

**SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS
DETENTION: XINJIANG'S HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
**CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA**
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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JULY 26, 2018
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SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS DETENTION: XINJIANG'S HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2018

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Marco Rubio, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Representative Smith, Cochairman, Senator King, Representative Lieu, Senator Cotton, and Senator Daines.

Also Present: Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations; Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce; Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia; Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans; and Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former research analyst at the Department of State.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Chairman RUBIO. Good morning. This hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China will come to order. The title of this hearing is "Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis."

We have two panels testifying today. The first panel will feature Ambassador Kelley Currie, the Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations; and Anthony Christino III who is the Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security at the U.S. Department of Commerce.

We'll have a second panel—Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia; Rian Thum, an associate professor at Loyola University New Orleans; and Jessica Batke, Senior Editor at ChinaFile and a former research analyst at the U.S. Department of State.

I want to thank you for being here. I know one of our initial panel witnesses is delayed, as happens in this great city that we

call our nation's capital. But we are going to begin, and we will accommodate that accordingly.

I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against the backdrop this week of Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback convening the first-ever State Department Ministerial to Advance International Religious Freedom, an event which has brought together senior representatives from more than 70 governments around the world to discuss areas of collaboration and partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally.

Secretary Pompeo penned an opinion piece in USA Today earlier this week highlighting the Ministerial and the importance of advancing religious freedom globally. Of note, he specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra and family.

While the Chinese government and the Communist Party are equal opportunity oppressors targeting unregistered and registered Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners, and others with harassment, detention, imprisonment and more, the current human rights crisis unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region targeting Muslim minority groups is arguably among the worst, if not the most severe, instances in the world today of an authoritarian government brutally and systematically targeting a minority faith community. This is an issue that the Commission has been dealing with for some time.

In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad urging him to prioritize this crackdown in his interactions with the Chinese government and to begin collecting information to make the case for possible application of Global Magnitsky sanctions against senior government and Party officials in the region, including Chen Quanguo, the current Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary.

The Commission's forthcoming Annual Report, set to be released this October, will prominently feature the grave and deteriorating situation we will cover here today.

While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in greater detail, I want to take a few minutes to paint a picture of life in Xinjiang.

For months now, there have been credible estimates of between 800,000 and 1 million people from this region being held at political reeducation centers or camps which are fortified with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors, and guard rooms. Security personnel at these facilities, at these camps, have subjected detainees to torture, to medical neglect and maltreatment, to solitary confinement, to sleep deprivation, to lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures, and other forms of abuse resulting in the death of some of these detainees.

According to one news source, "The internment program aims to rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs and reshape their very identities. The camps have expanded rapidly over the past year, with almost no judicial process or legal paperwork. Detainees who most vigorously criticize the people and things they love are rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are punished with solitary confinement, with beatings and food deprivation." That was a quote from the media coverage of this.

Some local officials in the region have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the very purpose of the arbitrary detentions of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim ethnic minority groups. These are the terms they've used: "eradicating tumors" or spraying chemicals on crops to "kill the weeds." One expert who is testifying today described Uyghur Xinjiang as "a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid."

While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied knowledge of the camps, a groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz, a scholar at the European School of Culture and Theology, published through the Jamestown Foundation in May, found that Chinese authorities were soliciting public bids for the construction of additional camps and the addition of security elements to existing facilities.

I would submit this report for the record and would also note the Google Earth footage behind me, which clearly shows the construction of these camps over the span of several months.

[The submitted document appears in the Appendix.]

Those not subject to "transformation through education"—as they call it—in these detention facilities still face daily intrusions in their home life. This includes compulsory "home stays," wherein Communist Party officials and government workers are sent to live with local Uyghur and Kazakh families.

The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by iris and body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA sequencers, and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, or in train stations. Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision and Dahua Technology, have profited greatly from the surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards of \$1.2 billion in Chinese government contracts for large-scale surveillance projects.

Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smartphones for encrypted chat apps and require residents to install monitoring applications on their cell phones. More traditional security measures are also employed. That includes extensive police checkpoints.

The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the proliferation of "convenience police stations," a dense network of street corner, village, or neighborhood police stations that enhances authorities' ability to closely surveil and police local communities.

Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a humiliating public act, cutting the skirts and even long shirts of Uyghur women on the spot, as they walked through local streets. They did so as a means of enforcing a ban on ethnic minorities wearing long skirts.

And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders indicating that 21 percent of arrests in China last year were in Xinjiang, which has only 1.5 percent of the population—21 percent of the arrests last year in all of China concentrated in an area with 1.5 percent of the population. The number of arrests increased 731 percent over the previous year and that does not include the detentions of those in the "political re-education centers," which are carried out extralegally.

Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this crisis. And that has not come without a cost. Developments in Xinjiang have had a direct impact on U.S. interests, most notably the detention

of dozens of family members of U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of family members of prominent Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights advocacy. We are delighted that RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja can join us today to speak to her personal experience in this regard.

The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on the “long arm” of China, and that dimension certainly exists as it relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including right here in the United States.

With that, I want to welcome our witnesses. Why don’t I start with you, Mr. Christino, since Ambassador Currie—

STAFFER. She’s here.

Senator RUBIO. I know. But I want to give her a second to catch up. I saw her walk in.

Why don’t we start with you. I was late a few minutes as well. I know it takes time to put it all together.

So, welcome. Thank you for being here today.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CHRISTINO III, DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DIVISION, OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND TREATY COMPLIANCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. CHRISTINO. Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and other Members of the Commission on China for convening this hearing today on this important topic. Today I will discuss the role of the Bureau of Industry and Security regarding export license requirements for China.

Under the Export Administration Regulations, known as the EAR, a Bureau of Industry and Security license is required for the export or reexport of most items on the Commerce Control List to China. Items on the CCL are identified by their individually assigned Export Control Classification Numbers according to the reasons for control, such as crime control and detection, known as Crime Control.

The Commerce Control List is also comprised of items controlled by the multilateral export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well as items controlled unilaterally for foreign policy reasons. And here I would draw the distinction with the crime controls—they are in fact unilateral, unlike controls over nuclear items and other items that would be of concern for security reasons to our international partners, and therefore controlled on one of the regimes.

In support of U.S. foreign policy specifically to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, the United States controls items on the Commerce Control List as required by Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act, as amended. As set forth in the Export Administration Regulations, the U.S. Government requires a license to export most crime control and detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and software to all destinations other than our closest allies such as NATO members Australia, Japan, etc. Additionally, a license is required to export cer-

tain crime-control items, including restraint-type devices such as handcuffs and discharge-type arms such as stun guns, to all destinations with the single exception of Canada.

The Export Administration Regulations impose limited controls on some items not on the Commerce Control List. Items subject to Commerce licensing jurisdiction under our regulations, but not specifically identified on the Control List, are designated as EAR99. Such items generally do not require a license for export or reexport to China unless destined to weapons of mass destruction-related end uses or end users, or unless the items are part of a transaction involving a restricted party identified on one of several lists maintained by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Bureau of Industry and Security's entity list, the Department of State's restricted list, and the Department of the Treasury's specially designated nationals list.

Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or removed from the CCL based on continuous review of the merits of maintaining the controls and the effectiveness of the controls. Section 6 of the EAR prohibits the imposition of foreign policy controls including crime-control items unless certain determinations are made and certain factors reported to Congress, such as the determination that the controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective, a description of consultative efforts with industry and other supplier countries, and determinations related to the economic impact on U.S. business and industry.

There is a specific crime control licensing review policy related to China. The U.S. Government considers applications to export or reexport most crime-control items favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in a country or the sale involves a region of concern or there is evidence that the government may have violated human rights.

The purpose of the controls is to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the United States from such abuses, and avoid contributing to disorder in a country or region. Now we maintain a general policy of denial for certain items: Applications to export crime-control items to countries that are not otherwise subject to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes but are identified by the Department of State as human rights violators, receive additional scrutiny and are generally denied. There are specific controls related to legislation popularly referred to as Tiananmen Square sanctions.

I'd like to conclude by just noting that we do not receive very many applications for exports to China. We did receive 25 last calendar year—21 were for the return of defective items manufactured in China. They were returned to the original Chinese manufacturers. There were nine denials, including applications for stun guns, optical sighting devices, pepper spray, etc., and voiceprint software, which I know was of interest.

I am happy to answer any questions you have on my testimony or anything relevant to the Export Administration Regulations and the controls we maintain specific to China and crime-control items. Thank you.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christino appears in the Appendix.]

Chairman RUBIO. Ambassador Currie.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KELLEY E. CURRIE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you so much, Senator Rubio. I apologize. I think you know we have the IRF (International Religious Freedom) Ministerial going on this week and between that and trying to get down here from New York this morning, it was a little bit difficult. But I do want to express our appreciation for you and the Commission holding this very important hearing today.

I am pleased to be able to appear before the Commission on behalf of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and discuss our concerns regarding the growing human rights crisis in Xinjiang, with a particular focus on how this crisis is being addressed—or not—at the United Nations. I would like to submit my full remarks for the record and just give a brief summary of them.

The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese government's worsening crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since April 2017, the Xi Jinping leadership, under the guise of fighting "terrorism," "secession," and "religious extremism," has greatly intensified the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing repressive policies against mainstream nonviolent Muslim cultural and religious practices in Xinjiang.

The stated goal of the current campaign is to "sinicize religion" and "adapt religion to a socialist society," suggesting that Beijing believes it now possesses the political, diplomatic, and technological capabilities to transform religion and ethnicity in Chinese society in a way that its predecessors never could, even during the peak horrors of the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist campaigns intended to remake Chinese society.

The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking. Authorities now prohibit "abnormal" beards, the wearing of veils in public, and classify refusal to watch state television as a crime, refusal to wear shorts, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat pork, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and practicing traditional funeral rituals as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious views.

Chinese authorities have banned parents from giving their children a number of traditional Islamic names, including Muhammad, Islam, Fatima, and Aisha, and have reportedly required children under age 16 who have Islamic names to change them. Of particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities have increasingly criminalized or punished the teaching of Islam to young people, even by their parents, adopting at least six new laws or regulations to put parents and religious leaders at legal risk if they promote nonviolent Muslim scripture, rituals, and clothing to children.

Chinese authorities also continue to crack down in particular on the use of Uyghur and other minority languages at universities and in classroom instruction.

As you noted, we now believe, based on a wide array of evidence, that the number of individuals detained in re-education centers for violating these strictures since April 2017 numbers in at least the hundreds of thousands, possibly millions. There are even disturbing reports that young children have been sent to state-run orphanages if only one of their parents is detained in internment camps. We call on China to end these counterproductive policies and free all those arbitrarily detained.

As you noted, with many things related to China's human rights abuses, the repression does not stop at the Chinese border. The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has compelled them to stop communicating with their family and friends abroad. We also are concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing Uyghurs abroad to compel them to act as informants, return to Xinjiang, or remain silent about the situation.

Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding Uyghurs—including nonviolent activists and advocates for human rights at home and abroad—as terrorist threats based solely on the basis of their political, cultural, and religious beliefs and practices.

Given the disturbing and severe nature of this crisis, it's worth asking why the pre-eminent human rights bodies of the United Nations haven't taken up this issue, exposed it, and demanded changes in China's policies. Part of the answer certainly lies in China's membership on the Human Rights Council and as a permanent member of the Security Council, as well as in its ability to portray itself as a member of the "Global South" in the Group of 77.

During the question and answer period I would be happy to give more examples of how this is working at the UN and share with you some of the particular experiences we've had, including with the attempts by the Chinese to silence Uyghur activists who wish to speak in UN forums, such as Dolkan Isa, during the recent forum on indigenous peoples, and even shut down human rights organizations and civil society organizations that sponsor individuals such as Mr. Isa and their attempt to speak.

I know I have run out of time, and I will leave that to the Q & A.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to talk about these important issues.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you for making the trip down here.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Currie appears in the Appendix.]

Chairman RUBIO. I want to start with just an editorial statement and then go into a couple of questions. And I don't even know how to do this while still containing my anger.

We are a free society—let me just start there—in the United States. As just an example, what you have just described here, what we are going to hear today is stuff from—like a horrible movie. These are crazy things—things that we've read about that used to happen thousands of years ago or things that happened under these regimes in a science fiction novel.

I mean, talking about forcing people to eat certain foods that violate the dietary laws of their religion, controlling what people name

their children, trying to strip their identity from them, both religious and ethnic. The list goes on. These are some of the most horrifying things that are happening in the world today. That it doesn't lead newscasts in the country and around the world in and of itself is problematic.

And then in this free country that we have—this is what I was alluding to at the beginning—we have multinational corporations who have every right—and I do not criticize them for this. They have every right to be involved civically in our country. When things happen in America and they don't like it, they stop selling products, they boycott cities and towns. They've done all sorts of things and it's their right to do so.

These are the same companies that are up here every day in Washington, D.C. lobbying for us not to raise these issues so they can have access to China's 1.4/1.3 billion-person marketplace. And I just think it's hypocritical for American corporations and multinationals doing business in China who are fully prepared to boycott American cities and American communities because they don't like things that are happening here to be okay, to turn a blind eye to what is happening and not criticize the government of China and the Communist Party because they don't want to jeopardize their ability to sell products in that country.

It's an outrage. It's an embarrassment. And I hope—again, I doubt this is going to make it onto the CBS evening news or any of the cable news shows tonight, but this is outrageous and it's hypocritical. And the international organizations that stand by and say nothing—why? Because China went into somebody's country and built a road or a bridge or maybe bribed them and gave them a billion dollars to be quiet and go along.

This is sick. And I just don't understand why there isn't more coverage of this and why there isn't more understanding of who we're dealing with here and what they're up to and what they do. And the next time someone comes to me and says, Well, you don't understand China, their peaceful rise, and this, that, and the other—I have no problem. I have tremendous admiration for the ancient culture and history of China and of its people. And I want China to be a key player in the world. We would love to have some help in dealing with all of the challenges on this planet. It would be great to have another superpower to partner with.

But this is what these people do with the power they have now. Imagine what they will do when that power grows militarily, economically, and geopolitically. Because if this is how you treat your own people, how do you expect them to treat people in some other part of the world? And I hope people wake up and understand what we're confronting here and the grave crisis that it presents.

In that vein, Mr. Christino, as you know, Representative Smith and I wrote a letter. I have the letter here. It is dated May 9, 2018—to Secretary Ross. We were asking for answers about the sale by U.S. companies, American companies selling surveillance and crime-control technology that is being used by Chinese security forces and by their police. We specifically raised concerns about a company named Thermo Fisher Scientific which is a company in Massachusetts which reportedly is selling DNA sequencers with

advanced microprocessors to the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and its Public Security Bureaus across China.

The reply we got from Commerce noted that these DNA sequencers have a legitimate end use, and I am sure they have a legitimate end use. But they also have an illegitimate end use. So what other recourse do we have if we know that this material is being used in this manner—what other recourse do we have other than to restrict their sale? Despite the fact that they may have some legitimate use—theoretically, there is a legitimate use for any product that is sold abroad. But we don't sell these products because they are misused by the people who are buying them. Why do we continue to allow the sale of American technology to be used to commit this level of atrocities?

Mr. CHRISTINO. Sir, I can point out to you that we have two types of controls relative to the Export Administration Regulations: controls over items, such as the DNA sequencer itself. And as you correctly pointed out, due to the multiple uses of it and the fact that it's not used solely or primarily as a crime detection instrument, we do not control the sequencer itself. There are certainly numerous uses in basic science and medicine, including in China. So to try to control the export of the item to China would be problematic at best.

The other type of control we have under the Export Administration Regulations is a control over the activities of entities that act in a manner that's inconsistent with U.S. national security or foreign policy. Certainly human rights violations are a concern with regard to U.S. foreign policy. And we do have a process related to end-user review. You mentioned the public security bureaus. We do have the opportunity to review; we are reviewing as a result of the information raised to us by this commission.

We are reviewing whether or not the evidentiary basis is there, we're relying on interagency partners to look at whether it is appropriate, through the end-user review committee, to place these entities on the entity list.

Senator RUBIO. Well, just on the issue of whether or not the end user is using it this way, the Department of State is seated right next to you, and they just testified publicly how this information is being used. So I think we have an interagency process right here in this committee. And I hope it is taken seriously.

On the issue of the product itself, virtually any product that is sold abroad has a legitimate use. Guns have legitimate uses, rockets, and we restrict the sale of those to certain people. We don't sell rockets, guns, tear gas, and crowd suppressant to a certain group because they have a history of oppressing people.

Is your testimony that you don't have the statutory authority to restrict these products based on the way the law is written today? Do you need a change in the law to be able to restrict that or is it sort of internally a policy determination at this time that it isn't wise to restrict the sale of these items because they have a broader legitimate use in China?

Mr. CHRISTINO. We have the appropriate authority both over items and over the activities of entities that receive U.S. items. The problematic nature of this challenge is that if you were to try and control DNA sequencers exported to China, you would have to be

able to make a determination—rather, the bureau and the department would need to be able to make a determination that such controls would be effective and would not adversely affect legitimate U.S. business interests in terms of selling these for the numerous uses in basic science or in medicine. And then you would also have to deal with potential diversion concerns over legitimate sales.

We’re looking at controls not just over the DNA sequencers but over other items that may be used, to determine if there is sufficient information to warrant a control over the item. But the inter-agency discussion which includes various bureaus at the State Department is at this point more focused on the entities.

Chairman RUBIO. Well, I don’t have a problem with restricting the entities, but those are easy to evade. In China, the Communist Party controls anything. So whoever you sell it to can easily transfer it for that use. I know you don’t make this decision. Therefore, I’m not trying to beat up on you personally because you’re here to represent the policy of the Commerce Department.

But I do want to say this . . . it sounds like your answer was, These companies have legitimate business interests and make money in China selling these DNA sequencers in the whole country, and most of the things they sell in the country are used legitimately. And we don’t want to unnecessarily burden their ability to make a profit just because a small but significant percentage of their sales might be being used in this way.

If that is the direction we’re going, I just find that to be unacceptable. It’s true—they can buy this from other countries, and other companies want to sell it to them. I think for us it comes down to the purpose of whether or not we want companies housed in the United States benefiting from American research, from our laws, from our freedom, from the protection of our rule of law in this country, to somehow be complicit in what is happening here, and in how their technology is being used. And the fact that they are making some money in China is to my mind not something that should counterbalance that concern. Again, I know you don’t make the decision, but I hope you report it back.

Ambassador Currie, you’re sitting here today. Does the State Department believe that DNA sequencers and other materials are being used in ways that we find to be a grotesque violation of human rights?

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you, Senator Rubio.

We do believe that the security state in Xinjiang is excessive and is perhaps one of the most repressive in the world at this time. We acknowledge that the system does include thousands of security cameras, including in mosques, facial recognition software, obligatory content monitoring apps on smartphones, and GPS devices in cars, widespread new police outposts, as you noted, and the embedding of Party personnel in homes, and the compulsory collection of vast biometric datasets on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the region, including DNA and blood samples, 3D photos, iris scans, and voiceprints.

We note that Human Rights Watch has documented that many of these DNA samples were collected deceptively as part of what regional officials called a “health campaign.” That is a report by

Human Rights Watch, not the U.S. Government, but it's in my testimony, so I believe that we must find it somewhat credible.

And the surveillance system has spurred experts in general security and experts in Xinjiang to label it as one of the most intrusive security police states in the world. There are also grave concerns that there's an intention to migrate this system from Xinjiang out more broadly into the rest of China, as this system, the grid system that's in place in Xinjiang, migrated first from Tibet into Xinjiang. It started out in Tibet and was kind of rolled out as a pilot there, and then built on, scaled up, in Xinjiang.

Chairman RUBIO. Okay. My question was whether using DNA sequencers in a way that violates human rights—my take on what you just answered—and I know it's the—you need to recite the policy of the administration. I think your answer was yes. And all I ask is, Can the State Department please tell that to the Commerce Department so that they—

Ambassador CURRIE. We will absolutely engage in interagency discussions with the Commerce Department about appropriate uses of technology, and—

Chairman RUBIO. Just tell Commerce that DNA sequencers are being used to violate human rights in a grotesque way so hopefully they can get moving on denying this. I don't care how much money Thermo—whatever their name is—Fisher—that company, Thermo Fisher Scientific.

Are you ready?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Cochairman SMITH. First of all, thank you, Chairman Rubio, for pulling together this extremely important hearing.

What's happening against the Muslim Uyghurs—we know that Rebiya Kadeer's entire family is incarcerated. When she got out, came here—she came and testified at one of my hearings, and just bowled us all over with her courage, her willingness to sacrifice. At that time, at least two of her family were incarcerated as a hedge by the Chinese dictatorship to say, You say anything, we will hold it against them.

And now it is—as we all know—as bad as it was during World War II, where the Muslim Uyghurs are being discriminated against, thrown into prison, tortured and killed in a massive way.

Back in 2006, I chaired a hearing to which I invited Google, Cisco, Microsoft and Yahoo about their surveillance. But in the case of Cisco, their sale of PoliceNet and other means by which the Communist dictatorship could surveil, and then apprehend, and then of course what follows then is torture and long prison sentences.

One of the men that Yahoo coughed up was Shi Tao, who you all recall—I know you recall it—you're shaking your head. I know you recall it well—a wonderful guy, a journalist who contacted a New York NGO and said, This is what we're told we cannot do when Tiananmen Square's anniversary comes around.

And for that, he got 10 years. And who gave them that information? Yahoo—they gave personally identifiable information, which

then was used as actionable police state information, to not only get him, but then they collect other people—or arrest them, I should say. Then they interrogate them with torture, and then they cough up other names.

So we're bearing terrible fruit of inaction for years. And as the Chairman said, it's gone far beyond PoliceNet—I am saying that, but it has gone far beyond the original tools of repression that a legitimate police force can and should use. And now it's so far beyond that.

I introduced a bill called the Global Online Freedom Act. One of the titles in that had to do with—just like we do with South Africa, prohibiting, proscribing certain police useable items that a repressive police state can use to gather up religious freedom activists, human rights activists, as in the case of the Uyghurs because of their ethnicity, and their religion, the Muslim Uyghurs.

I couldn't get the bill passed. The K Street lobbyists came, and they descended upon the Foreign Affairs Committee. When we had the markup, I had people on the Democrat side and some on the Republican side saying that I can't—I couldn't get the bill out of committee.

Now we've got John Boehner, our former Speaker, joining in the chorus of lobbyists for a dictatorship. If he speaks truth to power behind closed doors, and more than that, that would be great. But if he then comes up here and just promotes the bottom line of Beijing, of Xi Jinping, who is now one of the rivals for Mao Zedong when it comes to human rights abuse, we have a problem.

So, again, I would ask you again and plead with you, we've got to make sure, like we did with South Africa and others in the past, make sure all of these items—and when there's a dual-use capability that seemingly is benign for a commercial use but also has a political or a police application, that we go all out to make sure that that is on an export control regime.

So if you could speak to that, because I think we have been asleep at the switch. The Obama Administration, now Trump, during the Bush Administration, we could not get any traction. China has always been treated in a way that I have found baffling.

The people of China are great people. They don't have the government they deserve. They have a dictatorship that represses them. Why do we enable dictatorship by giving them these tools of repression? So if you'd like to respond to that? This is the consequence, I think, of gross inaction over the course of many years.

Mr. CHRISTINO. Sir, we do control quite a bit of items that are used in the way you describe. We control fingerprint analyzers, automated fingerprint retrieval systems, voiceprint identification, along with the more traditional law enforcement items normally used by a police force.

We also look very carefully at information technology items, including computer penetration forensics tools to try to ensure that we are appropriately controlling these items so they are not used—I should say misused—in the manner that you have described.

We continue to work with our interagency partners, primarily the Department of State, specifically the Bureau of Human Rights and Labor, the East Asia Pacific Bureau, etc., to ensure that we are capturing the right items. And if we cannot capture the item,

that we are capturing the end use or the entities. So we'll continue to do that.

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you, Chairman Smith. And thank you again for hosting this, for convening this important and very timely hearing today.

At USUN, we're focused on what we're seeing as the end result of the—I think—the policy approach that you outlined of believing that China was going to rise peacefully and was going to engage in political reform as it opened up economically. That clearly has not happened. I think that that's not a secret to anyone at this point, that that has not been the outcome that those who supported and advocated that policy desired.

So now we are dealing with the consequences of a China that has grown rich and powerful and is increasingly authoritarian in its behavior both at home and abroad. What we're seeing, which is incredibly disturbing for us and which we are trying to find ways to combat every day at USUN, goes beyond what we, I think, had become accustomed to in terms of defensive strategies where China would use its position and various bodies to block criticism of it in the Human Rights Council or in other places. What we're now seeing is an effort by China to actually try to transform the entire normative framework of human rights.

And when I say that, what I'm talking about is substituting what we all think of as the normative framework of human rights, of rights that attach at the individual level, basic God-given human rights—in the parlance of the American way of thinking about this, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of association—to transform the whole human rights system into what the Chinese characterize as one based on “win-win” cooperation or mutually beneficial cooperation between states and a system that prioritizes the concerns of governments, rather than prioritizing their responsibility to respect the human rights of their citizens. And what we're seeing at the UN, both in New York and across the UN system, is deeply concerning in this regard. The Chinese are using all of the tools of state power, all of their capabilities, to try to undermine the normative framework of human rights. And they're doing it in a way that is both blatant, as well as under the radar.

So we are fighting back against it whenever we can. We are trying to block them from putting the language of “win-win” and mutually beneficial cooperation into resolutions at the UN, which they are doing across the board. We are trying to block them from using the development system of the UN to undermine efforts to promote good governance, anti-corruption, and human rights as part of the package of responsible development behavior, something that they are doing through a variety of means. And we are also fighting to make sure that voices of civil society can be heard at the UN, including people like Uyghur activist Dolkan Isa, who the Chinese have tried to block from participating in UN fora.

So at USUN, we are, I think, very cognizant of the threat that the situation poses and are working very hard on a daily basis. Our biggest challenge right now is that we are relatively alone in this. And in a situation where you have got 193 member states, many of whom can be persuaded by some of the tools that Senator Rubio

mentioned, about the Belt and Road Initiative, about the amount, about the kind of relationships that the Chinese are building across the developing world, in particular, but not just the developing world.

We are really struggling to gain traction in terms of getting other member states to join us in this effort to push back on even things as simple as the debt that the Chinese system is building, the unsustainable debt levels in development that the Chinese are creating with developing countries.

So it is a massive struggle. This administration takes it very seriously, and everything from where you heard the White House push back on the Chinese political correctness with trying to force U.S. businesses to change their websites on Taiwan, to what we are doing every day at USUN. We are taking these threats seriously. We are looking for every opportunity to try to push back on them. And we are very serious about standing up for the human rights of the Chinese people, in particular, calling more attention to the situation in Xinjiang because it is deeply underreported, as Senator Rubio noted.

Cochairman SMITH. I will be very brief because I know my time is running out or has run out.

Ambassador Currie, thank you for your leadership. And Nikki Haley, please convey to her that I stand in great respect—I think we all do—for all of the work that she has done. She is often a lone voice, as our delegation and you have been tenacious.

The redefinition of human rights is exactly what the Soviet Union tried to do in the 80s and 90s. They used to say, Oh, look America, you have a terrible problem of homelessness. Therefore, we have a better situation than you do because nobody's on the street. Yeah, they're all in the gulag or in the psychiatric hospital.

But that said, we address our humanitarian needs, but as you pointed out, they're not fundamental human rights—and they are seeking redefinition.

Mr. Chairman, I held a series of hearings in my subcommittee—that's the Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights Committee—on the influence of Chinese soft power, particularly this indebtedness issue, which is putting the African countries in huge debt where even more power can be exerted by the Chinese. And then they call in those chits in the UN, with just what you are finding—us standing alone on this.

But hopefully for the Uyghurs and for the people suffering in the autonomous region, they will join us in that. They are even trying to influence Europe, amazingly. And they're having an impact.

So thank you for your leadership.

Chairman RUBIO. Senator King.

Senator KING. Well, first I want to thank both Chairman Smith and Chairman Rubio for their passion and attention to this issue. It's troubling to say the least.

The first thing I would do, Mr. Chairman, is submit for the record a long story that appeared in *The Economist* on May 31, that outlines this problem. I think this is a dramatic statement of exactly what we're talking about and the horror of it. As I read it, all I could think of was my youthful reading of "1984" and "Brave

New World.” It is technology turned on its head to enslave people instead of to liberate them.

I was also recently reading about the period of the 1930s and the reluctance of America principally, but other countries, to recognize what was going on in Germany. There was an almost deliberate blind eye turned to what was being done. And of course, it wasn’t until a decade later that we realized the full horror of the Holocaust. I’ve often thought of the difficulty that that question presents; What if we had known in detail, specifically in the 30s, what was going on in Germany? What then would our obligations have been?

It seems to me that we are at a similar moment, only we have more information. We know what’s going on. We don’t know the exact details, but we know about reeducation camps, we know about—as the Chairman recited—people being forced to change their names, violate religious practices, modern-day apartheid. We do know about it. So what do we do?

So, Ambassador, I appreciate your coming, number one, and I appreciate the statements that you’ve made. But it seems to me that what we really need is a—it’s not as if we have no relations with China. We have detailed interconnections, trade, culture, many exchanges, ambassadors, the whole deal. What can we do? What are the levers that we have? Because I don’t want somebody reading the history of this period and looking back 30 years from now or 50 years from now and saying, America tolerated a holocaust or something similar. What are the levers of power that we have that we can exert in this situation in order to try to bring this country, this wonderful country to its senses in terms of what they are doing to these people?

Ambassador, give me a laundry list.

Ambassador CURRIE. I wish I had a laundry list. Right now what we can do at USUN is help to shine a light on the situation. I think that the severity, the scope, and the magnitude of this situation have really only become clear—I would say—in the past few months. We had been hearing stories more or less sporadically that this was happening, but some of the research that Senator Rubio cited, the looking at the tender offers, and understanding, being able to map those things, and then as the stories—the Chinese have done an excellent job of attempting to keep this under wraps, of not allowing reporters to go into Xinjiang and actually report directly on what is happening, including our diplomats. So it has been a serious challenge to really get a handle on the scope and severity of this.

So I am not saying that as an excuse that—we are just now really starting to understand the scope of it. So we are starting to shine a light on it and looking for more opportunities to do that. And this hearing is an important one today.

Senator KING. But I think developing a laundry list is important.

Ambassador CURRIE. And we have the tools. The tools are the tools in the human rights world. They exist. It’s always a matter of political will for us about where we choose to use them.

I think today’s Ministerial on International Religious Freedom where this topic will be discussed—it was mentioned in Secretary Pompeo’s op-ed yesterday. It was mentioned, and it will be men-

tioned this week during the Ministerial. And I think that, for us, part of it at this point is educating, frankly speaking, a number of countries that are not as aware as we are at this point of what is going on, because when I raised it with colleagues at the UN, many of my colleagues, including in the Muslim world, have no idea this is even happening.

Senator KING. I think that is an important point because if there is anything we have learned in the last 20 years about sanctions, for example, they are much more effective if they are multilateral, much more effective. And I think a very important point is to talk to the rest of the world and say, it's nice that they are offering to build you a bridge, but understand that it comes with a price and the price may be paid by innocent people in this province of China.

So I think that's an important part, but I hope that you will—the administration will develop a set of options, policy options that can begin to not only express disapproval or shine a light on the problem, but really have some direct impact because this doesn't reflect well on the Chinese people.

It mars what would otherwise be something that might be positive in terms of assisting undeveloped parts of the world. But if it's done at the price of having to tolerate this, it's certainly not in the interests of the people of China or the people of the world.

Mr. Christino, I think if anything has come through, I hope, this morning, it's that we feel very strongly that, to the extent of your authority, we have really got to have renewed attention to the export of technology that is being used to develop what appears now to be the world's most advanced police state. I mean, the idea of having people that move in, that adopt a family, police stations 200 meters apart, thousands if not millions of surveillance cameras, iris scans, blood samples taken under false pretenses. I mean, this is really the stuff of science fiction, and horrible science fiction at that.

So I don't want it to be business as usual at your office. This is a new challenge, as the Ambassador said. It has come into focus in the last several months, the last year. So I hope your office will renew its attention to this and be much more alert to the potential use of this technology. And my view is, even if there is a legitimate use for it, if it can be used for this purpose, it should be under additional scrutiny if not outright sanction by your office.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUBIO. Senator Cotton.

Senator COTTON. I'll just continue where Senator King left off. Even if there is a legitimate use to it, why would we sell it to China? Why would we authorize it to be sold to China? I mean, they're not France. They're not Sweden. So I don't think we should sell it to China regardless, even if there is a legitimate use. And if the administration can't do it with existing authorities, then perhaps Congress should explore giving you more authorities to do so.

Mr. Christino, I know you have a lot of experience in this field. Did we sell crowd control and policing equipment and technology to the Soviet Union when it existed?

Mr. CHRISTINO. No, sir.

Senator COTTON. Why would we sell it to China now since China is our number one geopolitical rival going forward in the coming

decades. They're plainly using this kind of technology in Xinjiang to oppress their own people and to build their national power in a way to challenge us. I mean, one of the reasons China has been able to turn its focus outward onto the blue seas and challenge us inside the first island chain and in the South China Sea is that they've gained greater control of their internal borders, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet.

I turn now, Ambassador Currie, to you, and something you said earlier—I want to just explore a little bit further and ask if you could elaborate and talk about the concept of a pilot program. Some of these techniques were first piloted in Tibet. Now they've been rolled out on a greater and more advanced scale in Xinjiang, potentially going to the rest of China.

Could you elaborate, please, on that?

Ambassador CURRIE. Certainly, Senator Cotton.

I think our understanding is that after the 2008 events in Lhasa and the protests that took place then across the Tibetan Plateau, the Chinese authorities came in with a much more aggressive approach to policing and social control in Tibet. And they began both with policing, with the closely spaced police stations, the intense surveillance, and the control over religious institutions and cultural institutions, the massive political education, the pressure on state employees from teachers to policemen to doctors of Tibetan extraction who were forced to take political education classes, much more intensive management of monasteries in Tibet.

They fused that approach with what we might call community-based policing if it were being done for a proper purpose, but which in this case is really just community-based oppression—they fused that with a technological edge in Xinjiang and doubled down on it. And they added some very particular aspects to it in terms of the legal restrictions that they've passed into regulations and have made more of a—put it under law, which is something that the Chinese like to do to kind of create a thin veneer of legality over the forms of oppression that they're using against these minority communities.

Senator COTTON. Thank you for that. I suspect that is what is going to happen. It will be rolled out substantially throughout the country.

Also another issue that was touched upon briefly earlier, the Belt and Road Initiative—pretty tall mountains down there in Tibet. It is hard to get a road through there. So the road in the Belt and Road Initiative, presumably is going primarily through Xinjiang province into Central Asia and then perhaps all the way into Europe. How closely connected is the oppression that we see in Xinjiang province to that Belt and Road Initiative, which of course is a direct challenge to the United States' position as the world's leading economy and the global military superpower?

Ambassador CURRIE. Security along the belt and road is a major human rights challenge, not just inside China's borders but across them. They definitely are insistent on having a high degree of security through key corridors, and Xinjiang is one of those key corridors.

Part of it—it goes beyond, also, the repression directed at the Muslim minority communities in Xinjiang. And what we're seeing

in addition to the repression directed at those communities is the continued incentivization of in-migration and other activities to encourage the growth of the non-Uyghur, non-Kazakh, non-Muslim population.

Senator COTTON. By in-migration—to call a spade a spade—you mean, essentially, colonization, right?

Ambassador CURRIE. That is—it could be characterized—

Senator COTTON. The data I have here in front of me says that in 1949, Xinjiang had 7 percent Han Chinese. Today it's up to 40 percent.

Ambassador CURRIE. Some experts have characterized it as colonization, yes. What we've seen there is also that the Chinese residents of Xinjiang tend to dominate the businesses. They get the state contracts, and they are involved in the actual infrastructure development that is linked to the Belt and Road.

Senator COTTON. Again, to call a spade a spade, the Chinese there are dominating the businesses. They are dominating the businesses because the Chinese Communist Party is empowering them to have those businesses and disempowering all the native-born Muslim Uyghurs or Kazakhs, or other minorities in Xinjiang?

Ambassador CURRIE. Yes.

Senator COTTON. One final question. We talked earlier about the loss of a market for American companies and things like crowd control or policing technique, or more cutting-edge technology that can be used for those things like DNA mapping and facial recognition technology. One common argument you hear from American companies is, Well, if we do not sell it to them, someone is going to sell it to them, right? It reminds me of the old line that a communist's definition of a capitalist is a man who will sell us the rope with which we hang him.

But I just want to ask you, who are the countries whose companies could pick up that business? And maybe, Mr. Christino, this is better directed to you as well. If we stop selling this kind of technology to China, in which countries around the world are the companies located that would pick up that business from American companies?

Mr. CHRISTINO. Well, with regard specifically to the DNA sequencers that were mentioned prominently earlier during the hearing, they're made essentially all over the world. It's relatively simple technology. It's not very cutting-edge technology. It has been around for at least 30 years. Some of the main manufacturers are actually in China itself. And you don't even need the item, the sequencer, in many cases. As we see on TV all the time, there's a great deal of advertising for DNA analysis. It's simply a swab and send. So there's plenty of opportunity for the Chinese security services to continue to do what they're doing without U.S. items.

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Currie, do you have any response to that one?

Ambassador CURRIE. I would agree with my colleague that the Chinese, not just in this area of technology, but they, as part of the Made in China 2025 Drive and 2050 Drive, they have definitely—the goal there is to make China technologically self-sufficient so that even if we do put export controls on all manner of things, then

they would be able to produce them domestically without having to rely on external sources for items such as this.

Senator COTTON. OK. Thank you both.

Chairman RUBIO. I have just two quick comments and a quick question. Then I know Congressman Smith does as well before we turn to our second panel. We want to thank you both for being here.

Your answer to Senator Cotton's last question almost sounds like, They're going to do it anyway, so we might as well allow our companies to make some money on it. And I'm not saying that's what your intention is in representing it that way, but that's sort of the logical conclusion of it. This technology is widely available. This is not going to be able to stop them from doing it. And what I hope you'll take back to Commerce is, I don't believe that any of us who are calling for this technology, like the DNA sequencer, to be prohibited believe that doing so will prohibit them—or stop them from doing this. We just don't want American companies to be participants in it.

And I think that's the bigger point for us as a nation. You can buy crowd control equipment. China will sell you crowd control equipment. They'll sell you anything. They don't care about your human rights record, democracy, anything like that. If you have the cash, they'll sell it to you. That does not mean that we go—we still deny the sale of certain equipment. And it brings to light another point, and that is our laws have to keep pace with our technology. What is used to control crowds today is different from what it may have been 10, 15, 20 years ago. And that includes technological advances.

To that point—did you want to add something on that point?

Senator KING. Well I just wanted to point out that this is exactly the argument that was made in Britain to justify the sale of Rolls Royce engines to the Luftwaffe in 1935. It was a bad argument then, and it's a bad argument now because the issue you are talking about is complicity. I don't want to be complicit in this.

Chairman RUBIO. Agreed.

And talking about the other thing that I think this brings to light is, if you read through the regs and how they describe crowd control and suppression, it's all 20th century technology and it's still used. But in the 21st century, technology increasingly plays a role.

I'll give you one example; the use of intense security measures to surveillance technology. We know, for example, the Chinese are now using in a particular region, in specific, facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations.

It appears focused on using much of the surveillance and data collected to monitor and repress Uyghurs. In fact, the authorities reportedly integrate a lot of this surveillance. So they're taking data from all sorts of things—the computer, smartphones, closed circuit cameras, license plates, ID cards, individual family planning and banking records, information on their international travel—they're taking all of this information and they're running it through something that's called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. And they're using that data—all of that data—to identify

people that they think should be subject to investigation and potential detention.

In essence, how they're defining who to put in these camps is the process of an algorithm that's looking at all of this data they're collecting on people and deciding from it who they should be detaining. And here's why I point that out. A key component of that in the 21st century is going to be artificial intelligence, the ability to learn from the gathering of data the way a human would and improve it each and every time. And I raise that only because there's a tremendous irony in this room here today. That picture that we have of a camp and how it grew comes from Google Earth.

Google recently dropped out of a contract with the Department of Defense, on Project Maven, artificial intelligence—because its employees do not want to be involved with the American Government and the DoD working on the use of artificial intelligence to potentially harm people.

At the same time, Google has opened up an AI China Center. And basically anything you do in China that's technological, if you think you're going to constrain it to just the private sector, you're crazy. All of it will be shared with the military and with the repressive forces that are doing this. And Google has no excuse. They know that this is happening because they've got pictures of it. That's Google Earth.

So that's just one more example of the hypocrisy of an American company that knows this is happening, doesn't want to give AI technology to the military because God forbid we may use it one day to target a terrorist or someone who wants to harm America, but has no problem opening up a center of AI in China knowing full well that anything you do in China—if it's a benefit to the military, they're going to use it. If it's a benefit to their security services, they're going to use it.

And my last question—this is a question. We've raised the issue of Global Magnitsky sanctions; the purpose of Global Magnitsky sanctions was to be able to identify an individual doing horrible things and be able to impose sanctions upon them. We clearly know horrible things are happening here to the Uyghurs in their area. And we know that there are individuals who are at least making the decision, and most certainly individuals that are applying those decisions.

What is happening within State now? Is there consideration being made? Is there deliberation? Is there talk? What are the chances of being able to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions to individuals that we know are in charge of these regions and, at the highest levels, have to be held responsible for what's happening?

Ambassador CURRIE. Well as you know, Global Magnitsky is a rolling determination dataset where we are constantly looking at individuals who are involved with either serious corruption issues or gross human rights abuses. It's an interagency process. It's not the State Department alone that manages that process. In fact, the final determination and the final check on that is actually with the Treasury Department. But it is an interagency process, and the State Department does play an important role in identifying targets and helping to move them through the process, build the data packages around Global Magnitsky.

I cannot speak to specific individuals that may be being chosen or being looked at for sanctions, but what I can say is that we do see the Global Magnitsky sanctions as an important tool to help identify abusers and bring them—and use the ability of the United States to sanction those individuals, limit their access to the U.S. financial system and block them from being able to—in some cases, even seize assets that they may have in the U.S. financial system.

If there are suggestions that the Commission has for individuals that the Department should be looking at, I would encourage you to forward those to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, because they generally start the process rolling with determinations, and I'd be happy to take anything back that you have.

Chairman RUBIO. Well, you can count on—we most certainly have ideas about individuals and it's probably not a complete list. We're open to adding more people as this continues. My only takeaway is, as you go back, and however this form reaches the decision-makers in the interagency, to the extent that the Department of State is involved in the interagency, we just—I can't speak for everyone else, but I think there'd be a consensus on the Commission and across Congress that if ever there was a model case for how we intended Global Magnitsky to be used as a tool, this would be it . . . because there is most clearly abuse happening.

Wherever there is abuse, there are abusers. And in the case of China, those abusers—if they're high enough in government—are almost guaranteed to not just have U.S. visas, but either they or their families have some access to either the U.S. financial system, our universities, and are enjoying—that's just the way it works for high-ranking individuals. They like to travel the world, and they like to spend money in the U.S. So if ever there was an example of where Magnitsky could be powerful in making a statement about where we stand on this issue, we believe this is one of them, and we will most certainly continue to push for it and offer suggestions about individuals.

Congressman Smith, you have the final questions.

Cochairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just let me add my strong endorsement to what you just said about Global Magnitsky. I am the author of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004—great pushback when we did it. Lukashenko, the dictator in Belarus, was sanctioned along with about 200 other people. I went there twice, went to Minsk. The first time he called me “public enemy number one,” but one by one every political prisoner got out of prison. And it applied not just to him, but to his family and to other families of his group that were committing gross human rights violations.

So it does work. The Global Magnitsky Act, and the Magnitsky Act itself, targeted toward Russia, is a tool of surpassing capability.

I hope we would do a data call to our embassy in Beijing, to our Ambassador Branstad and say, Give us the names—it's got to really come—if they're not going to initiate it, and they probably won't, it will come from Washington, I would hope, and say, Who is responsible for this horrific carnage being imposed upon the Muslim Uyghurs?

Rebiya Kadeer, who is here, her courage is—she should win the Nobel Peace Prize for her courage. As a matter of fact, in the past,

many of us have asked that that happen, and she should be present as well.

I cannot tell you how concerned all of us are. We've got six Radio Free Asia families who are missing or are incarcerated as part of this massive World War II-type roundup. This is now similar to what the Nazis did in terms of the massiveness of gathering people for torture and the like.

So the Magnitsky Act is just sitting there like low-hanging fruit, tools that absolutely have to be deployed. And make up a list, like I said—the second time I met with Lukashenko, he was all sweetness and light. He's still a dictator. But all the political prisoners have been released, to the best of our knowledge.

On another related issue—in 2000, I wrote the Admiral Nance/Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act. One of the provisions we put in there said that anyone who is complicit with forced abortion or forced sterilization, which during the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal was properly construed to be a crime against humanity for its Nazi usage against Poles and others; it is just as much a crime against humanity today.

We know that China itself is missing 62 million women, girls, who have been eviscerated from their population by sex selection abortion. We know that it's been used as a genocidal tool against the Tibetans and against the Uyghurs. Nobody ever seems to talk about it except the Chairman and me, perhaps a small number of others. It is like the topic that you don't bring up because the choice community will look askance at this. These women are being horribly and forcibly aborted. Sometimes they bring—and it is being used as a tool of genocide to eliminate the Muslim Uyghurs in that country.

You have an additional tool sitting there since 2000. It was not used by the Obama administration. I brought it up over and over again in hearings. I said you may disagree with me on the right to life and the fact that unborn children ought to be protected from the violence of abortion, but here we are talking about forced abortion. Can we not even have agreement there to try to protect people from this violence that is being imposed upon them?

So you have another tool I would ask you to revisit, especially as it relates to the Muslim Uyghurs—because they are using it. I intervened in one case, brought to us by some good friends of a woman who had been brought in with about 25 to 30 cadres, family planning cadres, police escorts, to have her Muslim child aborted. I talked to the ambassador here—to China—talked to our ambassador, our U.S. Ambassador, and that one child got a reprieve and was saved. But one among millions being slaughtered.

So please look at the Admiral Nance/Meg Donovan provision to see if that could be brought out and used, get the dust off of it because I think it'll make a difference. And, again, like the Chairman said, the Magnitsky Act . . . you get a list of a couple of hundred—to start off with—names, and then they cannot come here. They cannot send their kids to NYU, which has a—I spoke at NYU a couple of years ago on human rights in Shanghai. Let's get it all out there. Okay, you're done. Your families don't come here because of your egregious violations of human rights.

So please, Magnitsky—this is a textbook case of where it should be utilized. And I implore you, and again, the Chairman, I thank you for again pulling together this extremely important hearing.

And, again, I do thank you, Ambassador, both of you, for your leadership at the UN. You've been extraordinary despite what the Human Rights Council does, which unfortunately majors in hypocrisy, focuses on Israel to the exclusion of the real human rights abuses, and Nikki Haley has called that out so courageously. And we thank her for that.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

And we have a second panel we want to get to as quickly as possible because I know Senator King needs to go. I know Congressman Smith has votes. But Senator Daines is here and I know he had a few questions for this panel before we turn it over.

Would our next panelists start getting ready because we are going to jump into it pretty quick?

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Chairman Smith. I thank you for holding this hearing, and I want to thank the witnesses for coming here today.

I spent more than half a decade in China in the private sector. In fact, I had two children born in Hong Kong. I lived in Guangzhou. I've led congressional visits to China every year since I've been in the United States Senate. I have had the opportunity to travel across the country in Xinjiang. I have been in Ürümqi as well. I've seen the prominent Uyghur Muslim populations. I have been in Tibet and seen the Buddhist monks. I just recently was in Dandong along the North Korean border. This has allowed me to see firsthand the pervasive censorship and the challenges the Chinese people face, as well as the efforts made by the Chinese government to extend their influence beyond their borders.

As your testimonies suggest, the State Department Human Rights Report and numerous others indicate the situation in Xinjiang is dire for its Uyghur population. Whether it's pervasive surveillance, the destruction of thousands of mosques, or the detention of hundreds of thousands in so-called "reeducation camps," as well as indefinite detentions, it's critically important that we, as a nation founded on freedom and the rule of law, bring our influence to bear to advance human rights in China and around the world.

Ambassador Currie, what do you see as China's endgame as it relates to the persecution and the repression of its Uyghur population? Is this cultural, economic, religious, or some other combination?

Ambassador CURRIE. Thank you for that question.

We would say that it's all of those things. It is a combination of those elements with an additional aspect of political control. What we see is an effort to sinicize religion and to bring—the Chinese Communist Party feels the need to control anything that is not under its immediate control. So it does put a lot of constraints on all religious activity in China. And because of the global nature, in particular of Islam and Christianity as well, those two religions tend to come in for particular scrutiny and particular suspicion from the authorities, and for a much more coercive and much more restrictive approach.

So I believe that in Xinjiang and in the case of the Uyghur population, in particular, there is an absolute—the State Department sees an effort to sinicize religion and to bring the practices of Uyghur Muslims into line with a level of religiosity that the Party finds acceptable. And bearing in mind that the Party is itself an atheist entity, we can surmise that that is a very low level of religiosity, and one that is very limited in terms of being—limited in terms of its international relations and connections outside of China.

Senator DAINES. Ambassador Currie, are there any particular tools or technologies that would be helpful for the U.S. Government or NGOs to support to assist those persecuted populations?

Ambassador CURRIE. The tools that the United States is using in terms of Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, getting the truth in to people, giving—and then making sure that we are also reporting on the situation there, are particularly important. Information is obviously critical here.

Our ability to understand what is going on in Xinjiang is limited by the efforts of the Chinese government to cover up and mask what they're doing. So the more that we can use information technology, both to inform our own population and our allies and other countries about what's happening as well as to make the people of China aware of what is happening in other parts of the country as well as the concerns that are taking place outside of China regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities and that these practices are not consistent with respect for international human rights.

I believe that those are the things that the U.S. Government can use to try to address the problem in terms of technology. Beyond that, I think that we are—a lot of it is about old-fashioned diplomacy and doing our jobs better of educating our colleagues at the UN, for instance, about the scope of what's going on and just trying to work and grow the coalition of countries that are concerned around this issue.

Senator DAINES. Yes, I remain very concerned since my visits out to western China a couple of years ago, the thousands of mosques that have been demolished. And whether it's the Muslim people, Christian people, the level of persecution—by all accounts, all reports we're receiving here—is reaching levels that are virtually unprecedented in modern history in China.

It is extending here to the United States, hearing reports from Chinese students who are being called by professors back in China saying, Do not associate and go to faith-based activities. This is something that we haven't seen, and I remain very, very concerned.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

Thank you both for being here. Ambassador Currie, thank you for making the trip. Thank you, Mr. Christino as well. We appreciate it. We are grateful. This was very insightful. Thank you.

Our next panel will come forward. And as you guys get positioned, Members will fluctuate in and out. Congressman Smith had to leave. The House has votes. Members here have meetings and different activities.

We certainly don't want to curtail your testimony. It is important to hear your stories. Know that your full testimony is going to be in the record.

We are probably going to have a hard stop in this meeting at 12:10 or 12:15. So the less—the shorter you can get those statements, the more time we can have to engage with you on some details that I think will be enlightening for the Commission and for our record.

[Pause.]

Chairman RUBIO. All right. Okay.

Thank you all for being here. Ms. Hoja, we will begin with you and your testimony. Thank you for being here. I have read your full statement. It is very compelling. We want to hear more from you today and I look forward to engaging with you. Thank you for being here.

**STATEMENT OF GULCHEHRA HOJA, UYGHUR SERVICE
JOURNALIST, RADIO FREE ASIA**

Ms. HOJA. Thank you. As-Salaam-Alaikum. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cochairman, and Members of the Commission, it's my privilege to participate in today's hearing on a topic that deeply affects me personally and professionally.

My name is Gulchehra Hoja. I am a journalist with Radio Free Asia's Uyghur Language Service, and I am a U.S. citizen. Given the time, I will not read my full statement, but share my story.

I grew up in Ürümqi, the capital of the Uyghur region in China, where I began my career in broadcast journalism before coming to the United States in 2001 to work for Radio Free Asia. It was a great sacrifice to leave my homeland. I left behind a successful career as a television journalist. I also left my home, my parents, my family, and my friends. But coming here guaranteed me freedom—something that could never be realized in China. Being part of Radio Free Asia—which reports on the true daily news happening in the Uyghur region—was the dream of a lifetime.

As I testify before you today, it grieves me no end to say that my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my relatives in China are missing—almost certainly held in what are called reeducation camps run by the Chinese government.

I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was detained at the end of September last year. Police had taken him when he was driving my mother to a doctor's appointment, leaving her alone in the car without any explanation. She waited for her son who would never return. Kaisar was being held in one of the so-called reeducation centers in Ürümqi. We have not seen him since.

In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from life-threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my mother and father, or to learn how they were doing, was almost too much to bear. I tried contacting other family but could not reach them. And I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their children—more than 20 people had been swept up by authorities on the same day. No one has confirmed where they are being held, but I strongly suspect they are in the camps, which sources say hold more than 1 million Uyghurs in extremely poor conditions.

My parents were held in a medical facility in the detention camps. They were allowed to leave in March—maybe because of their poor health. Authorities have questioned my parents about me, where I am, and my work for an organization they claim is “anti-China.”

Many of my Uyghur colleagues at the RFA share the same situation. Their families are also missing, detained and jailed after receiving threats about their work at RFA. I hope and pray for my family to be let go and released, but I know even if that happens, they will still live under constant threat. Despite these threats, I know, and my colleagues know, that we must continue because of the important role we have as a source of truth for Uyghur people.

I came to the United States to realize a dream, a dream of being able to tell the truth without fear. It may be difficult, but I will keep trying and I will never give up.

Thank you so much.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Gulchehra Hoja appears in the Appendix.]

Chairman RUBIO. Professor Thum.

Mr. THUM. Thank you to the Chairs and to the committee for organizing this incredibly important hearing.

STATEMENT OF RIAN THUM, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS

I would like to submit my written testimony for the record and just emphasize a few interpretive points here because we have a lot of the data on the table already.

The first point I'd like to make is that this is an emergency that is developing as we speak. Those numbers of several hundred thousand to over a million Uyghurs, 5 to 10 percent of the Uyghur population disappearing into these internment camps, are based on estimates from January, data that came out in January about what happened in the previous year. We have had another six months. People have continued to disappear and very few people, usually sick people, have been released.

We see new camps being built in the satellite imagery and we have new advertisements from the Xinjiang authorities asking for construction companies to build additional camps. The last one to appear is about a 400,000-square-foot facility that will probably come on line sometime between September and December.

This enormous and growing scale is important not just in an absolute sense, where we have the feeling that maybe if it crosses a big enough number the world will care, but also as a proportion of the number of community members who disappear. This is something you can see on the streets in southern Xinjiang, in the closed buildings, the closed shops, the closed houses, people who've disappeared. You can see it in one county in Kashgar where 18 orphanages have been built—according to a Financial Times report—in the last year alone to house the children of those who have been sent to the detention camps.

My second point that I want to make is about the goals of these camps, which is something that was asked about earlier. These camps serve multiple goals. They serve the explicit goal—which

many Chinese officials seem to really believe in—of changing the way people think through force, of purifying them of supposedly bad ideas and inculcating love for the Party and for Xi Jinping. They also serve to remove certain demographics from the population, especially 20- to 40-year-olds, which police have explicitly targeted. And, of course, they serve as the background disciplinary threat that upholds the totalitarian micromanagement of Uyghurs' everyday activities and cultural expression.

But the frightening thing is that what we know from history is that when you get large detention systems that are operating in legal gray zones, or in this case perhaps even an entirely extralegal zone, there is a lot of room for improvisation on the part of those who are running those camps. So the most frightening purpose is the one that hasn't occurred yet. And while right now torture and deaths in the camp seem to be happening at pretty low levels, that can change. In fact, I don't think we can rule out the possibility of mass murder.

The third point I want to make—and I will do it briefly—is that the camps are not the only problem. Although I have emphasized it here because they are easy to summarize, if you take them out of the picture, we're still looking at one of the most oppressive police states in the world with—as Senator Rubio mentioned—a system of racism very similar to apartheid.

My last major point I want to make is about the deeper causes of this. This is a colonial settler operation. And it is—contrary to some opinions—not explicitly about religion per se.

The Chinese Communist Party, despite being avowedly atheist, has a great deal of tolerance for what they see as Chinese religions being practiced by ethnic Chinese. When it comes to a foreign religion or a religion seen as Chinese, like Buddhism, practiced by non-Chinese, like Tibetans, that story changes. And it becomes even more intense when it's Islam because the Chinese Communist Party over the last 20 years or so has adopted American and European discourses of Islamophobia which they picked up largely through cooperation with the U.S. global war on terror.

Because of that, this is a deeply entrenched worldview of Chinese officials behind this, and I do not think, for that reason, that we can convince Chinese officials to change their path based on data about how it will improve the internal situation. I think instead—they think this is working. So we need to make this not a domestic issue, but a global issue.

And I see that I am out of time, so I will end there.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Professor Rian Thum appears in the Appendix.]

Chairman RUBIO. Ms. Batke.

**STATEMENT OF JESSICA BATKE, SENIOR EDITOR, CHINAFILE,
AND FORMER RESEARCH ANALYST AT THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE**

Ms. BATKE. Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to speak today.

I am here in a personal capacity, so I am only representing myself. Others have very ably already discussed what is happening in Xinjiang, so I won't use my time on that. Instead, first I'd like to talk a little bit about terminology. I believe that if we are to treat what is happening in Xinjiang with the seriousness and alarm that it merits, we first need to accurately label what it is we are witnessing.

Official Chinese sources refer to these as "transformation through education centers" or "counter-extremism centers." And outside China, they are frequently called "reeducation camps."

But from what we've heard today, we know these are somewhat euphemistic characterizations and they do not clearly and precisely define what it is we are witnessing. Some observers have called them concentration camps based on a definition of the state—for reasons of state security, targeting particular ethnic and religious minorities and confining them into certain spaces. Other people have wondered whether these camps—because they are interning religious and ethnic minorities—could presage something much worse, like ethnic cleansing.

And while I am not an expert in international law and I don't feel I have standing to offer the legal term of art which most accurately defines what we're seeing, I think the U.S. Government and the international community, in general, needs to think very hard about what is happening in these camps and what we should call them, and whether they are an early warning sign of something much worse to come.

Turning to the Chinese leadership—despite a general lack of insight into Chinese leadership politics, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo's role in this is unusually clear. His tenure coincides not only with the large-scale use of these camps, but as you noted, with the building of thousands of convenience police stations, with a massive increase in security personnel hiring and overall security spending, and as we know now, a massive increase in arrests as well.

And this pattern of securitization, as was previously mentioned, echoes very clearly Chen Quanguo's security policies in another ethnic minority region in China—Tibet—when he was Party Secretary there from 2011 to 2016. But though Chen has been directly responsible for overseeing these policies, neither Chen nor the policies themselves are *sui generis*. They clearly fit into a larger policy trend of criminalization of ethnic and religious identity, and that traces from central-level guidance, at least from 2014 if not earlier, down through regional regulations and local implementation.

So what is the impact beyond Xinjiang? Domestically, surveillance capabilities and restrictive measures could be employed, and indeed, by some accounts they are already being employed, against other ethnic or religious minorities in China.

Internationally, as we've discussed, Uyghurs in exile are not only surveilled, but they can be coerced into reporting on fellow Uyghurs back to Chinese state security authorities. Other governments have assisted China in forcibly repatriating ethnic minorities back to Xinjiang.

And finally, there is the issue of Chinese government pressure, even indirectly, often encouraging self-censorship among those of us who are here working and writing on China.

So I am going to make a few policy recommendations. It is a mistake to think that staying silent on human rights in China is a neutral act. Instead, every instance of silence just resets Beijing's expectations and it raises the psychic cost of reinjecting human rights back into the conversation later. Beijing still does care about its international reputation, meaning that both public and diplomatic pressure can be effective tools in encouraging change.

My full recommendations are in my written statement, but I'll just highlight a few of them here:

- First, to maintain a clear, consistent, and full-throated public defense of human rights and religious freedom in Xinjiang in addition to direct diplomatic engagement.
- To work with like-minded countries, particularly Muslim-majority countries, to coordinate an international response to the situation in Xinjiang and offer support to PRC citizens who have fled Xinjiang, whether here in the United States or elsewhere around the globe.
- To limit private companies' ability to provide training or equipment to Chinese state security agencies, and the Chair's recent letter to Secretary Ross is very helpful in this regard.
- And finally, to sanction relevant Chinese officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Any sanctions package should include Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. Sanctioning a sitting Politburo member who is one of the top 25 leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in China would clearly convey the United States' unequivocal condemnation of these camps. There is a list of additional leaders for your consideration in my written statement.

Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions.

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jessica Batke appears in the Appendix.]

Chairman RUBIO. Thank you all. Your testimony, while brief, has really gotten to the point.

I want to start with the first one. You know, let me just make sort of an editorial comment at the front end. I know there's a lot going on up here. Every morning brings news, depending on what's going on on Twitter—statements, press, whatever it might be, but—and there is coverage here. There are people. There are some cameras and some journalists and others who might watch later.

What we've heard described here today has both deep domestic and international implications of epic proportions. I know of few, if any, humanitarian outrages in the world that reach the level of what we've heard here described, and few in modern history that reach this level. And I daresay if this was happening in virtually any other part of the world, there'd be an incredible amount of outrage and coverage. And while I'm grateful to the journalists who are covering this today and those that may write about it, I am disappointed. Frankly, I am disappointed that there isn't more interest, that there isn't more coverage. This is horrifying. It certainly

is significantly more important for the future of the world and the 21st century.

You have a country that is in a full-scale effort to not just catch the United States but supplant us as the world's premier economic, military, geopolitical, and technological power. And history has taught us that the most powerful country in the world in any given era shapes that era, shapes the global norms. It shapes the way the world looks, feels, and acts.

I deeply believe that America's rise, and particularly since the end of the Second World War, has led to the spread of concepts about liberty, freedom, democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity, and helped shape the post-World War II era. And so we have to fear that in a world that is shaped by a country—if that is what it reaches—that does this to their own people, you can only imagine what they would be willing to support, tolerate, and/or promote if they ever reach the same status.

So I think this should inform our relationship and the urgency of all of our tasks with regard to our relationship with China. But focusing on this one in particular for a moment, let me first address those—and this is going to deal with your story, Ms. Hoja—of those who say to us—and I've had people tell me this—Human rights is important, but we have to be pragmatic and we can't raise it in every forum, can't talk about it all the time, and at the end of the day there are horrible things happening all over the world. We cannot tell other countries what to do all the time. We need to be focused on America and Americans.

Your story is about America and Americans. You are a United States citizen. You work for Radio Free Asia. And you have testified here today that your brother, your elderly and infirm parents have been detained, that over 20 of your relatives, including aunts, cousins, children, have been detained.

You have also testified here today, I believe in your written testimony—you may have said it verbally as well—that you know of other colleagues that have experienced the same. So here we have the testimony of a United States citizen working in a journalistic capacity whose family in another country has been harassed, detained, in some cases without any contact with their families, not knowing exactly what's going on, because they don't like what you're saying in the United States—in the United States. A United States citizen's family is being detained, harassed, and harmed in another country as an effort to silence you.

And it is a testament to your bravery and courage that you have not been silenced and that you appear here today. I wonder how many have been silenced, and how many have chosen not to speak. And who can blame them? Who wants to put their family through this?

You don't have to name names, but I'm interested in you sharing with us for the record whether, in fact, your story is an isolated one, or are there, in fact, more people who find themselves in the circumstances you are in. Again, I will leave it up to them to identify who they are and so forth, but is yours the only story, or are other people going through the exact same thing you are facing right now, other U.S. citizens?

Ms. HOJA. Of course, there are—the Chinese government right now puts people in reeducation camps who have a friend or family members outside of China. They feel they will influence them. That is why. I don't know the number, but I believe everyone, every Uyghur has somebody in the family or friends in the camps right now. You can ask any Uyghur, any, including my five other colleagues in our office.

And Rebiya Kadeer is here. Her sons, daughters, even grandchildren are locked up. She doesn't know where they are, how they are. And we recently confirmed Dolkan Isa's mother passed away in the reeducation camps.

So I wonder what evidence we have to prove again and again. So we've been trying to cover this darkness, the issues, for more than one year because the Chinese government, this Chen Quanguo, is using this policy harshly from the beginning of last year. But we have been—for example, for 17 years, I've been releasing every day, similar situations, similar human rights issues, abuses by the Chinese, but unfortunately, we are the only source. Radio Free Asia is the only voice to talk about ourselves. So is that enough? We don't know—because I'm still here. I'm raising my voice because we don't have a choice. We don't have any other people to talk. So we are the hope. So I have to stand up. I cannot give up.

Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman RUBIO. I ask you this, and I don't know if you even know the answer. You may not, and it does not mean there are not any people in these circumstances, but putting ourselves in that position, I think few people would have the courage that you have exhibited and the willingness to continue to speak, knowing the consequences of it.

Are you aware of or do you fear, do you have any sense or any reason to believe that there are those who have chosen—no one blames them for it—who have chosen to stop speaking up for purposes of avoiding what's happening to you?

Ms. HOJA. Of course, like when I heard my brother was detained, I chose to not speak up, too, because my mother asked me—she said, Please, I already lost you. I do not want to lose my son, too. Because I have been, and we have been, my family could not unite in 17 years. I believe other Uyghurs have similar situations—somebody is locked up in the jail, or detained, or in reeducation camps. We don't want to put them in further danger because of our acts or any word against China.

Chairman RUBIO. In your time talking about these issues, highlighting them globally here in the United States, have you ever felt like media outlets, individuals, companies, whoever, have chosen to not speak about your cause for fear of the impact it might have on their ability to cover events in China or their ability to do business in China? In essence, they may not have relatives, but they may have other interests in China that they are afraid there will be retribution against them as a result, and therefore, they do not really want to get involved in your case.

And listen, this could extend from a political figure who doesn't want to touch it because they have a company in their home state who does a lot of business. It could be businesses. It could be media outlets who have a bureau and don't want to lose access to a fast-

growing and important country. I don't know if at any point you've felt that there are those who have been complicit because of their own interests separate from having family.

You don't have to tell us who they are unless you want to. But I'm just curious whether that extends beyond simply those who have family members.

Ms. HOJA. Yes, I know. If you want to interview someone who is involved in human rights issues, or other issues they are doing there, like investigations—some of them will say, Excuse me, right now I cannot speak. Those kinds of reactions we are facing all of the time. But I do not know the exact company or the person. Maybe our colleagues can follow up that question.

Chairman RUBIO. And again, we would be interested in that. It can be done confidentially if you choose for us not to share it. But I think it's part of the broader long arm of China, which I think goes well beyond—I mean, we have seen it at universities. There are universities in this country that will not provide you, sadly, a forum to say what you've just said because they're going to lose their Confucius Institute funding, or they're going to lose their campus in mainland China. And so they decide—

Ms. HOJA. Even some Uyghur researchers in other countries, they have an opportunity to speak. They have freedom, but they are afraid, too.

Chairman RUBIO. All right.

Ms. Batke and Professor Thum, I wanted to focus on two things. On our relationship with China, a lot has been said about what we can do. How can we influence behavior?

It has been my experience that there are two things they seem to respond to and only two things. Number one is sort of sustained and committed pressure across the entire relationship, meaning the entire—you cannot just carve out pieces of it and say we're going to deal with trade here but human rights over here. We're going to deal with military affairs here but economics over here.

They most certainly pressure—the strategy China seems to follow is not one of sweeping change, although when they see an opportunity, they seize it. It seems to be one of slow, steady, but consistent escalation. The South China Sea is an example. Every time, they push a little bit further, creating a new normal every step of the way. And they pressure across the board—so today is very enlightening.

The administration had an opportunity to sanction ZTE. They did, basically issuing a death penalty—allowed them to come back into business by allowing them to buy chips from Qualcomm. Qualcomm had a pending deal in China, and the response of the Chinese after the ZTE thing got finalized is to continue to slow-dance Qualcomm, an American company, until the point where they've abandoned their hopes of doing business in China. Basically, they continue to sustain their pressure while we have given concessions on some things. I hope that was enlightening for the administration. I know it's unrelated directly to this topic.

But the first is sustained and committed pressure across the relationship, and the second is something that Ms. Batke pointed out, and that is invoking international partners. They want to be—one of the goals of the Chinese Communist Party in the 21st century

is to remake the global order to benefit them, to replace the Western global order that was established after the Second World War, with one that has their imprint. And part of that is the perception and the receptivity that people may have to that, based on their perceptions of China.

And so if their perception of the Chinese Communist Party is that it's a country with a lot of money, a non-interference policy, that is there to help you build things and move ahead without having to put up with some of the restrictions that American aid or Western aid comes with . . . that makes them appear benevolent and peaceful and in many cases continues the whole "bide your time and hide your power" strategy that they followed for a very long time.

If the perception of them is that they do bad deals, they take advantage of their partners and they violate people's rights . . . if it's a negative perception about the things they do, they're very sensitive to that because it goes right to the heart of their ability to remake the geopolitical system. And that's why they are so fearful of sustained—of our ability to invoke global partnerships to confront them and why it's important that we continue to do so. It's a little hard to do when you are fighting with some of the people that might join us in that, on trade, but hopefully that will be resolved so that we can do that.

So here are my two questions. The first is, Why is it so important? I know why it was important in the context of the Cold War and the Soviet Union—that in every instance virtually every American President, in addition to raising Soviet expansionism and nuclear weapons threats, always raised the cause of human rights.

If I were standing here today and said, Look, China is too powerful . . . they're too rich. We've got to do business with them. We can't afford to mess all of that up by raising these human rights issues—I've already outlined why I think it's important, and that is to sustain pressure across the relationship. But in your view, beyond the moralistic and humanitarian rationale, from a geopolitical rationale, why is it important that the United States, in every instance, raise these issues in every forum in which we engage them and—that's question 1. 1(A) is, Why is it important that it be public? Because the other thing we get is, We're going to raise it with them, but in private, because they don't like to lose face. They don't want to be embarrassed. So why is it important that we raise it geopolitically, just from sheer national interest, and why is it important that some of that or a lot of it be done publicly as opposed to in private one-on-one meetings? If you could both comment on that.

Mr. THUM. I think, as Jessica Batke pointed out, when things are not raised repeatedly, there is a reset of the norm. And you have to claw back that little part of the discourse to get it back on the table. And then that comes at a cost.

So I agree that it's important to raise this at every moment. And there actually is a legislative opportunity here. There's a law on the books from the late 90s that says that Tibet has to be raised in certain circumstances, and it would be very valuable, I think, to add the Xinjiang issue to that piece of legislation. I would add, though, that it's quite dangerous to link this Uyghur and Xinjiang

issue to geopolitics. I heard the words “blue seas” earlier, which invokes this kind of balance where if we intervene in Xinjiang, then that affects this global military strategic situation. That plays in very neatly to the Chinese Communist Party’s story about why they are engaged in this kind of activity and why they don’t have to listen when people in the rest of the world say that this violates international norms.

So I would hope we——

Chairman RUBIO. “Story” meaning that the West is trying to constrain and contain them from their rise?

Mr. THUM. The West is trying to constrain and contain, and even that the West might have some sort of secret joy when there’s unrest or trouble in Xinjiang and that this can be used as a pressure point on China in our geopolitical rivalry. So if we don’t separate those concerns, we’re going to have a great deal of trouble getting all of our international partners on board in undermining the CCP’s narrative on why this is happening. And I’ll also say just briefly——

Chairman RUBIO. I don’t think you are saying it shouldn’t be raised in every forum, but I take what you’re saying as, it should be its own separate category within the broader engagement, meaning you don’t trade human rights for a better trade deal.

Mr. THUM. That’s—yes, sure. I would accept that. I would also say that we are thinking somewhat small here. Senator King raised the long-standing criticism of America’s activities in regard to 1930s Germany. I would remind everyone that that supposedly insufficient reaction included Roosevelt recalling our Ambassador from Berlin. We are behind the curve on that reaction which is considered historically now to be insufficient.

Dr. Batke raised the issue of terminology and pointed out that these nightmare words of the 20th century—concentration camp, apartheid, gulag, all started out their careers as euphemisms that were designed to hide the terrors. That’s the point we are at now. But one day Xinjiang’s reeducation camps, under one name or another, are going to join that list of widely recognized atrocities. And I think we have a responsibility to act boldly to address that issue.

Ms. BATKE. I would second everything Dr. Thum just said. In terms of why it is important to keep bringing it up all the time, beyond what he just said, there’s this issue of the exporting of Chinese norms—as you were talking about—across the world. And I think that one thing that is important to remind other people is China touts itself as this country that does not interfere in the internal affairs of another.

But beyond the moral imperative of bringing this up, it’s important to remember that when we don’t, we are allowing them to interfere in our internal affairs and decide how we decide to bring up and frame things. And that’s a point that I think can be brought up again to other countries in terms of why they should also be speaking up, because those norms are also being reset and exported to those countries.

In terms of why it’s important to keep these things public, cordoning off these conversations into only private discussions allows them to confine that discussion and allows them to walk away from things without any sense of shame or embarrassment. Inter-

national pressure is effective. And I would point to the case of Liu Xia who was just recently released from house detention in Beijing and allowed to go to Germany. And that was a two-pronged effort. That was a lot of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes but also a sustained and public campaign keeping her case in the public eye.

Chairman RUBIO. And just on the public front versus private, on an individual basis, if there is an individual case somewhere in the world and progress can be made because there's some internal political reason why they've got to be able to save face—that's one thing. But we are talking about detention, and frankly in my view, the torture, humiliation, and abuse of hundreds of thousands of people—more, actually.

And that's why—there is not one individual that they could somehow just—this is one person. And I am not downplaying that one particular case, but that's what we do on this Commission. It's overwhelming. We could—volumes of names if that's what we choose to do in that regard.

I do want to ask both of you—the second part about invoking international partners to confront it. It is my view that if something even a quarter as bad as this were occurring in virtually any Western democracy now or various other countries around the planet, it would not just get more media coverage, but it would be widely condemned in every international forum. There would be widespread action against it. I mean, it would be intolerable.

Why isn't this occurring in the same way? What have they done or what is happening that has prevented this from reaching that level of international attention? I suspect I know the answer, but I would love to see if you agree. So I'm not going to tell you my answer until you tell me yours.

Ms. BATKE. Sure. I would say, quite baldly, money talks. China is very effective at going to countries one-on-one and making clear that they are happy to use their economic leverage as necessary to get their silence. I think this is really clear in the case of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. They've only issued two statements about what's happening in Xinjiang: one right after the Ürümqi riots in 2009, and one in 2015. But they said nothing since all of this has been happening in the last year. I strongly suspect that that has to do with economic concerns on their part.

Mr. THUM. Yes, I don't have much to add to that. I think you're right. This would be roundly condemned if it happened virtually anywhere else. It would be a major news item. And I agree that this is about money and China's economic clout. It's not helped by major powers like the U.S. retreating from human rights concerns and putting economic concerns first. But yes, that's absolutely what it is.

Chairman RUBIO. It strikes me—and that's my assessment as well. I mean, that is how I feel as well, and it is not—obviously, money does talk, and Chinese investment abroad isn't simply into roads and bridges. I mean, they fund political parties. They fund individuals. There are all sorts of things that come about as a result of this, and that leverage is one they made very clear.

We've also seen them, for example, cut off tourism to South Korea, allow agricultural products from the Philippines to rot at

the port, deny rare earth minerals to Japan—all in retribution for decisions that were made in those countries.

So taking that as a factor, you basically testified here today that the reason why certain countries cannot internally make a political decision to confront this in international forums is because the Chinese are using leverage. We've heard how they go after the family members of United States citizens as leverage to try to silence criticism of their practices.

And I think that's a pretty stark example of how hypocritical they are when they talk about their policy of noninterference when they are directly interfering in the affairs of other countries, because they are interfering with citizens of other countries by going after their families. They are interfering with their political leaders by threatening to cut them off from essential aid and help. They are shaping and interfering quite directly. So the hypocrisy of that is extraordinary.

I have one more question. We do need to wrap up.

Dr. Batke, I wanted to ask you about the testimony that you gave regarding the Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and his role within the leadership and the role that he plays in the repressive measures. You pointed to him as sort of the one individual that we should be looking at and—in your view, what would be the psychological—we would have to view what the economic impact of it is and the like. But you have talked about it and you have described it as a pretty significant escalatory measure, one that would get attention because for the first time you are not going after a country or even a party, but a specific individual.

I know I am asking you to speculate, but what impact do you think that would have internally among them, knowing now that, if they are participants in this sort of activity, they are now individually going to be named internationally as complicit in these activities?

Ms. BATKE. You're right. I cannot speculate about what's going on in their heads directly. I don't think that it would necessarily stop people from choosing to participate. And as much as we talk about repression, I think also there's a lot to be said about the choices of people in government in terms of whether they feel like they can completely step back from what they've been asked to do. So I don't know that it would prevent other young people from joining the government and choosing to do this. But I do think it would be an incredibly powerful symbolic step, particularly because Chen Quanguo is so high up in the Chinese Communist Party, rather than going after someone who is very low level, running maybe a camp or something. Although I think we should name and shame those people as well. This actually would show that the U.S. Government is unequivocally condemning these camps and is willing to raise it to a very high political level to do it.

Chairman RUBIO. My last two questions, and I'll be brief.

On the first—you were here for the first panel. You saw the back and forth with the Commerce Department—and again, I'm paraphrasing. But what I took from it is two things. Number one is our laws may potentially need to be updated to include new things, such as these repressive tools. I mean these tools that did not exist before.

But the other thing I took from it is we have to make—I am paraphrasing, but the way I took it was, we look at this product, the DNA sequencer. They're easy to do. They're not really that complex, although if there was not something unique about them, they wouldn't have to buy them from this company in Massachusetts. But nonetheless, they're not that advanced. China makes them. Plenty of other countries make them. They can find them anywhere in the world anyway. And they have a legitimate purpose.

If we deny it, they're still going to keep doing what they're doing. The only consequence will be that some American company will not be able to make money off of it. So since they're going to do it anyway, we might as well continue to make a profit.

In addition to the immorality of that and the notion about whether we want to be complicit in it, isn't that exactly what they're counting on, the idea that they know that one of the most powerful constituencies in America is business interests who, frankly, don't feel like they have a human rights obligation. They feel like they have a fiduciary obligation to their owners or shareholders to return a profit. And as a result, for them, they bring pressure to bear on the United States.

I see this in multiple realms, by the way, not just with regard to China. But one of the most consistent arguments you always get is of the business community coming back and saying, you're hurting us. We have a good thing going, and this huge market, and if you do this, you are going to hurt an American company. The Chinese government clearly understands that leverage point and they use it. Do they not?

Ms. BATKE. Yes.

Chairman RUBIO. Does anyone disagree with that?

Mr. THUM. I agree with that, and the conclusion that leads me to is that whatever action the U.S. Government takes is going to come at a cost. It's going to come at a cost to American citizens, and it's going to come at a cost to the options on the table for the U.S. Government. This is about political will.

Chairman RUBIO. All right. My final question is, if you're sitting in the Chinese Communist Party headquarters today and you're reviewing this policy, you probably aren't even aware that we are having this hearing, but the people who are in the embassy here are, and they are annoyed by it. They don't like this commission. They most certainly don't like me, and they get irritated when these things come up. But by and large, the world will go on, and tomorrow morning this is not going to lead headlines here, or anywhere, for that matter. The work continues. There are people that are certainly being intimidated by it.

In essence, they're sitting there thinking to themselves, this stuff is working. No one's condemning us internationally. We're continuing to do what we're doing. We're getting better at it every single day. As time goes on, it'll get easier as young people get disconnected from their heritage and their families.

Yes, they will have some commission hearings and a couple of senators and congressmen will write letters. And maybe they will cut us off from a DNA sequencer one day, and maybe a couple of

our individuals might get sanctioned, but that's a small price to pay for the big picture.

It's working. That's the saddest part of all. This strategy they are carrying out is working. That would be their view. And unless we change that dynamic or at least raise the price for it, this will continue. It will grow. It will become more widespread. In essence, it'll become the new normal. It will become baked in to the reality.

Am I wrong in that horrible assessment?

Mr. THUM. I think you're right about the attitude that they have toward this. And you're right about the threat that this becomes baked in to a larger order. We see, for example, some of these technologies used in Xinjiang being exported to South America. But I don't think this is a hopeless cause because China's expanding influence around the world depends a great deal on its reputation. For that reason, its leaders are very sensitive about its global reputation.

So the more that we can do publicly, and in particular, in partnership with other countries around the world, to expose what's going on and to shame the Chinese state for engaging in this kind of behavior, the greater the cost will be. I think it's a mistake to consider decision making at that level as something where they're certain about what they are doing. They see this as a balance of costs and benefits. And if we can add to the cost side, we may very well be able to shape the situation.

Chairman RUBIO. And I don't disagree with your assessment that this is not a hopeless cause. In fact, I only think it becomes a hopeless cause if we accept it as a fact that we have to deal with.

I raise the fact that it is working for the following reason, and that is, we can have a lot of commission meetings. We're going to issue our report, we're going to file bills, we're going to write letters, we're going to give speeches, and we are going to highlight this as much as we can. But this needs to be prioritized at the highest levels of our engagement both with China and the international community.

Congress is an important part of it, and we can even be the catalyst for it. But there is no replacing executive-level attention to this as part of the overall framework of our interaction with the international community and with China. And that is the only way that ultimately, we are going to see that cost-benefit analysis adjusted.

Congress can be a catalyst for it. Individual senators and congressmen can be a catalyst for it, but the execution of it will require us to have sustained—across both parties, across a sustained period of time, across multiple presidential administrations—attention to this. This cannot be a one-off issue. And that's the only way to keep it from becoming hopeless. That's why I asked that, because if we want some sense of urgency, we shouldn't think that simply shining a light on it alone is going to change that dynamic.

We need the top people in our government not just to be aware of this but to be outraged by it, and to embrace it as part of our overall narrative. That's what we're hoping to do. And that's what I hope the first panel took back.

So I want to thank you all for being here, particularly you, Ms. Hoja. Thank you for being a part of this. I know this is an ongoing issue for you. After we leave this hearing here today, you live with

this reality. But I thank you for your courage, your bravery, and your willingness to stand here today and provide that testimony. Thank you all for being a part of it. I know it takes time away from your other endeavors to be a part of this.

The record on this hearing will remain open for 48 hours in case some of you would like to submit additional information for the record so it can be a part of our record and maybe even make it into our report before we issue it in October. And there may be some follow-up questions from Members. If you have time to answer, we'd love to have that.

With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CHRISTINO III

Thank you Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and Members of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China for convening this hearing today on this important topic. Today I will be discussing the role of the Bureau of Industry and Security in regard to export license requirements for China.

Under the Export Administration Regulations (the EAR), a Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) license is required for the export or reexport of most items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to China. Items on the CCL are identified by their individually assigned Export Control Classification Number according to their reasons for control. The CCL is comprised of items controlled by the multilateral export control regimes (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group) as well as items controlled unilaterally for foreign policy reasons.

In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, the United States unilaterally controls items on the CCL for crime-control reasons, as required by Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended¹ (the EAA). As set forth in the EAR, the U.S. Government requires a license to export most crime-control and detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and software to all destinations other than Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Additionally, a license is required to export certain crime-control items, including restraint-type devices (such as handcuffs) and discharge-type arms (such as stun guns), to all destinations except Canada.

The EAR imposes some limited controls on items not on the CCL. Items subject to Commerce licensing jurisdiction under the EAR but not specifically identified on the CCL are designated EAR99. Such items generally do not require a license for export or reexport to China unless destined for certain WMD-related end uses or end users, or unless the items are part of a transaction involving a restricted party identified on one of several lists of sanctioned or restricted entities maintained by agencies of the U.S. Government, including BIS, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.

Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or removed from the CCL based upon continuous review of the merits of maintaining the controls and the effectiveness of the controls. Section 6 of the EAA prohibits the imposition of foreign policy controls, including on crime-control items, unless certain determinations are made and certain factors reported to Congress, such as determinations that the controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective, descriptions of consultation efforts with industry and other supplier countries, determinations related to the economic impact on U.S. industry and efforts to achieve the purpose of the controls through alternative means, descriptions of foreign availability, and determinations regarding the ability to effectively enforce the controls.

CRIME CONTROL LICENSING REVIEW POLICY

The U.S. Government considers applications to export or reexport most crime-control items favorably, on a case-by-case basis, unless there is civil disorder in the country or the sale involves a region of concern, or there is evidence that the government may have violated human rights. The purpose of these controls is to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuse, distance the United States from such abuse, and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region. The U.S. Government maintains a general policy of denial for specially designed implements of torture, regardless of the intended destination.

¹50 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015).

Applications to export crime-control items to countries that are not otherwise subject to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes, but that are identified by the Department of State as human rights violators, receive additional scrutiny in the license review process. The Department of State reviews all license applications for these countries on a case-by-case basis and makes recommendations to Commerce.

SPECIFIC LICENSING REVIEW POLICY FOR CHINA FOR CRIME-CONTROL ITEMS

Following the 1989 military assault on demonstrators by the Chinese government in Tiananmen Square, the U.S. Government imposed constraints on the export to China of crime-control and detection instruments and equipment on the CCL under Section 902(a)(4) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Public Law 101-246.

In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Commerce approved 25 licenses to China of crime-control items, 21 of which were for the return of defective rifle scopes and one license for the return of defective shotguns to their original Chinese manufacturers for refund or replacement, and three were for biometric identification equipment for a third country's visa system operating at its own diplomatic facilities in China. There were nine denials, including applications for cattle prods and stun guns, optical sighting devices, pepper spray, fingerprint powder, dyes and inks, and voiceprint software, to Chinese security agencies, manufacturing and development firms, and resellers.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today. I will be happy to take your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KELLEY E. CURRIE

Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith and other members of the Commission for convening this important hearing today. I am pleased to be able to appear before the Commission on behalf of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and discuss our concerns regarding the growing human rights crisis in Xinjiang, with a particular focus on how this crisis is being addressed—or not—at the United Nations, including through its various human rights mechanisms and deliberative bodies. I would like to submit my full remarks for the record.

As Secretary Pompeo noted yesterday in his op-ed welcoming the first ever U.S.-sponsored Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, the State Department recently hosted six journalists from Radio Free Asia's Uyghur Service to hear directly from them about the situation on the ground in Xinjiang. What RFA, as well as the Uyghur Service at VOA, have documented over the past year is truly disturbing. Their reporting indicates that Chinese authorities are likely detaining hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in what can only be described as internment camps across Xinjiang. There, they are subjected to "political reeducation" designed to undermine their distinct Uyghur identity. One of these journalists, Gulchehra Hoja, will testify in the next panel, and will undoubtedly tell you about how 23 of her family members—twenty-three—have been detained and how, since their detention, the authorities have provided little to no information about her family's well-being.

According to a growing number of credible reports by media and human rights organizations, a version of Gulchehra's story is becoming the norm for nearly every Uyghur living outside China who has family still in Xinjiang. In fact, having a family member overseas appears to be a key trigger for increased scrutiny for Uyghurs living in Xinjiang. Likewise, having studied, traveled or worked overseas, appearing to be an observant Muslim, and having an above average education also seem to be among the reasons that certain individuals are subject to intensive scrutiny by the authorities, including detention in the camps. Think about that: over the past year, hundreds of thousands of law-abiding Uyghur citizens of China—men, women, and even children—have disappeared into state custody, with barely any notice from the international community. That is why this hearing is so timely and important.

The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese government's worsening crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since April 2017 the Xi Jinping leadership, under the guise of fighting "terrorism," "secession," and "religious extremism," has greatly intensified the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing repressive policies against mainstream, non-violent Muslim cultural and religious practices in Xinjiang. The stated goal of the current campaign is to "sinicize religion" and "adapt religion to a socialist society," suggesting that Beijing wagers that it now possesses the political, diplomatic, and technological capabilities to transform religion and ethnicity in Chinese

society in a way that its predecessors never could, even during the peak horrors of the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist campaigns intended to remake Chinese society.

The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking: authorities now prohibit “abnormal” beards and the wearing of veils in public, and classify refusal to watch state television, refusal to wear shorts, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat pork, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, or practicing traditional funeral rituals, as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious views. Chinese authorities have banned parents from giving their children a number of traditional Islamic names, including “Muhammad,” “Islam,” “Fatima,” and “Aisha,” and have reportedly required children under age 16 who have Islamic names to change them. Of particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities have increasingly criminalized or punished the teaching of Islam to young people—even by their parents—adopting at least six laws or regulations which put parents and religious educators at legal risk for promoting non-violent Muslim scripture, rituals, and clothing to children. Chinese authorities also continue to crack down in particular on the use of Uyghur and other minority languages at universities and in classroom instruction.

Failing to comply with these restrictions, or activities such as communicating with relatives abroad and studying in foreign countries, has reportedly led to the detention of a large number of Uyghurs and other Muslims, including families and children, in facilities for purported “patriotic reeducation.” Detainees are required to learn the Chinese language, recite Chinese and Xinjiang laws and policies, watch pro-government propaganda videos, express their gratitude to the Communist Party and General Secretary Xi Jinping, and renounce their ethnic identities, religious beliefs, and mainstream cultural and religious practices. Detainees are granted no due process or contact with their families, and periods of detention have ranged from several months to indefinite detention in many cases. A wide array of evidence indicates that the number of individuals detained in such reeducation centers since April 2017 numbers at least in the hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions. There are even disturbing reports that young children have been sent to state-run orphanages if even one of their parents is detained in the internment camps. Notable detainees reportedly include well-known Uyghur athletes, prominent businesspersons, scholars, and students. There have been credible reports of at least two dozen deaths in these camps, including senior citizens who were incarcerated, including the widely revered 82-year-old Uyghur religious scholar Muhammed Salih Hajim. We call on China to end these counterproductive policies and free all those arbitrarily detained.

To guarantee that this suppression continues beyond the internment camps into the daily lives of all Uyghurs, Chinese authorities have constructed a highly intrusive, high-tech surveillance system in Xinjiang, which many experts fear will be extended throughout China. This system includes thousands of surveillance cameras, including in mosques; facial recognition software; obligatory content-monitoring apps on smartphones and GPS devices on cars; widespread new police outposts with tens of thousands of newly hired police, and even Party personnel embedded in people’s homes; and compulsory collection of vast biometric datasets on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the region, including DNA and blood samples, 3D photos, iris scans, and voiceprints. Human Rights Watch has documented that many of these DNA samples were collected deceptively as part of what regional officials called a Xinjiang-wide “health” campaign. This surveillance system has spurred security experts and Xinjiang specialists to label it one of the world’s most intrusive police states.

As with many things related to China’s human rights abuses, the repression does not stop at the Chinese border. The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has compelled them to stop communicating with their family and friends based abroad, including in the United States, for fear of retribution by authorities. We have received reports that U.S. lawful permanent residents and family members of U.S. citizens have been detained in these detention centers for indefinite periods. We have also received reports that U.S. citizens have been detained and interrogated while visiting Xinjiang. In addition to the cases of the RFA journalists mentioned earlier, we note that more than thirty relatives of Ms. Rebiya Kadeer have been disappeared or detained. This treatment of U.S. citizens, U.S. LPRs, and their family members is unacceptable, and we unequivocally condemn these actions by the Chinese government. China must provide information about the locations and medical condition of those detained and immediately release them if there is no evidence of actual criminal activity. We also have demanded that, at a minimum, China should meet its obligations under international law to provide consular access, not to mention minimum standards of due process, to those it has detained.

We also are concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing Uyghurs abroad in order to compel them to act as informants against other Uyghurs, return to Xinjiang or remain silent about the situation there, sometimes by detaining their family members. This includes harassment of American citizens, LPRs, and individuals legally residing in the United States. China has applied similar pressure to dual nationals or family members of citizens in other countries. Dating back to at least 2003, China has pressured other countries to forcibly return Uyghurs, at times claiming that individuals are members of “extremist groups” without credible evidence. China has also abused the INTERPOL Red Notice system, inappropriately placing international security travel notices on religious and political dissidents. We applaud governments that have resisted Chinese pressure and upheld their commitments to international human rights.

What is happening in Xinjiang is not just a human rights matter; it is also a security issue. China, like every other country, has the right to protect its security. But for these measures against violent extremism to be effective, they must promote good governance, inclusion, and respect for the rights of its minority citizens. However, draconian, indiscriminate, and disproportionate controls on ethnic minorities’ expressions of their cultural and religious identities have the potential to incite radicalization and violence. Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding Uyghurs—including non-violent activists and advocates for human rights—as terrorist threats on the basis of their political, cultural, and religious beliefs and practices, even if they do not advocate violence.

Given the severity of this crisis, it is worth asking: why haven’t the pre-eminent human rights bodies of the United Nations taken up this issue, exposed it, and demanded changes in China’s policies? Part of the answer certainly lies with China’s membership on the UN’s Human Rights Council, its role as a permanent member of the Security Council, and its ability to continue to portray itself as a developing country from the “Global South” in alignment with the Group of 77. From its perch on the HRC, China is able to effectively block any action on its appalling human rights record in Xinjiang, as well as scrutiny of the broader human rights crackdown under way in China. Likewise, by severely limiting access for special rapporteurs, human rights experts and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Chinese limit the discourse around these abuses. As a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, China effectively shuts down not only any discussion of its human rights abuses, but uses its position to shield other bad actors from criticism and generally block efforts to raise human rights issues in the Council. In doing so, China gains favor with other countries that have poor human rights records—of which there remain far too many in the UN—and these help block criticism of China in the General Assembly and other forums.

Perhaps more disturbing than these defensive strategies, however, is China’s ongoing, comprehensive effort to re-write the entire normative framework of international human rights in a manner that is more aligned with its authoritarian political system and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. This effort includes an emphasis on the “right to development” versus fundamental civil and political rights, and the promotion of “win-win” cooperation on human rights that privileges the interests of governments over their basic obligation to respect inherent human rights that attach at the individual level. A key aspect of this effort is China’s ability to obfuscate its intentions behind talk of “mutually beneficial cooperation” and a “shared future of all humanity” that appeals to other governments who dislike being criticized for human rights violations. The Chinese took a major step forward at the March 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council, when the Council passed a Chinese resolution promoting “win-win cooperation” on human rights. The United States was the only vote against the resolution. At the same session, I listened in horror as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights praised the good intentions he saw behind Xi Jinping’s “win-win” slogans, seemingly oblivious to the threat they pose to the very notion of respect for individual human rights. Instead, he offered only a wan concern about the “mismatch” between the aspirations of “win-win” and its implementation on the ground—as if they were not fruit of the same poisonous tree. In the same speech, Prince Zeid expressed strong concerns about “hate speech” and other perceived human rights abuses in the U.S. It was nothing short of surreal.

In April, I had the opportunity to hear directly about the situation in Xinjiang from Mr. Dolkan Isa, who is the president of the World Uyghur Congress. He was in New York to attend the annual meeting of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples. Mr. Isa is a quiet and diligent person, now a naturalized German citizen, who carefully and deliberately explains the repression that his community in Xinjiang is experiencing—despite the fact that his own family has been targeted by the authorities and he has essentially lost communication with them. We had our

discussion about this situation while we sat in a small lounge outside the UN Security Council. The fact that Mr. Isa was even able to sit in that lounge, inside the walls of the UN, was a minor miracle given the extent to which Chinese authorities have gone to block him from entering the premises over the years. In April 2017, while attempting to attend the same Forum as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization delegation, Mr. Isa was forcibly removed from the UN premises after representatives of the Chinese mission to the UN alleged he was a security threat. The Chinese authorities provided no evidence to back up their claims but UN security removed Mr. Isa nonetheless. This shocking behavior was subsequently documented in a report on reprisals against human rights activists by the UN Secretary General. This report, which criticized the manner in which UN security responded and called for changes to the way the UN handled such allegations, was released one month before the 2018 Indigenous Peoples Forum. Yet the Chinese mission in New York attempted again this year to block Mr. Isa from participating as an NGO delegate, accusing him of involvement in terrorist financing and recruitment, while again providing no evidence. After a lengthy delay and several interventions from the U.S. and German missions on Mr. Isa's behalf, he was finally allowed to participate on the final day of the Forum.

Having been thwarted in their efforts to block Mr. Isa's participation, the Chinese delegation then went after the German NGO that had sponsored his participation—the Society for Threatened Peoples. They used their position as a member of the UN committee that accredits civil society participation to attempt to revoke the Society's consultative status. In their remarks to the Committee, the Chinese referred to Mr. Isa as a terrorist and a separatist who threatened Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let that sink in for a moment—China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear power with one of the biggest armies in the world—is threatened by a mild-mannered German citizen who talks about China's treatment of the Uyghur people.

Once again, the U.S. and German missions pushed back and we ultimately overcame Chinese efforts to intimidate the NGO. Afterwards, several NY-based colleagues expressed surprise that the normally careful and disciplined Chinese delegation would go to such extreme lengths—including a highly public fight with the United States in the NGO Committee—to block the participation of a previously little-known activist in a relatively obscure UN event. But those who follow human rights issues in China were not the least bit surprised to see the Chinese attempt to use the NGO Committee or any other part of the UN as a tool to carry out reprisals against an individual who has spoken out about China's human rights record, in particular China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims.

With China facing both its Universal Periodic Review and a period review in the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination later this year, there will be more opportunities to call attention to the situation in Xinjiang, as well as the ongoing abuses in Tibet and Inner Mongolia and the general crackdown under way against human rights defenders, lawyers and other dissidents across China. The question is: Will others join us? So far the silence has mostly been deafening.

I want to conclude my remarks by talking about a case that is close to my heart: the Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. Ilham was an economics professor at Minzu University who wrote blog posts and articles asserting Uyghurs' rights to genuine autonomy under Chinese law, which resulted in his arrest and a life sentence in prison in 2014 on charges of separatism. He was the kind of moderate voice who advocated for improved understanding between Han Chinese and Uyghurs while also encouraging the Chinese authorities to respect Uyghurs' linguistic, cultural, and religious rights. He was a friend to Chinese human rights lawyers, Tibetan writers, and American scholars. His lovely daughter Jewher is today a student at Indiana University. He was supposed to travel with her and take up a teaching post there, but instead Chinese authorities pulled him off a plane and took him to prison. Today, he is serving a life sentence for separatism. We remain deeply concerned about the ongoing detention of Ilham Tohti, not just because of the issues around his arbitrary detention and unfair trial, as well as his worsening medical condition as he serves his absurd sentence, but because of the broader implications of China's targeting of him and moderate voices like him—the very people who could help to build a truly multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, stable and prosperous society in Xinjiang and throughout China.

As a small tribute to Ilham and those like him who are suffering for trying to improve human rights in Xinjiang and China, I would like to read a Chinese poem written in the aftermath of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo's death a little more than one year ago. This poem could just as easily apply to Ilham Tohti and

the other voices calling for moderation, peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights that the Chinese government is attempting to silence in Xinjiang:

They tried to bury him

nǐ men xiǎng bǎ tā (你们想把他)

Bury him in the ground

mái zàng zài ní tǔ lǐ (埋葬在泥土里)

But what they did not understand

dàn nǐ men wàng jì le (但你们忘记了)

Is that he is the seed.

tā shì yī lì zhōng zǐ

The world should know what is happening in Xinjiang, and USUN is committed to working toward that end—to watering the seeds, wherever they are. We face an uphill climb to do so at the United Nations, but we look forward to working with Congress, our colleagues in the administration, and with other countries who are committed to human rights, to ensure that China is not able to bury these abuses in the ground.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GULCHEHRA HOJA

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cochairman, and distinguished members of the Commission, it's my privilege to participate in today's hearing on a topic that deeply affects me personally and professionally as a reporter working for an organization with a congressional mission of bringing reliable news and information to people in China.

My name is Gulchehra Hoja, I'm a journalist with Radio Free Asia's Uyghur language service, and I'm a U.S. citizen. I grew up in Urümqi, the capital of the Uyghur region in China, where I began my career in broadcast journalism before coming to the United States in 2001 to work for Radio Free Asia (RFA). It was a great sacrifice to leave my homeland, where I had enjoyed success as a television journalist and where my parents, family and friends would remain. But coming here guaranteed me freedom—something that could never be realized in China. There, censorship and the pressure to toe the official line make truthful, objective journalism impossible. Being part of RFA, which broadcasts trustworthy news daily into Xinjiang, was for me the dream of a lifetime. Through this outlet, I could share this newfound freedom with those loved ones left behind. What I didn't know then was the price for making this dream a reality. Nor did I know that it would be my family who would be forced to pay dearly for my freedom to live and work as a journalist in the United States.

As I testify before you here today, it grieves me no end to say that my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my relatives in China are missing—almost certainly held in reeducation camps run by authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

I last saw my mother when she visited me here in the United States in 2005. Only one of my three children has ever met my parents—my oldest daughter, when she visited them with my husband in 2008. I had no choice but to miss that family trip. Because of my work, it's too dangerous for me to go back to China.

For the 17 years since I've worked for RFA, local police and authorities have harassed my family. They've watched their every step, monitored their movements, and constantly questioned them about my whereabouts and whether I plan to return. The treatment my family has had to endure is because of my decision to come to America. Authorities considered it a betrayal. When I left the XUAR I had established myself by launching and hosting the first children's program in the Uyghur Region for Xinjiang TV. (To this day, I hear from Uyghurs living in China that they saw me on television when they were children.) Chinese state media officials recognized my appeal with Uyghur audiences and rewarded me with national recognition and elevated status. But I always knew in my heart, as someone who witnessed repression in daily life for Uyghurs, that this success was not enough. I wanted to use my voice to bring issues into the light. Without even knowing it then, I wanted

to be a real journalist—one who is unafraid to ask questions and unafraid to seek answers.

I was raised by educated parents who taught me to value culture, history, and most of all, open and free dialogue. It troubled me to witness how Chinese authorities not only downplayed these aspects of Uyghur identity—including religion and language—on state media, but also sought to erase them entirely. When I first heard Radio Free Asia during a trip to Europe, I knew right away that I had found my calling. To hear a report about a protest by Uyghurs in Germany against Beijing's restrictive policies in the XUAR that would otherwise never be reported on, let alone known inside China, was amazing. Shortly after, I contacted the director of RFA Uyghur and asked about working for the broadcaster. He warned that I would have to give up everything if I were to leave China and work for the organization. It was a difficult choice, I told him, but it would be hard to live with myself if I didn't make it.

Since coming to RFA, I have felt fortunate to continue my work as a member of the world's only Uyghur language news service outside of China. For the roughly 12 million Uyghurs living in China's Northwest, one of the world's most restricted media environments, my colleagues and I are the only credible source for in-depth news and information of what's happening in their towns, cities, and villages. RFA first reported on the July 2009 unrest in Ürümqi, the following 10-month communication blackout in the region, the harsh restrictions preventing Uyghurs from observing the holy month of Ramadan and practicing their faith, the banning of the Uyghur language being taught in many schools, and the mass arrests and disappearances of men suspected of participating in protests and unrest. I have followed these stories with concern for my loved ones back home.

But early last year, my worries grew as my colleagues and I uncovered even more disturbing evidence that China was building a security state of vast reach and scope. We reported on the wide-sweeping use of technology to track Uyghurs, the building of convenience police stations that dot the streets of Kashgar and Ürümqi, even in mosques and elementary schools, and the confiscation of passports to bar any travel or movement out of the region for most Uyghurs. Chinese authorities showed barely any restraint in rounding up people, taking their smartphones, and contacting and detaining their family members. Authorities even began recalling hundreds of Uyghurs studying abroad in Egypt and detaining them upon their return. These individuals were being held in "reeducation centers"—mostly in Kashgar, where thousands of people would be held at a time, with little if any contact with friends and family outside.

My worries proved true when I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was detained at the end of September last year. Police had taken him when he was driving my mother to a doctor's appointment, leaving her alone in a car without explanation as she waited for her son who'd never return. Other family had to come get her. Kaisar was being held, my family learned later, in one of the so-called reeducation facilities. We have not seen him since.

In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from life-threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my mother and father or to learn how they were doing was almost too much to bear. Being almost 7,000 miles away, I felt helpless—even more than when my brother was taken. I tried contacting other family but could not reach them. I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their children—more than 20 people—had been swept up by authorities. I found out later that all had been detained on the same day. No one has confirmed their whereabouts. But I strongly suspect they are being held in these camps, which sources say hold over 1 million Uyghurs—men and women, youngsters and the elderly—in cramped and squalid conditions. My parents, whom I later discovered were held in medical facilities in detention camps, were allowed to leave in March—probably because of their poor health. Authorities had questioned my parents about me, my whereabouts, and my working for an organization they allege is "anti-China."

Nobody should suffer such treatment. But at least five of my colleagues at Radio Free Asia have also faced similar situations where family members in China have been detained. Often they too have heard reports of authorities questioning family and friends about their work for an "anti-Chinese" organization. Like me, they know little if anything about their relatives—whether they are well or even alive. It's a cruel irony that we as journalists can find out so much about what's happening inside China's Northwest, yet so little about our own families and loved ones. We are afraid to ask our friends and others there because any contact and communication could endanger them as well.

Despite these threats, I know—and my colleagues know—that we must continue for the sake of not letting a light be swallowed in the darkness, extinguished forever. We ask only that the United States and the international community make


clear in their dealings with China that this treatment of our families in our former homeland is unacceptable. I hope and pray for my family to be let go and released, but I know even if that happens, they will still live under constant threat. I came to the United States to realize a dream—a dream of being able to tell the truth without fear. And it may be difficult, but I'll keep trying and I'll keep working.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RIAN THUM



DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

MASS INTERNMENT, FORCED INDOCTRINATION, AND CULTURAL CLEANSING: CHINESE GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD MUSLIM MINORITIES IN XINJIANG



Satellite image of detention facility under expansion. April 22, 2018. Google Earth.

The situation of the Uyghurs and Kazakhs in China is an emergency that calls for immediate action. Many of us here have read the estimates that, since early 2017, several hundred thousand to a million Uyghurs, about 5%-10% of the entire Uyghur population, have been indefinitely interned without charge in forced indoctrination camps.¹ Those numbers are based on leaks from this past January. There is good reason to think that the number of interned people is much higher now. In one village near Khotan, police told a Radio Free Asia reporter this month that 40% of the population is now in re-education camps. Satellite imagery shows continued

¹ Adrian Zenz, "New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang," Jamestown, accessed July 19, 2018, <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/>.

construction of detention centers. In April the government requested construction bids for a new re-education camp of over 390,000 square feet, including an 86,000-square-foot underground facility. If this camp is built according to the same schedule as similar projects, it will come into service sometime between September and December of this year. So this is a problem that appears to be expanding even as we speak.

The effects of this mass-internment program are obvious on the streets of cities in Uyghur-majority areas, where many houses and shops stand locked and empty. The state has instituted a parallel program of orphanage construction, to handle the large number of children left behind when parents disappear into internment camps. One county built eighteen orphanages in 2017. In some places the new construction is insufficient, and orphanages are suffering from overcrowding. Those who have so far managed to stay out of the internment camps go about their daily activities under a shadow of fear, knowing that the tiniest misstep can lead to their disappearance.

The following actions have been documented as causes for enforced disappearance into the internment camps: expressing interest in travel abroad, encouraging a relative to travel abroad, returning to China from travel abroad, receiving a call from someone on a black list, praying with feet apart, giving up smoking, failing to greet officials, not using one's phone actively, being a Uyghur born in the 1980s or 1990s, possessing unapproved literature or sermons, having been present at a certain sermon delivered several years earlier, and being unable to speak Chinese.

Growth of repression since 1990

Chinese officials see the Uyghurs generally as a threat to both the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China and to the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Longstanding and widespread Uyghur dissatisfaction with Chinese rule has led to dissent, protests, rebellions, attacks on officials, and, in rare cases, terrorist attacks on ethnic Chinese civilians. Uyghur discontent is rooted in state-condoned racial discrimination, anger over outsider rule, and state attacks on Uyghur culture. In addition to policies that target Uyghurs directly, restrictions on personal freedoms that are technically in force throughout the People's Republic of China (such as the banning of religious participation for people under the age of 18 and controls on speech) are enforced far more rigorously for Uyghurs. The ruling Communist Party of China (CCP) has tended to respond to Uyghur dissatisfaction and resistance with increasing limitations on Uyghurs' movement, speech, cultural expression, and worship, along with harsh punishments for perceived disloyalty to the CCP. Since about 1990, after a brief loosening of controls in the 1980s, restrictions on Uyghurs have steadily increased over time.

Repression and surveillance of Uyghurs accelerated after July 5, 2009, when police tried to disperse a peaceful Uyghur protest in the provincial capital of Urumqi, and protesters turned violent, killing hundreds of ethnic Chinese bystanders. In the aftermath, authorities shut down the internet throughout the province for ten months, flooded the region with troops from the paramilitary People's Armed Police, established checkpoints both in and between towns, blanketed major cities with security cameras, and began to require rural Uyghurs to apply for a special permit (便民卡, a "People's Convenience Card") to travel.

Under pressure to achieve “social stability,” local officials throughout the region began experimenting with new kinds of restrictions and policies to encourage assimilation to ethnic Chinese culture. These included banning certain names for children, such as Muhammad, offering cash rewards for inter-ethnic marriages, forced line dancing competitions (supposedly to undermine fundamentalist Islam), and shutting down local holy places. Prayer in public places was banned, as was most private education, including Uyghur language education. House-to-house searches for banned books and other purportedly subversive materials became common. State-employed Uyghurs and school children were forced to sign pledges of loyalty to the CCP. None of these policies applied to ethnic Chinese.

Sharp turn to a police state from 2016

In August of 2016, Xinjiang received a new official, Chen Quanguo, in the top position of regional party secretary. Chen Quanguo was transferred from Tibet, where he had earned a reputation for successfully suppressing Tibetans’ dissent through the securitization of society. In Xinjiang he expanded the harsh policies he had used in Tibet. Chen initiated the building of thousands of new police stations throughout the region, spaced every 500 meters or less in towns and cities. The state published contract offers for artificial intelligence systems and facial recognition software to link data from ubiquitous security cameras with other data collected on citizens. Uyghurs were ordered to submit all electronic devices to their local police station for inspection. All Uyghurs’ passports were confiscated, to be returned only by special application to one’s local police station.

Uyghurs currently must pass through checkpoints with facial recognition software when entering various places, including public transport stations, bookstores, and markets. Particularly at roadblock checkpoints, they are often required to surrender smart phones. Police download the contents of the phone, check that it is running mandatory state spyware, and look for content deemed subversive. Discovery of content not approved by the state can lead to prison sentences or indefinite detention in the re-education camps.

Mass internment camps for minorities

Beginning in late 2016, Chen Quanguo oversaw the construction of a massive network of secret, extra-judicial internment camps, in which Uyghurs are subject to forced indoctrination. Police in many areas have told reporters that they have been given quotas for the number of people to be interned. In one part of Qaraqash, the quota is 40%. Officials who oversaw detentions in another village near Khotan reported in state media that 20% of the population was sent to the camps for re-education. Police in Tuwet township reported that just over 10% of the population had been imprisoned or sent to re-education camps. These villages are the only ones for which we have credible data on the proportion of the population interned. Similar percentages are likely for other areas.

The difficulty in obtaining definitive statistics about the number of people interned in the camps stems from efforts by the Chinese government to hide the camps from international scrutiny. A Chinese diplomat in Kazakhstan told foreign journalists that these camps do not exist. Foreign journalists are not allowed to live in Xinjiang, and when they visit the region they are typically followed, harassed, and briefly detained by Chinese police. A few visitors have managed to discreetly photograph the exterior of some camps, but none have been able to enter the camps or

elicit comprehensive data on the camps from Chinese officials. The existence of the camps is explicitly confirmed, however, by county-level governments in Xinjiang, who have on occasion promoted their “successes” in opening or operating the internment camps in local online media. In a few cases, cited above, police officials have, at great risk to themselves, answered phone calls from Radio Free Asia’s journalists and divulged local statistics about internee numbers or discussed the kinds of behaviors used to select individuals for internment.

The selection of victims for internment is limited in the first place by ethnicity. There are no known reports of ethnic Chinese being placed in the camps, only members of the Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz ethnic groups. The racially and ethnically targeted nature of policing in Xinjiang is further demonstrated by a leaked form used by police to evaluate the trustworthiness of residents in a neighborhood in Xinjiang. The form yields a numerical score. Subjects receive an automatic 10% deduction for being Uyghur. They receive a further deduction if they have connections abroad. Various government bodies in Xinjiang have publicly solicited bids for computer systems that integrate this kind of data with surveillance data from cameras, checkpoints, and house-to-house searches, in order to flag individuals for detention using artificial intelligence that supposedly predicts anti-Chinese activities. This kind of system, known as an “integrated joint operations platform” is already in use in at least one district.

Those taken to the camps do not seem to be charged with any crime and their families are not notified. Very few reports of people being released have emerged since the camps became active in spring 2017, and the length of planned internment is unknown. A small number of internees have been released for unknown reasons and described their experiences to journalists. Experiences vary from one location to another, but all are characterized by forced indoctrination and attempted inculcation of love for the CCP and its leader, Xi Jinping. Reported indoctrination methods include ideological study sessions, self criticisms (writing and/or orally presenting long confessions of one’s purportedly subversive thoughts and actions), marching in place, slogan memorization and chanting, watching videos about religious practices, forced renunciation of Islam, Chinese language study, and memorization of Confucian texts. Some former internees report beatings, torture, and suicide attempts. Deaths in the internment camps have also been reported, with corpses showing signs of violence. Those who have been released are often reluctant to describe their experiences because of explicit or implied threats that their family members will be sent to the camps in retaliation.

Prominent Uyghurs who are regarded as opinion leaders of one kind or another have been particularly targeted. The most famous Uyghur pop music star, Ablajan Awut Ayyup, has been disappeared, as has the most famous Uyghur folk musician, Abdurehim Heyit. Leading intellectuals, including professors, authors, and poets, have disappeared in large numbers. The most successful Uyghur professional soccer player was interned upon returning from soccer training abroad.

State goals

The explicit goals of the re-education camps, commonly called “Education Transformation Centers” or “Eliminating Extremism Education Centers” is to transform the thoughts and beliefs of internees. Many Chinese officials seem to genuinely believe that such forced indoctrination can produce docile subjects, or even successfully inculcate a love for the party. In some places

security officials are also using the camps to physically remove people they find suspicious from society, preventing them from acting on their discontent with Chinese rule by locking them up. And of course the camps serve an important disciplinary purpose. The threat of internment is what empowers the Chinese state to micro-manage the most mundane daily activities of Uyghurs and re-engineer Uyghur culture. Uyghurs have little choice but to comply with officials' every demand, and to do so with outward enthusiasm. But officials' current goals for the camps may not be the most important factors. Particularly in a system not bound by legal procedures, as this one is not, the purposes to which internment camps are put can change. For example, in the event of an uptick in violent resistance by a small subset of Uyghurs, it is possible that the camps could be put to darker uses. Even extermination cannot be ruled out as a possibility, particularly given the language that some officials have used to describe the camps, describing them as places that "eradicate tumors" or function like spraying chemicals on crops to kill the weeds.

More than re-education camps alone

I have emphasized the re-education camps here because their most basic effects are easy to quantify and describe in a short space, but it is important to remember that they are only one piece of a larger effort to assimilate Uyghurs to Chinese culture, to purge purportedly untrustworthy people from society, and to eliminate all hints of dissent. Xinjiang may be the most closely surveilled place on the planet. Its government is pursuing an explicit policy of Sinicisation and eliminating education in the Uyghur language. Even if the camps were dismantled tomorrow, Xinjiang would remain a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid. Its population would continue to suffer under a mass trauma much like China's own Cultural Revolution. Any efforts to address the situation should target the entire apparatus, not merely the re-education camps.

Causes

The current situation is ultimately a product of colonial rule, in which ethnic Chinese control the land of indigenous Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others. More narrowly, Chinese policies to enforce the colonial order are shaped by racism and Islamophobia. It is important to note that the Chinese Communist Party's attacks on Uyghur religious practices are *not* primarily a result of Communist ideological positions on religion and atheism, even though in many cases the Party cites such ideology to justify its actions. To begin with, there is very little that is communist about today's CCP aside from its name and its occasional lip service to Marxist ideologies it no longer makes any effort to implement. On the contrary, the Party is quite content to ignore religious affairs if the religion in question is the correct kind. Confucius temples, for example, are operating freely in China.

Chinese officials' belief that Islamic ideas are the driving force behind Uyghur dissent, and thus the belief that they need to uproot Uyghur culture and religious practices, gained strength under the influence of the United States' so-called "Global War on Terror." Previous CCP diagnoses of Uyghur discontent had focused on Uyghur ethno-nationalism. After 2001, Chinese officials and media increasingly adopted Western-style Islamophobic perspectives, associating Islam uniquely with terrorist violence and imagining Islam as a monolithic religion tied to Middle Eastern cultures. While the Chinese Communist Party is entirely responsible for its repression of the Uyghurs, many aspects of the repression have been shaped by discriminatory Islamophobia borrowed from the US.

Ideas that Uyghurs are inherently violent and untrustworthy, due both to their ethnicity and their Islamic faith, are now deeply entrenched in Chinese officialdom. At the same time, the CCP has promoted a new kind of nationalism in recent years, based less on the idea of a superior Communist system, but instead on ethno-nationalist loyalty to an abstract notion of China. That picture of China is based on the Han, the majority ethnic group, and leaves limited space for minorities like the Uyghurs and Kazakhs. There is also a widespread Chinese belief that Chen Quanguo's policies are working, and that no violent attacks have taken place under Chen's administration (this is untrue).

Such notions interact with other longer-term phenomena, such as CCP concern over the alternative systems of authority that religions and non-Han culture might provide. They are also amplified by a general turn toward greater authoritarianism and restrictions on dissent under CCP chairman Xi Jinping. Chen Quanguo's new Xinjiang strategy aligns quite neatly with this transformation. Finally, China's new-found global political and economic clout has allowed the CCP to ignore growing international outrage over its Xinjiang policies. The recent retreat by some arms of the US Government from human rights promotion have further abetted CCP impunity, something I hope this hearing will help to rectify.

Non-Chinese scholars who specialize in the study of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang have long argued that the way to achieve peace in Xinjiang is to crack down on anti-minority racism, to give Uyghurs equal access to employment, and to ease cultural restrictions on Uyghurs; in short, to address the many grievances Uyghurs have with Chinese rule. CCP officials have now embraced the opposite approach, eliminating virtually all space for Uyghurs to lead normal lives, and they think it is working.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JESSICA BATKE

Statement of Jessica Batke¹
Senior Editor, ChinaFile
Former Research Analyst at the Department of State

Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this important subject, and thank you for inviting me to participate. I am here today in my personal capacity and do not represent any organization or entity other than myself.

I will only briefly touch on the many ways in which human rights in Xinjiang continue to deteriorate; there is a wealth of well-sourced and reliable reporting that will provide more detail than I can here today, and I believe my fellow panelists will offer some of this necessary detail as well. Therefore, I will focus on how we in the international community discuss what is happening in Xinjiang, how the Party-state's policies towards Uyghurs and other Muslims in the region fit into the context of Chinese leadership politics, and the implications of these policies outside of Xinjiang. Finally, I will make some recommendations about what the U.S. Government should do in the face of the Party-state's escalating campaign to forcibly sever Xinjiang's ethnic minority Muslims' ties to their religion, cultural practices, and ethnic identity. This includes holding individuals within the Chinese Party-state personally and directly responsible for the policies being enacted in Xinjiang.

The Worsening Situation in Xinjiang

The Party-state's policies related to Xinjiang have become startlingly more repressive in the last two years, even for a region that was already under more intensive digital and physical controls than most other areas of China. In particular, two interrelated efforts have signaled a dramatic increase in repression.

The first is the recall and forcible repatriation of ethnic Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minority Chinese citizens from abroad. Beginning in early 2017, Chinese authorities began to order ethnic minority Muslim citizens studying abroad to return to Xinjiang, sometimes detaining family members back home until they did so. Some of those who returned were reportedly detained, held incommunicado, or sentenced to prison.¹ In the summer of 2017, local security personnel in Egypt detained, and in some cases forcibly repatriated, dozens of students who had not heeded the call to return.²

The second is the rounding up of those same populations in Xinjiang to put them into what are frequently called "re-education camps." It is worth taking a moment to consider

¹ The opinions and characterizations in this testimony are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent official positions of the United States Government.

the nomenclature we use when discussing these camps. Official Chinese sources refer to them as “transformation through education” and “counter-extremism training” centers. In many cases, this is a euphemistic characterization. Though we do not know what is happening in each of these facilities, in at least some of these facilities, detainees are subject to waterboarding, being kept in isolation without food and water, and being prevented from sleeping. They are interrogated about their religious practices and about having made trips abroad. They are forced to apologize for the clothes they wore or for praying in the wrong place at the wrong time.³

Some detainees are apparently held simply because they do not speak Mandarin Chinese.⁴ In other cases, individuals are detained because local police must meet a detention quota: at least two villages have reportedly had this quota set at 40 percent of the local population.⁵

Using the Chinese euphemisms for these camps, or even the more suggestive term “re-education camps,” does not clearly and precisely define what it is we are currently witnessing. Some observers have chosen to call them “concentration camps,” based on a definition that describes them as places that confine members of ethnic and religious minorities that the state has targeted as such for the professed goal of state security.⁶ As expert Dr. Sean Roberts recently wrote, “Historically, we have seen that the internment of large segments of a country’s population on the basis of ethnicity and religion can give rise to apartheid or, worse, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Given the politically charged nature of the terms ethnic cleansing and genocide, reporters and scholars have been reticent to apply them to the current policies in Xinjiang, but it is also irresponsible to ignore early warning signs.”⁷

I am not an expert in international law and therefore cannot offer the legal term of art that most accurately captures the situation in Xinjiang as we know it. But I do believe that we can only treat the phenomenon with the seriousness and alarm that it merits if we first label it accurately. Therefore, I encourage further thought and discussion about how the U.S. Government and the international community more generally should refer to these camps.

No matter what they are called, these camps do not represent the full scope of day-to-day repression that we see in Xinjiang. Omnipresent security checks, digital and biometric surveillance, and the policing of individuals’ clothing and hair are just some of the ways in which residents of Xinjiang experience restrictions on their individual rights even outside these camps.⁸ Recent reports indicate that the state may also be rapidly constructing crematoria in different areas of Xinjiang. This could well be for the government’s stated purpose of environmental conservation; it could also be a way to subvert Muslim burial traditions and assert the Party-state’s authority in all aspects of area Muslims’ cultural and religious practices.⁹

The Party-state’s actions outside the camps clearly violate ethnic and religious minorities’ human rights and deserve our attention. In addition, I encourage observers, particularly those with international legal expertise, to think about the full scope and

nature of PRC policies in Xinjiang and consider whether we should take them as an early warning signal of something much worse.

How Does Xinjiang's Current Leadership Fit in to the Broader Pattern of State-Led Repression in the Region?

Though as a rule we have very little insight into top CCP leadership deliberations and personal preferences, careful observation of personnel appointments and policy trends does allow for some judgments about individual leaders' roles; in this regard, current Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo's influence on the region's policies is unusually evident. Chen is undoubtedly responsible for some of the significant changes in security and treatment of ethnic minorities in China. The timing of his tenure in Xinjiang, beginning in August 2016, coincides neatly with the large-scale use of the camps discussed above. And with perhaps only a few exceptions, the timing of the recalls and repatriations of Chinese citizens abroad—said to have begun in early 2017—also fit in this timeframe (though it is very unlikely that a provincial-level party secretary has the unilateral authority to order security operations overseas).

These moves echo Chen's security policies in his prior position as the Party secretary of Tibet (2011-2016). It was on his watch that 21,000 government employees were stationed in villages and monasteries throughout Tibet to carry out security and propaganda work, and that "convenience police stations" sprang up throughout the region to ensure adequate surveillance of the local population.¹⁰ Indeed, almost immediately after Chen arrived in Xinjiang in 2016, the region instituted a similar building spree—along with a massive increase in security personnel hiring and overall security spending in the region.¹¹

Though Chen has been directly responsible for overseeing these policies, neither the policies nor Chen himself are sui generis. They fit clearly into a longer policy trend of increased securitization, criminalization of ethnic and religious identity, and the reframing by the CCP of nonconforming behavior as "extremism." At least since 2014, when the CCP leadership held its second Central Xinjiang Work Conference, central PRC policy guidance and regional policy documents shifted from an emphasis on economic development to security and counter-extremism. Regionwide counter-extremism regulations that went into effect in 2017 were the result of a two-year-long drafting process.¹² "Education through transformation" centers were already being opened in Xinjiang as early as 2015.¹³ Whether he himself is the progenitor of increasingly repressive measures now employed in Xinjiang, or whether he is simply the most ruthless tool by which to implement them, the policies he is enacting are the logical endpoint of the party's broader policy trajectory.

Beyond the Xinjiang Party Secretary, there are two main constellations of bureaucratic agencies that have influence over and responsibility for policy and implementation in Xinjiang: those engaged in "United Front" work, and those in the "Politics and Law" ambit. These constellations comprise both Party and state bodies, though now more than ever the Party is clearly the center of gravity. In addition, there is the Central Committee

Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, formed in 2000, that brings together leaders from both of these policy hierarchies—as well as from others—to provide guidance on Xinjiang policy.

- The United Front Work Department (UFD), a Party entity, is under the leadership of the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, who also sits on the most powerful policymaking body in the PRC, the Politburo Standing Committee. Beyond its own “Xinjiang Bureau,” the UFD oversees the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the State Administration for Religious Affairs (which was recently absorbed into the UFD itself), both of which have a role in Xinjiang-related policy.¹⁴
- The Central Committee Politics and Law Commission (PLC) is a Party body that oversees the country’s security apparatus as well as its justice system, and as such has as its members the heads of all the relevant state agencies in charge of implementing its policies. The head of the PLC generally moves up to this position after serving as Minister of Public Security, and is concurrently the First Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police, a paramilitary organization that is a major component of Xinjiang’s security strategy.
- The Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group is one of a number of “leading small groups,” or policy advisory bodies, in the PRC Party-state. Since 2012, the head of the CPPCC (and a Politburo Standing Committee member) has been head of the Xinjiang Small Group, an indication of the importance the central leadership accords Xinjiang-related issues.

The Impact Beyond Xinjiang

There are a number of ways in which Beijing’s policies toward Xinjiang have implications outside the region. The intensive surveillance capabilities deployed in the region could readily be expanded for use throughout mainland China. Some reports suggest this could already be starting in the neighboring province of Gansu, with local Hui Muslims worried that “they’re going to implement the Xinjiang model here.”¹⁵ Outside the PRC, Uyghurs in exile, including those who have fled the current wave of repression, are not only surveilled but can be coerced into reporting on fellow Uyghurs by Chinese state security authorities who threaten family members back in Xinjiang.¹⁶ Other members of the diaspora, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who have received Kazakh or Kyrgyz citizenship, are at risk of being detained in these camps if they make a return visit to China.¹⁷

As previously mentioned, other governments have already assisted in forcibly repatriating China’s ethnic minority citizens back to Xinjiang. By deferring to China’s wishes with regard to its fleeing religious and ethnic minorities, compliant governments undermine broader international norms regarding protections for human rights and religious freedom. They also contribute to the normalization of China’s use of its “internal affairs” as the justification for interfering in the “internal affairs” of other sovereign nations.

Beyond the most obvious impact on current or former PRC citizens, Chinese government pressure also has the effect of encouraging self-censorship among foreign academics and China-watchers. I myself am saddened at the prospect that this testimony may foreclose the possibility of me traveling to China for some time to come; I have spent much of my adult life studying and working on China and the possibility that I will find my visa cancelled based on my participation today is distressing. This type of looming threat allows Beijing to limit factual discussion of the conditions in Xinjiang, even among non-citizens and even on foreign soil, often without having to directly intervene.

Policy Recommendations

It is a mistake to think that staying silent on human rights in China is a neutral act. Instead, every instance of silence simply resets Beijing's expectations and increases the psychic cost of re-injecting human rights into the conversation. Silence can be interpreted as tacit approval. Further, Beijing does still care about its international reputation, meaning both public and diplomatic pressure can be effective tools in encouraging change.¹⁸ The United States only abets the CCP when it does not forcefully speak out for human rights in China.

My recommendations fall under several broad categories: taking a firm position on the human rights situation in Xinjiang that is consistent with the U.S. government's values and respect for human rights; publicly and precisely communicating that position, including in coordination with like-minded countries whenever possible; and leveraging available legal mechanisms to apply targeted pressure to the PRC and to individuals within the Party-state responsible for the abuses in Xinjiang.

I urge Congress and the Administration to:

- Maintain a clear, consistent, and full-throated public defense of human rights and religious freedom in Xinjiang in addition to direct diplomatic engagement. International pressure can be effective, but it must be consistent over time and be conveyed through multiple channels. It also gives potential allies confidence that the U.S. government will be there with them if they take a public stand.
- Work with like-minded countries to issue joint statements and otherwise coordinate an international response to the situation in Xinjiang. Critically, this should include engagement with Muslim-majority countries and international institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
- Be rigorous and accurate in official statements describing what is happening in Xinjiang, particularly with regard to the large-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities on the basis of that status, and avoid using PRC euphemisms or other indirect language.
- Similarly, not simply repeat PRC language with regard to terrorism or terrorist group designations; seek additional clarification from independent sources of information and from U.S. intelligence experts.
- Offer support to PRC citizens who have fled Xinjiang, whether here in the United States or elsewhere around the globe. This includes pressing third countries that

have detained Uyghurs or other minorities to ensure they provide access to a full and impartial hearing of any asylum claims and do not simply repatriate individuals to China without further investigation or consideration. It also includes raising the cases of exile Uyghurs' family members who are detained in Xinjiang.

- Use their power, through mechanisms such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, to limit the ability of private U.S. individuals and companies to provide security training or materiel to Chinese state security agencies and affiliated entities, particularly those that have a role in repressing ethnic and religious minorities in China.¹⁹ Special attention should be paid to the connections between such transactions and China's Belt and Road Initiative, of which Xinjiang is a key component; security-related procurement and training for the Belt and Road Initiative can easily be employed for repressive ends in Xinjiang even if that is not their stated purpose.
- Use their power, through mechanisms such as the Export Administration Regulations, to limit the ability of U.S. companies to sell surveillance equipment and technology to Chinese state security agencies and affiliated entities; the chairs' recent letter to the Secretary of Commerce requesting additional information about the tracking of such sales is very helpful in this regard.
- Sanction relevant Chinese officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Any sanctions package should include Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. Sanctioning a sitting Politburo member, one of the top 25 leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, would clearly convey the United States Government's unequivocal condemnation of the camps. A wide range of additional central and regional leaders can and should be held to account for this large-scale violation of human rights.²⁰

Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions.

¹ Shohret Hoshur, Gulchehra Hoja, and Eset Sulaiman, "Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to Xinjiang Under Threat to Families," *Radio Free Asia*, May 9, 2017, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ordered-05092017155554.html>; Shohret Hoshur, "China Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang From Egypt," *Radio Free Asia*, July 24, 2017, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/boy-07242017153914.html>; Shohret Hoshur, "Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Scholar to 10 Years in Prison," *Radio Free Asia*, August 9, 2017, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-08092017151559.html>.

² Jessica Batke, "China is Forcing Uighurs Abroad to Return Home. Why Aren't More Countries Refusing to Help?" *ChinaFile*, August 14, 2017, <http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-forcing-uighurs-abroad-return-home-why-arent-more-countries>.

³ Simon Denyer, "Former inmates of China's Muslim 'reeducation' camps tell of brainwashing, torture," *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/former-inmates-of-chinas-muslim-re-education-camps-tell-of-brainwashing-torture/2018/05/16/32b330e8-5850-11e8-8b92-45fd7aaef3c_story.html?utm_term=.d7ed03ce3226; Wong Lok-to and Qiao Long, "China Locks Up, Tortures Muslims in 'Re-education Camps,'" *Radio Free Asia*, June 27, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/china-locks-up-tortures-muslims-in-re-education-camps-06272018150827.html>; Bruce Pannier, "Kazakh Man Recounts 'Reeducation' In Western Chinese Camp," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, April 26, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-recounts-reeducation-in->

- western-chinese-camp/29194106.html; Gerry Shih, "China's mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution," *Associated Press*, May 18, 2018, <https://apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b>.
- ⁴ Shih, "China's mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution."
- ⁵ Shohret Hoshur, "Nearly Half of Uyghurs in Xinjiang's Hotan Targeted For Re-Education Camps," *Radio Free Asia*, October 9, 2017, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/camps-10092017164000.html>; Shohret Hoshur, "One in 10 Uyghur Residents of Xinjiang Township Jailed or Detained in 'Re-Education Camp,'" *Radio Free Asia*, June 29, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/target-06292018132506.html>.
- ⁶ Mehmet Tohti, "Uyghurs: Victims of 21st Century Concentration Camps," *The Diplomat*, May 18, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/uyghurs-victims-of-21st-century-concentration-camps/>; "Concentration Camp," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/concentration-camp>.
- ⁷ Sean R. Roberts, "How Should the World Respond to Intensifying Repression in Xinjiang?" *ChinaFile*, June 4, 2018, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-should-world-respond-intensifying-repression-xinjiang>.
- ⁸ "China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions," *Human Rights Watch*, December 13, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>; "Ban on Islamic Clothing in Xinjiang," *Dui Hua Human Rights Journal*, February 27, 2018, <https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2018/02/ban-on-islamic-clothing-in-xinjiang.html>; Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, "Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 19, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355>; Megha Rajagopalan, "This Is What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like," *BuzzFeed News*, October 17, 2017, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/the-police-state-of-the-future-is-already-here>.
- ⁹ Gulchehra Hoja, "Xinjiang Rapidly Building Crematoria to Extinguish Uyghur Funeral Traditions," *Radio Free Asia*, June 26, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/crematoriums-06262018151126.html>.
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- ¹² Jessica Batke, "Central and Regional Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi's Second Term," *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 56, <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm56jb.pdf>.
- ¹³ "尉犁县举行'去极端化'教育转化中心揭牌仪式" (Yuli County Holds Ceremony to Inaugurate "Counter-Extremism" Transformation Through Education Center), *Yuli county government website*, June 9, 2016, last accessed at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-f1K1lt7NMJ:w.yuli.gov.cn/Item/71624.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
- ¹⁴ Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle, "The United Front Work Department: 'Magic Weapon' at Home and Abroad," *China Brief*, July 6, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/united-front-work-department-magic-weapon-homeabroad/>.
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¹⁸ Mimi Lau, "The quiet diplomats: how Germany kept up pressure on China to free Liu Xia," *South China Morning Post*, July 22, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2156280/quiet-diplomats-how-germany-kept-pressure-china-free>.

¹⁹ Marc Fisher, Ian Shapira, and Emily Rauhala, "Behind Erik Prince's China Venture," *The Washington Post*, May 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/05/04/feature/a-warrior-goes-to-china-did-erik-prince-cross-a-line/?utm_term=.2e8a8e7b69d1.

²⁰ Though by no means exhaustive, the following list includes positions in the Party and state hierarchy that play a role in setting and implementing Xinjiang policy, as discussed in Batke, "Central and Regional Leadership for Xinjiang Policy in Xi's Second Term":

- UFWD Head;
- UFWD Executive Deputy Director;
- UFWD Xinjiang Bureau staff;
- Ministry of Public Security Executive Vice Minister with a seat on the Xinjiang Leading Small Group;
- National Development and Reform Commission Deputy Head with a seat on the Xinjiang Leading Small Group;
- CPPCC Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs Head;
- State Administration for Religious Affairs Head;
- State Ethnic Affairs Commission Head;
- People's Armed Police Commander;
- Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee Secretary;
- Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Commander and Deputy Party Committee Secretary;
- Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Deputy Party Secretary and Chairman;
- XUAR UFWD Head;
- XUAR Politics and Law Commission Head.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO

Good morning. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The title of this hearing is “Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang’s Human Rights Crisis.”

We will have two panels testifying today. The first panel will feature:

- **Ambassador Kelley E. Currie**, Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations, and
- **Anthony Christino III**, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Non-proliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.

The second panel will include:

- **Gulchehra Hoja**, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia,
- **Rian Thum**, Associate Professor at Loyola University New Orleans, and
- **Jessica Batke**, Senior Editor at ChinaFile and former research analyst at the U.S. Department of State.

Thank you all for being here.

I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against the backdrop this week of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback convening the first ever State Department Ministerial to Advance International Religious Freedom, which has brought together senior representatives from more than 70 governments around the world to discuss areas of collaboration and partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally.

Secretary Pompeo penned an op-ed in USA Today earlier this week highlighting the Ministerial and the importance of advancing religious freedom globally. He specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra’s family.

The Chinese government and Communist Party are equal opportunity oppressors—targeting unregistered and registered Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners, and others with harassment, detention, imprisonment, and more.

The current human rights crisis unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region targeting Muslim minority groups is arguably among the worst, if not the most severe, instances in the world today of an authoritarian government brutally and systematically targeting a minority faith community. This is an issue which the Commission has been seized with for some time.

In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad urging him to prioritize this crackdown in his dealings with the Chinese government and to begin collecting information to make the case for possible application of Global Magnitsky sanctions against senior government and Party officials in the region including Chen Quanguo, the current Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary.

The Commission’s forthcoming Annual Report, set to be released in October, will prominently feature the grave and deteriorating situation in Xinjiang.

While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in greater detail, I want to take a few minutes to paint a picture of life in Xinjiang.

For months now, there have been credible estimates of between 800,000 and 1 million people from Xinjiang being held at “political reeducation” centers or camps which are fortified with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors, and guard rooms.

Security personnel have subjected detainees to torture, medical neglect and maltreatment, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures, and other forms of abuse, resulting in the death of some detainees.

According to one news source, “The internment program aims to rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs and reshape their very identities. The camps have expanded rapidly over the past year, with almost no judicial process or legal paperwork. Detainees who most vigorously criticize the people and things they love are rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are punished with solitary confinement, beatings and food deprivation.”¹

Some local officials in the region have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of the arbitrary detentions of Uyghur Muslims and members of other Muslim ethnic minority groups, such as “eradicating tumors” or spraying chemicals on crops to kill the “weeds.” One expert who is testifying today described Xinjiang Uyghur as “a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid.”

¹ <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-life-like-in-xinjiang-reeducation-camps-china-2018-5>

While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied knowledge of the camps, a groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz, a scholar at the European School of Culture and Theology, published through the Jamestown Foundation in May, found that Chinese authorities were soliciting public bids for the construction of additional camps and the addition of security elements to existing facilities. I submit this report for the record and would also note the Google Earth footage behind me, which clearly shows the construction of these camps over the span of several months.

[The report appears in the Appendix.]

Those not subject to “transformation through education” in detention still face daily intrusions in their home life, including compulsory “home stays,” wherein Communist Party officials and government workers are sent to live with local Uyghur and Kazakh families.

The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by iris and body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA sequencers, and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations. Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision and Dahua Technology, have profited greatly from the surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards of \$1.2 billion in government contracts for large-scale surveillance projects. Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smart phones for encrypted chat apps and require residents to install monitoring applications on their cell phones.² More traditional security measures are also employed, including extensive police checkpoints.

The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the proliferation of “convenience police stations,” a dense network of street corner, village, or neighborhood police stations that enhance authorities’ ability to closely surveil and police local communities.

Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a humiliating public act, cutting the skirts and even long shirts of Uyghur women on the spot as they walked through local streets, as a means of enforcing a ban on ethnic minorities wearing long skirts.

And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders indicating that 21% of arrests in China last year were in Xinjiang, which has only 1.5% of the population. The number of arrests increased 731% over the previous year and does not include the detentions of those in the “political reeducation” centers which are carried out extralegally.

Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this crisis. And it has not come without a cost. Developments in Xinjiang have had a direct impact on U.S. interests, most notably the detention of dozens of family members of U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of family members of prominent Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights advocacy. We are delighted that RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja is able to join us today to speak to her personal experience in this regard.

The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on the “long arm” of China, and that dimension certainly exists as it relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including in the United States.

Without objection, we’ll keep the hearing record open for 48 hours to submit additional relevant materials including a bipartisan letter to Secretary Pompeo that Senators Warner and Gardner are spearheading this week—which I am pleased to sign—regarding the cases of the RFA journalists’ family members.

[The letter appears in the Appendix.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH

I commend Senator Rubio for holding this hearing. There is a dire need to shine a light on the stunning and outrageous detention of nearly one million Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

What is clear from news reports is that Uyghurs are being detained in “reeducation centers” throughout Xinjiang. Those interned are being asked to renounce Islam, inform on their families for “extremism,” and parrot their love for Xi Jinping and the Communist Party.

Whole families disappear, children are detained, students studying abroad and soccer players are detained because of their “foreign” contacts. There are reports of suicides and deaths and mistreatment in these detention centers.

² <https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355>

Human rights champion Rebiya Kadeer's whole family—sons, daughters-in-law, grandchildren have disappeared. The disappearance of the families of other Uyghurs has also happened—like Radio Free Asia's heroic journalists.

It is mind-boggling. The Chinese government is constructing a high-tech police state in Xinjiang whose goal is the forcible assimilation and “transformation” of entire ethnic minority populations and the “sinicization” of their religious beliefs and practices. In fact, retaining religious beliefs or attachment to culture and language makes one a suspect in Xinjiang.

All this is being done in the name of counterterrorism and counterextremism. But China's repression may just create the extremism that they fear. Over the past year, the world has started to see too many comparisons between the Nazis and the current Chinese government. First there was the death of Liu Xiaobo, the first Nobel Peace Prize laureate to die in state custody since Carl von Ossietzky died in Nazi internment.

Now nearly one million are detained in what should be called concentration camps—the largest jailing of an ethnic and religious minority maybe since the Holocaust, certainly since the apartheid days in South Africa. “Reeducation” is not a new tactic in China. Tibetans, Falun Gong and other dissidents have experienced “reeducation through labor”—but the size and scale of what is happening to the Uyghurs is audaciously repressive, even by China's low standards.

Where is the outrage? Where is the anger? I commend the State Department and Secretary Pompeo for their public statements. But why has the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation been silent? What have Turkey and other Turkic nations been doing to address this issue?

We are at a critical point. Governments and parliamentarians need to condemn what is happening in Xinjiang. The UN must investigate and seek answers to what may be massive human rights abuses or worse. Businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academics that remain silent—because they want to remain in favor with the Chinese government and Communist Party—risk losing their integrity by doing so.

The International Olympic Committee should be asked to reassess China's hosting of the 2022 games if they maintain an apartheid-like police state targeting Muslim minorities. How can any law firm or lobby shop shill for the government of China while Uyghurs are so brutally and forcefully assimilated? Or when Tibetans, Christians, human rights lawyers, and Falun Gong are systematically repressed?

I heard former Congressman Frank Wolf say recently that in the 1980s, no firm would have dared to work for the Soviet Union—but now China's cash is too tempting to turn down even for some of my former House colleagues. Shame. Shame. It is really a shame.

I wonder if the Congress should consider limiting U.S. Government contracts by the exact amount lobby firms receive from China, Russia, or some other authoritarian government. That would make for some interesting business choices. Either make no profit from your dealings with China or choose to represent an increasingly repressive and authoritarian Chinese government.

No one should profit from representing authoritarian countries, particularly when they constantly seek to undermine U.S. values and interests. Chinese officials also should not profit from their complicity in torture and arbitrary detention. This is the exact reason the Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Act.

The Senator and I have urged the State Department to consider levying Magnitsky sanctions on officials in Xinjiang. We will continue to do so and press for the use of this important tool to hold officials accountable. We urge anyone with specific and credible information about the complicity of Chinese government officials in human rights abuses in Xinjiang to send that information to us. We will make sure it gets to the State and Treasury Departments.

I also think the sanctions available in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 should be considered, particularly broad economic sanctions targeting industries in Xinjiang that benefit China's political leaders or other “state-owned entities.” We want to make sure that Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities do not suffer from such sanctions, but they do not much share in the wealth generated by Chinese populations right now.

China has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” since 1999. That designation carries with it the possibility of economic sanctions. This lever should be used now because, in my opinion, what is happening in Xinjiang is currently the world's worst religious freedom situation—the forced “sinicization” of Islam through detention and severe restrictions on religious belief and practice. Targeted and tough economic sanctions are the only way to convince China's leaders that they have a clear interest in ending the repression of China's Muslim minorities.

There is also an important role for the UN here. I am glad that Ambassador Currie is here with us today. What is happening in Xinjiang are clear violations of many international treaties and covenants to which China is a party. I realize that China's veto on the UN Security Council will create obstacles to many UN investigations, as will their presence on the UN Human Rights Council, but we should be making them use their veto, we should consider requesting a briefing on the situation at the Security Council and work together with the OIC and other Muslim-majority countries to raise the issue within the UN system. At a time when the Chinese government is seeking to gain allies through its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Central Asia and Africa, it would seem the last thing they want is an international debate about their poor and abusive treatment of ethnic and religious minorities.

Finally, I want to commend the exemplary work of Radio Free Asia's Uyghur Service reporters. Despite unacceptable threats to their families, they have kept working and have provided us with an extraordinary record of events. Your courage and professionalism are admirable. Thank you.

Senator, I commend you again for holding this important hearing to shine a light on an outrageous and horrible situation. We all need to believe in the power of light and sunshine because evil flourishes only in the dark.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUBIO




New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang

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By: [Adrian Zenz \(https://jamestown.org/analyst/adrian-zenz/\)](https://jamestown.org/analyst/adrian-zenz/)

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Police officers standing outside a facility in Xinjiang believed to house a re-education camp (Source: AP)

This article is condensed from a longer paper, available for download [here](https://www.academia.edu/37353916/NEW_Sept_2018_Thoroughly_Reforming_Them_Towards_a_Healthy_Heart_Education_Campaign_in_Xinjiang) (https://www.academia.edu/37353916/NEW_Sept_2018_Thoroughly_Reforming_Them_Towards_a_Healthy_Heart_Education_Campaign_in_Xinjiang). (Editor's note: longer paper was updated with corrections September 2018)

Since summer of 2017, troubling reports in Western media outlets about large-scale detentions of ethnic Muslim minorities (including Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have multiplied (RFA (<https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/shaoshuminzu/hj-05042018200446.html>), May 4). These reports include substantial anecdotal and eyewitness evidence describing a network of clandestine "re-education camps" in which detainees can be held indefinitely without process or recourse (AP News (<https://www.apnews.com/10207e125d564897934a27288855e34d>), December 17, 2017; Wall Street Journal (<https://www.wsj.com/articles/tweive-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355>), December 19, 2017).

The existence of these camps is denied by the Chinese government. In February of this year, during an interview with the Almaty Tengri News, Zhang Wei, China's Consul General in Kazakhstan, issued what is to date the only statement by a Chinese public official on the reputed camp network. In reference to a CNN report on the camps, Zhang argued that "we do not have such an idea in China" (AKIpress (<https://akipress.com/news:602025>), February 7; CNN (<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/02/asia/china-xinjiang-detention-camps-intl/index.html>), February 3). This article demonstrates that there is, in fact, a substantial body of PRC governmental sources that prove the existence of the camps. Furthermore, the PRC government's own sources broadly corroborate some estimates by rights groups of number of individuals interred in the camps. While estimates of internment numbers remain speculative, the available evidence suggests that a significant percentage of Xinjiang's Muslim minority population, likely at least several hundred thousand, and possibly just over one million, are or have been interred in political re-education facilities.

Overall, it is possible that the region's re-education system exceeds the size of China's entire former "education through labor" system that was officially abolished in 2013. The article also examines the evolution of re-education in Xinjiang, empirically charting the unprecedented re-education drive initiated by the region's Party secretary, Chen Quanguo. Information from 73 government procurement and construction bids valued at around RMB 680 million (approximately USD 108 million) along with public recruitment notices and other documents provide unprecedented insights into the evolution and extent of the region's re-education campaign.

The Inception of "De-Extremification" through Re-Education in Xinjiang

The concept of re-education has a long history in Communist China. In the 1950s, the state established the practices of "reform through labor" (劳动改造) and "re-education through labor" (劳动教养). [1] Later, in the early 2000s, the government initiated "transformation through education" (教育转化) classes for Falun Gong followers. [2]

It was not until 2014 that the "transformation through education" concept in Xinjiang came to be systematically used in wider contexts than the Falun Gong, Party discipline or drug addict rehabilitation. Its application to Uyghur or Muslim population groups arose in tandem with the "de-extremification" (去极端化) campaigns, a phrase first mentioned by Xinjiang's former Party secretary Zhang Chunxian in 2012 (Phoenix Information (http://www.360doc.com/content/15/10/12/23/15549792_505230217.shtml), October 12, 2015).

In 2014, the re-education system started to evolve into a network of dedicated facilities. Konashahar (Shufu) County (Kashgar Prefecture) established a three-tiered "transformation through education base" (教育转化基地) system as part of its "de-extremification" efforts (Xinjiang Daily (<http://www.xjdaily.com.cn/tsnb/1150049.shtml>), November 18, 2014). It operated at county, township and village levels. A three-tiered re-education system based on these three levels is likewise mentioned in a 2017 government research paper described below, one whose ideas have apparently found widespread adoption (Harmonious Society Journal (<http://www.doc88.com/p-2921386725182.html>) via www.doc88.com, p.76, June 2017).

The year 2015 also saw the first media report stating the actual capacity of a centralized re-education facility. Khotan City's "de-extremification education and training center" (去极端化教育培训中心) was said to hold up to 3,000 detainees whose thinking was "deeply affected" by "religious extremism" (Communist Party News (<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0917/c398213-27598576.html>), October 17, 2015).

Chen Quanguo Puts Re-Education into Overdrive

In August 2016, Chen Quanguo became Xinjiang's new Party Secretary. He came into the job from a position as Party Secretary of Tibet, where he pacified the restive region through a combination of intense securitization and pervasive social control mechanisms (*China Brief* (<https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/>), September 21, 2017).

A number of separate reports place the onset of massive detentions among the Uyghur population soon thereafter, in late March 2017 (RFA (<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detentions-01222018171657.html>), January 22). This timing coincides neatly with the publication of "de-extremification regulations" (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) by the government of the XUAR (Xinjiang Government (<http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2017/03/30/128831.html>), March 29, 2017). Directive No. 14 in Section 3 of this document states that "de-extremification must do transformation through education (教育转化) well, jointly implementing individual and centralized education".

A potentially influential document in this development was a research paper published by Xinjiang's Urumqi Party School (*Harmonious Society Journal* (<http://www.doc88.com/p-2921386725182.html>) via www.doc88.com, June 2017). The paper recommends the creation of "centralized transformation through education training centers" in all prefectures and counties. It lists three types of re-education facilities: "centralized transformation through education training centers" (集中教育转化培训中心), "legal system schools" (法制学校), and "rehabilitation correction centers" (康复矫治中心). Government construction bids confirm this and indicate that these are sometimes part of large new compounds that also host criminal detention centers, police stations or even hospitals and supermarkets (see *Table 1* (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>)).

In May 2017, the first official recruitment notices related to re-education appeared, although evidently most staff were recruited by other means. Karamay, a city in northern Xinjiang, listed 110 re-education center positions for four different "centralized transformation through education classes" (集中教育转化班) as well as 248 police officers for police stations and "transformation through education bases" (教育转化基地) (*Zhonggong zhaoqing* (<http://zjks.offcn.com/fjxi/u14230.html>), May 20, 2017; *Zhonggong wangxiao* (<http://www.eoffcn.com/kszx/gonggao/413713.html>), May 20, 2017). Lop and Yutian Counties in Khotan Prefecture advertised "transformation through education center" (教育转化中心) teaching positions (*Shiye Danwei Zhaopin* (<http://www.shiyebian.net/xinxi/217062.html>), August 2, 2017). Staff and teacher recruitment notices for Xinjiang's numerous new "educational training centers" (教育培训中心) often required no specific degree, skill, or teaching background. Instead, they frequently preferred recruits who demonstrated strong ideological conformity, army or police experience, or called for "training center policing assistants". In many instances, training center and police staff recruitments shared the same job posting, and bids show that "training center" compounds often have police stations. [3]

The Costs and Design of Re-Education Facilities

The start of Chen Quanguo's re-education initiative correlates closely with the release of detailed information in the form of government procurement and construction bids (采购项目 and 建设项目). Nearly all bids were announced from March 2017, just prior to the re-education drive (Figure 1, based on *Table 1* (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>)). Likewise, the values attached to these bids were by far highest in the months immediately after the start of the re-education campaign (Figure 2). While only a fraction of re-education facility construction is reflected in these bids, they do indicate a pattern consistent with re-education policy and implementation.




Figure 1. Source: Government procurement bids (Table 1 (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>))




Figure 2. Source: Government procurement bids (Table 1 (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>)). Values for some projects were not available. For others, advertised values pertained to the construction of several different facilities. In the latter cases, values for re-education facilities were estimated.

Bid descriptions indicate both the construction of new as well as upgrades and enlargements of existing re-education facilities (Table 1 (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>)). Some pertain to adding sanitary facilities, warm water supplies and heating or catering facilities, indicating that existing buildings are being used to house more people for longer periods of time. Several planned facilities feature compound sizes exceeding 10,000sqm. One bid combines vocational training and re-education facilities totaling 82,000sqm. A former detainee estimated that his re-education facility held nearly 6,000 detainees (RFERL (<https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-recounts-reeducation-in-western-chinese-camp/29194106.html>), April 26).

Many bids mandate the installation of comprehensive security features that turn existing facilities into prison-like compounds: surrounding walls, security fences, pull wire mesh, barbed wire, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, secure access systems, watchtowers, and guard rooms or facilities for armed police. One bid emphasized that its surveillance system must cover the entire facility, leaving "no dead angles" (无死角). Several facilities branded as vocational or other educational training facilities also carried bids calling for extensive security installations, with some mandating police stations on the same compound.

Overall, documentation assembled by the author lists 73 re-education facility related procurement bids valued at RMB 682 million in respect to their re-education components (Table 1 (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>)). [4] Nearly all of these were for regions with significant Uyghur or other Muslim minority populations.

The scale of re-education facility construction can be reflected in local budget reports. For example, Akto County stated that in 2017 it spent RMB 383.4 million or 9.6 percent of its budget on security-related projects, including “transformation through education centers infrastructure construction and equipment purchase” (教育转化中心等基础设施建设和装备购置) (Akto Government (http://www.xiakt.gov.cn/akt/c100147/2018-02/02/content_16c452210d3345f1a9e3abe8c92b0f65.shtml), February 2). [5]

While there is no published data on re-education detainee numbers, information from various sources permit us to estimate internment figures at anywhere between several hundred thousand and just over one million. The latter figure is based on a leaked document from within the region’s public security agencies, and, when extrapolated to all of Xinjiang, could indicate a detention rate of up to 11.5 percent of the region’s adult Uyghur and Kazakh population (Newsweek Japan (https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/stories/world/2018/03/89-3_1.php), March 13). The lower estimate seems a reasonably conservative figure based on correlating informant statements, Western media pieces and the comprehensive material presented in the long version of this article. It is therefore possible that Xinjiang’s present re-education system exceeds the size of the entire former Chinese re-education through labor system. [6]

Conclusions

China’s pacification drive in Xinjiang is, more than likely, the country’s most intense campaign of coercive social reengineering since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The state’s “war on terror” is arguably more and more an euphemism for forced ethnic assimilation.

Despite the strain on the local economy and the potentially disastrous long-term consequences for ethnic relations, Beijing’s support for Chen Quanguo’s extreme de-extremification measures is unlikely to wane. Under Xi Jinping, “foreign” religions such as Islam or Christianity have been kept on ever-tighter leashes and directed to “Sinicize” in accordance with “socialist core values” (New York Times (<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/opinion/sunday/chinas-communists-embrace-religion.html>), March 24, 2017). In that sense, Xinjiang’s re-education drive is effectively part of a larger, more subtle nationwide campaign.

Xinjiang’s status as the “core hub” of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative has seemingly made Beijing hell-bent on pursuing a definitive solution to the Uyghur question. The frequently highlighted “successes” of Xinjiang’s re-education system may lead the state to adopt it elsewhere. Just as Xinjiang has become China’s testing ground for cutting-edge surveillance technology, the state may use the experiences gathered from large-scale re-education for its social reengineering efforts across the nation.

As pointed out by the scholar James Millward, we would do well to ponder whether what is happening in Xinjiang will stay in Xinjiang (New York Times (<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-uyghurs.html>), February 3).

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Notes

[1] See Mühlhahn, K., 2009. Criminal Justice in China: A History, pp.215-257. Deckwitz, S., 2012. Gulag vs. Laogai – The Function of Forced Labour Camps in the Soviet Union and China. MA Thesis (<https://dSPACE.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/228062/gulagvslaogai.pdf?sequence=1>), Utrecht University.

[2] Compare Tong, J., 2009. Revenge of the Forbidden City: the Suppression of the Falungong in China 1999-2005. Besides combating the Falun Gong, the state also employed "transformation through education" to re-educate Party members, targeting e.g. cadres with "non-conformist" (不合格) or "backward" (落后) mindsets (Li Derong, Baidu Scholar (http://xueshu.baidu.com/s?wd=paperuri%3A%287175dca335d50866df44c75a312d6f76%29&filter=sc_long_sign&sc_ks_para=q%3D%E5%85%9A%E5%91%98%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95%E7%9A%84%E6%96%B0%E6%8E%A2%E7%B4%A2%E2%80%94%E6%B1%9F%E8%8B%8F%E5%93%8D%E6%B0%B4%E5%8E%BF%E5%AE%9E%E6%96%BD%E5%85%9A%E5%91%98%E2%80%9C%E5%91%8A%E8%AF%AB%E8%BD%AC%E5%8C%96%E2%80%9D%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6%E7%9A%84%E5%AE%9E%E8%B7%B5%E4%B8%8E%E6%80%9D%E8%80%83&sc_us=3028509239404475910&tn=SE_baiduxueshu_c1qieupa&ie=utf-8), 2002; Yuan Zhihua and Yi Waiping, Baidu Scholar (<http://xueshu.baidu.com/s?wd=paperuri%3A%28fc7be876ef8ab0f84b0436786d1aef5a%29>), 2006). Finally, "transformation through education" is a common concept in the context of coercive isolated detoxification treatments (强制隔离戒毒) given to drug addicts.

[3] Often, neither advert texts nor specific job requirements indicate a relationship with vocational skills training. Kuqa County in Aksu Prefecture, where nearly the entire population is Uyghur, advertised 60 "education and training center" staff positions in the same intake as its convenience police station advert. The advert preferred recruits with a background in the military or police. Qitai County in Changji Prefecture, with a Muslim population of 26 percent, advertised 200 assistant police positions specifically for its county "training center". Several other adverts recruited "education and training center" staff in the same advert as other police positions, in nearly all instances without any degree requirement or relevant vocational training knowledge. Rather, Shayar (Shaya) County in Aksu mandated some of its future teachers to have degrees in law or Chinese language, both "skills" that are typically taught in political re-education facilities. Sources: see the long version of this article.

[4] Some bids referenced in Table 1 (<https://jamestown.org/programs/cb/79853-2/>) did not show cost estimates.

[5] Similarly, Charchan (Qiemo) County's reported budget activities list RMB 105.1 million spending on security-related investments, including the construction of three re-education centers (教育转化中心) (Qiemo County (<http://www.xjqmx.gov.cn/gk/zjgl/czyjsbg/111334.htm>), December 28, 2017). Likewise, Yakan (Shache) County's 2017 budget report showed a RMB 1.5 million spending item on "legal system transformation through education" (司法教育转化), which likely pertains to operating expenses rather than facility construction. Similarly, Qaghiliq (Ruoqiang) County adjusted its 2017 budget to provide an additional RMB 6 million spending on re-education, likely also pertaining to running costs (Shache County (https://www.baidu.com/link?url=CphUI46T81kIV47CZMAIFTRnLnoOeTMacs2b_hENNurt9qnWYn2XyMSRbAbZfeFz6upSsTxT1bkptxdVp1jzH-bMKNDB1TkV9qNvfAtVn4BH7jBIS6Jxn1_W2MPpUrB0683kiVonHnMpEVvpbGC_&wd=&eqid=e3058ecf0006490600), March 8, 2017; Ruoqiang County (<http://www.loulan.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=41645>), January 29). All of these counties are located in regions with significant or majority Uyghur populations.

[6] Detailed sources and calculations for the statements made in this paragraph can be found in the longer version of this article.


ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KING

APARTHEID WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

CHINA HAS TURNED XINJIANG INTO A POLICE STATE LIKE NO OTHER

Totalitarian Determination and Modern Technology Have Produced a Massive Abuse of Human Rights

[From The Economist, May 31, 2018]



Hotan, Xinjiang Province.—“The prophet Sulayman approached his son and said to him, ‘I have received a message from God. I want you to circle the Earth and see if there are more people who are alive in spirit or more people who are dead in spirit.’ After a period the son returned and said, ‘Father, I went to many places and everywhere I went I saw more people who were dead than those who were alive.’”

Hasan shared that message on a WeChat social-messaging group in 2015, when he was 23. Born in Yarkand, a town in southern Xinjiang, Hasan had moved to the provincial capital, Ürümqi, to sell jade and shoes and to learn more about Islam. He described himself to Darren Byler, an anthropologist from the University of Washington, as a Sufi wanderer, a pious man with a wife and small daughter, who prayed five times a day and disapproved of dancing and immodesty.

But in January 2015 the provincial government was demanding that everyone in Ürümqi return to their native home to get a new identity card. “I am being forced to go back,” Hasan complained to Mr. Byler. “The Yarkand police are calling me every day. They are making my parents call me and tell me the same thing.” Eventually, he and his family boarded a bus for the 20-hour journey home. It was hit by a truck. Hasan’s wife and daughter were killed. He was hospitalized. “It was the will of Allah,” he said.

Hasan hoped the authorities would allow him to return to Ürümqi because of his injuries. No chance. Having lost wife, child and livelihood, Hasan lost his liberty, too. A fortnight after his accident, he was sent to a reeducation camp for an indefinite period. There, for all his relatives know, he remains.

Hasan is one of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, a Turkic-language people, who have disappeared in Xinjiang, China’s northwestern province. It is an empty, far-flung place; Hasan’s home town of Yarkand is as close to Baghdad as it is to Beijing. It is also a crucial one. The region is China’s biggest domestic producer of oil and gas, and much of the fuel imported from Central Asia and Russia passes through on its way to the industries of the east coast. It is now a vital link in the Belt and Road Initiative, a foreign policy which aims to bind the Middle East and Europe to China with ties of infrastructure, investment and trade.

But on top of that it is the home of the Uighurs, the largest Muslim group in the country, and ethnically quite distinct from the Han Chinese. A recent history of

Uighur unrest—in particular bloody inter-ethnic violence in Ürümqi in 2009 that followed the murder of Uighurs elsewhere in China—and subsequent terrorism have sent the government’s repressive tendencies into overdrive. Under a new party boss, Chen Quanguo, appointed in 2016, the provincial government has vastly increased the money and effort it puts into controlling the activities and patrolling the beliefs of the Uighur population. Its regime is racist, uncaring and totalitarian, in the sense of aiming to affect every aspect of people’s lives. It has created a full-fledged police state. And it is committing some of the most extensive, and neglected, human-rights violations in the world.

THE NOT-QUITE-GULAG ARCHIPELAGO

The government is building hundreds or thousands of unacknowledged reeducation camps to which Uighurs can be sent for any reason or for none. In some of them day-to-day conditions do not appear to be physically abusive as much as creepy. One released prisoner has said he was not permitted to eat until he had thanked Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, and the Communist Party. But there have been reports of torture at others. In January, 82-year-old Muhammad Salih Hajim, a respected religious scholar, died in detention in Ürümqi.

Kashgar, the largest Uighur city, has four camps, of which the largest is in Number 5 Middle School. A local security chief said in 2017 that “approximately 120,000” people were being held in the city. In Korla, in the middle of the province, a security official recently said the camps are so full that officials in them are begging the police to stop bringing people.

As a result, more and more camps are being built: the reeducation archipelago is adding islands even faster than the South China Sea. Adrian Zenz of the European School of Culture and Theology in Kortal, Germany, has looked at procurement contracts for 73 reeducation camps. He found their total cost to have been 682m yuan (\$108m), almost all spent since April 2017. Records from Akto, a county near the border with Kyrgyzstan, say it spent 9.6% of its budget on security (including camps) in 2017. In 2016 spending on security in the province was five times what it had been in 2007. By the end of 2017 it was ten times that: 59bn yuan.



Source: Google Earth
Economist.com

For all this activity, the government has not officially confirmed that the camps exist. They are not governed by any judicial process; detentions are on the orders of the police or party officials, not the verdict of a court. A woman working as an undertaker was imprisoned for washing bodies according to Islamic custom. Thirty residents of Ili, a town near the Kazakh border, were detained “because they were suspected of wanting to travel abroad,” according to the local security chief. Other offences have included holding strong religious views, allowing others to preach religion, asking where one’s relatives are and failing to recite the national anthem in Chinese.

A significant chunk of the total Uighur population is interned in this way. If the rate of detention in Kashgar applied to the province as a whole, 5% of the Uighur population of 10m would be detained. Other evidence suggests that this is quite possible. In February, Radio Free Asia, a broadcaster financed by an independent agency of the American government, cold-called 11 families at random in Araltobe, in the north of the province, far from the Uighurs’ heartland. Six said family members

had been sent to camps. In a village later visited by Agence France Presse in Qaraqash county, near Hotan, a fifth of adults had been detained over four months.

Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch, an advocacy group, reckons the overall number detained may be 800,000. Timothy Grose, a professor at Rose-Hulman University in Indiana, puts the total between 500,000 and 1m, which would imply that something like a sixth to a third of young and middle-aged Uighur men are being detained, or have been at some point in the past year.

The Chinese government argues that harsh measures are needed to prevent violence associated with Uighur separatism. In 2013 a Uighur suicide-driver crashed his car into pedestrians in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. In 2014 a knife-wielding Uighur gang slaughtered 31 travellers at a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province, an incident some in China compared to the September 11th 2001 attacks on America. Unrest in Yarkand later that year led to a hundred deaths; an attack at a coal mine in Aksu killed 50 people. Kyrgyz authorities blamed Uighur terrorists for an attempt to blow up the Chinese embassy in Bishkek; Uighurs have been blamed for a bombing which killed 20 at a shrine in Bangkok popular with Chinese tourists.

There are worrying links, as the Chinese authorities are keen to point out, between Uighur separatism and global jihad, especially in the Uighur diaspora, which is based in Turkey. Chinese and Syrian officials say 1,500 Uighurs have fought with Islamic State (IS) or Jabhat al-Nusra (part of al-Qaeda) in Syria. A group called the Turkestan Islamic Party, which demands independence for Xinjiang, is banned under anti-terrorist laws in America and Europe. In 2016 a defector from IS provided a list of foreign recruits; 114 came from Xinjiang.

IN THE GRID

But the system of repression in the province goes far beyond anything that would be justified by such proclivities and affiliations. In Hotan there is a new police station every 300 meters or so. They are called “convenience police stations,” as if they were shops—and in fact they do offer some consumer services, such as bottled water and phone recharging. The windowless stations, gunmetal gray, with forbidding grilles on their doors, are part of a “grid-management system” like that which Mr. Chen pioneered when he was party boss in Tibet from 2011 to 2016. The authorities divide each city into squares, with about 500 people. Every square has a police station that keeps tabs on the inhabitants. So, in rural areas, does every village.

At a large checkpoint on the edge of Hotan a policeman orders everyone off a bus. The passengers (all Uighur) take turns in a booth. Their identity cards are scanned, photographs and fingerprints of them are taken, newly installed iris-recognition technology peers into their eyes. Women must take off their headscarves. Three young Uighurs are told to turn on their smartphones and punch in the passwords. They give the phones to a policeman who puts the devices into a cradle that downloads their contents for later analysis. One woman shouts at a policeman that he is Uighur, why is he looking at her phone?

There can be four or five checkpoints every kilometer. Uighurs go through them many times a day. Shops and restaurants in Hotan have panic buttons with which to summon the police. The response time is one minute. Apparently because of the Kunming knife attack, knives and scissors are as hard to buy as a gun in Japan. In butchers and restaurants all over Xinjiang you will see kitchen knives chained to the wall, lest they be snatched up and used as weapons. In Aksu, QR codes containing the owner’s identity-card information have to be engraved on every blade.

Remarkably, all shops and restaurants in Hotan must have a part-time policeman on duty. Thousands of shop assistants and waiters have been enrolled in the police to this end. Each is issued with a helmet, flak jacket and three-foot baton. They train in the afternoon. In the textile market these police officers sit in every booth and stall, selling things; their helmets and flak jackets, which are uncomfortable, are often doffed. A squad of full-time police walks through the market making sure security cameras are working and ordering shop assistants to put their helmets back on. Asked why they wear them, the assistants reply tersely—“security.”

At the city’s railway station, travellers go through three rounds of bag checks before buying a ticket. On board, police walk up and down ordering Uighurs to open their luggage again. As the train pulls into Kashgar, it passes metal goods wagons. A toddler points at them shouting excitedly “Armoured car! Armoured car!” Paramilitary vehicles are more familiar to him than rolling stock.

Uniformed shop assistants, knife controls and “convenience police stations” are only the most visible elements of the police state. The province has an equally extensive if less visible regime that uses yet more manpower and a great deal of technology to create total surveillance.

Under a system called *fanghuiju*, teams of half a dozen—composed of policemen or local officials and always including one Uighur speaker, which almost always means a Uighur—go from house to house compiling dossiers of personal information. *Fanghuiju* is short for “researching people’s conditions, improving people’s lives, winning people’s hearts.” But the party refers to the work as “eradicating tumors.” The teams—over 10,000 in rural areas in 2017—report on “extremist” behavior such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and sporting long beards. They report back on the presence of “undesirable” items, such as Korans, or attitudes—such as an “ideological situation” that is not in wholehearted support of the party.


Since the spring of 2017, the information has been used to rank citizens’ “trustworthiness” using various criteria. People are deemed trustworthy, average or untrustworthy depending on how they fit into the following categories: 15 to 55 years old (i.e., of military age); Uighur (the catalogue is explicitly racist: people are suspected merely on account of their ethnicity); unemployed; have religious knowledge; pray five times a day (freedom of worship is guaranteed by China’s constitution); have a passport; have visited one of 26 countries; have ever overstayed a visa; have family members in a foreign country (there are at least 10,000 Uighurs in Turkey); and home school their children. Being labelled “untrustworthy” can lead to a camp. To complete the panorama of human surveillance, the government has a programme called “becoming kin” in which local families (mostly Uighur) “adopt” officials (mostly Han). The official visits his or her adoptive family regularly, lives with it for short periods, gives the children presents and teaches the household Mandarin. He also verifies information collected by *fanghuiju* teams. The programme appears to be immense. According to an official report in 2018, 1.1m officials have been paired with 1.6m families. That means roughly half of Uighur households have had a Han-Chinese spy/indoctrinator assigned to them.

Such efforts map the province’s ideological territory family by family; technology maps the population’s activities street by street and phone by phone. In Hotan and Kashgar there are poles bearing perhaps eight or ten video cameras at intervals of 100–200 meters along every street; a far finer-grained surveillance net than in most Chinese cities. As well as watching pedestrians the cameras can read car number plates and correlate them with the face of the person driving. Only registered owners may drive cars; anyone else will be arrested, according to a public security official who accompanied this correspondent in Hotan. The cameras are equipped to work at night as well as by day.

Because the government sees what it calls “web cleansing” as necessary to prevent access to terrorist information, everyone in Xinjiang is supposed to have a spyware app on their mobile phone. Failing to install the app, which can identify people called, track online activity and record social-media use, is an offence. “Wi-Fi sniffers” in public places keep an eye, or nose, on all networked devices in range.

Next, the records associated with identity cards can contain biometric data including fingerprints, blood type and DNA information as well as the subject’s detention record and “reliability status.” The government collects a lot of this biometric material by stealth, under the guise of a public-health programme called “Physicals for All,” which requires people to give blood samples. Local officials “demanded [we] participate in the physicals,” one resident of Kashgar told Human Rights Watch, an NGO. “Not participating would have been seen as a problem . . .”

A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), first revealed by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems, information from cameras, smartphones, financial and family-planning records and even unusual electricity use to generate lists of suspects for detention. One official WeChat report said that verifying IJOP’s lists was one of the main responsibilities of the local security committee. Even without high-tech surveillance, Xinjiang’s police state is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying.



In theory, the security system in Xinjiang applies to everyone equally. In practice it is as race-based as apartheid in South Africa was. The security apparatus is deployed in greatest force in the southwest, where around 80% of Uighurs live. In a city like Shihezi, which is 95% Han, there are far fewer street checkpoints, if any, and a normal level of policing. Where there are checkpoints, Han Chinese are routinely waved through. Uighurs are always stopped.

THE MINARETS TORN DOWN

Islam is a special target. In Hotan, the neighbourhood mosques have been closed, leaving a handful of large places of worship. Worshippers must register with the police before attending. At the entrance to the largest mosque in Kashgar, the Idh Kha—a famous place of pilgrimage—two policemen sit underneath a banner saying “Love the party, love the country.” Inside, a member of the mosque’s staff holds classes for local traders on how to be a good communist. In Ürümqi the remaining mosques have had their minarets knocked down and their Islamic crescents torn off. Some 29 Islamic names may no longer be given to children. In schools, Uighur-language instruction is vanishing—another of the trends which have markedly accelerated under Mr. Chen. Dancing after prayers and specific Uighur wedding ceremonies and funerary rites are prohibited.

Unlike those of South Africa, the two main racial groups are well matched in size. According to the 2010 census, Uighurs account for 46% of the province’s population and Han Chinese 40% (the rest are smaller minorities such as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz). But they live apart and see the land in distinct ways. Uighurs regard Xinjiang as theirs because they have lived in it for thousands of years. The Han Chinese regard it as theirs because they have built a modern economy in its deserts and mountains. They talk of bringing “modern culture” and “modern lifestyle” to the locals—by which they mean the culture and lifestyle of modern Han China.

So how have the Han and Uighur reacted to the imposition of a police state? Yang Jiehun and Xiao Junduo are Han Chinese veterans of the trade in Hotan jade (which the Chinese hold to be the best in the world, notably in its very pale “mutton-fat” form). Asked about security, they give big smiles, a thumbs-up and say the past year’s crackdown has been “really well received.” “In terms of public security,

Ürümqi is the safest it has ever been,” says Mr. Xiao, whose family came to the province in the 1950s, when the People’s Liberation Army and state-owned enterprises were reinforcing the border with the Soviet Union. “The Uighurs are being helped out of poverty,” he avers. “They understand and support the policy.”

Not all Han Chinese in Xinjiang are quite as enthusiastic. Tens of thousands came to the province fairly recently, mostly in the 1990s, to seek their fortunes as independent traders and business people, rather than being transferred there by state-owned companies or the army. They approve of better security but dislike the damage being done to the economy—for example, the way movement controls make it harder to employ Uighurs. So far, this ambivalence is not seriously weakening the support among the Han and, for the government in Beijing, that is all that matters. It sees Xinjiang mainly as a frontier. The Han are the principal guarantors of border security. If they are happy, so is the government.

The Uighur reaction is harder to judge; open criticism or talking to outsiders can land you in jail. The crackdown has been effective inasmuch as there have been no (known) Uighur protests or attacks since early 2017. It seems likely that many people are bowing before the storm. As Sultan, a student in Kashgar, says with a shrug: “There’s nothing we can do about it.”

But there are reasons for thinking resentment is building up below the surface. According to anthropological work by Mr. Byler and Joanne Smith Finley of Newcastle University in Britain, a religious revival had been under way before the imposition of today’s harsh control. Mosques were becoming more crowded, religious schools attracting more pupils. Now the schools and mosques are largely empty, even for Friday prayers. It is hard to believe that religious feeling has vanished. More likely a fair bit has gone underground.

And the position of Uighurs who cooperate with the Han authorities is becoming untenable. The provincial government needs the Uighur elite because its members have good relations with both sides. The expansion of the police state has added to the number of Uighurs it needs to co-opt. According to Mr. Zenz and James Leibold of La Trobe University in Melbourne, 90% of the security jobs advertised in 2017 were “third tier” jobs for low-level police assistants: cheap, informal contracts which mainly go to Uighurs. But at the same time as needing more Uighurs, the authorities have made it clear that they do not trust them. Part of the repression has been aimed at “two-faced officials” who (the party says) are publicly supporting the security system while secretly helping victims. Simultaneously recruiting more Uighurs and distrusting them more creates an ever larger pool that might one day turn against the system from within.

A Han businessman who travels frequently between Ürümqi and Kashgar says he used to feel welcome in the south. “Now it has all changed. They are not afraid. But they are resentful. They look at me as if they are wondering what I am doing in their country.” One of the few detainees released from the camps, Omurbek Eli, told RFA that the authorities “are planting the seeds of hatred and turning [detainees] into enemies. This is not just my view—the majority of people in the camp feel the same way.”

HASAN’S WARNING

China’s Communist rulers believe their police state limits separatism and reduces violence. But by separating the Uighur and Han further, and by imposing huge costs on one side that the other side, for the most part, blithely ignores, they are ratcheting up tension. The result is that both groups are drifting towards violence. Before he disappeared, Hasan, the self-styled Sufi wanderer, expressed Xinjiang’s plight. “To be Uighur is hard,” he wrote on WeChat in 2015. “I don’t even know what I am accused of, but I must accept their judgment. I have no choice. Where there is no freedom, there is tension. Where there is tension, there are incidents. Where there are incidents, there are police. Where there are police, there is no freedom.”

WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN CHINA'S 'RE-EDUCATION' CAMPS

[From The New York Times, May 15, 2018]

(By Rian Thum)¹

What does it take to intern half a million members of one ethnic group in just a year? Enormous resources and elaborate organization, but the Chinese authorities aren't stingy. Vast swathes of the Uighur population in China's western region of Xinjiang—as well as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other ethnic minorities—are being detained to undergo what the state calls “transformation through education.” Many tens of thousands of them have been locked up in new thought-control camps with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors and guard rooms.

The Chinese authorities are cagey and evasive, if not downright dismissive, about reports concerning such camps. But now they will have to explain away their own eloquent trail of evidence: an online public bidding system set up by the government inviting tenders from contractors to help build and run the camps.

Uighurs have more in common, culturally and linguistically, with Turks than Han Chinese, and many Uighurs are Muslim. Resentful of China's heavy-handed rule in the region, some have resisted it, usually through peaceful means, but on occasion violently, by attacking government officials and, exceptionally, civilians. The state, for its part, fuels Islamophobia by labeling ordinary Muslim traditions as the manifestation of religious “extremism.”

Over the last decade, the Xinjiang authorities have accelerated policies to reshape Uighurs' habits—even, the state says, their thoughts. Local governments organize public ceremonies and signings asking ethnic minorities to pledge loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party; they hold mandatory reeducation courses and forced dance performances, because some forms of Islam forbid dance. In some neighborhoods, security organs carry out regular assessments of the risk posed by residents: Uighurs get a 10 percent deduction on their score for ethnicity alone and lose another 10 percent if they pray daily.

Uighurs had grown accustomed to living under an intrusive state, but measures became draconian after the arrival in late 2016 of a new regional party chief from Tibet. Since then, some local police officers have said that they struggled to meet their new detention quotas—in the case of one village, 40 percent of the population.

A new study by Adrian Zenz, a researcher at the European School of Culture and Theology, in Korntal, Germany, analyzed government ads inviting tenders for various contracts concerning reeducation facilities in more than 40 localities across Xinjiang, offering a glimpse of the vast bureaucratic, human and financial resources the state dedicates to this detention network. The report reveals the state's push to build camps in every corner of the region since 2016, at a cost so far of more than 680 million yuan (over \$107 million).

A bid invitation appears to have been posted on April 27—a sign that more camps are being built. These calls for tenders refer to compounds of up to 880,000 square feet, some with quarters for People's Armed Police, a paramilitary security force. Local governments are also placing ads to recruit camp staff with expertise in criminal psychology or a background in the military or the police force.

Evidence of these technical details is invaluable, especially considering the growing difficulties faced by researchers and reporters trying to work in Xinjiang. Several foreign journalists have produced important articles, despite police harassment and brief arrests; ethnic Uighur reporters, or their families, endure far worse.

Given the risks, firsthand accounts from former detainees remain rare—although a few are starting to emerge.

In February, a Uighur man studying in the United States gave Foreign Policy one of the most detailed descriptions of detention conditions published to date. He was arrested upon returning to China for a visit last year, and then held for 17 days on no known charge. He described long days of marching in a crowded cell, chanting slogans and watching propaganda videos about purportedly illegal religious activities. As he was being released, a guard warned him, “Whatever you say or do in North America, your family is still here and so are we.”

¹ Rian Thum is an associate professor of history at Loyola University New Orleans and the author of “The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History.” He has been conducting research in Xinjiang, China, for nearly two decades. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-re-education-camps.html>

Last month, an ethnic Kazakh man described to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty his four-month stint in a camp in northern Xinjiang. He met inmates serving terms as long as seven years. He said he had been made to study how “to keep safe the domestic secrets” of China and “not to be a Muslim.” In these cases, as in many others, detainees were held incommunicado, their families left to wonder what had happened to them.

And now these rare eyewitness accounts are being corroborated, if unwittingly, by the Chinese state itself, as it makes public calls for contracts to build even more detention camps.

Many details of this carceral system are hidden, and remain unknown—in fact, even the camps’ ultimate purpose is not entirely clear.

They serve as grounds for compulsory indoctrination. Some officials use them for prevention as well, to lock down people they presumptively suspect of opposing Chinese rule: In two localities the authorities have targeted people under 40, claiming that this age group is a “violent generation.”

The camps are also tools of punishment, and of course, a threat. Few detainees are formally charged, much less sentenced. Some are told how long a term they will serve; others are simply held indefinitely. This uncertainty—the arbitrary logic of detention—instills fear in the entire population.

Surveillance was markedly heightened during my last trip to Xinjiang in December—so much so that I avoided talking to Uighurs then for fear that just being in contact with a foreigner would get them sent away for reeducation. Meanwhile, my Uighur contacts outside China were pointing to the quota-based purges of the Communists’ Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957–1959 and ever-shifting rules during the Cultural Revolution to explain that even if Uighurs in Xinjiang today wanted to submit wholly to the security regime, they no longer knew how to. Joining the security services used to be a rare way to ensure one’s personal safety. Not anymore.

Tens of thousands of families have been torn apart; an entire culture is being criminalized. Some local officials use chilling language to describe the purpose of detention, such as “eradicating tumors” or spraying chemicals on crops to kill the “weeds.”

Labeling with a single word the deliberate and large-scale mistreatment of an ethnic group is tricky: Old terms often camouflage the specifics of new injustices. And drawing comparisons between the suffering of different groups is inherently fraught, potentially reductionist. But I would venture this statement to describe the plight of China’s Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz today: Xinjiang has become a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African apartheid.

There is every reason to fear that the situation will only worsen. Several accounts of Uighurs dying in detention have surfaced recently—a worrisome echo of the established use of torture in China’s reeducation camps for followers of the spiritual movement Falun Gong. And judging by their camp-building spree in Xinjiang, the Chinese authorities don’t seem to think they have come close to achieving whatever their goal there is.

LETTER TO SECRETARY POMPEO SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUBIO

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 26, 2018

The Honorable Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Pompeo,

We write to express our urgent concern about an alarming situation affecting six U.S.-based journalists with Radio Free Asia's (RFA) Uyghur Service. As you may know, RFA is one of five media networks under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the U.S. agency responsible for international media. Its Uyghur-language news service provides roughly 12 million of China's mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur population with trustworthy, accurate news on the deteriorating human rights situation in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

RFA's Uyghur Service journalists, most of them U.S. citizens and residents of Virginia, have relatives in China—including elderly parents—who have been detained, jailed, or forcibly disappeared in what appears to be an act of direct retaliation against these U.S. journalists for their work in exposing the deteriorating human rights situation in the XUAR. We are deeply concerned that these cases illustrate that a foreign nation is pursuing extreme measures in an attempt to interfere with Radio Free Asia's congressionally mandated mission of bringing free press to closed societies.

Most relatives are believed to be held in re-education centers or camps that began appearing in the XUAR in the spring of 2017, but have greatly expanded since then. Media and think tank reports estimate that hundreds of thousands of individuals—men and women of all ages—have been arbitrarily detained in these facilities that operate much like open-air prisons under the ostensible purpose of rehabilitation. In recent months, reports and first-hand accounts have surfaced about their cramped, over-crowded and gulag-like conditions, and poor medical care.

Radio Free Asia's in-depth journalism has provided some of the world's most effective reporting about the XUAR, a region increasingly restricted to outside news organizations, diplomats, and NGOs. RFA's journalists understand that their work carries risks, but they also know that they are providing an important service through their work at RFA. It is an unfortunate irony that these same journalists who have already endured great risk and sacrifice have now become part of the stories that they report on. The fact that they have been targeted while living and working in the United States is even more troubling.

In your capacity as the United States' senior diplomat, we urge you, at every opportunity, to raise this urgent issue in your diplomatic communications with your Chinese counterparts, seek answers as to the whereabouts and well-being of these missing, detained, and jailed relatives, and


appeal for these individuals to be unconditionally released. We ask you to make clear to the Chinese government that these cases are a priority for the U.S. Government. We also ask that you brief our offices within the next few weeks with an update on their cases, to include specifics about your engagement with the Chinese government to-date, and your plan for future engagement.

Thank you in advance for your consideration, and most of all, for your action.


Sincerely,




Mark R. Warner
United States Senator




Tim Kaine
United States Senator




Edward J. Markey
United States Senator



Cory Gardner
United States Senator



Marco Rubio
United States Senator



Steve Daines
United States Senator

*Witness Biographies***Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations**

Ambassador Kelley E. Currie currently serves as the Representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and Alternate Representative of the United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Ambassador Currie specializes in political reform, development and humanitarian assistance, human rights, and other non-traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. She previously was a Senior Fellow with the Project 2049 Institute and held senior policy positions with the Department of State and several international and non-governmental human rights and humanitarian organizations. She also served as foreign operations appropriations associate and staff director of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus for Congressman John Porter of Illinois. She holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a B.A. cum laude from the University of Georgia's School of Public and International Affairs. She is married to Peter Currie and they have two children.

Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce

Anthony Christino is the Director of the Foreign Policy Division within the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance of the Export Administration of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the U.S. Department of Commerce. As such, he is responsible for licensing and the formulation of export control policy related to countries subject to sanctions and special controls. Mr. Christino has represented BIS in a wide variety of U.S. Government export control fora and numerous industry outreach programs as well as in bilateral and multilateral meetings with foreign governments. He holds a bachelor's degree in international relations and a master's degree in national security studies.

Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia

Gulchehra "Guli" Hoja is a broadcaster with Radio Free Asia's Uyghur Service, where she has worked since 2001. Prior to RFA, Ms. Hoja was a successful TV personality and journalist in China's Uyghur Region. But after hearing RFA's Uyghur Service, she decided to leave China and join the U.S. effort to provide the Uyghur people with trustworthy, uncensored journalism. At least two dozen of Ms. Hoja's China-based relatives are missing, including her younger brother, who was detained last September, all presumed to be held in so-called "reeducation camps." Her parents were detained in February but were released because of health issues. She has a bachelor's degree in Uyghur language and literature from Xinjiang Normal University. Ms. Hoja is a U.S. citizen, and lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with her husband and three children.

Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans

Dr. Thum is an Associate Professor of History at Loyola University in New Orleans and a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. Dr. Thum's research and teaching are generally concerned with the overlap of China and the Muslim World. His book, "The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History" (Harvard University Press, 2014) received the American Historical Association's Fairbank Prize and the American Anthropological Association's Hsu Prize.

Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former Research Analyst at the Department of State

Jessica Batke is a ChinaFile Senior Editor and runs The China NGO Project. She is an expert on China's domestic political and social affairs, and served as a Research Analyst at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research for nearly eight years prior to joining ChinaFile. In 2016, she was a Visiting Academic Fellow at MERICS in Berlin, where she published papers on Chinese leadership politics and created databases to catalogue hard-to-find, high-level Chinese policy documents and details about policy advisory groups. She is proficient in Mandarin.