China Monitor #4
A publication to keep Members of Congress and the public informed about critical human rights and legal developments in China
April 14, 2026
Contents:
Two Sessions prioritized national security and Taiwan reunification
CCP ramped up anticorruption messaging and purges ahead of Two Sessions
Additional removals of military officials and others continued ahead of Two Sessions
CCDI work report highlights increased number of investigations, punishments, and detentions of Party officials- Think Tanks Associated with U.S. Entities Ensnared in Anticorruption Drive
- Public Backlash Against Mistreatment of Women with Mental Disabilities
- Hong Kong: National Security Law Punishes Father of Exiled Activist
- Technology and Human Rights: PRC Enables Iran’s Surveillance and Repression:
- Political Prisoner Case—Huang Xueqin (黄雪琴)
Two Sessions Prioritized National Security and Taiwan Reunification: During the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the ‘Two Sessions’), Party supremacy, national security, and “reunification” with Taiwan were highlighted as policy priorities, as reflected in official work reports and the 15th Five-Year Plan. The NPC Standing Committee reported that it designated October 25 as the “Commemoration Day of Taiwan’s Restoration,” to encourage Chinese people to strive for national reunification. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) and the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) vowed to safeguard national security and warned that advocates for “Taiwan independence” would be strictly punished. The SPC further cited the case of Li Yanhe (李延贺, also known as Fu Cha, 富察), who authorities sentenced to three years in prison for “inciting separatism.” Reportedly, his Taiwan-based company published books with content inconsistent with the CCP’s historical narrative.
The reports also stressed the importance of law-based governance in the context of Party leadership and national development goals. In particular, the SPC described its role as subordinate to the “absolute leadership” of the CCP and used language indicating that courts were responsible for implementing economic and political agendas—a position that is inconsistent with Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which requires tribunals to be independent and impartial in adjudicating rights and obligations.
The 15th Five-Year Plan likewise described law-based governance as serving economic development and governance objectives under the Party’s leadership. The idea of treating law as an instrument, rather than as a constraint on state power, stands in contrast with the principle of the supremacy of law, under which all persons and institutions, including the state itself, are equally accountable to the law.
CCP Ramped Up Anticorruption Messaging and Purges Ahead of Two Sessions: In February, the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and the National Supervisory Commission issued a notice on prohibiting corruption during leadership transitions at the subnational level. The notice admitted that corruption in the personnel selection and appointment process is ongoing. Ten prohibitions related to “election discipline,” including restricting the formation of factions, preventing bribery, and other issues were listed, repeating similar prohibitions from a 2021 document of the same title. In the most recent version, prohibitions on “Engaging in political opportunism, maneuvering, or associating with political swindlers,” as well as “Nominating or promoting individuals with unaddressed issues in their records” were included. The CCP Central Committee published another notice that stated a “study and education campaign” would be launched throughout the Party to “establish and practice a correct view of performance,” placing an emphasis on adherence to Xi Jinping Thought. The Rights Defense Network observed that the two notices “strengthen top-down control of power through disciplinary rectification and ideological education, further narrowing the space for election supervision, public participation, and diverse expression.”
Additional removals of military officials and others continued ahead of Two Sessions: One week prior to the Two Sessions, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, without providing explanation, removed 19 of its members. Nine of the individuals dismissed were also People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, including two who worked at the Central Military Commission (CMC). Following the removal of these nine PLA officials, three more generals were removed from their roles in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on March 2. During a meeting with the PLA and the People’s Armed Police on March 7, Xi Jinping stated that there cannot be anyone in the PLA “who harbors disloyalty to the Party.” In light of the ongoing wave of removals, Joel Wuthnow, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the U.S. National Defense University, said that despite Xi’s efforts to remove important subordinates he has been unable to gain control of the bureaucracy.
CCDI work report highlights increased number of investigations, punishments, and detentions of Party officials: The CCDI’s most recent work report places the pre-Two Sessions removals into a broader national context. In 2025, discipline inspection and supervision bodies nationwide opened 15.4 percent more investigations, issued 10.6 percent more punishments, and also placed 23.7 percent more individuals in the system of liuzhi (留置) compared to 2024. According to Safeguard Defenders, liuzhi is a system “used to detain Party members and state functionaries for up to six months, at secret locations and without any legal remedy.”
Think Tanks Associated with U.S. Entities Ensnared in Anticorruption Drive
In January, the state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) announced it had taken control of one of the PRC’s most influential think tanks, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE). The announcement came on the heels of PRC authorities’ shuttering of the Taihe Institute, another prominent Beijing-based think tank focused on international relations and exchanges. Notably, both CCIEE and Taihe had close ties with powerful former officials taken down by anti-corruption investigations: CCIEE chairman and former head of the PRC’s food and drug regulatory body Bi Jingquan was expelled from the Party in December, while Taihe founder and former Ministry of State Security vice minister Gao Yichen was expelled in January. While many think tanks, including Taihe (prior to the ban) and CCIEE, are legally classified as social organizations (社会组织)—the PRC’s term for civil society organizations—and are considered nongovernmental, they nevertheless have severely limited independence and ultimately must serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2015, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping launched a major effort to increase the number of think tanks and deploy them internally as policy advisors and externally to promote Party narratives.
Think tanks like CCIEE and Taihe have been entrusted with the mission of “telling China’s story well” on the global stage. They had extensive international networks and engaged in exchanges and joint initiatives with a range of international partners, including leading organizations and individuals based in the United States. For example, in 2018, CCIEE and Bloomberg launched the New Economy Forum in partnership with executives from 3M, FedEx, and ExxonMobil, among others. Similarly, in 2017 and 2019, Taihe co-hosted its annual Civilizations Forum with the Humpty Dumpty Institute, a New York-based organization focused on global issues and featuring a bipartisan Congressional Advisory Board.
These organizations likely derived their prestige and limited autonomy—especially their ability to engage with international counterparts and provide independent policy analysis—from their association with Chinese Communist Party and government officials such as Bi and Gao. These same ties also made them vulnerable: When politically connected patrons are swept up in Xi’s anticorruption campaigns, the institutions associated with them are made vulnerable. Although it is often difficult to determine whether corruption charges are pretextual or legitimate, in the cases of Taihe and CCIEE, the removals provided an opportunity for the PRC to sharply rein in organizations that had been operating with some degree of independence domestically and internationally.
Public Backlash Against Mistreatment of Women with Mental Disabilities
Ahead of International Women’s Day on March 8, new developments in the case of “Bu Xiaohua”* renewed public scrutiny in China of the exploitation of rural women with mental disabilities, including the practice of men “taking in” such women, and of the state’s failure to protect them.
In November 2024, a volunteer found 45-year-old Bu Xiaohua malnourished in a rural village in Shanxi province more than 100 kilometers from her family home after disappearing over 13 years earlier. She was living with a man, surnamed Zhang, and had given birth to several children. While a statement from local police euphemistically described Zhang as having “taken in” (收留) Bu after she went missing following treatment for schizophrenia, social media users argued that this language was inappropriate for a case that involved human trafficking and rape. Local authorities detained Zhang on suspicion of rape in late 2024 and interest in the case waned until December 2025, when Bu’s family received a non-prosecution decision stating that Zhang’s actions were “fundamentally different from rape.” Online commentators expressed concern, with one Chinese lawyer stating that this effectively “redrew the boundary of what constitutes rape.” NORA, an independent media outlet focused on advocacy for victims of human trafficking, stated that the decision not to prosecute is tantamount to “legalizing” the practice of “taking in” women with mental disabilities and “forcing them into marriage and childbirth.” Interpretations of article 3 of the Palermo Protocol have included forced and early marriage as potential human trafficking, particularly when it involves children or vulnerable individuals.
Bu’s case is not unique but rather illustrative of the lack of law enforcement protection for women in rural China. Bu’s case is widely compared to that of “the chained woman,” whose story sparked widespread outrage after she was found shackled in a shed in Jiangsu province in 2022. The man who “took in” the chained woman was sentenced to prison in April 2023, although ongoing discussion of the case has since been tightly censored, and several people who attempted to investigate this or similar cases were questioned or detained by police. On the fourth anniversary of the chained woman’s case going public, NORA published a comprehensive report on the PRC government’s mechanisms to combat the trafficking of rural women with mental disabilities. Some key findings included that (1) PRC legislation targeting human trafficking remains fragmented; (2) coordination between government departments to prevent and track such cases is limited; and (3) civil society projects focused on trafficking largely focus on children, while projects serving rural individuals with mental disabilities “remain nonexistent.” These findings are consistent with those of the U.S. State Department, which has categorized the PRC as “Tier 3,” the most severe ranking, in their annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report since 2017, indicating that the PRC government “does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.” Without a coordinated effort to more effectively protect vulnerable women, and heightened transparency in the discussion of these women’s cases, it may be difficult to achieve progress for women like Bu Xiaohua.
*Only the woman's family name, Bu, has been publicly released, though various news outlets have colloquially referred to her as "Bu Xiaohua," "Bu Huahua," or "Hua Hua."
Hong Kong: National Security Law Punishes Father of Exiled Activist
Hong Kong authorities’ imprisonment of an exiled activist’s father is a form of coercion-by-proxy that mirrors a practice widely used in mainland China. In February, Kwok Yin-sang was sentenced to eight months in prison for allegedly attempting to deal with financial assets belonging to his daughter Anna Kwok Fung-yee. Anna lives in exile in the United States and was designated as an “absconder” by the Hong Kong government for alleged collusion with foreign forces, in part because of her public calls to sanction Hong Kong and PRC officials for human rights violations. Yin-sang’s conviction is based on the March 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), which prohibits any dealing with the financial assets belonging to an absconder.
The prosecution alleged that Yin-sang tried to terminate the insurance policy that he bought for Anna’s benefit when she was about two years old. The defense argued that the policy never belonged to Anna because Yin-sang paid the premiums, and title was never transferred to Anna. In rejecting the defense’s argument, the magistrate found that Yin-sang held the policy in trust only and that Anna was the sole beneficiary, treating attempts to terminate the policy as dealing with her assets. The magistrate acknowledged that Yin-sang did not directly endanger national security, and the defense maintained that the case amounted to collective punishment.
As applied, the SNSO lends a veneer of legality to the coercion-by-proxy that Hong Kong authorities have used to suppress dissent by overseas activists, a tactic that increasingly aligns with mainland China practice. According to a report prepared by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and its research partners, “[h]alf of the 105 targets interviewed . . . stated that family members in China had been intimidated and interrogated by police or state security officials.” Senators Sullivan and Merkley (chair and Senate ranking member of the Commission) likened Anna’s experience to hostage taking and highlighted that “at least 100 family members of Americans are currently detained or prevented from leaving China—used as leverage to censor, intimidate, gain economic advantages, and shape or undermine U.S. policy.”
As of March 2026, Hong Kong authorities have arrested 389 and convicted 179 people on national security grounds. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of 34 overseas activists, 14 of whom, including Anna, are charged with the offense of collusion.
Technology and Human Rights: PRC Enables Iran’s Surveillance and Repression
A new report by ARTICLE 19 sheds light on the otherwise opaque People’s Republic of China (PRC)-Iran technology relationship, highlighting how these ties enable state surveillance and censorship to silence dissent. While details remain scarce about agreements between Iranian and PRC authorities to build out Iran’s domestic internet, known as the National Information Network, current and former Iranian officials have described cooperation with PRC authorities in its development.
This technology relationship has also created business opportunities for Chinese technology firms, forming a commercial-security pipeline rather than isolated transactions. ZTE and Huawei have provided Iranian telecommunications providers with deep packet inspection technology capable of monitoring communications. Chinese firm Tiandy has supplied surveillance equipment to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the U.S. Government and European Union designate as a terrorist organization. Research firm Kharon has also linked Tiandy products to Iranian government and police entities.
The PRC’s export of surveillance tools and public security training reflects a broader strategy of equipping authoritarian regimes with tools to monitor and suppress dissent. The People’s Public Security University of China has trained Iranian police officers for over a decade. In 2024, Iran’s police chief signed agreements with the PRC’s Minister of Public Security to expand collaboration in areas such as countering terrorism, which the PRC broadly defines as actions that create “social panic” or threaten public safety.
While PRC cooperation has strengthened Iran’s domestic surveillance capacity, the relationship remains asymmetrical. The PRC is Iran’s largest trading partner, but Iran ranks only 38th among China’s partners. The PRC’s trade with Iran’s neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is significantly larger. Nevertheless, the PRC has provided material assistance, such as dual-use technologies, and offers diplomatic support that can reinforce the Iranian government’s ability to monitor and suppress dissent.
Following the death of thousands during the December 2025 civilian protests against the Iranian regime, the Chinese Government called for stability and opposed foreign interference, framing the protests as an internal matter. During previous protests, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had avoided direct public statements. The PRC also voted against a UN Human Rights Council resolution in January 2026 calling for an investigation into human rights violations in Iran and condemning the crackdown on protesters. This is in keeping with the PRC’s practice of voting against resolutions dealing with the human rights situation in specific countries, often arguing that such actions are “interference in internal affairs . . . under the pretext of human rights.”
Political Prisoner Case—Huang Xueqin (黄雪琴)
CECC Political Prisoner Database record number 2019-00454
Sophia Huang Xueqin, an independent journalist and civil society activist, was arrested in 2021 and later charged with “inciting subversion of state power,” a charge related to national security. Her detention, together with labor rights activist Wang Jianbing, came before Huang’s planned departure to attend graduate school at the University of Sussex in the UK. She was previously detained in 2019 in connection with her reporting on the Hong Kong democracy protests. Huang had also been a leading voice for China’s #MeToo movement, gaining prominence after creating an online platform for women to share their experiences of sexual harassment. Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing were likely targeted for their leadership in Guangzhou’s civil society, where they explored new strategies for organizing civil society, including holding weekly meetings to discuss issues considered sensitive by the Chinese government in an increasingly restricted environment.
The indictment for “inciting subversion of state power” follows a concerning pattern: rights advocates working to organize civil society in China are increasingly being charged with crimes that carry hefty sentences, rather than the previously more common “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” charge, which carries less time. In June 2024, authorities sentenced Huang Xueqin to five years in prison, a fine of 100,000 yuan, and four years’ deprivation of political rights. She has reportedly been tortured while in custody and, according to human rights groups, she has suffered from poor health, including sudden weight loss, amenorrhea, severe calcium deficiency, hypoglycemia, and low blood pressure.
While Huang is scheduled to be released in September 2026, China’s harassment of political prisoners after release is well documented. In reality, authorities often restrict freedom of movement by placing activists under de facto confinement immediately after release, sometimes in hotels or a police facility, also known as “non-release release” (伪释放). Wang Jianbing completed his prison sentence in March 2025, after which police escorted him back to his parents’ home in Gansu province rather than his place of residence in Guangzhou, which may suggest such a “non-release release.” Given Wang’s treatment, Huang Xueqin may experience similar restrictions after her expected September release.