




CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

2025 ANNUAL REPORT • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY




ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DECEMBER 2025




“Over the past seven decades, China has encouraged large-scale Chinese migration into Southern Mongolia, reducing the ethnic Mongolian population to only 18 percent of the region. This has not only displaced us from our land but has also eroded our culture and way of life,” said Temulun Togochoog, a U.S.-born Southern Mongolian young activist, in testimony at the hearing titled, “The Preservation of Memory: Combating the CCP’s Historical Revisionism and Erasure of Culture.”



Padlock and surveillance camera on Uyghur mosque at the Mausoleum of Apak Khoja and Tomb of the Fragrant Concubine in Kashgar, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China (September 14, 2018). (karenfoleyphotography/Alamy)



The Justitia statue in front of the Chinese flag symbolizes reform, legal changes, and the discussion about the rule of law and state control in China (June 18, 2025). (IMAGO/Michael Bihlmayer/Alamy)



Owner of *Apple Daily* newspaper Jimmy Lai is seen shackled as prison guards escort him to a prison van at Lai Chi Kok Reception Center on December 12, 2020 in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai was set to appear before a court in Hong Kong that day on charges under the newly implemented National Security Law. (Vernon Yuen/NurPhoto/Alamy)



CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

SENATE

Dan Sullivan, Alaska,
Chair

Tom Cotton, Arkansas

Jeff Merkley, Oregon

Tammy Duckworth, Illinois

Andy Kim, New Jersey

Lisa Blunt Rochester, Delaware

HOUSE

Christopher H. Smith, New Jersey,
Co-Chair

Elise Stefanik, New York

Zachary Nunn, Iowa

Jen Kiggans, Virginia

Dale Strong, Alabama

James P. McGovern, Massachusetts

Thomas Suozzi, New York

Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

To Be Appointed

Scott Flipse, *Staff Director*

Piero Tozzi, *Deputy Staff Director*



STATEMENT FROM THE CHAIRS

Promises made, promises broken: the People's Republic of China (PRC)—in reality, a party state run by and for the benefit of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—makes solemn commitments, then governs as if those commitments are optional. The gap between promise and practice runs through the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's evaluation of the PRC's record on such issues as religious freedom, labor rights, Hong Kong, free expression, and adherence to international law and treaties. Broken promises are not an exception; they are a feature of how the CCP deals with the world and with its own people.

The 2025 Annual Report traces broken promises across both international obligations and China's own stated guarantees—the fifty years of rights and unchanged “way of life” promised in Hong Kong, and “autonomy” to Uyghurs and Tibetans that has yielded mass detentions and omnipresent surveillance; “constitutional” protection for belief and speech overshadowed by tighter controls on worship and expression; declarations of labor rights contradicted by persistent forced labor and unfair trade practices; and pledges to play by global rules narrowed or reinterpreted in practice. What is promised on paper does not match what is practiced in reality.

These broken promises affect Americans. Wrongful detentions and exit bans continue to endanger U.S. citizens who work, study, or travel in the PRC. American consumers, including our men and women in uniform, consume seafood caught or processed using forced labor. Personal privacy is at risk when PRC national security and intelligence laws grant sweeping access to data held by companies in China; everyday apps, cloud services, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools collect sensitive information. Beyond China's borders, transnational repression reaches into diaspora communities in America and abroad—covert “overseas police” activity, harassment of dissidents with bounties placed on their heads and cyber operations aimed at critics and journalists, often employing pressure on families back home. CCP coercion crosses borders.

Broken promises also ripple through the international system. Allies and partners face maritime intimidation in open waters and even in their own Exclusive Economic Zones despite clear legal standards. “Smart city” projects in Africa arrive with censorship-ready software and opaque demands for user data that could help any aspiring authoritarian expand social control.

From this year's report, three implications are clear.

First, promises matter only when kept. Where commitments are repeatedly set aside—on labor, religion, due process, or maritime norms—U.S. policy must be calibrated to address behavior that harms U.S. interests. That means sustained enforcement against forced labor, real traceability in high-risk sectors like seafood and lithium, and alignment of federal procurement with human rights standards so that American consumers and workers are not made to subsidize coercion. It means transparent, public reporting on compliance, and consequences that follow promptly when obligations are breached.

Second, Americans must be protected. We will continue to elevate the risks of wrongful detention and press for the return of our citizens. We support measures that keep high-risk software, services, and AI models off government and critical-infrastructure networks, and we will promote simple, effective privacy safeguards for the public. We also back robust law enforcement action—here and with like-minded countries—against covert policing, intimidation, cyberstalking, and harassment aimed at diaspora communities and human rights advocates. No one residing in America should have to look over their shoulder for fear of a foreign security service agent on U.S. soil.

Third, the free world must act together. Beijing will try to divide allies with threats and incentives; democracies must be diligent in closing ranks around our shared interests and values. That means coordinated sanctions and visa bans, joint prosecutions of illegal agents, shutting down covert “overseas police” outposts, aligned export controls on surveillance technology, and shared early-warning systems to protect diaspora communities from harassment and cyberattacks.

This year’s report underscores the important role of human rights in U.S. strategy and diplomacy. When forced labor undercuts American workers, when state-sanctioned hostage taking endangers our citizens, when censorship chills speech globally, and when international rules at sea are ignored, Americans pay the price—in security, in prosperity, and in credibility. Upholding human dignity helps keep markets fairer, travel safer, technology freer, and alliances stronger. It reduces the leverage authoritarian states—led by a totalitarian PRC—wield over people and partners.

Throughout the year, the Commission’s work advanced these issues documenting cases of detention and torture in our Political Prisoner Database, examining the spread of censorship and surveillance technology, and detailing how rules are rewritten to entrench the CCP’s political control. We also tracked how the CCP’s malign influence operations and transnational repression target diaspora communities and rights advocates abroad, and how forced labor threatens American laborers.

At its core, the Commission’s Annual Report shines a light on human rights abuses, ensuring that political prisoners are not forgotten, atrocities are documented, and that PRC behavior is publicly contrasted with its commitments made to the world and, indeed, to China’s citizens.

Behind every chart and citation in this report is a person: a pastor barred from his pulpit; a woman punished for speaking about harassment; a student denied due process; a family separated by detention or exit bans; an activist abroad who still fears a knock at the door. To them—and to the many Chinese citizens who persist in telling the truth—we dedicate this Annual Report.

Sincerely,



Senator Dan Sullivan
Chair



Representative Chris Smith
Co-Chair

As the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) nears a quarter century of existence, it is worth taking stock of what has been learned in that time—in particular the statutory charge to “monitor the development of the rule of law in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)”—and reassess these assumptions in light of facts drawn from the current reporting year.

The PRC routinely enters into treaties, conventions, and international agreements but then fails to fulfill those obligations in practice. Pledges to respect trade commitments, to honor Hong Kong’s autonomy, and to protect the basic human rights of China’s citizens are made—then repeatedly broken. This “promises made, promises broken” framework captures the persistent gap between commitments and actions.

When the CECC’s authorizing statute was introduced, the prevailing assumption was that if the United States engaged, opened its markets, and honored the rules, the PRC would, over time, play by the same rules that have preserved peace and fostered global prosperity for decades. The PRC did not become the responsible stakeholder in the international community that many had hoped. That assumption failed to account for how Beijing cloaks pledges to the international community in ambiguity—for example, invoking allegiance to *fazhi* (法治). To many, the term sounds like a commitment to the “rule of law,” but in practice it signifies “rule by law”—where the law becomes a tool of control wielded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain domestic dominance and advance its ambitions abroad.

What is seen now, with respect to the rule of law, is not *development* but rather *regression*, making the monitoring work of the CECC all the more essential.

The persistent pattern of unfilled commitments extends beyond specific trade or human rights concerns and undermines confidence in China’s adherence to international standards. It raises the broader questions of trust and cooperation in the global system. While American and other foreign companies have invested heavily in China, ongoing issues with intellectual property protections, subsidies, and labor practices illustrate the gap between the PRC’s international commitments and its implementation, even as it

continues to benefit from membership in global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).¹

Such contradictions have bred deep and widespread “promise fatigue”—a weariness felt by businesses, governments, and most heavily, by the citizens of the PRC.

Just as contracts bind companies to uphold their commitments, so too do treaties bind nations. Yet time and again, the PRC has signed on to international agreements only to disregard their obligations, betraying the trust of both the global community and its own people. It is this ongoing cycle of promises made and promises broken—formalized in treaties that China has ratified but routinely violates—that lays bare the extent of the CCP’s abuses and the challenges faced in holding it accountable.

By sampling a select number of treaties that the PRC has ratified and subsequently broken, one is able to chronicle broken promises made to other nations, particularly with regard to the abuses that the CCP has wreaked upon the people of China, as documented in the chapters of this year’s Annual Report.²

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—ratified/promise made: 2001. Disregard for labor rights and the “liberty of parents” to choose schools to “ensure the religious and moral education of their children” abrogates the ICESCR. As a State Party, the PRC agreed to several labor provisions—Articles 6, 7 and 8, governing freedom of choice, just and fair wages and working conditions, and the right to form unions. Yet, the PRC routinely flouts these promises. The CCP-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions remains the only organization permitted to represent workers under Chinese law and though not formally prohibited by law, workers are prosecuted for participating in strikes, often under the criminal charges of “disturbing public order” or “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” As a State Party, the PRC agreed to several provisions—Articles 10, 13 and 15, governing the right to education and to take part in cultural life. The PRC denies these rights by placing children from Tibet and the Uyghur region in colonial boarding schools, where strict rules regarding the use of Mandarin Chinese are enforced, per Xi Jinping’s dictate, to strengthen “the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, and the Chinese Communist Party.”

COMMISSION ACTIVITY

NOVEMBER 2024–OCTOBER 2025



Hearings

- The Preservation of Memory: Combating the CCP's Historical Revisionism and Erasure of Culture (December 2024)
- Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC's Political Warfare and Transnational Repression (July 2025)



Commission Analysis

- First Separatism Conviction of a Taiwanese Citizen and Its Implications (January 2025)
- North Koreans in China: Marginalized, Exploited, and Repatriated (January 2025)
- 709 Crackdown: China's Overt Rejection of Universal Values (July 2025)

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)—*ratified/promise made: 1981*. As a State Party to ICERD, China made a commitment to “amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.” ICERD extends the term “racial discrimination” beyond race to include “colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” ICERD ratification also obligates China to guarantee, among other rights, “cultural rights” including “the right to equal participation in cultural activities.” The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and States Parties have asserted the right of minority and marginalized groups to use their own language.³ The CCP, far from nullifying discriminatory laws and regulations, has systematically sought to erase the cultures of Tibetans, Mongols, Uyghurs, and other citizens of the PRC and advance Han Chinese ethnic chauvinism. The CCP seeks also to “sinicize” religion, particularly Islam and Christianity, enforcing conformity to the Party and its agenda and bleaching them of any stain deemed “foreign”—such as Arabic-style minarets on mosques.

Convention Against Torture (CAT)—*ratified/promise made: 1988*. The CAT definition of torture includes “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . .” Torture, including in prisons and other types of detention centers in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as well as during pretrial detention, is commonplace throughout the PRC. It is frequently directed at political prisoners, from human rights lawyers to religious prisoners—including Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, and members of new religious movements like the Church of Almighty God—as well as ethnic minorities such as predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and Tibetan Buddhists. A particularly egregious violation is state-sanctioned harvesting of human organs, a practice reported extensively among Falun Gong practitioners and more recently among Uyghurs.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)—*ratified/promise made: 1982*. The Refugee Convention, along with the CAT, prohibits the refoulement of refugees to countries where they may face torture, imprisonment, or worse. Refugees from North Korea—many of whom were trafficked—have faced imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, forced abortions, forced labor, and even execution upon being repatriated to North Korea against their will, a practice the Chinese government has routinely engaged in since October 2023 after North Korea reopened border areas that had been closed during

the COVID crisis. The PRC has pressured other countries to refoyl Uyghurs, including 40 Uyghurs deported from Thailand in February 2025 following then Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra's visit to Beijing, and Abdureqip Rahman, who was refoiled to the XUAR from Cambodia in February 2024.

Forced Labour Convention—*ratified/promise made: 2022*. The very first article of the Forced Labour Convention commits the PRC to “suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.” Notwithstanding this commitment, the PRC routinely engages in systematic forced labor practices, particularly with respect to Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities—a practice expanded in the XUAR during the reporting year.

A paramilitary organization that has been sanctioned by the U.S. Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, uses and distributes Uyghur forced labor throughout China, contaminating supply chains, including those of products found on supermarket shelves and apparel hanging from department store racks in the United States and around the world. Chinese fishing fleets routinely engage in “illegal, unreported and unregulated” (IUU) fishing, commandeering forced labor not only aboard fishing boats but also in processing plants, many of which employ Uyghurs, as well as women dispatched by the North Korean government, in exploitative working conditions.

Fish tainted by forced labor even finds its way onto the plates of American soldiers, children in school lunch programs, and prisoners incarcerated in federal penitentiaries. These government purchasing practices should be reviewed and addressed, U.S. taxpayer funds should not support goods linked to forced labor.⁴

Sino-British Joint Declaration—*ratified/promise made: 1984*. Pursuant to this bilateral treaty with the United Kingdom, the PRC government guaranteed the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region “a high degree of autonomy” with “executive, legislative and independent judicial power” to “remain basically unchanged.” It further committed to maintaining “[r]ights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly,” which would be enshrined in the Basic Law, the city's mini-constitution. This past year saw authorities weaponizing national security laws foisted upon the former British colony by the mainland's National People's Congress Standing Committee to repress all forms of political dissent and convict 45 pro-democracy advocates of subversion for having organized an unofficial primary election. In another case, a slogan emblazoned on a

COMMISSION ACTIVITY

NOVEMBER 2024–OCTOBER 2025



Letters

- Former Chair and Co-chair Urge Volker Türk, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, to Investigate Abuses in the Boarding School System in Tibet (January 2025)
- Former Chair and Co-chair nominate Ilham Tohti, Hada, Wang Yi, Sophia Huang Xueqin, and Jimmy Lai for 2025 Nobel Peace Prize (January 2025)
- Co-chair and House CCP Select Committee Chairman Ask Kennedy Center about Relationship with National Ballet of China (January 2025)
- Co-chair and House CCP Select Committee Chairman Nominate Five Champions of Peace and Freedom for Nobel Peace Prize (January 2025)
- Co-chair and House CCP Select Committee Chairman Urge U.K. Ambassador to Reject CCP's Largest European Embassy amid Human Rights Concerns (February 2025)
- Co-chair and House CCP Select Committee Chairman Ask U.S. Ambassador to PRC to Meet with Americans Whose Families Are Unjustly Detained or Forcibly Separated through Exit Bans (April 2025)
- Chairs Ask Executive Branch Leadership to End Importation of Seafood That Is Fished, Farmed, or Processed Using Forced Labor (July 2025)
- Co-chair and House CCP Select Committee Leadership Ask State Department to Hold Organ Traffickers Accountable by Leveraging the State Department's Rewards Program (August 2025)

BROKEN PROMISES

The **PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law** contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities,” yet these promised protections are regularly violated.

- Authorities suppressed the expression of beliefs in Hui religious communities, including through actions aimed at “sinicizing” Islamic practices.
- PRC officials forced hundreds of young Tibetan novice monks to leave monastery-affiliated schools and instead enroll at state-run residential schools.
- Authorities continued to build boarding schools for Uyghur and other ethnic minority children, to break the transmission of cultural traditions from parents to children.
- Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) authorities in several towns required residents to film themselves eating lunch in order to prove they were not fasting during Ramadan.

Article 35 of the PRC Constitution says citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration. Yet this past year:

- Authorities sentenced filmmaker **Chen Pinlin** to three years and six months in prison after he produced a documentary about the 2022 White Paper protests against COVID-19 restrictions.
- Police in Zhejiang province detained several individuals who had participated in a memorial event for Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo.
- Police detained artist **Gao Zhen** in Hebei province in August 2024 on charges of “insulting revolutionary heroes and martyrs” for creating satirical artwork in the past depicting Mao Zedong.

(continued)

T-shirt was seen as a “national security” threat. Since 2021, the United Kingdom has considered the PRC to be in a “state of ongoing non-compliance” with its obligations under the Sino-British pact.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—*ratified/promise made: 1996*. Despite being a State Party for nearly three decades, the PRC’s aggressive assertion of an extralegal “nine-dash line” over much of what traditionally has been known as the “South China Sea” as its exclusive maritime domain violates numerous provisions of the UNCLOS treaty it ratified. Articles 56 and 57 create Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) that extend 200 nautical miles from coastal baselines, which the PRC has sought to circumvent by creating artificial “islands,” intruding upon the EEZs of countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, in addition to seizing the Scarborough Shoals, located within the Philippines’ EEZ.

Both the assertion of sovereignty in these areas and the pretextual building of artificial islands to extend maritime claims violate UNCLOS, which states that only naturally formed islands capable of sustaining human habitation can be used as a basis for expanded EEZs. A 2016 UNCLOS arbitral ruling underscored the lack of a legal basis for the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and found the PRC to have violated the Philippines’ EEZ rights. The PRC nonetheless has ignored the ruling and continues to aggressively challenge Filipino vessels within the Philippines’ EEZ, which, consistent with the UNCLOS ruling, Filipino authorities now refer to as the West Philippines Sea.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—*ratified/promise made: 1979*. Article 55(1) of the Consular Relations Convention requires consular officers to “respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State,” and further imposes a duty “not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.”⁵ PRC consular officials routinely derogate from this obligation. In a September 2024 article, the *Washington Post* confirmed in detail the role played by the PRC San Francisco and Los Angeles consulates, identifying culpable consular officials who coordinated counter-protests that turned violent against peaceful protesters demonstrating in opposition to the participation of Xi Jinping at the November 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in San Francisco.⁶

Violations extend beyond street-level harassment. PRC consulates have been linked to the operation of so-called “service stations”—undeclared overseas police outposts—and to active engagement with Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) on U.S. campuses. Such

associations, often operating under consular guidance, have monitored and reported on PRC students studying in the United States, pressuring them to toe the Party line, and have assisted in surveillance, particularly of those who speak critically of Beijing.

Meanwhile, American diplomats operating in the PRC face significantly greater restrictions. The PRC routinely limits U.S. diplomatic access, imposes stringent surveillance, and tightly controls interactions with civil society and media. In contrast to PRC officials abroad, who covertly extend their influence through the above-mentioned service stations and consular-backed networks like the CSSA, U.S. diplomats encounter barriers that hinder their ability to engage openly and reciprocally.

This stark imbalance in diplomatic freedom and behavior undermines the principle of reciprocity that is foundational to international relations and the effective functioning of diplomatic missions worldwide.

Viewed collectively, such a sustained and systematic rejection of law, agreed-upon rules, and established customs while using them only where it is advantageous—such as by filing requests for consultation with the WTO against U.S. tariffs, or engaging the U.S. court system to conduct lawfare against CCP critics such as the Hui Muslim activist Ma Ju⁷—suggests a consistent strategic approach. But the challenges here are not simply economic or strategic, but systemic, as the PRC seeks to replace and supplant the current global system with one of its own devising.

As noted in last year's Annual Report, this pattern extends also to the domain of human rights, where the PRC manipulates notions of collective rights, such as the right to development, to suppress individual liberties. In doing so, it seeks to erode rights central to the post-World War II human rights architecture embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its progeny, reimagining a global order with the PRC at its center. It advances this vision through initiatives such as the "Global Civilization Initiative" and "Community of Shared Future for Mankind," through its redefinition of "whole process democracy," and via close coordination with Russia to promote alternative models for global governance in international forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Ultimately, as this survey of the PRC's broken promises reveals, those most harmed by this habitual prevarication are the citizens of China themselves. They are the ones whose rights are most often violated, be it at a detention center in

BROKEN PROMISES

- Authorities cracked down on mass nighttime bicycle rides by university students in Henan province, a grassroots phenomenon that peaked with between 100,000 and 200,000 students participating.

Arbitrary detention violates **PRC's Constitution Art. 37** as regards the unlawful deprivation or restriction of a person's liberty yet the Commission documented multiple cases of unlawful detention.

- A group of United Nations experts noted the "recurring patterns of repression, including incommunicado detention and enforced disappearance, aimed at restricting artistic, cultural and religious expressions . . ."
- A U.N. Working Group reported that there were 144 outstanding cases of enforced disappearance as of May 2024, including rights lawyer **Gao Zhisheng**, who has remained missing for over seven years.
- Chinese authorities continued to abuse the form of detention known as "residential surveillance at a designated location" which a group of U.N. experts deemed "analogous to incommunicado and secret detention and tantamount to enforced disappearance."

Article 3 of the PRC Labor Law guarantees "equal right to employment and choice of occupation" and the **PRC Law on the Promotion of Employment** prohibits discrimination based on ethnic backgrounds, races, and gender yet forced labor and discrimination continued.

- Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims were transferred in forced labor programs, often from rural areas into factories and other industrial work.

(continued)

BROKEN PROMISES

- Both Chinese agribusinesses and Western companies working with or purchasing products from them facilitated forced labor in the XUAR.
- Women in mainland China and Hong Kong faced discrimination and harassment in the workplace.

Article 36 of the PRC Constitution guarantees the freedom of religious belief, but practitioners continued to be arbitrarily detained and their practices curtailed.

- PRC authorities limited religious beliefs and practices, instead seeking to order religious observance around loyalty to the Party and the state.
- In Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province, public security officials took Imam **Ma Yuwei** into custody, in connection with his preaching.
- PRC officials ordained two bishops in apparent contravention of the Sino-Vatican Agreement, during the period following Pope Francis's death and preceding the appointment of a new pope.
- A court in Shanxi province sentenced Linfen Covenant Church pastors **Li Jie** and **Han Xiaodong** to three years and eight months in prison premised upon donations made by church members.
- Qinghai province authorities sentenced Pangkar Thang Monastery monk **Jampa Choephel** to one year and six months in prison after he shared a speech by the Dalai Lama online.

the Uyghur region or on a street corner in San Francisco, where ruffians hired and directed by the PRC consulate target dissidents exercising the universally recognized right of freedom of expression denied to them in the PRC.

Once again, the CECC will call attention to such abuses. The chapters that follow document the PRC's broken promises and shine a bright light on the ways in which the PRC does violence to the fundamental rights of the citizens of the People's Republic of China.

¹As part of congressional approval for the PRC's accession to the WTO, it was agreed that a hybrid House-Senate-executive branch entity (the CECC) would be established to monitor the PRC's adherence to international human rights norms and monitor rule-of-law developments.

²In addition to the treaties mentioned in the overview, see also, the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)," the PRC signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1998 but has not yet ratified it; the "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)," the PRC signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980; the "Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)," the PRC signed the CRC on August 29, 1990, and ratified it on March 2, 1992; the "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)," the PRC signed the CRPD on March 30, 2007, and ratified it on August 1, 2008; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights. These treaties are also used in the chapters that follow to assess the PRC's commitment to its international obligations.

³Treaty monitoring body interpretations and recommendations are non-binding, though they may be helpful where a treaty contains terminology that is undefined, such as in the case of ICERD, and serve as standards for assessing a government's behavior. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "General Recommendation No. 21," United Nations, CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3, adopted March 8, 1996; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "General Comment No. 27," United Nations, A/55/18, annex V, adopted August 16, 2000; and various Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concluding Observations.

⁴As has been pointed out in a CECC report published in 2025, North Korean workers in fish processing plants in China are paid a fraction of the funds that are conveyed to the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for their services, thus violating the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act.

⁵"Vienna Convention on Consular Relations," adopted April 24, 1963, entered into force March 19, 1967, and ratified by China on September 17, 1980; "The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations" (*ratified/promise made: 1975*), contains comparable provisions. Article 41(1) and (3) require diplomatic personnel to "respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State," and not to use the premises of the mission "in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission."

⁶Shibani Mahtani et al., "How China Extended Its Repression into an American City," *Washington Post*, September 3, 2024.

⁷Marie Tsai, "He Escaped China. Harassment Followed Him to a New York Courtroom," *Radio Free Asia*, March 19, 2025.

KEY FINDINGS

Freedom of Expression

- During the Commission’s 2025 reporting period, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) persisted in imposing restrictions on expression that contravene Article 35 of China’s Constitution, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 178 out of 180 countries and territories in its 2025 World Press Freedom Index, and Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom in the World report scored China 0 out of 4 on “free and independent media” for the seventh year in a row.
- The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China as the world’s leading jailer of journalists during this reporting year. Currently detained or imprisoned journalists include **Zhang Zhan, Sophia Huang Xueqin, Dong Yuyu, Chen Pinlin, Gu Wanming, Li Weizhong, and Liu Hanbin**. Foreign journalists in China also continued to face restrictions and harassment.
- The Party continued its efforts to shape its image abroad through an expanding network of state-directed media initiatives, including its network of international communication centers (ICCs). OpenAI, a U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) company, found accounts which “appear to originate in China” that used AI to write news articles criticizing the U.S. in Latin American media outlets and to generate posts denouncing a critic of the Party.
- Chinese authorities exercised control over freedom of expression of global audiences on the app TikTok through content moderation and censored posts on the Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu, known as RedNote.
- Authorities in China continued to tightly control in-person assemblies that they viewed as potentially threatening to the Party and targeted even non-political gatherings, particularly those involving youth. Individuals who participated in protests or commemorative activities continued to face detention and

harassment, including **Fang Yirong** and **Mei Shilin**, both detained for hanging pro-democracy banners.

- PRC legislators introduced several measures to tighten control over the internet, including a regulation on a new national internet identification (ID) system and a draft regulation targeting multi-channel networks (MCNs).
- Authorities and social media platforms in China continued to censor online discussions and public expression related to topics that generated criticism or contradicted official policy or positions. Observers noted various examples of authorities treating China’s economic challenges as sensitive topics to be censored this past year.
- China experienced a series of violent “revenge against society” attacks this past year, including various knife attacks and car ramming incidents. In response, the PRC government tightly controlled information about the events and prioritized surveillance and punishment.
- Authorities continued to exercise tight control over the entertainment, art, and literature sectors, including by imprisoning artists, writers, and public intellectuals such as **Gao Zhen, Fei Xiaosheng, Xu Lin, and Li Yanhe**.
- The PRC continued its control over educational and research institutions this past year, impeding free exchange of information and international academic collaboration.

Civil Society and Social Movements

- The Chinese Communist Party continued to increase its presence in social organizations, the PRC’s term for civil society groups, preventing them from operating independently.
- This year, the Party set up central and local branches of the Central Society Work Department, created in 2023, in order to more fully penetrate all aspects of society. Local society work departments held training sessions and launched a range of projects focused on Party-building within new and priority sectors.
- As in previous years, PRC authorities have taken steps to eliminate “illegal social organizations,” a category that refers to, among others, organizations engaged in activities deemed undesirable or sensitive by the

government. In February 2025, the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the revised *Measures Banning Illegal Social Organizations*.

- PRC citizens continued to engage in ad hoc collective expressions of discontent and advocacy, predominantly in response to perceived injustices at the local level. According to *China Dissent Monitor*, there were 937 dissent events between July and September 2024, constituting a “27 percent year-on-year increase” over the same period in 2023. Groups engaged in protest events this past year included property owners and investors.
- PRC authorities also worked to suppress collective gatherings composed predominantly of young people, which were not explicitly political but were likely perceived as a threat. In November 2024, authorities cracked down on mass night bicycle rides by university students from Zhengzhou municipality to Kaifeng municipality in Henan province, an apparently grassroots phenomenon that peaked at between 100,000 and 200,000 students.
- Also during the 2025 reporting period, the Commission observed new efforts to leverage Chinese citizen activism outside of China to effect domestic policy change at the local level. The 611Study.ICU, led by a Milan-based Chinese activist, focused on exposing exploitative conditions at primary and secondary schools in China.
- The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to suppress independent civil society organizations and movements by isolating civil society leaders and by arbitrarily detaining religious clergy and practitioners, rights advocates, and independent organizers of civic and political activities.
- Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBTQ) persons living in China continued to experience ongoing state repression.
- The Party sought to exert control over theological education and institutions across religious groups to ensure the political reliability of future religious leaders.
- The National Religious Affairs Administration published new regulations governing the religious activities of foreigners in China that create a more restrictive environment for non-PRC citizens to practice their own religion or interact with Chinese believers.
- The Party and government have continued their efforts to co-opt Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese folk religion while also pushing for further “sinicization” of these groups.
- This past year, PRC authorities continued to suppress dissent and inculcate ideological conformity in ethnic minority Muslim communities, including in Yunnan province, following tensions over mosque “rectifications” and other sinicization efforts.
- The Party continued to assert its ultimate authority over the Chinese Catholic Church, despite the renewal of the Sino-Vatican Agreement. In the interregnum period after the death of Pope Francis, local authorities conducted “elections” to select two bishops when papal approval would have been impossible.
- Authorities continued to raid unregistered Protestant “house” churches and detain their members, using fraud charges, exit bans, censorship, and surveillance to suppress and intimidate clergy and laity from exercising their religious beliefs.
- The Party and government have continued to direct considerable resources and attention toward the suppression and persecution of Falun Gong, often detaining, charging, and prosecuting practitioners under Article 300 of the *PRC Criminal Law*. The Falun Gong-affiliated website *Minghui* reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody and hundreds of cases of practitioners being sentenced by authorities, apparently for their connection with Falun Gong.
- In addition to Falun Gong, the Party and government have designated 22 religious groups to be “cult organizations” or *xiejiao* (邪教), a historical term used by the Party to refer to new religious movements it perceives as threatening, and continue to subject them to persecution. Among these groups, authorities have engaged in a protracted and apparently nationwide crackdown

Freedom of Religion

- The Chinese Communist Party and government continued to constrain individuals and groups from freely forming and practicing their religious beliefs, instead seeking to order religious observance around loyalty to the Party and state.
- During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission observed a coordinated campaign, led by the United Front Work Department, to train religious personnel in the “strict governance of religion.”

against the Church of Almighty God, launching consecutive campaigns to eradicate the religious group.

- In at least two cases this past year, authorities detained Taiwanese citizens for participation in religious activities associated with supposed *xiejiao*.

Criminal Justice

- The criminal justice system remained a political instrument used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party's autocratic rule. In addition to combating criminal conduct, the government also targeted individuals who pursue universal human rights, such as exercising free speech and seeking remedies within the legal system.
- Government officials arbitrarily detained political activists, religious practitioners, ethnic minorities, and rights advocates, including through extralegal means such as “black jails” and psychiatric facilities, or through criminal prosecution under offenses such as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or crimes endangering state security. Some detainees, particularly those held incommunicado, reported being mistreated or tortured. After entering the formal legal process, defendants sometimes faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and delayed sentencing.
- Legal mechanisms such as administrative detention, “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL), and “retention in custody” were frequently employed with minimal oversight. Amendments to the *PRC Supervision Law* in late 2024 further expanded state power, introducing new coercive measures and extending permissible detention periods.

Governance and Rule of Law

- The Chinese Communist Party continued to advance a governance model that prioritizes political security and social stability at the expense of individual rights. The Party's early intervention strategy in addressing social problems led to overzealous enforcement and an expansion of surveillance within a climate of ongoing suppression of citizens' access to justice—likely contributing to the very anti-social behaviors the government sought to contain. The Party's uncontested power also perpetuated a lack of transparency and public oversight, hampering institutional reforms and enabling persistent systemic corruption.

- The Party framed governance around risk prevention, using stability maintenance measures that draw from the “Fengqiao Experience” policy, a way to exert granular social and political control through neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level organizations. In implementing the policy, authorities expanded early intervention tactics, targeting individuals based on vague behavioral markers using techniques such as artificial intelligence analytics to enable preemptive intervention.
- Parallel to these security-driven measures, fiscal pressure on local governments spurred aggressive revenue-generation tactics such as retroactive taxes, arbitrary fines, and asset seizure. In some cases, authorities arbitrarily detained business owners and conditioned their release on the payment of money, a practice that some critics likened to state-sanctioned extortion.
- Policymakers issued a new five-year plan with the aim of easing rural-to-urban migration restrictions so as to facilitate labor mobility and urbanization. Challenges in resource allocation, however, will likely continue, since the plan does not emphasize the provision of public services for new migrants in cities or for the elderly and disabled residents who remain in rural areas.
- In areas such as food and drug safety, authorities demonstrated a degree of responsiveness following exposés by state-run media, suggesting some space for public discourse. Nevertheless, efforts by independent investigators were censored, underscoring the government's intolerance of unsanctioned scrutiny and its broader resistance to bottom-up accountability.

Ethnic Minority Rights

- During the Commission's reporting year, authorities suppressed the expression of Islamic beliefs in Hui religious communities, including through actions aimed at “sinicizing” Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims' ability to practice their religion and culture.
- In December 2024, hundreds of local Muslims gathered in front of the municipal government building in Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province to protest the detention of well-known imam **Ma Yuwei** and call for his release. Ma's detention and the ensuing protests followed a period in which authorities detained other Hui imams and targeted other Hui figures, and came in the wake of a May 2023 demonstration involving thousands of

residents of Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi, over the planned demolition of a local mosque.

- In January 2025, security personnel in Hohhot municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, brought veteran Mongol rights advocate **Hada** to a hospital, where he was placed on a respirator in intensive care. During his hospitalization, state security personnel failed to provide information on Hada's condition to his wife, Xinna, and their son, Uiles. Hospital staff later moved Hada from intensive care to another part of the hospital, but police forbade them from disclosing where they had transferred him within the hospital.

Status of Women

- During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, Chinese political leaders implemented several legal measures related to women's rights in marriage and divorce. A law delegating more power to rural village assemblies sparked debate as to whether it is enough to guarantee women equal land rights and social insurance benefits. Additionally, online commentators spoke out against a revised draft law aiming to make registering for marriage easier and filing for divorce more difficult, citing concerns about domestic violence victims within the controversial 30-day "cooling-off" period.
- The Commission observed reports of sexual violence against women in China, along with varied responses from PRC authorities. Netizens expressed concerns about a lack of sufficient official response to the following cases: a Ph.D. student accused of drugging and raping at least seven young women in China, a university professor who sexually abused his student for two years, the alleged trafficking of a rural woman suffering from mental illness, and cases of sexual assault of young girls. Such posts often faced official censorship.
- Women in mainland China and Hong Kong faced discrimination and harassment in the workplace. One report revealed that one-third of women in Hong Kong experienced workplace sexual harassment in the last three years, while other reports showed widespread discriminatory hiring practices based on female applicants' fertility and family status. Some blame the CCP's recent pro-natal policies and rhetoric for employers' reluctance to hire married women of child-bearing age.
- The Commission continued to monitor cases of official harassment and arbitrary detention of women's rights activists, including **He Fangmei**, **Sophia Huang Xueqin**, **Zhang Zhan**, and **Li Qiaochu**.

Population Control

- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or "Party") and PRC government continued to implement population planning policies that violate international standards by seeking to control family size, including the application of the three-child policy, which permits and seeks to incentivize families to have up to but no more than three children.
- The National Bureau of Statistics of China's 2024 data revealed that, while the total number of births in China increased for the first time in eight years, likely due to the auspicious "Year of the Dragon," the overall population declined for the third consecutive year. Marriage rates also fell to the lowest rate since public records began in 1986.
- PRC central authorities announced a variety of pro-natal initiatives this year, including a survey to identify family and childbearing attitudes, increased support for infrastructure related to childrearing, and a proposed national childcare subsidy. Local authorities also attempted to boost birth rates through financial incentives, pro-natal messaging, and calling young women to ask about their family planning and menstrual cycles.
- The Commission observed reports of the discriminatory effects of centrally led family planning policies, including the likely continuation of birth suppression of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
- The legacy of the one-child policy (1980 to 2015) continues to have an impact on Chinese society, including the continued sex ratio imbalance and increased socio-economic precarity for China's elderly population.
- In September 2024, the PRC announced the end of international adoptions originating in China, to which the one-child policy era's social engineering abuses had often been linked. The sudden decision included the halting of hundreds of cases of families who had already been matched and had communicated with a child and spurred particular concern for the thousands of children remaining in Chinese orphanages, often with disabilities.

Human Trafficking

- The government of Brazil accused China's BYD Company Ltd. of employing at least 163 workers in "slave-like conditions" at a construction site in Bahia. The Brazilian government said that the workers were "victims of international trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation." Brazilian authorities identified forced labor indicators including the withholding of the workers' passports and salaries.
- The Commission continued to observe reports of forced labor linked to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In December 2024, Adrian Zenz and I-Lin Lin of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation asserted that the PRC government's heightened agricultural production policies have resulted in coercive forms of work that "constitute state-imposed forced labor as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and operationalized in its updated handbook on the measurement of forced labor."
- In February 2025, the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) documented the presence of North Korean workers on a fleet of Chinese tuna fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean between March 2019 and June 2024. At least five vessels showed indicators of forced labor, including deception related to wages, withholding of documents, physical and verbal abuse, and excessive overtime.

Worker Rights

- Documented worker strikes and protests in China decreased overall from 2023 to 2024; however, strikes in the manufacturing sector increased. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has attempted to resolve wage arrears, in part due to a desire to "maintain social harmony and stability." Wage arrears were the cause of the majority of worker strikes and protests in 2024.
- During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong authorities continued to suppress labor rights activists. In Hong Kong, **Carol Ng Man-ye** and **Winnie Yu Wai-ming** were sentenced to prison for "conspiracy to commit subversion" under Hong Kong's *National Security Law* in November 2024. Mainland Chinese labor rights advocate **Wang Jianbing** was released from prison in March 2025, but human rights experts assert that he may continue to face unlawful restrictions and is at risk of re-detention. Similarly, in August 2024,

Chinese labor activist and women's rights advocate **Li Qiaochu** was released after serving a three-year, eight-month prison sentence, and remains subject to two years' deprivation of political rights.

- Due to fears of instability and social unrest, PRC officials have sought to provide more protection for delivery workers, who have faced increasing pressure in the expanding gig economy. Observers are skeptical that these measures will directly benefit delivery workers.
- Chinese workers continued to face poor working conditions and were subject to excessive overtime practices. Workers in Yunnan province's coffee farms, who supply coffee to Starbucks and Nestlé, as well as workers at Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd. (CATL), faced excessive overtime practices.
- The Commission continued to document cases of job discrimination in China. Local procurators found that women who applied to positions at over a dozen companies in Nantong municipality, Jiangsu province, were illegally administered pregnancy tests during pre-employment physicals. Concerns over age bias were raised by representatives at the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March (Two Sessions), with some calling for age limits to be formally eliminated in the hiring process.

The Environment

- During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, the Chinese Communist Party and government continued to state their intention to prioritize environmental protection.
- China continued to contribute to domestic and cross-border pollution, which experts suggested may contribute to "a vicious cycle of poverty and health hazards." Authors of a February 2025 study revealed "the existence of unidentified exposure sources" of lithium in Beijing municipality, resulting in higher lithium levels in maternal and umbilical cord blood samples of pregnant women in the city.
- While food and water security reportedly remain a top priority for the Party and government, PRC citizens continued to face difficulty accessing these resources. Local surface water monitoring stations located along the Leishui River in Hunan province detected "abnormal concentrations of thallium" in March 2025. In April 2025,

the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region experienced a severe drought, causing direct economic losses. More than 16,000 hectares of crops were severely damaged and 83,000 people faced a shortage of drinking water.

- Dams built by the PRC government, both in China and abroad, continued to contribute to environmental damage. The PRC government's building of dams in Tibet and along the Mekong River contributed to rapidly changing water levels and destruction of agriculture. A dam built in northwest China may have contributed to forced relocations and forced labor programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
- The Commission observed reports of environmental degradation tied to PRC-affiliated mines globally, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Laos, Peru, Tajikistan, and Zambia.
- PRC authorities sentenced 29-year-old Tibetan **Tsongon Tsering** to eight months in prison for "disrupting social order." Tsongon Tsering had posted a video online denouncing local officials for failing to adequately address the environmental damage to the Tsaruma River caused by illegal mining.

Business and Human Rights

- Companies that do business in, source from, or work with companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are at risk of complicity in human rights abuses committed by the Chinese Communist Party and government. Reports of corporate involvement in mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the agricultural, apparel, automotive, critical minerals, pharmaceutical, shipbuilding, and tourism industries.
- The *Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act* (UFLPA; Public Law No. 117-78) Entity List consists of nearly 150 PRC-based companies found to be complicit in rights abuses in the XUAR. XUAR Communist Party Secretary Ma Xingrui claimed in March 2025 that U.S. sanctions on entities over forced labor had "become one of the biggest challenges in the region's development." According to *Radio Free Asia*, this was the first time such an admission had been made by a representative of the Chinese government, "proving that international sanctions do have bite."
- Reports from this past year link U.S. and Chinese companies, including **Apple, Google, Meta, and DeepSeek**, among others, in the Chinese government's data collection, surveillance, and censorship efforts.

- During the 2025 reporting year, the Commission observed some U.S. companies downsizing, withdrawing, or closing operations in China in part to address U.S.-China geopolitical tensions and legal risks of non-compliance with PRC laws.
- Companies that operate in Hong Kong may find themselves implicated or at risk of complicity in sanctions evasion. Information and communications technology (ICT) companies may encounter difficulty navigating Hong Kong's regulatory changes and threats to privacy and freedom of expression.

Technology and Human Rights

- The PRC government expanded digital repression on a global scale by exporting censorship technologies to authoritarian governments, undermining human rights by enabling these governments to silence dissent.
- China's expansion of satellite communications infrastructure also raised concerns about the global spread of digital authoritarianism, as its centralized satellite internet model could enable other governments to adopt PRC-style censorship, surveillance, and information control and at the same time deepen PRC influence over global digital governance.
- During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a report that analyzed internal Chinese documents about the Safe Silk Road (SSR) platform, which collects information from companies operating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expands the PRC government's surveillance and data collection practices.
- The PRC government embedded the "core values of Socialism" alongside "society's morals and ethics" into its development of artificial intelligence (AI) by mandating that a type of machine learning systems, known as large language models (LLMs), align with the policies, propaganda, and principal tenets of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and by enforcing censorship using data evaluation standards.
- The PRC's advancements in quantum computing and AI surveillance could pose significant threats to human rights by enabling mass censorship, undermining privacy, and amplifying CCP narratives on human rights, ultimately expanding the government's ability to monitor, manipulate, and suppress dissent.

- The operations of DeepSeek reflected how PRC authorities can use a Chinese AI startup to insert censorship, propaganda, and surveillance into emergent AI technology.

Tibet

- The Commission did not observe any interest from People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. The last round of negotiations was held in January 2010. The Dalai Lama announced that a future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama would be born "in the free world."
- The PRC continued to restrict and seek to control the religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism, unduly limiting Tibetans' freedom of religion and belief. The PRC continued to assert control over the process of selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, including the Dalai Lama. The National Religious Affairs Administration revised the *Measures on the Management of Tibetan Buddhist Temples*, increasing requirements on monasteries and nunneries to adhere to Chinese Communist Party political doctrine and placing new bureaucratic demands on monastic leadership.
- PRC authorities continued a program of mass expulsions and demolitions, begun in 2016, at Larung Gar Buddhist Academy, a major Tibetan Buddhist educational and training center. In November and December 2024, several hundred officials were stationed at the complex, and authorities pressured monastic residents to leave, ultimately expelling around 1,000 monks and nuns.
- The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan self-immolations occurring during the 2025 reporting year, the third year since 2021 in which no self-immolations were reported to have occurred. The Commission has observed reports of 154 self-immolations since 2009 that were due to political or religious issues in Tibetan areas.
- PRC officials took steps this past year to further restrict the space for independent Tibetan education, ordering the temporary closure of at least one major non-state Tibetan school and forcing hundreds of young Tibetan novice monks to leave monastery-affiliated schools and instead enroll at state-run residential schools.
- In contravention of international human rights standards, PRC officials punished residents of Tibetan

areas for the exercise of their protected rights, including expression of religious belief, protest against or criticism of Party or government policy, and free speech and assembly. Notable cases this past year included those of **Jampa Choephel**, a monk sentenced to one year and six months in prison for sharing a speech by the Dalai Lama on social media; **Sherab** (or Jamyang Legshe) and **Gonpo Tsering**, senior monks sentenced to four and three years, respectively, for protesting against construction of a hydroelectric dam; and **Gonpo Namgyal**, a language rights advocate who died due to torture in custody.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

- During the Commission's 2025 reporting year, the Simon-Skjoldt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum published research by scholar Rian Thum showing that PRC officials had perpetrated and continued to perpetrate mass atrocity crimes against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Thum determined that all of the official policies in the XUAR that led to the findings of crimes against humanity and genocide have continued.
- Reports indicated that authorities in the XUAR had recently expanded a system of forced labor that involved Turkic and Muslim individuals, often transferring them from traditional occupations in rural areas into industrial work. In conjunction with forced labor programs targeting rural Uyghurs, authorities have confiscated land held by Uyghur farmers and transferred their land use rights to state-run cooperatives and developers.
- As in previous reporting years, XUAR authorities placed restrictions on Muslims' observance of Ramadan. According to videos posted on Chinese social media platforms, authorities forced residents of various locations in Aksu and Hotan prefectures to engage in forced labor during the Ramadan period in March 2025 in order to prevent them from fasting. In addition, authorities required residents of several towns in Peyziwat (Jiashi) county, Kashgar prefecture, to film themselves eating lunch during the Ramadan period in order to prove that they were not fasting.
- On February 27, 2025, Thai officials deported 40 Uyghur asylum seekers to China, in spite of widespread international concern over their safety and evidence that PRC

authorities had imprisoned or tortured 20 Uyghurs who were similarly deported from Cambodia to China in 2009. The men were among 500 Uyghurs who fled the XUAR to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries around a decade ago in hopes of reaching Türkiye. In November 2024, *Radio Free Asia* reported that 16 of the Uyghurs deported from Cambodia in 2009 were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and two of the deportees died in prison.

- In February 2024, Chinese officials sent 22-year-old **Abdureqip Rahman**, an ethnic Uyghur, to Kucha (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture, XUAR, from Cambodia, where he had fled in hopes of ultimately seeking asylum in the United States. In spite of U.N. officials' attempts to assist him, in January 2024, Abdureqip Rahman was first held in custody by Cambodian authorities and then transferred to the custody of PRC authorities in Cambodia, before being sent to Kucha on February 1. Abdureqip Rahman's whereabouts remained unknown as of December 2024.
- Authorities in the XUAR used surveillance technology and other methods to maintain control over Turkic and Muslim residents. Methods used included an online security operation in the summer of 2024; requirements in Kashgar and Hotan prefectures for Uyghurs to promptly report the arrival of guests to their home to the police; a winter security campaign in the runup to the Spring Festival in early 2025; and the re-detention of Uyghurs who had previously been detained, including businessmen, philanthropists, and people who had traveled abroad.

Hong Kong and Macau

- Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, Hong Kong authorities have used national security laws to suppress and prevent all forms of political dissent. In 2024, 47 pro-democracy activists were convicted of subversion for organizing an unofficial primary election. A law passed in March 2024, the *Safeguarding National Security Ordinance*, introduced harsher penalties for offenses such as sedition and expanded the scope of punishable activities. By early 2025, hundreds had been arrested under national security charges, with many serving prison sentences. High-profile cases included the ongoing trial of publisher **Jimmy Lai**, charged with collusion with foreign forces, and the sentencing of former *Stand News* editors for publishing content critical of the government.

- More civil society organizations disbanded amid legal and political pressure. The Democratic Party, once Hong Kong's largest opposition party, began dissolution procedures after being approached by representatives allegedly linked to the PRC government. A religious group focusing on political engagement likewise announced disbandment, saying that it could no longer carry out its mission in the current social environment.
- Government control over the social work profession tightened, as the Legislative Council changed the law to consolidate control by government appointees and to disqualify social workers convicted of national security offenses, some of whom were present at protests in 2019 monitoring police conduct.
- Media restrictions continued, as journalists were deterred from advocating for press freedom by the threat of job termination. The Hong Kong government also denied entry to foreign journalists, a practice that could be regularized, as a law was passed that requires airlines to submit preboarding passenger information for screening purposes.
- Hong Kong authorities increasingly restricted the flow of information, including through censorship, with extra-territorial effect, as shown in their attempt to block the overseas publication *Flow HK*. A new law taking effect in 2026 will give police broad powers over designated private tech companies, raising concerns about privacy, corporate autonomy, and the government's access to data, including data stored overseas.
- The Macau government implemented extensive security measures for a visit by PRC leader Xi Jinping in December 2024, and reports of consequent disruptions were censored. In addition to celebrating the 25th anniversary of Macau's reunification with China, Xi also inaugurated the new chief executive, Sam Hou Fai, who was elected in an uncontested election and whose judicial rulings in his former capacity as a top judge contributed to the restrictions on fundamental freedoms.

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

- The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued a multifaceted campaign of transnational repression against members of the Chinese diaspora and critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to intimidate individuals and stifle dissent. The Commission observed the use of tactics ranging from verbal and online

harassment to lawfare, as well as physical intimidation such as through overseas police “service stations.” Cases of transnational repression this reporting year include the issuance of HK\$1,000,000 (US\$129,000) bounties on six overseas activists, passport cancellations for activists with existing bounties, threats against Uyghurs attending an international conference, and harassment of Falun Gong practitioners.

- U.S. federal authorities prosecuted various perpetrators of PRC-led transnational repression, including two prominent leaders in U.S.-based pro-democracy groups, as well as 12 Chinese nationals responsible for a vast cyber-hacking campaign targeting critics of the CCP. Outcomes varied, with three individuals sentenced for acting as illegal agents of the PRC, while a separate jury acquitted a man accused of spying on Chinese diaspora members.
- Despite advocacy groups and governments calling for their protection, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur refugees back to China in February 2025. The repatriated men faced possible torture and long-term imprisonment upon their return, according to U.N. officials. The Thai government later claimed that their decision to deport was due to potential retaliation from the PRC.
- The PRC continued to exert malign influence abroad by attempting to target foreign politicians and governments, influence democratic processes abroad, and shape public opinion about the CCP and PRC government. Notable examples include the use of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices to spread propaganda and promote CCP policies, covertly gaining access to high-level figures in the U.K. government, spreading disinformation among voters about the U.S. elections, and influencing sub-national politics in the U.S. through political aides.
- PRC authorities continued to make efforts to subvert processes and procedures within the U.N. system in order to deny China’s human rights abuse, challenge the universality of international human rights norms, and obfuscate obligations made in international treaties and covenants the PRC signed and ratified. Reports this past year revealed “an extensive campaign to subvert the work of the U.N. Human Rights Council” through groups linked to the PRC government. Additionally, despite official calls from governments in the Universal Periodic Review process and elsewhere for the PRC to improve its record on human rights, PRC diplomats rejected many such recommendations, warning against “political forces aiming at containing and vilifying China.”



Rowena He, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin and author of “Tiananmen Exiles: Voices for the Struggle for Democracy in China,” testified at the December 5, 2024, hearing entitled “The Preservation of Memory: Combating the CCP’s Historical Revisionism and Erasure of Culture.”



Julian Ku, Hofstra University’s Faculty Director of International Programs and Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, testified at the December 5, 2024, hearing entitled “The Preservation of Memory: Combating the CCP’s Historical Revisionism and Erasure of Culture.”



CECC Commissioners, (from left to right) Senator Jeff Merkley, Senator Dan Sullivan (Chair), Senator Lisa Blunt Rochester, and Senator Andy Kim, listened to expert testimony at the July 23, 2025, hearing entitled “Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression.”



Peter Mattis, President of The Jamestown Foundation, and Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, USN (Ret.), Former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, testified at the July 23, 2025, hearing entitled “Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression.”



Audrye Wong, Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Assistant Professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California, testified at the July 23, 2025, hearing entitled “Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression.”



Representative Chris Smith, CECC Co-Chair, and Senator Dan Sullivan, CECC Chair, listen to witness testimony at the July 23, 2025, hearing entitled “Stand with Taiwan: Countering the PRC’s Political Warfare and Transnational Repression.”

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

The Commission's 2025 Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners⁸ in the context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and government's application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its research, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database as a resource to prepare summaries of information about and support advocacy for political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at <https://www.ppdcecc.gov>.

The Commission seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members seek to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends

that drive political and religious imprisonment in China, and work on an ongoing basis to add, maintain, and update records of political and religious imprisonment in the PPD. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights violation by Chinese authorities connected to their detention. These include, among others, violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials.

When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Commission relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), groups that specialize in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

⁸The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising their human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners documented in the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China's Constitution and law, or by international human rights standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt, but officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. A defendant may authorize someone to provide their legal counsel and defense, as the *PRC Criminal Procedure Law* guarantees in Article 33, yet officials may deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a defense.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Overview

As of June 30, 2025, the PPD contained 11,262 records of political or religious prisoners in China. Of those records, 2,755 are considered “active detentions,” referring to records of political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, or under coercive controls. There are 8,507 records of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more cases of current political and religious detention in China than are contained in the PPD.

Ethnic Group

Of the active detentions, 1,706 contained information on the prisoner’s reported or presumed ethnicity. Of those, 788 were Tibetan, 507 were Uyghur, 315 were Han, 39 were Kazakh, 27 were Mongol, 9 were Hui, and 21 were of other ethnic groups. Of the 1,049 prisoners without recorded ethnicities, many were likely Han.

Religion

Of the 2,755 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,671 contained information on the

prisoner’s religious affiliation. 672 were Tibetan Buddhists, 485 were Falun Gong practitioners, 246 were Muslim, 83 were Protestants, 38 were members of the Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning), 22 were adherents of Mentu Hui, 18 were Jehovah’s Witnesses, 17 were Yi Guan Dao members, and 15 were Catholic.

Sex

Of the 2,755 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,714 were of male prisoners, 756 were of female prisoners, and 285 records did not contain information on the prisoner’s sex.

Sentencing

Of the 2,755 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,429 pertain to individuals serving prison sentences. Of those 1,429 prisoners, 1,335 were serving fixed-term sentences, 63 were serving life sentences, 24 were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, and 7 were sentenced to death.

Place of Detention





The table below shows the number of active detentions in each province-level administrative division:





Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	618	Jiangsu province	44
Sichuan province	407	Shanxi province	42
Tibet Autonomous Region	255	Jiangxi province	41
Guangdong province	167	Jilin province	39
Qinghai province	147	Shaanxi province	33
Gansu province	86	Shanghai municipality	27
Heilongjiang province	80	Fujian province	27
Beijing municipality	79	Yunnan province	26
Liaoning province	74	Zhejiang province	22
Hong Kong SAR	72	Chongqing municipality	19
Shandong province	70	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	15
Henan province	67	Tianjin municipality	13
Hebei province	66	Guizhou province	12
Hubei province	55	Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	8
Anhui province	52	Hainan province	1
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	46	Macau SAR	0
Hunan province	45		

POLITICAL PRISONER CASES OF CONCERN



Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) for credible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners or groups of prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the Commission's 2025 Annual Report highlight a small number of individuals whom Chinese authorities have

detained or sentenced for peacefully exercising their internationally recognized human rights. Members of Congress and the Administration are urged to advocate for these individuals in meetings with Chinese government and Communist Party officials. For more information on these cases and other cases raised in the Annual Report, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.

Name	PPD Record No.	Case Summary (as of June 30, 2025)
 <p>Peng Lifa 彭立发 2022-00176</p>	<p>Date of Detention Peng: October 13, 2022; Mei: April 2025; Fang: August 2024</p> <p>Place of Detention Peng: unknown location believed to be in Beijing municipality; Mei: unknown location believed to be in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province; Fang: unknown location believed to be in Loudi municipality, Hunan province</p> <p>Charge(s) All: Unknown</p> <p>Status All: Detained</p> <p>Context On October 13, 2022, days before the beginning of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Peng, also known online as Peng Zaizhou, hung banners from</p>	<p>Beijing's Sitong Bridge calling for PRC leader Xi Jinping to step down, criticizing the official response to COVID-19, and calling for elections. Following Peng's detention, information on his case was unclear, including his whereabouts, his condition and treatment in custody, and what charges, if any, he was facing.</p> <p>In April 2025, authorities in or around Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, detained Mei Shilin following the April 15 appearance of banners hung from a road overpass in Chengdu critical of Chinese Communist Party rule and calling for political reform; shortly after news emerged online about the protest, Mei was confirmed as the one responsible. Mei reportedly had been involved in a labor dispute with a former employer and had sought help in vain from Chengdu officials to resolve the dispute.</p> <p>On an unknown date between July 30 and August 3, 2024, police detained Fang Yirong after he staged a solo protest during which he demanded freedom and democracy and hung a banner on a bridge in Xinhua county, Loudi municipality, Hunan province. Inspired by the "White Paper" movement, a series of protests beginning in late November 2022 in reaction to the government's harsh zero-COVID measures, Fang began to engage in activism, advocating for democratic reforms.</p>
 <p>Mei Shilin 梅世林 2025-00043</p>		
 <p>Fang Yirong 方艺融 2024-00158</p>		
 <p>Gao Zhen 高甄 2024-00161</p>	<p>Date of Detention August 26, 2024</p> <p>Place of Detention Sanhe PSB Detention Center, Sanhe city, Langfang municipality, Hebei province</p> <p>Charge(s) Insulting or slandering heroes and martyrs</p>	<p>Status Detained, awaiting trial</p> <p>Context On August 26, 2024, police officers in Sanhe city, Langfang municipality, Hebei province, took into custody artist Gao Zhen at his Sanhe residence and studio. Police searched his studio, installed surveillance cameras, and seized artwork, books, and computer hard drives. Authorities held Gao at the Sanhe PSB Detention Center on suspicion of "insulting or slandering heroes and martyrs," reportedly in connection with his artwork, including on the theme of reassessing the Cultural Revolution.</p>

Name			
PPD Record No.		Case Summary (as of June 30, 2025)	
 <p>Zhang Zhan 张展 2020-00175</p>	<p>Date of Detention August 25, 2024</p>	<p>took citizen journalist Zhang Zhan into custody in Zhang's hometown of Xianyang municipality, Shaanxi province. Shortly thereafter, Shanghai police took Zhang to Shanghai, where she lives, and held her at the Pudong New District PSB Detention Center. Shanghai police criminally detained her on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble." Prior to her detention, Zhang had traveled to Gansu province to advocate for recently detained rights defender Zhang Pancheng.</p>	<p>Additional Information Zhang Zhan was previously detained from 2020 to 2024 in connection with her work documenting and reporting on the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, on social media. The Pudong New District People's Court sentenced Zhang to four years in prison for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble."</p>
	<p>Place of Detention Pudong New District PSB Detention Center, Shanghai municipality</p>		
	<p>Charge(s) Picking quarrels and provoking trouble</p>		
	<p>Status Detained, awaiting trial</p>		
	<p>Context On August 25, 2024, public security officials from Shanghai municipality</p>		
 <p>Chen Mingyu 陈明玉 2025-00105</p>	<p>Date of Detention July 4, 2024</p>	<p>Context Following a May 20, 2024, dinner gathering in Chongqing municipality where rights defenders celebrated the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as President of the Republic of China, Chongqing police questioned or took into custody over 20 attendees. On July 4, Yubei district police detained Chen Mingyu in connection with her attendance at the dinner, accusing</p>	<p>her of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" and holding her at the Yubei PSB Detention Center. On March 26, 2025, the Yubei District People's Court sentenced Chen to two years and six months in prison.</p>
	<p>Place of Detention Yubei District PSB Detention Center, Chongqing municipality</p>		
	<p>Charge(s) Picking quarrels and provoking trouble</p>		
	<p>Status Sentenced to two years</p>		
 <p>Xin Ruoyu 辛若雨 2025-00104</p>	<p>Date of Detention July 2024</p>	<p>Status Detained extralegally</p>	<p>reportedly detained Xin, a mother of one in her thirties, due to her work in developing a Christian app that provided users access to hymns and worship music along with a library of devotional material. Xin was reportedly held at a "black jail," an extralegal detention facility, believed to be in Shandong province.</p>
	<p>Place of Detention Unknown location believed to be in Shandong province</p>		
	<p>Charge(s) Unknown</p>		
 <p>Zhao Ying 赵颖 2025-00103</p>	<p>Date of Detention April 26, 2021</p>	<p>Status Sentenced to three years, six months</p>	<p>PSB Detention Center twice refused to admit her due to high blood pressure. Authorities indicted Zhao in February 2023 and detained her again on August 1, 2024. On October 29, the Haizhu District People's Court sentenced her to three years and six months in prison. Zhao has serious health conditions, including bladder cancer, a heart condition, and diabetes.</p>
	<p>Place of Detention Tianhe District PSB Detention Center, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province</p>		
	<p>Charge(s) Unknown</p>		

</

Name	
PPD Record No.	
Case Summary (as of June 30, 2025)	
<div></div> <div>Sherab (Jamyang Legshe) ཤེས་རབ་ (འཇམ་དབང་ལེགས་པ་ཤེད་) 西饶 (降央列谢) 2025-00072</div>	<div>Date of Detention February 2024</div> <div>Place of Detention Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province</div> <div>Charge(s) Unknown</div> <div>Status Sentenced to four years</div>
<div>Context In February 2024, police officials in Dege (or Derge; Chinese: Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, detained hundreds of Tibetan protesters, including monks from nearby monasteries and local laypeople, after thousands of residents protested against the planned construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) river which would flood six monasteries and two villages in the area. In June 2025, reports emerged that authorities had sentenced two senior monks from the threatened Yena Monastery. Sherab (also reported as Jamyang Legshe) received a four-year prison sentence, and Gonpo Tsering a three-year sentence.</div>	
<div></div> <div>Gulshan Abbas گولشەن ئابباس 古丽先·阿巴斯 2021-00002</div>	<div>Date of Detention September 11, 2018</div> <div>Place of Detention Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region</div> <div>Charge(s) Participating in a terrorist organization, aiding terrorist activities, and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order</div>
<div>Status Sentenced to 20 years</div> <div>Context Authorities initially detained retired Uyghur doctor Gulshan Abbas in Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, in September 2018, after her sister Rushan Abbas spoke at a think tank in Washington, D.C., about Uyghur rights issues. Family members surmised the detention was likely in retaliation for her sister's human rights advocacy. In December 2020, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that she had received a sentence of 20 years in prison. Gulshan Abbas reportedly suffers from high blood pressure, migraines, back problems, and osteoporosis.</div>	

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

The Commission makes the following recommendations for Administration and congressional action.

Create a Strategy to Address Transnational Repression

Transnational repression—including that being perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government—is a direct threat to national sovereignty, civil liberties, and the safety of persons residing in the United States and other countries. Congress and the executive branch should work on developing a whole-of-government strategy that equips federal agencies to deal with emerging risks, strengthens international partnerships, and supports diaspora communities.

Congress should—

- **Pass the Transnational Repression Policy Act (S. 2525/ H.R. 4829)** to expand authorities for U.S. law enforcement and the State Department to counter acts of transnational repression on U.S. soil.
- **Require a Transnational Repression Threat Report** from the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other relevant federal agencies to evaluate U.S. efforts to thwart transnational repression. The report should detail the following:
 - Investigations, prosecutions, and civil remedies pursued;
 - Interagency coordination and training initiatives;
 - Engagements with diaspora communities and support for NGOs seeking to shine a light on transnational repression;
 - Public diplomacy campaigns countering foreign propaganda and fear-based influence operations; and
 - Emerging threats and outreach to at-risk diaspora or exile communities.
- **Commission a Gap Analysis Report** from the Department of Justice evaluating whether current U.S. law sufficiently criminalizes and deters transnational repression and recommend any statutory changes necessary to fill legal gaps, particularly around foreign intelligence proxies and digital harassment tools.

The Administration should—

- **Deepen International Coordination and Intelligence Sharing** by convening biannual multilateral exercises—building on the G7’s transnational repression framework—to exchange real-time intelligence on coercive tactics and identify key actors engaged in cross-border intimidation.
- **Assess and Report on PRC Digital Platforms Used for Intimidation** by conducting a comprehensive risk assessment report evaluating how platforms such as WeChat, TikTok, and RedNote are employed for censorship, surveillance, disseminating propaganda, election interference, and the intimidation of U.S. residents. The report should include connections to PRC global propaganda and malign influence operations efforts and prioritize policy and enforcement recommendations.
- **Expand Victim Support and Legal Remedies** through broadening access to psychological counseling, legal services, and other assistance for victims under the *Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act* (Public Law No. 106-87), the *Victims of Crime Act* (34 U.S.C. §§ 20101–20111), and other measures to address the trauma, isolation, and civil rights harms suffered by targets of transnational repression.
- **Advance Global Accountability Mechanisms by—**
 - Championing the Creation of a U.N. Mandate for Transnational Repression—a special rapporteur or equivalent—tasked with documenting extraterritorial human rights abuses (e.g., abductions, threats, coercive returns), coordinating civil society input, and issuing annual findings.
 - Creating Sanctions and Enforcement Toolkits and disseminating model sanctions authorities and law enforcement training modules to help allies and partners detect, investigate, and prosecute instances of transnational repression.

Stop Seafood Imports Tainted with Forced Labor

The U.S. should stop imports of PRC seafood caught or processed with forced labor to protect American consumers from complicity in human rights abuse, to defend the

domestic fishing industry from unfair competition, and to pressure the PRC and corporations to end exploitative practices that violate international labor standards.

Congress should—

- **Pass the FISH Act (S. 688)** to target harmful fishing practices and forced labor in the PRC seafood industry.
- **Restrict Department of Defense Procurement of PRC Seafood Imports** and require reporting on the national security implications of federal procurement of seafood procurement in China, which are provisions of the *Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act* (S. 2560 / H.R. 4830).
- **Urge the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy** to issue clear guidance to all federal agencies to prohibit procurement of goods made with forced labor, particularly seafood processed in China or caught via “illegal, unreported, and unregulated” (IUU) fishing.
- **Direct the Secretary of State and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence** to report on the amount of foreign currency earned by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from North Koreans working in China and on the amount of seafood processed in China that skirts U.S. sanctions on Russian seafood imports.

The Administration should—

- **Implement Executive Order No. 14276, “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness,”** by—
 - Issuing an interagency Seafood Trade Strategy to combat IUU fishing, forced labor, and unfair trade practices;
 - Establishing a consolidated blacklist of vessels engaged in IUU fishing and Chinese facilities implicated in forced labor, aligning this list with the *Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act* (UFLPA) Entity List, with enforcement of the *Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act* (CAATSA), and with Withhold Release Orders (WROs);
 - Committing sufficient resources to law enforcement investigations to explore additional WROs for Chinese fleets engaged in IUU fishing and connected to the seafood processing industries of Shandong and Liaoning provinces, given their reliance on the forced labor of Uyghurs and North Koreans and the likely processing of banned Russian seafood;

- Supporting action to prohibit the procurement and commissary sales by the Department of Defense of seafood imported from China; and,
- Strengthening enforcement cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and key Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea and Japan, to improve data sharing and to align blacklists, enforcement actions, and port control.
- **Use the authorities available in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (Public Law No. 114-122)**, including sanctions and the freezing of assets of any person or company in the PRC that employs North Korean labor, particularly targeting the PRC seafood industry.

Free Unjustly Detained Americans in China

The PRC unjustly detains more Americans than any other country, using arbitrarily enforced criminal charges and “exit bans” to restrict the liberty of Americans on spurious grounds and gain diplomatic bargaining leverage.

Congress should—

- **Pass the Nelson Wells Jr. and Dawn Michelle Hunt Unjustly Detained in China Act (H.R. 5491) and the Countering Wrongful Detention Act (S. 1478 / H.R. 4179)** to create additional diplomatic resources and accountability measures to address the PRC's unjust detention and mistreatment of Americans in China.
- **Task the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC)** (created by 22 U.S.C. § 1741b) to include the PRC's use of exit bans as a form of hostage taking in its annual reporting.
- **Conduct Regular Hearings on U.S. efforts** to secure the release of unjustly detained nationals and to deter future abuses.

The Administration should—

- **Expand Multilateral Coordination** by convening a multilateral “Wrongful Detention Working Group” with G7 and other allies to align case management, consular affairs demarches, and intelligence on detention tactics.
- **Enhance Travel Advisories and Risk Assessments** by creating an “Unjustly Detained Risk” indicator, clearly distinguishing arbitrary detention threats from general safety concerns.
- **Nominate a Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs** as stipulated in the *Robert Levinson Hostage*

Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. § 1741a).

- **Provide Regular Congressional Briefings on Detentions** used to affect U.S. policy or intimidate U.S. citizens, including more detailed reporting on the PRC's use of exit bans and U.S. efforts to end this practice.

Strengthen Enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public Law No. 117-78)

The PRC's continued use of forced labor—particularly of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities—in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) not only sustains grave human rights abuses but also creates unfair competitive advantage for imports entering U.S. markets. Building on the UFLPA and the establishment of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF), the Administration and Congress should take the following actions.

Congress should—

- **Authorize Funding for Enforcement Technologies** to assist with the enhanced adoption of DNA-origin testing, isotopic analysis, blockchain supply-chain mapping, and machine-learning screening to flag XUAR-sourced goods—even in low-value parcels.
- **Give the FLETF Exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act** notice and comment requirements to protect sources and methods of their investigation into UFLPA forced labor entities similar to those given the Bureau of Industry and Security under Section 1762 of the *Export Control Reform Act* (50 U.S.C. 4821).
- **Mandate Corporate Accountability in Federal Procurement** by requiring all federal agencies to certify that contracts (particularly for vehicles, electronics, seafood, and textiles) contain no inputs sourced from forced labor regions, backed by full supply chain audits and third-party verification.
- **Request a Government Accountability Office Study** to evaluate whether the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is effectively enforcing the reporting requirements under the *Securities Exchange Act of 1934* and the *Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act* (Public Law No. 116-222), specifically regarding issuers' disclosure of transactions with Chinese companies listed on the Treasury Department's Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List), on the Commerce Department's Entity

and Unverified Lists, or those implicated in forced labor or sanctioned for human rights abuses.

- **Hold UFLPA Oversight Hearings** with FLETF agencies to ensure ongoing visibility into forced labor enforcement resource allocations, stakeholder engagement, enforcement priorities, entity list expansion, staffing, and petition responses.

The Administration should—

- **Use Appropriated Funds for “Entity-List Targeting”** by employing the \$5 million allocated by Congress in FY 2025 for technology acquisition to aid in UFLPA Entity List targeting, including database creation, secure compartmented information facility system updates, and other contract support.
- **Impose Targeted Sanctions for Forced Labor Complicity** using the sanctions authorities under Section 6 of the *Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act* (Public Law No. 116-145) on entities complicit in forced labor within global supply chains including in the seafood industry, aluminum industry, and automotive industry, among others.
- **Accelerate Entity-List Designation** to ensure that enforcement keeps pace with identified risks, leveraging existing Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) research to aggressively add companies, government bodies, and trade intermediaries with verifiable links to forced labor operations in the XUAR or upstream supply networks.
- **Expand Enforcement of Executive Order No. 14256** by directing that FLETF target international traders who use transshipment, origin masking, mislabeling, and other tactics to circumvent the elimination of the de minimis exception for small parcel and e-commerce shipments originating from China, particularly the XUAR.
- **Send Fast Fashion Retailers a Clear Message** by evaluating whether companies like Temu and SHEIN—if vertically integrated in manufacturing, sourcing, or warehousing—warrant inclusion on the UFLPA Entity List to clarify their legal obligations and potential liabilities related to forced labor.
- **Enhance Criminal Enforcement** by empowering the Department of Justice's Trade Fraud Task Force to investigate and prosecute UFLPA violations, particularly in sectors known for forced labor risk or deliberate transshipment schemes.

- **Promote Global Adoption of UFLPA-Style Measures** using bilateral and multilateral forums to encourage allies—especially in the G7, USMCA, and APEC—to enact comparable forced labor prohibitions and entity listing regimes and establish formal channels to share intelligence with partner governments to prevent transshipment and close enforcement gaps.
- **Consider Expanding Forced Labor Enforcement Efforts**, to further target the following sectors:
 - Seafood: IUU fishing fleets and PRC companies processing seafood caught by Russian fishing vessels or using North Korean labor; and
 - Electric Batteries: The import of lithium-ion batteries made in China produced with cobalt mined and processed using forced or child labor in the Democratic Republic of Congo and lithium mined by Chinese companies using state-sponsored forced labor transfer schemes.

Pursue Accountability for Human Rights Abuse and Cultural Erasure

Congress and the Administration should take urgent and coordinated action to confront atrocity crimes and other egregious human rights abuses perpetrated by the PRC against Uyghurs, Tibetans, ethnic Mongols, Hong Kongers, and other ethnic and religious communities. These include genocide, torture, arbitrary detention, systematic cultural erasure, forced assimilation, and transnational repression.

Congress should—

- **Pass Key Legislation** such as the *Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act* (S. 2560 / H.R. 4830), the *Uyghur Policy Act* (H.R. 2635 / S. 1542), and the *Southern Mongolian Human Rights Policy Act* (S. 288) in order to expand accountability tools and elevate U.S. policy responses to atrocity crimes and PRC actions that endanger cultures.
- **Request a Sanctions Evaluation** from the Treasury Department on the enforcement and impact of Global Magnitsky sanctions imposed on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).
- **Create an Endangered Voices of East Asia Fund** to support the preservation of at-risk languages and traditions—such as Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and Cantonese—through educational initiatives, academic research, and documentation of efforts by the PRC to suppress cultural identity.

- **Consider Legislation to Increase Financial Transparency** for nonprofit organizations that fail to disclose financial interests in PRC entities tied to forced labor, organ harvesting, other gross human rights abuses, or China's civil-military fusion efforts.

The Administration should—

- **Appoint a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues**, as mandated by the *Tibetan Policy Act*, as amended by the *Tibetan Policy and Support Act* (Public Law No. 116-260) at a senior level to coordinate U.S. Government policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet.
- **Produce a Report Identifying all PRC Public Security and Police Entities** that can be considered by the Bureau of Industry and Security for addition to the Entity List, blocking their access to U.S. biometric and surveillance technologies.
- **Use authorities and funding provided by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (Public Law No. 116-260)** to preserve the cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of Tibetan communities both inside China and in exile.
- **Advocate for a U.N. Security Council session**, through an open debate or Arria-formula briefing, to address the security risks posed by gross human rights violations in the XUAR and Tibet.
- **Elevate the State Department Travel Advisory** for the XUAR and Tibetan regions to discourage Americans from participating in state-managed tourism that may legitimize or facilitate atrocity crimes.

End Forced Organ Harvesting

Testimony and evidence provided to Congress include troubling allegations that the PRC engages in systematic and illegal harvesting of organs—in blatant violation of human rights and medical ethics—including by targeting specific ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities held in detention.

Congress should—

- **Pass the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act (H.R. 1503)** to expand annual reporting by the State Department on forced organ harvesting globally and to give needed authorities to stop “organ tourism.”
- **Ask the State Department to Offer Rewards** for credible evidence that will deter and disrupt the market for illegally procured organs and hold accountable those responsible for the practice of forced organ harvesting.

The Administration should—

- **Deny U.S. Entry Visas** for physicians and researchers known to be involved in forced organ harvesting activities and research and announce such decisions publicly.
- **Pursue Accountability Actions** by sanctioning entities complicit in forced organ harvesting or illegal organ trafficking in the XUAR and add them to the Department of the Treasury’s “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List,” which would prevent financial transactions with U.S. companies or research institutions.
- **Report on Federal Funding** provided to PRC entities involved in unethical organ transplantation practices, including those that violate human subject research protections outlined in the Common Rule and the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) policy on human subject protection and publicly announce the prohibition of such entities from receiving future NIH and National Science Foundation grants.

Defend Human Rights in Hong Kong

The Administration should fully and consistently apply the sanctions authorities provided under the *Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act* (Public Law No. 116-76) and the *Hong Kong Autonomy Act* (Public Law No. 116-149) to hold accountable government officials, prosecutors, judges, police, and others complicit in the political persecution of Hong Kongers and the systematic erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy.

Congress should—

- **Pass the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act (H.R. 2661)** to determine if Hong Kong’s three U.S.-based offices should have diplomatic immunity and other privileges.
- **Pass the Hong Kong Judicial Sanctions Act (S. 1755 / H.R. 733)** to mandate stronger sanctions on officials responsible for undermining democracy, human rights, and due process.
- **Pass the Stop CCP Money Laundering Act (S. 1339)**, which requires a determination on whether Hong Kong is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern and a report on whether U.S. and foreign financial institutions operating in Hong Kong are capable of preventing the transfer of products, technology, and funds intended to evade U.S. sanctions.

- **Remove the Sunset Date on Sales of Police Equipment** to permanently prohibit the sale of U.S. police and crowd-control equipment to the Hong Kong Police Force, ensuring that American technology is not used to suppress peaceful dissent.
- **Support Secure Digital Infrastructure** to protect Hong Kongers from transnational repression by digital means, archive banned books and digital content, and facilitate diaspora-led news outlets and investigative journalism.

The Administration should—

- **Use Existing Sanctions** authorities provided under the *Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act* (Public Law No. 116-76) and the *Hong Kong Autonomy Act* (Public Law No. 116-149) to hold accountable government officials, prosecutors, judges, police, and foreign financial institutions for the systematic erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and fundamental freedoms.
- **Coordinate Sanctions with the United Kingdom** and other like-minded allies to maximize diplomatic pressure and visibility.
- **Issue a Financial Institutions Report** as required by Section 5(b) of the *Hong Kong Autonomy Act* (Public Law No. 116-149), as the last such report was issued in 2022.
- **Provide Regular Briefings on Jimmy Lai** and engage in other diplomatic efforts to free Hong Kong political prisoners such as **Joshua Wong, Chow Hang-tung, Gwyneth Ho, Benny Tai, and Lee Cheuk-yan.**

Confront Malign PRC Influence Operations

A unified, bipartisan approach—blending enforcement, transparency, community protection, and capacity building—can address the human rights implications of the CCP’s covert influence networks, uplift vulnerable populations, and reinforce the integrity of U.S. political, academic, and civil society institutions.

Congress should—

- **Stand Up an Interagency Influence Hub** by tasking the State Department to chair a “Global PRC Influence Observatory,” drawing in DNI, DOJ, Commerce, and civil society liaisons.
- **Require the Director of National Intelligence to create a semiannual open access assessment** on the impact of

PRC malign influence by region (Africa, Latin America, Pacific Islands, etc.) and analyze consequences for U.S. security, human rights, and economic interests.

- **Deepen Linguistic and Cultural Expertise** by scaling up Mandarin Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan-language immersion programs in U.S. high schools and colleges, leveraging the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative as a model.
- **Safeguard Vulnerable Diasporas** by directing DHS to report annually on efforts to shield diaspora communities and human rights NGOs from PRC digital harassment—detailing tool distribution, training sessions, and incident response metrics.
- **Pass the SHIELD Against CCP Act (H.R. 708 / S. 1625)** to form a working group at DHS tasked with improving cybersecurity, protecting critical infrastructure, and fighting threats to democratic institutions posed by the CCP.

The Administration should—

- **Shut Down CCP Covert Networks** by terminating any U.S. operations of the United Front Work Department, PRC Ministry of Public Security “police stations” (a.k.a. “service stations”), and affiliated entities, by sanctioning those complicit in facilitating these networks, including freezing assets or revoking visas.
- **Elevate Intelligence Sharing** by conducting quarterly briefings for key allies and partners on FMIC findings and creating a secure portal to distribute declassified FMIC threat assessments to federal, state, and local agencies.
- **Protect At-Risk Communities** by scaling the FBI’s “Protected Voices” program into a nationwide awareness campaign—webinars, hotlines, and community workshops—to help journalists, academics, and diaspora groups guard against PRC cyber intrusion, doxxing, and intimidation.
- **Roll Out Updated Intrusion Detection Tools** through the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to individuals, NGOs, faith organizations, and ethnic community centers at highest risk of PRC surveillance and digital intimidation in the United States.

Defeat Digital Authoritarianism

The PRC attempts to export censorship, surveillance, and information manipulation tactics to undermine democratic

institutions and enable the repression of dissent at home and abroad, including the intimidation of U.S. citizens, residents, and businesses.

The Administration should—

- **Create a “Digital Freedom Task Force”** charged with coordinating U.S. agencies, Congress, civil society, and industry partners to undermine the PRC’s Great Firewall, disrupt its export of surveillance and censorship tools, and safeguard global internet openness.
- **Brief Congress on a “China Censorship Monitor and Action Group”** strategy to address PRC-directed censorship in the United States and enhance the U.S. Government’s response to digital authoritarianism.
- **Create Cyber Resilience Programs** that run webinars and disseminate toolkits that ensure that activists, dissidents, and diaspora know and can use vetted secure communications and anti-hacking tools available through CISA at DHS.
- **Scale Digital Freedom Programs** by leveraging the Countering the PRC’s Malign Influence Fund to:
 - Support investigative journalism in countries hosting Belt and Road Initiative projects, exposing corruption, malign influence tactics, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks;
 - Advance anti-circumvention technologies through seed grants for research and development of next-generation platforms, including decentralized VPNs and peer-to-peer mesh networks and integrate these tools with public diplomacy efforts and a modernized international broadcasting architecture; and
 - Strengthen independent organizations dedicated to overcoming the censorship of the PRC’s Great Firewall.

Advocate for Political Prisoners

Advocating for political prisoners serves U.S. interests by targeting PRC efforts to censor independent thought and export repression beyond its borders—including against U.S. citizens and residents. Through consistent and persistent advocacy for political prisoners, coupled with public diplomacy efforts about political prisoners, the United States champions fundamental freedoms that have made America strong and prosperous and empowers local actors who often support freedom, transparency, and values aligned with long-term American strategic interests. Experience also shows that diplomatic efforts for individual prisoners can

lead to better treatment in detention, reduced sentences, or even release.

Congress should—

- **Pass the FREEDOM for Gao Zhisheng Act (H.R. 5303)** to focus diplomatic advocacy and accountability efforts for arbitrarily detained Chinese rights defenders.
- **Engage PRC Officials on Political Prisoners** using the information compiled in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, an authoritative resource on political and religious detention in China and Hong Kong.
- **“Adopt” Political Prisoners** through resources provided by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s Defending Freedoms Project.

The Administration should—

- **Maintain Comprehensive and Regularly Updated Prisoner Lists**, drawing on the CECC’s Political Prisoner Database and other credible sources. These lists should include detailed case information to enable Administration officials—at the highest levels and in every appropriate engagement—to raise specific cases directly with PRC counterparts.
- **Designate a Senior Official** within the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to assist the families of political prisoners and coordinate the diplomatic efforts of the regional bureaus across the U.S. Government and with international partners, aimed at securing the release of political and religious prisoners and ending the PRC’s abusive use of exit bans.

Evaluate Human Rights Diplomacy

Given the creation of a new Bureau of Foreign Assistance, Humanitarian Affairs, and Religious Freedom and plans for regional bureaus to assume responsibility for human rights diplomacy, the Administration should issue a policy directive affirming that defending human rights and democracy, opposing forced labor in supply chains, advocating for political prisoners, and supporting open access to information are integral to the mission strategies of all U.S. embassies and any U.S. Government entity or agency engaging with the People’s Republic of China.

Congress should—

- **Require a Human Rights Strategy**, and if necessary fund, a State Department report that translates recent

reorganizations into clear policy, resourcing, performance, and accountability measures for all U.S. country strategies and diplomatic engagements with the PRC, including:

- Integration of human rights and international religious freedom diplomacy into Integrated Country Strategies, Joint Regional Strategies, Mission Resource Requests, and security assistance/arms transfer processes;
- Interagency coordination with DHS, Treasury, Labor, and Commerce on forced labor, sanctions and visa restrictions, transnational repression, and open information/anti-censorship efforts;
- Workforce measures—mandatory training, promotion and awards precepts, performance metrics—and public diplomacy requirements; and
- A strategic impact analysis of any reductions to programs that assist human rights defenders, produce research and data on abuses, or document forced labor in the PRC.
- **Require a Government Accountability Office Multi-Year Performance Audit** that:
 - Evaluates initial progress in integrating human rights diplomacy across regional bureaus and measures the effects of foreign assistance program cuts on U.S. interests; and
 - In subsequent reports, assesses the effectiveness of efforts to mitigate forced labor, address unjust detentions and atrocities, and tackle other priority concerns; examines the impact of training standards and incentives tied to human rights tradecraft; and analyzes the national security implications of changes to foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs for overall human rights goals.

The Administration should—

- **Regularly Brief Members of Congress** on its PRC human rights strategy, including concrete developments on forced labor, the unjust detention of Americans, transnational repression, mitigating ongoing human rights abuse, including genocide, and the strategic impact of foreign assistance programs, including use of the Democracy Fund, the Countering the PRC’s Malign Influence Fund, and religious freedom funds to advance U.S. interests.

Create a Robust Public Diplomacy Strategy

The Chinese Communist Party invests heavily to steer global narratives and censor dissenting opinions, integrating state-directed media control, content partnerships, and aggressive information operations into a sophisticated strategic weapon. The U.S. must respond by building out a world-class public diplomacy capability to advance national interests, values, and strategic objectives because truth remains the CCP's greatest vulnerability.

Congress should—

- **Fund International Broadcasting** and innovative digital platforms and new media and provide oversight for a robust public diplomacy strategy that will focus on communicating factual information about U.S. policy and values to foreign audiences, expose the malign activity of authoritarian regimes, and ensure uncensored

global access to free and open information, particularly in East Asia, where the news and information services of *Radio Free Asia* and *Voice of America* regularly exposed CCP corruption and human rights abuses in Mandarin, Cantonese, Tibetan and Uyghur.

- **Institutionalize Funding Pathways for Censorship Circumvention Tools** and partnerships that bypass or dismantle the censorship systems of authoritarian regimes and enable access to fact-based content in repressive information environments such as the PRC.

The Administration should—

- **Provide Congress with a Public Diplomacy Strategy** and a timetable for implementing reinvigorated international strategic communications, global messaging, and information operations.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China

243 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-226-3766

www.cecc.gov