CECC 2004 Annual Report

FINDINGS

• Forced evictions in urban areas and the requisition of farm­land in rural areas are fueling a wave of popular anger at offi­cials and developers and a growing number of citizen petitions, legal disputes, and social protests across China.
• Despite strong central government initiatives and some local efforts to curb illegal land transactions and abuses related to land transfers, procedures and compensation standards for the government requisition of land use rights and buildings con­tinue to be weighted heavily in favor of the government and developers.
• Existing procedural protections are inadequate to protect the rights and economic interests of urban residents and farmers whose land is requisitioned and to check endemic corruption in the land sector. Petitioners and some legal representatives seeking redress of grievances related to evictions and land req­uisitions have been detained or harassed.

Land Ownership in China

Under China’s Constitution and the PRC Land Management Law, the state owns urban land and peasant collectives own most rural and suburban land.⁸⁶¹  Within the framework of urban state ownership, state entities, private entities, and citizens may be granted or allocated land use rights.⁸⁶² Although in the past, work units assigned housing to most urban residents without charge or for nominal rent, in the mid-1990s the central government adopted policies that encouraged urban residents to purchase apartments from their work units, often at heavily subsidized rates or with lim­ited transfer rights.⁸⁶³ In rural areas, the PRC Rural Land Con­tracting Law gives farmers 30-year land use rights to individual plots of land free from local readjustments.⁸⁶⁴  In both urban and rural contexts, individuals hold a land use right and may own buildings or fixtures, but ownership of the land itself remains in the hands of the state or the collective.⁸⁶⁵

Over the last decade, rapid economic growth, skyrocketing land prices, and urban renewal have resulted in the large-scale redevel­opment and expansion of China’s urban centers.⁸⁶⁶  To make room for new infrastructure and private developments, urban authorities are tearing down older residential areas and relocating residents to new housing or providing them with nominal compensation. The scale of the redevelopment and relocations is enormous. From 1991 to 2003, for example, Shanghai city authorities relocated nearly 900,000 households, or 1.2 million people.⁸⁶⁷  In 2002 alone, Beijing authorities relocated 86,000 people, and city officials plan to dis­place 300,000 more in the next several years as they prepare for the 2008 Olympics.⁸⁶⁸  The same pattern is evident in urban areas across China.⁸⁶⁹

In the countryside, authorities are converting large tracts of farmland to accommodate urban expansion and village economic initiatives. To proceed with such projects, the state must first req­uisition arable land from and compensate peasant collectives ac­cording to a detailed legal process set out in the Land Management Law and related regulations.⁸⁷⁰ After the state compensates the collective for requisitioned land, it may then use the land or sell land use rights to private developers.⁸⁷¹  According to official esti­mates, nearly 5 percent of the country’s arable land has been lost as a result of urbanization and development over the past seven years, and more than 40 million peasants have been displaced by such development over the past 20 years.⁸⁷²  This trend has alarmed Chinese authorities, who view landless, unemployed peas­ants as a threat to social stability.⁸⁷³

Problems in Urban Relocations and Rural Land Requisitions

Although many relocations take place without incident,⁸⁷⁴ a number of problems and abuses have been associated with reloca­tions and land requisitions in China. Urban residents are supposed to be paid the market value of their land use rights and structures.⁸⁷⁵  But most of the value of urban property lies in the land itself, which the state owns, and not in the dilapidated structures that often stand on it or the limited land use rights held by many residents (if they hold any formal land use rights at all).⁸⁷⁶  As such, in many cities, relocation and resettlement compensation is not sufficient for residents to purchase new homes in comparable locations. Resettlement housing is often located in distant suburbs, detached from the social and business networks in which residents have lived and worked for years.⁸⁷⁷  Such displacement angers many residents.⁸⁷⁸  In rural areas, collectives retain much of the compensation that the state provides when it requisitions arable land, and the small amount that farmers do receive is significantly less than the economic value of the 30-year land use right that the Rural Land Contracting Law guarantees to farmers.⁸⁷⁹  As a result, farmers end up landless and, once they have exhausted their small subsidies, unemployed and without a source of income.⁸⁸⁰

State transfers of land also create significant incentives for cor­ruption. Because compensation is low under existing legal stand­ards, local government entities can compensate residents and farmers or provide resettlement housing at nominal cost and then sell land use rights to developers at a significant profit.⁸⁸¹  In some cases, corrupt officials, developers, and demolition companies siphon off funds intended for compensation or resettlement, fail to provide promised resettlement housing, or unfairly reduce compensation amounts through fraudulent appraisals or other tactics.⁸⁸²  The large number of illegal land transactions in China is one indication of the extent of such corruption. Last year alone, the government identified more than 178,000 illegal or irregular land transactions, and in August 2004 it announced that it had suspended work on 4,800 illegal development zones.⁸⁸³

Procedures for urban demolitions and rural land requisitions lack transparency and are heavily weighted in favor of the government and developers. Generally, government authorities do not give urban residents an opportunity to comment on or challenge general development plans or specific demolition decisions before they are made.⁸⁸⁴  In most cases, officials simply inform residents that they will be relocated and give them a limited time to negotiate com­pensation and move.⁸⁸⁵  Residents may challenge the amount of compensation offered, but cannot stop the demolition process once government arbitration panels rule on compensation disputes, even if they appeal the arbitration decision to a people’s court.⁸⁸⁶  In many rural areas, courts often refuse to accept land disputes altogether.⁸⁸⁷  New regulations obligate land officials to hold hearings on a limited range of land requisition decisions, and farmers may request a hearing to comment on compensation plans or plans to convert agricultural land for non-agricultural use.⁸⁸⁸  In practice, however, urban and rural residents have little chance of over­turning a demolition or land requisition decision or challenging the purpose for which land is taken, and at most can hope only to im­prove their compensation.⁸⁸⁹

Finally, as documented in Chinese and Western media, reports by international human rights organizations, and Chinese govern­ment circulars, government officials, developers, and demolition companies often employ abusive tactics to deal with recalcitrant residents. According to such reports, developers and demolition per­sonnel have cut off water and electricity, used physical threats and other forms of intimidation, and resorted to violence to deal with residents who refuse to move or who hold out for additional com-pensation.⁸⁹⁰  Although the central government has issued stern warnings for such “uncivilized” demolitions and land seizures to stop and has prosecuted some companies and individuals for abuses,⁸⁹¹ reports of violent evictions and coercion continue to emerge.⁸⁹²

Social Conflicts Related to Property Takings

Over the past year, property seizures and relocations in China’s cities and the requisition of farmland for development in rural re­gions have become two leading causes of social discontent in China. According to official statistics, the Ministry of Land and Resources received more than 18,620 complaints related to relocation in the first half of 2004 alone, compared with 18,071 complaints in all of last year.⁸⁹³ In December 2003, Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Xiao Yang reported that the fastest growing categories of administrative lawsuits in China relate to “urban construction” and “land resources.” ⁸⁹⁴ More disturbing to government and Party offi­cials, demonstrations, social protests, and violent confrontations related to property seizures are on the rise.⁸⁹⁵  In one shocking inci­dent last year, several individuals burned themselves in Tiananmen Square to protest the demolition of their homes.⁸⁹⁶  A leading Chinese social scientist reports that property rights have now displaced tax burdens as the primary focus of peasant activism.⁸⁹⁷  State Council circulars and official statements acknowledge that property protests are serious, widespread, and “influencing so­cial stability and the normal order of production and life.”⁸⁹⁸

Alarmed by such social unrest, central government leaders have expressed growing concern about land abuses and taken a series of steps to address the problem and demonstrate sympathy with pop­ular grievances. Over the past year, the National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted a new constitutional amendment to enhance the protection of property rights and is reportedly working on a Prop­erty Law, a Law on the Protection of Peasant Rights, and revisions to the Land Management Law.⁸⁹⁹  Observers expect these new leg­islative initiatives to increase compensation standards for land req­uisitions and address some of the most common complaints related to relocations. The government appointed a high-level policymaker to oversee demolition and land requisition reforms and has issued numerous regulations and circulars in an attempt to address com­mon public complaints about evictions and improve procedures.⁹⁰⁰  Central authorities also attempted to rein in land corruption by re­moving the Minister of Land and Resources and undertaking a se­ries of investigation and rectification campaigns in both urban and rural areas.⁹⁰¹

Some local governments and lawyers associations have also taken positive steps to address land conflicts. In Shanghai, for ex­ample, the government has worked to publicize information regard­ing resident rights and re-evaluate local compensation standards, while the local lawyers association has introduced a city-wide legal assistance project to provide pro bono representation for displaced residents.⁹⁰²  In July 2004, Shanghai also announced that it was raising the minimum standard compensation for relocations, al­though residents have complained that even the new compensation level is not in line with market standards.⁹⁰³

At the same time, government authorities have used severe tac­tics in an effort to suppress public dissent and unrest related to land transactions. For example, central authorities issued a direc­tive instructing local officials to keep land petitioners out of Beijing during the 2004 NPC session and arbitrarily detained or repatri­ated some petitioners who managed to enter the city.⁹⁰⁴  Both the State Council and local authorities have instructed the news media to limit reporting on relocation disputes to avoid “intensifying con­flicts.” ⁹⁰⁵  In some cases, activists and legal advocates for displaced residents have also been harassed or prosecuted.⁹⁰⁶  In one recent example, a court in Shanghai convicted Zheng Enchong, a lawyer who represented evicted residents in a sensitive demolition case, of "disclosing state secrets.” In the wake of Zheng’s conviction, Shang­hai lawyers expressed concern about taking on property rights cases that involve direct challenges to the government.⁹⁰⁷  In other cases, land petitioners have reportedly been sent to re-education through labor camps.⁹⁰⁸

Although central government concern about land abuses appears to be genuine,⁹⁰⁹ the many government circulars on urban demolitions and rural land requisitions and reports on protests suggest that forced evictions continue to be a problem. As senior Chinese legislators noted in June 2004, local governments are re­sisting efforts to curb abuses.⁹¹⁰  According to foreign and Chinese experts, additional changes will be necessary to address the reloca­tion and land transfer problem. First, they argue that more precise guidelines are needed for when land can lawfully be taken by the government and sold for redevelopment.⁹¹¹  Compensation stand­ards, the key issue in the majority of relocation disputes, need to be enhanced.⁹¹²  Finally, procedures for urban demolitions and rural land requisitions remain stacked in favor of the government and developers. Chinese experts note that demolition and reloca­tion disputes should be resolved through a neutral judicial process, and not by administrative agencies with connections to developers.⁹¹³  Until the government implements such protections, high land values are likely to continue to fuel local corruption and fur­ther unrest.

861 PRC Constitution, art. 10; PRC Land Management Law, adopted 25 June 86, amended 29 December 88, and 29 August 98. None of the Constitution, the Land Management Law, and other relevant regulations and interpretations clearly defines the nature of collective ownership. Collectively owned land is typically managed and administered by village committees. Peter Ho, “Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights, and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity,” 177 China Quarterly 394, 397–401 (August 2001).

862 PRC Urban Real Estate Management Law, adopted 5 July 94.

863 Commission Staff Interviews; Property Seizures in China: Politics, Law and Protest, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 June 04, Written State­ment of Patrick A. Randolph, Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City. In other cases, residents who had been living on urban property for years were simply permitted to con­tinue residing in old homes and buildings without any formal land use rights or transfer of in­terest. Commission Staff Interviews.

864 PRC Rural Land Contracting Law, adopted 29 August 02. Article 5 states that “members of rural collective economic entities have the right to contract rural land that is allocated through contracting by their own rural collective economic entity.” Article 20 states the con­tracting term for arable land is 30 years.

865 PRC Constitution; PRC Land Management Law; PRC Urban Real Estate Management Law.

866 For one English-language account of China’s growing cities, see Howard W. French, “New Boomtowns Change Path of China’s Growth,” New York Times, 28 July 04, <www.nytimes.com>. A recent Xinhua story notes that Chinese cities will need a total of 200 million square meters of additional living space annually until 2020 to accommodate urban growth. “Research Esti­mates 200 Million Square-Meter Annual Need in New Urban Residences,” Xinhua, 2 June 04 (FBIS, 2 June 04). China currently has more than 15,000 highway projects underway that will add more than 162,000 kilometers of road to the country. Ted Fishman, “The Chinese Century,” New York Times, 4 July 04, <www.nytimes.com>.

867 Official statistics provided in Commission Staff Interview. Shanghai has announced plans to relocate an additional 80,000 families in 2004. “Developer Calling for Halt to Urban Renova­tion in Shanghai,” Xinhua, 4 February 04, <news.xinhuanet.com>.

868 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Claims of Olympic Eviction Denied,” South China Morning Post, 11 March 04, <www.scmp.com>. The Geneva-based Center on Housing Rights and Evictions claims that 300,000 have been evicted in preparation for the Olympics. The head of the Beijing Munic­ipal Administration of State Land denied this, claiming that 18,000 people would be relocated for this purpose, but added that 300,000 individuals would be relocated as part of an overall urban renewal effort in Beijing. According to Mr. Miao, more than 400,000 households have been relocated in Beijing since 1991. Liu Li, “City Denies Reports on Large-Scale Evictions,” China Daily, 11 March 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>.

869 For example, in 2003 alone, 24,000 families were relocated in Chengdu. Commission Staff Interview. In 2003, between 200,000 and 300,000 people were relocated in Tianjin, a number equal to the total for the prior five years. “Seeking the Locus of China’s Urban Property Housing Price Comprehensive Rise in 2004” [2004 xunzhao zhongguo chengshi fangjia quanmian shangyan de guiji], 21st Century Business Herald [21 shiji jingji baodao], 25 May 04, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>.

870 PRC Land Administration Law, chapter V.

871 PRC Land Administration Law, chapter V; PRC Urban Real Estate Management Law, art.

872 “China’s Farmland Dwindles by 6 Million Ha in Seven Years,” Xinhua, 25 June 04 (FBIS, 25 June 04).

873 “CPC General Secretary Calls for Strict Farmland Protection,” Xinhua. Chinese officials have expressed concern that landless, jobless farmers could threaten “social stability.” “China’s Farmland Dwindles by 6 Million Ha in Seven Years,” Xinhua.

874 Both governmental and non-governmental sources in China contend that in many cases, relocations take place without incident and residents are willing to move because they are pro­vided with resettlement housing that is better than their dilapidated homes in city centers. Commission Staff Interviews.

875 See, e.g., Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Regulations [Chengshi fangwu chaiqian guanli tiaoli], issued 6 June 01, art. 24; Guidance Opinion for Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Appraisal [Chengshi fangwu chaiqian pinggu zhidao yijian], issued 1 October 03, arts. 3, 12, 14.

876 Commission Staff Interviews.

877 Commission Staff Interviews. “Forced Demolitions Blur Rights,” China Daily, 21 April 04 (FBIS, 21 April 04).

878 Commission Staff Interviews. Some residents and observers interviewed by Commission staff noted that many residents are willing to relocate because they typically have a higher standard of living in resettlement housing. They note if transportation networks were better, other displaced residents who are unhappy would not feel so disadvantaged. See also Bill Savadove, “Shanghai Increases Payout for Eviction,” South China Morning Post, 23 July 04 (FBIS, 23 July 04) (noting complaints by relocated Shanghai residents that “low-cost housing is located far outside the city centre with poor transport and other infrastructure”) and Leu Siew Ying, “Doomed Art Village Group Take Battle to the Top,” South China Morning Post, 22 July04 (FBIS, 22 July 04) (quoting one displaced resident who complained that “The compensation won’t be enough to buy a house half the size of my present house, let alone land for the garden. But it’s not just a question of money. We have put a lot in to build our home.”)

879 Under the PRC Land Administration Law, when the state requisitions farmland from the collective, it pays compensation for loss of land, crops and fixtures and a resettlement subsidy. PRC Land Management Law, art. 47. According to Professor Roy Prosterman, even if all of this amount were paid directly to the farmers, under current compensation standards, it would be insufficient to compensate them for the economic value of a 30-year land use right. Property Seizures in China: Politics, Law and Protest, Testimony and Written Statement of Roy Prosterman, President, Rural Development Institute. In practice, most of the compensation funds are kept by the local governments and collectives and only a small amount is paid directly to farmers. Tang Min, “New Rules Protect Farmers Who Lose Land,” China Daily, 15 February04, (FBIS, 15 February 04) (noting that according to official statistics, 60 to 70 percent of the compensation for land requisitions goes to local governments, 25 to 30 percent to village collec­tive units, and less than 10 percent to the farmers themselves); “Delegates Discussing National Affairs,” China Daily, 11 March 04 (FBIS, 11 March 04) (citing a senior official as noting that farmers receive little compensation and local governments attempt to profit from land seizures). Land officials interviewed by the Commission acknowledged that the economic value of the 30­year land use right is not fully compensated for when rural land is requisitioned, but argued that farmers who lose their land are taken care of in other ways. Commission Staff Interviews.

880 “China’s Farmland Dwindles by 6 Million Ha in Seven Years,” Xinhua. There are some ex­periments under way to alleviate this problem. Authorities in Chengdu are experimenting with higher compensation standards and a social security system to provide basic living necessities for farmers who have lost their land. Commission Staff Interviews.

881 Han Baojiang, “Farmland Wastage Must End,” China Daily, 22 March 04 (FBIS, 22 March 04); “The Land Beneath Their Feet,” China Daily, 16 March 04 (FBIS, 16 March 04); “Delegates Discussing National Affairs,” China Daily. According to one Xinhua article, “Some local govern­ments lavished land use rights just to fill up their coffers. According to statistics, proceeds from land auctions by some governments at county and city levels made up about 35 percent of their fiscal income.” “Effective Actions Called for to Constrain Fast Loss of Arable Land in China,” Xinhua, 12 March 04 (FBIS, 12 March 04). For a detailed English-language discussion of these and other problems, see Philip P. Pan, “Chinese Fight a New Kind of Land War,” Washington Post, 14 September 03, <www.washingtonpost.com>.

882 For a detailed description of corruption related to land transfers and relocations, see Human Rights Watch, “Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in China,” March 2004, and Property Seizures in China: Politics, Law and Protest, Testimony of Sara (Meg) Davis, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch. Such corruption has also been noted by many domestic Chinese sources. See, e.g., “The Land Beneath Their Feet,” China Daily; Robert J. Saiget, “PRC Vice Minister Says ‘Great Deal’ of Corruption in Property Mar­ket,” Agence France-Presse, 18 September 03 (FBIS, 18 September 03) (citing Liu Zhifeng, vice minister of construction, as stating “at present there is indeed a great deal of corruption in real estate development especially in the relocation of people and city planning.”). According to Sheng Huaren, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, farmers are owed at least 9.88 billion yuan (1.2 million US dollars) in unpaid land requisition compensation and relocation fees.” China’s Farmland Dwindles by 6 Million Ha in Seven Years,” Xinhua. According to Commission sources, there are often close personal and business relationships between land officials and de­velopers. Commission Staff Interviews.

883 Zhang Shaoli, “The National Land Ministry Announces Illegal Land Cases, Local Govern­ments are the Focus of Investigation,” [Guotubu gongbu tudi weifa anjian, difang zhengfu chen chachu zhongdian], Procuratorial Daily [Jiancha ribao], 24 March 04, <www.jcrb.com.cn>; “Chi-na’s Farmland Dwindles by 6 Million Ha in Seven Years,” Xinhua. According to Chinese sources, permits for 3,763 of these zones have been revoked; “China Alert To Severe Farmland Reduction in Urbanization Process,” Xinhua, 9 July 04 (FBIS, 9 July 04); Cao Daosheng, “China Cancels 4,800 Development Zones,” China Daily, 24 August 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>. According to official reports, China filed more than 30,000 cases involving illegal land transactions in the first half of 2004. Xie Dengke, “More Than 30,000 Illegal Land Cases Investigated and Prosecuted in the First Half of the Year” [Shang ban nian chachu tudi weifan yu 3 wan jian], Guangming Daily [Guangming ribao], 19 July 04, <www.gmw.cn>.

884 Human Rights Watch, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in China. Chinese officials in three cities and in relevant national-level ministries confirmed that there is no notice and comment period during which affected urban residents are entitled to express their views on general city planning and development decisions or approvals for spe­cific projects that may affect them. Commission Staff Interviews. In a recent article in Southern Weekend, one reporter argued that citizens should be involved in city planning, noting that cit­izen participation is the foundation of the planning process in many developed countries. Gu Haibing, “City Residents Should be Allowed to Participate in ‘Overall City Planning”’ [“Chengshi zongti guihua” yinggai rang shimin canyu], Southern Weekend, 1 April 04, <www.nanfangdaily.com.cn>.

885 Commission Staff Interviews; Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Reg­ulations, arts. 7–17.

886 Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Regulations, arts. 16; Urban Hous­ing Demolition and Relocation Arbitration Work Rules [Chengshi fangwu chaiqian xingzheng caijue gongzuo guicheng], issued 30 December 03, arts. 17–21.

887 Chang Hongxiao, “Firming Up the Rural Land Contracting Law.”

888 Regulations on Land and Resources Hearings [Guotu ziyuan tingzheng guiding], issued 9 January 04. Under the regulation, land officials must hold public hearings when they (1) estab­lish or revise benchmark land prices, (2) prepare or revise a land use master plan and mineral resources plan, (3) establish or revise regional compensation standards for land requisition, or(4) upon the request of an effected landowner, if a requisition involves (a) a plan for formulating compensation standards and resettlement packages for intended land requisition projects or (b)a plan for using basic agricultural land for non-agricultural development. Although the regula­tion applies to both urban and rural areas, its language suggests that it is primarily intended to cover requisitions of agricultural land.

889 Under the PRC Constitution and the PRC Land Management Law, the state has the power to requisition land for public purposes. PRC Constitution, art. 10; PRC Land Administration Law, chapter V. Under the PRC Urban Real Estate Management Law, a land use right granted to a land user may be recovered by the state “under special circumstances and in light of the need of social and public interests.” PRC Urban Real Estate Management Law, art. 19. In the­ory, an urban resident or farmer could use the PRC Administrative Litigation Law to challenge an administrative decision to requisition land, recover a granted land use right, or demolish property and relocate residents. However, relevant land laws and regulations do not define “pub­lic interest,” leaving officials with broad discretion to make such determinations. Rural Develop­ment Institute Memorandum, “Land Takings in China: Policy Recommendations,” 5 June 03 (available at www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/062104/memo.pdf). Urban and rural residents can also petition to government officials through the letters and visits system. As discussed in Sec­tion V(c), however, such petitions are rarely successful. One national land official told Commis­sion staff that farmers have no right to challenge decisions to requisition agricultural land. Ac­cording to multiple Commission sources, in practice most residents who raise complaints dispute the amount of compensation, not the underlying relocation or requisition decision. Commission Staff Interviews.

890 For reports by international human rights organizations on such tactics, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in China, and Liu Qing, “The Legal Time Bomb of Urban Development,” China Rights Forum, No. 2 (2003), 68–72 (both making extensive use of Chinese sources, including legal experts, residents, and media reports). According to international monitors, in some cases, homes have been bulldozed without the required legal notice or administrative review, or while residents are still inside, resulting in injuries and even some deaths. Chinese and foreign media have reported extensively on abusive eviction tactics. See, e.g., “Forced Evictions Blur Rights,” China Daily; “A Hundred People Barbarically Pull Down Houses in Shenyang,” Taiyang Pao, 13 November 03 (FBIS, 13 November 03); Yang Li, “Respect for Residents’ Rights,” China Daily, 30 September 03,<www.chinadaily.com.cn>; Li Jing, “Developers Held Over Demolitions,” China Daily, 31 Octo­ber 03; “Chinese Legal Experts, Scholars Strongly Oppose Government Developers,” Agence France-Presse, 10 September 03, (FBIS, 10 September 03) (citing the China Economic Times as stating that in some places, the mafia is used to threaten residents, or electricity or water is shut off to force people out); Pan, “Chinese Fight a New Kind of Land War.” Government circu­lars explicitly prohibiting such abusive tactics also suggest that they have been common prob­lems. For an example of one such circular, see Notice on Controlling the Scale of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation and Strictly Managing Demolition and Relocation [Guowuyuan banggongting guanyu kongzhi chengzhen fangwu chaiqian guimo, yange chaiqian guanli de tongzhi], issued 6 June 04 (strictly prohibiting demolition entities and relevant units from en­gaging in uncivilized demolition and relocation, illegal demolition and relocation, cutting off water, electricity, gas, or heat, obstructing movement, or other tactics to forcibly remove resi­dents subject to demolition and relocation).

891 See, e.g., Notice on Controlling the Scale of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation and Strictly Managing Demolition and Relocation. In November 2003, Beijing arrested five devel­opers and rescinded the qualifications of 13 demolition companies for illegal demolitions and abuses. Li Jing, “Developers Held Over Demolitions,” China Daily, 31 October 03; Wang Jun, “Qualifications for 13 Demolition Units are Canceled,” [Beijing 13 ren chaiqian danwei bei chexiao zizhi], Xinhua, 5 November 03, <www.xinhuanet.com>.

892 See, e.g., “Evicted Chinese Residents Clash With Authorities in North China’s Xi’an,” Agence France-Presse, 27 May 04 (FBIS, 28 May 04). Even in Shanghai, considered one of China’s most legally advanced locales, reports of violent demolition tactics continue to circulate. For one example, see the entry for Tuesday, May 11, 2004 on the weblog of a foreign reporter in Shanghai, describing a recent incident in which more than “300 policemen and people who were probably hired by a relocation company, entered the neighbourhood and started to beat the in­habitants, to make them move.” The “China Herald” Weblog, www.chinaherald.net/2004—05— 09—chinaherald—archive.html#108432203174288450 (source provided by Sara (Meg) Davis, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch). In July 2004, a local Shanghai television station re­ported that demolition workers pulled down an occupied house, injuring three people. Bill Savadove, “Shanghai Increases Payout for Eviction,” South China Morning Post, 23 July 04 (FBIS, 23 July 04). In August 2004, authorities of Cangshan township, near Fuzhou, reportedly sent police and a group of convicted criminals to Wanli village to demolish homes and intimidate residents who refused to relocate. Human Rights in China Press Releases, “Police and Thugs Suppress Fujian Peasant Protest,” 25 August 04, and “Protesting Peasants Under Siege in Wanli Village,” 9 September 04. These are but a few examples of intimidation tactics that con­tinue to be applied despite central government prohibitions on such behavior.

893 Liu Feng, “Petitions on Land Requisition and Demolition and Relocation in the First Half of this Year Exceed the Number for All of Last Year,” [Jinnian shang ban nian zhengdi chaiqian shangfang chaoguo qu nian zongliang], People’s Daily [Renmin ribao], 6 July 04, <www.peoplesdaily.com.cn>. Chinese activists believe even this number is too low. Jane Cai,”Surge in Property Demolition Complaints,” South China Morning Post, 6 July 04, <www.scmp.com>. In the fall of 2003, the National Letters and Visits Office in Beijing reported that it had received more than 11,600 complaints regarding relocation issues in the first eight months of 2003, a 50 percent increase over last year. Commission staff visiting Beijing in the spring of 2003 noted long lines of petitioners in front of the Ministry of Land and Resources. According to one Beijing reporter, land complaints constitute the largest category of complaints in the letters and visits system. Commission Staff Interview.

894 “This Year the Number of Suits by People Against Government Exceed 100,000, Urban Construction Administrative Suits Constitute the Largest Increase” [Jinnian “ren gao si” tupo 10 wan, chengjianlei xingzheng an zenzhang zuida], Xinhua, 16 December 04, <www.news.xinhuanet.com> (noting that the number of administrative lawsuits related to urban construction in the first 11 months of 2003 increased 31.77 percent over the same period last year, while the number of lawsuits related to land and resources increased 31.3 percent).

895 One Hong Kong article cited “relevant departments” as stating that between January and November 2003, more than 1,500 incidents of violence, suicide, and demonstration related to demolitions and relocations had occurred across the country. “Explosive Public Indignation Aris­ing From Forced Evictions Alarms Central Government,” Ming Pao, 12, November 03 (FBIS, 12 November 03). Reports of such incidents appear almost daily in the Chinese and foreign press.  For a list of more than 50 incidents related to relocation that have been reported over the past year, visit the Property Rights page of the Commission Web site at <www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/rol/propres.php>.

896 “Explosive Public Indignation Arising From Forced Evictions Alarms Central Government,” Ming Pao; “More on Anhui Farmer Attempts at Self-Immolation in Tiananmen Square Over Forcible Relocation,” Xinhua, 15 September 03 (FBIS, 15 September 03).

897 Zhao Ling, “An Interview With Rural Development Researcher Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences” (translated by Manfred Elfstrom, available at www.chinaelections.org/en).

898 See, e.g., Urgent Notice on Conscientiously Carrying Out the Work of Housing Demolition and Relocations in Cities and Towns to Safeguard Social Stability [Guanyu renzhen zuohao chengzhen fangwu chaiqian gongzuo weihu shehui wending de jinji tongzhi], issued 9 September03 (noting that “disputes and collective petitions sparked by demolition and relocation have been on the rise and have even triggered some terrible incidents, influencing social stability and the normal order of production and life”); Notice on Controlling the Scale of Urban Housing Demoli­tion and Relocation and Strictly Managing Demolition and Relocation (noting that relocations have resulted in a large number of citizen petitions and influenced social stability and calling on local governments to curb abuses and reduce the number of demolitions). For concerns about the growing number of rural disputes and an excellent review of the implementation of the PRC Rural Land Contracting Law, see, Chang Hongxiao, “Firming Up the Rural Land Contracting Law” [Yinghua tudi chengbaofa], Finance [Caijing], 20 July 04, <www.caijing.com.cn>.

899 Commission Staff Interviews. For the Law on the Protection of Farmer’s Rights, see “China Expects First Ever Farmer Protection Law,” Xinhua, 12 July 04 (FBIS, 12 July 04). The Su­preme People’s Court is also reportedly drafting an interpretation on handling land dispute cases. Chen Si, “Judicial Interpretation on Cases Involving the Transfer of Collective Land and Compensation for Land Requisitions to Appear Next Year” [Jiti suoyouzhi tudi liuzhuan hezhengdi buchang anjian de sifa jieshi mingnian chutai], People’s Court Daily [Renmin fayuan wang], 4 March 04, <www.chinacourt.org>. The Supreme People’s Court is also reportedly draft­ing an interpretation to guide courts in their handling of rural land disputes. However, Chinese observers indicate that the draft interpretation that has been circulated is problematic and will not adequately address core issues such as compensation. Chang Hongxiao, “Firming Up the Rural Land Contracting Law.” As some Chinese scholars have observed, the Land Administra­tion Law must be amended in part because it is in conflict with the revised Constitution. Ye Xinfeng, Gu Xiuyan, Gong Chang, “How to Link the Amended Constitution and the ‘Land Ad­ministration Law”’ [“Tudi guanli fa” zenme yu xiuxian xianan], Theory and Inquiry [Lilun yu tansuo], No. 5, 2004, 28–9.

900 Following several self-immolations in Tiananmen Square, the State Council appointed Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan to temporarily supervise large-scale demolition and land requisition work.”  Explosive Public Indignation Arising From Forced Evictions Alarms Central Government,” Ming Pao, 12 November 03 (FBIS, 12 November 03). In June 2004, Chinese media reported that Premier Wen Jiabao chaired a State Council meeting on the problem of urban relocations. “Wen Jiabao Chairs State Council Meeting on Urban Housing Relocation Issues,” Xinhua, 4 June 04 (FBIS, 4 June 04). For regulations issued, see e.g. Urgent Notice on Conscientiously Carrying Out the Work of Housing Demolition and Relocations in Cities and Towns to Safeguard Social Stability [Guanyu renzhen zuohao chengzhen fangwu chaiqian gongzuo weihu shehui wending de jinji tongzhi], issued 19 September 03; State Council General Office, Notice on Controlling the Scale of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation and Strictly Managing Demolition and Relocation [Guowuyuan banggongting guanyu kongzhi chengzhen fangwu chaiqian guimo, yange chaiqian guanli de tongzhi], issued 6 June 04; Measures on Administering the State Land and Resources System for the People [Guotu ziyuan guanli xitong xingzheng wei min cuoshi], issued 14 January 04; Prohibitions on State Land and Resources Management Personnel, [Guotu ziyuan guanli xitong gongquo renyuan jinling], issued 14 January 04; Urgent Notice on Carrying Out Land and Resources Petition Work Well During the Period of the “Two Meetings” [Guanyu zuohao “lianghui” qijian guotu ziyuan xinfang gongzuo de jinji tongzhi], issued 11 Feb­ruary 04; State Council General Office, Notice on Controlling the Scale of Urban Housing Demo­lition and Relocation and Strictly Managing Demolition and Relocation [Guowuyuan banggongting guanyu kongzhi chengzhen fangwu chaiqian guimo, yange chaiqian guanli de tongzhi], issued 6 June 2004 (calling on local government to reduce demolitions and relocations in the coming year). Procedural regulations tightened appraisal and arbitration procedures for land requisitions and urban demolitions. Guidance Opinion on Urban Housing Demolition; Relo­cation Appraisal and Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation Arbitration Work Rules. The government also established a new hearing system for land requisitions. Regulations on Land and Resources Hearings [Guotu ziyuan tingzheng guiding], issued 9 January 04.

901 Tian Fengshan was removed in October 2003 on suspicion of corruption. Andrew K. Collier, "Land Minister Is Suspended for Alleged Graft,” South China Morning Post, 22 October 03, <www.scmp.com>. According to Chinese reports, immediately after his appointment as demoli­tion and relocation czar, Zeng Peiyan led an investigation team to look into the illegal requisi­tion of peasant land in Zhejiang and Hunan. “Explosive Public Indignation Arising From Forced Evictions Alarms Central Government,” Ming Pao. In the fall of 2003, an NPC inspection visited Fujian, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Hebei, Jiangsu, and Jilin to investigate the implementation of the Rural Land Contracting Law. Shen Lutao, “Land Contract and Management Rights of Chinese Peasants Protected Effectively,” Xinhua, 4 November 03 (FBIS, 4 November 03). Other inves­tigation and rectification efforts have focused on illegal development projects. Zhang Shaoli, “The National Land Ministry Announces Illegal Land Cases, Local Governments are the Focus of Investigation,” [Guotubu gongbu tudi weifa anjian, difang zhengfu chen chachu zhongdian], Procuratorial Daily [Jiancha ribao], 24 March 04, <www.jcrb.com.cn>. In the spring of 2003, offi­cial Chinese sources reported that the Ministry of Land and Resources launched an “unprece­dented” nationwide probe of illegal land transactions. Tang Min, “Ministry Probes Land Abuses,” China Daily, 15 March 04, <www.chinadaily.com.cn>. China Daily reported in August 2004 that seven ministries were involved in the campaign, include the ministries of land and resources, finance, agriculture, construction, and supervision, the State Development and Re­form Commission, and the National Audit Office. Dian Tai, “Regulation of Land Use Starts to Show Progress,” China Daily, 14 August 04 (FBIS, 14 August 04). In addition to these measures, central authorities punished some abusive demolition companies, established complaint and legal consultation hotlines for urban residents and farmers, reformed the land management bu­reaucracy so that local land officials report directly to provincial land bureaus instead of to local governments, announced that they would enforce legal provisions requiring all land to be bid at auction, and instituted an experimental program for blacklisting construction companies that have given bribes to government offices. For hotlines and legal consultation measures, see Measures on Administering the State Land and Resources System for the People [Guotu ziyuanguanli xitong xingzheng wei min cuoshi], issued 14 January 04; Notice on Effectively Strength­ening Transparency of Government Information on Land Resources Through the Internet in Practice and Publicly Promoting Administration According to Law and Administration for the People [Guanyu qieshi jiaqiang guotu ziyuan zhengwu xinxi wangshang gongkai cujin yifa xingzheng he xingzheng wei min de tongzhi], issued 20 May 04; “China Curbs Illegal Land and Resources Deals,” Xinhua, 7 January 04 (FBIS, 7 January 04); Tang Min, “ ‘Hotline’ to Land Ministry Enhances Client Assistance,” China Daily, 19 December 03. For reforms to the bu­reaucracy, see Tang Min, “Land Allocation Abuses Probed,” China Daily, 28 December 03 (FBIS,28 December 03); Andrew K. Collier, “State to Approve Capital’s Land Sales,” South China Morning Post, 18 June 04; Tang Min, “Ministry Probes Land Abuses.” For auctions, see Tang Zheng, “Beijing Developers Scramble for Land,” Finance [Caijing], 28 June 04 (FBIS, 28 June 04) (noting that “after an August 31 deadline set by the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Ministry of Supervision, all rights for commercial land use projects must be obtained through auctions or tender bids.”). The deadline has reportedly caused a panic among Beijing developers, who have benefited from the capital’s failure to fully implement the auction require­ment. For the bribery blacklist, see Li Jinrong, “China Adopts Blacklist System to Tackle Con­struction Bribes,” China Net, 14 June 04 (FBIS, 15 June 04).

902 Commission Staff Interviews. According to Shanghai officials, approximately 100 “reloca­tion centers” have been established around Shanghai. The centers handle relocations for a des­ignated area and are supposed to clearly post approvals for the relocation project as well as com­pensation standards and a list of resident rights. Commission staff visited one such center in the spring of 2003. The Shanghai lawyers association has worked actively with local government bureaus to address some of the more sensitive issues related to demolition and relocation, par­ticularly the issue of compensation standards. Lawyers association officials report that local law­yers have handled about 6,000 relocation cases in the last several years. According to these offi­cials, about 70 percent of the cases arose after residents were relocated and involved issues re­lated to resettlement housing.

903 Bill Savadove, “Shanghai Increases Payout for Eviction,” South China Morning Post, 23 July 04 (FBIS, 23 July 04).

904 Urgent Notice on Carrying Out Land and Resources Petitions Work Well During the Period of the “Two Meetings.” For treatment of land petitioners, see Section III(a)—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, Disappearances, Security Sweeps, and House Arrests.

905 Urgent Notice on Carrying Out the Work of Housing Demolition and Relocations in Cities and Towns Well to Safeguard Social Stability; Beijing City People’s Government, Opinion on Carrying Out the Work of Housing and Demolition Well to Safeguard Social Stability [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu guanyu zuohao fangwu chaiqian gongzuo weihu shehui wending de yijian], issued 10 November 03.

906 In addition to the Zheng Enchong case discussed below, see “Zhu Donghui, Litigation Rep­resentative for Shanghai Households Subject to Demolition and Relocation, Sentenced to Two Years of Re-education Through Labor” [Shanghai chaiqianhu susong dailiren Zhu Donghui bei pan laojiao liangnian], Radio Free Asia, 7 July 04 (reprinted at www.boxun.com).

907 Jane Cai, “Lawyers Team Up to Fight Property Rows in Shanghai,” South China Morning Post, 23 September 03. See also Human Rights Watch, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in China, 17 (citing interviews with concerned Shanghai lawyers).

908 “China Jails Woman for Internet Article in Crackdown on Petitioners,” Agence France-Presse, 1 April 04 (FBIS, 1 April 04); Human Rights in China Press Releases “Journalist Pur­sued for Aiding Peasants,” 12 July 04; “Tangshan Petitioners Persecuted,” Human Rights in China, 2 July 04.

909 Unlawful or abusive property seizure is an issue that has sparked anger in both urban and rural residents and, as indicated above, is contributing to social instability. Party and gov­ernment leaders have an interest in controlling the problem. In addition, the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao leadership team has sought to bolster its image by taking action to protect human rights, battle corruption, and improve the living standards of rural Chinese. Initiatives to curb land abuses dovetail with these general efforts.

910 “Inspectors Claim Initial Success with Land Laws,” South China Morning Post, 25 June 04 (citing a report by NPC vice-chairman Sheng Huaren, which notes that local governments have failed to comply with central government initiatives to address corruption in land trans­actions); Li Jing, “Legislator: Keep an Eye on Unlawful Use of Land,” China Daily, 26 June 04 (FBIS, 26 June 04) (citing NPC chairman Wu Bangguo as stating that while rectification cam­paigns related to land abuses have yielded preliminary results, local officials are “still displaying a lust for diverting cultivated land”).

911 Property Seizures in China: Politics, Law and Protest, Testimony and Written Statement of Roy Prosterman, President, Rural Development Institute; Jia Hepeng, “ ‘Public Interest’ Not a Free Pass,” China Daily, 12 July 04 (FBIS, 12 July 04).

912 The need to increase compensation is widely acknowledged by Chinese officials and com­mentators. See, e.g., “Forced Demolitions Blur Rights,” China Daily.

913 “Neutral Party Is Needed,” China Daily, 31 May 04 (FBIS, 31 May 04); “Forced Demolitions Blur Rights,” China Daily.