, and funerals.” In April 2017, an international media report indicated authorities throughout the XUAR had begun banning baby names deemed “extremist,” with a penalty of preventing noncompliant parents from registering their children for household registration (hukou). Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Human Rights Watch reported that according to the “Naming Rules for Ethnic Minorities,” dozens of names with Islamic connotations, including Saddam and Medina, were banned. On June 1, an international media report indicated that XUAR authorities expanded the ban on names to cover anyone up to age 16. [For more information on the hukou system, see Section II—Population Control and Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.]

A Hong Kong-based policy analyst wrote in February 2017 that XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was considering reducing the number of mosques in the XUAR, as Chinese experts on Uyghurs view mosques as incubators for Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Chinese sentiment. Prior to this analyst’s claim, RFA reported in December 2016 that in three months in late 2016, authorities demolished thousands of mosques in the XUAR as part of a “mosque rectification” campaign introduced by central govern-
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ment officials and overseen by local security personnel. RFA said it independently confirmed the destruction of mosques in Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu prefectures, and received reports of demolitions in other parts of the XUAR. RFA interviewed local officials who cited “the safety of worshippers” due to the age of the mosques among the official reasons for the campaign. In August 2017, RFA reported that authorities in Kashgar prefecture had begun implementing a directive earlier in the summer that ordered local mosques to fly the national flag of China and to replace religious inscriptions with patriotic banners.

According to a report from RFA, in May 2017, authorities in Urumqi municipality, XUAR, sentenced Uyghur religious scholar Hebibulla Tohti to 10 years in prison for “illegal religious activity.” In September 2015, the Islamic Association of China, which had sponsored his studies, reportedly praised his academic work upon his completion of a doctorate degree in theology at Al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, Egypt. Tohti reportedly returned from Egypt to the XUAR in July 2016 when Chinese officials threatened Uyghurs studying in Egypt with punishment and detained their relatives, in some cases, to compel them to return. During his initial detention in July, authorities reportedly questioned Tohti about having taught religion to Uyghurs in Egypt without the approval of Chinese officials, among other “illegal activities.”

As in previous reporting years, XUAR officials reportedly imposed controls on Uyghur Muslims’ observance of Ramadan, while heightening security measures and carrying out detentions of religious believers throughout the XUAR. Authorities placed restrictions on fasting for state employees and teachers, forced restaurants to remain open, and held events aimed at increasing “stability maintenance” work during Ramadan. In late May 2017, authorities reportedly detained at least 22 Uyghurs in areas in and around Hotan prefecture for engaging in religious activities. In addition, authorities reportedly assigned Chinese officials to stay in every Uyghur household in Hotan during Ramadan for up to 15 days, to prevent Uyghurs from fasting or praying.
In 2017, authorities reportedly cracked down on ethnic Kazakh Muslim residents of the XUAR, detaining many for peaceful religious activities and for “offenses” such as sending online messages on emigration issues, as well as for having connections to friends and relatives living in Kazakhstan and for “having close ties” to Uyghur Muslims in the XUAR.\textsuperscript{88} In June 2017, officials in Wumachang township, Qitai county, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, reportedly issued a notice saying that local Muslims must obtain a permit before praying, or they could be detained for “illegally engaging in religious activities.”\textsuperscript{89} Local Kazakhs, however, said authorities subsequently detained many Muslims who applied for a permit, and also detained some local imams for presiding over prayers without having obtained a permit.\textsuperscript{90} In early 2017, authorities in Altay (Aletai) prefecture sentenced well-known Kazakh imam Okan to 10 years’ imprisonment for performing traditional Kazakh funerary rites.\textsuperscript{91} In or around April, a court in Emin county, Tacheng prefecture, Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, sentenced Kazakh Yesihati to 10 years’ imprisonment after he reportedly posted online content regarding Kazakhstan’s immigration policies.\textsuperscript{92} In June, authorities in Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture reportedly detained ethnic Kazakh imam Akmet for unknown reasons; several days later authorities said he had hung himself and returned his body to his family.\textsuperscript{93} XUAR authorities reportedly detained more than 100 of Akmet’s acquaintances who made comments online about his death.\textsuperscript{94}

**Freedom of Expression**

During this reporting year, central and regional officials placed restrictions on communication tools,\textsuperscript{95} issued regulations limiting the spread of “false” or “harmful” information,\textsuperscript{96} and constrained the ability of foreign journalists to report from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\textsuperscript{97} In one example of new state controls on cell phone use, in or around July 2017, authorities in multiple XUAR jurisdictions ordered residents to install an application called Jingwang Weishi (or “Web Cleansing Guard”) on their cell phones that enables the government to surveil their online activities, monitoring “terrorist” and “illegal religious” content.\textsuperscript{98} Authorities reportedly set up checkpoints to randomly check whether residents had installed the software on their phones, and those who had failed to do so faced a possible 10-day detention.\textsuperscript{99} As in the previous reporting year,\textsuperscript{100} authorities reportedly penalized mobile phone users for downloading software to circumvent the Great Firewall, the censorship hardware and software that Chinese authorities use to filter the Internet.\textsuperscript{101} International media reported in October 2016 that, according to an official crime report that was issued by public security authorities in Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture and leaked on Chinese social media, public security authorities in Changji classified the downloading of Internet censorship circumvention software to a mobile device as “terrorist” in nature.\textsuperscript{102} According to the crime report, Changji security personnel detained a local Internet user in October 2016 for allegedly downloading the software to bypass the Great Firewall.\textsuperscript{103}
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[For more information on Internet restrictions in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.]

In another example of authorities' restrictions on XUAR residents' access to communication tools, regional authorities issued regulations, effective October 1, 2016, requiring individuals in the region to register with their real names before being permitted to access the Internet, including on their mobile phones.\textsuperscript{104} In December 2016, the XUAR People's Congress issued regulations providing for punishments for residents who spread “false” or “harmful” information on the Internet.\textsuperscript{105} Under the regulations, website operators who “create, compile, spread, release or copy” “false” or “harmful” content can be subject to substantial fines, and authorities may sever their websites.\textsuperscript{106} Types of “false” or “harmful” information covered by the regulations include information that is “harmful to national security,” “promotes religious fanaticism, or destroys religious harmony”; and “promotes ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination.”\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{Freedom of Movement}

As in past reporting years,\textsuperscript{108} XUAR officials continued to restrict Uyghurs' ability to travel freely, in violation of Chinese law and international legal standards. Beginning in October 2016, authorities in locations throughout the XUAR reportedly ordered residents to turn in their passports to police, with varying deadlines of up to four months.\textsuperscript{109} Authorities subsequently required residents to seek approval from police for international travel in order to retrieve their passports.\textsuperscript{110} In a statement published in November, Human Rights Watch (HRW) likened the passport recall to similar restrictions in the Tibet Autonomous Region, describing it as a form of “collective punishment.”\textsuperscript{111} HRW said public security personnel in eight locations throughout the XUAR confirmed that regional public security bureau authorities issued the recall, and that authorities were implementing it across the XUAR.\textsuperscript{112} HRW described the passport recall as having “no basis in Chinese law,” and specifically noted Articles 2 and 15 of the PRC Passport Law.\textsuperscript{113} According to Article 2 of the law, “no organization or individual should . . . illegally seize passports.”\textsuperscript{114} Article 15 of the law limits Chinese officials' authority to seize passports to instances “where necessary for handling a case,” and only to passports belonging to “the parties of a case.”\textsuperscript{115} In addition, according to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”\textsuperscript{116}

XUAR authorities also reportedly restricted the ability of ethnic Kazakhs to travel freely, and confiscated the Chinese passports and permanent residence permits for Kazakhstan of around 200,000 individuals, though authorities reportedly later returned at least some of these documents.\textsuperscript{117} In addition, XUAR officials reportedly detained some ethnic Kazakhs who returned to China after living in or visiting Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{118}

Beginning in late January 2017, Chinese authorities reportedly ordered some Uyghurs studying abroad in countries including Egypt, Turkey, France, Australia, and the United States to return to the XUAR.\textsuperscript{119} XUAR authorities detained or threatened to de-
tain relatives of some students to compel them to return, and reportedly detained some returnees and forced some students to undergo “political reeducation.” Chinese authorities reportedly threatened Uyghur and Kazakh students studying in Egypt with punishment if they did not return to China. Despite concern from international organizations that Chinese authorities would mistreat the students upon their return to China, as of August 2017, Egyptian authorities had reportedly forcibly deported at least 22 individuals. Reports from July and August indicated that XUAR authorities had detained some Uyghurs, as well as their accompanying family members, upon their return, and some Kazakhs whom authorities deported from Egypt disappeared.

Labor

Some government and private employers within the XUAR discriminated against non-Han job applicants. As in past reporting years, the Commission observed employment advertisements that reserved positions exclusively for Han Chinese, including civil servant and private sector positions, in contravention of Chinese labor law. Private and public employers also continued to reserve some positions exclusively for men, leaving non-Han women to face both ethnic and gender discrimination in the hiring process.

In a report published in April 2017, a U.S.-based Uyghur rights organization documented employment advertisements from various cities in the XUAR that discriminated against Uyghur job applicants, noting that employment discrimination exists in the fields of civil service, education, state-owned enterprises, and private industry. The report stated that in addition to ethnic discrimination, Uyghurs faced difficulty finding employment due to language-based, religious, and gender discrimination; a lack of social capital; and administrative costs to employers due to government requirements to enforce security measures for Uyghurs. Employers reportedly must complete “special registration procedures” when hiring Uyghurs and report regularly to public security officials on Uyghur employees, especially since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the regional capital of Urumqi.

HASHAR

Reports emerged this past year that officials continued to require Uyghurs to engage in hashar, a type of forced, unpaid group labor for public works projects. In November 2016, a Germany-based Uyghur exile organization published a report compiling information on authorities’ use of hashar as a means of “stability maintenance,” particularly in southern parts of the XUAR such as Kashgar, Aksu, and Hotan prefectures, and Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture. According to a February 2017 Radio Free Asia report, officials in Guma (Pishan) county, Hotan, told residents that they had abolished hashar, but also informed them they would require residents to perform the same type of work they had performed under hashar, such as flood management and tree planting. Forced labor violates the International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.
During this reporting year, XUAR government authorities expanded Mandarin-focused “bilingual education” in the region, a policy that contravenes international law and that a Uyghur rights advocacy organization criticized for its emphasis on Mandarin-language education at the expense of other languages as well as for the loss of Uyghur educators’ jobs. Under “bilingual education,” class instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups. In June 2017, education officials in Hotan prefecture, XUAR, reportedly issued a directive further restricting the use of the Uyghur language in schools through the secondary school level, “in order to strengthen elementary and middle/high school bilingual education.” The directive includes a prohibition on Uyghur-only signage on school grounds, as well as the use of Uyghur in schools’ public activities and educational management work. In March 2017, state media announced that authorities would strengthen preschool “bilingual education” in the XUAR, by building or expanding a total of 4,387 “bilingual kindergartens” and hiring 10,000 “bilingual teachers” in 2017. The plans continued a regional government initiative to expand “bilingual education” at the preschool level between 2016 and 2020 using central government funds. In addition, a Ministry of Education and State Language Commission document issued in March 2017 stated that the inability of some people in the central and western parts of China to speak Mandarin could have an impact on “ethnic unity and harmony.”
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Uighurs Say Aimed at Frightening Them’ [Xinjiang zai gao fankong huodong weizu ren zhi zai zai zhenresa weiren], Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17.


18. Xinjiang Again Holds Counterterrorism Activity, Uighurs Say Aimed at Frightening Them’ [Xinjiang zai gao fankong huodong weizu ren zhi zai zhenresa weiren], Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17; “Xinjiang Holds Collective Voice of the Sword Mass Rally, Stresses Fight Against Three Forces” [Xinjiang ban jiti fa sheng liang jian dahui, qiandiao dao jadi sangu shihl], Oriental Daily Net, 30 May 17.


23. Ibid.


27. “Killings in Xinjiang’s Guma Sparked by Anger at Prayer Restrictions,” Radio Free Asia, 23 February 17. See also “10 People Hacked in Pishan County, Xinjiang, 5 Dead, 5 Injured, and 3 Thugs Killed on the Spot” [Xinjiang pishan xian 10 minzhong bei kan, 5 si, 5 zhang, 3 baotou, baotou dangan de jiji], Radio Free Asia, 14 February 17; Teddy Ng, “Eight Killed in Xinjiang Knife Attack: Police Shoot Three Attackers,” South China Morning Post, 15 February 17.


29. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the “PRC Counterterrorism Law” [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqiu qu jijuanduan hua], issued 29 July 16, effective 1 August 16, art. 40; Bai Tianlian, “Xinjiang To Constrain Radicals in Solitary in New Anti-Terror Rule,” Global Times, 2 August 16.

30. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqiu qu jijuanduan hua], issued 29 March 17, effective 1 April 17, arts. 5–9, 16–29. See also PRC Counterterrorism Law [Zonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 19, 28–30, 45, 80–82, 84; “Xinjiang Rolls Out China’s First Law To Purge Religious Extremism,” Xinhua, 30 March 17.


32. Human Rights Watch, “China: Disclose Details of Terrorism Convictions,” 16 March 17. See also “Supreme People’s Court Work Report” [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzheng baogao], 12 March 17.


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Amnesty International, "China’s Deadly Secrets," 10 April 17, 29. For information on China Judgements Online, see page 24 of Amnesty International’s report and Jiang Xingguang, "China Judgements Online Grows in Influence," China Legal Information Center, 6 September 16.


Ibid., 34.

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Free Asia, 12 October 16; Kavitha Surana, ‘‘China Tells Citizens To Inform on Parents Who Participate in Religious Activities’’ [Xinjiang jinzhi fumu ‘‘yinyou’’ canjia zongjiao huodong], Radio Xinjiang,” Reuters, 11 October 16; ‘‘Xinjiang Forbids Parents From ‘Luring’ Children To Participate in Religious Activities’’ [Xinjiang jinzhi fumu ‘‘yinyou’’ zina canjia zongjiao huodong], Radio Free Asia, 10 April 17.

See also ‘‘Xinjiang Holds 97 Cadres Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn’t Dare To Smoke in Front of Religious Figure’’ [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: gan dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17; ‘‘One Hundred Xinjiang Officials Punished for Ineffective Stability Maintenance’’ [Xinjiang bai guan weiwuer bu bei chufen], Radio Free Asia, 10 April 17.

Li Caiyu, ‘‘Xinjiang Official Demoted for Timidity in Fighting Religious Extremism,’’ Global Times, 11 April 17; ‘‘Xinjiang Holds 97 Cadres Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn’t Dare To Smoke in Front of Religious Figure’’ [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: gan dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17.

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‘‘Uyghur Village Cadre Dismissed for Holding Islamic Wedding Vows at Home,’’ Radio Free Asia, 18 April 17; ‘‘China Bans ‘Extreme’ Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang’s Uyghurs,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 April 17; ‘‘Xinjiang Holds 97 Cadres Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn’t Dare To Smoke in Front of Religious Figure’’ [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: gan dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17.

‘‘Xinjiang Officials Admonishes Fellow Uyghur Cadres for ‘Anti-Terror’ Failings,’’ Reuters, 5 April 17; Mehmet Emin Bekri, ‘‘Xinjiang Kashgar Deputy Commissioner: Uyghur Cadres Must Take the Lead in Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work’’ [Xinjiang kashi xingshu 97 ming ganbu: xuyao weiwuer gan bu dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17.

See, e.g., Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Dispatches: China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,’’ 24 April 17; Nectar Gan, ‘‘Ban on Beards and Veils—China’s Xinjiang Passes Regulation To Curb Religious Extremism,’’ South China Morning Post, 30 March 17; Darren Byler, ‘‘Imagining Re-Engineered Muslims in Northwest China,’’ Milestones Journal, 20 April 17.


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