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Findings

- Authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have increasingly treated women’s public participation as politically sensitive. Cases of official retaliation or punishment against women who have gone public with criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and PRC government are well documented during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s first decade in power. This past year, public security officials reportedly focused on identifying “feminists” among those detained for participating in the November 2022 anti-COVID lockdown (White Paper) protests.
- In May 2023, a U.N. expert committee reviewed China’s compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Submissions from independent nongovernmental organizations to the CEDAW Committee focused on authorities’ widespread use of gender-based violence and harassment against women political and religious prisoners in China.
- The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 illustrated the underrepresentation of female Party members in the Party’s seniormost ranks, reflecting male-dominated institutional barriers to political leadership in the PRC. No women were among the 24 individuals selected to join the 20th Party Central Committee Political Bureau or its 7-member Standing Committee, China’s paramount policy and decisionmaking body led by Xi Jinping.
- China’s “huge arsenal of laws designed to combat and punish domestic violence” is failing Chinese women, including those women who have turned to the courts for personal safety protection orders, according to a U.S.-based scholar. According to official data, judges throughout China granted 4,497 protection orders in 2022. In contrast, a domestic violence hotline app in China reportedly received 13,000 calls in August 2022 alone.
- International reports about gender-based violence in China this past year raised concerns about an official policy that coerces Uyghur women to marry Han men; the use of strip searches to humiliate women rights defenders in detention; and the use of online harassment and threats against women journalists of Chinese and Asian descent as a way to silence their reporting on China.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to take the following actions:

- Publicly and privately urge Chinese officials to respect the freedom of expression and assembly of all rights advocates and to refrain from harassing and intimidating independent women’s rights advocates who seek to increase awareness of gender inequality and sexual harassment. Raise the cases of women whom PRC authorities have detained for their efforts to advocate for human rights, to document social and political developments, to peacefully express their opinions on social media,

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and to practice their religious faith without government repression, including **Huang Xueqin, Li Qiaochu, He Fangmei, Rahile Dawut, Niu Xiaona, Li Kangmeng, Xu Na, Kamile Wayit**, and other women mentioned in this report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

- Urge Chinese authorities to publicly expand the commitment to gender equality through measures such as increasing the number of women at the highest levels of political leadership, instituting gender equality and anti-harassment training in government workplaces, and challenging discriminatory attitudes based on gender, through public education.

- Acknowledge recent legal developments in China aimed at promoting the welfare of women and gender equality. These include the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests and new guidelines that include provisions to improve women's rights and conditions in the workplace. Encourage the government to strengthen formal support services for implementation—for example, by increasing funding for health services or shelters for women experiencing violence, providing funding and support for lawyers to provide legal services, and allowing independent lawyers and advocates to assist with the promotion and implementation of laws related to gender equality through lawsuits and public campaigns.

- In light of the lack of sufficient data on women's conditions in China, as raised by experts on the U.N. committee that reviewed China's compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in May 2023, encourage the collection, analysis, and public availability of data on disparities in economic and social factors based on gender so as to monitor changes and develop policies and programs that contribute to gender equality and rights protection for women, including those with disabilities, the elderly, and ethnic minorities.

- Support international exchanges among academics, legal advocates, nongovernmental organizations, and others that focus on the implementation and enforcement of recently adopted laws promoting gender equality. In particular, facilitate and support technical assistance programs that would help all those working in and with the judiciary to effectively implement the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law and the PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests. Train law enforcement, as the first point of contact, to address reports of violence in a way that does not undermine victims' concerns or safety. Urge provincial-level government officials to implement new provisions that hold employers responsible for enforcing protections against gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.

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Introduction

Chinese Communist Party and PRC government authorities—through policy, law, and action—continued to violate women’s human rights, including women’s rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, digital privacy, and rights relating to childbearing and familial relations and participation in political and public life. Moreover, by not adequately implementing laws and regulations aimed at protecting women from discrimination, domestic violence, and other practices harmful to women, the government failed to fulfill its obligations under China’s domestic laws and policies and its commitments under the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which it ratified in 1980.¹

Political Representation and Public Participation

TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS: NO FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN TOP LEADERSHIP BODY

In October 2022, Xi Jinping secured a third term as the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary during its 20th National Congress, breaking with the two-term norm established in the post-Mao period.² Xi did not break the longstanding underrepresentation of women in the Party’s seniormost ranks,³ however, neglecting to select a senior female Party member to join the Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) despite the presence of at least one female Party member on the Politburo over the past 20 years.⁴ The exclusion of women from seniormost positions of political power is a consequence of the Party’s male-dominated system, according to experts.⁵ Official statements that support female cadre inclusion⁶ have not been met with institutional and cultural changes to facilitate career advancement for female cadres.⁷ Thus, 24 men, including Xi Jinping, sit on the 20th Central Committee Politburo, 6 of whom were selected by Xi to join him on the Politburo Standing Committee—the PRC’s paramount political decision- and policymaking group.⁸ One researcher observed that Xi’s centralization of power and appointment of male loyalists around him has further marginalized Chinese women’s overall participation in politics.⁹ Further evidence of the lack of women in Party leadership is the absence of female Party Secretaries for any of China’s 31 provinces and province-level municipalities and autonomous regions,¹⁰ a senior-level position seen as a potential channel for promotion to the Central Committee.¹¹ The inclusion of 11 women among the full 205-member 20th Central Committee¹² and 22 women among the 171 alternate members¹³ is consistent with previous rates of female representation.¹⁴ [For more information on developments during the 20th Party Congress, see Chapter 6—Governance.]

POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OVER WOMEN’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

China’s authoritarian suppression of women’s public participation continued this past year at the same time that officials es-

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poused high-minded rhetoric on gender equality and amended legislation to strengthen the legal framework for women's rights.¹⁵ The suppression has been ascribed to Party leaders' perception that women's public participation may be politically sensitive,¹⁶ particularly women's public claims of sexual harassment.¹⁷ When tennis star Peng Shuai accused retired male Party leader Zhang Gaoli—formerly a Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Premier of the State Council—of sexual assault in November 2021,¹⁸ the All-China Women's Federation, the Party's "bridge" to women, is not known to have commented publicly about Peng's claims.¹⁹ Moreover, Zhang was highly visible during the 20th Party Congress, sitting with other senior leaders in the front row of seats,²⁰ while Peng has been incommunicado since February 2022.²¹ Cases of official retaliation against, or detention of, women who have criticized the Party are well documented during Xi Jinping's decade in power,²² including former Central Party School instructor Cai Xia, feminist advocate Zheng Churan, critic Dong Yaoqiong, and publisher Geng Xiaonan.²³ This past year, public security officials focused on identifying "feminists" among the November 2022 anti-COVID lockdown (White Paper) protesters, some of whom were later detained.²⁴ [For further information on the detention of anti-lockdown protesters who were targeted for feminist interests, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression.]

CEDAW Review in May 2023

In May 2023, the U.N. Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) reviewed the Chinese government's compliance with CEDAW.²⁵

WOMEN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS

Reports from independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the CEDAW Committee described the PRC's use of gender-based violence and harassment against women political and religious prisoners in China. As evidence, the NGOs described dozens of cases in which PRC authorities used arbitrary detention²⁶ and prolonged detention;²⁷ sexual violence against Uyghur and other Turkic-speaking women;²⁸ strip searches and other forms of physical and emotional torture while in detention;²⁹ the denial of adequate food and medical treatment, unsanitary conditions;³⁰ and reprisals against women in detention.³¹ Although the total number of women detained in China for the peaceful exercise of their human rights is not known, the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation has entered over 14,700 cases of women political prisoners in its database, of whom more than 2,000 were believed to be in detention at the time of its written submission to the CEDAW Committee in April 2023.³² Select cases of women in detention as of June 30, 2023, include the following.³³

- **He Fangmei** has been a target of official harassment for her advocacy of vaccine safety following the illness of one her children from a defective vaccine.³⁴ Authorities have kept her in detention in Xinxiang municipality, Henan province, since October 2020.³⁵

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- **Li Qiaochu** is detained in Linyi municipality, Shandong province, in connection with exposing online the torture in detention of her partner—citizen rights and legal advocate Xu Zhiyong—and lawyer activist Ding Jiayi.³⁶ Authorities detained Li in February 2020 the day after Xu was detained, and released her on bail in June 2020, yet have denied bail since her formal arrest on February 26, 2021, despite her serious depression and other ailments in detention.³⁷
- **Rahile Dawut**, a Uyghur folklore scholar and former faculty member at Xinjiang University, was “disappeared” by officials in December 2017.³⁸ It is believed that authorities initially held her in a mass internment camp, and it was later confirmed that she was criminally prosecuted and sentenced to a prison term of unknown length.³⁹
- **Niu Xiaona** is a disabled Falun Gong practitioner whom authorities in Heilongjiang province sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in 2022 under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law—the crime of “organizing and using a cult organization to undermine implementation of the law.”⁴⁰ She suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and is unable to walk or attend to her daily needs without assistance.⁴¹ The Dui Hua Foundation commented that Niu’s sentence is “one of the longest prison sentences known to have been given to Falun Gong practitioners convicted of the sole offense of Article 300.”⁴²

CHINESE WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN LAW

The PRC delegation’s presentation on May 12, 2023, to the CEDAW committee and its prior written documentation featured the Chinese government’s passage of laws as a means of strengthening women’s rights.⁴³ They highlighted the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law (passed in 2015),⁴⁴ a provision in the PRC Civil Code (2020) regarding sexual harassment,⁴⁵ and extensive revisions to the PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (Women’s Rights Law, 2022).⁴⁶ While the amended Women’s Rights Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2023, contains commendable legal provisions,⁴⁷ practitioners⁴⁸ and scholars⁴⁹ alike have previously pointed to gaps between the law in theory and in practice in China, finding that the “social reality rampant with gender inequalities has rendered most gender legislation in China merely guidelines instead of implementable laws...”⁵⁰ Additionally, experts have linked the Party’s public focus on “defining women’s interests” and the promotion of women’s rights legislation with Party efforts toward “consolidation of power and societal stabilization.”⁵¹ Considered within this context, a Hong Kong-based legal expert described the amended Women’s Rights Law as “an apparatus response to President Xi Jinping’s frequent mention of gender equality.”⁵²

CHINESE INFLUENCE EFFORTS AT CEDAW

PRC authorities’ efforts to influence the U.N. system were evident in advance of and during the May 2023 CEDAW review and demonstrated the “worrying ways in which China pursues influence over the composition, role and attributions of the [U.N. Treaty

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Bodies], and active government efforts to deter inputs from independent NGOs, while facilitating inputs from government-aligned organisations,” according to the NGO International Service for Human Rights.⁵³ One indication of China’s “pursuit of influence” is the election in late 2020 of an All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) vice president, Xia Jie, to the 23-member CEDAW Committee for a standard three-year term (2021–2024).⁵⁴ Xia did not appear to have an active role in asking Chinese delegates questions during the two public CEDAW Committee sessions on May 12, 2023,⁵⁵ but her ACWF affiliation⁵⁶ is seemingly at odds with the Committee mandate for experts to “serve in their personal capacities, and not as representatives of the States parties which present their candidature.”⁵⁷ Organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party and PRC government⁵⁸ submitted more than one-third of the 52 nongovernmental reports to the CEDAW Committee.⁵⁹ Several of these purported “nongovernmental” groups gave oral reports to the CEDAW Committee on May 8, 2023, during time reserved for NGOs.⁶⁰

Gender-Based Violence

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: TOO FEW PROTECTION ORDERS

China’s “huge arsenal of laws designed to combat and punish domestic violence” is failing Chinese women, including those who have turned to the courts for personal safety protection orders, according to a U.S.-based legal scholar.⁶¹ According to the data provided in the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) annual work reports to the National People’s Congress, judges granted 11,272 protection orders between 2017 and 2021.⁶² In March 2023, an SPC vice president claimed that the courts granted 34 percent more protection orders in 2022 over those issued in 2021, which equals 4,497 protection orders, based on the SPC’s report of 3,356 orders issued in 2021.⁶³ A domestic violence hotline app using WeChat as a platform reportedly received 13,000 calls in August 2022 alone.⁶⁴ The government does not publish comprehensive data about domestic violence in China,⁶⁵ complicating research, policymaking, and the provision of services to domestic violence victims.⁶⁶

The SPC released Provisions on Several Issues on the Application of the Law in Handling Cases of Personal Safety Protection Orders (“Provisions”) in July 2022,⁶⁷ adding to regulatory and guiding documents issued in the past three years aimed at improving access to protection orders.⁶⁸ Judges, however, have hindered the granting of protection orders by turning to mediation between the domestic violence victim and batterer;⁶⁹ not accepting many forms of evidence; and maintaining an overly high standard of proof to establish domestic violence claims.⁷⁰ The new Provisions attempt to clarify the scope of acceptable evidence in protection order applications and expand the circumstances that constitute domestic violence, including emotional abuse.⁷¹ The Provisions also highlight that applications for protection orders are no longer linked to divorce proceedings,⁷² as they were prior to the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law.⁷³

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT

Reports of sexual harassment and assault in China continued to be a focus of public concern this past year,⁷⁴ including accusations on social media of sexual harassment at universities⁷⁵ and in the workplace,⁷⁶ and in videos and photos of brutal assaults of women by men.⁷⁷ In one of the most notorious incidents recently captured on video and widely shared on social media, a man and his companions assaulted four women in June 2022 at a restaurant in Tangshan municipality, Hebei province, after one of the women rebuffed a sexual advance.⁷⁸ Authorities reportedly prevented many domestic journalists from reporting about the Tangshan incident, and harassed and detained journalists **Mao Huibin**⁷⁹ and **Zhang Weihai**.⁸⁰ Hundreds of social media accounts reportedly were shut down for alleged rumormongering.⁸¹ In September 2022, a court in Langfang municipality, Hebei, sentenced the main assailant in the Tangshan incident to 24 years in prison on multiple charges, mostly related to organized crime.⁸² Critics were concerned that authorities had downplayed the gender-based nature of the violence, noting that authorities attempted to allay public opinion by claiming only a few “bad actors” were involved,⁸³ emphasizing law and order,⁸⁴ and censoring content linked to gender and women’s rights.⁸⁵

The Commission also continued to observe reports this past year about PRC authorities’ use of sexual harassment, censorship, and violence to target women they deem threatening to the Party, including the following:

- **Coerced interethnic marriage in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).** In November 2022, the Uyghur Human Rights Project reported on the Chinese government policy since 2018 to coerce ethnic intermarriage between Han men and Uyghur women as part of its “de-extremification” program in the XUAR.⁸⁶ In some reported cases, Uyghur women agreed to marry Han men due to threats that the women’s family members would be placed in mass internment centers or that an interethnic marriage would lead to the release of detained family members.⁸⁷
- **Women human rights defenders strip-searched in police stations and detention centers.** In an April 2023 report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported findings from a series of interviews it held with about a dozen women human rights defenders in China.⁸⁸ Interviewees described instances of being taken into detention centers or police stations during which public security officials subjected them to strip searches as a form of punishment or reprisal for their rights advocacy.⁸⁹
- **Harassment of women journalists of Chinese or Asian descent.** The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China documented the online harassment of Chinese and Asian women journalists in its 2022 survey of working conditions in China.⁹⁰ This is consistent with a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in June 2022, which documented gender-based cyberstalking and cyber-harassment of women journalists of Chinese or Asian descent outside China.⁹¹ One of the ASPI researchers described the motivation behind the harass-

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ment as an effort “to silence the view of these women and also [to] serve as a deterrence against others reporting critically on China ...”⁹²

Notes to Chapter 8—Status of Women

¹Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed April 30, 2023. China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980.

²Guoguang Wu, “New Faces of Leaders, New Factional Dynamics: CCP Leadership Politics Following the 20th Party Congress,” *China Leadership Monitor* 74, December 1, 2022.

³“Xi Jinping zai dapo 20 nian chuantong wu nüxing jinru zhongyang zhengzhiju” [Xi Jinping breaks another 20-year tradition, no women enter the Central Committee Political Bureau], *Voice of America*, October 24, 2022. Women make up approximately 30 percent of the Party’s 97 million members.

⁴“Xi Jinping zai dapo 20 nian chuantong wu nüxing jinru zhongyang zhengzhiju” [Xi Jinping breaks another 20-year tradition, no women enter the Central Committee Political Bureau], *Voice of America*, October 24, 2022. Wu Yi joined the 16th Party Congress Politburo in 2002. See also Cheng Li, “The Reshuffling Report: Female Representation in the Chinese Leadership Prior to the Party Congress,” *China-US Focus*, June 9, 2022.

⁵Erin Hale, “China’s Communist Party at 100: Where Are the Women?,” *Al Jazeera*, June 30, 2021; Mimi Lau, “Why Are Women Unlikely to Win Promotion Race at China’s Communist Party Congress?,” *South China Morning Post*, October 2, 2022. In a recently published book, scholar Jérôme Doyon analyzed Party activity at several elite universities, showing the already highly masculine culture of the Party at an early stage of participation. Jérôme Doyon, *Rejuvenating Communism* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2023), 9, 99–100. See also Vanessa Cai, “State Councillor Shen Yiqin The One Woman at the Top of Chinese Politics,” *South China Morning Post*, March 12, 2023.

⁶“Xi Jinping: Gaoju Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida qizhi wei quanmian jianshe shehui zhuyi xiandaihua guojia er tuan jie fendou—zai Zhongguo Gongchandang di ershi ci Quanguo Daibiao dahui shang de baogao” [Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive in unity to build a modern socialist country in all respects—report given at the Chinese Communist Party 20th National Party Congress], October 16, 2022, reprinted in *Xinhua*, October 25, 2022; *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng* [Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party], adopted September 6, 1982, amended October 22, 2022, art. 35. Article 35 states that “The Party attaches great importance to the training and promotion of female officials and ethnic minority officials.”

⁷Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, “Provinces in Command: Changes in Prefectural Appointments from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping (2003–2020),” *Journal of Contemporary China* 32, no. 144 (2023); Jérôme Doyon, *Rejuvenating Communism* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2023), 9–10, 97–99, 116; Alexandra Stevenson, “Leadership Changes Reveal That in China, Men Still Rule,” *New York Times*, October 23, 2022.

⁸“The 20th Politburo,” *South China Morning Post*, accessed April 20, 2023.

⁹Ahana Roy, “20th Party Congress and Women in China’s Elite Politics,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, October 4, 2022.

¹⁰“31 ge sheng shi qu Dangwei, Renda changweihui, zhengfu, Zhengxie si tao banzi yibashou mingdan (jianli)” [List of the first-in-command (bios) for the four groups: 31 provincial, province-level municipality and autonomous region Party committees, NPC Standing Committee, government, and CPPCC], *China Economic Net*, May 31, 2023.

¹¹Cheng Li, “The Reshuffling Report: Provinces: The Key to Pekingology,” *China-US Focus*, March 8, 2022; Rahul Karan Reddy and Omkar Bhole, “Xi’s Loyalists: A Breakdown of China’s New Leadership” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, November 3, 2022; Cheng Li, “The Reshuffling Report: Provinces: The Ongoing Reshuffling of Provincial Party Committees,” *China-US Focus*, March 27, 2022.

¹²“List of Members of 20th CPC Central Committee,” *Xinhua*, October 22, 2022.

¹³“Women Fill 8.8% of China’s Top Body as Xi’s Patriarchy Rolls On,” *Bloomberg*, October 22, 2022; “List of Alternate Members of 20th CPC Central Committee,” *Xinhua*, October 22, 2022.

¹⁴Cheng Li, “The Reshuffling Report: Female Representation in the Chinese Leadership Prior to the Party Congress,” *China-US Focus*, June 9, 2022; Sierra Janik, Daniel Blaughner, and Jonathan Ray, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Women in China’s Leadership,” March 30, 2022.

¹⁵Chen Jun, “Zhongguo xin xiuding de Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa de juti luoshi he jian du mianlin tiaozhan” [Practical implementation and oversight of China’s newly revised Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests encounters challenges], *Voice of America*, November 8, 2022.

¹⁶Alexandra Stevenson, “Leadership Changes Reveal That in China, Men Still Rule,” *New York Times*, October 23, 2022; Paul Eckert, “Interview: ‘There Have Been Many Years of Build-up to This Moment,’” *Radio Free Asia*, November 29, 2022.

¹⁷Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, “Coalition-Based Gender Lobbying: Revisiting Women’s Substantive Representation in China’s Authoritarian Governance” *Politics & Gender* 18, no. 4 (December 2022): 981, 987–88.

¹⁸Emily Feng, “Peng Shuai, the Chinese Tennis Star, Denies Sexual Assault by Government Leader,” *NPR*, February 6, 2022.

¹⁹Chen Xiaoping, “Shishi dajia tan: Yan Geling wei ba hai muqin fennu fasheng zao engsha, ‘Quanguo Fulian’ yi yan bufa gai jiesan?” [Let’s discuss current events: Yan Geling was blocked after her angry comments on behalf of the mother of eight children, should the “ACWF” be disbanded for not saying anything at all?], *Voice of America*, February 18, 2022. See also Yunyun Zhou, “‘Being a Good Daughter of the Party’: A Neo-Institutional Analysis of the All-China Women’s Federation Organisational Reforms in China’s Xi Era,” *Chinese Perspectives*, 2019–2,

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June 8, 2019; Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, “Coalition-Based Gender Lobbying: Revisiting Women’s Substantive Representation in China’s Authoritarian Governance,” *Politics & Gender* 18, no. 4 (December 2022): 981, 987–88.

²⁰Charis Chang, “This Man Was Accused of Rape, Now He’s Meeting with China’s Elite,” *SBS News*, October 17, 2022; Andréa J. Worden, “What Does the 20th Party Congress Mean for Peng Shuai and the Future of the WTA in China?,” *Andréa J. Worden’s Words* (blog), October 27, 2022.

²¹Emily Feng, “Peng Shuai, the Chinese Tennis Star, Denies Sexual Assault by Government Leader,” *NPR*, February 6, 2022.

²²Alexandra Stevenson, “Leadership Changes Reveal That in China, Men Still Rule,” *New York Times*, October 23, 2022; Jing Wei, “Why Do So Few Women Hold High Office in the Ruling Chinese Communist Party?,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 19, 2022. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2022 Annual Report* (Washington: November 2022), 172.

²³See, e.g., Chris Buckley, “Cai Xia Was a Communist Party Insider in China. Then She Denounced Xi,” *New York Times*, October 14, 2020; Chen Pinjie, “Duihua Zheng Churan: Nüquan de chengong shi yi ge guocheng” [A conversation with Zheng Churan: The success of women’s rights is a process], *Radio Free Asia*, April 9, 2023; Candice Chau, “‘Ink Girl’ Who Defaced Xi Jinping Poster Reappears, Says She Can’t Take Intense Surveillance,” *Hong Kong Free Press*, December 2, 2020; Mimi Lau, “Chinese Businesswoman Jailed after Voicing Support for Beijing Critic,” *South China Morning Post*, February 9, 2021. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2015-00118 on Zheng Churan, 2018-00343 on Dong Yaoqiong, and 2020-00228 on Geng Xiaonan.

²⁴Emily Feng, “China’s Authorities Are Quietly Rounding Up People Who Protested against COVID Rules,” *NPR*, January 11, 2023; Shen Lu and Liyan Qi, “In China, Young Women Become Accidental Symbols of Defiance,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 25, 2023.

²⁵Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend China on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation, Ask about Women’s Political Participation and Sex-Selective Abortions,” May 12, 2023; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “85th Session (8–26 May 2023) Schedule of Dialogues (as of 31 March 2023),” accessed May 13, 2023.

²⁶The 29 Principles, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” April 12, 2023; “Joint Submission by PEN International, PEN America, and Independent Chinese PEN Center (3 PEN Centers) to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ahead of its consideration of the People’s Republic of China’s ninth period report at the 85th Session in May 2023,” April 11, 2023.

²⁷The 29 Principles, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” April 12, 2023.

²⁸The Rights Practice, “Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for Consideration in its Ninth Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China,” April 6, 2023, para. 40.

²⁹Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China (85th Session),” April 8, 2023.

³⁰The Rights Practice, “Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for Consideration in its Ninth Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China,” April 6, 2023, paras. 19, 42.

³¹Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China (85th Session),” April 8, 2023; The 29 Principles, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” April 12, 2023.

³²Dui Hua Foundation, “Submission of the Dui Hua Foundation, an NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for the State Report on China at the 85th Session,” April 2023.

³³Guidelines from the CEDAW secretariat on NGO participation in the 85th session instructed NGOs to “Anonymize the names of any alleged victims, witnesses and perpetrators referred to in the report by replacing them with their initials and ensure that no photographs of alleged victims, witnesses or perpetrators are included.” Secretariat, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), “Participation by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),” April 2023, sec. V.

³⁴“Fears Grow in China over Safety of Disappeared, Pregnant Vaccine Campaigner,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 27, 2020; Dai Ju, “‘Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia’ faqi ren He Fangmei an chaoqi jiya reng wei panjue: nü’er zhijin zhiliu jingshenbing yuan” [In “Vaccine Babies’ Home” founder He Fangmei’s case, prolonged detention without a verdict: her daughter is stranded at a psychiatric hospital until today], *NGOCN*, February 1, 2023. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women for its Consideration of the Ninth Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China (85th Session),” April 8, 2023. For more information on He Fangmei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00185.

³⁵Dai Ju, “‘Yimiao Baobao zhi Jia’ faqi ren He Fangmei an chaoqi jiya reng wei panjue: nü’er zhijin zhiliu jingshenbing yuan” [In “Vaccine Babies’ Home” founder He Fangmei’s case, prolonged detention without a verdict: her daughter is stranded at a psychiatric hospital until today], *NGOCN*, February 2, 2023.

³⁶“Feminist Activist Li Qiaochu Struggles with Mental Health in Detention,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 30, 2021; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “Lüshi di yi ci xianxia huijian Li Qiaochu”

[For the first time, lawyer meets offline with Li Qiaochu], March 22, 2023. For more information on Li Qiaochu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00129.

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