

XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY

Findings

- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-faceted campaign of transnational repression against critics, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others to stifle criticism and enhance control over emigrant and diaspora communities. After engaging in China-related protests abroad, some individuals experienced reprisal from Chinese authorities, intimidation or harassment from unidentified individuals, or self-censorship due to fear of reprisal. Authorities in the United States reported criminal charges against or arrested several groups and individuals involved in such PRC-led transnational repression plots.
- Prompted by reporting from the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders this past year, governments, international media, and NGOs investigated extraterritorial Chinese police stations, also known as “service stations,” around the globe with reported connections to Chinese law enforcement authorities. Reporting also detailed some of the “service stations” activities, including persuading alleged criminal suspects to return to China.
- The Commission observed reports that the PRC is targeting foreign politicians to influence them to support the Chinese Communist Party. This past year, former Solomon Islands provincial Premier Daniel Suidani claimed he was ousted from his post due to PRC political influence operations, while Canadian intelligence officials announced they had evidence of PRC influence operations targeting Canadian policymakers Michael Chong, Jenny Kwan, and Erin O’Toole.
- Chinese-owned companies and banks responsible for foreign development projects continued allowing abusive conditions for workers abroad. This past year, multiple reports detailed forced labor conditions for workers in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and non-BRI Chinese projects abroad, including physical and sexual violence, withholding of wages, and debt bondage.
- Chinese authorities continued to attempt to influence U.N. processes, including efforts to prevent the publication of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Chinese Communist Party- and government-affiliated NGOs monopolizing time dedicated to civil society organizations during the review of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in May 2023.

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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to take the following actions:

- Prepare a comprehensive strategy against China's transnational repression within the U.S. and globally, including addressing "service stations" connected to PRC law enforcement. This may include identifying and protecting individuals likely to be targeted, sharing intelligence among appropriate law enforcement entities, and imposing sanctions on perpetrators and enablers of these coercive operations.
- Consider legislation on accountability measures, such as sanctions, against foreign government officials who return individuals to the PRC where they are at risk of torture and other human rights abuses in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
- Show support to foreign political leaders and government officials who have been targeted by the Chinese government in retaliation for speaking out against the PRC's human rights abuses. This may include providing platforms for these individuals to speak about their experiences to increase awareness of the PRC's use of political coercion or working closely with them to coordinate appropriate responses to China.
- Call on the host governments of Chinese foreign development projects and the United Nations to insist that Chinese entities provide increased transparency in their development projects abroad. This might include publication of rigorous environmental, social, and governance risk assessments; detailed data regarding Chinese state involvement; terms of agreements for projects with state involvement; and evaluation of human rights safeguards.
- Offer alternative options for countries hosting Chinese development projects, including assistance in restructuring unfair debts with China or promotion of investment projects in which the United States may have a competitive advantage.
- Ensure broad, sustained U.S. engagement in U.N. bodies with human rights functions to ensure that these bodies can prevent further Chinese influence efforts that distort universal human rights principles. This should include putting forth qualified U.S. candidates to serve on those bodies, encouraging allies and partners to do the same with their candidates, and building coalitions to support those candidates.

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Transnational Repression

During the Commission’s 2023 reporting year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multi-year campaign of transnational repression to enhance control over critics, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others.¹ “Transnational repression” refers to transnational efforts to stifle dissent or independent organizing within emigrant or diaspora communities.² Freedom House has called China’s transnational repression campaign “the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive . . . in the world.”³ In some cases, authorities harassed or intimidated the China-based relatives of overseas targets as an indirect way to compel compliance from the targets themselves,⁴ a tactic referred to as “coercion by proxy.”⁵ Selected examples of transnational repression from this past year follow.

- **Transnational repression charges in the United States.**

This past year, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) criminally charged individuals connected with the PRC in transnational repression plots against individuals in the United States. This included seven individuals accused of pressuring a U.S.-based Chinese national to return to China as part of a PRC-led international extralegal repatriation effort known as “Operation Fox Hunt.”⁶ In another case, the DOJ charged 44 individuals in April 2023—including 40 Ministry of Public Security (MPS) officers and two officials from the Cyber-space Administration of China (CAC)—in a transnational repression scheme targeting U.S. residents in which the defendants reportedly created thousands of fake social media accounts to harass individuals “whose political views and actions are disfavored by the PRC,” and worked with an employee of a U.S. telecommunications company to remove such individuals from the company’s platform.⁷ Finally, in May 2023, the DOJ announced the arrest of Litang Liang, a man living in Massachusetts who had allegedly been “providing PRC government officials with information on Boston-area individuals and organizations; organizing a counter-protest against pro-democracy dissidents; providing photographs of and information about dissidents to PRC government officials; and providing the names of potential recruits to the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security.”⁸

- **Uyghurs.** This reporting year, the Commission observed the release of multiple reports detailing new findings of Chinese transnational repression targeted at Uyghur diaspora members. In its August 2022 report on human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights noted the problem of coercion by proxy for Uyghur families separated across national boundaries.⁹ According to that report, fear of reprisals against XUAR-based relatives is a common reason for Uyghurs to cut off communication with their family members when they or their family members live abroad.¹⁰ As an example, the report cited one instance of a man’s wife, children, and over 30 other relatives in the XUAR refusing contact with him

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out of fear of reprisals.¹¹ In a separate report, David Tobin and Nyrola Elimä of the University of Sheffield shared further examples, including one of an anonymous Uyghur man who has received harassing phone calls and threats to him and his family by XUAR police for years, while previously living in Turkey and now the U.K.¹² [For more information about transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, see Chapter 18—Xinjiang.]

- **Lhamjab Borjigin.** PRC police took into custody the prominent Mongol writer **Lhamjab Borjigin**¹³ in May 2023 at his residence in Mongolia’s capital of Ulaanbaatar before forcibly returning him to his home in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) on the same day.¹⁴ Lhamjab Borjigin has written several books on Mongolian history, and escaped “residential surveillance” in the IMAR in March 2023 to live in Mongolia and publish a new history of the suppression of Mongolian identity by the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁵ The Mongolian government released an official statement asserting Lhamjab Borjigin left Mongolia voluntarily without any Chinese police operation, though analysts from Safeguard Defenders assert that “it appears that Mongolia had allowed the arrest to take place.”¹⁶ [For more information on the case of Lhamjab Borjigin, see Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

- **Mayflower Church.** Chinese state security continued to harass members of the Shenzhen Holy Reformed Church, also called the Mayflower Church,¹⁷ who left China between 2019 and 2020 seeking religious asylum after facing intensifying government persecution.¹⁸ After flying to Thailand from South Korea to appeal directly to the U.N. refugee agency office in Bangkok, members of the Mayflower Church reported receiving dozens of “harassing phone calls” from Chinese officials accusing them of committing national security offenses, while authorities in China interrogated and intimidated their relatives.¹⁹ International advocacy, including by the U.S.-based Christian rights group ChinaAid Association and U.S. government agencies, led to the release of Mayflower Church members from Thai prison and their subsequent journey to the U.S. in April 2023.²⁰ [For more information on religious persecution in China, see Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion.]

PROTESTERS ABROAD EXPERIENCE INTIMIDATION, REPRISALS, AND CHILLING EFFECTS

This past year, international media reported cases of individuals who, after engaging in China-related protests outside of China, were subjected to reprisals from Chinese authorities, intimidation or harassment from unidentified individuals, or self-censorship due to fear of reprisals. Selected examples follow.

- **Hong Kong.** On the first day of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing municipality,²¹ protesters outside the Chinese consulate in Manchester, United Kingdom, displayed banners that criticized Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, demanded the end of the Party, and called for Hong Kong independence.²² A man who later identified

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himself as Chinese Consul-General Zheng Xiyuan²³ kicked one banner and pushed down another, and Chinese consular staff tried to take a poster from protesters during the demonstration.²⁴ A violent confrontation with protesters then ensued.²⁵ One protester reported that individuals inside the consulate gates grabbed his hair, pulled him inside the gates, and assaulted him.²⁶ Following the incident, U.K. authorities reported that they had initiated an investigation.²⁷ In a separate case, a Hong Kong resident who had previously visited the U.K. reported that officials identifying themselves from the “national security office” summoned him upon his return to Hong Kong and warned him that his participation in recent protests in the U.K. “constitute[d] terrorist activities.”²⁸ After issuing these threats, the officials released the man without a formal bail note, and the man left Hong Kong soon thereafter.²⁹ [For more information about authorities’ efforts to suppress peaceful expression in connection with the 20th Party Congress, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression. For more information about conditions in Hong Kong, see Chapter 19—Hong Kong and Macau.]

- **Support of Peng Lifa.** Some cases were connected to displays of solidarity abroad with **Peng Lifa’s** protest in Beijing municipality shortly before the 20th Party Congress.³⁰ Beijing authorities immediately detained Peng in October 2022 after he hung banners calling for the removal of Xi Jinping and criticizing authorities’ response to COVID-19 among other demands, in calls that were subsequently echoed through social media posts and posters in China and abroad.³¹ Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that some Chinese students studying abroad posted messages in support of Peng anonymously, which a Chinese student in the U.S. told RFA was out of concern about potential reprisals against family and friends in China.³² In one case, a Chinese national studying in Washington state reported that, after he expressed support for Peng online, police in Beijing pressured his family to convince him not to be a “traitor.”³³ [For more information about Peng Lifa’s protest, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression.]

- **Solidarity with White Paper protesters.** Diaspora communities showed solidarity with the November 2022 White Paper protests in China against harsh “zero-COVID” measures and censorship,³⁴ by publicly protesting in locations throughout the world. Members of the Hong Kong diaspora abroad expressed fears about using their real names or showing their faces while participating in these protests, out of concern that Hong Kong authorities might pursue them under extraterritorial provisions in Hong Kong’s national security law³⁵ or retaliate against their friends and family back in Hong Kong.³⁶ [For more information about White Paper protests, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2—Civil Society, Chapter 6—Governance, and Chapter 12—Public Health.]

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Overseas Police “Service Stations”

Prompted by reporting from the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders this past year, governments, international media, and NGOs investigated extraterritorial Chinese police stations, also known as “service stations”³⁷ around the globe with connections to Chinese law enforcement authorities. In September and December 2022, Safeguard Defenders reported that Chinese public security bureaus from three municipalities in Jiangsu, Fujian, and Zhejiang provinces, and one county in Zhejiang,³⁸ had established in total 102 such stations in at least 53 countries, with some dating back to 2016.³⁹ While at least one Chinese public security bureau reportedly signed bilateral agreements with some host countries in question, Safeguard Defenders reported that three other public security bureaus in China established “service stations” illegally, breaching “territorial and judicial sovereignty” of the host countries.⁴⁰ Subsequently, authorities in the United States, Austria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom announced investigations into the existence and activities of these service stations.⁴¹ As a result of one such investigation, the United Kingdom’s Security Minister, Tom Tugendhat, reported in June 2023 that China had closed “service stations” across Britain, and that an investigation into those sites did not reveal any illegal activity by the Chinese state in the U.K.⁴² Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Justice charged two individuals in connection with “opening and operating an illegal overseas police station” in New York City “for a provincial branch of the [Ministry of Public Security] of the PRC.”⁴³

Reporting from this past year also provided additional details about the activities of the “service stations” over the years. Some sources reported that the “service stations” connected Chinese citizens abroad with local authorities in China—via telephone, video conference, or postal mail—to facilitate driver’s license renewals, telehealth exams, and notary services, as well as dispute resolution services that included litigation and mediation.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, in at least four cases, “service stations” reportedly facilitated the “persuasion” of alleged criminal suspects to return to China from abroad, specifically from Serbia in 2018,⁴⁵ France in 2019,⁴⁶ Spain in 2020,⁴⁷ and Mozambique in 2022.⁴⁸ In July 2022, authorities from Nantong municipality, Jiangsu, reported that the “Nantong Police and Overseas Liaison stations have assisted in the capture or persuasion to return of 80 ‘criminal suspects’ to China” from unspecified countries⁴⁹ since the “service stations” were launched in 2016.⁵⁰ “Persuasion to return” is part of broader international efforts by PRC authorities to target alleged corruption suspects, critics of government and Party officials, and members of ethnic minority emigrant and diaspora communities.⁵¹

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TARGETING FOREIGN POLITICIANS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

This reporting year, the Commission also observed reports that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is targeting foreign politicians and government officials to influence them to support the Chinese Communist Party. Selected examples include the following:

- **Solomon Islands.** The Solomon Islands Prime Minister's office announced that China provided US\$2.49 million in funds to be spent at the Prime Minister's discretion in 2021, which were subsequently distributed to 39 out of 50 members of the Solomon Islands' parliament that year.⁵² These payments prompted "criticism the payments were politically motivated" because the 39 paid politicians were supporters of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, who has been instrumental in developing Sino-Solomon Islands relations.⁵³ Moreover, former provincial Premier Daniel Suidani, a public critic of the Solomon Islands' diplomatic ties with the PRC and its corrupt practices in his province, was ousted from his seat in February 2023, and has claimed the PRC orchestrated a political operation to influence members of his government to vote for a motion of no confidence to remove him from his post.⁵⁴
- **Canada.** Canada's intelligence agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) informed multiple Canadian politicians in May 2023 of Chinese influence operations targeted at them. The Canadian newspaper *Globe and Mail* revealed that, according to CSIS, Toronto-based PRC diplomat Zhao Wei had ordered the monitoring and potential intimidation of Hong Kong-based relatives of Canadian Member of Parliament (MP) Michael Chong, who previously sponsored a motion in 2021 condemning the PRC's treatment of Uyghurs as "genocide."⁵⁵ Similarly, MP Jenny Kwan stated later in May 2023 that CSIS had informed her that China had targeted her in a foreign interference campaign and that she "would continue to be a target," likely due to her activism related to human rights in Hong Kong and Uyghurs in the XUAR.⁵⁶ Canada's former Conservative Party Leader Erin O'Toole also reported that CSIS had identified PRC-organized misinformation campaigns against him in the 2021 election, reportedly because O'Toole opposed the use of Huawei technology in Canada and criticized the PRC's human rights record.⁵⁷

Foreign Development Projects

The Commission observed multiple reports of human rights violations this past year tied to Chinese corporations' and banks' involvement in foreign development projects, including those associated with its state-sponsored Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In November 2022, China Labor Watch (CLW), an NGO based in the U.S., detailed forced labor conditions for Chinese workers in BRI projects in multiple countries.⁵⁸ Drawing on data from correspondence with over 2,000 workers in eight countries across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, CLW found "systematic violations of the rights of Chinese workers in BRI-affiliated projects."⁵⁹ In interviews with workers, CLW found that interviewees raised grievances that correspond to International Labor Organization indica-

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tors of forced labor or human trafficking in as high as 85 percent of cases (retention of identity documents).⁶⁰ The CLW report documented issues such as predatory sub-contracting arrangements that shield companies from accountability; false advertising regarding salaries and other working conditions overseas; allowing or forcing workers to work overseas without required work visas; illegal contracting practices; passport seizures; arbitrary wage withholding and fines; surveillance, intimidation, and physical abuse at job sites; and corruption and collusion with host country authorities to suppress worker complaints.⁶¹ In one specific case from this past year, CLW reported a variety of these issues—plus multiple worker deaths—at PT Virtue Dragon Nickel Industrial Park (the Industrial Park) in Indonesia,⁶² which reportedly had investment from state-owned China First Heavy Industries.⁶³ In January 2023, workers at the Industrial Park reportedly went on strike in response to poor working conditions, which resulted in violent conflict between workers and security personnel and the deaths of an Indonesian worker and a Chinese worker.⁶⁴

In addition to cases involving BRI projects, other Chinese foreign development initiatives were connected to human rights abuses as well this year. Selected examples include the following:

- **Solomon Islands stadium.** Workers at a Chinese state-funded stadium complex construction zone in the Solomon Islands spoke to the New York Times about the project’s unjust labor practices.⁶⁵ Workers reported unfulfilled promises of pay, lack of any safety training, and incidents of Chinese supervisors hitting workers in the head as punishment.⁶⁶
- **Latin America projects.** A coalition of Latin American NGOs submitted a report to the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in February 2023, documenting violations of environmental and social standards in the region by companies and banks over which the PRC has effective control and jurisdiction.⁶⁷ The NGOs analyzed 14 projects led by Chinese companies or with Chinese financing, carried out in nine Latin American countries in infrastructure, energy, and extraction sectors.⁶⁸ In doing so, the group revealed “violations of the rights of indigenous peoples, the right to health, a healthy environment, water, food, housing, labor rights, and various civil and political rights,” which the PRC failed to make sufficient efforts to prevent.⁶⁹
- **Zimbabwe mining.** The U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Zimbabwe Country Report on Human Rights Practices reported common themes of PRC-owned companies abusing workers in Zimbabwe.⁷⁰ Specifically, it cites reports of “physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers; unsafe working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissals; firings without notice; failure to abide by collective bargaining agreements; and failure to report health and safety incidents.”⁷¹

Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies

Chinese authorities continue to make efforts to influence processes and procedures within the U.N. system to prevent public reporting of China’s human rights violations to the international

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community.⁷² In July 2022, Reuters reported on a letter authored by Chinese authorities urging Michelle Bachelet, then the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, not to publish a report on human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which ultimately was released by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on August 31.⁷³ Chinese authorities reportedly circulated the draft letter for signature by other countries' authorities.⁷⁴ The Financial Times later reported that Bachelet confirmed authorities from China and other countries had contacted her directly and asked her not to publish the OHCHR report.⁷⁵ Additionally, this past year, “nongovernmental” organizations affiliated with the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party submitted approximately one-third of the 52 nongovernmental reports to the committee of experts who reviewed China’s compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination in May 2023.⁷⁶ According to the International Service for Human Rights, such “nongovernmental” organizations typically echo PRC official talking points about China’s self-proclaimed human rights achievements, at the same time that their participation “reduces the time and space for independent NGOs to interact” with U.N. treaty body experts.⁷⁷ [For more information about the OHCHR’s report on human rights concerns in the XUAR, see Chapter 18—Xinjiang. For more information about Chinese influence efforts at the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination China review in May 2023, see Chapter 8—Status of Women.]

Notes to Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

¹Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 16, 2022), 348.

²See, e.g., Dana M. Moss, *The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 5; Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021, 1; Safeguard Defenders, “Involuntary Returns: China’s Covert Operation to Force ‘Fugitives’ Overseas Back Home,” January 2022, 8–9; Dana M. Moss, “Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization, and the Case of the Arab Spring,” *Social Problems* 63 (2016): 480–82; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Transnational Repression,” last accessed June 27, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 16, 2022), 348.

³Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021, 15.

⁴See, e.g., James T. Aredy, “China’s Displeasure with a Bookseller Follows Him to Florida,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 28, 2023; Mia Ping-chieh Chen, Yitong Wu, and Chingman, “Chinese Police Pressure Family of U.S.-Based Student over Support for ‘Bridge Man,’” *Radio Free Asia*, October 21, 2022.

⁵Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021, 2; Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, Freedom House, “At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression,” July 2020.

⁶U.S. Department of Justice, “Two Arrested and 13 Charged in Three Separate Cases for Alleged Participation in Malign Schemes in the United States on Behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” October 24, 2022.

⁷U.S. Department of Justice, “40 Officers of China’s National Police Charged in Transnational Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. Residents,” April 17, 2023.

⁸U.S. Department of Justice, “Massachusetts Man Indicted for Acting as an Illegal Agent of the People’s Republic of China,” May 15, 2023.

⁹Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, para. 138.

¹⁰Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, para. 135.

¹¹Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, paras. 135, 138.

¹²David Tobin and Nyrola Elimā, “We Know You Better Than You Know Yourself: China’s Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora,” University of Sheffield, April 13, 2023, 47–50.

¹³For more information on Lhamjab Borjigin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00105 and Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2020 Annual Report* (Washington: December 2020), 131.

¹⁴Massimo Introvigne, “China Kidnaps Southern Mongolian Dissident in Mongolia,” *Bitter Winter*, May 15, 2023; PEN America, “PEN America Condemns China’s Arrest of Exiled Mongolian Writer and Historian Lhamjab A. Borjigin,” May 12, 2023; Safeguard Defenders, “Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in Mongolia,” June 12, 2023.

¹⁵Massimo Introvigne, “China Kidnaps Southern Mongolian Dissident in Mongolia,” *Bitter Winter*, May 15, 2023; PEN America, “PEN America Condemns China’s Arrest of Exiled Mongolian Writer and Historian Lhamjab A. Borjigin,” May 12, 2023; Qiao Long and Sun Cheng, “Thousands Held in Inner Mongolia as Crackdown on Language Protesters Continues,” *Radio Free Asia*, trans. and ed. Luisetta Mudie, October 20, 2020.

¹⁶Safeguard Defenders, “Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in Mongolia,” June 12, 2023.

¹⁷Chun Han Wong, “Chinese Christians Detained in Thailand While Seeking U.N. Protection,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 2023. This article explains that “American activists and politicians have described the congregation as the ‘Mayflower Church,’ drawing a parallel with the English pilgrims who in 1620 traveled to what was to become the U.S.”

¹⁸Chun Han Wong and Josh Chin, “A Christian Congregation Fled Xi Jinping’s China, but Escaping Control Had a Price,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 2, 2021; Chun Han Wong, “Chinese Christians Detained in Thailand While Seeking U.N. Protection,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 2023.

¹⁹Tassanee Vejpongsa and Dake Kang, “Beijing Hounds Chinese Church Seeking Safety Overseas,” *Associated Press*, September 7, 2022; Chun Han Wong, “Christian Church That Fled China Seeks Refugee Status from United Nations,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 5, 2022.

²⁰ChinaAid Association, “A Great Good Friday Reunion—Mayflower Church Lands in Texas,” April 9, 2023.

²¹“Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui 16 ri shangwu zai Renmin Dahui Tang kaimu Xi Jinping daibiao Di Shijiu jie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui xiang Dang de Ershi Da zuo baogao” [The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in the Great Hall of the People on morning of the 16th; on behalf of the 19th Central Committee, Xi Jinping delivered a report to the 20th Party Congress], *Xinhua*, October 16, 2022.

²²Adam Parker, “Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really Happened,” *Sky News*, October 21, 2022, 0:19–0:23, 0:55–0:57.

²³“Chinese Consul General in Manchester Admits to Pulling Hong Kong Protester’s Hair,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 20, 2022; Adam Parker, “Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What

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Really Happened,” *Sky News*, October 21, 2022; Inzamam Rashid, “Chinese Consul-General Defends Actions after Being Seen Pulling Protester’s Hair in Manchester,” *Sky News*, October 20, 2022. In images and video of the incident, a man wearing a beret and a mask can be seen pulling Chan’s hair. Based on images and video of the incident, that man is the same man who emerged from the Consulate grounds, kicked a protest banner, pushed down another protest banner, and then went back inside the Consulate grounds. After the incident, during an interview with Sky News, Chinese Consul-General in Manchester Zheng Xiyuan identified himself as having pulled protester Bob Chan’s hair during the incident.

²⁴Adam Parker, “Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really Happened,” *Sky News*, October 21, 2022; “Chinese Consul General in Manchester Admits to Pulling Hong Kong Protester’s Hair,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 20, 2022; Lily Kuo and Vic Chiang, “Hong Kong Protester Dragged into Chinese Consulate in Manchester and Beaten,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2022.

²⁵Adam Parker, “Chinese Consulate Attack: This Is What Really Happened,” *Sky News*, October 21, 2022, 1:00–2:25.

²⁶“Police Appeal for Video Footage after ‘Absolutely Unacceptable’ Attack on Protester at Chinese Consulate in Manchester,” *Sky News*, October 20, 2022.

²⁷Greater Manchester Police, “Investigation Underway after Assault of Man outside Chinese Consulate,” October 17, 2022.

²⁸Yuan Yang, “Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach of Police Repression,” *Financial Times*, January 6, 2023.

²⁹Yuan Yang, “Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach of Police Repression,” *Financial Times*, January 6, 2023.

³⁰Li Yuan, “China’s Protest Prophet,” *New York Times*, December 7, 2022; Gao Feng, “Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa ‘Sitong Qiao kangyi shijian’ zao jingfang koucha, shilian” [Citizens across multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, or go missing, after reposting about the “Sitong Bridge protest”], *Radio Free Asia*, October 27, 2022; Tessa Wong, “China Congress: How One Man on a Bridge Marred Xi Jinping’s Big Moment,” *BBC*, October 22, 2022; Yibing Feng, “Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward as China Maintains Silence,” *Voice of America*, October 20, 2022; “‘Bridge Man’ Peng Zaizhou’s Mission Impossible and His ‘Toolkit for the Removal of Xi Jinping,’” *China Change*, October 19, 2022; Gao Feng et al., “Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China’s New Tank Man, or ‘Bridge Man,’” *Radio Free Asia*, October 14, 2022. For more information on Peng Lifa, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00176.

³¹See, e.g., Gao Feng, “Zhongguo duo di gongmin zhuanfa ‘Sitong Qiao kangyi shijian’ zao jingfang koucha, shilian” [Citizens across multiple locations in China detained and questioned by police, or go missing, after reposting about the “Sitong Bridge protest”], *Radio Free Asia*, October 27, 2022; Tessa Wong, “China Congress: How One Man on a Bridge Marred Xi Jinping’s Big Moment,” *BBC*, October 21, 2022; Yibing Feng, “Beijing Banner Protest Ripples Outward as China Maintains Silence,” *Voice of America*, October 20, 2022; “‘Bridge Man’ Peng Zaizhou’s Mission Impossible and His ‘Toolkit for the Removal of Xi Jinping,’” *China Change*, October 19, 2022; Gao Feng et al., “Beijing Banner Protester Lauded as China’s New Tank Man, or ‘Bridge Man,’” *Radio Free Asia*, October 14, 2022; Lili Pike, “‘Depose the Traitorous Despot’: How China’s ‘Bridge Man’ Unleashed a Global Protest against Xi Jinping,” *Messenger*, October 21, 2022; Li Yuan, “China’s Protest Prophet,” *New York Times*, December 7, 2022.

³²Jenny Tang, “Overseas Solidarity with Beijing ‘Bridge Man’ Protest Sparks Fears of Retaliation,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 19, 2022.

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³⁴Lyric Li, “China Clamps Down on ‘Zero Covid’ Protests, Loosens Some Pandemic Measures,” *Washington Post*, November 29, 2022; Eva Rammeloo, “What Happened to the Man Who Led the Chants against Xi Jinping?,” *1843, Economist*, November 29, 2022; Jessie Yeung, “China’s Lockdown Protests: What You Need to Know,” *CNN*, November 29, 2022.

³⁵*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Weihu Guojia Anquan Fa* [PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], passed and effective June 30, 2020, art. 38. For recent analysis on Hong Kong judges and the National Security Law, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “One City, Two Legal Systems: Hong Kong Judges’ Role in Rights Violations under the National Security Law,” May 2023.

³⁶Yuan Yang, “Hong Kong Activists in the UK Fear the Long Reach of Police Repression,” *Financial Times*, January 6, 2023.

³⁷Different sources use different terms to refer to these entities, such as “overseas service stations,” “overseas police service stations,” “110 overseas” (named after China’s national emergency phone number), and “bringing you close from afar, it’s 110 overseas” (*tianya ruo bilin, haiwai 110*). See, e.g., Safeguard Defenders, “110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,” September 2022, 3, 10–11; Zheng Jianguo, “‘Tianya ruo bilin, haiwai 110,’ Fuzhou gong’an anxia kuajing bianqiao fuwu ‘kuai jin jian’ [With “bringing you close from afar, it’s 110 overseas,” Fuzhou Public Security presses “fast forward” on services for overseas Chinese], *China News*, February 16, 2022. This chapter uses “service stations” as a shorthand for these various terms.

³⁸Safeguard Defenders, “Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up Investigation to 110 Overseas,” December 2022, 5. These are the Nantong Municipal Public Security Bureau, Jiangsu province; Wenzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, Zhejiang province; Fuzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, Fujian province; and Qingtian County Public Security Bureau, Lishui municipality, Zhejiang.

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⁴⁶ Safeguard Defenders, “Patrol and Persuade: A Follow-Up Investigation to 110 Overseas,” December 2022, 26.

⁴⁷ “Cong Xibanya Madeli dao Qingtian ‘jian qiao zhi jia’ quan fan zhui tao xianyi ren” [From Madrid, Spain to Qingtian, the “home for prosecutors and overseas Chinese” persuades fugitive suspect to return], *Zhejiang Daily*, reprinted in *Baidu*, January 18, 2020; Lishui Municipal People’s Procuratorate, “Jian qiao zhi jia’ hengkua Ou Ya 9200 gongli shipin lianxian, chenggong quan fan fanzui xianyi ren” [“Home of Overseas Prosecutors” spanned 9200 kilometers across Europe and Asia in a video call to successfully persuade a criminal suspect to return], January 15, 2020; Safeguard Defenders, “110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,” September 2022, 16–17.

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