CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

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

"I am holding up an image that shows many current political prisoners in China. My heart aches terribly every time I see this picture. But I put it on my desk at home, and I look at it every day. I must let the world know the true human rights situation in China. I must fight for their rights and call for the release of all of them," Sophie Luo, wife of detained Chinese human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, said in testimony at the hearing titled "The PRC's Universal Periodic Review and the Real State of Human Rights in China."

Fengsuo Zhou, Tiananmen student leader and Executive Director of Human Rights in China, holds up a relic from 1989 during his testimony at the June 4, 2024, hearing titled "Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China." The Chinese Communist Party's violent suppression of the 1989 demonstrations, along with ongoing censorship of any public discussion of what happened in June of 1989, have had far-reaching consequences for Chinese society and U.S.-China relations.

Workers are shown in Shandong province, China, which relies on Uyghur and other labor from Xinjiang and exports to the U.S., Canada, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. (Douyin/The Outlaw Ocean Project)

A hearing attendee holds up a sign during the March 20, 2024, hearing titled "Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?"

Pro-Tibet protesters confront supporters of Chinese President Xi Jinping during demonstrations at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Week in San Francisco, California, on November 15, 2023. (Photo by JOSH EDELSON/AFP via Getty Images)

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

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STATEMENT FROM THE CHAIRS

This reporting year the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC, or Commission) focused on ongoing human rights abuses by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly with regard to forced labor which runs throughout supply chains; the complicity of American and other Western corporations in such human rights abuses; and the PRC's efforts to deflect international criticism of its human rights record and to reinterpret international human rights norms.

The CECC continued to oversee implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), a signature piece of legislation that originated with the CECC Chairs and Ranking Members that has arguably been the most impactful law this century in terms of forcing companies to modify their behavior in order to be compliant with a human rights standard and curbing corporate subsidization of the CCP's tyranny.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), consistent with encouragement from the Chairs, expanded the number of entities for which importation into the United States is prohibited by the UFLPA during the reporting year, exercising an underutilized tool contained in the legislation. The Chairs nonetheless continue to urge DHS to do more in this regard and anticipate that the CECC will continue to push this issue in the next Congress.

Beyond forced labor, the CECC focused on complicity by U.S. and foreign corporations with CCP oppression. This scrutiny included the actions of one American corporation in particular, Thermo Fisher Scientific, whose DNA sequencers had been used by police in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet to compile DNA databases of Uyghurs and Tibetans, and could be used for organ transplantation amidst allegations of forced organ harvesting in the PRC.

The Commission also looked at the role of social audits in allowing corporations to give themselves a clean bill of health when it came to supply chains. These audits are intended to provide assurances that supply chains are free of forced labor and other concerns. But because of the lack of transparency and accountability, in reality such audits are often faulty and serve to obscure and whitewash corporate conduct and complicity.

The PRC's efforts to exert its influence in the U.N. system to alter international human rights norms could be seen during the PRC's Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations Human Rights Council at the beginning of 2024. The session saw the U.S. and like-minded countries raise questions about a series of human rights abuses, including the crushing of press freedom in Hong Kong and the forced repatriation from China of North Korean citizens, but also an almost equal number of nations glossed over violations of human rights or even endorsed some of the PRC's rights-abusing policies and praised its economic development achievements.

Yet even in areas where the PRC has acceded to global standards, such as on the environment, its actions show non-compliance. The PRC remained the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide, while squelching environmental protests and detaining those who sought to raise concerns.

We believe that the work of the Commission and its dedicated staff is constructive in the effort to document the PRC's massive failures to comply with international human rights standards. We reaffirm our commitment to challenge those in government and the corporate world who would look the other way on violations of fundamental human rights in order to secure short-term political or economic gains.

For behind all the statistics of human rights abuses – black numbers on a white page – lie individuals, who have been deprived of rights that we take for granted. It is for these individuals to whom we dedicate our Annual Report, this year and every year.

Sincerely,

Representative Chris Smith
Chair

Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley
Co-Chair

OVERVIEW

In a series of hearings and other activities during this 2024 reporting year, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) exposed the ongoing presence of forced labor in corporate supply chains and U.S. Government procurement sources; revealed how "audit washing"—the use of social compliance auditing firms to claim certification that factories and supply chains in the People's Republic of China (PRC) are free of forced labor and other human rights violations—evades genuine scrutiny of supply chains; and sought greater use of mechanisms to combat importation of goods made with forced labor, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).

In short, the CECC sought to shine a light on the subsidization of tyranny.

This theme was amplified at the first hearing of the reporting period, entitled *Corporate Complicity: Subsidizing the PRC's Human Rights Violations*. It examined how multinational businesses, once considered a vanguard of the concept that economic integration would spur political liberalization in China, sometimes find themselves at risk of being complicit in human rights abuses in China in order to maintain access to the China market. The hearing named names, including the National Basketball Association, Raytheon, and Boeing.

Another revelatory public-facing event was an October 2023 hearing focused on forced labor in the PRC's deep-sea fishing and fish processing industries, featuring research from The Outlaw Ocean Project detailing harsh conditions and minimal pay with minimal regard for safety.

The hearing, entitled *From Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America's Seafood Supply Chain,* also included testimony that U.S. Government food procurement programs purchased some $200 million worth of seafood over a five-year period from tainted Chinese sources, including fish served on U.S. military bases and through the National School Lunch Program.

It appears that such government procurement may violate three U.S. laws—Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (banning all goods produced with forced labor), the UFLPA (banning goods made with Uyghur forced labor), and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA (banning goods made by North Korean forced labor). In light of this, CECC Chair Chris Smith and Co-Chair Jeff Merkley sent two letters to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and other Cabinet secretaries asking that federal agencies take steps to comply with the laws, improve interagency coordination to stop imports of seafood made with forced labor, and to require that procurement officials at the relevant agencies ensure that such tainted seafood does not make its way to the plates of servicemembers, veterans, and schoolchildren.

The CECC Chairs also encouraged robust implementation of the UFLPA, including an expansion of the "Entity List" of companies using forced labor in violation of the UFLPA, by the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF). The FLETF is chaired by DHS Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert Silvers and includes CECC Commissioner Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs at the Department of Labor. The FLETF has made seafood a high-priority sector for enforcement and added a seafood company, Shandong Meijia Group, to the Entity List.

The Commission also scrutinized forced labor in electric vehicle (EV) supply chains in a hearing entitled *From Cobalt to Cars: How China Exploits Child and Forced Labor in D.R. Congo*. It examined how child and forced labor in the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) taints the extraction of cobalt, a metal that is a critical component in lithium-ion batteries used in EVs and other modern devices, including cell phones. Chinese entities control 80 percent of the cobalt output from the D.R.C., which has roughly four-fifths of the world's cobalt supply.

The hearing revealed not only forced and child labor in the sourcing of cobalt but accompanying environmental degradation. These concerns led CECC Chair Smith to introduce legislation designed to address this issue, including the China's Odious and Brutally Atrocious Labor Trafficking (COBALT) Supply Chain Act, H.R. 6909, and the Stop China's Exploitation of Congolese Children and Adult Forced Labor through Cobalt Mining Act, H.R. 7981, which passed out of the House Ways and Means Committee in April 2024.

Forced labor at the other end of the cobalt supply chain—the production of batteries in China—was among the examples referenced in a hearing on the widespread

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Hearings

- Corporate Complicity: Subsidizing the PRC's Human Rights Violations (July 2023)
- Countering China's Global Transnational Repression Campaign (September 2023)
- From Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America's Seafood Supply Chain (October 2023)
- From Cobalt to Cars: How China Exploits Child and Forced Labor in the Congo (November 2023)
- The PRC's Universal Periodic Review and the Real State of Human Rights in China (February 2024)
- Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done? (March 2024)
- Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible (April 2024)
- Tiananmen at 35: the Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China (June 2024)
- Bringing Home Americans Detained in China (September 2024)

Witnesses at the September 18, 2024, hearing entitled "Bringing Home Americans Detained in China" gathered for a hug. There are more Americans detailed in the People's Republic of China (PRC) than anywhere else in the world.

practice of "audit washing," entitled *Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible*. In practice, these audits serve as a fig leaf to cover up rather than expose human rights abuses, leading to a false impression in corporations' public shareholder reports that their supply chains are free of forced labor.

In a well-documented case, German automaker Volkswagen, in addition to committing import violations under the UFLPA, used Uyghur forced labor to build a test track in Turpan municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Observers have warned of the high risk of forced labor at a Volkswagen joint venture factory in the XUAR's Urumqi municipality. Giving insight into a deception endemic to the audit industry, auditors at the audit firm Löning Human Rights & Responsible Business publicly distanced themselves from an audit that had allowed Volkswagen to claim in December 2023 that there was "no indication of any human rights violations or wider issues around working conditions."

Of further concern, PRC authorities amended laws in part to discourage compliance with U.S. or foreign laws designed to promote responsible business practices. Such laws include the onerous Counterespionage Law that took effect in July 2023, and the PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets that took effect in May 2024. These legislative actions renewed concern, including in the business community, about potential arbitrary enforcement, as the laws provide a legal basis for preventing individuals from leaving China. This past year, PRC authorities imposed exit bans on two foreign businessmen under opaque circumstances: a senior executive from American risk advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from Japanese financial services group Nomura Holdings.

The repressive atmosphere that has accompanied Xi Jinping's tenure as Chinese Communist Party General Secretary now extends to Hong Kong, where a pall has descended upon the once-active civil society as space for free expression and the exercise of civil and political rights in the special administrative region recedes.

The façade of an alternative system of political governance that was promised to last 50 years by the PRC signatories to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and guaranteed by the Basic Law—Hong Kong's mini-constitution—has withered away, as Hong Kong becomes nearly indistinguishable from any other neon-lit city on the Chinese mainland. Indeed, Hong Kong officials may now be more zealous than their mainland counterparts in enforcing national security laws. Coupled with convictions in the "Hong Kong 47" case,

the trial of Jimmy Lai—business leader, champion of press freedom, and paragon of faith-based conscientious objection—underscores how civil rights are no longer protected, despite the traditional pomp displayed by wig-bedecked Hong Kong judges.

Likewise, the Hong Kong legislature's passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (also known as "Article 23" legislation) signaled that its government was mimicking central government state security initiatives—including the PRC's 2015 National Security Law and the 2024 legislation on protecting state secrets—reinforcing the chilling effect of the National Security Law that the central government imposed on the special administrative region in 2020. Expanding the scope of existing national security legislation, Article 23 continued to diminish the space for mediating institutions, a trend exemplified by recent events such as the closure of a Cantonese-language advocacy group whose founder's home was raided without a warrant in August 2023 and the relocation of Radio Free Asia outside of Hong Kong.

YouTube exemplified corporate acquiescence by removing the Hong Kong protest anthem "Glory to Hong Kong" from its platform in Hong Kong, ostensibly in compliance with a court injunction. The Chairs wrote to executives at YouTube and its parent company Google asking that the anthem be restored to the platform on the grounds that the injunction violated international human rights principles.

Another area of Commission inquiry and activity was transnational repression, the topic of a September hearing entitled *Countering China's Global Transnational Repression Campaign*, which featured Canadian parliamentarian Michael Chong, who himself had been a target of transnational repression due to his policy positions in support of Uyghurs.

One of the most shocking examples of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) transnational repression on American soil occurred in November 2023 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Summit in San Francisco, attended in person by Communist Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping. Those who came to peacefully protest ongoing human rights abuses in the PRC—from colonialist policies in Tibetan regions, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and the XUAR, to the mass relocation of populations due to environmentally problematic damming projects—were met by organized pro-CCP counter-protesters who surrounded the protesters and used "metal rods, flagpoles, closed umbrellas and pepper spray" to batter those seeking to exercise their fundamental rights, much of which was caught on video.

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Commission Analysis

- **Ongoing Challenges Faced by Persons with Disabilities in the People's Republic of China** (December 2023)
- **UPR Stakeholders' Submissions Flooded with PRC-Sympathetic Reports** (January 2024)

Other Commission Activity

- **Press Conference to Highlight Victims of Violence and Harassment at APEC Summit** (December 2023)
- **Chairs' Statement on the Trial of Entrepreneur and Democracy Advocate Jimmy Lai** (December 2023)
- **Press Conference on Passage of Article 23 in Hong Kong** (March 2024)
- **Chairs' Statement on the Verdicts in the 'Hong Kong 47' Trial** (May 2024)
- **Chairs' Statement on Additions to the UFLPA "Entity List"** (June 2024)
- **Staff Director's Remarks on Technological Dimensions of Transnational Repression and Election Interference at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China Summit in Taipei, Taiwan** (July 2024)

COMMISSION ACTIVITY

JULY 2023-OCTOBER 2024

Letters

- Chairs Ask Milwaukee Tool about Reported Forced Labor in Its Supply Chain (July 2023)
- Chairs Seek Meeting with U.N. High Commissioners to Avert North Korean Refugee Crisis (August 2023)
- Chairs Call for the Release of Ilham Tohti on the Ninth Anniversary of His Sentencing (September 2023)
- Chairs Ask NBA and NBPA for Stance on Forced Labor and Freedom of Expression (October 2023)
- Chairs Seek Export Controls on Technology Used for Mass Biometric Data Collection in Tibet (October 2023)
- Chairs Ask Homeland Security Department to Restrict U.S. Imports of Seafood from China (October 2023)
- Letter to Costco and ADI Raises Concerns about Sale of Hikvision and Dahua Products (November 2023)
- Chairs Send Letter to Attorney General Seeking Investigation of Violence at APEC Summit (December 2023)
- Chairs and House CCP Select Committee Leadership Seek Sanctions for Hong Kong Officials Involved in Bounties (December 2023)
- Chairs Nominate Four Champions of Peace and Freedom for Nobel Peace Prize (January 2024)
- Xinjiang: Chairs Write to Travel Companies and U.S. State Department Concerning the Whitewashing of Atrocities (March 2024)

In December, the CECC Chairs held a press conference with activists who described the violence they experienced or witnessed protesting the summit, including Hong Kong Democracy Council's **Anna Kwok,** Human Rights in China's **Zhou Fengsuo**—who spoke of coordination between the attackers and the PRC's San Francisco consulate—Students for a Free Tibet's **Pema Doma**, the Uyghur American Association's **Elfidar Iltebir,** and alleged beating victim **Kaiyu Zhang.**

The CECC Chairs subsequently wrote Attorney General Merrick Garland asking for a thorough investigation of the assaults at the APEC Summit by apparently CCP-aligned actors, and of the online intimidation of activists, inquiring as to the adequacy of law enforcement's response and calling for protection of peaceful protesters' civil rights.

Hong Kong activists abroad—including U.S.-based Kwok, **Frances Hui,** and **Joey Siu,** the latter also a U.S. citizen—were victims of transnational repression by the Hong Kong government. In addition, Chinese dissidents in the United Kingdom were surveilled by three men, including the office manager of the London Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO); the three men were arrested by British authorities for their role in the surveillance.

CECC Chair Smith, Co-Chair Merkley and Ranking Members McGovern and Rubio introduced legislation to authorize the President to revoke the privileges and immunities of HKETOs and prohibit federal agencies from cooperating with HKETOs' efforts to whitewash their record, on the grounds that special status for HKETOs is no longer merited following Hong Kong's loss of autonomy and the role they play as additional propaganda and spy outposts of the PRC.

The Commission also witnessed the long arm of transnational repression in Laos and Spain, where PRC authorities sought the forcible repatriation of critics of the Chinese Communist Party and government.

Human rights attorney **Lu Siwei**—who had angered the Chinese government by representing other rights lawyers and advocates and by offering to represent 12 Hong Kong dissidents who tried to flee to Taiwan in 2020—was detained in Laos by Lao authorities, presumably at the behest of PRC government actors.

Despite public and private interventions by the U.S. Government and like-minded countries pointing out the obligations of the government of Laos under international law—including an intervention by the CECC Chairman—Laos apparently buckled to pressure from the PRC, refouling Lu in September 2023.

A similar outcome was averted in Spain, where a prominent member of the Church of Almighty God, **Li Yanli,** whom Spanish authorities had slated for deportation, was able to file an eleventh-hour asylum application to stay her refoulement. As pointed out in Li's asylum application, new religious movements such as the Church of Almighty God, or "Eastern Lightning," and Falun Gong are often targeted in China for persecution and subjected to defamation.

Organ harvesting was the subject of a CECC hearing during the reporting period entitled *Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?* The hearing examined claims that Falun Gong adherents were early targets of this heinous practice and that predominantly Muslim Uyghurs in the XUAR have also been subject to this toxic form of human exploitation.

Questions raised at the hearing implicated an American corporation, Thermo Fisher Scientific, in the supplying of DNA kits to PRC police, allegedly facilitating the collection of biometric data for political identification and racial profiling, potentially qualifying the kits for U.S. export controls on the technology. One hearing witness said that the DNA kits could have implications for organ transplantation.

Relatedly, in response to the targeting of the Uyghur population, Chair Smith introduced with former CECC Commissioner Tom Suozzi a House companion bill, H.R. 8124, to Senators Rubio and Merkley's Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act, calling for a strategy to deter and disrupt forced organ harvesting in the XUAR. In addition, the State Department's 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report contained a section entitled "Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal" as a highlighted "Topic of Special Interest."

In a February 2024 hearing, the Commission looked at how the PRC defiantly disregarded criticism of its human rights record at its review under the U.N. Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The PRC's marshalling of support from friendly governments and nongovernmental organizations was documented by CECC analysis that looked at the large number of pro-PRC submissions from UPR stakeholders. As one witness noted, "China's actions over the last decade show that the PRC has become intent on using its presence in the U.N. to alter international human rights norms and rewire the system in ways that will make it easier for states to escape scrutiny of their human rights records." This assessment can be seen as an extension of the vision outlined in the leaked document called the "Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere," or more colloquially, "Document Number Nine,"

COMMISSION ACTIVITY

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Letters (continued)

- Chairs Say Illegal PRC Seafood Imports Must Be Stopped (March 2024)
- Hong Kong: CECC Chairs and Select Committee Leadership Express Opposition to Article 23 Legislation (March 2024)
- Commissioners Urge State Department Action to Disrupt Illegal Organ Trade in the PRC (May 2024)
- Chairs Ask Google to Restore Censored Hong Kong Protest Anthem (June 2024)
- Chairs and Select Committee Leadership Urge Sanctions for Hong Kong Officials Eroding Rule of Law and Rights Protections (July 2024)
- Commissioners Ask USMCA Trade Representatives to Take Additional Steps to Stop Forced Labor (September 2024)
- Chairs Urge President to Seek the Release of Americans Detained in China (October 2024)

written in 2013 at the beginning of Xi Jinping's General Secretaryship and circulated among PRC leadership. Among its objectives was the strengthening of Party resolve in combating "universal values," or the view of people who "believe Western freedom, democracy, and human rights are universal and eternal." The witness concluded that "China is strongly motivated to continue this assault on the U.N. human rights regime because the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights present an existential threat to the CCP's continued one-party rule."

Likewise, at the United Nations and in its engagement with developing nations, the PRC has long put forward the concept of a "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" that prioritizes a state-centered approach to human rights, while subordinating the individual rights of its citizens to the matter of national interest.

This should drive home the magnitude of the challenge of monitoring and seeking accountability for human rights violations by the People's Republic of China. Chinese Communist Party leaders maintain that the rights that the people of China should be able to enjoy are those confined to an interpretation of human rights that serves the Party's political interests, rather than to the full range to which they are entitled under international human rights law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Commission remains committed to the principle that the people of China are entitled to the same rights as any other people in the world, and we will continue to report on the PRC's failure to respect both their rights and the underlying notion that they are allowed to have such rights.

KEY FINDINGS

Freedom of Expression

- This reporting year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to restrict online and in-person expression, censoring various forms of artistic, literary, historical, and entertainment content, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and China's Constitution.
- Freedom House's 2024 Freedom in the World report scored China 0 out of 4 for "free and independent media," and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 172 out of 180 countries and territories in its *World Press Freedom Index*.
- The Chinese Communist Party continued to use Chinese news media as its mouthpiece to provide the Party's version of the news, signal and amplify policy priorities, and shape public opinion. Journalists at Party and state-run news outlets faced increased political pressure and censorship this past year to adhere to the Party line.
- Party efforts to control news media also continued to reach beyond China's borders. One program that expanded this past year was that of international communication centers (ICCs)—local and regional media groups within China acting as centers for external-facing propaganda.
- Authorities continued to harass, surveil, and restrict foreign journalists. The annual survey of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China in 2024 revealed that foreign reporters face significant obstacles in China.
- This past year, many journalists, other media professionals, and "citizen journalists"—non-professionals who publish independently to circumvent official restrictions—remained in detention, prison, or subject to bail conditions as a result of their reporting. RSF again ranked China "the world's largest prison for journalists," as nearly a quarter of all journalists detained worldwide are in Chinese jails. Currently detained or imprisoned journalists include **Huang Xueqin, Yang Zewei,** and **Shangguan Yunkai.**
- This past year, Freedom House ranked China the "world's worst abuser of internet freedom" for the ninth year in a row. The PRC's Ministry of Public Security declared 2024 a "year of special operations against online rumors," targeting influencers and content creators who "stage photos maliciously or fabricate rumors" about politically sensitive issues.
- Government agencies implemented new regulations and pressured internet companies to tighten restrictions on online expression, including mandating "real name" registration for popular users.
- Authorities continued to harass, detain, and imprison people who participated peacefully in protests, demonstrations, and other gatherings, including demonstrations against opaque handling of school deaths and the demolition of Tibetan villages and monasteries.
- The PRC intensified its efforts to exert control over educational and research institutions, impeding the free exchange of information and hindering international academic collaboration.

Civil Society

- During the Commission's 2024 reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party and government continued their efforts to control, co-opt, or dismantle civil society.
- In December 2023, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed a series of amendments to the People's Republic of China (PRC) Charity Law of 2016. The amended law states that charity work must "uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party," requires that charities report on any cooperation with foreign organizations, and makes it more difficult for registered organizations to assist unregistered organizations, many of which work in sensitive areas, with fundraising.
- PRC authorities continued to push for the consolidation of Party and government control over social organizations (SOs), co-opting SOs to serve their policy priorities and objectives.
- The Party and government continued to target so-called "illegal social organizations" (ISOs) through a coordinated effort at both the central and local levels. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, along with 10 other departments, launched a six-month-long "special campaign"

in June 2023 that aimed to crack down on ISOs, with 1,100 organizations censured in 2023, according to official media.

- During the January 2024 session of the U.N. Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government's human rights record, the PRC sought to "game" the process, using channels established for independent civil society participation to promote entities influenced or controlled by the government.
- Despite government efforts to comprehensively deter public dissent, Chinese citizens continued a pattern of organizing adhoc protests during the reporting year, often gathering in the hundreds or thousands to protest perceived injustices.
- The Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court sentenced women's rights advocate **Sophia Huang Xueqin** to five years in prison, and labor rights advocate **Wang Jianbing** to three years and six months, on June 14, 2024 on charges of "inciting subversion of state power."
- During the reporting year, the Party and government detained or sentenced rights advocates involved in democracy efforts, including a former public security officer and those involved with the China Human Rights Watch group.
- During the Commission's 2024 reporting year, PRC authorities continued to suppress lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) advocacy groups, limit public space for LGBTQ-identifying persons to associate, and to censor expressions of LGBTQ identity.

Freedom of Religion

- During the Commission's 2024 reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party and government enacted legal provisions that strengthened control over religious practices, including the Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities and the PRC Patriotic Education Law. Since 2018, the Chinese Communist Party and government have issued several key provisions to tighten control over religious activities.
- The five state-recognized religious bodies overseeing Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, and Islam, each published updated Five-Year Plans for "sinicization." Individuals and religious sites were promoted as "models" of sinicization.
- During this reporting year, the Commission observed the Chinese government's efforts to "sinicize" Taoism, emphasizing Party control and alignment with Party ideology rather than religious identity. The government also continued to exert pressure on Buddhism to use historical reinterpretation to promote religious subordination to the Party.
- The Party cracked down on folk religious practices that it views as potentially undermining its authority.
- During this reporting year, four Catholic bishops were consecrated with mutual approval from both PRC authorities and the Holy See, the only appointments made since 2021, while about 40 dioceses remained without leadership. Authorities continued to hold Catholic clergy in detention or forcibly disappear them due to their refusal to join the Christian Council of China, including Catholic Bishop **Shao Zhumin** of the Diocese of Wenzhou in Zhejiang province.
- The PRC government continued its campaign to remove Islamic architectural elements from mosques or demolish them. These policies target Hui Muslims and aim to eradicate religious and cultural distinctiveness while promoting assimilation with Han Chinese culture. Experts commented that this year marked the conclusion of the nationwide mosque "sinicization" campaign, as the last major mosques in China lost their Arabic-style features.
- The Party exerted pressure on Hong Kong religious communities to conform to the "sinicization" policies of mainland China, including through continual trips between mainland China and Hong Kong. Experts on religious freedom and belief also noted the threat posed to the confidentiality of the Sacrament of Penance with the enactment of the *Safeguarding National Security Ordinance*.
- PRC authorities continued to violate Protestants' religious freedom through detention of leaders of unregistered churches, surveillance of activities and participants, and use other legal tools to control and punish church leaders. Authorities continued to order the removal of crosses and other Christian symbols from church buildings.
- During this reporting year, PRC authorities continued to monitor, detain, and imprison Falun Gong practitioners, Church of Almighty God members, and others for being members of "evil cults" (*xiejiao*, 邪教). In March 2024,

the Commission held a hearing in which witnesses expressed concerns about possible forced organ removal from religious and ethnic minorities in China, including Falun Gong practitioners.

Criminal Justice

- The criminal justice system remained a political instrument used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian rule. The government punishes criminal acts, but it also targets individuals who pursue universal human rights, particularly when they independently organize or challenge the Party's authority.
- Government officials arbitrarily detained religious practitioners, ethnic minorities, and rights advocates, including through extralegal means such as "black jails" and psychiatric facilities, or through criminal prosecution under offenses such as "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" or crimes endangering state security. Some detainees reported being mistreated or tortured. After entering the formal legal process, defendants sometimes faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and delayed sentencing.
- Reports of detainees being denied counsel and family visits, especially in political cases, continued to emerge. In the case of rights lawyer **Lu Siwei,** for example, officials denied a meeting request by the lawyer retained by Lu's wife on grounds that the government already had appointed counsel for him. The unilateral appointment was said to be intended to allow the government to have full control over the proceedings in order to secure a conviction.

Access to Justice

- While China's Constitution recognizes certain universal human rights, the court system continued to lack any legal channel through which citizens can assert or protect these constitutional rights, thus failing to fulfill the obligation to provide enforceable legal remedies for rights violations committed by government officials.
- As courts in China slowed the rate of uploading judicial documents to the publicly accessible database, the Supreme People's Court announced the creation of a parallel database that is accessible only to judicial personnel. This development prompted concerns that authorities planned to phase out the public-facing database, thereby reducing judicial transparency, which would have the effect of undermining the rule of law and judicial credibility.
- Developments this past year indicate that the petitioning system has been weakened. The petitioning system, an extrajudicial channel through which citizens file grievances involving official misconduct, is being assimilated into the grassroots governance system overseen by the newly established Chinese Communist Party organ called the Social Work Department. One of the department's missions is to implement the "Fengqiao Experience," which is a way to exert granular social and political control through neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level organizations.
- Petitioners continued to suffer retaliation from local officials who tried to suppress exposure of their wrongdoing. Mistreatment experienced by petitioners included criminal prosecution, forcible commitment to a psychiatric hospital, arbitrary detention, and torture.
- Rights lawyers likewise suffered mistreatment, including criminal prosecution, for their legal work. After completing their sentences, lawyers typically have their law license revoked and are subjected to surveillance, restrictions on domestic and international travel, repeated forced relocation, and punishment of their family members, such as denial of education. As a United Nations special rapporteur pointed out, preventing lawyers from fulfilling their legal duties to their clients may "open the door to systematic violations of the right to a fair trial and equality before the law" in certain kinds of cases.

Governance

- The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to be an authoritarian Party-State that increasingly sought to exert comprehensive ideological control. Central authorities implemented Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's expansive notion of national security through legislative acts, potentially making repressive measures more enduring. Amended laws extended secrecy requirements to non-classified material under the vague and expansive concept of national security, exposing travelers and businesspersons to the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
- With a stated goal of improving administrative efficiency, local governments created "comprehensive administrative enforcement" units. These units, however, serve as a

grassroots-level mechanism of social control under the grid system, which is a Party-devised method of managing and surveilling citizens. Local governments hired large numbers of grid workers and tasked them with non-political community services, as well as political duties including disseminating propaganda, surveilling, and collecting personal information of residents.

- With laws requiring political education, Party offices merged with college administrative offices to allow for more direct control over academic institutions' delivery of political indoctrination to students. Political topics that became a requirement this past year included patriotism, Party history, and national defense.
- As Party propaganda emphasized "culture building" as a way to reduce ideological risks by unifying people's beliefs, authorities implemented policies that aimed at erasing ethnic cultures to promote a single Chinese nationality. Such policies included replacing Uyghur buildings with ones that reflect Chinese culture, banning Mongolian-language instruction in schools, and punishing advocacy for the Tibetan language.
- Despite official rhetoric promoting constitutional enforcement, citizens continued to lack judicial or administrative means to assert their rights as enumerated in the PRC Constitution. At the same time, the government concealed or manipulated public data, undermining citizens' right to meaningfully participate in civic affairs.

Ethnic Minority Rights

- During the Commission's 2024 reporting year, Party and government officials championed the "integration" of ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures.
- Reports indicate that authorities had altered, destroyed, or closed large numbers of mosques serving Hui communities in an effort to "sinicize" these communities and restrict their religious freedom, particularly in Gansu province and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. In February 2024, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that officials in Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province, had installed pagodas in place of the dome and minarets they demolished the previous year at the local Najiaying Mosque. Authorities also replaced the Arabic-style dome and minarets on the Grand Mosque in Shadian subdistrict, Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, with a pagoda rooftop and pagoda towers.
- Officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) continued to implement policies suppressing the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction in schools. In September 2023, authorities largely completed the transition to a region-wide policy, begun in 2020, of enforcing instruction in Mandarin Chinese for all subjects from kindergarten through senior high school.
- Mongols originally from the IMAR who sought refuge in Mongolia reportedly experienced transnational repression from PRC authorities, against a backdrop of PRC pressure on Mongolian authorities to prevent criticism within Mongolia of the PRC's actions in the IMAR.

Status of Women

- Women's rights were the subject of recommendations during the fourth Universal Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) compliance with international human rights norms in January 2024. With legal provisions weakly implemented in China, rural and urban women are at risk of losing property rights, face gender discrimination at work, are vulnerable to gender-based violence, and have limited access to justice.
- At the October 2023 National Women's Congress, officials emphasized building families and the nation, and the role of the All-China Women's Federation in promoting family values to promote population growth.
- The Commission continued to monitor official harassment and detention of women's rights advocates, as well as women harassed and detained for political advocacy and religious belief. These included: **Huang Xueqin, Ye Haiyan, Rei Xia, Wu Qin, Xu Qin,** and **Tang Hui.**
- So-called "everyday feminism" is on the rise in China, but the overall environment for feminist advocacy in China is highly restricted in the wake of crackdowns on independent and grassroots civil society advocates and organizations, suspicion of women's public participation, and the censorship of feminist websites and social media.
- Women's political empowerment in China remains low, according to the World Economic Forum's Global

Gender Gap Report. Scholarly analysis published this past year concluded that the Party's "commitment to gender equity and its quota policy have failed to integrate women meaningfully into the inner circles of power so that Chinese politics remains largely gendered."

- A State Council assessment of the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law in August 2023 highlighted problems with implementation, such as a minimal use of mandatory reporting in cases of children harmed by domestic violence, the low number of protection orders and warnings issued by local courts and public security bureaus, the vulnerability of women with disabilities, inadequate funding, and a lack of legal knowledge among frontline personnel.

Population Control

- The Chinese Communist Party and government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to apply a birth limit policy, which violates international standards by seeking to control family size. An expert commented that the PRC three-child policy instituted in 2021, which permits and seeks to incentivize families to have up to but no more than three children, is a project to "[reassert] Party-State control over [the] population."
- The pro-birth policy has not resulted in population growth, however, and PRC population trends are similar to those in other East Asian countries. The National Bureau of Statistics of China's 2023 data revealed that the population declined in China for the second year in a row and that the total number of births in China declined for the seventh year in a row.
- Young people's reluctance to marry and have children has been linked to a variety of factors, including the high cost of raising children in China, economic precarity, and gender inequality.
- Party leaders emphasized the importance of population growth during official speeches and events this past year. Pro-birth and marriage messaging was featured in official propaganda, municipal governments' financial incentives, and judicial opinions. Measures passed in September 2023 incentivized childbirth for military personnel. Some legislative proposals focused on supporting women's rights in the workplace.
- The legacy of the one-child policy (1980–2015) continues to have an impact on Chinese society, including human trafficking for the purpose of marriage and the commercial sex trade. Data published this past year showed on average, boy-preference for couples having a third child, with 133 boys born for every 100 girls, across China.
- Chinese authorities' enforcement of population control policies has contributed to increasing socio-economic precarity for China's elderly population, including an underfunded pension system and the inability of adult children to provide traditional care for their elderly parents.

Human Trafficking

- The Outlaw Ocean Project, the *New Yorker*, and the Environmental Justice Foundation separately identified practices indicating forced labor in the Chinese seafood industry. The reporting found that International Labour Organization (ILO) indicators of forced labor were present onboard Chinese fishing vessels and that Turkic and Muslim workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and North Korea were likely subjected to forced labor in the seafood processing industry.
- Forced employment and poverty alleviation policies involving Turkic Muslims from the XUAR continued during the reporting year, and they are set to continue at least through 2025. Reports found that gold and aluminum were likely tainted by forced labor involving Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims from the XUAR, and witnesses at a Commission hearing found that audits were unreliable when investigating instances of forced labor in and from the XUAR.
- Scamming organizations in Southeast Asia, including many run by Chinese nationals, continued to force individuals from China and other countries to work in compounds carrying out online scam operations targeting people around the world.
- In a March 2024 hearing held by the Commission, witnesses expressed concern that large-scale collection of the DNA of Uyghurs and others in the XUAR could be used to match organs for forced removal. Forced organ removal is considered a form of human trafficking by the U.N.

Worker Rights

- The recorded number of strikes and labor protests in the People's Republic of China (PRC) increased in 2023 for the first time since the peak of a "strike wave" that

ended in 2016. The increase can primarily be attributed to the demand for money owed for back wages. A slowing economy has led to factory closures, causing bosses to leave without paying out back wages. This has contributed to a tenfold increase in the number of factories that experienced strikes between 2022 and 2023. Construction workers were denied pay as a tightening in the housing market led to the closure of or slowdown of work at construction sites. Police continued to suppress strike activity after being called in to disrupt at least 181 strikes in 2023.

- China's reppression against labor rights activists has continued. In June of 2024 a court in Guangzhou municipality, Guangzhou province sentenced labor rights activist **Wang Jianbing** to three years and six months in prison. Additionally, in the first half of 2023, police were called in to 82 strikes, and detained workers at 7 of the strikes. The continued harassment of whistleblowers such as **Lu Yuyu** and **Tang Mingfeng,** even after their release from prison, highlighted the difficulties faced by those who try to tell the truth about labor conditions in China.
- A system of normalized forced overtime among white-collar workers persisted despite China officially having an eight-hour workday, with the workweek not allowed to exceed 44 hours. In the technology industry, workers are expected to participate in an overtime practice referred to as "996," from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week. This overtime practice dovetails with age discrimination, as workers over 35 are perceived as unable to handle these long hours and are therefore subject to hiring discrimination.
- Inequality continues to be systematized through the *hukou* or household registration system. Urban *hukou* holders continue to be able to access considerably more benefits than rural *hukou* holders and migrant workers. In December 2023, the World Bank released a report that documented the unequal treatment of rural and urban residents when it comes to access to pensions sufficient to maintain a worker during retirement.
- The PRC continues to deny its workers the right to unionize. The official, Party-controlled union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), continues to be the sole representative of workers. In 2023, the ACFTU held its 18th Congress, during which it signaled further consolidation and centralization under the leadership of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

Public Health

- The PRC authorities' response following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, and throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by a lack of transparency and problematic reporting. In October 2023, the government considered draft revisions to the PRC Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, including amendments that would strengthen reporting of infectious disease outbreaks within China.
- During the Commission's 2024 reporting year, PRC authorities continued to suppress criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and government about the PRC's response to the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic and have promoted a narrative of "success".
- Several Chinese citizens based in Shanghai municipality faced official harassment and detention in connection with their efforts to document the COVID-19 pandemic and protest harsh lockdown measures including: **Chen Pinlin, Ji Xiaolong, Rei Xia,** and **Zhang Zhan.**
- Although there have been sporadic efforts to punish corruption in the healthcare sector in the past, during this reporting year, Xi Jinping's anticorruption "battle" engulfed the sector in a nationwide crackdown.
- The State Council passed new "Regulations on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation" that were presented as a means to strengthen oversight and management of the organ allocation and distribution system. A group of transplant surgeons and ethicists expressed skepticism that the PRC had ended abuses in its organ transplant system, noting China's failure to adhere to WHO Guiding Principles—including a lack of accountability, allegations of forced organ harvesting, and falsified data on organ transplantation.
- PRC authorities continued to use forcible psychiatric commitment as a tool of political control and repression in China, according to a Chinese nongovernmental organization, including in the cases of: **Wu Yanan, Wang Yuping,** and **Song Zaimin.**

The Environment

- China remained the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions in 2023. China's CO_2 emissions continued to grow in January and February of 2024, followed by a 3-percent decrease in March—the first

decline since the discontinuation of the zero-COVID policy in the country.

- International media and observers detailed trends in China's coal sector that may impede the country's progress towards meeting its 2025 targets under the Paris Agreement.
- At the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), China did not sign on to the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge. Experts speculate that China chose to refrain from signing in part due to the pledge's references to phasing out fossil fuels and coal.
- Extreme weather events that observers have linked to climate change affected cultural heritage, food and water security, and public health in China. 2023 was described as the country's "historic warmest year," and July 2024 as "the hottest single month in the history of observation."
- PRC authorities repressed environmental advocates. This past year, officials detained environmental advocate and blogger **Hu Nengke,** known as "Hu Laoshi" (Teacher Hu), for exposing corruption committed by officials in Gushi county, Xinyang municipality, Henan province, which included allowing companies to violate environmental regulations. In addition, PRC authorities deployed armed police to peaceful protests in Anqing City, Anhui province and detained more than 1,000 Tibetans for voicing their opposition to the Kamthog (Gangtuo) hydropower dam in Derge (Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.
- The PRC's dams, island-building initiatives, and giant clam harvesting contributed to environmental degradation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Business and Human Rights

- Companies that do business in, source from, or work with companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are at risk of complicity in human rights abuses being committed by the Chinese Communist Party and government. Reports of corporate involvement in mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the apparel, automotive, mining, seafood, solar, tomato, and tourism industries.
- Reports and congressional testimony continued to highlight evidence of the unreliability of social compliance audits conducted in the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially in the XUAR. In December 2023, German car manufacturer Volkswagen commissioned Löning Human Rights & Responsible Business to conduct an audit of its joint venture factory in the XUAR. Although the automaker claimed the audit found no signs of forced labor, human rights experts and advocates raised concerns that social compliance audits are neither equipped nor designed to accurately identify state-imposed forced labor in the region.
- Chinese and international technology companies are linked to the Chinese government's data collection, surveillance efforts, and censorship. Reports from this past year found the following:
  - Accelerated Nuclear DNA Equipment, with the support of Chinese security equipment vendor Beijing GAC World Trade, sold DNA testing machines to public security bureaus across China.
  - Chinese biotechnology firm WuXi AppTec transferred a client's data and intellectual property from the U.S. to China without consent.
  - PRC authorities censored content on Apple's App Store by directly requesting that Apple remove specific apps, by setting complex rules for app developers, and by creating localized versions of select apps to restrict access to global versions, among other tactics.
  - Google's YouTube blocked access to more than 30 videos of the popular pro-democracy protest anthem "Glory to Hong Kong" for viewers in Hong Kong.
- Recent PRC legislation expanded the scope of laws authorizing government control of information, prompting businesses to self-censor or take other precautionary measures. The Commission observed businesses implementing heightened precautionary measures, including 1) encouraging use of burner phones; 2) withdrawing operations from China; 3) limiting access to international databases; and 4) working from home.
- As of May 2024, the U.S. State Department's China Travel Advisory warns travelers about the "arbitrary enforcement of local laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the risk of wrongful detentions." According to reporting from September 2023, Chinese authorities blocked a senior executive from American risk advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from Japanese financial services group Nomura Holdings from leaving mainland China.

North Korean Refugees in China

- Shortly after the border reopening in the summer of 2023, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to repatriate North Korean refugees, many of whom were women. In October 2023, the PRC government facilitated the return of 500 to 600 North Korean refugees. International condemnation followed, and concerns were raised this past year at the United Nations by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and by the Republic of Korea (South Korea) government, among others.
- Despite Chinese authorities' continual denials, there have been reports of abuse and torture of North Korean refugees who were repatriated since the border reopening. According to media reports, seven female refugees who were repatriated in October 2023 died due to serious human rights violations that occurred at two detention sites in the DPRK, including at least one case of reported suicide.
- North Korean workers dispatched from North Korea to earn foreign currency in China are overwhelmingly women and are vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation. Despite recent media reports and an international outcry over human rights violations in seafood processing plants, Chinese companies employed additional workers, defying international sanctions banning the hiring of workers from North Korea.
- North Korean trafficking victims, mostly women who had been residing in China before the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), remain highly marginalized. Chinese authorities denied them access to essential healthcare and social services. The number of North Korean women being trafficked into China has decreased due to strict border controls. In a couple of cases heavy sentences were meted out for trafficking of North Korean women.

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

- The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to rely on a National Anti-Fraud Center (NAFC) app to collect data and access personal information, monitor online activity, and potentially aggregate data for surveillance. While use of the app is prevalent across China, the Tibet Autonomous Region was a focal point for surveillance, leading individuals to engage in self-censorship, reducing cultural expression, and reinforcing control and conformity.
- Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed the Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative, which emphasizes sovereignty while potentially limiting human rights. Domestically, the Chinese government has issued regulations that further ensure that artificial intelligence (AI) is aligned with Chinese Communist Party values, and Chinese academics have posited a need to guard against "Western values."
- Chinese entities demonstrated competency in using AI to create social media content aimed at manipulating public opinion. First Voice, an opinion unit of Chinese state-owned media outlet *China Global Television Network* (CGTN), used AI to generate a series of animated videos on X and YouTube, called "A Fractured America," showing fake strikes and riots happening across America because of income inequality and a lack of accountable democracy. Meanwhile, a research report revealed the first use of an AI-generated human by a Chinese company in an influence campaign.
- An online propaganda and disinformation operation employing a network of social media accounts (or "bots") linked to the Chinese government, called "Spamouflage," continued to make posts on social media favorable to the Chinese government and hostile to opinions contrary to PRC policy. The Canadian government attributed the posting of "thousands" of comments in English and French on Facebook and X accounts of Members of Parliament to the operation.

Tibet

- The Commission did not observe any interest from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama's representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, was held in January 2010.
- The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. As part of the broader policy of "sinicizing" religion, PRC authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of religious worship, including during important religious events or around the times of politically sensitive anniversaries, limited access to religious institutions and places of worship, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples, and otherwise unduly restricted Tibetans' freedom of religion and belief. The PRC continued to assert control over the process of selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, including the Dalai Lama.

- The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan self-immolations occurring during the 2024 reporting year, the second year since 2021 in which no self-immolations were reported to have occurred.
- PRC authorities maintained a system of residential boarding schools in Tibetan areas that observers fear could constitute a serious threat to Tibetan society and the intergenerational transmission of culture and language.
- Large-scale protests broke out in February 2024 in Derge (Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, due to official plans for construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) River that will submerge at least two villages and six monasteries, one of which, Wontoe Monastery, contains well-preserved 13th-century murals. Security personnel detained approximately 1,000 Tibetans in connection with the protests; many were later released, but local authorities escalated surveillance and monitoring of local communities in the following months.
- In contravention of international human rights standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan areas for exercising protected rights, including the expression of religious belief, expressing criticism of PRC policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases this past year included those of writer **Pema,** a monk and teacher at Kirti Monastery, who in a lone protest held a portrait of the Dalai Lama and called for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and religious freedom for Tibetans; **Semkyi Drolma,** detained for her participation in discussion groups about Buddhism on the social media platform WeChat, and later sentenced to one year and six months in prison for "leaking state secrets"; and **Tenzin Sangpo,** a senior monk at Derge's Wontoe Monastery detained in February 2024 as part of the anti-dam protests.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

- Research published this past year indicated that the rate of imprisonment for Turkic and Muslim individuals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was disproportionately high compared to China's overall prison population. According to analysis published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) in April 2024, based on official figures, Uyghurs and members of other non-Han Chinese ethnic groups in the XUAR constituted 34 percent of the number of people estimated to be formally imprisoned in China, although these groups make up only one percent of the country's population. UHRP's analysis estimates that members of ethnic minority groups in the XUAR are formally imprisoned at more than 47 times the rate of Han Chinese people in the region, with 1 in every 26 ethnic minority XUAR residents imprisoned.
- During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved Turkic and Muslim individuals, shifting from a system involving former mass internment camp detainees to one that generally involves people who have not been detained. According to observers, officials use forced labor programs to tighten political and social control over Uyghur and other communities in the XUAR. Official data show that authorities planned to transfer at least one million "surplus laborers" through the "poverty alleviation" program in 2023—a figure that did not include all types of forced labor transfers—and that this figure included a significant increase in the number of cross-provincial labor transfers.
- New regulations took effect this reporting year in the XUAR that tightened limits on the religious practices of Muslim residents in the region. In December 2023, the XUAR People's Congress amended the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), which took effect on February 1, 2024. The revised regulations focus on the need to "sinicize" religious practices and venues, in line with government efforts to "sinicize" religious worship nationwide in recent years, and tighten restrictions on the establishment, construction, and renovation of places of worship. Human Rights Watch wrote that according to the text of the revised RRA, "[r]eligious venues are to be, effectively, training grounds that promote the values of the Chinese Communist Party to the people."
- Reports emerged this past year showing that Chinese authorities have continued implementing policies that infringe upon Uyghurs' rights to maintain their own language and culture. In June 2024, Human Rights Watch published research findings, which it produced together with the Norway-based organization Uyghur Hjelp, showing that between 2009 and 2023, Chinese officials had changed the names of more than 600 villages traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs into names that removed their cultural or religious significance. In September 2023, three U.N. special rapporteurs issued a

press release expressing "grave concern" over reports of a "significant expansion" of the boarding school system in the XUAR. The three experts expressed concern over the fact that the boarding schools into which Uyghur children are placed provide little to no instruction in the Uyghur language, and that these children are pressured to speak and learn only Mandarin Chinese.

Hong Kong and Macau

- As the Chinese Communist Party and government increasingly interfered with Hong Kong's affairs in violation of the "one country, two systems" principle, the Hong Kong government continued to implement various repressive policies purportedly to protect national security. The arbitrary application of national security laws has led to the imprisonment of dissidents and activists, further eroding fundamental freedoms in the city.
- Ongoing criminal prosecution on charges involving national security and sedition against individuals who peacefully exercised their rights included news media executives **Jimmy Lai** and **Chung Pui-kuen,** human rights lawyer **Chow Hang-tung,** and student activist **Joshua Wong Chi-fung.**
- Hong Kong police issued warrants of arrest on at least 13 exiled activists and offered rewards for information leading to their arrest. These individuals advocated for democratic reform and for imposing financial sanctions on Hong Kong and People's Republic of China (PRC) officials who perpetrated human rights violations. A group of United Nations (U.N.) experts expressed serious concern over the case, saying that the Hong Kong government was punishing people for political speech.
- Some foreign judges on Hong Kong's highest court resigned, with one of them explaining the factors that had profoundly compromised the rule of law: 1) The National Security Law severely limited judges' freedom of action; 2) the National People's Congress Standing Committee could overturn judges' decisions; and 3) authorities were intent on quashing even peaceful dissent.
- The Hong Kong government's application to order unspecified social media companies to take down a popular protest song was granted by an appellate court, which reversed a lower court that denied the application based on protection of civil liberties considerations.
- Annual vigils commemorating the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests were no longer held. In past years, authorities initially denied applications to hold the vigils on public health grounds. More recently, no such applications have been made because the organizing group dissolved after its core leaders became political prisoners.
- Allegations emerged this year of physical and sexual violence taking place at a juvenile detention facility. Prison guards reportedly abused political prisoners and sometimes did so using other inmates as proxies. Avenues through which abuse could be reported were ineffective because abusers exploited security camera blind spots and victims were too afraid to step forward publicly to file complaints.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

- The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued a multifaceted campaign of transnational repression against Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, journalists, Chinese university students, and others to stifle dissent and intimidate individuals in emigrant and diaspora communities. Examples include the issuance of HK$1,000,000 (US$127,600) bounties on 13 overseas activists, intelligence-gathering efforts in diaspora communities, and the harassment of China-based relatives of overseas targets.
- The PRC's transnational repression efforts were observed leading up to, during, and after the November 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco, California.
- This reporting year, the Commission observed reports of PRC authorities forcibly repatriating overseas Chinese citizens **Lu Siwei** and **Yang Zewei,** also known as Qiao Xinxin, through extrajudicial means.
- The PRC targeted foreign politicians and governments by attempting to influence democratic elections and shape public opinion abroad about the Chinese Communist Party and government, including in Canada, the Solomon Islands, and Taiwan.
- PRC authorities continued to make efforts to influence processes and procedures within the U.N. system to limit public awareness of China's human rights abuses in the international community. This past year, reports detailed the PRC's efforts to influence and impede the U.N. Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and several U.N. Special Procedures.

Maya Mitalipova, Director of the Human Stem Cell Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, testified at the March 20, 2024, hearing on "Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?" Witnesses provided recommendations for addressing organ harvesting, the complicity of U.S. corporations in the PRC's transplant abuses, and the issue of "organ tourism."

Jim Wormington, Human Rights Watch's Senior Researcher and Advocate on Corporate Accountability, testified at the April 30, 2024, hearing entitled "Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible." Witnesses described the connection between social audits and global brands and retailers in China, as well as the problems associated with social audits in the PRC.

Commissioners listen to witness testimony at the September 18, 2024, hearing entitled "Bringing Home Americans Detained in China."

Frances Hui, Policy and Advocacy Coordinator at the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, delivers remarks at the Tiananmen Vigil in front of the Victims of Communism Memorial on June 3, 2024.

U.S. Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) and U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR), the Chair and Co-Chair, respectively, of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China nominated human rights lawyers Ding Jiaxi and Xu Zhiyong, Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, and entrepreneur and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai to receive the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize. The last award given to a person in China was to Liu Xiaobo in 2009.

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

The Commission's 2024 Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners[1] in the context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and government's application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its research, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database as a resource to prepare summaries of information about and support advocacy for political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report and to access and make use of the PPD at https://www.ppdcecc.gov.

The Commission seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members aim to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China, and work on an ongoing basis to create, maintain, and update records of political and religious imprisonment in the PPD. Each record describes the type of human rights violation by Chinese authorities connected to the prisoner's detention. These include, among others, violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate for peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials.

When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Commission relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), groups that specialize in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

[1] The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising their human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate for peaceful social or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners documented in the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China's Constitution and law, or by international human rights standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt, but officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. A defendant may authorize someone to provide their legal counsel and defense, as the PRC Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 33, yet officials may deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a defense.

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

Overview

As of June 30, 2024, the PPD contained 11,199 records of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 2,764 records were considered "active detentions," referring to records of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, or under coercive controls. There were 8,435 records of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more cases of current political and religious detention in China than are contained in the PPD.

Ethnic Group

Of the active detentions, 1,693 contained information on the prisoners' reported or presumed ethnicity. Of those, 790 were Tibetan, 502 were Uyghur, 309 were Han, 35 were Kazakh, 27 were Mongol, and 9 were Hui. Of the 1,071 prisoners without recorded ethnicities, many were likely Han.

Religion

Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,686 contained information on the prisoner's religious affiliation. 678 were Tibetan Buddhists, 497 were Falun Gong practitioners, 245 were Muslim, 86 were Protestants, 22 were adherents of Mentu Hui, 18 were Jehovah's Witnesses, 17 were Yi Guan Dao members, 36 were members of the Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning), and 15 were Catholic.

Sex

Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,710 were of male prisoners, 761 were of female prisoners, and 293 records did not contain information on the prisoner's sex.

Sentencing

Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,441 pertain to individuals serving prison sentences. Of those 1,441 prisoners, 1,347 were serving fixed-term sentences, 63 were serving life sentences, 24 were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, and 7 were sentenced to death.

Place of Detention

The table below shows the number of active detentions in each province-level administrative division:

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	611	Hunan province	45
Sichuan province	397	Jiangxi province	42
Tibet Autonomous Region	244	Shanxi province	39
Guangdong province	171	Jilin province	39
Qinghai province	153	Shaanxi province	36
Gansu province	86	Shanghai municipality	26
Liaoning province	84	Yunnan province	26
Heilongjiang province	84	Fujian province	25
Beijing municipality	81	Zhejiang province	20
Shandong province	73	Chongqing municipality	19
Hong Kong SAR	72	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	17
Henan province	67	Tianjin municipality	13
Hebei province	66	Guizhou province	12
Anhui province	57	Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	10
Hubei province	53	Hainan province	1
Jiangsu province	49	Macau SAR	0
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	46		

POLITICAL PRISONER CASES OF CONCERN

Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) for credible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners or groups of prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the Commission's 2024 Annual Report highlight a small number of individuals whom Chinese authorities have detained or sentenced for peacefully exercising their internationally recognized human rights. Members of Congress and the Administration are urged to advocate for these individuals in meetings with Chinese Communist Party and government officials. For more information on these cases and other cases raised in the Annual Report, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

Name PPD Record No.	Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Wang Jianbing
王建兵

2021-00517

Sophia Huang Xueqin
黄雪琴

2021-00517

Date of Detention
September 19, 2021

Place of Detention
Guangzhou Municipal No. 1 PSB Detention Center in Guangdong province

Charge(s)
Inciting subversion of state power

Status
Wang: sentenced to three years and six months;
Huang: sentenced to five years

Context
On September 19, 2021, public security authorities in Guangzhou took into custody journalist and gender rights advocate Sophia Huang Xueqin and labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing. Authorities placed Huang and Wang under "residential surveillance at a designated location"—a form of incommunicado detention that leaves detainees vulnerable to torture and abuse—and formally arrested them on October 27 for "inciting subversion of state power." Authorities held Wang in solitary confinement for five months and did not permit him to meet with his lawyer. In September 2023, the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court tried Huang and Wang in a closed hearing and sentenced them on June 13, 2024.

Additional Information
Wang worked on rural development, youth education initiatives, advocacy on behalf of persons with disabilities, and labor rights, and is a strong supporter of China's #MeToo movement. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention deemed his detention arbitrary in 2022. Authorities previously detained Huang on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," possibly in connection with her coverage of sexual harassment in China and her reporting on the 2019 pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.

Yu Wensheng
余文生

2014-00387

Xu Yan
许艳

2023-00110

Date of Detention
April 14, 2023

Place of Detention
Yu: Suzhou No. 1 PSB Detention Center;
Xu: Suzhou No. 4 PSB Detention Center

Charge(s)
Picking quarrels and provoking trouble

Status
Detained, awaiting trial

Context
On April 14, 2023, police in Beijing municipality detained lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife, activist Xu Yan, as they headed to a meeting with European Union diplomats. The next day, police verbally read a criminal detention notice to their son saying that both were held on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" but did not provide a written copy. Police reportedly stationed personnel in Yu and Xu's home with their son and told their lawyers that Yu did not want a lawyer, and that Xu had chosen two others. On May 21, Yu's brother reported that authorities had formally arrested Yu and Xu but had not given him an arrest notice or allowed him to photograph one. He also said that police warned lawyers not to represent the couple.

Additional Information
Authorities previously detained Yu from 2014 to 2015 in connection with his support for pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and from 2018 to 2022 he served a four-year prison sentence for "inciting subversion of state power" due to his advocacy of political reform.

Name PPD Record No.	Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Tonyee Chow Hang-tung
鄒幸彤

2021-00514

Date of Detention
June 4, 2021

Place of Detention
Tai Lam Centre for Women, Hong Kong SAR

Charge(s)
Inciting others to join an unauthorized assembly; inciting subversion of state power; failure to comply with notice to provide information

Status
Detained

Context
On June 4, 2021, Hong Kong police arrested Tonyee Chow Hang-tung, alleging that she had incited others to join a candlelight vigil commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen protests, which police had declined to authorize on public health grounds. Police released her on bail but arrested her again on June 30, accusing her of inciting others to join an unauthorized assembly on July 1, the anniversary of Hong Kong's handover. Chow is a rights lawyer and was previously vice chair of the NGO Hong Kong Alliance that organized June 4th vigils annually. In September, police arrested Chow and several other Hong Kong Alliance members for failing to surrender documents relating to the organization's operations, additionally charging her with "inciting subversion of state power" under the National Security Law (NSL). Chow has been sentenced to a total of 22 months in prison for two charges relating to unauthorized assembly. In December 2022, the Hong Kong High Court overturned a 15-month sentence related to the unauthorized assembly, but in January 2024, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal overturned the acquittal. In May 2024, Chow was arrested under the provisions of the new Safeguarding National Security Ordinance ("Article 23" legislation) for publication of seditious materials.

Additional Information
In May 2023, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that Chow's detention was arbitrary and called on Hong Kong authorities to release her.

Xu Qin
徐秦

2016-00015

Date of Detention
February 9, 2018

Place of Detention
Yangzhou Municipal PSB Detention Center in Jiangsu province

Charge(s)
Inciting subversion of state power

Status
Sentenced to four years

Context
Police in Gaoyou city, Yangzhou, detained veteran rights defender Xu Qin in February 2018 on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" in apparent connection with her advocacy on behalf of other rights advocates, including detained lawyer Yu Wensheng. In March, police placed Xu under "residential surveillance at a designated location" and accused her of "inciting subversion of state power." After releasing Xu on bail in September, authorities maintained her bail conditions for three years. In November 2021, she was taken back into custody and formally arrested for "inciting subversion." Xu's lawyer reported that in June 2022, she was paralyzed and in a wheelchair. The Yangzhou Intermediate People's Court sentenced her in March 2024 to four years in prison.

Additional Information
A former Communist Party member, Xu was detained previously in 2016 in connection with a planned gathering of petitioners in Beijing municipality. Xu has been a member of the rights defense organizations China Human Rights Watch and Rose China, whose founder, Qin Yongmin, is serving a 13-year prison sentence for his democracy advocacy.

Yang Zewei
杨泽伟

2023-00171

Date of Detention
May 31, 2023

Place of Detention
Hengyang Juvenile PSB Detention Center in Hengyang municipality, Hunan province

Charge(s)
Inciting subversion of state power

Status
Formally arrested, awaiting trial

Context
On May 31, 2023, Chinese police officers, in cooperation with Laotian police officers, abducted free speech activist Yang Zewei, also known as Qiao Xinxin, from his home in Vientiane, Laos. On July 7, 2023, Hengyang police formally arrested Yang for "inciting subversion of state power" and held him at the Hengyang Juvenile PSB Detention Center.

Additional Information
Yang Zewei worked as a journalist for outlets such as Radio Free Asia before moving to Laos. In March 2023, he launched an online campaign to advocate against internet censorship in China.

Name PPD Record No.	Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Lu Siwei
卢思位

2021-00269

Date of Detention
July 28, 2023

Place of Detention
Xindu District PSB Detention Center

Charge(s)
Illegally crossing the border

Status
Released on bail, awaiting trial

Context
On July 28, 2023, authorities in Laos detained Lu Siwei, a disbarred Chinese rights lawyer, near the Thai border as he was traveling from China via Thailand to the United States, where his wife and daughter live. In September, Lao officials transferred Lu back to the custody of PRC officials, who detained him on suspicion of "illegally crossing the border" and held him at the Xindu District PSB Detention Center in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province. On October 28, 2023 authorities released Lu on bail pending trial.

Additional Information
Lu Siwei has represented clients including rights lawyers and advocates and offered to work for one of 12 Hong Kong activists detained in August 2020 while attempting to flee to Taiwan. In 2017 he called on the National People's Congress to investigate torture allegations among individuals detained in the 2015 "709" crackdown on rights lawyers and advocates. In January 2021, Sichuan authorities disbarred Lu, and in May 2021 he was banned from leaving China.

Pema
དཔལ་
白玛

2018-00552

Date of Detention
March 26, 2024

Place of Detention
Unknown location believed to be in Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province

Charge(s)
Unknown

Status
Detained

Context
Pema, a monk and teacher at Ngaba's Kirti Monastery, was detained on March 26, 2024, after a solo protest in which he held a portrait of the Dalai Lama and called for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and religious freedom for Tibetans. Following Pema's detention, police stepped up restrictions in the area around Kirti Monastery and inquired into Pema's contacts from his WeChat account.

Rahile Dawut
راهىلە داۋۇت
热依拉·达吾提

2018-00552

Date of Detention
December 2017

Place of Detention
Unknown location in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)

Charge(s)
Unknown charge related to endangering state security

Status
Sentenced to life imprisonment

Context
Uyghur ethnographer Rahile Dawut disappeared in December 2017 and was believed to have been held in a mass internment camp. In July 2021, sources confirmed that she had been sentenced to prison on unknown charges. Later reporting confirmed that she had been tried in 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge related to "endangering state security" and that the XUAR High People's Court rejected her appeal. Friends and other observers suggested that authorities may have detained her due to her efforts to preserve Uyghur culture and heritage, or due to her foreign connections. She formerly taught at Xinjiang University and is well regarded for her scholarly research on traditional Uyghur culture.

Name PPD Record No.	Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)		
 Lang Dongyue 郎东月 **2024-00071**	**Date of Detention** December 14, 2021 **Place of Detention** Zhangjiakou PSB Detention Center **Charge(s)** Unknown **Status** Sentenced to nine years	**Context** On December 14, 2021, police took into custody Falun Gong practitioner Lang Dongyue in Huailai county, Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province. Police initially detained her in a police station and later transferred her to the Zhangjiakou PSB Detention Center in early 2021. In or around July 2023, the Xuanhua District People's Court in Zhangjiakou sentenced Lang to nine years in prison and imposed a fine of 15,000 yuan. The Zhangjiakou Intermediate People's Court later rejected Lang's appeal.	**Additional Information** Authorities had previously detained Lang at least five times beginning around 1999, during which time she was reportedly subjected to torture.
 Zhou Songlin 周松林 **2024-00125**	**Date of Detention** November 30, 2023 **Place of Detention** A PSB detention center in Hefei municipality, Anhui province **Charge(s)** Fraud **Status** Detained	**Context** On November 30, 2023, public security officials in Hefei municipality, Anhui province, raided the homes of leaders and staff of the unregistered Ganquan Church. Fourteen individuals from the church initially were taken into custody, and while most were released shortly thereafter, among those criminally detained was the church's pastor, Zhou Songlin. Authorities criminally detained him and four others on suspicion of "fraud."	**Additional Information** In recent years, PRC authorities have used "fraud" charges against unregistered churches, effectively criminalizing churches' offerings-based funding structures.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

The Commission makes the following recommendations for actions by the Administration and Congress.

Enforce Forced Labor Import Restrictions

Congress and the Administration should provide sufficient resources to enforce laws prohibiting the importation of goods produced with forced labor, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public Law No. 117-78); enable the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) to expand the UFLPA's "Entity List," and for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to hire analysts with Chinese language skills. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Employ available funds for technologies to assist in UFLPA enforcement, such as DNA traceability and secure supply chain mapping tools, and software, to better analyze packages entering the U.S. via the de minimis duty-free shipping loophole;
- Focus enforcement efforts on small-parcel imports that enter the United States under the de minimis threshold, including by considering placing e-commerce sites like Temu on the UFLPA "Entity List" as some reportedly operate in China not only as online marketplaces, but as vertically integrated manufacturers and retailers responsible for sourcing goods;
- Continue to expand the UFLPA "Entity List" aggressively so that importers have clear guidelines for supply chain management and better understand which companies are employing labor within, and transferred from, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR);
- Direct the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other federal agencies to end procurement of seafood processed in the Chinese provinces of Liaoning and Shandong, given evidence that such processed seafood is tainted by the forced labor of Uyghurs and North Koreans;
- Issue clear guidelines through the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy directing all federal agencies to prohibit procurement of goods made with forced labor, particularly seafood processed in China;
- Expand the ability of the U.S. Department of Justice's Trade Fraud Task Force to investigate and prosecute international trade-related crimes, particularly those committed by entities violating the UFLPA in high-priority enforcement sectors or by entities seeking to obscure forced labor in existing supply chains, including through the transshipment of goods; and
- Encourage foreign governments and legislatures to adopt their own national legislation or regulations modeled on the UFLPA; and

Congress should—

- Pass legislation amending the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. Chapter 4) to reform, reduce, or eliminate the de minimis threshold for duty-free shipments into the United States to prevent companies from circumventing the import restrictions required by the law;
- Consider legislation to expand the "rebuttable presumption" under the UFLPA that goods were made with forced labor to high-priority enforcement sectors beyond the XUAR, including 1) the fishing sector to target Chinese maritime fleets engaged in "illegal, unregulated, or unreported" fishing and 2) the importation of lithium-ion batteries made with cobalt mined and processed using forced or child labor. Congress should pass H.R. 6909 and H.R. 7981 (118th Cong.), both of which address labor abuse in the cobalt mining industry;
- Consider legislation or other legislative action to require certification that federal vehicle purchases are free of parts made with forced labor or containing materials mined with forced or child labor, including by providing complete supply chain mapping for the vehicles and their parts;
- Consider passing legislation, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act (H.R. 4840), to require issuers of securities to publicly disclose their supply or production chain related to the XUAR or to companies involved in

labor transfers involving Uyghurs or other persecuted groups; and

- Seek from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) information about whether issuers of securities are violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose the material impacts of their links to the XUAR or with entities employing the forced labor of Uyghurs.

Pursue Accountability for Atrocity Crimes

Congress should pass the bipartisan Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act (S. 1770/H.R. 8124) and the Uyghur Policy Act of 2023 (H.R. 2766) because the People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to commit atrocities, including genocide, against Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The Administration should fund programs to document and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes committed in the XUAR and more robustly use existing sanctions authorities found in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (Public Law No. 116-145) to hold PRC officials accountable for atrocity crimes. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Create a Special Coordinator for the XUAR within the U.S. State Department whose task would be to enlist the cooperation of allies and partners in addressing atrocities; seek the release of Uyghurs detained who have family members living outside of the PRC; elevate enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and coordinate public diplomacy efforts to counter PRC propaganda globally;
- Request an open debate or an Arria-formula briefing at the U.N. Security Council on the situation in the XUAR;
- Raise the U.S. State Department's Travel Advisory for the XUAR to "Level 4" to reduce the possibility of Americans enabling atrocity crimes, such as through state-chaperoned and -managed tourism excursions.
- Ensure that export controls prohibit U.S. companies from assisting Chinese companies engaged in digital or biometric surveillance that aids in the commission of atrocity crimes in the XUAR; and
- Strengthen programs of public diplomacy globally to highlight the PRC's atrocities, including by expanding the Uyghur Service of *Radio Free Asia* and by supporting projects of the *Voice of America,* the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute; and

Congress should—

- Pass legislation to extend expiring sanctions authorities including those found in H.R. 8366 (118th Cong.) and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Reauthorization Act of 2024 (S. 4465).
- Require the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report assessing the impact of the PRC's atrocities on regional security, global supply chains, refugee flows, and its global propaganda efforts and including a detailed evaluation of the PRC's digital and biometric surveillance architecture; the entities owned or operated by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC); the spread of facial recognition and other biometric surveillance tools globally; and the products and supply chains dependent on XUAR-sourced goods and products;
- Direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to issue a report on the impact of sanctions enforcement on the XPCC, which was sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328);
- Provide sufficient funding for personnel at the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State to more effectively gather information and vet sanctions eligibility of suspected perpetrators of atrocities;
- Consider legislation that would create a public archive of information documenting the Uyghur genocide and other atrocities for future atrocity accountability efforts;
- Require the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to add all PRC police and public security entities to the BIS Entity List, in order to prohibit them from purchasing U.S. biotechnology products for the mass forced collection of biometric data that could be used for state surveillance, particularly in Tibetan and Uyghur regions; and
- Consider legislation that would deny tax-exempt status for non-governmental organizations that fail to publicly report holding interest in any Chinese entity identified as engaged in forced organ harvesting, gross violations of human rights, human trafficking, or forced labor.

Defend Human Rights in Hong Kong

The Administration should employ more robustly the sanctions authorities found in the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 116-76) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 116-149) to target specifically government officials, prosecutors, judges, police, and other individuals complicit in the arbitrary detention of political prisoners and the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Expand programs that support human rights and internet freedom in Hong Kong and provide legal support for democracy activists;
- Expand investigative journalism projects to preserve the flow of independent news and information from Hong Kong and create academic residency programs for Hong Kong journalists and executives whose news and media outlets were shuttered due to abuse or threats under the National Security Law;
- Remove barriers for Hong Kong residents applying for U.S. visas, including by extending Priority 2 refugee status for those fearing political persecution, and publish a plan to address the long-term status and treatment of Hong Kong residents in the United States;
- Coordinate sanctions and messaging about political prisoners in Hong Kong with the United Kingdom and other like-minded nations to amplify the impact of diplomatic efforts; and
- Brief Congress regularly on U.S. diplomatic advocacy for political prisoners in Hong Kong, including Jimmy Lai, Joshua Wong, Chow Hang-tung, Gwyneth Ho, Claudia Mo, Benny Tai, and Lee Cheuk-yan; and

Congress should—

- Direct the Department of the Treasury to report on the financial institutions restricting Hong Kongers from accessing their financial assets and impose sanctions, particularly for those financial institutions found to be acting at the behest of the Hong Kong government;
- Pass the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) Certification Act (S. 490) to remove the diplomatic privileges given to Hong Kong's three offices in the United States;
- Pass the Safeguarding Internet Freedom in Hong Kong Act (S. 3114) to develop and deploy firewall circumvention and other tools to protect democracy and rights activists online;
- Pass S. 3177/H.R. 6153 (118th Cong.) to provide for a review of sanctions with respect to Hong Kong regarding officials responsible for undermining democracy, human rights, and due process protections of Hong Kong citizens;
- Extend the prohibition on sales of certain crowd control equipment and munitions to the Hong Kong police, as laid out in H.R. 8366 (118th Cong.); and
- Extend sanctions authorizations for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2024 (S. 4467).

Protect North Koreans in China

Congress should pass the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023 (S. 584/H.R. 3012) to authorize the work of the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights and institute programs to help protect North Korean refugees and victims of human trafficking. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Seek a report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the vulnerabilities faced by North Koreans living and working in China; the obstacles faced by the UNHCR in gaining access to North Koreans in China; and whether these obstacles violate the PRC's obligations under the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture, and other international human rights covenants;
- Direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to identify and stop U.S. imports, particularly of processed seafood, from Chinese companies that employ North Korean labor, as such imports are prohibited by the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; Public Law No. 115-44);
- Use the authorities available in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (Public Law No. 114-122), including sanctions and the freezing of financial assets, for any person or company in the PRC that employs North Korean labor;
- Require the U.S. Director of National Intelligence to report on the amount of foreign currency earned by

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from North Koreans working in China, the companies where they are employed, and the goods produced for export, including what goods enter the U.S., Canada, and Mexico; and

- Expand U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) broadcasting of uncensored news and information to the North Korean people through *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Asia* and direct USAGM to issue a report on its reach and impact on North Koreans living and working in China and Russia.

Mainstream Human Rights Diplomacy

The Administration should mainstream human rights diplomacy by issuing a policy directive to require that the critical mission strategies of all U.S. Government entities interacting with the PRC contain human rights, internet freedom, and democratic governance goals. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Ensure that human rights and democracy programs at the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development emphasize 1) the funding of projects working to ensure access to justice, 2) conserving and expanding the space for an independent civil society, and 3) labor rights, freedom of association, and the freedom of religion in China. Grants should continue to go to third-party entities outside of the PRC working on these issues; and

Congress should—

- Replace the now-shuttered Open Source Fund with a new federal entity that will translate and maintain collections of important open-source Chinese-language materials from the PRC and provide access to all government-sponsored research projects.

Defend Threatened Cultures and Languages

Congress should fund programs to assist communities facing threats to their cultural and linguistic heritage including Uyghurs, Mongols, and Hong Kongers. The Administration should fund education, exhibitions, and research on ethnic and religious communities currently living within China and leverage the funding authorized by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (Public Law No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 3119) to help sustain the religious, linguistic, and cultural identity of Tibetan communities.

Protect Tibet and Tibetans Globally

Congress should extend the report required by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (Public Law No. 115-330). Members of Congress should interact regularly with the leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration and with parliamentarians globally to build international coalitions to defend human rights in Tibet, protect Tibetan refugees in Nepal and elsewhere, and promote the resumption of PRC-Tibetan dialogue. The Administration should actively counter PRC disinformation on Tibet as required by the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act (Public Law No. 118-70). In addition, the Administration should use its voice, vote, and influence at the U.N. Human Rights Council to seek investigation into mass relocations of Tibetans, the forced placement of Tibetan children in colonial boarding schools, and the health and whereabouts of the Panchen Lama and his parents.

Condition Access to U.S. Capital

Congress should strengthen disclosure and auditing requirements to ensure that American investors are not wittingly or unwittingly funneling capital to PRC companies that the U.S. Government has identified as national security threats or human rights abusers. Congress should prohibit investment in companies and their subsidiaries sanctioned by the U.S. or included on key U.S. Government blacklists, including the UFLPA "Entity List," and those included in Withhold Release Orders and the Findings Dashboard related to forced labor. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Build on Executive Order No. 14105, "Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern," and restrict U.S. investment in areas related to technologies used for mass biometric surveillance or other human rights abuses, particularly those used to perpetuate atrocities; and
- Direct the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive digital database that allows businesses and investors to easily ascertain which PRC entities the U.S. Government has sanctioned or listed for engaging in human rights abuses or for posing a threat to U.S. national security or more generally to American citizens; and

Congress should—

- Consider legislation to prevent PRC companies' access to U.S. capital markets if they are under human rights sanctions and mandate that the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) delist from stock exchanges any entities on the UFLPA "Entity List" or entities that have broader connections to the importation of goods made with forced labor or child labor; and
- Seek a Government Accountability Office study on whether the SEC is sufficiently enforcing the reporting requirements found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law No. 116-222) to ensure that issuers of securities disclose any transactions with PRC companies that have been placed on the Treasury Department's Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List), the Commerce Department's Entity List and Unverified List, or those implicated in forced labor or sanctioned for human rights abuses; and

End Forced Organ Harvesting

Congress should pass the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023 (S. 761/H.R. 1154) to expand annual reporting by the U.S. Department of State on forced organ harvesting globally and should require the Director of National Intelligence to issue a report on whether forced organ harvesting and "organ tourism" activities were used by the PRC in the XUAR to advance policies that amount to genocide. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Use existing authorities to deny U.S. visas to physicians and researchers from China known to be involved in forced organ harvesting activities prior to 2015 and announce such decisions publicly;
- Sanction individuals or entities found to have been engaged in forced organ harvesting or illegal organ trafficking in the XUAR after 2015 and add them to the Department of the Treasury's "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List," which would prevent financial transactions with U.S. companies or research institutions;
- Use State Department rewards programs to seek credible evidence that will deter and disrupt the market for illegally procured organs and hold accountable those responsible for the practice of forced organ harvesting;
- Investigate whether federal funding has been provided to Chinese entities involved in unethical organ transplantation practices, including those that violate human subject research protections outlined in the Common Rule and the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) policy on human subject protections and publicly announce the prohibition of such entities from receiving future NIH and National Science Foundation grants;
- Build alliances with partners at the U.N. Human Rights Council to investigate concerns raised by U.N. human rights experts and by the Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, which concluded that forced organ harvesting from executed prisoners, political prisoners, and ethnic and religious minorities, sponsored or sanctioned by the PRC, constituted crimes against humanity:
- Promulgate regulations prohibiting federal insurers from reimbursing patients for either seeking organ transplantation in the PRC or seeking immunosuppressant or other transplant aftercare subsequent to receiving an organ transplant in the PRC; and
- The Administration should keep the PRC and Macau on the Tier 3 blacklist required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Public Law No. 106-386) as long as they remain a significant source and destination for sex and labor trafficking, including human trafficking for the likely purpose of organ removal.

Advocate for Political Prisoners

Members of Congress and Administration officials, at the highest levels and at every opportunity, should raise political prisoner cases in meetings with PRC officials. Experience demonstrates that consistently raising individual prisoner cases and the larger human rights issues they represent can result in improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences or, in some cases, release from custody, detention, or imprisonment. Members of Congress are encouraged to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for reliable information on cases of political and religious detention in China and Hong Kong, and to "adopt" individual prisoners through the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission's "Defending Freedoms Project." In addition,

The Administration should—

- Create a Special Advisor for Political Prisoners position within the State Department's Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights, and Labor to develop and coordinate diplomatic strategies to gain the release of political and religious prisoners; to end the PRC's unacceptable use of "exit bans"; and to serve as a resource to former political prisoners living in the United States seeking guidance on the safety of planned travels abroad and medical and psychological care.

Strengthen International Organizations

Congress should require a strategy from the Administration to counter the PRC's expanding reach in international organizations and U.N. Treaty Bodies to ensure that the governance structures of entities like the International Telecommunication Union, the International Labour Organization, INTERPOL, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Health Organization meet the highest standards of transparency, accountability, and reform; uphold universal human rights; and address pressing transnational challenges. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies to—
  - Reform the process of suspending the right of membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for Member States that commit gross and systemic violations of internationally recognized human rights;
  - Reform or replace the U.N. Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, which too often denies consultative status to civil society organizations critical of the PRC or other authoritarian governments;
  - Take action at the U.N. Human Rights Council to protect Chinese human rights defenders, environmental activists, journalists and citizen-journalists, and civil society organizations that publicly expose the failure of the PRC to live up to its responsibilities and obligations under international law, and seek input from these groups for upcoming treaty reviews, including by the Committee against Torture; and
  - Within the context of state obligations under the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, work on ways to ban the use of chaining and other inhuman and abusive treatment of people with disabilities in the PRC.

Support Victims of Torture and Atrocities

The Administration should accelerate processing times for current refugee and asylum cases and ensure that the expansion of the annual cap on refugees admitted to the United States is used to increase the protection and resettlement of those fleeing PRC persecution. In addition,

Congress should—

- Ensure that sufficient funding is available for psychological and medical support for victims of genocide and crimes against humanity, including in countries of first asylum, through programs authorized by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (Public Law No. 102-256), and consider expanding such services to victims of transnational repression; and
- Consider legislation to assist in civil litigation efforts of trafficking victims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Public Law No. 106-386) to hold accountable entities responsible for the labor trafficking of Uyghurs and other persecuted groups.

Defeat Digital Authoritarianism

The Administration should create an initiative to counter the PRC's information control strategies, bringing together relevant U.S. Government agencies, the private sector, and congressional leaders to help people in the PRC circumvent the "Great Firewall," and curtail the PRC's development and deployment of surveillance and censorship tools globally. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Issue a report on the implementation of the "China Censorship Monitor and Action Group," as provided under 22 U.S.C. §3363, and its integration and impact on the U.S. Government's response to digital authoritarianism. Included in the report should be an assessment as to whether resources are sufficient to address the PRC's censorship and intimidation of American citizens and legal residents;
- Use the "Countering PRC Influence Fund" to—
  - Build the capacity of independent investigative journalists and civil society organizations in countries with Belt and Road Initiative projects to expose corruption, malign influence tactics, and environmental, social, and governance risks; and

  - Strengthen cybersecurity measures to safeguard activists, dissidents, and human rights organizations from Chinese government digital surveillance and hacking attempts and ensure that all diaspora groups know about the cybersecurity tools and training available through the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; and
- Require any social media and online content providers operating in the United States to disclose—
  - When they actively enable censorship or surveillance on their own accord or at the request of the PRC; and
  - When they distribute content or accept payments from entities linked to the PRC that push propaganda or disinformation about U.S. policy or politics; and
- Expand resources for the Open Technology Fund and other internet freedom entities within the U.S. Agency for Global Media to distribute proven and effective anti-censorship tools globally and provide media literacy to help users circumvent China's "Great Firewall"; and

Congress should—

- Require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report detailing whether U.S.-origin technology is used by the PRC to engage in internet censorship or mass digital and biometric surveillance or to advance atrocities, including genocide, in the XUAR. Included in the report should be an assessment of whether new export control authorities are needed to prevent the malign use of such technology;
- Assess whether the U.S. Agency for Global Media's (USAGM) current content is an effective counter to Chinese Communist Party global information manipulation and consider ways to expand and target U.S. Government efforts in countries and regions where PRC propaganda and influence operations are prevalent challenges to U.S. interests in democratic governance and the protection of human rights; and
- Amend the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (Public Law No. 115-232, §§1701–1728) to trigger a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States review of any foreign company seeking to acquire U.S. assets controlling or collecting biometric information of Americans and coordinate such screening processes with allies.

End Transnational Repression

Congress should pass the Transnational Repression Policy Act (S. 831/H.R. 3654) to provide resources and additional authorities for U.S. law enforcement agencies and the State Department to constrain the PRC's ability to commit acts of transnational repression in the U.S. by training personnel to better recognize and combat transnational repression, hiring Federal Bureau of Investigation staff with appropriate language skills for its threat intake portal, and imposing targeted sanctions on individuals conducting harassment and intimidation operations on U.S. residents. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Build on the 2024 G7 Foreign Ministers' statement on "Digital and Transnational Repression" and create ongoing coordination exercises to share strategies and intelligence, and collaborate on responses, including sanctions, for entities engaged in transnational repression;
- Create a set of standards that 1) evaluates all foreign digital platforms, such as WeChat, for their potential to facilitate espionage or transnational repression while operating in the United States and 2) signals to foreign governments and actors that using such platforms to surveil or intimidate U.S. residents or companies or curtail their free speech will incur a significant cost, including U.S. sanctions;
- Consider extending psychological and social support available under the Torture Victim Protection Act (Public Law No. 102-256) to exile and diaspora communities targeted by transnational repression efforts; and
- Advocate within multilateral organizations for establishing independent mechanisms to monitor, report, and respond to transnational repression, including by establishing a U.N. Special Rapporteur for transnational repression, given the global scale of the problem; and

Congress should—

- Direct the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and all relevant federal agencies to submit an annual report assessing U.S. Government efforts to address transnational repression at home and abroad, and including a detailed account of law enforcement training and coordination, criminal prosecutions and sanctions, public diplomacy efforts, consultations with diplomatic allies and civil society, efforts to support victims, and a

description of emerging threats or at-risk individuals or communities, among other things; and

- Seek from the Department of Justice a report on whether there are gaps in U.S. law that limit the DOJ's ability to counter transnational repression and whether legislation is needed to criminalize acts of transnational repression.

Confront the Challenge of Malign Influence Operations

The Administration should end operations of the United Front Work Department and PRC security agencies in the United States, including the operation of "police stations," also known as "service stations," by the PRC Ministry of Public Security and subordinate branches in the United States. In addition,

The Administration should—

- Ensure that allies and partners are regularly briefed on the findings produced by the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
- Expand the "Protected Voices" initiative at the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide resources for U.S. residents to protect themselves from PRC propaganda, intimidation, and cyberattacks;
- Require U.S. educational institutions, think tanks, and other non-governmental organizations to publicly report all foreign gifts, grants, contracts, and in-kind contributions that exceed $50,000 as part of their annual tax filings to maintain non-profit status;
- Support educational and cultural exchange programs, including restoration of the Fulbright exchange program in China and Hong Kong in targeted academic fields and the preservation of scholarship and exchange programs for Tibetans, as a valuable resource; and
- Establish an interagency body, headed by the State Department, that gathers and and shares information, with Congress and allies and partners, about the PRC's malign influence and propaganda efforts globally and reports publicly on its findings.

Congress should—

- Create an interagency group, led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, that produces a public database to assist universities, foundations, think tanks, film production companies, publishers, non-governmental organizations, and state and local governments in conducting due diligence on potential business or academic partners in China, and in identifying PRC-based entities with connections to the United Front Work Department, intelligence and public security agencies, the Communist Party, and entities involved in the PRC's civil-military fusion program;
- Require the FMIC to issue publicly available reports on the impact of the PRC's malign influence operations and propaganda efforts throughout the world, including in Africa, South America, Central America, the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean on the national security, human rights, and economic interests of the United States;
- Update and expand the requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA; 22 U.S.C. 22 U.S.C. §§611–621) to cover individuals and other entities lobbying on behalf of government entities, businesses, or organizations working on behalf of educational or scientific pursuits in the PRC and ban lobbying on behalf of entities affiliated with the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, or others complicit in egregious human rights abuses;
- Expand Mandarin language training in U.S. high schools and colleges, for example, through the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative; and
- Require DHS to detail efforts to protect diaspora communities and human rights organizations from cyberattacks and provide intrusion detection software and training for any cybersecurity tools they distribute.

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