The China of today is vastly different from that of 30 years ago, when major economic reforms began, and even 10 years ago, when China acceded to the World Trade Organization. More people in today’s China enjoy an improved quality of life, economic freedoms, and greater access to information via the Internet and other communication technologies. But economic and technological progress has not led to commensurate gains in China’s human rights and rule of law record.

In the areas of human rights and rule of law this year, China’s leaders have grown more assertive in their violation of rights, disregarding the very laws and international standards that they claim to uphold and tightening their grip on Chinese society. China’s leaders have done this while confidently touting their own human rights and rule of law record. This year, officials declared that China had reached a "major milestone" in its legal system and made "remarkable achievements" in carrying out its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, asserting that "civil and political rights have been effectively protected." China’s leaders no longer respond to criticism by simply denying that rights have been abused. Rather, they increasingly use the language of international law to defend their actions. According to China’s leaders, today’s China is strong and moving forward on human rights and rule of law.

Official rhetoric notwithstanding, China’s human rights and rule of law record has not improved. Indeed, as this year’s Annual Report indicates, it appears to be worsening in some areas. A troubling trend is officials’ increased willingness to disregard the law when it suits them, particularly to silence dissent. Beginning in February 2011, Chinese police took the unusual step of "disappearing" numerous lawyers and activists in one of the harshest crackdowns in recent memory. It was no surprise, then, that in sensitive issue areas such as China’s population planning policy, local government officials demonstrated little restraint in turning to illegal measures, including violence, to coerce compliance with a policy that itself violates international human rights standards. Lack of respect for the rule of law extended into the international arena, where China pursued domestic subsidies and industrial policies inconsistent with China’s commitments as a member of the World Trade Organization.

The Chinese government’s misuse of the law to violate fundamental human rights continued. The Commission observed officials citing the "law" as a basis to crack down on peaceful protests; to prevent Buddhists, Catholics, Falun Gong practitioners, Muslims, Protestants, and Taoists from freely practicing their beliefs; to prevent Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minorities from exercising autonomy despite guarantees in Chinese law; to prevent workers from independently organizing; and to clamp down on civil society organizations. The Communist Party tightened its grip at all levels of society, stepping up monitoring of citizens and social groups and stifling attempts at independent political participation and advocacy for democracy.

Along with negative developments, there have been some hopeful signs, notably at the grassroots level. The Commission observed the courage of citizens calling for justice, as when daring journalists and millions of Internet users outmaneuvered censors to raise questions about the government’s response to a high-speed rail crash, or when members of the Shouwang Church openly defied the government to hold outdoor worship services in Beijing. The Commission also continued to observe well-intentioned officials and individuals seeking to bring about positive changes within the system. Such actions testify to the Chinese people’s desire for a just society and their willingness to be productive partners in pursuit of that aim.

Human rights and rule of law developments in China are important to the rest of the world. The rights to freedom of expression, association, and religion are universal and transcend borders. These rights are provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two documents that China has publicly supported. When the Chinese government and Communist Party deny these rights, as when they censor the press and Internet and restrict access to courts, citizens worldwide—not just in China—know less about issues such as poisoned food, unsafe products, natural and man-made disasters, and infectious disease, and have less recourse to hold officials accountable. Moreover, the Chinese government’s respect for human rights and rule of law domestically serves as an important barometer for China’s compliance and cooperation internationally, from trade agreements to issues of common global concern. Finally, as recent years have shown, China’s increasing confidence in and defense of its human rights record risk setting negative precedents for other countries and reshaping international human rights standards to allow for China’s abuses. China’s strident justification this past year of its imprisonment of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, and the refusal of some governments to send representatives to the Nobel ceremony, exemplify this trend.

This is the Commission’s 10th Annual Report on China’s human rights and rule of law developments. As in the past, the Commission has assessed the Chinese government’s record on the basis of China’s own Constitution and laws and international human rights standards, relying on research based in large part on reports and articles published in China. As Commission research has shown this past year, Chinese officials continue to deny Chinese citizens their rights in order to preserve the Communist Party’s notion of political stability and harmony. China’s stability is in the United States’ best interest, but the Commission believes that stability will not result from repressing rights for perceived short-term gain, but only by ensuring and protecting the rights of all Chinese citizens.

OVERVIEW

Below is a discussion of the major trends that the Commission observed during the 2011 reporting year, covering the period from fall 2010 to fall 2011.

DISREGARD FOR THE LAW

The Commission observed Chinese officials disregarding the law to deny Chinese citizens the freedoms of speech, association, and religion, and the right to be free from arbitrary detention, as well as Chinese officials refusing to abide by international commitments:

Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyers and Activists. In the first half of 2011, authorities reportedly "disappeared" numerous lawyers and rights activists known for criticizing the Communist Party and for advocating on behalf of politically sensitive causes and groups. The "disappearances," in which persons went missing with little or no word of their whereabouts or the charges against them, violated the limited procedural protections provided under Chinese law and drew the criticism of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and of the international community. The missing included the well-known artist and public advocate Ai Weiwei, who was kept at a secret location for 81 days before being released on bail on the condition that he not grant interviews or send Twitter messages. Following the crackdown, the Chinese government announced a draft revision to its Criminal Procedure Law that would legalize such disappearances.
Population Planning. Although Chinese law prohibits officials from infringing on the rights and interests of citizens when promoting compliance with population planning policies, the Commission noted reports of official campaigns, as well as numerous individual cases in which officials used violent methods to coerce citizens to undergo sterilizations or abortions or pay heavy fines for having "out-of-plan" children. In one such example, in October 2010, local family planning officials in Xiamen city, Fujian province, reportedly kidnapped a woman who was eight months pregnant with her second child and detained her for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her with a substance that caused the fetus to be aborted. During this time, the woman’s husband reportedly was not permitted to see her.
Worker Rights. China’s Constitution and international human rights standards provide for freedom of association, but workers in China are still denied their fundamental right to organize independent unions, despite some potentially positive but limited developments this past year (see below). Instead, workers must rely on a Party-controlled union to represent them. Without genuine labor representation, Chinese workers continue to face poor working conditions and harassment when they seek to advocate independently for their rights. Worker safety issues, especially among miners, and child labor remained serious problems.
Extralegal Confinement of Released Activists, Petitioners. Hu Jia, a human rights and environmental advocate, and Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal advocate who publicized population planning abuses, were released from prison this year only to face, along with their families, onerous conditions of detention and abuse with little or no basis in Chinese law. In Chen’s case, authorities kept him and his wife under extralegal house arrest and allegedly beat them after video footage of their conditions was smuggled out of the house and released on an overseas Web site. In addition, officials continued to hold Mongol rights advocate Hada after completion of his prison sentence in December 2010. The legal basis under Chinese law, if any, for his continued custody is unclear. Chinese and international media also reported on the ongoing problem of "black jails," which are extralegal detention facilities used to house and abuse citizens who persistently petition the government about their grievances.
Commercial Rule of Law. China continued to implement policies that are inconsistent with its commitments as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are incompatible with the rule of law. Industrial policies limit market access for non-Chinese companies and in some cases violate the core WTO principle of national treatment; state-owned enterprises enjoy direct and indirect subsidies, including land and regulatory protection, which is contrary to China’s WTO commitments. Favoring state-owned enterprises has implications for human rights, including the taking of land to subsidize production and the use of the state secrets law to protect information in the state-owned sector. WTO cases this past year addressed the impact of China’s policies on its trading partners in industries ranging from tires to wind energy. These cases highlight Chinese support of its domestic industry, China’s use of quotas and subsidies, the lack of transparency, and the fear of retaliation against foreign companies that speak up. China continued to control its currency, which many economists and the Inter-national Monetary Fund consider to be undervalued.
Ethnic Minority Language and Culture. In Tibetan autonomous areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and other minority areas, the government continued to promote policies threatening the viability of the language and culture of Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, and other groups, in contravention of China’s Constitution and law providing autonomy to ethnic minorities. These policies included the imposition of Mandarin Chinese language in schools at the expense of other languages, the compulsory resettlement of large numbers of nomads, tight curbs over religious practice, and economic development projects that threatened livelihoods and sacred sites.

MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AS A TOOL FOR REPRESSION

The Commission also noted the continuance of Chinese officials abusing and strengthening laws as a tool for repression and to deny citizens the basic freedoms of speech, association, and religion, and the right to be free from arbitrary detention.

Criminal and Administrative Law. Official abuse of Chinese criminal law and administrative provisions prohibiting "subversion," "splittism," and "disrupting social order" remained a significant concern this reporting year. Chinese officials used these provisions to imprison labor advocates, writers, Internet essayists, democracy advocates, and Tibetan and Uyghur writers and journalists who engaged in peaceful expression and assembly. These included labor lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin, three Tibetans—Buddha (pen name), Jangtse, and Kalsang Jinpa—democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, Uyghur journalist Memetjan Abdulla, and numerous other ad-vocates swept up in the domestic crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the calls for "Jasmine" protests in China. In August, China’s top legislature reviewed a draft amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law that would legalize the current practice of forcibly "disappearing" rights advocates in violation of international standards.
Internet Regulation. The Chinese government sought to tighten its supervision of Internet activities, establishing in May 2011 a State Internet Information Office to "strengthen [the state’s] supervision of online content." Reports indicated that officials also stepped up measures to monitor Internet use in public places. The total number of Web sites in China reportedly decreased dramatically as a result of greater state intervention.
Religious Regulation. The Chinese government continued to formally recognize only five religions and to require groups belonging to these religions to register with the government and submit to ongoing state control. Unregistered worshippers and those practicing unrecognized beliefs continued to face harassment.
- Buddhists and Taoists. Authorities maintained a restrictive framework for controlling Buddhist and Taoist doctrines, practices, worship sites, and religious personnel.
- Catholics. Authorities continued to harass and detain Catholics who worshipped outside state-controlled parameters. The state-controlled church forced some bishops to attend the ordination ceremonies of two bishops ordained without Holy See approval—the first such ordinations since late 2006—as well as a December 2010 state-controlled church conference.
- Falun Gong. Officials continued to carry out a cam-paign—lasting more than a decade—of extensive, systematic, and in some cases violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their beliefs. This year, officials were in the second year of a three-year campaign that included greater funding and government measures to achieve these goals.
- Protestants. Officials took into custody or confined to their homes hundreds of members of unregistered Protestant congregations who assembled into large groups or across congregations. These included members of the Shouwang Church, which had not registered with the authorities, after they attempted to hold large-scale outdoor services in Beijing.
Regulations in Ethnic Minority Regions.
- Tibetans. Governments at prefecture levels or above issued or drafted a series of regulations to tighten state control over Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks, and nuns.
- Uyghurs. Following demonstrations and riots in the Xinjiang region in 2009, authorities there maintained repressive security policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs.

TIGHTENING PARTY CONTROL OVER SOCIETY

The Commission observed the Communist Party’s attempts to strengthen control over many aspects of society in ways that threatened basic human rights of freedom of expression, association, and religion. Authorities created new institutions and stepped up monitoring of citizens and groups in the name of "comprehensive management of public security" and "safeguarding social stability." In some cities, Party monitoring was extended into commercial buildings and local officials packaged "social management" tasks with government service delivery in expanded monitoring of neighborhoods. Party wariness of the formation of independent networks, whether among Chinese citizens or between Chinese citizens and foreign groups, remained a prominent feature in many policies.

Democratic Governance and Political Participation. Top officials continued to insist that there would be no multiparty elections or separation of powers and that the goal of any political reform—whether it is of the political system or of the media—must be to strengthen, not weaken, the Party’s leadership. The use of the Internet by independent candidates running in local people’s congress elections emerged as a hopeful sign for grassroots attempts at democracy, but the Party discouraged such candidates, and local officials took repressive measures to stop them. The Party sought to monopolize village leadership positions. Authorities continued to have no tolerance for certain democracy advocates, for example restricting the freedom of movement of elections expert Yao Lifa.
Media and Internet. Party officials maintained heavy censorship of the Internet, media, and publishing, including limiting coverage of public disasters and health emergencies, and silencing well-known journalists such as Chang Ping. Repression of foreign journalists peaked after they attempted to cover the calls for "Jasmine" protests.
Negotiations With the Dalai Lama. Regarding the status of negotiations between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, no formal dialogue between the two sides took place this past year, the longest break since dialogue resumed in 2002. Officials continued their campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader. For his part, the Dalai Lama renounced an official role in exiled Tibetan governance, a move that could alter the dialogue dynamics by making it more difficult for officials to characterize him as a "political" figure.

PROGRESS CLAIMED; IMPACT UNCLEAR

This past year, the Chinese government announced new measures related to human rights and the rule of law, but the actual impact was unclear or negative.

Civil Society. Beijing and Shanghai reportedly conducted limited reforms to potentially make it easier for certain types of civil society organizations to register with the government, but some experts argued that the moves could solidify the government’s already tight control over which types of civil society organizations are allowed to operate in China.
Death Penalty Reform. In order to limit application of the death penalty, for which statistics remain a state secret, authorities amended the PRC Criminal Law to reduce the number of crimes punishable by death from 68 to 55. In practice authorities rarely, if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 reclassified crimes.
Access to Justice. Officials promoted a new mediation law, effective in January 2011, as the preferred method of resolving disputes and maintaining social stability. While mediation may be effective in some cases, the courts’ emphasis on this form of dispute resolution raised questions about denying access to courts, increasing pressure on courts and parties to mediate cases, and weakening the rule of law.
Village Governance. Local authorities continued to implement pilot projects in villages to reduce corruption, maintain "social stability," improve budget transparency, and promote "democratic" public participation, but the sustainability and impact of these projects are unclear.
Environment. Some central-level authorities continued to state their support for public participation and took steps to improve environmental information disclosure. An administrative provision limiting the disclosure of basic pollution information, however, appeared to remain in effect, and local environmental authorities continued to be reluctant to disclose information, especially in relation to polluting industries. In addition, central-level environmental officials issued a measure that states support for social organizations and encourages closer cooperation between government officials and environmental groups, but also stipulates strengthening "guidance" of and "political thought" work for environmental groups.

POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS

In a few areas, the Commission observed developments that could bring about positive change in human rights and the rule of law in China depending on implementation and other factors.

Mental Health. After decades of preparation, officials released a draft national mental health law in June 2011 that could curb abuse of the diagnosis of mental illness to detain in psychiatric institutions persons who voice dissent.
Government Transparency. Officials continued to state their support for open government information initiatives, and the number of government agencies publicly disclosing general information about their budgets reportedly increased. However, a number of fundamental obstacles to transparency remained in place, including China’s state secrets laws, lack of a free press and independent judiciary, and policies requiring government approvals of investments through a non-transparent process.
Worker Rights. Faced in part with the demands of a younger, more assertive workforce and pressure to maintain social stability, Chinese officials introduced limited steps that could improve conditions for workers. A law on social insurance took effect that deals with work-related injury insurance, and authorities reportedly continued to consider a draft national wage regulation. It remains unclear whether such measures will help address unequal wealth distribution and streamline worker compensation procedures.
Citizen Participation on the Internet. Government initiatives to expand access to the Internet, including access among rural residents, have contributed to creating an online space that Chinese citizens have utilized to express concern over human rights and government policies. The government and Party, however, continued to heavily censor the Internet and to promote its use for economic development and propaganda.
Anticorruption. The government continued limited anti-corruption measures, including steps to prevent corruption at the grassroots level, to curb judicial corruption, and to criminalize bribery of foreign officials by Chinese companies operating overseas. Officials issued provisions calling for the promotion of an "honest" Party and a "clean" government. Despite some new regulatory language, protections for whistleblowers remain inadequate.
Access to Justice. Chinese officials reportedly took some steps to expand legal aid and to promote administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater oversight of state agencies and government employees and to protect citizens’ interests.
Property Rights. Regulations covering expropriation of urban housing came into effect in January 2011. If fully implemented, the regulations could offer greater protection for urban homeowners. Rural landowners, however, lack equivalent protection.
Criminal Procedure Reforms. In August, China’s top legislature reviewed a draft amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law, which includes revisions that aim to prohibit forced self-incrimination, bar the use of evidence obtained through torture, and permit Chinese criminal defense attorneys to meet criminal defendants in custody without being monitored.

The Commission’s Executive Branch members have participated in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this Annual Report, including its findings, views, and recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the Administration.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of specific findings follows below for each section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with the Commission’s legislative mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Findings

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese officials continued to maintain a broad range of restrictions on free expression that do not comply with international human rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such standards permit states in limited circumstances to restrict expression to protect interests such as national security and public order, Chinese restrictions covered a much broader range of activity, including expression critical of the Communist Party and peaceful dissent. Despite this, Chinese officials continue to point to Internet development in China as proof of freedom of expression and to argue that Chinese restrictions comply with international law, including in the case of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo.
This past year was marked by a major crackdown on Internet and press freedom that exemplified the range of tools officials can use to restrict the free flow of information. The crackdown began in mid-February following protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the appearance of online calls for "Jasmine" protests in China.
While international and domestic observers continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell phone use in China, government and Party officials showed little sign of loosening political control. Top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, called for "strengthening" the Party’s guidance of online public opinion, as well as the Party’s leadership over the Internet. Officials established a central-level agency to tighten supervision of the Internet and issued regulations to increase monitoring of Internet use in public places. Censors continued to block the sharing of online information that officials deemed to be politically sensitive, including news of the Nobel Peace Prize award to imprisoned intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo, the calls for "Jasmine" protests, and words such as "human rights" and "democracy." At times, citizen expression on China’s microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following the Wenzhou high-speed train accident in July 2011.
Officials insisted that any reform of the media industry would result in "no change in the Party’s control over the media." Officials continued to issue broad guidance, such as telling the media it was their "common responsibility" to promote the 90th anniversary of the Party’s founding. Officials also continued to issue specific directives, such as how to cover the protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Harassment of foreign journalists reached a new height this past year, including beatings and threats of expulsion of journalists who attempted to report on the "Jasmine" protest strolls.
Officials continued to arbitrarily restrict expression by abusing vague criminal law provisions and abusing broad regulations and registration requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and the Internet. Citizens who criticized the government were charged with national security crimes such as "subversion." Official campaigns to train and supervise journalists conducted in the name of combating corruption continued to be heavily imbued with political indoctrination. Officials continued to use campaigns they described as intended to enforce the law to instead target "illegal" political and religious publications. Such publications included ones that "defame the Party and state leaders" or "contain political rumors that create ideological confusion."

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Raise concerns over and draw enhanced international attention to the Chinese government’s continued insistence that its restrictions on freedom of expression are consistent with international standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures are taken to protect national security or public order when available information indicates that many measures are aimed at silencing opposition to the Party or blocking the free flow of information on politically sensitive topics. Emphasize that the Chinese government’s position undermines international human rights standards for free expression, particularly those contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and government censorship of the Internet and the press can lead to instability by eroding public faith in the media and government.
Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese officials on the issue of how governments can best ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to protect national security, minors, and public order. Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such as public participation in formulation of restrictions on free expression, transparency regarding implementation of such restrictions, and independent review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese officials’ own calls for greater transparency and public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S. and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the protection of common interests on the Internet, including protecting minors, computer security, and privacy.
Acknowledge the Chinese government’s efforts to expand access to the Internet and cell phones, especially in rural areas, while continuing to press officials to comply with international standards. Support the research and development of technologies that enable Chinese citizens to access and share political and religious content that they are entitled to access and share under international human rights standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools and training materials that enable Chinese citizens to access and share content in a way that ensures their security and privacy. Support the dissemination of online Chinese-language information on the Internet, especially popular Chinese social media sites, that discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese citizens are entitled under international standards.
Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials’ instrumental use of the law, including vague national security charges, as a tool to suppress citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, and question whether such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the "rule of law."
Elevate concern over the increased harassment of foreign journalists, who this past year have been beaten and threatened with expulsion for attempting to report on events of public concern. Emphasize that such treatment is not in keeping with regulations issued for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games in which Chinese officials promised greater freedoms for foreign journalists, and is not in keeping with the treatment Chinese journalists are afforded when reporting on events in the United States.
Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other political prisoners imprisoned for allegedly committing crimes of endangering state security and other crimes but whose only offense was to peacefully express support for political reform or criticism of government policies, including Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February 2010 to five years in prison after using the Internet to organize an independent investigation into school collapses in an earthquake).

WORKER RIGHTS

Findings

Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including the right to organize into independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU.
The Commission continues to note the lack of genuine labor representation in China. ACFTU officials continue to state that it is their goal to develop stronger representation for workers. In January 2011, for example, the ACFTU announced its plan to establish a system of electing worker representatives in 80 percent of unionized public enterprises and 70 percent of unionized non-public enterprises in 2011. In March 2011, Zhang Mingqi, the vice chairman of the ACFTU, acknowledged that an increase in worker actions was due to enterprises having "neglected the legal rights and benefits of workers" for many years. Multiple localities in China also announced plans to establish collective wage consultation systems in coming years, including Qingdao, Changde, Rizhao, Qinhuangdao, and Shenzhen.
At the same time, advocates for worker rights in China continue to be subjected to harassment and abuse. In particular, officials appear to target advocates who have the ability to organize and mobilize large groups of workers. For example, in October 2010, a Xi’an court sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years in prison for organizing workers at state-owned enterprises. Authorities charged him with "mobilizing the masses to disrupt social order." Authorities continue to detain Yang Huanqing for organizing teachers in fall 2010 to petition against social insurance policies they alleged to be unfair.
As the Commission found in 2010, Chinese authorities continue to face the challenge of accommodating a younger, more educated, and rights-conscious workforce. In February 2011, the ACFTU released a set of policy recommendations intended to better address the demands of these young workers. Younger workers, born in the 1980s and 1990s, continue to be at the forefront of worker actions in China this year, including large-scale street protests in southern China in June 2011. These young workers also make up about 100 million of China’s 160 million migrant workers, and compared to their parents, have higher expectations regarding wages and labor rights. China’s Minister of Agriculture Han Changfu has pointed out that many of these young workers have never laid down roots, are better educated, are the only child in the family, and are more likely to "demand, like their urban peers, equal employment, equal access to social services, and even the obtainment of equal political rights."
With Chinese officials charged with preserving "social stability," the extent to which they will allow workers to bargain for higher wages and genuine representation remains unclear. In part to address official concern over the unequal distribution of wealth across China and its potential effects on "social unrest," the government reportedly is considering a national regulation on wages. Chinese media in the past year reported that the draft regulation includes provisions creating a "normal increase mechanism" for wages, defining a set of standards to calculate overtime pay, and requiring the management of certain "monopolized industries" (longduan qiye) to disclose to the government and the public the salary levels of their senior employees.
The Commission continued to monitor the progress of Guangdong province’s draft Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises, which reportedly would extend to workers the right to ask for collective wage consultations and allow worker members to sit on the enterprise’s board of directors and board of supervisors, represent worker interests in the boards’ meetings, and take part in the enterprise’s decision-making processes. In September 2010, the Standing Committee of the Guangdong People’s Congress reportedly withdrew the draft from further consideration due to heavy opposition from industry. During this reporting year, a major Hong Kong media source reported that Guangdong authorities would approve the draft in January 2011. However, no such action has been observed.
Chinese workers, especially miners, continued to face persistent occupational safety issues. In November 2010, the ACFTU released figures showing a 32 percent increase in occupational illnesses in 2009, of which the vast majority involved lung disease. Officials took some efforts to close some mines and promote safety, and fatalities have been consistently reduced over the past few years, but uneven enforcement reportedly continued to hinder such efforts. Collusion between mine operators and local officials reportedly remains widespread.
In January 2011, revisions to the Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance became effective. The changes include requiring officials to respond more quickly to worker injury claims, but the effectiveness of the changes is unclear. As the Commission reported last year, the claims process may last for more than a decade. The process is further complicated for migrant workers who may already have left their jobs and moved to another location by the time clinical symptoms surface.
The extent of child labor in China is unclear in part because the government does not release data on child labor despite frequent requests by the U.S. Government, other countries’ governments, and international organizations. While a national legal framework exists to address the issue, systemic problems in enforcement have dulled the effects of these legal measures. Reports of child labor continued to surface this past year. As an example, in March 2011, Shenzhen authorities reportedly found 40 children working at an electronics factory.
The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the PRC Social Insurance Law in October 2010, and it became effective on July 1, 2011. The law specifies that workers may transfer their insurance from one region to another and discusses five major types of insurance: Old-age pension, medical, unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity. No implementing guidelines have been released and some critics have said the law is too broad to be implemented effectively. In addition, the extent to which the law will enable a greater number of migrant workers to obtain social insurance remains unclear. At the same time, migrant workers continued to face discrimination in urban areas, and their children still faced difficulties accessing city schools. Employment discrimination more generally continued to be a serious problem, especially for workers without urban household registration status.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support projects promoting reform of Chinese labor laws and regulations to reflect internationally recognized labor principles. Prioritize projects that not only focus on legislative drafting and regulatory development, but also analyze implementation and measure progress in terms of compliance with internationally recognized labor principles at the shop-floor level.
Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase the experience of collective bargaining in action for both Chinese workers and trade union officials; identify local trade union offices found to be more open to collective bargaining; and focus pilot projects in those locales. Where possible, prioritize programs that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not have an official union presence. Encourage the expansion of exchanges between Chinese labor rights advocates in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the bar, academia, the official trade union, and U.S. collective bargaining practitioners. Prioritize exchanges that emphasize face-to-face meetings with hands-on practitioners and trainers.
Encourage research that identifies factors underlying inconsistency in enforcement of labor laws and regulations. This includes projects that prioritize the large-scale compilation and analysis of Chinese labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases and guidance documents issued by, and to, courts at the provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the publication and dissemination of Chinese language casebooks that may be used as a common reference resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, employers, union officials, and law schools in China.
Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and deepen relationships with labor organizations inside and outside of China and to invite these groups to increase the number of training programs in mainland China. Support programs that train workers in ways to identify problems at the factory-floor level, equipping them with skills and problem-solving training so they can relate their concerns to employers effectively.
Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experience and efforts in protecting worker rights—through legal, regulatory, or non-governmental means—with Chinese officials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for Chinese officials to observe and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other regulatory agencies at all levels of U.S. Government that work on labor issues.
Support USDOL’s exchange with China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) regarding setting and enforcing minimum wage standards; strengthening social insurance; improving employment statistics; and promoting social dialogue and exchanges with China’s State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) regarding improving workplace safety and health. Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL started in 2010 and its plan for the establishment of a safety dialogue. Encourage discussion on the value of constructive interactions among labor NGOs, workers, employers, and government agencies. Encourage exchanges that emphasize the importance of government transparency in developing stable labor relations and in ensuring full and fair enforcement of labor laws.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Findings

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government waged a broad-scale crackdown on human rights advocates, lawyers, bloggers, writers, and democracy activists. In early 2011, Chinese public security officials detained more than 200 advocates in a campaign that appeared related to official sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called "Jasmine" protests within China.
Harassment and intimidation of human rights advocates and their families by Chinese government officials continued during this reporting year. Public security authorities and unofficial personnel illegally monitored and subjected to periodic illegal home confinement human rights defenders, petitioners, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family members. Such mistreatment and abuse were evident particularly in the leadup to sensitive dates and events, such as the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony in December 2010 and the "Jasmine" protests of early 2011.
Chinese officials continued to use various forms of extralegal detention against Chinese citizens, including human rights advocates, petitioners, and peaceful protesters. Those arbitrarily detained were often held in psychiatric hospitals or extralegal detention facilities and subjected to treatment inconsistent with international standards and protections found in China’s Constitution and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law.
Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to confront obstacles to practicing law without judicial interference or fear of prosecution. In cases that officials deemed "politically sensitive," criminal defense attorneys routinely faced harassment and abuse. Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were not able to have counsel of their own choosing and some were compelled to accept government-appointed defense counsel. Abuses of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law, which prescribes criminal liability to lawyers who force or induce a witness to change his or her testimony or falsify evidence, continue to hinder effective criminal defense.
In February 2011, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee reviewed and passed the eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which reduced the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty to 55 crimes. The reduction signaled the first time the Chinese government has reduced the number of crimes punishable by capital punishment since the PRC Criminal Law was enacted in 1979. International organizations and the state-run media pointed out that courts rarely, if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes no longer eligible for capital punishment.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Press the Chinese government to release immediately advocates who are in prison or detention and to adhere to fair trial standards and ensure procedural protections for the approximately 40 human rights advocates in cases that have already gone to trial.
Support the establishment of exchanges between Chinese provincial law enforcement agencies and U.S. state law enforcement agencies to study policing, evidence collection, inmate rights, and other criminal justice reforms currently underway in China.
Press the Chinese government to adopt the recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Committee against Torture to investigate and disclose the existence of "black jails" and other secret detention facilities as a first step toward abolishing such forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese government to extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit China.
Call on the Chinese government to commit publicly to a specific timetable for its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified. Press the Chinese government to implement the principles asserted in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, and request that the Chinese government implement additional plans to advance human rights and the rule of law.
Urge the Chinese government to amend the PRC Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced rights and protections for lawyers and detained suspects contained in the 2008 revision of the PRC Lawyers Law. Encourage Chinese officials to commit to a specific timetable for revision and implementation of the revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Findings

The Chinese government continued in the past reporting year to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. China’s Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief but limits protections for religious practice to "normal religious activities," a term applied in a manner that falls short of international human rights protections for freedom of religion. The government continued to recognize only five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism—and required groups belonging to these religions to register with the government. Registered groups received some legal protection for their religious activities but remained subject to ongoing state controls. Members of both unregistered and registered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters for religion faced risk of harassment, detention, and other abuses. Some unregistered groups had space to practice their religions, but this limited tolerance did not amount to official recognition of these groups’ rights. Authorities also shut down the activities of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on other religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong.
The government continued to use law to control religious practice in China rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens, accelerating efforts in the past reporting year to revise or pass new legal measures. Planned legal measures, like others passed in recent years, build on provisions contained in the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA). Recent legal measures have added more clarity to ambiguous provisions in the RRA but also have articulated more detailed levels of control.
Authorities continued to control Buddhist institutions and practices and take steps to curb "unauthorized" Buddhist temples. As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringement on freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.
Authorities continued to deny Catholics the freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to the practice of their faith, including selecting Chinese bishops. Authorities continued to harass, detain, and place under surveillance some unregistered priests and bishops, as well as forced some bishops to attend what the Holy See considers illegitimate state-controlled church events against their will.
Local governments across China continued to prohibit Muslims from engaging in religious outreach and preaching activities independent of state-set parameters. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, officials integrated curbs over Islam into security campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and women from wearing veils, and targeted "illegal" religious materials in censorship campaigns.
Cases of harassment and detention of Protestants since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities have intensified toward Protestants who organize into large groups or across congregations, or who have contact with foreign individuals or organizations. This past year, the government also called for "guiding" members of unregistered Protestant groups to worship at registered sites.
Authorities maintained controls over Taoist activities and took steps to curb "feudal superstitious activities."
Authorities are currently in the second year of a three-year campaign to increase efforts to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their belief in and practice of Falun Gong. This campaign is part of a broader campaign—lasting more than a decade—that reportedly has been extensive, systematic, and in some cases violent. Local authorities in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, took measures to restrict the freedom of Falun Gong practitioners during the November 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, including detaining Falun Gong practitioners on suspicion of "cult"-related activity.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to remove the government’s framework for recognizing only select religious communities for limited state protections. Stress to Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes the right to practice a religion, as well as the right to hold religious beliefs, and that China’s limited protections for "normal religious activities" do not meet protections for freedom of religion as defined by international human rights standards. Call on officials to integrate steps to protect freedom of religion into initiatives to improve human rights in China. Stress to the Chinese government that the right to freedom of religion includes: The right of Buddhists to carry out activities in temples independent of state controls over religion, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to the practice of their faith, including to make bishop appointments; the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in religious outreach and preaching activities independent of state-set parameters and not face curbs on their internationally protected right to freedom of religion in the name of upholding "stability"; the right of Protestants to worship free from state controls over doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches, free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; and the right of Taoists to interpret their faith free from state efforts to ban practices deemed as "feudal superstitions."
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist nun sentenced in 2009 to 10 years’ imprisonment after she and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama’s long life and return to Tibet); Su Zhimin (an unregistered Catholic bishop who disappeared after being taken into police custody in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Nurtay Memet (Muslim man sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for a "su-perstition"-related activity connected to his religion); Fan Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house church leader kept under home confinement since November 2010 in connection with his advocacy for unregistered Protestant communities and coinciding with a broader crackdown on rights advocates), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.
Call for officials to eliminate criminal and administrative penalties that target religion and spiritual movements and have been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of religion. Specifically, call for officials to eliminate Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which criminalizes using a "cult" to undermine implementation of state laws) and Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law (which stipulates detention or fines for organizing or inciting others to engage in "cult" activities and for using cults or the "guise of religion" to disturb social order or to harm others’ health).
Support initiatives to provide technical assistance to the Chinese government in drafting legal provisions that protect, rather than restrain, freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens. Promote exchanges to bring experts on religious freedom to China and support training classes for Chinese officials on international human rights standards for the protection of freedom of religion. Promote dialogue on religious freedom, including information on protecting the rights of the range of religious communities and organizations, including faith-based groups that carry out social welfare activities.
Support non-governmental organizations that collect information on conditions for religious freedom in China and that inform Chinese citizens of how to defend their right to freedom of religion against Chinese government abuses. Support organizations that help religious practitioners to appeal prisoners’ sentences and orders to serve reeducation through labor stemming from citizens’ exercise of freedom of religion; to challenge government seizure of property; and to challenge job discrimination based on religion.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities in China continued to face unique challenges in upholding their rights, as defined in both Chinese and international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities within a state "shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language." The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law stipulates some protections for minority rights and provides for a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. Limits in the substance and implementation of state laws and policies, however, prevented minorities from fully enjoying their rights in line with international standards and from exercising meaningful autonomy in practice.
The government continued to recognize 55 groups as minority "nationalities" or "ethnicities" (shaoshu minzu) and exerted tightest control over groups deemed to challenge state authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See separate findings and recommendations on Xinjiang and Tibet within this section.] Government authorities continued to punish ethnic Mongols perceived to challenge state power or who attempted to promote their rights. In the past year, authorities detained, sentenced to prison, or appeared to hold in extralegal detention a number of Mongols who aimed to protect their rights or preserve Mongol culture. Those detained included Mongols who held demonstrations in May 2011 to protest government policy toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol culture.
Government steps to address ethnic minorities’ grievances remained limited in the past year. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission reported in December 2010 on exploring and "perfecting" "new mechanisms and forms" for improving the state’s regional ethnic autonomy system, but also affirmed the basic parameters of the state’s minority policies. The Chinese government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan pledged support for some aspects of ethnic minority rights, but appeared to have limited impact, especially in the areas of civil and political rights.
The Chinese government continued to implement top-down development policies that have undercut the promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cultures, languages, and livelihoods, while bringing a degree of economic improvements to minority areas. The government bolstered longstanding grasslands policies that have imposed grazing bans and required some herders to resettle from grasslands and abandon pastoral livelihoods, a development that affects Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups in China. Mongols protested grasslands policies during a series of demonstrations in May.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support rule of law programs and exchange programs that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in line with both domestic Chinese law and international human rights standards. Following the expiration of the 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, call on Chinese authorities to continue to include attention to minority rights in subsequent human rights initiatives and issue concrete plans for implementation and assessment in line with international standards.
Support programs that promote models for economic development in China that include participatory decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities. Call on the Chinese government to examine the efficacy of existing grasslands policies in ameliorating environmental degradation and to take steps to ensure that the rights of herders are protected in the process of promoting environmental policies.
Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China to enable them to continue their research and develop programs to help ethnic minorities increase their capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such organizations to develop training programs on promoting economic development that includes participatory decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities; programs to protect ethnic minority languages, cultures, and livelihoods; and programs that document conditions and research rights abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Encourage broader human rights and rule of law programs that operate in China to develop projects that address issues affecting ethnic minorities in China.
Call on the Chinese government to release people detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for advocating for the rights of ethnic minority citizens, including Mongol rights advocate Hada (who remains in custody despite the expiration of his 15-year sentence in December 2010), his wife Xinna and son Uiles (detained in advance of Hada’s scheduled release and later formally arrested), and other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

POPULATION PLANNING

Findings

Chinese government officials continued to implement population planning policies that interfere with and control the reproductive lives of its citizens, especially women, employing various methods including fines, withholding of state benefits and permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and arbitrary detention to punish policy violations.
The Commission observed in 2011 the continued practice by local governments of specifically targeting migrant workers for coercive implementation of family planning policies.
The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not consistent with the standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families and additional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against "out-of-plan" children, also violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China is a state party to these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms.
The Chinese government does not consistently implement provisions in the PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) that prohibit and provide punishment for abuses in the implementation of population planning policies. Article 4 of the PFPL states that officials shall "enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens." Under Article 39, an official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if, in the implementation of population planning policies, the official "infringes on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests" or "abuses his power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices for personal gain . . . ."
September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of the beginning of China’s current family planning efforts, and following this anniversary, the Commission observed increased public discussion of the prospects for family planning policy reform. Top Communist Party and government leaders continue to publicly defend the policy and rule out its cancellation in the near-term.
The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, including a severely imbalanced sex ratio—the highest in the world—an aging population, and a decline in the working age population.
Authorities released Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal advocate who publicized population planning abuses, from prison after he had completed his full sentence on September 9, 2010. Following his release, however, authorities have kept Chen and his family under "soft detention," or home confinement, and continued to subject them to abuse and restrictive control.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge Chinese government officials to cease coercive methods of enforcing family planning policies. Urge the Chinese government to dismantle coercive population controls and provide greater reproductive freedom and privacy for women.
Urge the Chinese government to reevaluate the PRC Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into conformance with international standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Urge China’s central and local governments to enforce vigorously provisions under Chinese law that provide for punishments of officials and other individuals who violate the rights of citizens when implementing population planning policies. Urge the Chinese government to establish penalties, including specific criminal and financial penalties, for officials and individuals found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and coercive sterilization—practices that continue in China despite provisions under existing laws and regulations intended to prohibit them. Urge the Chinese government to delink material and financial incentives for officials from their performance in implementing family planning policies and thereby reduce or remove the impetus for unlawful practices.
Support the development of programs and international cooperation on legal aid and training programs that help citizens pursue compensation under the PRC State Compensation Law and that help citizens pursue other remedies against the state for injury suffered as a result of official abuse related to China’s population planning policies.
Call on the Chinese government to release Chen Guangcheng and his family from extralegal detention and to permit them to enjoy the freedoms of movement, expression, and association, as provided under Chinese law and international standards to which the Chinese government has committed.

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Findings

During the Commission’s reporting year, the Chinese government continued to relax some household registration (hukou) restrictions consistent with earlier efforts. The system, first implemented in the 1950s, continues to limit the right of Chinese citizens to establish formally their permanent place of residence.
The Chinese government implemented several pilot hukou reform projects in several municipalities, aimed to bring all residents who already hold a local hukou under a unified registration system. The ramifications of the latest hukou reforms remain unclear. The Chinese media have praised the latest reforms as an important step toward true equality between urban and rural Chinese citizens. However, potential problems include the possibility of forced relocation of rural residents, inadequate compensation, and rural residents’ ability to adjust to urban life after relocation.
The Chinese government continued to impose restrictions on Chinese citizens’ right to travel in a manner that is inconsistent with international human rights standards. During the past year, authorities increasingly used various legal pretexts to prevent rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving China. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for preventing rights defenders from traveling.
The Chinese government continued to place restrictions on liberty of movement to punish and control political dissidents and human rights advocates. Restrictions on liberty of movement within China were especially harsh during this reporting period. Authorities employed a spectrum of measures including stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders, taking rights defenders to remote areas, inviting them to meetings to "drink tea" with security personnel, and imprisonment.
Chinese authorities used forceful efforts to intimidate and control human rights advocates and their family members during this reporting period. The Chinese government appears to have intensified efforts to crack down on human rights advocates after the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to prominent Chinese writer and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo and an anonymous online call for "Jasmine Revolution" protests within China.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers that provide legal assistance to migrant workers, and encourage policy debates on the hukou system.
Call on U.S. academic and public policy institutions and experts to consult with the Commission on avenues for outreach to Chinese academic and public policy figures engaged in policy debates on reform of the hukou system.
Stress to Chinese government officials that the Chinese government’s non-compliance with international standards regarding freedom of movement inside China negatively impacts confidence outside China in the Chinese government’s commitment to international standards more generally.
Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so that the meaning and parameter of "harmful to state security," and "cause a major loss to national interests" under Article 8(5) are more clear.
Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so that those who are detained can appeal the decision or seek other remedies.
Raise specifically Chinese government authorities’ restriction on liberty of movement of rights defenders, advocates, and critics including writer Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng and his family.

STATUS OF WOMEN

Findings

Chinese officials continue to promote existing laws that aim to protect women’s rights, including the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the amended PRC Marriage Law; however, ambiguity and lack of clearly outlined responsibilities in China’s national-level legislation, in addition to selective implementation and selective enforcement of this legislation across localities, limit progress on concrete protections of women’s rights.
In its domestic laws and policy initiatives and through its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Chinese government has committed to ensuring female representation in government. However, female representation at all levels of government appears to have made little significant progress in the 2011 reporting year.
The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees in October 2010, revising the language stating that there should be "an appropriate number of women" in village committees to language that states village committees "should have female members." The revised law also includes a stipulation that women should hold one-third of positions in village representative assemblies. The impact these revisions will have on female representation at the village level in the future is unclear, but some domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step. An increase in women’s decisionmaking power at the village level may lead to greater protection of women’s property rights in rural areas.
China has committed under CEDAW to take "all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment." Women continue to experience widespread discrimination in areas including recruitment, wages, and retirement despite the fact that the Chinese government has committed under Article 7 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 11 of CEDAW to ensuring gender equality in employment. While China’s existing laws such as the PRC Labor Law, amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI), and PRC Employment Promotion Law prohibit gender discrimination, they lack clear definitions and enforcement mechanisms, which weakens their effectiveness.
The amended LPWRI and amended PRC Marriage Law prohibit domestic violence, and individuals charged with the crime of domestic violence are punishable under the PRC Criminal Law. These national legal provisions leave many who encounter domestic violence unprotected, however, as they do not define domestic violence or outline specific responsibilities of government departments in prevention, punishment, and treatment. Officials reportedly completed draft national-level legislation that clarifies the definition and distribution of government responsibilities. Domestic violence reportedly remains pervasive, affecting nearly one-third of families in China. China’s amended LPWRI also prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for victims. The LPWRI does not, however, provide a clear definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment, presenting challenges for victims in protecting their rights. Sexual harassment reportedly remains prevalent in China.
Statistics and analysis from studies published in 2008, 2009, and 2010 regarding China’s skewed sex ratio suggest that sex-selective abortion remains widespread, especially in rural areas, despite the government’s legislative efforts to deter the practice. Some observers, including Chinese state-run media, have linked China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio with an increase in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms of human trafficking.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support programs in China that increase women’s leadership training through U.S.-China exchanges and international conferences. Support legal programs that promote women’s land rights, especially in rural areas, and urge that steps be taken to ensure that village rules and regulations are in accordance with national-level laws and policies and to ensure adequate protection of women’s rights and interests.
Urge the Chinese government to strengthen enforcement mechanisms for implementation of provisions in the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI), and the PRC Employment Promotion Law that prohibit gender discrimination. Urge Chinese officials to address specifically gender discrimination in recruitment, wages, and retirement.
Urge the Chinese government to enact comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly defines domestic violence, assigns responsibilities to government and civil society organizations in addressing it, and outlines punishments for offenders. Inquire whether officials will release such legislation for public comment and, if so, how long the public comment period will be and to whom it will be made available. Urge the Chinese government to further revise the LPWRI or enact new comprehensive national-level legislation to provide a clear definition of sexual harassment and specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment. Support training programs that increase awareness of domestic violence and sexual harassment issues among judicial and law enforcement personnel.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Findings

China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and children. The majority of human trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage.
The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in December 2009. To date, the Chinese government has revised some, but not all, of its legislation to conform to the Palermo Protocol. For example, the Chinese government issued an amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which included revisions that broaden the scope of prosecutable offenses for forced labor and increase penalties, but do not clearly define forced labor. The Chinese government’s legal definition of trafficking does not conform to international standards.
Using the definition of human trafficking under Chinese law—which conflates human smuggling, child abduction, and illegal adoption with human trafficking—the Supreme People’s Court reportedly convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking cases in 2010, up from 2,413 in 2009. Of these, courts reportedly handed down 2,216 prison sentences of five years or more. In addition, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reportedly convicted 4,422 individuals on trafficking-related crimes in 2010. In cooperation with non-governmental organizations and international organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to improve protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking but continued to focus efforts on women and children.
The Chinese government does not offer legal alternatives to deportation for identified foreign victims of trafficking, and continues to deport North Korean refugees under the classification of "economic migrants," regardless of whether or not they are victims of trafficking.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge the Chinese government to abide by its commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; continue to revise the government’s definition of trafficking; and enact comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation to align with inter-national standards.
Call on the Chinese government to provide more services for trafficking victims. Support expanding training programs for law enforcement personnel and shelter managers that help raise awareness and improve processes for identifying, protecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chinese trafficking victims.
Object to the continued deportation of North Korean trafficking victims as "economic migrants." Urge the Chinese government to abide by its international obligations with regard to North Korean trafficking victims and provide legal alternatives to repatriation.

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Findings

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, central and local authorities continued policies of classifying all North Koreans in China as "illegal" economic migrants and repatriating North Korean refugees in China, amid rising concerns over humanitarian crises and political instability in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2011, the Chinese government reportedly increased the presence of public security officials in northeastern China and erected new barricades along the Chinese-North Korean border.
The Chinese government continued to deny the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to the Chinese-North Korean border and to North Korean refugees in northeast China. The inability of the UNHCR to access North Koreans seeking asylum in China makes it difficult for the UNHCR and human rights organizations to obtain accurate information on the number of North Korean refugees, the reasons behind the North Korean defections, and the concerns of North Korean refugees over forced repatriation.
Chinese security authorities reportedly cooperated with North Korean police officials to repatriate North Korean refugees in reported "manhunts" throughout China, including remote areas within Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Chinese law enforcement agencies have deployed hundreds of officials to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees.
North Korean women in China continue to be trafficked into forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), as well as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol). The government’s failure to take adequate measures to prevent North Korean women from being trafficked and to protect North Korean victims of trafficking contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Chinese local authorities near the border with the DPRK continued to deny household registration (hukou) to the children of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. Without household registration, these children live in a stateless limbo and cannot access education and other social benefits.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support the efforts of the UNHCR to gain unfettered access to North Korean refugees in China, beginning with children born to a North Korean parent in China, and encourage the Chinese government to work with the UNHCR in enacting and implementing national asylum legislation that conforms with China’s obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol and to immediately cease detaining and repatriating North Koreans in China.
Urge central and local Chinese government officials to abide by their obligations under the Palermo Protocol (Article 9) and CEDAW (Article 6) to prosecute human traffickers in northeastern China and along the border with the DPRK.
Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and related social benefits to North Korean women married to Chinese citizens and grant the same to their children. In particular, urge local Chinese officials to allow these children to receive an education in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). Urge the Chinese government to allow greater numbers of North Korean defectors to have safe haven and secure transit until they reach third countries.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Findings

The Chinese government’s domestic legislation explicitly forbids discriminatory practices in employment, and as a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Chinese government has committed to eliminate discrimination in employment and education against persons with disability or infectious diseases. Discrimination against people living with medical conditions such as infectious diseases and mental illness remains commonplace, and those who experience discrimination face challenges in seeking legal recourse.
Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individual advocates continue to play a positive role in raising awareness about health concerns; however, Chinese officials continue to harass some public health advocates and monitor and control the activities of NGOs through restrictions on registration and funding.
The burden that cases of mental illness place on the country’s under-resourced mental healthcare system is significant. Officials reportedly continue to abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and medical professionals by using them as "tools for detaining people deemed a threat to social stability." In June 2011, the Chinese government released for public comment the draft Mental Health Law, which generated vibrant discussion among individuals and organizations across civil society sectors. Officials announced plans to enact the Mental Health Law by the end of 2011.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the Chinese government to stop repression of public health advocates and provide more support to U.S. organizations that address public health issues in China.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective implementation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit discrimination in hiring and in the workplace against persons living with HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses. Support programs that raise rights awareness among individuals living with infectious disease, disability, or mental illness.
Urge the Chinese government to address concerns that individuals and NGOs raised during the public comment period for the draft Mental Health Law. Urge Chinese officials to accomplish their stated goal of enacting the Mental Health Law by the end of 2011. Urge officials to then ensure implementation of the law across localities.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Findings

China’s environmental problems remain serious. This year’s report highlights heavy metal and growing rural pollution problems. Citizens continued to express their environmental grievances and sometimes protested in the streets, including at a protest against a chemical plant in Dalian city, Liaoning province, involving over 10,000 citizens who "took a walk" in front of government and Communist Party buildings. In some cases, officials suppressed demands for a cleaner environment. Local authorities detained, harassed, or threatened people in-cluding parents of children affected by lead poisoning in several provinces who raised grievances or sought redress; citizens demonstrating or complaining about landfill operations in Fujian province; citizens protesting operations of a waste incinerator in Jiangsu province; and citizens protesting expanded mining operations in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous areas.
Corruption, noncompliance with and uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, and the lack of legal recourse, remain significant challenges for China in managing its environmental problems. Sometimes environmental protection authorities do not take enforcement actions as required by law, and at times courts refuse to accept lawsuits because of concerns over "social stability." Environmental protection was among the areas to have the highest levels of bribery and corruption in the first six months of 2010.
Central and some local Chinese environmental protection officials have taken steps to improve information disclosure. Yet, efforts to implement disclosure measures remain underdeveloped. Some citizens have been proactive in requesting information; however, several challenges to accessing information remain, including administrative provisions that limit the scope of information that environmental authorities can disclose. The most difficult type of information to obtain in some cases is that related to polluting enterprises, which has potential implications for citizen health. Chinese citizens and experts have expressed concern over the speed and lack of transparency of developing hydroelectric and nuclear power projects. The nuclear power plant disaster in Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese citizens and experts to speak out about safety concerns, and prompted Chinese officials to conduct a safety review and consider new legislation that could improve the transparency of China’s nuclear industry.
Environmental protection remains a sector in which public participation is somewhat encouraged, yet officials also continue to seek to "guide" or manage participation. A new national-level official guiding opinion requires environmental groups to report on their international cooperative projects with foreign non-governmental entities for "examination and approval." The opinion also calls for the further strengthening of relations and cooperation between the government and social organizations, as well as greater political indoctrination of environmental groups by relevant authorities.
Top Chinese authorities reportedly consider China to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have taken steps to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Chinese leaders plan to voluntarily reduce carbon dioxide intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of GDP) by 17 percent by 2015. While non-governmental organizations continue some activities to address climate change, public participation in climate change policy processes is minimal. Chinese leaders stated they would improve data reliability and transparency in relation to energy and climate change; however, Chinese leaders face significant challenges in these areas. Official Chinese measures to address climate change, as well as their implementation, could place the rights of citizens at risk without sufficient procedural and safety protections.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing citizens for their grassroots environmental activism or for utilizing official and institutionalized channels to voice their environmental grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand awareness of citizens’ environmental rights and to promote the protection of those rights. Projects might include supporting U.S.-China discussions about complaint resolution mechanisms and strengthening U.S.-China cooperation regarding researching and addressing environmental health problems. Include environmental law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal expert dialogues.
Support multilateral exchanges regarding environmental enforcement and compliance tools, including environmental insurance, market mechanisms, criminal prosecution of serious environmental infringements, and public interest litigation mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen environmental impact assessment processes and citizen participation in those processes. Engage Chinese officials and others who seek to devise a realistic and fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution in China that could aid enforcement efforts.
Support continued expansion of environmental information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more environmental transparency. Support programs that educate Chinese citizens about China’s system of open government information. Encourage Chinese officials to make government and expert research reports regarding climate change and its impacts in China public and easily accessible. In addition, continue U.S. Government engagement with relevant ministries, academic institutions, experts, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing China’s capacity to measure, report, publicize, and verify emissions reduction strategies and techniques reliably.
Encourage the development of environmental NGOs in China, including incorporating joint non-governmental participation in bilateral projects. Support efforts to raise the technical and operational capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs.
Engage local Chinese leaders in their efforts to reconcile development and environmental protection goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city relationships in China to incorporate en-vironmental rights awareness, environmental protection, and climate change components into their sister-city programs. When making arrangements for travel to China, request meetings with officials from central and local levels of the Chinese government to discuss environmental governance and best practices. Invite Chinese local-level leaders, including those from counties, townships, and villages, to the United States to observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to environmental problem-solving.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Findings

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the number of civil society organizations (CSOs)—including organizational forms that most nearly correspond to the Western concept of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—participating in legal and policymaking activities in areas that are not politically sensitive continued to increase gradually. At the same time, organizations and individuals who worked on politically sensitive issues continued to face challenges.
NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling complicated and cumbersome registration requirements. In order to operate legally, an organization is required to obtain a sponsorship agreement from a public administration department in a relevant "trade, scientific or other professional area" at the appropriate level of government before registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship agreements are sometimes difficult to obtain because local sponsors are at times reluctant to take on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities. NGOs that do not fulfill these "dual management" requirements are not protected under the law and are prohibited from receiving outside donations. Some NGOs opt to register as commercial entities, in part to circumvent the burdens of fulfilling dual management requirements, though such actions could also subject them to targeted or selective oversight from the government as well as higher tax rates.
The Commission observed in this reporting year that "private" foundations (fei gongmu jijin hui), which are not permitted to solicit donations through public fundraising activities, reportedly continued to face operational hardships. "Private" foundations may apply to become "public" foundations (gongmu jijin hui), which are permitted to solicit donations through public fundraising activities, only if they can find government department sponsors and meet other required criteria. The Chinese government reportedly is considering revisions to the 2004 PRC Regulations on the Management of Foundations and is drafting the PRC Charities Law. Nevertheless, because draft language does not appear to have been widely circulated, it remains unclear what the proposed revisions and the new law will entail or how proposed regulatory changes will create room for private foundations to operate and grow.
Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish and operate NGOs that focus on issues officials deem to be sensitive faced intimidation, harassment, and punishment from government authorities. During this reporting year, for example, Chinese authorities continued to repeatedly harass and interfere with the operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization founded in 1994 by Wan Yanhai, a public health researcher. Authorities reportedly visited Aizhixing’s office where they confiscated documents, warned Wan—who had left China for the United States in May 2010 over concerns for his personal safety—not to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Norway honoring Liu Xiaobo, and shut down the organization’s Web site for posting a letter that officials found objectionable.
Some localities are following efforts in Shenzhen to simplify the registration process for certain types of service-oriented NGOs, and two other localities are among those considering changes to current regulations. Authorities in Beijing, for example, may extend to the entire city a current pilot project in one district that "opens up" the registration process for four types of social organizations, including the types of organizations that provide "social benefits" (shehui fuli) and "social services" (shehui fuwu). Officials in Shanghai city reportedly signed a "cooperative agreement" with the Ministry of Civil Affairs to "create new models for the development of social orga-nizations." The extent to which these reform efforts will create space for civil society organizations to grow remains unclear, as civil society advocates remain under tight scrutiny, and some were subjected to harassment, detention, and other abuses. Moreover, some experts on Chinese civil society both in China and abroad have cautioned that the latest reform efforts, while helpful to many grassroots organizations providing various kinds of social services, could also solidify the government’s ability to control such groups by forcing them to follow "government leadership" as a condition to operate.
During this reporting year, Chinese officials have continued to emphasize efforts to "guide" developments in civil society. Zhou Yongkang, the Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, said that "in fostering comprehensive social organizations, we must work hard to integrate various types of social organizations into a social organization system led by the Party Committee and the government . . . in the management of social organizations, we must establish a system of separate development and separate management to promote the healthy and orderly development of social organizations . . . in the management of foreign non-governmental organizations working in China, we must establish a joint management mechanism to protect legitimate exchanges and cooperation and strengthen management according to the law."

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Ask Chinese officials for updates on recent reforms at the local level relating to registration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other aspects of civil affairs. Encourage these officials to broaden the reform efforts that relax constraints on NGOs and to make them applicable to other parts of the country through national legislation and regulatory development.
Ask the Chinese government to refrain from applying uneven or selective enforcement of regulations to intimidate groups that they consider to be handling sensitive work. Request the Chinese government to revisit the recently issued State Administration of Foreign Exchange circular concerning overseas donations to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that NGOs, both domestic and international, are outlets for citizens to channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn contribute to the maintenance of a stable society. Conversely, point out that stricter controls over civil society organizations could remove a potentially useful social "safety valve," thereby increasing the sources of instability. During discussions with Chinese officials, mention the Tsinghua University report which found that even as the government increased spending on public security and tightened its control over civil society, social conflicts are happening with greater regularity.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international conferences and forums, and support training opportunities in the United States to build their leadership capacity in nonprofit management, public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media relations.

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Findings

The Communist Party exercises control over political affairs, government, and society through networks of Party committees or branches that exist at all levels in government, legislative, and judicial agencies, as well as in businesses, major social groups (including unions), the military, and most residential communities. During the 2011 reporting year, Communist Party leaders reiterated Party dominance and accelerated efforts to build or revitalize Party organizations, especially focusing on Party branches in commercial buildings, urban neighborhoods, academic institutions, and law firms.
China’s political institutions do not comply with the standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an intention to ratify. Nor do China’s political institutions comply with the standards outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While central-level Chinese leaders continued to issue measures meant to improve the efficiency of bureaucratic governance and to bolster trust in the Party, news reports did not indicate any major forthcoming political reforms. Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the need for political reforms; however, some of his remarks were censored in the Chinese domestic news. Other top leaders appeared to criticize ideological pluralism and to emphasize the impos-sibility of implementing "Western-style" democracy with its separation of powers and competing political parties.
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities expanded social controls under the banner of strengthening "comprehensive management of public security" and "safeguarding social stability." Officials engaged in a largely preemptive crackdown affecting hundreds of people, apparently disregarding their constitutional right to freedom of assembly and preventing them from gathering peacefully in so-called "Jasmine Revolution" rallies, with the purpose of advocating for democratic reforms, among other issues. In addition, authorities continued to detain, sentence, and demonstrate little tolerance for those individuals involved in political parties not sanctioned by the Communist Party. For example, authorities handed down a harsh sentence to Liu Xianbin for his democracy advocacy activities and arrested Li Tie for posting writings advocating for democracy on the Internet.
Direct elections for local people’s congress representatives are held only at the county level. Authorities appeared to discourage "independent candidates" who utilized online resources to campaign in the latest round of local people’s congress elections, and news stories reported harassment of "independent candidates" and their families. At least 100 "independent candidates" announced via microblog their intention to run.
Chinese leaders continued to voice support for village autonomy with the Party as the leading core. While village committee elections have spread across most of China, they continue to be plagued by official interference and corruption. Major revisions to the law governing village committee elections are likely to alter the balance of authority in village-governing organizations, partially because the law mandates establishment of a new "supervisory committee" or equivalent in every village. The revisions also clarify election and recall procedures. The supervisory committees may help to reduce village corruption, but they may also act to "maintain social stability" by stifling critical voices. Central-level officials continued a survey of outstanding governance problems at the grass-roots level, and authorities in numerous localities reported that they instituted a variety of "democratic management" projects to improve relations between village leaders and rural residents, to reduce corruption, to improve information disclosure, and to promote "democratic" public participation. The Commission has not observed news media reports containing details on the implementation and sustainability of these pilot projects.
Authorities continued to express support for government information disclosure and expanding the transparency of Party affairs. In addition, the State Council released the Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules by Law in November 2010, which emphasizes enhancing government information disclosure, with a focus on budgets, allocation of public resources, approval and implementation of major construction projects, and nonprofit social causes. Beijing municipality issued a measure that reportedly will, for the first time, include Party leaders within the "scope of accountability."
The Chinese government and Communist Party reportedly sought to improve governance accountability, and at the same time improve "social management." The government reportedly took limited steps to combat corruption, which remains a significant problem. In the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government issued China’s first white paper on corruption as well as other measures to subject officials to financial audits, encourage reporting of corruption, and protect whistleblowers. Chinese government authorities revised official evaluation models that could lead to greater accountability, relieving pressure on officials to falsify data in order to be promoted. Au-thorities issued a major economic and social development plan for the next five years (the 12th Five-Year Plan), which notes that authorities will "establish a community management and service platform," linking service provision and social management.
Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to political decisionmaking processes; however, they are increasingly able to use various channels to express opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory instruments. New measures stipulate that "major" policy decisionmaking processes should include public participation, expert argumentation, risk assessment, legal review, and group discussions. The measures also stipulate that authorities should track how their decisions are being implemented.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Call on the Chinese government to release people detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to call for political reform within China—including democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in March 2011 for "inciting subversion of state power"; the people detained for mentioning the protests in the Middle East and North Africa or calls for "Jasmine" protests in personal communications or in Internet postings; and other prisoners of conscience mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.
Support research programs for U.S. citizens to study political and social developments at the grassroots level in China and expand the number of U.S. consulates throughout the country.
Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in local people’s congress and village committee elections, including expansion of domestic election monitoring systems, training of Chinese domestic election monitors, and joint U.S.-Chinese election monitoring activities.
Support continued substantive exchanges between Members of the U.S. Congress and members of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, especially in relation to Congressional oversight processes and budgetary matters.
Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations that seek to work with local Chinese governments in their efforts to improve transparency and accountability, especially efforts to expand and improve China’s government information disclosure initiatives. Such projects might include training in the U.S. Freedom of Information system for Chinese officials, joint efforts to better publicize the Open Government Information (OGI) Regulations at local levels, and citizen and group training about how to submit OGI requests.
Support projects that assist local governments, academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding transparent public hearings and other channels for citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking process. Such projects might include an exchange program component, whereby Chinese local government officials and non-governmental organization representatives would travel together to the United States to attend town hall or public meetings that address significant issues. Such projects might also include pilot projects in China in which citizens’ suggestions to authorities about draft laws, regulations, or policies are made available to the public.

COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW

Findings

Industrial policy continues to play an important role in the Chinese economy, guiding important sectors such as automotive, software, and "cultural industry." These industrial policies are comprehensive frameworks for development in key sectors of the Chinese economy, providing for subsidies and other benefits, plans for restructuring the state-owned companies in the relevant sector, and export goals. The use of industrial policies, especially in key sectors, was supplemented by China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, which sets out certain "strategic emerging industries" for support, including energy conservation, new-generation information technology (IT), biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energies, new materials, and new-energy vehicles. Further, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other government departments have issued sector-specific plans.
China’s state-owned sector enjoys preferential treatment, crowding out private companies in certain key sectors. This can act as a barrier to legal development and the rule of law, as the state controls the companies, the courts, the legislatures, and administrative departments. China’s industrial policies encourage the transfer of technology to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and their consolidation into "domestic champions." SOEs also enjoy various direct and indirect subsidies.
Chinese legislation is vague as to whether information concerning the SOEs falls under China’s rules on commercial secrets or the PRC State Secrets Law. This was highlighted in the case of Xue Feng, a U.S. citizen who was arrested in China for helping his U.S.-based employer purchase a commercial database in China. The database was not classified as a state secret at the time of the transaction. Xue was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment in China for violating China’s state secrets law, and his sentence was upheld on appeal in February 2011.
China has been a party to several World Trade Organization (WTO) cases since acceding to the WTO in December 2001, and there were six active disputes against China in 2010. The WTO found against China in a case it brought challenging the United States’ imposition of tariffs on certain auto and truck tires under the transitional product-specific safeguard provision in China’s Protocol of Accession. The United States brought a case against China concerning its provision of subsidies to the domestic wind energy industry, which is pending. China appealed a WTO decision that China’s restraints of exports of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc are not consistent with China’s obligations under the WTO.
The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be a subject of concern to policymakers inside and outside China.
Chinese government departments closely regulate foreign investment in China and use the approval process to ensure that foreign investment is in keeping with government policy. During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities issued a revised draft of the Foreign Investment Guidance Catalogue, which lists industries in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or forbidden. The revised catalogue includes provisions listing as "encouraged" the strategic emerging industries covered in the 12th Five-Year Plan.
Chinese outbound investment has grown, with much of the growth concentrated in investments in energy and minerals needed for Chinese manufacturing. Outbound investment is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission issued new measures regulating offshore financial activities by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Outbound investments are financed by loans from China’s state-owned banks, outbound investment funds, and use of renminbi reserves.
Two of the three Chinese government departments in charge of implementing the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued new AML regulations during the 2011 reporting year. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce passed three sets of regulations on monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance, and abuse of administrative power, and the NDRC issued two sets of regulations on price monopoly. The five sets of regulations became effective on February 1, 2011.
MOFCOM, which handles AML merger reviews, has held up approval of mergers of non-Chinese entities outside China during this reporting year, including Nokia’s purchase of certain of Motorola’s network assets, and the merger of two Russian potash companies. There have been no reports of MOFCOM not approving, or giving only conditional approval to, mergers between Chinese companies; however, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission has been encouraging the consolidation of the SOEs in China, a process which some industrial policies, such as that for the auto industry, mandate.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Develop and support a project surveying the role of China’s industrial policies in the Chinese economy from the perspective of WTO requirements, including how the development of these policies, and the role they play in directing China’s economy, impact the development of transparency, rule of law, and China’s compliance with its international legal commitments.
Request through the Open Government Information office at the Ministry of Commerce, or through bilateral dialogues between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and their Chinese counterparts, details on merger applications reviewed since the PRC Antimonopoly Law came into effect, including the number of applications involving non-Chinese companies, the number of applications involving state-owned enterprises, and the results of each of the merger reviews.
Through bilateral dialogues between (1) the U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Department of Commerce and (2) China’s Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, and State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, obtain details on the amount of Chinese investment (other than in financial instruments) in the United States, the criteria Chinese authorities use in making approval decisions concerning such investment, and how such investment is financed.
Arrange for Chinese authorities to clarify the approval pro-cedure applicable to foreign investment in China, including how the security review procedure relates to the regular review procedure applicable to all foreign investment in China under the auspices of legal exchanges such as the U.S. Legal Exchange under the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Findings

Chinese citizens’ ability to redress perceived wrongs continued to face significant challenges during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. Authorities continued to promote a "harmonious" socialist society with Chinese characteristics. Key policies and regulations during the past year reflect the Party’s ongoing concern with "maintaining social stability."
The courts encouraged the use of mediation over trials as means to resolve disputes in civil cases. Critics point out that mediation could lead to curtailed access to courts for Chinese citizens. In addition, it remains unclear whether the new PRC People’s Mediation Law can adequately resolve disputes without coercion, and whether it can provide for effective enforcement of mediated agreements.
Citizen petitioners seeking to address their grievances continued to face official reprisals, harassment, violence, and detention, especially by local governments due to incentive structures linked to citizen petitioning.

Officials at various levels of government continued to discourage, intimidate, and detain human rights lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases, and clients that officials deem to be "sensitive." Officials employed a spectrum of measures including stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders, forcing rights defenders to travel to unknown areas or to attend meetings to "drink tea" with security personnel, and imprisonment.
The Supreme People’s Court announced in May 2011 that it would issue uniform guidelines for some types of cases. The guiding cases are meant to provide uniformity in decision-making for the public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and the courts. One of the key questions that remains unanswered is the degree to which the guiding cases are binding on lower courts.
The Chinese government continued to promote administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater oversight of state agencies and government employees and to protect citizen interests if they are faithfully implemented and executed. The amended PRC Administrative Supervision Law became effective in June 2011. Its key provisions provide some protection for whistleblowers. The amended PRC State Compensation Law became effective in December 2010. Its key provisions expand the scope of the law by allowing negligence as a cause of action against the government under some circumstances. In addition, the amended law eliminates certain procedural loopholes making it easier to establish a valid claim.
Chinese citizens remained reluctant to bring cases against government officials utilizing administrative law provisions. Cases brought against the government based on administrative law provisions reportedly accounted on average for very low percentages of local courts’ total workloads.
The government increased funding for the legal aid system during the 2011 reporting year. Nevertheless, China faces a systemic shortage of defense lawyers. In underdeveloped regions, some criminal defendants may have no access to legal representation.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor’s Leadership Program and other bilateral exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the non-governmental organization and academic sectors that partner with China’s human rights lawyers and nonprofit legal organizations.
Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as the Chinese government’s preferred way to resolve disputes. Achieve a clear understanding of the implications on Chinese citizens’ access to justice and the Chinese government’s compliance with international standards.
Continue to monitor the anticipated issuance of the guiding cases by the Supreme People’s Court for the public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and the courts. Pay particular attention to their effect, if any, on lower level courts.
Express concern to Chinese authorities over treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders to examine the incentive structures at the local level that lead to abuse of petitioners who seek to express their grievances.
Object to the continued harassment of human rights lawyers and advocates. Call for the release of lawyers and activists who have been subject to unlawful home confinement, "disappearance," or harassment by officials for their activities to defend and promote the rights of Chinese citizens.
Support exchange, education, and training in legal aid expertise with Chinese defense lawyers and law schools.

PROPERTY

Findings

Over the past year, there have been numerous cases of expropriation and abuses by local governments and property developers, including forced evictions. Forced evictions are contrary to the General Comments to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which China has ratified. Some property owners who refuse to leave their homes have been beaten, harassed, or illegally detained. China’s economic development has led to increased need for land, and income from land sales has been an important source of revenue for local governments.
In January 2011, the Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land came into effect. The regulations define "public interest" in the context of land takings and set out some procedural protection for urban land rights owners. Though the 2007 PRC Property Law and the 2004 PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property both provide that local government should only expropriate land in the "public interest," neither include a definition of the term. While the new regulations provide greater clarity and better protection, their effectiveness will depend on implementation.
The Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land apply only to urban land, leaving China’s rural residents with a lower level of protection. Rural land is owned by collectives, and farmers legally can enter into 30-year contracts with their collectives for use of collectively owned land. However, there is little protection for farmers, and there have been recommendations that protection from expropriation be extended to rural residents.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge the Chinese government in meetings and correspondence to prepare and pass legislation concerning expropriations that provides protection for rural land dwellers comparable to that enjoyed by urban dwellers under the Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land.
Arrange and support a program of technical assistance for Chinese government departments responsible for land management concerning U.S. procedures and standards for taking property by eminent domain. Such assistance would highlight the meaning under U.S. law of takings in the "public interest," and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments working with their sister cities in China.
Urge the Chinese government to put in place comprehensive legislation to clarify rural land titles and to provide legal assistance to rural land dwellers to help them protect their rights to collectively owned land. Working through U.S.-China dialogues, such as the Legal Exchange under the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, engage in technical exchanges with China concerning pro bono programs at law firms, or provision of other legal services for the poor in the United States.

XINJIANG

Findings

Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region’s stability. Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011, following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an expanded trade expo.
The Chinese government continued to obscure information about people tried in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas media reported on cases of people imprisoned for peaceful speech and assembly during that time. The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of endangering state security—a category of criminal offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and dissent—decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 figures but remained higher than in years before 2009.
Implementation of a series of central government-led development initiatives, first announced at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred an intensification of longstanding policies—including Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban development projects— that have undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and livelihoods.
Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight controls over religion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on religious practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations. Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and women from wearing veils, and targeted "illegal" religious materials in censorship campaigns.
Discriminatory job hiring practices against Uyghurs and other non-Han groups continued in both the government and private sectors. Authorities also continued to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs elsewhere in China, through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by coercion to participate and exploitative working conditions. Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in work-study programs that exceeded permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker rights.
National and XUAR government officials continued to implement projects that have undermined Uyghurs’ ability to protect their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to demolish and "reconstruct" the Old City section of Kashgar and relocate residents, a five-year project launched in 2009 that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for undermining cultural heritage protection. The Chinese government also continued to politicize the protection of Uyghurs’ intangible cultural heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and artistic gathering for increased state and international protection, but defining this form of intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that contain religious elements and social activism.
Information remained limited on the status of asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum seekers’ refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese security officials, in cooperation with authorities in Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a Uyghur man—initially recognized as a refugee, though the UNHCR later revoked this status—from Kazakhstan to China. In August, authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man to Chinese authorities—who are presumed to have returned him to China—while authorities in Pakistan and Malaysia forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same month. The forced returns are among several documented cases of forced deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of "refoulement" and torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway of China’s influence and its disregard for international law.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to pro-tect their human rights.
Raise concern about human rights conditions in the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for their personal connection to rights advocates, including: Gheyret Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for "leaking state secrets" after giving interviews to foreign media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison for allegedly "inciting racial hatred or discrimination" or "inciting separatism" after writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for alleged economic and "separatist" crimes), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.
Call on the Chinese government to provide details about each person detained, charged, tried, or sentenced in connection to demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, including each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the name of each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned. Call on the Chinese government to encourage people who have been wrongfully detained to file for compensation. Call on the Chi-nese government to ensure people suspected of crimes in connection to events in July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their right to employ legal defense in accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and to ensure suspects can employ legal defense of their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government to announce the judgments in all trials connected to events in July 2009, as required under Article 163 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Call on the government to allow independent experts to con-duct independent examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to allow them access to the trials connected to these events.
Support non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue to gather information on conditions in the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to preserve their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage. Provide support for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand their capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored information to XUAR residents. Provide support for libraries that hold Uyghur-language collections to increase their capacity to collect and preserve books and journals from the XUAR. Support organizations that can research and take steps to safeguard tangible and intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to support development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad protection of XUAR residents’ rights and allow the XUAR government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy in making development decisions. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that promotes not only economic growth but also respects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and engages these communities in participatory decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into account the particular needs and input of non-Han ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges protecting their rights in the face of top-down development policies and who have not been full beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on authorities to ensure that residents have input into resettlement initiatives and receive adequate compensation. Call on authorities to take measures to safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their cultures and livelihoods.
Call on the Chinese government to ensure government and private employers abide by legal provisions barring discrimination based on ethnicity and cease job recruiting practices that reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on authorities to monitor compliance with local directives promoting job opportunities for non-Han groups, who continue to face discrimination in the job market. Support organizations that can provide technical assistance in monitoring compliance with labor laws and in bringing suits challenging discriminatory practices, as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employment Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to investigate reports of coercion and exploitative working conditions within labor transfer programs that send rural non-Han men and women to jobs in the interior of China. Call on Chinese authorities to investigate work-study programs within the XUAR and ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker rights.
Call on the Chinese government to provide information on the whereabouts and current legal status of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned from Cambodia in December 2009 and Uyghurs forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, and Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and with officials from international refugee agencies and from transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations of other countries. Call on transit and destination countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention against Torture on "refoulement."

TIBET

Findings

Expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan culture—especially on religion and language—are resulting in consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with increases in government-provided statistical measures on economic development and social services, such as education. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of government and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of punishment as the central and local governments expand the use of legal measures to safeguard "social stability" by criminalizing such expression.
No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese government and Party officials during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the government pressed forward with implementation of legal measures and policies that many Tibetans—including the Dalai Lama—believe threaten the Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile. The change has the potential to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for the Party and government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a "political" figure.
The government and Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader and expanded government and Party control over Tibetan Buddhism to impose what officials describe as the "normal order" of the religion. As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries. The measures impose closer monitoring and supervision of each monastery’s Democratic Management Committee—a monastic group legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey government laws, regulations, and policies. The measures expand significantly township-level government authority over monasteries and nunneries and provide a monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role to village-level committees.
Government security and judicial officials used China’s legal system as a means to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. Examples during the 2011 reporting year included writer-publishers, a conference organizer, a singer, and persons who downloaded "prohibited" songs. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influencing other Tibetans by punishing peaceful expression as a "crime" and using imprisonment to remove them from society.
Events this past year highlighted the importance Tibetans attribute to the status and preservation of the Tibetan language and the increased threat that some Tibetans believe will result from "reform" of the "bilingual education" system. Tibetan students in one province led protests against plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during the period 2010 to 2020. A Party official characterized "unity of spoken and written language" as essential for "a unified country" and implied that protesting students put national unity at risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to authorities a petition analyzing what they deemed to be violations of China’s Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that result in the infringement of ethnic minorities’ rights.
Rural Tibetans protested against what they consider to be adverse effects of government and Party economic development policies—especially mining—that prioritize government objectives above respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and environment. The value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) mineral resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010 subsidies the central government provided to the TAR, based on official reports. The TAR government has completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population. Officials provided updates on construction of the railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu, which the government renamed and will make into a "city" with a substantial population, economy, and well-developed infrastructure. Tibetans in Yushu protested after authorities either sold or expropriated their property without providing adequate compensation.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama’s withdrawal from exiled Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for the government and Party to characterize him as a "political" figure. As tensions rise in Tibetan areas, a Chinese government decision to engage in dialogue can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the Chinese government and Tibetans and improve the outlook for local and regional security in coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of refraining from expanding the use of legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists’ right to the freedom of re-ligion. Point out to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama campaign, aggressive programs of "patriotic education," and re-cent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to control Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs could promote social discord, not "so-cial stability." Urge the government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions.
Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an "ordinary citizen" along with his family. Urge the government to invite a representative of an international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy; photograph the international representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s statement and the photograph.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by honoring China’s Constitution’s reference to the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to infringe upon and repress Tibetans’ exercise of such rights. Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in teaching modern subjects.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when the government plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of such projects and in advising the government on the implementation and progress of such projects. Request the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property or property rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu earthquake and the government’s decision to redevelop Yushu as a new "city."
Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.
Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the Chinese government to provide complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative examples include: Former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for "inciting splittism"); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival).

DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU

Findings

Though the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the "ultimate aim" is the selection of the chief executive and the election of all members of the Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage, reforms passed in 2011 fell short of these aims. The reforms cover the election of Legco members and the selection of the chief executive in Hong Kong’s 2012 elections. Under the reforms, the number of members of the selection committee that chooses the chief executive will be increased from 800 to 1,200, and the number of Legco members will be increased from 60 to 70, with 5 of the additional 10 members elected directly and the other 5 elected under a newly created territory-wide District Council functional constituency. According to a report in an independent Hong Kong newspaper, the mainland Chinese government has been "coordinating" election strategies behind the scenes.
The Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law provide that Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In the past year Hong Kong’s immigration authorities refused to grant visas to two exiled leaders of the Tiananmen protests, Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of Hong Kong democracy activist Szeto Wah in January 2011. Hong Kong controls its own immigration policies under the Basic Law, and at least one Hong Kong commentator viewed the immigration department’s refusal to issue visas as Hong Kong de-ferring to the wishes of the mainland authorities.
Corruption in Macau is a major and growing problem, with Macau’s ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index dropping from 43rd in 2009 to 46th in 2010. The growth of gambling in Macau, fueled by money from mainland Chinese gamblers and the growth of U.S.-owned casinos, has been accompanied by widespread corruption, organized crime, and money laundering.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Continue to make every effort to visit Hong Kong when traveling to mainland China. U.S. Government delegations’ meetings in Hong Kong should include meetings with members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, officials with the Hong Kong government administration, and members of the judiciary. Such meetings show U.S. support for a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong under the system of "one country, two systems" and for rule of law.
In meetings with Chinese government officials, urge them to allow the people of Hong Kong to enjoy the high degree of autonomy articulated in the Basic Law and the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration, especially in matters concerning elections and immigration, and to allow the introduction of universal suffrage with "one man, one vote," if this is the wish of the people of Hong Kong.
Arrange for regulatory experts from states with gaming industries, such as Nevada, to provide technical training and as-sistance to Macau authorities on how to control criminal activity, and ensure that U.S. casino owners and operators in Macau are adhering to the highest standards for the gaming industry.

The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 13 to 0.†

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

Recommendations

When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (https://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including his or her alleged crime; specific human rights that officials have violated; stage in the legal process; and location of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious prisoners compiled from database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China to explore the database and to advocate for the release of political and religious prisoners in China.

A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY

The Commission’s 2011 Annual Report provides information about Chinese political and religious prisoners1 in the context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses result from the Communist Party’s and government’s application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of information about political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at https://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available at https://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)

PPD use has increased substantially following the July 2010 PPD upgrade. The PPD received approximately 90,900 online requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 2011, an increase of approximately 164 percent over the 34,400 requests during the 12-month period ending in August 2010. During the 12-month period ending in August 2011, the United States was the country of origin of the largest share of requests for information (approximately 46 percent), followed by China (24 percent), Germany (8 percent), France (3.5 percent), and Great Britain (3.2 percent). Approximately 13 percent of the requests originated from U.S. Government (.gov) Internet domains, 13 percent from worldwide commercial (.com) domains, 13 percent from worldwide network (.net) domains, 1.5 percent from U.S. education (.edu) domains, and 0.8 percent from worldwide nonprofit organization (.org) domains. Approximately 16 percent of the requests for information were from numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information about the name of the registrant or the type of domain.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the staff member’s area of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China.

As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained information on 6,623 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 1,451 are cases of political or religious prisoners currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 5,172 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more than 1,451 cases of current political and religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the PPD.

The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and individuals who research political and religious imprisonment in China or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly leveraged the capacity of the Commission’s information and technology resources to support such research, reporting, and advocacy.

The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the freedom to advocate for peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials.

The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet to query the database and download prisoner data without providing personal information to the Commission and without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s computer. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal information to set up such an account. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a user’s computer as the result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID (which can be a nickname) and password are the only information required to set up a user account.

† Voted to adopt: Representative Smith; Senators Brown, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Merkley, Collins, and Risch; Deputy Secretary Harris, Under Secretary Otero, Under Secretary Sánchez, Assistant Secretary Campbell, and Assistant Administrator Biswal.

Notes to Section I—Political Prisoner Database

1 The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as China’s Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a defense.

I.要点摘要

仅本文件英文原文具法律约束力。本文件中文译文仅作参考之用。两者之间不一致之处均以英文原文为准。

导言

今天的中国和三十年前开始经济改革之时相比有了很大不同，甚至与其十年前加入世界贸易组织之时相比也有了很大的差别。在今天的中国，越来越多的人享受生活质量的提高和经济自由，同时也可以在更大程度上通过互联网和其他通讯技术获得信息，然而经济和技术的进步并未使中国在人权和法治记录方面相得益彰。

今年，在人权和法治方面，中国领导人更加武断地侵犯权利，无视他们声称要维护的法律和国际准则，并加紧了对中国社会的控制。与此同时，中国领导人却信心十足地表彰自己的人权和法治记录。中国政府官员在今年宣布中国在法律制度上达到了一个‘‘重要里程碑’’，并在贯彻其《国家人权行动计划(2009-2010)》方面取得了‘‘重大成就’’；而且‘‘公民权利与政治权利得到更加有效的保障。’’中国领导人不再对其人权记录的批评简单地加以抵赖，而是更加利用国际法的语言为自己的行为辩护。中国领导人宣称，今天的中国很强大，而且在人权和法治方面正在不断进步。

与这些官方说辞相反，中国的人权和法治记录并没有得到改善。事实上，今年的年度报告反映出在某些领域还更加恶化。一个令人不安的趋势是官员们更加恣意践踏法律，在压制反对意见方面尤甚。从2011年 2月起，中国警方在昀近的记忆中昀恶劣的一次突击镇压中采取非同寻常的手段，使许多律师和活动家‘‘失踪’’。因此毫不奇怪，在一些敏感的问题上，如中国的计划生育政策方面，地方政府官员采用非法措施，包括暴力，强迫执行违反国际人权准则政策的时候，很少表现出克制。中国缺乏对法治的尊重也扩展到了国际舞台上，表现在中国实行的国内补贴和产业政策与其加入世界贸易组织时的承诺有悖。

中国政府滥用法律侵犯基本人权仍在继续。本委员会观察到中国官员援引‘‘法律’’打击和平示威，阻止佛教徒、天主教徒、法轮功修炼者、穆斯林、基督教徒和道教徒自由实践他们的信仰；防止藏族、维吾尔族和其他少数民族行使受中国法律保证的自治；禁止工人独立地组织工会；打击公民社会团体。共产党加强对社会各阶层的控制，加强对公民和社会团体的监督，扼杀独立的政治参与和对民主的呼声。

伴随这些负面事态的发展，特别是在基层民众中也出现了有一些有希望的迹象。本委员会观察到公民呼吁正义的勇气。例如，大胆的记者及数以百万计的互联网用户穿过网络封锁质问政府官员对高速铁路撞车事故的回应；又如，守望教会成员公然藐视政府在北京举行户外崇拜活动。本委员会也继续观察到具有良好意愿的官员和个人寻求在体制内带来积极变化的行动。这样的行动证明了中国人民拥有建立一个公正社会的愿望以及他们在追求这个公平社会时所富有合作的精神。

人权和法治在中国的发展对整个世界都具重要意义。言论、结社和宗教的自由超越国界具有普世价值。这些权利在《世界人权宣言》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》这两个文件中有明确规定。中国政府已经公开支持这两个文件。当中国政府和中国共产党剥夺了人民的这些权利，如他们审查新闻和互联网，限制获取司法的渠道，全世界的公民，不仅是中国人，都会对有毒食品，不安全产品，自然与人为灾害，及传染性疾病无从得知，减少了官员问责的依据。此外，中国政府在国内尊重人权和法治与否也是一个检验中国能否与国际合规及合作的重要的晴雨表，涉及的领域包括贸易协定和其他全球共同关注的问题。昀后，近年来，中国对其人权记录的自信心和辩护为其他国家开了负面的先例，重塑国际上允许中国的侵犯人权的标准。中国在过去的一年对监禁诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波的强硬辩护和一些国家的政府拒绝派代表出席诺贝尔奖仪式，正好体现这一趋势。

这是本委员会有关中国人权和法治发展的第十个年度报告。和以往一样，本委员会的评估根据中国政府自己的宪法、法律和国际人权准则。我们的研究在很大程度上依照了中国发表的报告和文章。我们的研究表明，在过去的一年里，中国官方继续剥夺中国公民的权利，以便维持共产党自己认为的政治稳定与和谐。中国的稳定符合美国的昀佳利益，但是本委员会认为，稳定不是从压制公民权利的眼前利益中得到，而只是靠保障和保护所有中国公民的权利中取得。

概览

以下是在 2011报告年度期间本委员会对观察到的主要趋势的讨论。此报告年度涵盖 2010年秋至 2011年秋。

无视法律

本委员会观察到，中国官员无视法律，剥夺中国公民言论、结社、宗教，并享有免受任意拘留的自由。同时，中国官员拒绝遵守对国际的承诺。

人权律师和活动家的失踪。当局在2011年上半年报道，许多律师和人权活动家纷纷‘‘失踪’’其原因是他们批评共产党和为政治敏感的运动和群体呼吁。被‘‘失踪’’个人的下落及对他们的指控很难，甚至根本无法得知。‘‘失踪’’违反了中国法律的有限程序保护规定，并遭到联合国非自愿失踪工作组和国际社会的谴责。失踪人员包括知名的艺术家和公众吁请人艾未未，他被秘密隐藏 81天后被获准保释，但条件是他不得接受媒体采访或发送推特消息。继此之后，中国政府宣布了一项修订草案，将‘‘失踪’’在刑事诉讼法中合法化。
计划生育。尽管中国法律禁止官员在贯彻人口计划生育政策时侵犯公民的权利和利益，本委员会注意到从官方活动的报告，以及许多个别案件的资料表明，官员使用暴力手段强迫公民接受绝育或人工流产或因为养育‘‘计划外’’儿童而支付巨额罚款。例如，在 2010年 10月，福建省厦门的地方计划生育官员绑架了一名怀孕 8个月，即将生下第二胎的女子。官员将她拘留了 40个小时并强行给她注入一种造成堕胎的药物。有报道说，在此期间，她的丈夫不允许探望。
工人的权利。中国宪法和国际人权准则提供了结社自由。尽管有一些潜在的积极和有限的发展（见下文），在过去一年里，中国工人组织独立工会的基本权利仍然被剥夺。相反，工人必须依赖于一个由共产党控制的工会来代表他们。在没有真正劳工代表的情况下，中国工人在他们寻求独立的权利时继续面临恶劣的工作条件和骚扰。工人安全问题，尤其是矿工的安全问题，以及童工的问题，依然很严重。
法外监视居住释放的活动家和上访者。胡佳，人权和环保活跃分子；陈光诚，一个自学成才，致力于公布非法计划生育措施的法律专家，2010年 9月从监狱释放，但马上与家人一起遭到拘留和虐待，这样的处理很少或根本没有中国的法律基础。在陈光诚的案子中，他和他的妻子受到非法监视居住，据称当他们把自己境况的视频公布于世后还遭到毒打。此外，蒙古人权人士哈达于 2010年 12月刑满释放后继续受到政府拘押。继续拘押是否有法律依据目前并不清楚。中国和国际媒体也都报道过仍然存在的非法拘留、收容和虐待那些坚持上访伸冤公民的‘‘黑监狱’’问题。
商业法治。中国继续实施与作为世界贸易组织（WTO）成员国的承诺不一致以及不符合法治的政策。产业政策限制非中国公司进入中国市场的机会。在某些情况下，违反世贸组织有关国民待遇的核心原则。国有企业享受直接和间接的补贴，包括土地和规章上的保护，这违背了中国加入世贸组织的承诺。优待国有企业已影响到人权，包括征用土地来补贴生产和使用国家保密法来保护国有部门的信息。这过去一年中，世贸组织的案子显示了中国这些政策对其贸易伙伴的影响，涉及从轮胎到风能的一系列产业。这些案件突显中国支持其国内产业，使用配额和补贴，缺乏透明度，以及对敢于抗议的外国公司进行报复。中国继续控制被许多经济学家和国际货币基金组织认为价值偏低的货币。
少数民族语言和文化。在西藏自治区域，新疆维吾尔自治区，内蒙古自治区和其他少数民族区域，中国政府违反中国的宪法和民族区域自治法继续推动威胁这些民族语言和文化活力的政策。这些政策包括在学校强制实行汉语，取代其他语言；对大量游牧民强制搬迁；紧密控制宗教活动，以及开发威胁生计和宗教圣地的经济发展项目。

滥用法律作为压迫的手段

本委员会还注意到了中国官员持续滥用和强化法律，以其作为压制和剥夺公民基本言论、结社、宗教、免受任意拘留的权利和自由的工具。

刑事和行政法律。中国官方滥用刑事和行政法律来禁止‘‘颠覆’’、‘‘分裂’’和‘‘扰乱社会秩序’’的活动仍然是本年度报告昀为关注的方面之一。中国官员使用这些规定关押从事和平言论和集会的劳工维权人士、作家、互联网评论家、民主人士以及西藏和维吾尔作家和记者。他们包括劳工律师和维权人士赵东民、三个藏族人士--佛（笔名）、强次（强次顿考）、和格桑金巴--民主活动家刘贤斌、维吾尔记者买买提江阿布杜拉和许多其他活动人士。他们的交恶发生在中东、北非和在中国称作‘‘茉莉花’’的抗议之后中国政府开始的全国规模的大镇压。八月，中国昀高立法机关审查了刑事诉讼法修正案草案，试图将‘‘人员失踪’’合法化。这种做法违反国际准则。
互联网条列。中国政府设法加强对互联网活动的监督，于2011年 5月建立国家互联网信息办公室‘‘加强[国家对]互联网信息内容管理。’’ 各种报道显示，政府官员也加强了公共场所监控互联网使用的措施。据报道，正是由于这种更大规模的国家干预，中国的网站总数大幅下降。
宗教管理。中国政府仍只正式承认五大宗教，并要求属于这些宗教的组织向政府登记并继续接受政府的控制。未注册的崇拜者和那些信奉不被承认的宗教的人士继续受到骚扰。
- 佛教徒和道教徒。当局保持限制性框架以控制佛教和道教的教义、活动、宗教场所和宗教教职人员。
- 天主教徒。当局继续进行骚扰和拘留国家控制之外崇拜的天主教徒。由国家控制的教会迫使一些主教参加两个未受教廷批准的主教的祝圣典礼以及一场 2010年 12月由国家控制的教会会议。这个祝圣典礼是自 2006年下旬以来的第一次。
- 法轮功。官方继续实行有十年以上历史广泛而系统的、并在某些情况下很暴力的手段来强迫法轮功修炼者放弃自己的信念。今年是官方加大力度达到其目标的三年计划中的第二年。这个计划包括更大的资金投入和更多的政府措施。
- 基督教徒。官方拘留或限制在家中数百名未经登记的基督教团体成员，包括未经登记又曾试图在北京举行大型户外崇拜活动的守望教会信徒。

少数民族地区的条例。

藏人。州级以上的政府部门发行或起草了一系列法规，以加强国家对藏传佛教寺院、尼姑庵、僧侣和尼姑的控制。
维吾尔人。继 2009年在新疆的示威和骚乱之后，地方当局坚持强硬的安全政策，以便有针对性地对和平的异议、宣扬人权及表达文化和宗教特性等活动进行镇压。这些镇压行动对维吾尔人尤其严重。

加强党对社会的控制

本委员会也注意到共产党力图加强对社会的各个方面的控制，其所采用的方法威胁到言论结社和宗教自由的基本人权。官方建立了一些新的机构来加强对公民和团体的监控，其名义是所谓的‘‘社会治安综合治理’’和‘‘维护社会稳定’’。在一些城市里，党的监控扩展到一些商业建筑里面，一些地方官员将这些所谓的‘‘社会管理’’的任务用提供政府服务的任务包装起来，对各个居民社区进行监控。共产党对中国公民之间，或者中国公民与外国团体之间建立独立社会网络深感忧虑，这在许多政策中表现得很突出。

民主治理和政治参与。高层的官员继续强调不得有多党制的选举或者权力分离。他们还坚持任何政治改革的目标，不管是政治体制改革或者是媒体的改革，都必须以加强而不是削弱共产党的领导地位为目标。独立的候选人利用互联网参与地方人民代表大会选举是一件基层民主参与中很有希望的事情。但是共产党阻碍这些候选人，地方官员则采取镇压措施阻止他们。共产党也企图垄断乡镇一级的领导地位。官方继续不容忍某些民主人士，从他们限制选举专家姚立法的行动自由即可看出。
媒体和互联网。共产党的官员继续对互联网、媒体、出版业实施严格的审查。这些审查包括限制对公共灾难或是公共卫生紧急状况的报道，而对长平这样的新闻记者则使其不得发声。在报道了茉莉花抗议行动之后，对外国新闻记者的压制达到了高潮。
与达赖喇嘛的谈判。在中国官员和达赖喇嘛以及达赖喇嘛代表之间谈判的状况方面，在过去的一年中双方没有正式的对话。这种不接触是自2002年对话以来昀长久的一次。官方继续对作为宗教领袖的达赖喇嘛进行污蔑；而达赖喇嘛本人则放弃了在西藏流亡政府中地位。这个变化有可能改变对话的互动机制，消除了中国党和政府把达赖喇嘛作为一个‘‘政治人物’’的指控基础。

声称的进步不明的影响

过去的一年，中国政府宣布了新的有关人权和法治的措施，但实际影响是不明确或负面的。

公民社会。据报道，北京和上海进行了有限的改革，使某些类型的民间社会组织更容易向政府注册。但一些专家认为，该举动可能加强政府已经很严格的控制机制来决定哪些类型的民间社会组织可以或不可以获准在中国运作。
死刑改革。死刑统计仍然属于国家机密。为了限制死刑，中国政府修订了《中华人民共和国刑法》，将死刑罪的数量从68减至 55项。但实际上这 13项在被重新规定之前也很少或者没有被专政机关以死刑罪执行过。
获取司法与正义资源。官员提倡一个在 2011年 1月起生效的新的调解法，这是作为首选的解决争端和维护社会稳定的方法。虽然调解在一些案件中有效，但是法院强调这种解决纠纷的方式令人怀疑此举是否剥夺了民众诉诸法院的权利，而且可能增加对法院和当事人接受调解案的压力,而弱化法治。
乡村治理。地方当局继续实行落实到村的试点项目来减少腐败，保持‘‘社会稳定，’’提高预算的透明度，促进‘‘民主’’的公众参与，但这些项目的可持续性和影响目前还不清楚。
环境。一些中央级机关继续支持公共参与，并采取步骤，以改善环境信息透明度。但是限制基本污染信息公开的一条行政法规似乎仍然有效。一些地方环保部门对披露污染信息，特别是在有关排放污染企业的信息方面表现得仍不太情愿。此外，中央级的环保官员发出一条部级文件扶持培育环保社会组织发展，加强政府官员和环保组织之间更紧密的合作，但也规定要加强对环保团体的‘‘指导’’和‘‘思想政治建设’’工作。

进步的潜力

本委员会在几个领域里，观察到可能会带来正面的人权和法治变化的发展，虽然这要看在中国的法律执行情况和其他因素而定。

心理健康。经过几十年的准备，官方在 2011年 6月公布了国家精神病法律草案，这有助于遏制滥用精神病诊断将活动家扣留在精神病院
政府的透明度。官方继续声称支持政府信息公开化的措施，有报道说公开预算数字的政府机关数量有所增加。然而，一些阻碍透明度的根本障碍继续存在，包括中国的国家保密法，缺乏新闻自由和司法独立，和非透明的政府投资批准的程序。
工人权利。面对更年轻，更自信的劳动力和维稳的压力，中国官员推出有限措施来改善工人的工作条件，一项有关社会保险的法律已经生效，该法主要涉及工伤保险的问题。有报道说官方还会进一步研究一项全国工资管理条例草案。但是目前还不清楚这些措施是否有利于解决不平等的财富分配问题，以及简化工人赔偿申请的程序。
公民在互联网上的参与。政府扩展了互联网覆盖率的措施，包括在乡村的居民，这使中国公民有了可以用来表达自己在人权和对政府政策方面看法的网上空间。但是，中国政府和共产党继续非常严格地审查互联网，并推动互联网为发展经济及宣传所用。
反腐败。中国政府继续执行有限的反腐败措施，包括防止基层的腐败，减少司法腐败，而且将中国在海外的公司对外国官员的贿赂列为一种刑事犯罪。官方还公布条例开展‘‘洁党廉政’’建设。尽管有了一些新的条例，但对举报人的保护仍然是不够的。
获取司法资源的难易。有报告显示，中国政府官员采取了一些措施扩大法律援助以及实行行政法的改革，旨在更大程度上监督国家机关和政府雇员，保护公民的利益。
财产权。在 2011年1月，有关征收城市住宅的条例已经生效，如果严格执行此项条例，将有助于更好地保护城市屋主的权利。但是，对于农村的土地拥有者来讲，却没有相应的保护。
刑事诉讼法改革。8月，中国昀高立法机关审议了刑事诉讼法修正案草案，其中包括禁止强迫自证其罪，禁止使用通过酷刑取得的证据，并允许中国刑事辩护律师在不被监视的情况下面见被羁押的被告。

本委员会来自行政部门的成员参加并支持本委员会的工作。此年度报告的内容，包括其调查结果、意见和建议，并不一定反映每个行政部门成员的意见或者反映行政当局的政策。

具体的调查结果和建议

以下年度报告每个章节的具体调查结果的摘要，涵盖了本委员会观察的每个领域。在每个领域，委员会确定了在未来一年值得关注的问题，并遵照该委员会的法定任务，向总统和国会提出一套建议，作为立法或行政行为的参考。

言论自由

调查结果

在本委员会 2011年报告年度期间，中国官员继续维持一套限制言论自由的广泛措施。这些限制活动不符合包括《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》第19条以及《世界人权宣言》第19条和29条在内的国际人权准则。虽然这些国际准则允许国家为了维护国家安全和公共秩序对言论可作在有限的限制，但中国的限制措施远远超出这样的范围而包括了对共产党的批评意见及和平的政治异议。尽管如此，中国官员继续指出中国互联网的发展是中国有言论自由的证明，并争辩说中国限制言论的措施，包括监禁诺贝尔和平奖获得者刘晓波，遵循了国际法。
过去的一年发生了对互联网和新闻自由的一个严打运动。这个严打运动显示中国官员可以在更大范围内使用限制信息自由流通的工具。严打于二月中旬开始，紧跟在中东和北非的抗议活动以及网上出现的呼吁在中国举行‘‘茉莉花’’抗议行动之后。
虽然国际和国内观察员继续注意到在中国互联网和手机的使用异常活跃，但党政官员并未表现出任何松动政治控制的迹象。昀高领导人，包括胡锦涛主席，呼吁加强党对互联网上公共舆论的指导，以及党对互联网的领导。官方成立了一个中央级的机构来加强对互联网的监管，并发布法规，以增加对公共场所的互联网使用的监测。审查员继续阻止共享政治上被认为是敏感的网上信息，包括诺贝尔和平奖得主，被监禁的知识分子和改革倡导者刘晓波、‘‘茉莉花’’抗议呼吁以及如‘‘人权’’、‘‘民主’’之类的词汇。有时，包括在 2011年7月温州高速火车事故期间，中国公民大量的微博淹没了网审的阻扰，像 2011年7月温州高速火车事故发生后所出现的那样。
官方坚持认为，任何传媒业的改革将不能改变‘‘党管媒体不能变’’的方针。官方继续向媒体发布大范围的指示，如告诉媒体宣传建党 90周年是媒体的‘‘共同责任’’。官方还做出具体指示，比如如何报道中东和北非的抗议活动和刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖等事件。今年，对外国记者的骚扰也达到新的高潮，包括对报道茉莉花抗议散步行动的记者进行殴打，威胁驱逐出境等。
官员继续任意限制言论自由，滥用模糊的刑法，滥用针对记者、出版商、新闻媒体以及互联网的广义的规定及以登记信息来实行限制。批评政府的公民被指控犯有‘‘颠覆国家政权’’之类的国家安全罪。官方在对记者的培训予监管中以反腐的名义大量灌输政治教条。官员继续以执行法律为名打击‘‘非法’’的政治和宗教出版物。这些出版物包括‘‘诋毁党和国家领导人’’或‘‘传播政治谣言、制造思想混乱。’’

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

提高对中国政府坚持限制自由表达，以及声称其镇压措施符合国际准则的说辞的关注和国际社会对此问题的注意。中国官员声称，这些措施旨在保护国家安全或公共秩序，而现有资料表明，许多措施旨在压制反对党的声音或阻止对敏感政治问题信息的自由流通。强调指出中国政府的立场损害了国际人权有关自由表达的准则，特别是《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》第 19条和《世界人权宣言》第19 和 29条。向中国政府官员强调共产党和政府审查互联网和新闻界可以导致不稳定，并削弱公众对媒体和政府的信心。
从事与中国政府官员的对话和交流，探讨政府如何能够确保不滥用对言论自由的限制以及这些限制不得超过保护国家安全、未成年人安全和公共秩序的范围。强调对程序保护的重要性，如在制定限制自由表达尺度的公众参与，实施这样的限制时的透明度，以及对这些限制的独立审查。重申中国官员自己声称要在立法过程中有更大透明度和公众参与。这样的讨论可以是中美两国之间更广泛的讨论的一部分，以确保保护互联网上的共同利益，包括保护未成年人、计算机安全和隐私。
承认中国政府扩大互联网和普及手机的努力，特别是在农村地区；但继续向中国施加压力促其遵守国际准则。支持使中国公民能够访问和共享他们有权根据国际人权准则获得的政治和宗教内容的技术研究和开发。支持使中国公民在访问和共享互联网时可以确保他们的内容安全和隐私行为的措施和中文语言工具。支持传播互联网上中文语言信息，特别是在受欢迎的中国社会媒体网站上，中国公民根据国际准则有权获得的有关权利和自由的讨论。
增强对中国官员用法律，包括模糊的国家安全罪，作为工具压制公民言论自由的关注，质询这些政策是否符合法治精神。
提升对外国记者骚扰的关注。在过去的一年中，这些记者因报道公众关注的事件而被殴打，并面临遭到驱逐的威胁。强调这种对待不符合中国在2008年北京夏季奥运会期间向外国记者承诺给予更大自由的规定，也和中国记者在美国进行采访报道的待遇不相符合。
呼吁释放刘晓波及其他被监禁的涉嫌危害国家安全和其他犯罪的政治犯，他们的唯一罪行是和平表达政治改革的意见或批评政府的政策，包括谭作人（2010年二月被判5年徒刑，罪名是使用互联网组织对在地震中倒塌的学校作独立调查）。

工人的权利

调查结果

在法律或实践中，中国工人的权利仍然得不到充分保障。这些权利符合国际准则，包括组织独立工会的权利。中华全国总工会是在共产党指导下的官方工会，是中国唯一合法的工会组织。所有基层的工会必须是中华全国总工会的附属。
本委员会继续注意到中国存在缺乏真正的劳工代表的现象。中华全国总工会的官员继续声称他们的目标是建立更强有力的工人代表。例如，在 2011年 1月，中华全国总工会公布一个建立选举国有企业里80％工会代表以及非国有企业工会中的70％的工会代表的制度。2011年三月，中华全国总工会副主席张鸣起承认，工人行动的增加主要是由于企业多年来‘‘忽视工人的合法权益。’’中国各地，包括青岛、常德、日照、秦皇岛和深圳还宣布计划在未来几年内建立工资集体协商制度。
同时，工人权利维权人士在中国继续受到骚扰和迫害。官方似乎特别注重打击有能力组织和动员大批工人的人士。例如，在 2010年 10月，西安法院判处劳工律师和维权人士赵东明三年徒刑，其罪名是在国有企业中组织工人。当局控告他‘‘聚众扰乱社会秩序’’。当局继续拘留杨焕清，指控他在 2010年秋季组织教师上访，反对他们认为不公平的社会保险政策。
与本委员会在 2010年所发现的事实相同，中国当局继续面临如何容纳一个更年轻、更有教育和更有权利意识的劳动大军的挑战。2011年 2月，中华全国总工会发布了一套政策建议，旨在更好地解决这些年轻工人的需求。20世纪 80年代和 90年代出生的年轻工人继续走在全国工人行动的前列，包括 2011年 6月在南方的大规模街头抗议。这些年轻的工人约占中国一亿六千万流动工人[农民工]人口中的一亿，和他们的父母相比，他们对工资和劳动权利具有较高的期望。中国农业部部长韩长赋指出，这些缺乏稳固根基的年轻工人中许多人有良好的教育，是家里唯一的孩子，更有可能同‘‘城里人一样平等就业、平等享受公共服务，甚至得到平等的政治权利。’’
由于中国官员具有维护社会稳定的责任，他们将让工人在多大程度上对更高工资和真正的劳工代表权上讨价还价还是一个未知数。据报道，鉴于财富分配不均现象对‘‘社会动荡’’潜在影响的担忧，政府正在考虑发布一项全国性的工资条例。在过去一年中，中国的媒体报道称，该条例的草案包括创建一个工资的‘‘正常的增长机制’’，确定一套计算加班工资的标准，并要求某些“垄断企业”向政府和公众公布其高级雇员的工资水平。
本委员会继续监察广东省的《企业民主管理条例（草案）》的进展。有报道称，该条例将包括工人有权要求集体工资协商，并允许工人成员参加企业的董事会和监事会，有权在董事会里代表工人利益，并参与企业决策过程。据报道，2010年 9月，广东省人民代表大会常务委员会由于遭到企业界的强烈反对撤销了这个草案。在本报告年度，香港一家主要媒体报道称，广东省当局将在 2011年 1月批准这个草案。然而，迄今还没有看到这样的行动。
中国工人，尤其是矿工，继续面对持续的职业安全问题。在 2010年 11月，中华全国总工会公布的数字显示，2009年的职业病增长了 32％，其中绝大多数涉及肺部疾病。官方作出一些努力，关闭了一些矿井，促进安全生产，死亡人数在过去几年也一直减少，但不均衡的执法继续阻碍这种努力。据报道，矿商和地方官员之间共谋互利的现象仍然普遍存在。
2011年 1月，《工伤保险条例》的修订案生效。修订案包括要求官员对工伤索赔更加迅速回应，但成效还不清楚。正如去年本委员会报告指出，索赔过程可能会持续长达十年以上。由于农民工在受伤之后的临床症状在他们离开目前工作单位及搬往另外的地方之后才出现，因此使得这个索赔过程进一步复杂化。
童工在中国的普遍程度目前还不清楚。部分原因是政府不公布数据，尽管美国政府、其他国家政府和国际组织经常请求。虽然解决这一问题的国家法律框架存在，但执法中存在的系统性问题使这些法律措施效力不足。过去的一年里，雇用童工报道继续出现。例如，2011年3月，有报道称，深圳当局发现 40名儿童在一家电子厂工作。
全国人民代表大会常务委员会在 2010年 10月通过了《中华人民共和国社会保险法》。该法于 2011年 7月 1日起生效。该法规定，工人可以将其保险从一个地区转到另一个地区。该法也对五个主要类型的保险进行了讨论，这五种类型为：养老退休金、医疗保险、失业保险、工伤保险和生育保险。但如何执行该法却没有任何具体指示，批评者说，该法过于宽泛，无法有效实施。此外，该法律在多大程度上使更多的农民工获得社会保险仍不清楚。同时，农民工在城市地区仍然面临着歧视，他们的子女上学仍然很困难。就业歧视更是普遍存在的一个严重问题，特别是没有城市户口的工人。

建议

敦促美国国会和政府官员的议员：

支持促进改革中国劳动法律法规从而符合国际公认的劳工原则的项目。尤其要重点支持的不仅是立法起草，同时也要关注自工场一级以上的法律执行情况和监察在遵守国际公认的劳工原则方面的进展。
支持能显示中国工人和工会官员集体谈判经验多年期的试点项目。寻找并确认那些更加愿意进行集体谈判的地方工会，将试点项目优先放在这样的地区。在可能的情况下，对虽然没有官方工会存在，但有能力进行集体谈判的工厂优先安排试点项目。鼓励扩大倡导中国劳工权利的民间组织、律师界、学术界、官方的工会和美国集体谈判的工会人员之间的交流。优先强调具体的办事人员及其训练人员直接会谈的交流项目。
鼓励有助于确定造成在劳动法律法规实施中不一致的因素的研究。这些项目包括大规模汇编和分析中国省级及以下法院劳动争议诉讼和仲裁案件中的指导性文件，并昀终导致出版和传播中文的资料汇编，使之也许成为工人、仲裁员、法官、律师、雇主、工会官员、以及法学院共同使用的参考性资料。
支持能力建设方案，以加强中国劳动和法律援助组织参与捍卫工人的权利。鼓励中国地方各级官员制定、维护和深化与国内国外的劳工组织的关系，并邀请这些团体增加在中国大陆的培训课程数量。支持培训工人，确定工场以上场所存在的问题，训练必要解决问题的能力，使他们可以就他们关心的问题与雇主进行有效的交流。
在适当的情况下，与中国官员共享美国进行中的通过法律、法规、和非政府渠道来保护工人权利的经验与努力。扩大中国官员与美国的劳工权利团体、律师、劳工部、及其美国各级政府中涉及劳工问题部门的实地考察和交流。
支持美国劳工部与中国人力资源和社会保障部就有关制定和执行昀低工资标准，加强社会保险，改善就业统计和促进社会对话的交流。支持与中国的国家安全生产监督管理总局就改善工作场所的安全和健康进行交流。支持美国劳工部与中国自 2010年开始的年度劳动对话，以及建立一个安全生产的对话。鼓励对劳工民间组织、雇主、和政府机构之间建设性互动的价值的讨论。鼓励在发展稳定的劳动关系，确保劳动法全面、公正执法上强调政府透明度的交流。

刑事司法

调查结果

在本委员会的 2011报告年期间，中国政府发动了一场大规模打击人权倡导者、律师、博客写手、作家和民主活动家的运动。2011年初，中国公安人员在与中东、北非和中国境内被称为‘‘茉莉花’’的抗议运动有关的敏感期间的一次拘捕行动中拘留了 200多名活跃人士。
在本报告年度，中国政府继续骚扰和恐吓人权人士及其家人。公安机关和非官方人员非法监测和监禁人权维护者、上访人员、宗教信徒、人权律师及其家庭成员。特别是在敏感时期或敏感事件上，如 2010年12月诺贝尔和平奖仪式和 2011年初‘‘茉莉花’’抗议之前的日子，这种虐待更为明显。
中国官方继续利用各种非法形式拘留中国公民，包括人权倡导者、上访人员及和平示威者。这些被任意拘留人员往往被送入精神病医院或非法拘留所。这种行为与国际准则、中国宪法和《刑事诉讼法》不符。
中国的刑事辩护律师在执业时继续遭遇到司法干扰或担心受到起诉的困境。在官员视为‘‘政治敏感’’的案子中，刑事辩护律师经常面临骚扰和虐待。一些敏感案件的嫌疑人和被告不能有自己选择的律师，而被迫接受政府指定的辩护律师。《中华人民共和国刑法》第 306条规定律师如强制或诱导证人改变其证言或伪造证据将承担法律责任。对这一条款的滥用继续阻碍着有效的刑事辩护。
在2011年 2月，全国人大常委会审议并通过了《中华人民共和国刑法》第八条修正案，此修正案将可判处死刑的罪行数目减至 55项。降低死亡罪行数目是自中华人民共和国刑法于 1979年颁布以来的第一次。国际组织和官方媒体指出，法院很少运用不再列为死罪的 13个罪行判处死刑。

建议

敦促美国国会和政府官员的议员：

向中国政府施压，立即释放在监狱或被拘留的人权活跃人士。对已经在审的约 40名人权活跃人士，要坚持公平审判的标准，并确保程序保障。
支持建立中国省级执法机构和美国各州执法机构之间的交流机制，以研究治安、证据收集、犯人权利和其他目前在中国正在进行的司法改革。
对中国政府施压，采纳联合国禁止酷刑委员会的建议，以此作为取消法外拘留形式的第一步，调查和披露‘‘黑监狱’’的存在和其他秘密拘留设施。呼吁中国政府邀请联合国任意拘留问题工作组访问中国。
呼吁中国政府公开承诺制定一个具体的时间表，批准中国政府于 1998年签署，但尚未批准的《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》。要求中国政府实施其在《国家人权行动计划(2009-2010)》中声称的原则主张，并要求中国政府进一步采取措施促进人权和法治。
敦促中国政府修改中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法，以反映载于 2008年的‘‘中华人民共和国律师法’’修正案中对律师和被拘留的犯罪嫌疑人增加了的权利和保护。鼓励中国官员提交一个特定的时间表来修订和执行中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法。

宗教自由

调查结果

中国政府在过去一年里继续限制中国公民的宗教自由。中国的宪法保障宗教信仰自由，但只局限于保护‘‘正常的宗教活动’’。这个词所包含的法律保护达不到保护宗教自由的国际人权准则。政府仍只承认五大宗教，即佛教、天主教、伊斯兰教、基督教和道教，并要求属于这些宗教的团体向政府登记注册。注册的团体虽受到一些法律保护，但仍受国家控制。而与国家规定相抵触的注册与未注册的宗教成员则面临骚扰、拘留和其他虐待的风险。一些未经注册的团体虽可从事他们的宗教活动，但这种有限的宽容并不等于官方承认这些团体的权利。当局还禁止了一些未经注册团体的活动，保留对包括法轮功在内的其他宗教或精神团体的禁令。
中国政府在过去的一年加紧修改或通过新的法律措施，以法律控制在中国的宗教活动，而不是保护所有中国公民的宗教自由。计划中的法律措施，同近年来通过的其他措施一样，基于 2005年《宗教事务条例》（RRA）。昀近的法律措施澄清了宗教事务条例中一些模棱两可的规定，但也说明了更详细的控制层面。
当局继续控制佛教机构和佛教活动，并采取措施遏制‘‘未经授权’’的佛教寺庙。截至2011年 8月，中央政府和 10个藏族自治州中的 9个州级政府发布或起草了国家对藏传佛教寺院和尼姑庵的管理措施，该措施大幅度增加了对宗教自由的侵犯。
当局继续剥夺天主教徒在其信仰中承认教廷的权威，包括选择中国主教的自由。当局继续骚扰、拘留并监视一些未经登记的神父和主教以及强迫一些主教出席教廷认为不合法的由国家控制的教会活动。
全国各地地方政府继续禁止穆斯林从事独立于国家管制的宗教宣传和传教。在新疆维吾尔自治区，官方将限制伊斯兰教与维护治安融为一体，监视清真寺，限制遵守斋月，继续防止穆斯林男子戴胡须以及妇女戴面纱，并在出版物审查运动中集中打击‘‘非法’’宗教材料。
自2010年底以来骚扰和拘留基督教徒的案件显示，当局对组织大规模团体，或跨教区教会，或有接触外国个人或组织的基督教徒的敏感度有所加强。在过去的一年，政府还要求‘‘指导’’未经登记的基督教团体成员到登记的地点进行崇拜活动。
当局保持对道教活动的控制，并采取措施遏制‘‘封建迷信’’活动。
对于法轮功，当局目前处在一个为期三年的镇压活动的第二年，旨在迫使法轮功学员放弃他们的信仰和修炼法轮功。这项运动是更广泛的镇压运动的一部分，已经持续了十年以上。有报道指出，这个镇压运动广泛而系统化，在某些情况下甚至使用暴力。广东省广州市的地方当局在 2010年11月亚运会期间采取措施限制法轮功学员的自由，包括以涉嫌参与‘‘邪教’’活动而拘留法轮功学员。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

呼吁中国政府按照《世界人权宣言》第18条来保证所有公民的宗教自由，并取消只对所承认的宗教团体加以有限的国家保护的政府框架。向中国官方强调宗教自由包括有权进行宗教活动，以及有权持有宗教信仰，而中国的对‘‘正常宗教活动’’的有限保护不符合国际人权准则所界定的对宗教自由的保护。呼吁中国采取官方措施保护宗教自由，使之成为改善中国人权的一部分。向中国政府强调宗教自由的权利包括：佛教徒有在国家控制范围之外的庙宇进行宗教活动的自由；藏传佛教徒有权公开表达他们对佛教领袖，包括达赖喇嘛的尊重和热爱的权利；天主教徒有承认教廷是他们信仰活动的权威的权利，包括对主教任命的权利；法轮功学员有在中国境内自由修炼法轮功的权利；穆斯林有权从事独立于国家制定的范围之外的宗教宣传和传教活动，而不受到以维护‘‘稳定’’为名对他们所受到的国际保护宗教自由权利的侵犯；基督教徒有权不受国家干涉而崇拜自己教义，有权在未经登记的家庭教会中进行崇拜活动，免予骚扰、拘留和其他虐待行为；道教徒有权不受国家干涉来解释他们的信仰，并不因此作为‘‘封建迷信’’遭到禁止。
呼吁释放因践行宗教自由(包括持有和行使精神信仰的权利)而遭到打击报复，被软禁、拘留或监禁的中国公民。这些囚犯包括：索朗拉措（藏传佛教尼姑，2009年因和其他尼姑一起参与一场抗议活动，要求西藏独立和祝福达赖喇嘛长寿，并希望其返回西藏而被判以10 年徒刑）；苏志民（未登记的天主教主教，被警方在 1996年拘留后失踪）；王治文（法轮功修炼者，因 1999年组织法轮功修炼者和平示威而判处 16年徒刑）；努尔泰买买提(Nurtay Memet)( 穆斯林男子，被认为从事与其宗教有关的‘‘迷信’’活动而被判处 5年徒刑）;范亚峰（法律学者、宗教自由倡导者、家庭教会领袖，自 2010年 11月起在家遭监视居住，其罪名是提倡未经注册的基督教团体的权利，适逢对维权人士大规模突击镇压之时），以及本委员会的报告和政治囚徒数据库中提及的其他遭打压的囚徒。
呼吁中国官方取消针对宗教和精神运动而制订及已被用来惩罚中国公民行使宗教自由权利的刑事和行政处罚条例。具体来说，呼吁中国官方取消《中华人民共和国刑法》第 300条（其中将使用‘‘邪教’’破坏执行国家法律加以刑事处罚）和《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚法》第27 条（该条规定组织或煽动他人从事‘‘邪教’’活动和利用邪教组织，或‘‘冒用宗教’’的‘‘名义’’来扰乱社会秩序或危害他人健康者，将处以拘留和罚款）。
支持向中国政府主动提供技术援助起草保护而不是限制中国公民宗教自由的法律规定。促进用交流来将宗教自由问题专家派往中国，帮助培训中国官员，开设保护宗教自由国际人权准则的课程。促进有关宗教自由对话，包括保护宗教团体和组织的权利及实施社会公益活动的信仰团体。
支持收集中国宗教自由现状信息并告知中国公民如何捍卫自己的宗教自由权利使之不受政府侵犯的民间组织。支持帮助宗教人士为刑事判决上诉，以及上诉因宗教自由的原因而遭到劳教的组织，反对政府没收财产，反对基于宗教的就业歧视。

少数民族权利

调查结果

在过去的报告年度中，中国的少数民族在维护中国法律和国际法律承认的权利时面临独特挑战。《公民及政治权利国际公约》规定，一国内在种族、宗教和语言上的少数民族‘‘不得否认这种少数人同他们的集团中的其他成员共同享有自己的文化、信奉和实行自己的宗教或使用自己的语言的权利。’’《中华人民共和国民族区域自治法》虽然规定了对少数民族权利的一些保护，也在指定区域里规定了区域自治的一套系统；然而，国家政策和法律的实质及执法不力使得少数民族无法充分享受他们符合国际准则的权利以及实际意义上的自治。
中国政府继续承认五十五个少数民族。对被认为挑战国家权威的少数民族，尤其在新疆维吾尔自治区、西藏自治区和其他地区的藏族自治区域和内蒙古自治区的少数民族地区施加昀严密的控制 [参见本章节对新疆和西藏的单独调查结果和建议] 。政府当局继续惩罚被认为是挑战国家权威，或者企图促进自身权益的蒙古人。过去的一年里，当局将好几位主张保护自身权利和保护蒙古文化的蒙古人拘押、判刑或者有可能加以法外拘留。受拘押的包括 2011年五月份参加抗议政府削弱蒙古文化和牧草地政策的蒙古族人士。
过去的一年里，政府解决少数民族不满情绪的措施是有限的。国家民委2010年十二月份的报告提到探索和‘‘完善’’国家民族区域自治制度的‘‘新机制和新形式’’，但是也同时再次确认了国家少数民族政策的基本范围。中国政府的《国家人权行动计划(2009-2010)》承诺在某些方面支持少数民族的权利，但是效果似乎有限，尤其在公民和政治权利方面更是有限。
中国政府继续执行由上而下的发展政策，在给少数民族地区带来某种程度经济进步的同时，却削弱了促进地区自治并限制了少数民族维护自己独特文化、语言和生活方式的权利。中国政府加强了长期实行的牧草地政策，禁止牧民放牧。这些政策要求一些牧民迁出牧草地，放弃牧民生活方式，也对蒙古人、藏人、哈萨克人和中国境内的其他少数民族造成了影响。在五月份的示威中，蒙古人就此牧草地政策加以抗议。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和行政官员：

支持法治和交流项目，这些项目旨在提高中国领导人对根据中国法律和国际准则保护少数民族权利，让他们实施有实质意义自治的不同治理模式的认识。在《国家人权行动计划(2009-2010)》到期之后，呼吁中国当局继续将少数民族的权利纳入以后的人权计划中，并按照国际准则颁布具体执行和评估计划。
支持包括有少数民族参与其决策的中国经济发展的模式。呼吁中国政府审查其在改善生态环境时现行牧草原政策的有效性，并采取措施确保在实行环保政策过程中牧民的权利受到保护。
支持从事于中国少数民族人权状况的民间组织，使他们能够继续研究和发展帮助少数民族增强保护自身权益的项目。鼓励这种组织制定培训项目促进包括有少数民族参与决策的经济发展，促进保护少数民族语言、文化和生计的方案；以及记录并研究内蒙古自治区的人权状况及侵权现象。鼓励在中国境内开展的涉及更广泛人权和法治的方案，制定涉及中国少数民族所面临问题的项目。
呼吁中国政府释放因倡导少数民族权利而被拘留、监禁或以其他方式被羁押的人士，包括主张蒙古人权利的哈达（尽管他的 15年刑期在2010年 12月届满，但仍被关押），他的妻子新娜（Xinna）和儿子维勒斯（Uiles）（在哈达预定释放之前被拘留，后来被正式逮捕），和其他在本委员会的报告和政治囚徒数据库中提及的犯人。

计划生育

调查结果

中国政府官员继续实施干预和控制公民生育的计划生育政策，特别是对妇女，运用包括罚款、剥夺社会福利和执照、强迫绝育、强迫堕胎和任意拘留等多种方法惩罚违反政策者。
本委员会在 2011年继续观察到地方政府专门针对农民工家庭强制实施计划生育政策。
《中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法》违背 1995年制定的《北京宣言》和 1994年开罗国际人口与发展大会所颁布的《国际人口与发展大会行动纲领》。中国妇女及其家庭所遭遇的强制性控制，从强迫堕胎到对‘‘计划外’’儿童的歧视，也违反了《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》、《儿童权利国际公约》以及《国际经济、社会和文化权利公约》。中国是这些条约的缔约国，有遵守的义务。
中国政府并未始终如一地执行《中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法》，该法本应禁止在执行人口计划生育政策时滥权，并对违规者加以惩罚。该法的第 4条规定，国家官员应‘‘文明执法，不得侵犯公民的合法权益。’’第 39条规定，在执行人口计划生育政策时‘‘侵犯公民人身权、财产权和其他合法权益的’’或‘‘滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊’’将受到刑事或行政处罚。
2010年 9月是中国现行计划生育政策实施的 30周年。在这个纪念日之后，本委员会观察到公众对计划生育政策改革前景的公开讨论有所增加。昀高党政领导人继续公开捍卫该政策，并排除在短期内取消该政策的可能性。
中国政府的人口计划政策继续加重了该国的人口问题，使其成为世界上性别比例失衡昀严重的国家，另外还有人口的老龄化，工作年龄人口下降等问题。
陈光诚是自学成才、训练有素的法律专家，他将计划生育中的滥权曝光而被判刑。2010年 9月 9日，他刑满释放后，当局则将他和家人软禁，继续对他们加以虐待和受限制的控制。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

敦促中国政府官员停止强制执行划生育政策。促请中国政府废除强制的人口控制，并向妇女提供更大的生育自由和隐私保护。
敦促中国政府重新评估《中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法》，使之符合 1995年制定的《北京宣言》、1994年开罗国际人口与发展大会所颁布的《国际人口与发展大会行动纲领》、《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》、《儿童权利国际公约》以及《国际经济、社会和文化权利公约》中所规定的准则。
敦促中国的中央和地方政府大力实施根据中国法律规定处罚在执行人口计划生育政策时违反公民权利的官员。敦促中国政府确立刑事和经济处罚条例，惩治违反现行法律和法规、强制堕胎和绝育的违法官员和个人。促请中国政府废除在执行计划生育政策中根据表现所给予的物质与经济的奖励机制，以期减少或消除官员违法乱纪的动力。
支持在法律援助和培训方面的发展和国际合作，帮助公民根据《中华人民共和国国家赔偿法》所定的赔偿要求索赔，对在计划生育政策下受到的伤害向国家寻求相应的补偿。
呼吁中国政府释放遭到非法拘押的陈光诚及其家人，允许他们享有中国法律和中国政府承诺的国际准则所规定的行动、言论和结社的自由。

居住和迁徙自由

调查结果

本委员会的报告年度期间，中国政府继续放宽一些户口登记的限制，这是早先努力的继续。起源于 20世纪 50年代的户口制度仍在限制着中国公民选择他们永久居住地的权利。
中国政府把几个城市作为改革一些户口制度的试点，旨在将已经持有本地户口的居民置于一个统一的登记制度之下。昀新户口改革的结果仍不清楚。中国媒体称赞它向城乡之间中国公民的平等迈出了重要一步。然而，潜在的问题包括强迫农村居民搬迁、补偿不足和农村居民搬迁后难以适应城市生活等。
中国政府继续以不符合国际人权准则的方式限制中国公民的迁徙自由。在过去的一年，当局越来越多地使用各种法律借口防止人权维护者、活动家和持批评意见者离开中国。中国官员经常引用中国公民出入境管理法为理由阻止维权人士出国。
中国政府继续以迁徙自由的限制来惩罚和控制持不同政见者和维权人士。在本报告期内，对国内迁徙自由的限制特别苛刻。当局为此所采用的一系列措施中包括派驻警察监视维权人士的房屋、将他们送往边远地区或邀请他们与保安人员‘‘喝茶’’，甚至监禁。
在本报告期内，中国当局粗暴威胁和控制维权人士及其家庭成员。在中国著名作家和民主活动家刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖和匿名的在线呼吁展开‘‘茉莉花革命’’抗议活动之后，中国政府加强了打击人权人士的措施。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

支持从事研究和向农民工提供法律援助并鼓励就户籍制度进行政策辩论的中国决策者和学术机构的项目、组织和交流计划。
呼吁美国学术界、公共政策机构和专家向本委员会提供咨询，寻求与从事户口改革辩论的中国学术界和公共政策人士的沟通途径。
向中国政府官员强调，中国政府在迁徙自由上不遵守国际准则的行为将会使国际社会对中国政府致力于达到国际标准的努力产生负面的影响。
呼吁中国政府修改《中华人民共和国公民出入境管理法》，给予第 8条第（5）款中的‘‘危害国家安全’’和‘‘对国家利益造成重大损失’’更加明确含义。
呼吁中国政府修改《中华人民共和国公民出入境管理法》以使被拘留人士可以提出上诉，或寻求其他补救措施。
特别向中国政府当局指出对维权人士、活动家和异议人士行动自由的限制，这些人士包括诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波的妻子刘霞和维权人士陈光诚及其家人。

妇女的状况

调查结果

中国官员继续推动现有的旨在保护妇女权利的法律，包括修订的《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》和修订的《中华人民共和国婚姻法》。但是，中国国家立法中的模糊性和明确阐述职责的缺乏，加之各个地方政府选择性地执法，限制了在切实保护妇女权利方面的进步。
中国政府在其国内法律和政策措施中，通过批准了《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》，并一直致力于确保政府中的女性代表；然而，各级政府的女性代表在 2011年度取得的进展十分有限。
全国人民代表大会常务委员会于 2010年 10月通过了修订后的《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》，其中将‘‘村民委员会成员中，妇女应当有适当的名额’’修改为‘‘村民委员会成员中，应当有妇女成员。’’修订后的法律规定妇女应持有三分之一村民代表大会的职位。这些新规定对女性代表在未来的影响目前还不清楚，但有些国内观察员誉其为一个积极的步骤。在村一级增加妇女的决策权可能会导致更好地保护农村地区妇女的财产权利。
中国已承诺根据《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》‘‘采取一切适当措施，消除在就业方面对妇女的歧视。’’尽管中国政府承认《经济，社会和文化权利国际公约》第 7条和《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》第十一条所规定的就业中性别平等，但中国妇女仍然在招聘、工资和退休等方面受到广泛的歧视。虽然有如《中华人民共和国劳动法》、修订的《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》和《中华人民共和国就业促进法》等法律，但因它们对性别歧视缺乏明确定义和执行机制，使其有效性受到削弱。
修订的《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》和《中华人民共和国婚姻法》禁止家庭暴力，违反者将受到刑事处分；但是这些国家法律未对家庭暴力做出定义，也未规定政府部门在预防、处罚并解决家庭暴力方面的具体职责，因此使许多遇到家庭暴力的人得不到不受保护。据官方的报道，国家立法机关完成的草案中对家庭暴力有明确的定义和政府责任的具体规定；但同时也有报道称，家庭暴力广泛存在，影响中国近三分之一的家庭。修订的《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》也禁止性骚扰，并向受害者提供了索赔途径，然而《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》并未提供明确的性骚扰定义也无具体的惩治和预防标准，这对受害者保护自己权益造成极大困扰。据报道，在中国，性骚扰仍然普遍存在。
2008年、2009年和 2010年发表的有关中国性别失衡的统计和分析研究表明，尽管政府有立法，但性别选择性流产仍然广泛存在，特别是在农村地区。一些观察员，包括中国官方媒体认为，中国日益加大的性别比例失衡导致了强迫卖淫，强迫婚姻和人口贩卖等社会问题。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

通过中美交流和国际会议，支持在中国的对妇女领导能力培训的计划。在农村地区支持改善妇女土地权利的法律方案，并敦促采取步骤确保乡村的规章制度符合国家的法律法规，确保充分地保护妇女的权利和利益。
敦促中国政府加强对《中华人民共和国劳动法》、修订后的《中华人民共和国就业促进法》的执法机制，禁止性别歧视。敦促中国官员解决专门在招聘、工资和退休中的性别歧视。
敦促中国政府颁布全面的国家级法律法规，明确家庭暴力定义，向政府和社会机构指定解决此问题的责任，并明确对罪犯的处罚。了解官员是否公布这些立法草案让公众评论，公民会有多长评议期及谁负责收集公民的意见。敦促中国政府进一步修改《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》或制定一个对性骚扰有明确定义，对预防、惩处性骚扰有具体标准和程序的新的全面的国家立法。支持增强司法、执法人员对家庭暴力与性骚扰问题意识的培训项目。

人口拐卖

调查结果

中国仍然是拐卖男人、妇女和儿童的起源国、过境国和目的地。大多数人口贩运案件是国内的，以性剥削、强迫劳动和强迫婚姻为目的。
中国政府于 2009年 12月加入《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约关于预防、禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童行为的补充议定书》（《巴勒莫议定书》）。迄今为止，中国政府对其一些立法作了修订以符合《巴勒莫议定书》。中国政府颁布了《中华人民共和国刑法》修订案，其中包括扩大了强迫劳动罪的范围，加大了处罚力度；但未明确界定‘‘强迫劳动。’’中国政府对人口拐卖的法律定义不符合国际准则。
中国法律将贩卖人口与偷渡人口、拐骗儿童、非法收养混为一谈。据报道，昀高人民法院根据此项定义在 2010年判决了 3,138贩运案件。2009年判案 2,413例。报道称，在 2010年的判决中，有 2,216件案例为五年以上徒刑。此外，在 2010年昀高人民检察院的贩卖人口案件中4,422人被定罪。在与民间组织和国际组织合作方面，中国当局采取措施，加强了对贩卖受害者的保护、服务和照顾，但仍重点于妇女和儿童。
中国政府对被拐卖的外籍人士只是简单地加以驱逐，而不是提供其他法律途径的援助；在中国的北朝鲜难民无论是否人口贩运的受害者，一律被归为‘‘经济移民’’加以驱逐。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

敦促中国政府遵守《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约关于预防、禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童行为的补充议定书》;继续修改政府对人口贩运的定义，并制定符合国际准则的全面的反贩运立法。
呼吁中国政府为人口贩运受害者提供更多的服务。支持对执法人员和救助之家管理人员的培训计划，帮助提高鉴别、保护和协助拐卖受害者的能力和程序。支持为中国和外籍拐卖受害者奔走呼吁的法律援助计划。
反对继续将北朝鲜贩运被害人以经济移民的名义驱逐出境。促请中国政府遵守其有关朝鲜贩运受害者的国际义务，提供除遣返之外的其他法律途径。

在中国的朝鲜难民

调查结果

在2011年该委员会的报告年度里，北朝鲜深陷人道危机和政治不稳定之际，中国中央和地方当局继续将所有在中国的朝鲜人列为‘‘非法’’经济移民并将其遣返。据报道，2011年中国政府增加东北公安力量，在中朝边境架设新的路障。
中国政府继续拒绝联合国人权事务高级专员访问中朝边境和在中国的朝鲜难民。致使难民署和人权组织无法得知朝鲜难民数量、逃离的原因及这些难民对强行遣返的担心。
据报道，中国安全部门与北朝鲜警察官员配合，在中国各地，包括偏远地区的云南省、广西壮族自治区和西藏自治区追捕朝鲜难民。中国执法机构已经部署了数百名警员查找和强行遣返朝鲜难民。
在中国的朝鲜妇女继续面临强迫婚姻和以商业为目的的性剥削。中国政府遣返被贩卖的朝鲜妇女的做法违反了 1951年《关于难民地位的公约》、其 1967年议定书及《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约关于预防、禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童行为的补充议定书》的第7条款。中国政府未采取适当措施防止朝鲜妇女被贩卖及保护朝鲜贩运被害人，违反了其承诺的联合国禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童议定书《巴勒莫议定书》的第 9条款，以及对《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》第 6条款的义务。
与朝鲜边境接壤地区的中国地方政府继续拒绝向与中国公民结婚的朝鲜妇女的子女发放户口。这些没有户口的儿童国籍无着，无法获得受教育及其他社会福利。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

支持联合国难民总署[人权事务高级专员]的努力，争取无阻碍地接触在中国的朝鲜难民。这项工作应从接触有一个朝鲜家长的孩子开始，并鼓励中国政府和难民总署合作，制定和实施国家庇护立法，以履行中国政府对 1951年公约及其议定书的义务，并立即停止拘留和遣返在中国的朝鲜人。
敦促中国中央和地方的政府官员遵守《巴勒莫议定书》（第 9条款）和《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》（第 6条款），起诉在中国东北和中朝边境的人贩子。
敦促中国官员给予嫁给中国公民的朝鲜妇女及其子女居留身份和相关的社会福利。尤其要敦促中国地方官员让这些孩子接受教育，以贯彻《中华人民共和国国籍法》（第 4条）以及《中华人民共和国义务教育法》（第 5条）。敦促中国政府允许逃离北朝鲜者安全避难，使之能够安全过境，直到他们到达第三国。

公共卫生

调查结果

中国政府的国内立法明确禁止就业歧视。作为《国际经济、社会和文化权利公约》缔约国，中国政府一直承诺消除在就业和教育上对残疾和传染病人的歧视。但是对患有传染性疾病和精神疾病公民的歧视依然司空见惯，而那些遭受歧视的人在寻求法律赔偿时往往困难重重。
中国的民间组织和活跃人士继续在提高人们对健康问题的认识上发挥积极作用。然而，中国官员继续骚扰一些公共卫生活跃人士，通过注册和资助程序监测和控制这些民间组织的活动。
精神疾病例对该国匮乏的心理保健系统所造成的负担是显著的。据报道，官方继续滥用权利将精神病院和医疗专业人员作为工具，拘留对社会稳定视为威胁的人士。在 2011年 6月，中国政府发布《中华人民共和国精神卫生法（草案）》征求公众意见，引起全社会个人和组织的热烈讨论。政府宣布将在 2011年底前颁布《中华人民共和国精神卫生法》。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

呼吁中国政府停止镇压公共卫生问题的活跃人士，向致力于解决中国公共卫生问题的美国组织提供更多支持。
敦促中国官员集中注意力解决《中华人民共和国就业促进法》及相关法规的有效执行，禁止对有艾滋病毒和艾滋病患者、乙型肝炎病毒和其他疾病的患者施行就业和工作场所的歧视。支持旨在提高患有传染病、残疾、或精神疾病者的权利意识的计划。
敦促中国政府关注在公众讨论期间个人和民间组织提出的对《中华人民共和国精神卫生法（草案）》的意见。促请中国官员完成 2011年底颁布《中华人民共和国精神卫生法》的既定目标。促请官员颁布该法后在各地实施。

环境

调查结果

中国的环境问题依然严重。今年的报告重点突出了重金属和有增无减的农村污染问题。公民继续表达对环境情况的不满，有时用街头抗议的形式。辽宁省大连市发生了一万多市民因反对一个化工厂而聚集在政府和党的办公楼前‘‘散步’’。在一些案例中，官员压制公民改善环境质量的诉求。一些地方政府甚至对这样的公民拘留、骚扰或威胁，包括因为儿童遭到铅中毒而提出信访、申诉或寻求补救措施的家长;福建的市民因对垃圾填埋场的作业不满而上街示威或信访；江苏省的市民抗议废物焚烧炉的运作；公民抗议在内蒙古和西藏自治区的采矿业的扩充营运计划。
腐败、有法不依或执法不严及诉诸法律渠道缺乏，仍成为中国环境管理的重大挑战。环境保护部门有时不按法律规定执法；法院以‘‘社会稳定’’为由拒绝接受环保案子的情况时有发生。2010年上半年，环保是受贿和腐败程度昀高的领域之一。
中央和一些地方环境保护官员已采取措施改善信息公开度。然而，实施信息公开措施的努力仍然缺乏。有些公民要求信息公开，但获取信息仍然困难重重，限制基本污染信息公开的一条行政法规似乎仍然有效。昀难获取的信息是在某些案例中涉及到污染环境的企业，而这种不透明也许对公民健康有潜在影响。中国公民和专家对发展水电和核电站的透明度深表关切。2011年 3日日本核电厂灾难似乎使公民和专家就安全问题的发言更加大胆，并促使中国官员进行安全审查以及对中国核工业的新的立法，该立法可能会促使提高中国核工业的透明度。
环境保护仍然是一个公众参与并多少有点可获鼓励的领域，但是政府也继续对这种参与加以‘‘指导’’或管理。一个新的环境保护部指导意见要求环保团体报告他们与境外民间组织的合作项目，并必须由外事部门‘‘审批。’’该指导意见还呼吁进一步加强政府和社会组织之间的关系和合作，以及由有关部门加强对环保团体进行思想政治建设。
据报道，中国的昀高领导人认为中国很容易受到气候变化的影响，并已采取措施减轻和适应气候变化。中国领导人计划到 2015年自动减少17％二氧化碳强度（即国内生产总值的每单位排放量）。虽然民间组织继续组织一些活动以应对气候变化问题，政策制定过程中的公众参与仍然微乎其微。中国领导人表示他们将提高能源和气候变化有关数据的可靠性和透明度，但是中国领导人在这些领域面临着重大挑战。如果没有足够的程序性和安全性的保护措施，中国官方应对气候变化的措施及其实施可能会将公民的权利置于危险之地。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

呼吁中国政府停止惩治公民的草根环保行动及利用正式和制度化的渠道表达他们对环境不满或保护自己的权利。支持在华的中国和美国团体旨在扩展公民环境权利意识和促进维护这些权利的努力。可能的项目包括支持美中双方讨论投诉解决机制，并加强美中的合作研究来解决环境健康问题。将环境法律的问题包括在中美人权和法律专家对话之中。
支持涉及环境执法和守法手段的多边交流，包括环境保险、市场机制、对严重破坏环境行为的刑事起诉和公益诉讼机制。鼓励中国领导人加强环境影响评价及其过程中的公民参与。与中国官员和其他人员一道寻求制定一个对受污染损害的人的现实可行与公平补偿的制度，以协助执法力度。
支持中国继续扩大环境信息透明度。与中国政府分享美国制定有毒物质排放清单制度和美国其他的增加环境透明度方案的经验。支持旨在教育中国公民关于中国政府信息开放系统的项目。鼓励中国官员将政府和专家的有关中国气候变化及其影响研究报告向公众公布并使之更加容易获取。此外，继续美国政府与有关部委、学术机构、专家和民间组织的接触，提高中国测量、公布和验证排放量减持战略和技术可靠性。
鼓励中国非政府环保组织的发展，包括邀请民间组织参与两国双边项目。支持和提高中国环境民间组织的技术和业务能力。
接触中国地方领导人正在致力协调发展和环境保护之间的关系。呼吁与美国有姐妹城市关系的中国城市把环境权利意识，环保和气候转变等问题放进姐妹城市计划之中。在安排到中国访问的计划中加入与中央和地方各级官员讨论环境治理和昀佳实践的要求。邀请中国县、镇、村的地方领导人到美国考察美国公共政策和解决环境问题的作法。

公民社会

调查结果

在2011年该委员会的报告年度，民间社会组织（民间组织） -包括昀接近西方的民间组织概念（NGO）的组织 – 对政治上不敏感的法律和决策活动的参与继续逐渐增加。同时，致力于政治敏感问题的组织和个人继续面临挑战。
民间组织继续面临挑战，要履行复杂和繁琐的注册要求。为合法经营，民间组织在向民政部登记前需获得支持协议，挂钩于一个政府层次的‘‘对口行业，学科或其他专业领域’’的业务主管单位。业务主管单位的批准有时很难获得，因为当地业务主管单位有时不愿意增加监管责任。不履行这些‘‘双重管理’’的民间组织不受法律保护并难以接受境外捐赠。一些民间组织干脆选择作为商业实体登记，原因之一是规避履行双重管理要求的负担，但是这样做使他们有可能成为政府抽查及缴纳高税率的目标。
‘‘非公募基金会’’不允许从事公共募捐筹款活动。本委员会在本报告年度观察到，有报道称，这些组织继续面对经营的困难。非公募基金会可能申请成为‘‘公众’’基金会（公募基金会），允许从事公共筹款活动，但是他们要能找到政府部门的赞助，并满足其他要求。据报道，中国政府正在考虑修订2004年制定的中国基金会管理法，并正在起草中国慈善法。不过，由于草案的内容没有广泛传阅，目前仍不清楚修订内容是什么，新的法律将如何为非公募基金会的操作和成长提供更大的空间，还难以预测。
有些中国公民试图建立和经营有关中国官员认为是敏感问题的民间组织，但他们面临政府的恐吓、骚扰和处罚。在本报告年度中，例如，中国当局继续反复骚扰和干扰爱知行健康教育研究所的运作。这是个以北京为基地的公共卫生维权组织，由公共健康研究者万延海成立于1994年。据报道，官方造访北京爱知行的办公室，没收其文件，警告万延海不得出席在挪威举行的刘晓波诺贝尔和平奖仪式并因为一封令政府不满的信件关闭了该组织的网站。为人身安全起见，万延海已于2010年5月离开中国来到美国。
一些地方仿照深圳的例子在简化一些服务性的民间组织的注册程序。其中两个地方正考虑改变现行法规。例如，北京政府可能将其在一个区的试点项目扩大到整个城市，以‘‘开放’’对四种组织的登记程序，主要包括提供‘‘社会福利’’和‘‘社会服务’’的组织。据报道，上海市和民政部签订了一个‘‘合作协定，’’旨在为‘‘社会组织的发展创造新的模式。’’这些改革努力将在何种程度上为民间社会组织的成长制造空间还不清楚，因为公民社会组织的活跃人士仍然受到严格审查，有些人还受到骚扰、拘留和其他虐待。此外，一些中国国内或境外的公民社会专家警告说，昀新的改革努力中，虽然可以帮助许多提供各种社会服务的基层组织，但也可以巩固政府的控制能力，迫使他们以遵循‘‘政府领导’’来作为进行经营的交换条件。
在本报告年度，中国官员继续强调要‘‘指导’’公民社会的发展。中国共产党中央政法委员会书记周永康说，‘‘…培育综合性社会组织，努力把各类社会组织纳入党委和政府主导的社会组织体系…在社会组织管理方面，要建立分类发展、分类管理机制，促进社会组织健康有序发展…在境外民间组织在华活动管理方面，要建立联合管理机制，保护正当交往合作，依法加强管理。’’

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

向中国官员了解有关地方一级的涉及民间组织（NGO）注册改革和其他民政事务方面的昀新进展。鼓励这些官员扩大改革的努力，放宽对民间组织的约束，通过国家立法和监管使这些改革措施也适用于其他地区。
要求中国政府不要以有选择性地执法恐吓他们认为从事敏感事务的团体。要求中国政府重新审视昀近国家外汇管理局发布的涉及海外组织捐款的条例。强调国内和国际的民间组织是人民表达冤情、寻求补偿的渠道，因而起到了维持社会稳定的作用。而对公民社会组织进行严格管制会除去有用的社会‘‘安全阀’’，从而增加不稳定因素。在与中国政府官员讨论时，可以提到清华大学的报告结论，即使政府增加公安支出和加强对民间社会的控制，社会冲突也在以更大的频率发生。
采取措施促进在非政府机构工作的中国公民参与有关国际会议和论坛，支持在美国的培训机会以增强非营利组织、公共政策倡导、战略规划以及媒体关系方面的领导能力。

民主治理机构

调查结果

共产党通过在社会各级政府、立法和司法机构以及商业、主要社会团体（包括工会）、军队和绝大多数的居民委员会中设立党委组织来实施对政治、政府和社会的控制。在 2011年报告年度，共产党的领导人重申党的绝对领导，努力加速建立或恢复党的组织，特别是在商业楼宇、城市社区、学术机构、律师事务所建立党支部。
中国的政治体制不符合中国领导人已签署并宣布打算通过的《公民权利和政治权利的国际公约》第 25条所界定的准则。中国的政治体制也不符合《世界人权宣言》中概述的准则。虽然中国中央领导人继续采取措施努力提高政府治理效率，加强对党的信任度，但新闻报道中并没有任何重大政治改革即将出现的动向。温家宝总理强调需要政治改革，但是，他的一些言论在中国国内的新闻中受到审查。其他高层领导人似乎批评思想的多元化，并强调绝不可能实施‘‘西式’’民主中的分权力和竞争性的政党政治。
在本报告年度，中国当局在加强对‘‘社会治安综合治理’’和‘‘维护社会稳定’’的旗号下扩大了对社会的控制。当局无视自由集会的宪法权利，对几百人采取先发制人的镇压，防止他们从事旨在倡导民主改革和其他事物的所谓‘‘茉莉花革命’’的和平集会。此外，当局还继续扣留、投监，毫不手软地镇压不被共产党承认的政治党派的组织者。例如，当局以宣传民主活动的罪名将刘贤斌处以重刑；逮捕在互联网上主张民主的李铁。
地方各级人民代表大会代表直接选举只在县级举行。当局劝阻利用网上资源在昀新一轮的地方各级人民代表大会选举中参选的‘‘独立候选人’’。新闻报道指出，‘‘独立候选人’’ 和他们的家人遭到骚扰。至少有100名‘‘独立候选人’’通过微博宣布他们打算参加选举。
中国领导人继续表达支持以党为领导核心的村民自治。虽然村委会选举在中国大部分地区展开，选举继续为官方干预和贿赂所困。对村委会选举法的重要修订有可能改变村级组织中的权力平衡，部分原因是因为法律规定在每一个村庄设立一个新的‘‘监督委员会’’或相当的机构。修订案还将明确定义选举和罢免程序。监督委员会可能有助于减少腐败，但它们也可能因‘‘维护社会稳定’’而扼杀批评的声音。中央官员继续在搞一个地方政府治理中的突出问题的普查，许多地方当局也报道说他们制定了各种‘‘民主管理’’项目以加强村干部和农村居民之间的关系，减少腐败，提高信息透明度，促进‘‘民主’’的公众参与。但是本委员会并没有观察到新闻媒体报道这些试点项目措施的执行和可持续性的细节。
当局继续表达对政府信息公开的支持和扩大党务的透明度。此外，国务院在 2010年11月发布《关于加强法治政府建设的意见》，强调加强政府信息公开，尤其是预算、公共资源分配、重大建设项目的批准和实施，以及非营利性的社会事业等方面的信息。据说北京市出台的一项措施会首次将党的领导人至于‘‘问责范围之内’’。
•据报道，中国政府和中国共产党寻求改善治理责任制，并在同时改善‘‘社会管理’’。据说政府采取了有限措施打击仍然很严重的腐败现象。在 2011年报告年度中，中国政府颁布了中国首部关于腐败问题的白皮书，以及官员接受财务审计，鼓励举报贪污，并保护举报人的措施。中国政府当局修订导致更大的政府责任制的政府官员评估制度，避免官员靠伪造数据得到提升。当局公布了一个未来五年的重大经济和社会发展计划（第十二个五年计划），其中指出，政府将‘‘构建社区综合管理和服务平台’’，将提供服务和社会管理联系起来。
中国公民和团体对政治决策过程直接参与的机会微乎其微，然而，他们越来越能够利用其他各种渠道表达意见，对有关政策和监管手段提出看法。新措施规定，‘‘重大’’的政策决策过程应包括公众参与、专家论证、风险评估、法律审查并分组讨论。这些措施还规定，政府主管部门应跟踪他们的决定执行情况。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

呼吁中国政府释放因行使倡导政治改革权利而被拘留或监禁的人士，包括民主人士刘贤斌。他在 2011年 3月因‘‘煽动颠覆国家政权罪’’被判处有期徒刑 10年。以及那些因提及中东和北非的抗议活动或因在个人通信或互联网上提到‘‘茉莉花’’抗议而遭到拘押和监禁人士，以及本委员会的政治犯数据库中提到的政治良心犯。
支持美国公民对中国的基层政治和社会发展的研究项目，并扩大美国在华领事馆的数目。
支持那些旨在减少腐败的地方各级人民代表大会和村委会选举的项目，包括扩大国内选举观察制度，中国国内的选举观察员的培训，及美中联合选举观察活动。
继续支持美国国会议员和全国人民代表大会和中国人民政治协商会议成员之间的实质性交流，尤其是在国会的监督程序和预算事项领域。
支持美国或中国的寻求提高中国地方当局透明度和问责制的项目，特别是努力扩大和提高中国的政府信息公开的举措。这些项目可能包括在美国训练中国官员如何运用‘‘信息自由系统’’，共同开展就如何更好地宣传《政府信息公开条例》的项目及在地方、公民和团体如何提交信息公开申请的培训。
支持帮助当地政府部门、学术界、非营利组织在扩大公众听证透明度和通过其他渠道将公民意见纳入决策过程的项目。其中一项可包括交流计划。籍此，中国地方政府官员和民间组织代表可一同到美国参加讨论重大议题的市政厅或其他公开会议。这种项目还可包括在中国将民众对政府有关法律草案、法规或政策的意见公开的试点项目。

商业法治

调查结果

工业政策继续在中国经济中发挥重要作用，指导重要的工业部门，如汽车、软件和‘‘文化产业’’。这些产业政策是中国经济关键部门发展的总框架，为其提供补贴与优惠，并为重组相关国有企业和制定出口目标制定计划。第 12个五年计划补充了这些产业政策，特别是在关键部门的实施。第 12个五年计划中提出扶助一些‘‘战略性的新兴产业’’，包括节能、新一代信息技术（IT）、生物技术、高端装备制造、新能源、新材料、新能源汽车。此外，工业和信息化部和其他政府部门相继出台了针对具体产业部门的计划。
中国国有部门享受优惠待遇，私人公司被挤出了某些关键部门。这可能成为法律发展和法治建设的障碍。因为国家控制公司、法院、立法机关和行政部门。中国的产业政策鼓励向国有企业实行技术转让，以及让其合并成‘‘国内大头’’。国有企业还可以享受各种直接和间接补贴。
中国法律关于国有企业的信息是否属于中国商业秘密或者中华人民共和国国家保密法方面是含糊不清的。在薛峰的案子中充分体现了这一问题。薛峰在中国被捕时是美国公民，罪名是帮助他的总部设在美国的雇主购买中国的商业数据库。该数据库在薛峰购买时并没有被列为国家机密。薛被中国政府因违反中国的国家保密法判处 8年徒刑，他的判决在 2011年 2月上诉时被判维持原判。
自2001年 12月加入世贸组织以来，中国卷入几个世界贸易组织纠纷案子。在 2010年有六个指控中国的纠纷。中国曾在世贸组织中质疑美国向中国某些汽车和卡车轮胎以中国入世议定书中承诺的过渡性特定产品保障条款的名义征收关税。但世贸组织判中国败诉。而美国则向世贸组织指控中国向其国内风力能源产业提供补贴，目前该案正在审议之中。中国还对世贸组织的另一项裁决提出上诉，指出中国限制出口铝土矿、焦炭、萤石、镁、锰、碳化硅、金属硅、黄磷和锌等物品符合中国加入世贸组织时承诺的义务。
中国人民币的价值仍然是一个受到中国境内外决策者关注的问题。
中国政府部门严密规范外商在中国的投资，并使用审批程序以确保外商投资与政府的政策保持一致。在本委员会 2011年报告年度期间，中国当局出台了外商投资指导目录的修订草案，其中列出了鼓励、限制或禁止外资进入的产业。修订后的目录中‘‘鼓励’’外资的产业包括第十二个五年计划所涵盖的战略性新兴产业。
中国对外投资增长的大部分主要集中在中国制造业需要的能源和矿产业。对外投资受商务部和国家发展和改革委员会的管制。国务院国有资产监督管理委员会发布了新措施监管国有企业的境外金融活动。对外投资的贷款由中国国有商业银行、对外投资资金以及人民币储备提供。
在2011年报告年度，负责《中华人民共和国反垄断法》（AML）实施的三个政府部门中有两个颁布了新的反垄断法规。国家工商行政管理局通过了三套有关垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位和滥用行政权力的规定。国家发改委发出两套针对价格垄断的法规。这五套规定于 2011年2月 1日起生效。
商务部负责处理反垄断的企业合并审查，在本报告年度，该部拖延了批准中国以外的非中国实体的企业合并，包括诺基亚购买某些摩托罗拉的网络资产，和两个想合并的俄罗斯钾肥公司。但是还没有消息显示商务部不批准，或只能有条件地批准中国国内企业之间的兼并。但国有资产监督管理委员会一直鼓励中国国有企业合并，这种合并对一些产业政策来说，如汽车行业政策，是必须的。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

制定和支持一项以世贸组织标准调查产业政策在中国经济中的作用的项目，包括这些产业政策的发展变革、对指导中国经济的作用及如何影响透明度、法治及中国与国际法律承诺的遵守。
通过中国商务部的信息公开办公室，或通过美国司法部和联邦贸易委员会与中国有关部门的双边对话机制，获取自中国反垄断法生效以来的有关合并申请审查的详细信息，包括非中国企业与国有企业申请合并的数目及每个合并申请的审查结果。
通过美国贸易代表、美国商务部于中国商务部、国家发展和改革委员会和国务院国有资产监督管理委员会之间的双边对话，获得中国在美国投资的详细数额（在金融业的投资除外）、中国当局对此类在美投资的审批准则以及这种投资的资金来源的资料。
与中国当局交涉以明确外商在华投资申请的审批程序，包括涉及到通常在华投资申请及审批过程中的安全审查程序，而后者是美国根据商贸联委员会下属的法律交流项目安排并主持的。

获取司法与正义资源

调查结果

在本委员会的 2011年报告年度中，中国公民力所能及地纠正冤案并得到赔偿仍面临重大挑战。政府继续推进有中国特色的‘‘和谐’’的社会主义社会。过去一年中，重大的政策法规都强调了维护社会稳定这一中心任务。
法院鼓励使用调解而不是审判解决民事案件纠纷。批评者指出，调解可能导致缩减中国公民使用司法的权利。此外，目前仍不清楚新的人民调解法是否可在不受胁迫的情况下充分解决纠纷及对调解协议加以有效地执行。
寻求解决冤情的上访公民继续面对官方的报复、骚扰、暴力和拘留，由于地方政府的奖励制度与迫害访民直接挂钩，地方官员更加积极地迫害访民。
在各级政府官员继续劝阻、恐吓并扣留敢于接受敏感问题、案子和客户的人权律师和维权人士。官方运用一系列手段，包括派驻警察监督维权人士的住所、迫使维权人士前往未知的地方或迫使他们和保安人员‘‘喝茶’’，甚至监禁。
昀高人民法院在 2011年 5月宣布将某些类型的案件统一指导。指导性案例旨在为公安人员、检察院和法院提供判决的统一性。其中的关键问题仍然是这些指导性的案例对基层法院究竟有多大程度的约束力。
中国政府继续推动行政法的改革，如切实落实与执行。这些改革可加大对国家机构和政府雇员的监督和对公民利益的保护。修订的《中华人民共和国行政监察法》在 2011年 6月生效。其关键条款具备了对举报者一定的保护。经修订的《中华人民共和国国家赔偿法》在 2010年12月生效。其关键条款扩大了法律规定的范围，允许在某些情况下对政府因疏忽罪采取法律行动。此外，修正后的法律消除了某些程序上的漏洞，使其更容易建立一个有效的索赔制度。
由于心存顾虑中国公民仍不愿利用行政法条款对政府官员提起法律诉讼。据报道，以行政法起诉政府的案例只占地方法院平均总工作量极小的一部分。
在2011年报告年度，中国政府增加了法律援助制度的拨款。然而，中国面临着辩护律师系统的短缺。在不发达地区，一些刑事被告人不可能获得法律代表。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

支持美国国务院国际访问者领导项目和其他双边交流项目，邀请中国的人权律师、维权人士、学者到美国学习和对话。支持与中国的人权律师和非营利性的法律组织有合作关系的美国民间组织和学术部门中类似的项目。
继续监察作为中国解决纠纷首选方式的调解政策。清楚了解该调解系统是否涉及到中国公民获得司法正义的权利及符合国际准则。
继续监测由昀高人民法院预期颁发的旨在为公安人员、检察院和法院提供判决的统一指导性案例，并要特别注意是否对基层法院的影响
向中国当局就对待上访人员的方式表示关切，鼓励中国领导人审查导致地方官员迫害访民的奖励机制。
反对继续骚扰人权律师和维权人士。呼吁释放因捍卫中国公民权利而受到非法监视居住、‘‘失踪’’或遭到官员骚扰的律师和活动家。
支持与中国的辩护律师和法律学院进行法律援助的专业知识培训与交流。

财产

调查结果

在过去的一年中，有许多地方政府和开发商征收和滥用的案例，包括强迫迁离。强迫搬迁违背了中国批准的对《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》的一般性意见。一些房产主人因拒绝离开自己的家园而被殴打、骚扰或非法拘禁。中国的经济发展导致对土地需要的增加，卖地收入一直是地方政府重要的收入来源。
2011年 1月，国有土地房屋征收和补偿条例生效。该法规界定了在土地征收背景下的‘‘公共利益’’，并列出了一些对城市土地拥有者权利的程序性保护。虽然 2007年中国物权法和中华人民共和国城市房地产管理法都规定地方政府只应因公共利益而征收土地，但两个法都没有对‘‘公共利益’’作出界定。尽管新法规提法更加明晰并有更好的保护措施但其有效性将取决于实施的具体情况。
国有土地房屋征收和补偿条例只适用于城市土地，因此中国农村居民得到的保护相对较低。农村土地属于集体所有，农民可以合法签订 30年的合同使用集体所有的土地。然而，对农民的保护很少。有建议对城市居民的征收补偿法也应适用于农村居民。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

在会议和书信中敦促中国政府通过立法对农村居民提供与城市居民同样的享有国有土地房屋征用和补偿条例的保护。
安排和支持技术援助方案，使中国负责土地管理的政府部门了解有关美国根据征用权(eminent domain)准则征用土地的程序与标准。这种援助将阐明美国法律下‘‘公共利益’’的含义。该项目可通过美国与中国的各姊妹城市来进行。
敦促中国政府落实全面的法规澄清农村土地所有权和为农村居民提供法律援助，帮助他们保护在拥有集体所有土地上的权利。通过美国与中国的对话，如商贸联委员会下的法律交流项目，与中国有关律师事务所进行无偿服务方面的经验交流或美国如何为穷人提供法律服务的交流。

新疆

调查结果

在委员会 2011年的报告年度，新疆维吾尔自治区的人权状况仍然很差。继 2009年 7月在该地区的示威和骚乱以来，当局保持压制性的安全政策，有针对性地把和平异议、倡导人权以及文化和宗教的独特表达活动，尤其是针对维吾尔族的活动，作为对该地区稳定构成威胁的活动。2011年夏季的一个贸易博览会开幕之前和在官方声称是恐怖袭击事件的发生之后，政府加强了对该地区的安全政策。
中国政府继续掩盖 2009年 7月的示威和骚乱之后为和平言论自由、集会而遭监禁、受审人员的情况，而海外媒体则对此作了报道。在新疆维吾尔自治区审结的危害国家安全罪的案件数字在 2010年比 2009年有所下降，但比 2009年之前要高。这是中国政府惩治活跃人士和异议人士的刑事犯罪类别。
在2010年 5月被称为新疆工作座谈会上，中央政府首次宣布实施一系列由中央政府主导的发展措施，强化了一些长期以来的政策，包括学校里的汉语教育、牧民搬迁和城市发展项目。这些措施削弱了维吾尔人和其他非汉族群体保持自己固有文化、语言和生计的权利。
新疆当局对宗教，特别是伊斯兰教，实施严格的控制，并保持对宗教活动的限制。这些限制比国家性条例制定的限制更加严厉。官方将对伊斯兰教的限制纳入加强安全的运动，监视清真寺，对遵守斋月假期加以限制，继续阻止穆斯林男子留胡须，不让穆斯林女子戴面纱，并在出版物审查活动中有针对性地收缴‘‘非法’’宗教材料。
对维吾尔族和其他非汉族群体在政府和私营部门的就业歧视还在继续。当局还继续派农村非汉族男性和女性到中国其他地方就业。据报道，有些是被强制参加这种就业计划的，且工作条件极具剥削性。在新疆的教育主管部门继续要求学生以勤工俭学的方式从事摘棉花和其他形式的体力劳动，超出根据中国法律和国际劳动标准允许的学生劳工的范围。
国家和新疆维吾尔自治区政府官员继续实施削弱维吾尔人保护自己文化遗产的计划。当局继续拆除和‘‘改造’’喀什老城区段和搬迁居民。这是一个２００９年出台的为期五年的项目，因此举要求居民搬迁，并会削弱对文化遗产的保护而遭到来自维吾尔居民和观察员的反对。中国政府还继续对维吾尔人非物质文化遗产的保护政治化。政府提名一个维吾尔的社会和艺术集会作为需要加强的国家和国际保护，但是对其狭义解释，排除宗教与社会活动的元素。
对于２００９年１２月在联合国难民署高级专员有可能对寻求庇护的难民情况作出决定之前而遭柬埔寨强制遣返到中国的寻求庇护者的消息仍然有限。2011年 5月，中国公安人员与哈萨克斯坦当局合作，强行将一名维吾尔人从哈萨克斯坦遣返回中国。他昀初被确认为难民，后被难民署撤销。八月份，泰国当局送交一个维吾尔人给中国当局。据信此人已被返回中国。而在同一月，巴基斯坦和马来西亚当局也强行遣返维吾尔人回到中国。这些是今年来有据可查的被迫遣返案例，突显维吾尔寻求庇护难民所面临的‘‘驱回’’风险及返回中国后的酷刑。这些遣返是在邻国受到中国施加的压力和中国无视国际法的情况下发生的。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

支持为扩大美国政府旨在提高对新疆人权状况的认识，保护维吾尔文化，并为维吾尔人增加保护他们权利途径资源的立法。
向中国官员表达对新疆维吾尔自治区人权状况的关心，谴责使用治安运动压制人权。呼吁中国政府释放因主张其权利或因与维权人士的个人关系而被监禁的人士，包括海来特•尼亚孜（2010年因为接受国外媒体采访而以‘‘泄露国家秘密罪’’被判处 15年徒刑），努尔买买提•亚森（在2005年因所写的小说涉嫌‘‘煽动种族仇恨或歧视’’、‘‘煽动分裂国家罪’’被判 10年徒刑。）；阿里木 •阿布都热衣木和阿不力克木•阿不都热依木（活动家热比娅•卡德儿的成年子女，分别于2006年和 2007年因涉嫌经济和‘‘分裂国家’’罪被判７年与 9年徒刑），以及其他在本报告中和在本委员会的政治犯资料库中提及的囚犯。
呼吁中国政府提供在 2009年７月的示威和骚乱中被拘押、指控、审判或判刑的每个人的情况，包括姓名、指控（如果被指控的话）、起诉办公室的名称和位置（即检察院）、处理每个案件的法院以及他们被拘留或监禁设施的名称。要求中国政府鼓励对那些被错误拘留的人寻求补偿。要求中国政府根据《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》第 33条和第96条的规定确保因 2009年７月涉嫌犯罪的人有聘请律师及行使自己选择法律辩护人的权利。要求中国政府按照《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》第 163条规定，宣告对在 2009年 7月后受审人士的判决。呼吁中国政府允许独立专家对示威和骚乱进行独立调查，并允许他们出席与此事件有关的审判。
支持有关新疆的人权问题的民间组织，使它们继续收集有关新疆状况的信息，以成立计划帮助维吾尔人加强他们保护自己文化、语言和文化遗产的权利。支持致力于向新疆维吾尔自治区的人民报道以及收集消息的新闻媒体，让他们增大从该地区向外部世界报道而向新疆住民提供不经审查的消息的能力。提供支持收集维吾尔语言书刊的图书馆，使之进一步有能力从新疆地区收集和保存书刊。支持那些可以研究和采取措施来保障新疆地区物质或非物质文化遗产的组织。
呼吁中国政府支持旨在促进广大新疆维吾尔自治区居民权利的保护，并允许新疆维吾尔自治区政府行使民族区域自治的权力的新疆发展政策。呼吁中央和新疆维吾尔自治区当局确保不仅促进经济增长，同时也尊重广泛的新疆维吾尔自治区居民公民权利和政治权利的公平发展，并使这些社区能够参与决策。确保新疆的发展项目能够特别考虑到非汉族人士的特殊需要，因为他们面临自上而下的发展政策中的独特挑战，而且并没有成为该地区经济增长的完全受益者。呼吁当局确保居民对搬迁举措有发言权，并能够获得足够的搬迁补偿。呼吁当局采取措施维护牧民保存其文化和生计的权利。
要求中国政府确保政府和私人企业遵守禁止民族歧视的法律规定，停止专聘汉人的做法。呼吁政府监督地方当局遵守对仍受就业歧视的非汉族群体增加就业机会的指令。支持可提供技术援助的组织监督遵守劳动法的情况，并根据《中华人民共和国就业促进法》第 62条的规定就歧视性行为提起诉讼。呼吁中国当局调查在农村非汉族男性和女性被转移到中国内地工场劳动时是否被胁迫及工作条件是否具有剥削性的报道。呼吁中国当局调查新疆维吾尔自治区的勤工俭学计划，确保这些计划不超过中国法律和国际劳动标准规定的学生劳工范围。
呼吁中国政府提供被柬埔寨于 2009年 12月强行遣返的维吾尔庇护申请人的下落以及他们目前的法律地位。同样地，呼吁告知在 2011年从哈萨克斯坦、泰国、巴基斯坦和马来西亚遭强行遣返的人的下落和法律地位。向中国官员、国际难民机构的官员以及维吾尔难民过境国或目的地国家的官员提及维吾尔人的寻求庇护者的问题。呼吁中国官员和维吾尔难民过境国或目的地国家的官员尊重联合国难民高级专员庇护申请人或难民地位的确定及其他国家难民和公民身份的确定。呼吁维吾尔寻求庇护者、难民和移民的过境国与目的地国家遵守 1951年《关于难民地位的公约》以及《禁止酷刑公约》里的关于遣返的规定。

西藏

调查结果

中国政府和中国共产党扩大使用法律和政策的措施对西藏文化施加压力，特别是在宗教和语言方面的压力，致使西藏人认为他们的文化生存能力已受到威胁。对比政府在经济发展和诸如教育的社会服务增加的统计数据，藏族文化福祉却正在下降。和平表达对政府和党的西藏政策不满的藏族人受到惩罚的危险在增大，因为中央和地方政府扩大运用法律措施来维护“社会稳定”并把这些不满列为刑事犯罪。
在本委员会 2011 年报告年度期间，中国政府和党的官员与达赖喇嘛的代表之间没有正式的对话。许多藏人包括达赖喇嘛相信，有些政府政策对西藏文化、语言、宗教、文物和环境造成威胁，而中国政府则继续执行造成这种威胁的法律措施和政策，从而使汉藏之间的对话环境进一步恶化。在2011 年，达赖喇嘛采取措施结束达赖喇嘛作为基于印度的被称为西藏流亡政府组织中的正式地位。这个变化有可能改变对话的互动机制，消除中国党和政府把达赖喇嘛作为一个“政治人物”指控的基础。
政府和党继续进行诋毁达赖喇嘛的宗教领袖地位的运动，扩大了政府和党对藏传佛教的控制，强制实行官员所描述的宗教‘‘正常秩序’’。到2011 年8 月止，中央政府和10 个藏族自治州政府中的9 个发布或起草的监管措施大幅度增加了国家对藏传佛教寺院和尼姑庵的宗教自由的侵权。这些措施加强了监督和监管每个寺院的‘‘民主管理委员会’’，一个使和尚、尼姑、教师服从政府法律法规和政策的寺院团体。该措施另将对寺院和尼姑庵的监测扩展到乡级政府机关，具有向村委会提供监督和报告的功能。
政府的安全和司法官员用中国的法律系统作为手段，拘留和监禁西藏作家、艺术家和知识分子。这些藏人以含蓄的语言感叹西藏文化的地位，或批评政府对西藏人民和文化的政策。2011 年报告年度的例子包括作家兼出版商、一个会议的组织者、一个歌手和下载‘‘禁止’’歌曲的藏人。政府努力防止这些藏人去影响其他藏人，将和平的言论作为‘‘犯罪’’来惩治并使用监禁将他们从社会中消除。
过去一年的事件突显藏人认为藏语地位和保存的重要性。一些藏人相信‘‘双语教育制度’’的‘‘改革’’将增加对藏语的威胁。一个省的藏族学生领导了一场示威，抗议在2010 年至2020 年期间减少使用藏语和减少藏语重要性的计划。一名党的官员指出‘‘口语与书写语言的结合’’对一个‘‘统一的国家’’至关重要，并暗示抗议的学生在威胁民族团结。退休的西藏教育工作者向当局提交了一份请愿书，分析了他们视为违反中国宪法和民族区域自治法而造成违犯少数民族权利的事情。
乡村的藏人抗议政府和党的经济发展政策带来的不利影响，尤其是采矿。这些经济开发政策把政府的目标置于尊重和保护西藏文化和环境之上。据官方的报告，西藏自治区矿产资源的价值比 2001年至 2010年间政府交给西藏自治区的补贴翻了大约一倍。西藏自治区政府已完成西藏自治区近三分之二乡村人口的强制性定居或迁移。政府提供的铁路网络建设昀新信息显示，铁路网将纵横交错于青藏高原，其中一个路段将穿越遭受地震重创的玉树。被政府重新命名的玉树将会成为一个拥有众多人口、繁荣的经济和发达的基础设施的‘‘市。’’玉树的藏族人因政府出售或征收他们的财产而没有提供足够补偿举行了抗议。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

敦促中国政府同达赖喇嘛或他的代表进行实质性对话，商讨在西藏自治区和在青海、甘肃、四川、云南等省的西藏自治州县保护西藏文化、语言、宗教和传统。达赖喇嘛从流亡政府政务中的退出失去了共产党将其定性为‘‘政治人物’’的根据，有助于改变对话互动机制的可能性。随着藏族地区紧张局势的上升，中国政府若决定进行对话，可能导致一个对中国政府和西藏人都持久互利的结果，从而改善未来几十年当地和自治区的安全。
向中国政府表达限制用法律手段侵犯并压制藏传佛教宗教自由权利的迫切重要性。向中国官员指出，反对达赖喇嘛的运动、‘‘爱国主义教育’’和昀近在州一级采取的控制西藏佛教寺院事务的法律手段，实际上导致社会的不和谐，而不是‘‘社会稳定’’。促请政府尊重藏传佛教根据西藏人的意愿和与传统相一致的方式来选择和培育宗教教师的权利。
吁请中国政府进一步阐明西藏自治区政府主席在 2010年声明中所称，即达赖喇嘛在 1995年承认的班禅喇嘛更登确吉尼玛还在作为一个‘‘普通人’’与他的家人一起生活在西藏自治区。促请政府邀请一名国际组织的代表，面见更登确吉尼玛，使确吉尼玛可以向该代表表达他尊重隐私的意愿; 并让该代表与更登确吉尼玛合影留照，公布更登确吉尼玛的声明和照片。
向中国政府传达尊重和保护藏族文化和语言的重要性。敦促中国官员通过遵守中国宪法的言论、结社、集会和宗教自由的条款促进一个充满活力的西藏文化，而不是用安全机构、法院和法律，侵犯和镇压西藏人行使这种权利。敦促官员尊重西藏人的愿望，在现代事务的教学中同时使用藏语和中文，不得因停止使用藏语使其成为次等语言。
鼓励中国政府在策划基础设施建设、自然资源开发、以及在中国西藏地区的人员安置项目时要充分考虑到藏族人的意见和喜好。鼓励中国政府雇用相称的专家评估这些项目的影响，并对这些项目的实施和进展向政府提供咨询。要求中国政府对在 2010年 4月玉树地震和重建新‘‘城市’’的过程中失去财产或财产权利的藏人实行充分、公平和及时的补偿。
增加对美国民间组织的支持以帮助藏人提高他们和平地保护和发展自己文化、语言和文化遗产的能力; 帮助生活在中国西藏地区的藏族人改善其教育、经济、健康和环境的保护; 替西藏人创造可持续的效益，而不致助长非藏族人涌入这些地区。
继续向中国政府表达区分和平的藏族抗议者和暴徒的重要性。谴责使用治安运动压制人权，要求中国政府提供因和平抗议而被拘留、起诉、判刑的藏人详情。继续在与中国官员会见和信件通讯时提及因和平实践人权而被监禁的西藏人案子。具有代表性的案例包括：原西藏僧侣晋美嘉措（目前正在监狱被判延至 18年的刑期，其罪名是印刷传单、派发海报和在监狱呼喊亲达赖喇嘛的口号）;僧侣曲因克珠（因印刷传单被判处终身监禁）;晋美丹增尼玛（藏佛教徒视为转世喇嘛，因‘‘煽动分裂’’原判终生监禁，后改判 18年徒刑）;和牧民荣吉阿扎（因在公共节日喊政治口号被判处 8年监禁）。

在香港和澳门的发展

调查结果

虽然香港基本法规定，‘‘终极目的’’是由全民普选行政长官和立法会所有成员，2011年通过的改革法案则与这些目标不符。改革涉及 2012年的立法会和香港行政长官的选举。根据这些改革，选择行政长官的推选委员会成员人数将从 800人增至 1,200人，立法会议员的数量将从60增到 70人，外加直接选举出的 10个当选成员中的五人，和其他来自新建区议会选民团体的 5名议员。据一家独立的香港报纸报道，大陆中国政府一直在幕后‘‘协调’’选举策略。
中英联合声明和香港基本法规定，香港应享有高度自治。在过去的一年，香港的入境事务处拒绝为吾尔开希和王丹这两个流亡的天安门抗议活动领导人发放签证，使其不能参加 2011年 1月举行的香港民主活动家司徒华的葬礼。根据基本法香港当局掌控自己的移民政策。至少有一个香港评论员认为，入境事务处拒发签证以向大陆当局示好。
在澳门的腐败是一个重大而日益严重的问题。澳门在透明国际公布的腐败排名指数从 2009年的第43名降至 2010年的第 46名。由来自中国大陆赌徒和美国赌场资金注入而带来的澳门赌博业的增长，伴随着广泛的腐败、有组织犯罪和洗钱。

建议

敦促美国国会议员和政府官员：

继续尽一切努力在前往中国大陆时也访问香港。美国政府代表团在香港的活动应包括与香港立法会议员，香港特区政府行政和司法官员的会面。这些会面应表明美国支持‘‘一国两制’’和在法治框架下的香港高度自治。
在与中国政府官员会面时，敦促他们允许让香港市民享有基本法和中英联合声明均阐述的高度自治，尤其包括在有关选举和移民问题方面的高度自治。如果香港人民愿意，允许在一人一票的原则下实行普选。
安排来自美国允许赌博的州（如内华达州）的赌博监督管理专家向澳门当局提供技术培训和援助加强控制犯罪活动，并确保在澳门经营的美国赌场业主和经营者坚守赌博业昀高准则。

本委员会以 13对 0票通过本报告†。

II. Human Rights

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese officials maintained a broad range of restrictions on free expression that do not comply with international human rights standards. While such standards permit states in limited circumstances to restrict expression to protect interests such as national security and public order, Chinese restrictions covered a much broader range of activity, including peaceful expression critical of the Communist Party. Chinese officials showed little sign of loosening political control over the Internet and cell phones. They called for strengthening the Party’s guidance of online opinion and censored politically sensitive information, including searches for "human rights" or "democracy." At times, citizen expression on China’s popular microblogs over-whelmed censors, including following a high-speed train accident in July. A top official said there would be "no change in the Party’s control over the media," amidst censorship of events such as the Nobel Peace Prize award to imprisoned Chinese intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo and intensified harassment of foreign journalists. Officials continued to abuse vague criminal charges, including subversion, to target peaceful speech critical of the Party. Officials maintained broad regulations and registration requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and the Internet.

International Standards for Free Expression

Many Chinese restrictions on free expression do not comply with international human rights standards. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is (1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting national security, public order, public health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve the purported aim.1 Regarding the purpose requirement, the UN Human Rights Council has said restrictions on "discussion of government policies and political debate," "peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace and democracy," and "expression of dissent," are inconsistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR.2 As outlined in this section, Chinese officials continued to restrict expression on the Internet and in the media for impermissible purposes, such as to stifle peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. As to restrictions clearly set forth in law, Chinese officials this past year abused vaguely worded criminal law provisions and resorted to extralegal measures to arbitrarily restrict free expression. As to the narrowness requirement, as documented in this section, Chinese restrictions continued to be overly broad and disproportionate to protecting the stated interest. In May 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted that restrictions on expression should be applied by an independent body and include the possibility of remedy against abuse.3 As noted in this section, in China there remained no independent checks on government abuse.

Official Response to Overseas Protests and Calls for Domestic "Jasmine" Protests

This past year was marked by a crackdown on free expression in China in early 2011 that followed protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the appearance of online calls for "Jasmine" protests domestically. Protests in the Middle East began in Tunisia in December 2010 and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the region. In February 2011, the "Jasmine" calls began circulating online in China.4 They called for weekly non-violent protest strolls in select cities to demand an end to corruption and to promote issues such as judicial independence, free expression, and political reform.5

MEDIA AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP

Officials reportedly censored Chinese media coverage of the Middle East and North Africa protests. According to leaked censorship instructions, officials allegedly ordered Chinese media to use only stories issued by the central government news agency, Xinhua, and banned reporting on demands for democracy in the Middle East or drawing comparisons to China’s political system.6 Western media observed Chinese media relying heavily on Xinhua stories and observed one-sided coverage emphasizing the dangers of democracy for countries not ready for it.7 At the time, online censors reportedly blocked searches of the words "Egypt," "Libya," "Jasmine," and "democracy." 8 The duration and effectiveness of the censorship was unclear. Foreign media attempting to report on the "Jasmine" protests encountered intense harassment. [See Foreign Journalists below for more information.]

HARASSMENT, DETENTIONS OF CHINESE CITIZENS

Starting in mid-February 2011, Chinese authorities also targeted large numbers of writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform advocates. Many were outspoken critics of the government; some tried to share information about the "Jasmine" protest calls, while the connection of others, if any, to the calls was unclear.9 Officials detained numerous citizens on national security and public disturbance charges.10 [For information on these and other individual cases in the crackdown, see Internet and Other Electronic Media, and Abuse of Criminal Laws To Punish Free Expression in this section.] The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other international groups noted reports of numerous Chinese citizens having gone missing or disappearing into official custody with little or no information about their charges or whereabouts.11 [For more information on the apparent disregard of criminal procedural protections in connection with the disappearances, see Enforced Disappearances in Section II—Criminal Justice.]

Internet and Other Electronic Media

BLOCKING AND FILTERING POLITICAL CONTENT

In China, officials are not transparent about the content that is blocked or why it is blocked,12 and they continue to arbitrarily block content for purposes impermissible under international standards. Chinese authorities expressed anger over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo in October 2010, for example, and blocked online searches for "Nobel Peace Prize" or "Liu Xiaobo" and text messages containing Liu’s name.13 In January 2011, authorities reportedly banned hundreds of words, including "democracy" and "human rights" from cell phone text messages.14 Politically sensitive Web sites continued to be blocked, including a popular Tibetan culture site, an anticorruption site, and a public health advocacy Web site.15 Officials also continued to block information in a disproportionate manner that did not appear necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. For example, access to overseas sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube remained completely blocked.16 In late May 2011, officials reportedly imposed broad blocks on Internet and cell phone access in the northern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region following a series of mostly peaceful pro-tests sparked by the death of a herder.17

Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens who sought to share politically sensitive content online. In each case, the activity appeared to pose little threat to national security or public order, or the punishment appeared disproportionate to the alleged offense. For example, rights defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) sent a satirical Twitter message urging anti-Japanese protesters to converge on the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.18 The Xinxiang City Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Committee in Henan province ordered her to serve one year of RTL in November 2010.19 In April 2011, authorities in Chongqing municipality ordered a citizen to serve RTL for posting scatological humor in a critique of the policies of Chongqing’s Party Secretary Bo Xilai.20 In November 2010, Shanghai police interrogated the writer Xia Shang after he offered to buy flowers for victims of a Shanghai fire in an Internet post.21 Officials treated citizens who sought to share information about the calls for domestic "Jasmine" protests, which appeared to be a non-violent call for political reform, as threats to the state. The detained included Hua Chunhui, an insurance company manager and activist who reportedly sent Twitter messages about the "Jasmine" protest calls and was charged with endangering state security.22 In April 2011, officials in Jiangsu province ordered Hua to serve 18 months of RTL.23 In February, police in Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, detained Internet blogger Liang Haiyi on suspicion of the crime of "subversion of state power." Police accused her of posting information about the "Jasmine" protests on the popular QQ microblogging site.24

The types of content prohibited online in China are not clearly defined in law, and thus conflict with international standards. Chinese Internet regulations contain vague and broad prohibitions on content that, for example, "harms the honor or interests of the nation," "spreads rumors," or "disrupts national policies on religion." 25 Chinese law does not define these concepts.26 In China, the government places the burden on Internet service and content providers to monitor and remove content based on these vague standards and to maintain records of such activity and report it to the government.27 In February 2011, a manager at Renren, a major social media company similar to Facebook, said that the company censored sensitive content using a staff of 500 and a keyword filtering system, and that the "CEO would have to have a coffee with the government" for any misstep.28 The Party’s influence over the technology sector was evident in June, when more than 60 representatives from top Chinese Internet companies, including Sina and Baidu, gathered in Shanghai to commemorate the Party’s 90th anniversary.29 Also in June, Sina announced plans to launch an English microblog site in the United States, which could have the effect of exporting Chinese censorship to overseas markets.30 The U.S.-based company Google, which has operations in China and which in early 2010 challenged Chinese censorship requirements, reportedly continued to face problems in China. In March 2011, Google reported that the Chinese government appeared to be interfering with its email service in China and making it look like a technical problem.31 The government denied the charge.32 In June, Google reported that an attack on hundreds of personal Gmail accounts, including those of Chinese political activists, senior U.S. officials, and journalists, had originated from China.33 The Party’s official newspaper rejected the allegation.34

PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON THE INTERNET

In addition to blocking certain types of content, officials in China control the Internet by determining who gains access to the medium through numerous licensing requirements (i.e., prior restraints). All Web sites hosted in China are required either to be licensed by or registered with the government, and sites providing news content or audio and video services require an additional license or registration.35 In a 2011 report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Free Expression said that licensing requirements "cannot be justified in the case of the Internet, as it can accommodate an unlimited number of points of entry and an essentially unlimited number of users." 36 In October 2010, Chinese media reported that as of the end of September 2010 Chinese Internet companies had inspected nearly 1.8 million Web sites and shut down 3,000 for failing to register.37 In July 2011, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) reported a 41 percent decrease in the number of Web sites in China in 2010 to 1.91 million sites.38 The report’s editor cited government campaigns targeting "obscene" sites and the economic downturn as reasons for the decrease, and said in recent years few sites had been closed "purely to control speech." 39 Other observers in China, however, attributed the decrease to the chilling effect of expanding government control.40 The CASS study also claimed that the United States was using new media, including the Voice of America, to threaten China’s "ideological safety." 41

EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, WHILE MAINTAINING CONTROL

The government has pledged to expand access to the Internet and cell phones.42 Official statistics indicate that by the end of 2010, there were 457 million Internet users in China, including a growing number in rural areas, and by April 2011, 900 million mobile phone accounts.43 Officials have sought to expand the Internet to promote economic development and government propaganda.44 Still, international observers and Western media continue to note the difficulties officials have in controlling this emerging and vibrant space for expression, including expression of criticism of the government and discussion of some politically sensitive topics.45 In July 2011, for example, users on China’s two most popular Twitter-type microblogs posted some 26 million messages after a high-speed train crash near Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province.46 Officials reportedly censored some messages, but a large number of messages either were allowed through or appeared too quickly for censors to react.47

Official statements and actions continue to emphasize control rather than freedom on the Internet. The importance of maintaining official control was reinforced in May 2011, when officials established a State Internet Information Office to "supervise and urge relevant departments to strengthen their supervision of online content, and to be responsible for approvals for online news services and other related services as well as day-to-day oversight." 48 In China, the Communist Party exercises tight control over government agencies that manage the media and Internet.49 This relationship gives the Party discretion to use government restrictions not just for the purpose of regulating pornography, intellectual property violations, and protecting minors—permissible purposes under international standards—but also to serve the Party’s interests. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao called for "strengthening the mechanisms for guiding online public opinion." 50 The practice of authorities paying Chinese citizens to post comments favorable to the government and Party on the Internet reportedly continued.51 In February, Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang said authorities should "coalesce a comprehensive" structure for managing the Internet "under the Party committee’s unified leadership." 52 In Beijing, authorities reportedly issued regulations requiring bars, hotels, and other public places to purchase and install costly software to monitor the identities of people using wireless services at those locations.53

Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression

Officials continued to use the criminal charges of "subversion" and "inciting subversion" (Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law) this past year, in part in connection with the crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the calls for "Jasmine" protests domestically.54 According to the non-governmental organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders, out of a total of 48 individuals detained since mid-February 2011, officials had charged at least 17 with "subversion" or "inciting subversion." 55 Ran Yunfei, a prolific writer, blogger, and activist, was arrested in March for "inciting subversion." 56 Authorities released him in August but placed him under "residential restriction" for six months, restricting his movements and ability to write and speak.57 In March, police in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, detained prominent blogger Guo Weidong on suspicion of "inciting subversion of state power" after alleging he had forwarded information online about the protests.58

Officials also charged numerous persons with "creating disturbances," a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Law.59 Officials detained the human rights activist Wei Qiang on the charge of "creating a disturbance" in March 2011, before releasing him on bail to await trial in April.60 In February, Wei was at the site of one of the "Jasmine" protest strolls in Beijing and reported on the scene using his Twitter account. Amid the broader crackdown, authorities in March 2011 also detained the Beijing-based rights advocate Wang Lihong on the charge of creating a disturbance, but in connection with activities stemming from almost a year earlier.61 They alleged that Wang had used the Internet to organize protests outside a court in support of three bloggers accused of defamation for helping a woman call on officials to reinvestigate her daughter’s death.62 In September, after a trial reportedly marked by procedural irregularities,63 a Beijing court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for creating a disturbance.64

In the case of the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, officials charged him with economic crimes, alleging that his company had evaded "a huge amount of tax." 65 Ai had become an outspoken critic of government policies and had been keeping track of the lawyers, bloggers, and activists swept up in the crackdown, when officials detained him in April.66 Authorities had refused to notify his family of the charges against him or his whereabouts and kept him at a secret location, purportedly under "residential surveillance." 67 During his 81 days in custody, Ai was reportedly kept in a cell without windows and was accompanied by two guards.68 Authorities released Ai on bail in June on the condition that he not give interviews or use Twitter.69 In August, Ai resumed his Twitter messages and told a Western newspaper, "I can’t be alive and not express my feelings." 70

The actual threat these citizens posed to state security and public order or whether the underlying crime was the actual motivation for official action is unclear, as details regarding many of these cases remain limited. Available information suggests that officials targeted the citizens to stifle political expression and dissent. Many of the citizens targeted had track records of criticizing the government and Communist Party and advocating for democracy and human rights.71 As the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Chinese Human Rights Defenders have noted in recent years, the vagueness of Chinese crimes of endangering state security, including subversion, lends itself to official abuse of freedom of speech, and Chinese courts make little assessment of whether the speech in question poses a threat to state security.72 There were other cases of alleged subversion or splittism this past year. In October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei province, arrested the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of subversion; Li had written numerous essays in support of democracy.73 In November, Beijing authorities detained activist Bai Dongping on inciting subversion charges after he posted online a photo of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.74 In December, three Tibetan writers, Kalsang Jinpa, Jangtse Donkho, and Buddha were sentenced to prison terms of three to four years for inciting splittism after articles they had written about the 2008 Tibetan protests appeared in a magazine.75 In March 2011, authorities in Suining city, Sichuan province, sentenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin to 10 years in prison for seeking to incite subversion by writing essays advocating for, among other things, democracy, and posting them on Web sites outside of China.76

Authorities Defend Liu Xiaobo Case on Grounds of International Law

After imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, Chinese authorities sought to defend their handling of his case as consistent with international law. After the award was announced, China’s central government news agency, Xinhua, issued an analysis of the case based on the findings of a Chinese criminal law scholar, Gao Mingxuan.77 The analysis noted that international treaties and nearly every country’s laws criminalize some speech, and that Liu’s speech had sought to incite the overthrow of the Chinese government.78 Xinhua failed to note that the essays and activities cited as evidence against Liu, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison, did not advocate violence and instead called for nonviolence and gradual political reform.79 A May 2011 opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Chinese authorities’ handling of Liu’s case violated both his right to fair trial and his right to political free speech as provided under international law.80 Chinese officials responded to the Nobel announcement by detaining citizens who distributed leaflets and posted online messages in support of Liu.81

Extralegal Harassment

Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict the travel of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to punish and stifle expression. Under illegal home confinement after his release, self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing recorded video of themselves describing the round-the-clock surveillance and harassment they faced.82 After the video was smuggled out and posted online in February 2011, security officials reportedly beat Chen and Yuan on two occasions.83 After the Nobel announcement in October 2010, authorities confined Liu Xia, the wife of Liu Xiaobo, to her home in Beijing and cut off her communications to the outside world.84 A May 2011 opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Liu Xia’s house arrest violates international standards.85 After his release from prison in December, China Democracy Party co-founder Qin Yongmin was harassed by police in Wuhan city, Hubei province, who accused him of speaking to reporters.86 Officials refused to allow the noted writer Liao Yiwu to attend the March 2011 PEN World Writers Festival in New York and a literary festival in Australia in May.87 In July, Liao escaped China at the Vietnam border. He fled to Berlin in anticipation of the publication of a memoir on the four years he spent in a Chinese prison for writing a poem on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.88 The Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng reportedly has been beaten, harassed, and prevented from participating in a Buddhist celebration by authorities in Guangdong province following his release from prison in February 2010.89 Wu previously served 11 years for alleged economic crimes, although reports connect that imprisonment to his issuance of letters to China’s leadership calling for reforms and an end to corruption.90

Freedom of the Press

Chinese government and Communist Party control over the press continued to violate international standards. International experts identify media serving "as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the public interest" as a major challenge to free expression.91 In China, officials expect the media to serve as the Party and government’s mouthpiece. In a November 2010 speech on political reform, Liu Binjie, director of the government agency responsible for regulating the press, the General Administration on Press and Publication, said any reform must be "beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party’s leadership over press and publishing work. . . . From beginning to end we must insist on . . . no change to the nature of press and publishing serving as mouthpiece of the Party and the people, no change in the Party’s control over the media." 92 In January 2011, a spokesperson for the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said officials had ruled out any moves to commercialize radio and television stations. "Radio and television stations are the Party’s important news media and battleground for propagandizing ideology and culture . . . and propaganda must remain its focus," he said.93 In November 2010, the Party’s official journal, Seeking Truth, cited the experience of the former Soviet Union to argue against any liberalization of China’s press.94

Authorities have allowed reporters some room to exercise "public supervision" duties over local officials and local matters, but in recent years have sought to rein in this space. In the summer of 2010, for example, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly barred more commercially oriented "metropolitan" (dushi) newspapers from publishing "negative" stories about incidents in other geographic areas within China or carrying stories published by newspapers based in other areas, a practice known as "outside area supervision." 95 Rhetorically, officials continue to claim that the rights of legally recognized journalists should be protected, although the content of such rights remains unclear.96 Emboldened by official claims that journalists deserve protection, Chinese journalists protested a series of incidents during the summer of 2010 in which local officials and commercial interests had targeted a number of journalists, including threatening them with charges of criminal defamation.97 Despite such protests, a deputy editor at Caijing, a Chinese financial magazine known for its investigative reporting, noted the "core problem: our police and judiciary are not independent and there is widespread collusion between officials and enterprises." 98 In July, the Party issued an order censoring news coverage of a high-speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, forcing newspapers to discard pages containing coverage of the incident.99 The order came after Chinese citizens flooded the Internet with messages questioning officials’ response and openness following the crash.100 A number of Chinese journalists expressed outrage at the propaganda order on their blogs, and at least one news weekly appeared to ignore the order.101

POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH PARTY DIRECTIVES

This past year, officials continued to publicly issue broad directives on what China’s domestic media should report, reminding journalists of their duty to "correctly" (zhengque) guide public opinion. On Journalists’ Day in China in November 2010, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, said that "a correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party and the people." 102 He called on the news media to "propagandize the Party’s positions." 103 To prepare for the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in July 2011, Central Propaganda Department director Liu Yunshan said in April that covering the anniversary was the "common responsibility of media organizations at various levels." 104 He called on evening and metropolitan newspapers to "use vivid stories and inspiring topics to illustrate the glorious history of our Party’s struggle" and urged online media to "help the large numbers of netizens understand the Party’s great historical course by publishing special postings, background links, and online interviews." 105 In May 2011, an official at SARFT confirmed that television stations had been verbally ordered not to air detective and time travel shows during the anniversary period.106

The Party, through its Central Propaganda Department, lower level propaganda departments, and other government agencies, also issues more specific directives to the media on what they can and cannot report on. These directives are considered state secrets, but their contents continue to be leaked to the public and reported on by foreign and Hong Kong media and non-governmental organizations. In an April 2011 Washington Post story, unnamed Chinese editors and journalists confirmed the substance of a series of directives issued in March that appeared to reflect official nervousness over the North Africa and Middle East protests.107 In January 2011, the International Federation of Journalists released a report documenting more than 80 censorship orders in 2010.108 The orders reportedly blocked information on "public health, disasters, corruption and civil unrest." 109 A virtual news blackout, including the blacking out of Western stations broadcast in China, followed the Nobel Peace Prize announcement in October 2010.110 The only news stories were from state-run media outlets such as Xinhua and Global Times, which reported on Chinese displeasure with the award.111 In January 2011, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly ordered media not to use the phrase "civil society" in their reports.112

PUNISHMENT OF JOURNALISTS

Journalists and news media who issued news reports that authorities did not approve of continued to face punishment. In December 2010, a reporter at Southern Weekend said that the paper had been ordered to cease publication of an annual media award.113 In January 2011, the outspoken journalist Chang Ping, who worked for the Southern Daily Group, reported that he had been dismissed from his job under pressure from authorities.114 That same month, Time Weekly placed one of its editors, Peng Xiaoyun, on what appeared to be involuntary leave after the paper ran a story mentioning prominent activists and several signers of Charter 08.115 Titled the "100 Most Influential People of Our Time" and published in mid-December, the list included Zhao Lianhai, the advocate for victims of tainted milk.116 After the story’s publication, copies reportedly were recalled and Peng and another editor were required to write self-criticisms.117 In March 2011, Peng reported that she had been dismissed.118 The publishers of another Guangzhou-based publication, South Wind Window, reportedly demoted its president and suspended another journalist after officials criticized a story they deemed "anti-government and anti-Communist Party." 119 Following the Wenzhou train crash, China’s central television network suspended Wang Qinglei after the host of a program he produced questioned the Railway Ministry’s response to the incident, and removed another program after it criticized the ministry’s spokesman.120

POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS AND JOURNALISTS

All news media are subject to an extensive licensing system and continual government oversight. In order to legally report the news, domestic newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as well as individual journalists, must obtain a license or accreditation from the government.121 Radio and television broadcast journalists must pass a government-sponsored exam that tests them on basic knowledge of Marxist views of news and Communist Party principles.122 In the 2010 Annual Report, the Commission reported that government officials were planning to require all journalists to pass a similar exam, but it is unclear whether this exam has been implemented.123 Ongoing training initiatives for journalists continued to be heavily imbued with political indoctrination. In November, teleconferences with journalists across China were held in connection with a new campaign to "Stop False Reporting, Strengthen Social Responsibility, and Strengthen Construction of News Profession Ethics." 124 The campaign sought to "guide editors and journalists to grasp the basics of Marxist views of news . . . in order to strengthen the feeling of glory and mission in doing the Party’s news work well." 125 According to an April 2011 article on the China Journalists Association Web site on 14 newspaper units that carried out "self-education," journalists at one Beijing newspaper were reminded that "news media are the mouthpiece of the Party and people . . . and not simply a commercial activity." 126

International experts have criticized a general licensing requirement for journalists.127 In a 2010 joint declaration on challenges to free expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression and his international counterparts identified as challenges "registration requirements for print media" and government rules against "publishing false news." 128 Chinese officials continue to exercise their discretion to shut down unlicensed media. In March 2011, China’s main press regulator, the General Administration on Press and Publication, announced a 100-day campaign to, among other objectives, shut down "illegal" reporting offices.129

FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

This past year the Commission observed a spike in the intensity and level of harassment against foreign journalists as they attempted to report on events considered sensitive by Chinese officials. In February 2011, foreign journalists who traveled to Linyi city, Shandong province, to report on the home confinement of self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng encountered violent groups of men who roughed them up, threatened them with bricks, and destroyed equipment.130 The journalists contacted local police but received no assistance.131 In late February and early March 2011, Chinese authorities harassed foreign journalists attempting to cover the "Jasmine" protest strolls at sites in Beijing and other parts of China.132 On February 27, reporters covering the Wangfujing site in Beijing met rough treatment from officials, and one journalist was reportedly beaten and later sought treatment at a hospital.133 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi denied that any foreign journalists had been beaten, and foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said the journalists had disrupted "normal order" and violated unspecified rules.134 Harassment continued in the days that followed, with officials asking a journalist to sign a pledge promising never to report on the "Jasmine" protests and officials threatening to expel journalists or revoke their press credentials.135 In April, plainclothes police detained, and in at least one case roughed up, foreign reporters attempting to cover an outdoor Christian religious gathering.136 In May 2011, the professional association of international journalists in China, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, said 94 percent of survey respondents believed reporting conditions in China had deteriorated, with 70 percent saying they faced interference, violence, or other harassment during the past year, and 40 percent saying their sources had encountered official harassment.137

RESTRICTIONS ON "ILLEGAL" PUBLISHING AND POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS

The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to root out unlicensed publications and publications containing what officials deemed to be "illegal" political and religious content. In China, no one may publish, print, copy, or distribute a publication without government approval, and publishers must submit to ongoing government supervision.138 To obtain government approval, a publisher must meet minimum capital requirements, obtain a government-approved sponsor, and accord with the state’s own plans for the publishing industry.139 Once approved, publishers must submit written reports of their publishing activities to the government and seek advance approval to publish on matters that involve "state security" or "social stability." 140 In March 2011, the State Council amended the Regulations of the Administration of Publications, leaving these general requirements intact and adding new provisions requiring those who distribute publications over the Internet or information networks to obtain a license and requiring specialized personnel to take a state exam to show compliance with state-imposed qualifications.141

Those who "illegally" engage in business activities, including publishing without a license, remain subject to criminal penalties under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law, and officials continue to use this charge to target political speech.142 In August 2010, authorities in Shaanxi province detained author and journalist Xie Chaoping on this charge after he published a book on the relocation of citizens affected by a hydroelectric dam.143 Prosecutors refused to approve Xie’s arrest for insufficient evidence.144 In December 2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into custody in apparent connection to a new book he authored that reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from China, saying the writer had engaged in "illegal publishing." 145 The Chinese government reported in September 2010 that Mongol rights advocate Sodmongol was being tried in connection to "counterfeiting book registration numbers and illegally publishing and selling books." 146 In April 2010 authorities detained Sodmongol while he was en route to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.147

Government agencies police content based on vague and sweeping prohibitions on content deemed by officials to "destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and habits," "propagate evil cults or superstition," or "harm the honor or interests of the nation." 148 Provincial and local authorities continued to target "illegal" political and religious publications. In March 2011, a Chinese news report said authorities in Heilongjiang province would "strictly confiscate political illegal publications and publications that defame the Party and state leaders, along with illegal publications that incite ethnic division." 149 It also said authorities would emphasize blocking and confiscating "illegal political publications" that "hostile foreign forces cook up," or that "domestic lawless persons illegally print or copy to disseminate political rumors," or that "create ideological confusion." 150 In April, authorities in Jiangxi province seized some 632 publications that constituted "illegal religious propaganda." 151 Also in April, authorities in Guang’an city, Sichuan province, reportedly destroyed some 30 items that were "illegal political publications, [related to the] Falun Gong cult organization, and illegal religious propaganda," as well as 1,141 "illegal newspapers and journals." 152

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression

1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue,16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.

2 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i).

3 In its May 2011 report, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression stated that "any legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against abuse, including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its abusive application." UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.

4 Wu Yu, " ‘Jasmine Revolution’ Circulates Online, Chinese Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts" [Wangchuan "molihua geming," zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle, 19 February 11.

5 "China’s ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ Assembly Sites in Each Major City" [Zhongguo "molihua geming" geda chengshi jihui didian], Boxun, 19 February 11; Wu Yu, " ‘Jasmine Revolution’ Circulates Online, Chinese Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts" [Wangchuan "molihua geming," zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle, 19 February 11; Human Rights in China, "Jasmine Organizers Call for Rallies Every Sunday," 22 February 11.

6 "Latest Directives From the Ministry of Truth, January 2–28, 2011," China Digital Times, 8 February 11; "Latest Directives From the Ministry of Truth, February 17–24, 2011," China Digital Times, 23 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Censor Access to Information on Middle East and Chinese ‘Jasmine’ Protests," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.

7 Jeremy Page, "Beijing Blocks Protest Reports," Wall Street Journal, 31 January 11; Edward Wong and David Barboza, "Wary of Egypt Unrest, China Censors Web," New York Times, 31 January 11. See, e.g., "Color Revolutions Will Not Bring About Real Democracy," Global Times, 30 January 11.

8 Michael Kan, "China Microblogs Block Chinese Word for ‘Egypt,’ " IDG News, reprinted in PCWorld, 29 January 11; Jeremy Page, "China Co-Opts Social Media To Head Off Unrest," Wall Street Journal, 22 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Censor Access to Information on Middle East and Chinese ‘Jasmine’ Protests," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.

9 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Escalating Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in China," 31 March 11. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May 11.

10 Ibid.

11 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "China: UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced Disappearances," 8 April 11; Human Rights Watch, "China: Arrests, Disappearances Require International Response," 31 March 11; Amnesty International, "China: New Generation of Internet Activists Targeted," 23 March 11.

12 Barbara Demick, "China Has Many ‘Dirty Words,’ " Los Angeles Times, 21 April 10; Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, "China’s Censors Thrive in Obscurity," Wall Street Journal, 31 March 10. Zhang Lei, "Publish and Be Deleted," Global Times, 25 February 10.

13 Andrew Jacobs, "China, Angered by Peace Prize, Blocks Celebration," New York Times, 9 October 10; "PRC Blocks Web, Text Message Reports of Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo," Agence France-Presse, 8 October 10; Pascale Trouillaud, "China Wages Propaganda War After Nobel," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.

14 "New Controls on Text Messages," Radio Free Asia, 6 January 11.

15 "China, Tibet: The End of TibetCul.com? " Global Voices, 19 March 11; "Graft-Busting Site Blocked," Radio Free Asia, 11 January 11; "China Closes AIDS Website," Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11.

16 Sky Canaves, "What Are You Allowed To Say on China’s Social Networks? " IEEE Spectrum, June 2011.

17 Reporters Without Borders, "Internet Is Collateral Victim of Crackdown on Inner Mongolia Protests," 31 May 11. For CECC analysis, see "Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

18 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "News Flash: Rights Defender Wang Yi About To Be Sent to Reeducation Through Labor" [Kuai xun: weiquan renshi wang yi zheng yao bei song qu laojiao], reprinted in Boxun, 15 November 10; Amnesty International, "Chinese Woman Sentenced to a Year in Labour Camp Over Tweet," 17 November 10. For CECC analysis, see "Henan Authorities Order One-Year Reeducation Through Labor Sentence for Activist’s Satirical Tweet," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.

19 Ibid.

20 "Netizen ‘Re-educated’ for Online Rant," Radio Free Asia, 6 June 11.

21 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, "Caught in an ‘Authoritarian Moment,’ " New York Times, 25 November 10.

22 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the Harshest in Recent Years," 25 February 11.

23 "Guangzhou Lawyer Liu Zhengqing Arrested and House Searched, Zheng Chuangtian Seeks Defense and Hua Chunhui Receives Reeducation Through Labor" [Guangzhou lushi liuzhengqing beibu chaojia, zheng chuangtian qubao hua chunhui chuan laojiao], Radio Free Asia, 1 April 11.

24 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the Harshest in Recent Years," 25 February 11.

25 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 15.

26 See, e.g., a November 2010 China Daily article that notes the concerns of one Chinese professor, who said there is a need for specific laws to determine when citizens have "spread rumors." Li Xinzhu, "Latest Batch of Rogue Netizens Exposed," China Daily, 3 November 10.

27 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwuguanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, arts. 15–16; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwuguanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 19–21.

28 Lana Lam, "Social Media Finding Ways Around Censors," South China Morning Post, 13February 11.

29 Zhang Duo, et al., "Online Media Visit ‘First Congress’ Meeting Site in Nanhu, Li YanhongSpeaks on Behalf of Members" [Wangluo meiti tanfang "yi da" huizhi nanhu li yanhong daibiao chengyuan fayan], Xinhua, 8 June 11.

30 Melanie Lee, "Sina To Launch English Microblog by Year-End," Reuters, 7 June 11.

31 Loretta Chao, "Google Objects to China’s Acts," Wall Street Journal, 22 March 11.

32 Chris Buckley, "Ministry Spokeswoman Says Accusations ‘Unacceptable,’ " Reuters, 22 March 11.

33 "Ensuring Your Information Is Safe Online," The Official Google Blog, 1 June 11.

34 Michael Wines, "China Rejects Google’s Hacking Charge," New York Times, 6 June 11.

35 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art.5; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 5, 11, 12;Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January08, art. 7.

36 The Special Rapporteur also noted that such licensing schemes should be distinguished from"registration with a domain name authority for purely technical reasons or rules of general application which apply without distinction to any kind of commercial operation." UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 28. In China, because the registration system gives the government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site operator intends to post "news," and if so, whetherit is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively different from registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme. Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 5.

37 "Nationwide 3000 Web Sites Closed for Failing To Register, 636,000 Domain Names No Longer Resolving" [Quanguo guanbi 3000 ge wei bei’an wangzhan, tingzhi jiexi 63.6 wanyuming], Sina, 28 October 10.

38 Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, "The Indigenization and Socialization of China’s NewMedia—Characteristics, Dissemination Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in China in 2010" [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua—2010 nianzhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi], taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.

39 Priscilla Jiao, "41pc of Mainland Websites Close in Just One Year," South China Morning Post, 13 July 11.

40 Ibid.

41 Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, "The Indigenization and Socialization of China’s New Media—Characteristics, Dissemination Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in China in 2010" [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua—2010 nian zhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi], taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.

42 State Council Information Office, "White Paper on the State of the Internet in China" [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang bai pi shu], 8 June 10, sec. I.

43 China Internet Network Information Center, "27th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China" [Di 27 ci zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha tongji baogao], 19 January 11, 12, 21; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, "Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Announces April 2011 Telecommunications Industry Operating Situation" [Gongye he xinxihua bu fabu 2011 nian 4 yue tongxinye yunxing zhuangkuang], 24 May 11.

44 "Wang Chen: Chinese Government Attaches Great Importance to and Actively Promotes the Development and Utilization of the Internet" [Wang chen: zhongguo zhengfu gaodu zhongshibing jiji cujin hulianwang fazhan yu yunyong], China.com, 30 December 10; "Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientization of Social Management" [Hu jintao: zhazhashishi tigaoshehui guanli kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.

45 Guobin Yang, "China’s Gradual Revolution," New York Times, 13 March 11; Keith B.Richburg, "In China, Microblogging Sites Become Free-Speech Platform," Washington Post, 27 March 11; Michael Wines, "China’s Censors Misfire in Abuse-of-Power Case," New York Times, 17 November 10. One U.S.-based Chinese Internet expert tallied 60 major cases of online activism in 2009 and 2010, but noted that the protests were primarily local and directed at corrupt officials and specific instances of injustice and that government controls had prevented more "broad-based coalitions." Guobin Yang, "China’s Gradual Revolution," New York Times, 13March 11.

46 Michael Wines and Sharon LaFraniere, "In Baring Facts of Train Crash, Blogs Erode ChinaCensorship," New York Times, 28 July 11.

47 Ibid.

48 "State Internet Information Office Established" [Guojia hulianwang xinxi bangongshi sheli], Xinhua, reprinted in State Council Information Office, 4 May 11.

49 In an April 2011 Chinese news article, an official with the Beijing City Internet Propaganda Supervision Office noted that the "basic principle of the Communist Party managing the media"had been legally enshrined in major Internet regulations and that the government body in charge of managing the media, the State Council Information Office, and the Central Party External Propaganda Office were simply "the same office under different names." Chen Hua, "Looking Back on Ten Years of Internet News Publishing Work and the Avenues of Management by Law" [Hulianwang zhan dengzai xinwen yewu shinian huigu yu fazhi guanli lujing], Qianlong Net, 29 April 11.

50 "Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientization of Social Management" [Hu jintao: zhazhashishi tigao shehui guanli kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.

51 Pascale Trouillaud, "China’s Web Spin Doctors Spread Beijing’s Message," Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 11.

52 "Zhou Yongkang: Adapt to New Economic and Social Development Conditions, Strengthen and Create Innovations in Social Management" [Zhou yongkang: shiying jingji shehui fazhan xinxingshi, jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli], Xinhua, 20 February 11.

53 Andrew Jacobs, "As China Steps Up Web Monitoring, Many Wi-Fi Users Stay Away," NewYork Times, 25 July 11; Xu Tianran, "Is Wi-Fi Software Illegal? " Global Times, 29 July 11.

54 Dui Hua Foundation, "Official Data Show State Security Arrests, Prosecutions Remained at Historic Levels in 2010," 15 March 11. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for attempts to subvert state power or up to 15 years for inciting such subversion. PRCCriminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,28 February 09, art. 105.

55 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " updated 30 May 11.

56 Ibid.

57 Andrew Jacobs, "China Releases Dissident Blogger, With Conditions," New York Times, 10 August 11.

58 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Escalating Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in China," 31 March 11.

59 PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05,29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 293.

60 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following Callfor ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " updated 30 May 11.

61 "Chinese Activist on Trial Amid Crackdowns," Associated Press, reprinted in Time, 11 August 11.

62 Tania Branigan, "Chinese Internet Activist Wang Lihong Goes on Trial," Guardian, 12 August 11.

63 Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang Lihong," 13 August 11.

64 Human Rights in China, "Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced to Nine Months," 9 September 11.

65 "Ai Weiwei’s Company Evades ‘Huge Amount’ of Tax: Police," Xinhua, 20 May 11.

66 Andrew Jacobs, "China Takes Dissident Artist Into Custody," New York Times, 3 April 11.

67 "Wife of Detained Chinese Artist Finds Him Tense During Visit; No Word on Why He Was Seized," Associated Press, 15 May 11.

68 Jeremy Page, "Ai Weiwei Resumes His Defiance of Beijing," Wall Street Journal, 12 August 11.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " updated 30 May 11.

72 Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that the vague definition of crimes of endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state power, and supplying state secrets "leaves their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly." It recommended that political crimes "that leave large discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as ‘endangering national security,’ ‘subverting State power,’ ‘undermining the unity of the country,’ ‘supplying of State secrets to individuals abroad,’ etc. should be abolished." Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, paras. 34, 82(s). In a January 2008 report, ChineseHuman Rights Defenders studied 41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which officials used the "inciting subversion" provision of the PRC Criminal Law (Article 105(2)) to punish Chinese citizensfor exercising their right to freedom of expression. It found that in such cases "[t]he ‘evidence’ often consists of no more than the writings of an individual or simply shows that he/she circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, without any effort to show that the expression had any potential or real subversive effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion. . . ." Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China," 8 January 08. See, e.g., a Beijing court’s December 2009 decision in the Liu Xiaobo case in which the court provided no evidence that Liu advocated violence in his works. Human Rights in China, "CaseUpdate: International Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict," 30 December 09. For CECC analysis, see "Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From Outset,"CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2.

73 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Wuhan Rights Defender Li Tie Arrested on Suspicionof ‘Subverting State Power’ Crime" [Wuhan weiquan renshi litie bei yi shexian "dianfu guojia zhengquan zui" daibu], 17 November 10.

74 "Chinese Activist Held Over Tiananmen Picture," Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, 30 November 10.

75 International Campaign for Tibet, "Three More Tibetan Writers Sentenced to Prison," 21 January 11; "Tibetan Writers Sentenced," Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet, "Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict," 5 November 10; "Tibetan Writers Tried as ‘Splittists,’ " Radio Free Asia, 5 November 10.

76 Human Rights in China, "Activist Sentenced to Ten Years for Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence," 25 March 11.

77 "So-Called ‘Punishment Because of Speech’ Is a Misreading of the Judgment in the Liu Xiaobo Case" [Suowei "yinyan huozui" shi dui liu xiaobo an panjue de wudu], Xinhua, 25 October 10. For CECC analysis, see "Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets International Standards," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 1–2.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011 (People’s Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1 August 11. For CECC analysis, see "UN Group Calls for Immediate Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12 August 11.

81 Reporters Without Borders, "Debate on Internet Censorship Censored," 30 November 10;"Guizhou Poet ‘Still Missing,’ " Radio Free Asia, 16 December 10.

82 ChinaAid, "Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese Citizens Appeal to America,"10 February 11; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, "Vehemently Condemn Beating and Taking Into Custody Rights Defense Lawyer" [Qianglie qianze ouda ji jujin weiquan lushi],21 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11March 11.

83 Ibid.

84 PEN American Center, "PEN Sounds Alarm Over Treatment of Jailed Nobel Laureate’s Wife in China," 22 February 11.

85 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011 (People’s Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1 August 11. For CECC analysis, see "UN Group Calls for Immediate Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12 August 11.

86 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Qin Yongmin, Recently Released From Prison, Suffers High Blood Pressure After Being Abused by Police During Visit" [Gang chuyu de qin yongminyin jingcha shangmen manma, zhi xueya dou sheng chuxian yanzhong bushi], 1 December 10.

87 Philip Gourevitch, "Liao Yiwu: Grounded in China," New Yorker, 30 March 11; "China BansWriter From Traveling Abroad," Associated Press, 9 May 11. Earlier, officials had allowed Liao to attend a literary festival in Germany in September 2010.

88 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, "Chinese Artists Drawn to Berlin, a Haven That Reveres History," New York Times, 10 August 11.

89 Human Rights in China, "Three Documents Related to the Case of Buddhist Leader Wu Zeheng," 22 September 11.

90 Ibid.

91 UN Human Rights Council, "Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade," Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, art. 1(a).

92 "Liu Binjie: Political System Reform Must Insist on the Correct Orientation" [Liu binjie: zhengzhi tizhi gaige bixu jianchi zhengque fangxiang], China Press and Publications Daily, 17 November 10.

93 "SARFT Spokesperson: Radio and Televisions Not Allowed To Entirely Go on Market" [Guangdian zongju xinwen fayan ren: diantai dianshitai buxu zhengti shangshi], China News Net, 14 January 11.

94 Zhao Qiang, "Loss of Control Over Public Opinion: Catalyst for Disintegration of Soviet Union" [Yulun shikong: sulian jieti de cuihuaji], Seeking Truth, 1 November 10.

95 "Local Newspapers Prohibited From Swapping Reports, Freedom of Speech in the Mainland Again Put Under Pressure" [Difang baozhang jin huhuan gaojian neidi yanlunziyou zai yu ya], Ming Pao, 15 July 10; Reporters Without Borders, "New Regulations Pose Threat to Liberal Press," 21 July 10. For CECC analysis, see "Communist Party Seeks To Restrict Already Limited Critical Media Reports," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.

96 "Does China’s General Administration on Press and Publication Safeguard or Restrict Freedom of the Press? " [Zhongguo xinwen chuban shu weihu hai shi xianzhi xinwen ziyou?], Radio Free Asia, 6 November 10.

97 Katherine Hille, "Anger Over Attacks on Journalists in China," Financial Times, 8 August 10.

98 Ibid.

99 Sharon LaFraniere, "Media Blackout in China After Wreck," New York Times, 31 July 11.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 "Remarks at 11th China Journalists’ Day and Presentation of Awards and Report Meeting" [Zai di shiyi jie zhongguo jizhe jie ji banjiang baogao hui shang de jianghua], People’s Daily, 8 November 10.

103 Ibid.

104 "Liu Yunshan Presides Over Convening of Meeting on Topic of Starting Propaganda Reporting Work for 90th Anniversary of the Party’s Founding" [Liu yunshan zhuchi zhaokai jiandang 90 zhounian xuanchuan baodao gongzuo zhuanti huiyi], Xinhua, 22 April 11. For CECC analysis, see "Top Official Directs Media To Promote July Anniversary of Party’s Founding," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

105 Ibid.

106 Damian Grammaticas, "Chinese Regulators Suspend TV Crime and Spy Dramas," BBC, 6 May 11.

107 Keith Richburg, "Chinese Editors, and a Web Site, Detail Censors’ Hidden Hand," Washington Post, 1 April 11.

108 International Federation of Journalists, "New IFJ Report Outlines Restrictions on Journalists in China in 2010," 30 January 11.

109 Ibid.

110 Pascale Trouillaud, "China Wages Propaganda War After Nobel," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.

111 Ibid.

112 Wu Yu, "Chinese Authorities Issue Media Restriction, Banning ‘Civil Society’ " [Zhongguo danggju xiada meiti jinling, pingbi "gongmin shehui"], Deutsche Welle, 6 January 11.

113 Priscilla Jiao, "Officials Put an End to Reporting Awards," South China Morning Post, 28 December 10.

114 David Barboza, "Chinese Journalist Who Defied the Censors and Wrote About Corruption Is Fired," New York Times, 27 January 11.

115 " ‘Time Weekly’ Selection Crisis, Commentary Department Head ‘Forced To Resign’ " ["Shidai zhoubao" pingxuan fengbo, pinglunbu zhuren "bei cizhi"], Radio Free Asia, 10 January 11.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Committee to Protect Journalists, "Mainstream Journalists Also Targeted in China Crackdown," 30 March 11.

119 Priscilla Jiao, "High Price for Airing Sun Yat-sen Criticism," South China Morning Post, 19 August 11.

120 International Federation of Journalists, "IFJ Demands Reinstatement of Journalist Suspended Over China Disaster Reports," 2 August 11.

121 Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8, 11; Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15; Measures for Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16.

122 Zhejiang Province Radio, Film and Television Bureau, "2010 Nationwide Radio and Television Editors and Reporters, Broadcasters, and Hosts Qualification Exam" [2010 nian quanguo guangbo dianshi bianji jizhe, boyin yuan zhuchi ren zige kaoshi dagang], 30 July 10, chap. 2, art. 6.

123 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 68.

124 "Stop False Reporting, Strengthen Social Responsibility, Strengthen Construction of News Professional Ethics" [Dujue xujia baodao, zengqiang shehui zeren, jiaqiang xinwen zhiye daode jianshe], Xinhua, 24 November 10.

125 Ibid.

126 "14 News Units Conscientiously Launch Self-Education and Self-Examination, Self-Rectification" [Shisi jia xinwen danwei renzhen kaizhan ziwo jiaoyu he zicha zijiu], Xinhua, 13 April 11.

127 "Individual journalists should not be required to be licensed or to register. There should be no legal restrictions on who may practice journalism." UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, "International Experts Condemn Curbs on Freedom of Expression and Control Over Media and Journalists," UN Press Release, 18 December 03.

128 UN Human Rights Council, "Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade," Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, arts. 1(b), 1(g).

129 "GAPP’s Special Campaign Against Newspaper and Magazine Journalist Stations" [Xinwen chuban zongshu jiang dui baokan jizhe zhan kaizhan zhuanxiang zhili], Xinhua, 24 March 11.

130 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, "Warning: Reporting on Chen Guangcheng," 17 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Releaseof Video Detailing Official Abuse," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.

131 Ibid.

132 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, "New Details on Wangfujing Interference," 28 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten ForeignJournalists Covering ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.

133 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, "New Details on Wangfujing Interference," 28 February 11; "Bloomberg Journalist Assaulted as China Heightens Security," Bloomberg, 27 February 11. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.

134 "Foreign Minister to Foreign Press: Don’t Believe Your Lying Eyes," Wall Street Journal,8 March 11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on March 3, 2011," 5 March 11. The Commission and others reported on theexistence of local regulations issued in late 2010 and early 2011 that require official approval to report in the Wangfujing area and near the designated Shanghai protest site. For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11. But national regulations put in place for the 2008 Beijing Olympics provide that foreign journalists may interview any individual or organization so long as they obtain their consent. At the time, officials touted the regulations as providing foreign journalists freedom to report on every aspect of Chinese society, from political matters to social issues. Regulations of the People’s Republicof China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguojizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17 October 08, art. 17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Ministry News Department Head Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press Conference on State Council’s Promulgation of the ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists’ " [Waijiaobu xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao jiu guowuyuan banbu shishi "zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli" juxing zhongwai jizhehui], 17 October 08.

135 Sharon LaFraniere and Edward Wong, "Even With Protests Averted, China Turns to Intimidation of Foreign Journalists," New York Times, 6 March 11; Alexa Olesen, "China Warns Foreign Media Not To Cover Protests," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 3 March 11.

136 Louisa Lim, "China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor Service," National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Bill Schiller, "Star Reporter Detained, Interrogated by Chinese Police for Taking Photo," Toronto Star, 11 April 11.

137 Ben Blanchard and Chris Buckley, "Foreign Media in China Face Worsening Conditions— Survey," Reuters, 19 May 11.

138 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, arts. 6, 7, 61; Provisions on the Administration of Newspaper Publishing [Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 4; Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikanchuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 5.

139 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, art. 11.

140 Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding],issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 45 (written reports); Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, art. 20 (advance approval for special topics).

141 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, arts. 36, 53.

142 PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97,amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 225.

143 "Procuratorate Decides Not To Arrest Author Xie Chaoping in Sanmenxia Dam Relocation Program ‘Book Case,’ " Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 December 10.

144 Ibid.

145 "Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for Publishing New Book" [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi daibu], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; "Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly Arrested in Inner Mongolia" [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki mongghulda mexpiy tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer, Author of ‘Forefront of Independence’ Arrested and Detained," 23 January 11.

146 UN Human Rights Council, "Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009–July 2010)," Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, James Anaya, 15 September 10, A/HRC/15/37/Add.1.

147 Ibid.

148 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, art. 25.

149 "Strongly Rectify and Standardize Culture Market Order" [Zhongquan zhengdun guifan wenhua shichang zhixu], Heilongjiang Information Net, 11 March 11.

150 Ibid.

151 "Jiangxi Province ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Publications Market Program Clean-Up Has Remarkable Results" [Jiangxi sheng "saohuang dafei" chubanwu shichang zhuanxiang zhengzhi chengxiao xianzhu], People’s Daily, 21 April 11.

152 Liu Xilin, "Our City Has Destroyed More Than 60,000 Items of Rights—Violating, Pirated, and All Types of Illegal Publication" [Wo shi jizhong xiaohui 6 wan yu jian qinquan daoban ji gelei feifa chubanwu], Guang’an City Radio and Television Station, 22 April 11.

WORKER RIGHTS

Introduction

Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including the right to organize into independent unions. Advocates for worker rights in China continued to be subjected to harassment and abuse. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU.

During the 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities have faced the dual challenges of accommodating a younger, more educated, and rights-conscious workforce and addressing changes in economic development patterns (including inland growth, fewer workers migrating to coastal areas, rising wages, and labor shortages in some locales). Due in part to shifting labor, economic, and demographic conditions, official and unofficial reports have indicated that workers appeared to have gained increased leverage in the relationship between labor and capital. In recent years, Chinese workers have become more assertive in securing their rights, higher wages, more genuine representation, and better protection under China’s labor laws. In some cases during this reporting year, workers continued to channel their grievances through, and to seek guidance, advice, and legal aid from, labor lawyers and advocates. At the same time, authorities have harassed, detained, and sent to prison labor advocates who attempted to organize workers for "disrupting social order." Some local officials reportedly beat and kicked striking workers and labor petitioners, and reports of attacks on migrant workers seeking back pay continued to surface.

With Chinese officials charged with preserving "social stability," the extent to which they will allow workers to bargain for higher wages and genuine representation remains unclear. Principles and different aspects of collective bargaining rights have been mentioned in multiple drafts of local and national regulations during this reporting year, including the draft Regulation on Wages—proposed in part to address official concern over the unequal distribution of wealth across China and its potential effects on "social unrest"—as well as trials and measures for collective wage negotiations in different localities. Some critics, however, have questioned the lack of specifics in some of these proposals and, thus, their eventual effectiveness.

Rights Consciousness, Worker Actions, and "Social Stability"

During this reporting year, Chinese officials have continued to assess the characteristics of the new generation of migrant workers as well as their significance on the shifting labor landscape, public safety, and "social stability." 1 Chinese government statistics suggest that these young workers constitute 61.6 percent of all migrant workers.2 In February 2011, the ACFTU released a study identifying the characteristics unique to current young migrant workers. The document also provided several policy recommendations for "resolving the problems facing the new generation of migrant workers in realizing their rights and interests." 3 The report notes that over half of young migrant workers are unmarried and that 74.1 percent of them had "studied in school" prior to leaving home. By contrast, only 35.4 percent of the "traditional migrants," those born before 1980, had studied in school.4 These young migrant workers also are mostly concentrated in secondary and tertiary industries and are overwhelmingly employed by private enterprises (84.3 percent) as opposed to state-owned enterprises (12.5 percent).5 On average, they receive lower wages (167.27 yuan (US$26) lower than "traditional migrants"); are more likely to sign labor contracts that lack specific provisions detailing minimum pay in line with local regulations; have less employment stability; face "relatively more hidden dangers" in terms of workplace safety; and are less likely to join labor unions (44.6 percent of young migrant workers are union members, versus 56 percent of "traditional migrants").6

The ACFTU report provides several recommendations on ways in which the government may more effectively accommodate younger workers’ unique life experiences and characteristics. Some of the suggestions include strengthening efforts to tackle wage disparities, advance social insurance programs, provide technical training to increase young migrant workers’ competitiveness and ability to adjust to changing circumstances, encourage localities to explore methods to reform the household registration system, and organize young migrant workers into unions and facilitate channels for them to address their grievances.7 These suggestions appear to reflect the Chinese government’s initial ideas to grapple with the aforementioned generational changes, a generation of migrant workers who, as one senior Chinese official observed, have never put down roots, are better educated, are only children, and are more likely to demand equal access to employment and social services—and even equal political rights—in the cities.8

Official and unofficial reports indicate that, for the most part, the young migrant workers described above have been at the forefront of recent worker actions.9 Worker actions have been common in China in recent years, and that continues to be the case during the 2011 reporting year. China Strikes, a Web site dedicated to "track[ing] strikes, protests and other collective actions taken by Chinese workers to defend their rights and interests," recorded at least 32 such actions by workers from October 2010 to May 2011.10

As with the spate of worker actions that took place in the spring and summer of 2010 that garnered international attention, workers during this reporting year took action to recover back wages, protest the non-payment of wages, call for higher pay, and, for some older workers, demand due compensation in the cases of restructuring at certain enterprises. Social inequality and the lack of rule of law reportedly played a role in driving low-paid migrant workers to participate in a series of riots and protests in southern China in June 2011.11 In April 2011, workers reportedly blocked the front gate of a liquor factory protesting the compensation terms during restructuring.12 In the same month, more than 1,000 truck drivers in Shanghai municipality, reacting to rising fuel costs, protested for higher pay. In March 2011, about 80 sanitation workers in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, took part in work stoppages to protest non-payment of wages, claiming that management owed each worker from 3,000 to 4,000 yuan (US$464 to US$618) for overtime and other allowances.13 In November 2010, an "entire street" in Foshan city, Guangdong province, was reportedly "filled with workers," perhaps up to 7,000, as management at Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned company that produces electronics, allegedly forced workers to sign contracts with terms that many workers found unsatisfactory.14 Starting in October 2010, about 70 workers at a Japanese-owned factory took part in strikes to demand that the company comply with China’s labor laws, including the right to sign contracts and to be compensated with overtime payments.15

Chinese authorities during this reporting year continued to harass, detain, and imprison labor advocates and lawyers whom officials deemed to be threats to "social stability." For example, authorities ordered Yang Huanqing, a teacher in Jingzhou city, Hubei province, to serve one year of reeducation through labor in March 2011 for "disrupting work unit order" when he supposedly organized 22 and 33 dismissed teachers in October and November 2010, respectively, to petition in Beijing. Yang reportedly led the teachers to petition against social insurance policies they alleged were unfair.16

In another case that reflects authorities’ concern with labor advocates’ and lawyers’ ability to organize and mobilize large groups of workers, the Xincheng District People’s Court in Xi’an city, Shaanxi province, sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years’ imprisonment on October 2010 for "gathering a crowd to disrupt social order." 17 Zhao had allegedly organized workers at state-owned enterprises in Xi’an in April 2009 to establish the Shaanxi Union Rights Defense Representative Congress, an organization that, according to China Labor News Translations, a Web site dedicated to analyzing developments in China labor relations, was "critical of the Chinese [state-run] trade union’s failure to represent the interests of state sector employees in restructured and/or privatized enterprises." 18 Prior to Zhao’s arrest, Shaanxi authorities had warned that Zhao and others had:

seriously disrupted the normal workings of Party and government organs and have become a huge potential danger to social stability. They have made use of problems in society, including using old and frail enterprise retirees as cannon fodder to pressure the government. They have stirred up extreme delusions and fanned the flames in an extremely outrageous manner. If resolute measures are not adopted, they will grow into a threatening force and are very likely to wreak even greater havoc to social stability.19

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The Chinese government prevents workers in China from exercising their constitutional right to freedom of association.20 Trade union activity in China is organized under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a quasi-governmental organization under the direction of the Communist Party.21 Leading trade union officials hold concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the Party and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese government.22 The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues in China, such as shop-floor organizing and formalistic collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently or uniformly advance the rights of workers.23

At the shop-floor level, the ACFTU’s unions remain weak and marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at lower administrative levels sometimes may play an important role in legislative and regulatory development, this role is not matched with power at the enterprise level. Generally speaking, firm-level union branches are weak, non-democratic, and subordinate to management.24 Despite an increase in legislation and administrative regulations that grants the ACFTU more power at the firm level to resolve disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union branches make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker advocacy difficult and slow.25

COLLECTIVE CONTRACTING

Collective contracts and some process of collective consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor relations since the 1990s, when state enterprise reform deepened and labor conflict began to increase rapidly, especially in the private sector. The ACFTU has championed collective contracts and collective negotiations as important foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In recent years, the collective contract system has received more Chinese government and Communist Party support as part of an attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU, and the employer associations.26 Moreover, some Chinese officials have stated in public that collective consultation—and, in the process, fostering more genuine representation for workers—could be an effective way to defuse labor disputes and develop "harmonious labor relations." 27

In January 2011, the ACFTU published a set of "work objectives" for the new year, stating the organization’s goal to "set up trade union organizations according to law to unionize the vast majority of workers[.]" 28 More specifically, some of the benchmarks that the ACFTU document provided include the boosting of national unionization rates at "businesses with corporate capacity to 65 [percent]," and an increase in "the number of union memberships to make up more than 80 [percent] by the end of 2011" and "over 90 [percent] by the end of 2013." 29 Even as the ACFTU supplied quantifiable benchmarks, however, it is not clear how these goals will be implemented in practice. It remains to be seen whether such goals will facilitate the approval of local and national regulations with specific implementation and follow-through directives and measures, as well as the necessary reforms to make unions more representative of workers’ interests.30

During this past year, the Commission continued to follow developments concerning the Guangdong province draft Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises (Regulations). As the Commission reported last year,31 the draft Regulations would extend to workers the right to ask for collective wage consultations 32 and allow worker members to sit on the enterprise’s board of directors and board of supervisors,33 represent worker interests in the boards’ meetings,34 and take part in the enterprise’s decision-making processes.35 In September 2010, reportedly under heavy lobbying by members of the Hong Kong industrial community, many of whom operate factories in southern China and are concerned with rising production costs, the Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation of the draft Regulations.36 In January 2011, a source in the Hong Kong industrial community who had met with officials in Guangdong province reported to the South China Morning Post that the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress would "very likely" approve the draft Regulations later that month.37 Other unofficial sources, however, suggest that the approval process of the draft Regulations seemed to have stalled indefinitely.38

Other localities in China also announced plans to establish collective wage consultation systems in the coming years. In Qingdao city, Shandong province, for example, the Qingdao City Health Bureau announced in March 2011 goals to establish a system of "equal collective wage consultation" for all contract workers within three years.39 In a city with more than 40,000 medical workers, the health bureau’s plan reportedly will only cover contracted workers, who number around 5,000.40 At medical organizations where unions do not yet exist, a government document suggests that workers may choose their own representatives.41 This past year, other cities that reported plans for collective wage consultation initiatives included Changde city, Hunan province; 42 Rizhao city, Shandong province; 43 Qinhuangdao city, Hebei province; 44 and Guanghaiwei city, Zhejiang province.45 The Shenzhen Municipal Trade Union reportedly plans to sign collective wage contracts at 550 enterprises in the next year.46

The extent to which the ACFTU’s stated goals, if materialized, and other local experiments with collective consultation will expand the space for greater and more genuine worker representation remains unclear. At present, the collective contract and consultation system remains weak and formalistic in many cases because enterprise-level trade union leaders are not positioned to serve the interests of their workers. Many collective contracts reportedly solely reflect the basic legal standards in the locality and often are the result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the result of genuine bargaining between management and the enterprise trade union.47 Finally, none of the aforementioned actions taken by different localities and the ACFTU have changed the fact that freedom of association does not exist in China.

Migrant Workers

Migrants are generally characterized as rural residents who have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and sometimes far from home. Official Chinese government statistics break down the total number of migrants into those who spent less than half the year as migrants, i.e., those who spent less than six months during the year away from their place of legal residence (61 million in 2010), and those who spent more than half the year as migrants (160 million in 2010).48 The government estimates that over the next three decades, about 300 million people are expected to relocate to urban areas.49 As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often abused, exploited, or placed in unsafe work conditions by employers who take advantage of their insecure social position and lower levels of education.50 Persistent discrimination reportedly continues to adversely affect the social, civil, and political rights of migrant workers.51

In 2011, migrant workers continued to face serious challenges in the workplace, such as wage arrears and non-payment of wages.52 They also lacked access to reliable social insurance, specifically payments covering occupational injuries and diseases.53 Many localities have expanded efforts to provide migrants with social insurance coverage. Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security indicated that, by mid-2011, 838 counties in 27 provinces and autonomous regions, as well as the four directly administered municipalities, had launched what the State Council has called the "new-type rural social old-age insurance pilots," covering 24 percent of the population in these areas.54 A 2009 State Council document also provided details on ways to make social insurance accounts transferable as migrants move around the country.55 There still appear to be significant problems in terms of participation (for both employers and employees), coverage, and portability between rural and urban areas.56 Migrant workers generally are able to withdraw funds only from their individual accounts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid by their employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about whether they will return to the same locale from one year to the next to look for new work, and with the portability of pension accounts highly restricted, some have chosen to withdraw their pensions.57

Law on Social Insurance

The National People’s Congress approved the PRC Law on Social Insurance in October 2010, and it went into effect on July 1, 2011.58 The law states that the Chinese government will establish 59 a system of basic old-age insurance,60 medical insurance,61 work-related injury insurance,62 unemployment insurance,63 and maternity insurance.64 It specifies the respective responsibilities of employees and employers to fund contributions for different insurance programs. Under the law, both the employee and the employer, for example, are required to contribute toward the basic insurance funds for old-age pensions, medical care, and unemployment benefits.65 For work-related injury and maternity insurance, however, only the employer is responsible for the contributions.66 The law also requires employers to register employees with social insurance agencies within 30 days of hire,67 delineates the legal penalties for an employer who fails to contribute the required funds within the specified time limit,68 and grants social insurance agencies the right to seek help from government administrative units— at the county level or above—to request the transfer of funds equal to the amount of missed payments from the appropriate banking and financial institutions.69

One of the law’s stated aims is to make social insurance coverage "sustainable," 70 and the law specifies that workers may transfer their accounts as they move from one region to another. It explicitly states that "rural residents entering cities to work may participate in social insurance." 71 In the cases of old-age and medical insurance, the law seeks to enable their portability by stating that, for an individual who travels from one region to another for work, his or her basic old-age and medical insurance records "will transfer along with the individual," and the calculation of his or her contributions will be "cumulative." 72 Once the individual reaches retirement age, basic old-age insurance benefits will be calculated by taking into account work performed in all localities, but payments will be made in a "unified" way (i.e., no distinction between work done in rural and urban areas).73 The law, however, states only that "national coordination" of old-age insurance pools and "provincial coordination" of the other four insurance pools will be "gradually implemented," leaving the "specific time frame [and] steps" for the State Council to decide.74 Moreover, one foreign law firm pointed out that since the law does not provide "national united social insurance contribution rates . . . employers would still need to refer to the local regulations for contribution rates of the social insurance schemes." 75 At this point, the law’s effectiveness and ability to standardize and expand China’s social safety net remain unclear and implementation regulations have yet to be issued.76

Wages

By the end of 2010, 30 provinces had reportedly raised minimum wage levels by an average of 22.8 percent.77 Some localities continued to establish higher levels of increases thereafter.78 On March 1, 2011, Guangdong province announced a four-tier minimum wage level chart, categorizing minimum wage levels by region within the province.79 Authorities assigned Guangzhou city, the provincial capital, a level of 1,300 yuan (US$200) per month. Dongguan city, where many foreign-invested factories are located, fell into the second category, with a new minimum wage level of 1,100 yuan (US$170) per month. In Shenzhen, effective April 1, 2011, the government raised the minimum wage level by 20 percent, to 1,320 yuan (US$204) per month, the highest in China.80 Other localities, such as Shanghai municipality and Shandong province, also established further increases.81 Reports indicate that some cities proceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled to attract workers.82 Despite rising minimum wage levels, however, reports also indicate that inflationary pressure continued: Inflation stood at 5.4 percent in March 2011 83 and 5.5 percent in May 2011, with food prices rising by 11.7 percent.84

The PRC 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers and requires local governments to set wage standards for each region.85 The PRC Labor Contract Law improves formal monitoring requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to monitor labor practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.86 The law also imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates below minimum wage.87 In addition, the law guarantees minimum hourly wages for part-time workers.88

Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine minimum wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, especially for migrant workers.89 Subcontracting practices within industry reportedly also exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When investors and developers default on their payments to construction companies, workers at the end of the chain of labor subcontractors may lack the means to recover wages from the original defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any direct avenue to demand their salaries.90 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, in conjunction with other government agencies—including the Ministry of Public Security and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission—reportedly formed a "united investigative group" and examined wage arrears problems in provincial-level areas such as Tianjin, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Guangxi, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.91

DRAFT REGULATION ON WAGES

In part to address official concern over the unequal distribution of wealth across China and its potential effects on "social unrest," Chinese media sources indicated that the Chinese government reportedly has assembled a "basic framework" for a national regulation on wages.92 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) began formulating the regulation in 2007, and officials reportedly started soliciting comments and suggestions for a completed draft in early 2009.93 Some media reports indicated that the regulation would be approved sometime in 2010, though one MOHRSS official later said that was never the case.94 It appears that deliberations surrounding the pending regulation likely will continue throughout 2011.95

Based on media reporting, the draft contains 10 sections, including provisions that delineate the "parameters for collective contracts, collective consultations, and minimum wages." 96 In addition, the draft reportedly lays out standards to determine minimum wage level increases, and mandates certain enterprises to "periodically and publicly release average wage levels, increases, and bonuses"; 97 requires that overtime compensation, time off given on days with extreme temperatures, as well as various kinds of state subsidies may not be factored into the calculation of wage levels; 98 calls upon provinces to consider local consumer price indexes in setting minimum wage levels; 99 and establishes a "normal increase mechanism" to "create a system" of collective wage consultations and "open a scientifically logical space for wage increases." 100

Labor experts cited in Chinese media reports also commented that the draft lacks clarity on certain points. For example, it reportedly does not delineate whether or not employers will be required to answer workers’ demands for collective wage negotiations, nor does it lay out the consequences for failing to do so.101 One labor expert also supported the idea to "link wage increases to the growth of enterprises," which apparently was introduced in an earlier version of the draft.102

Reportedly, the draft regulation attempts to bridge the wealth gap with additional provisions such as requiring the disclosure to both the government and the public of plans to adjust salary levels and benefits within what one state-run publication called "monopolized industries." 103 These so-called "monopolized industries" (longduan qiye) refer to state-owned enterprises in industries such as electricity, telecommunications, insurance, and finance.104 Another provision reportedly also would require these enterprises to seek approval from three different government departments before issuing bonuses or raises.105 One media report suggested that these provisions have contributed to the delay in the regulation’s approval.106 One academic cited in the same report stated that the draft’s proposed "interference with or even control of wages through administrative methods are not compatible with the trends of market economics." 107

PRESSURE TO EXAMINE WAGE POLICIES

In 2011, three developments continued to exert pressure on Chinese officials at all levels to examine their policies on wages: Labor shortages in certain areas, growing income inequality, and the central government’s acknowledgement of the need to rebalance China’s economy. During this reporting year, the Commission monitored reports of labor shortages surfacing in China’s manufacturing centers, particularly in the south and coastal areas.108 As early as 2006, the PRC State Council Development Research Center found that 75 percent of the 2,749 villages surveyed in China "no longer have young laborers to move" outward,109 and other reports also suggest that more migrant workers are opting to pursue opportunities in their home provinces.110 Such developments reportedly have contributed to the upward pressure on wage levels and, combined with other factors, have made some factory owners consider moving their operations further inland or to Southeast Asian countries in order to keep production costs competitive.111 At the same time, it has been pointed out that "improved productivity can pay for more than half of these wage increases, while the other half can be passed in the form of higher customer prices." 112 Moreover, despite moderate increases, wages actually have fallen for 22 straight years in proportion to China’s gross domestic product.113

The unequal distribution of wealth received much attention in recent years. The National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference featured this issue prominently during their March 2010 meetings.114 In 2011, the Chinese media continued to report on the growing gap between the rich and the poor.115 The current "income ratio among China’s eastern, central, and western regions" is roughly 1.52:1:0.68.116 Moreover, the distribution has grown more unequal over time, with rural areas lagging far behind the urban regions.117 According to a November 2010 Chinese report, the ratio of "urban to rural income" was 2.9:1 in 2001, 3.22:1 in 2005, and 3.31:1 in 2008.118 The difference between the top and bottom 10 percent of China’s income earners has increased from a multiple of 7.3 in 1988 to 23 in 2009.119

Chinese officials have appeared more willing to openly acknowledge that a higher consumption rate within China is an important part of the government’s efforts to rebalance the country’s economic development. The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development, for example, noted that Chinese officials "must be soberly aware of the fact that the problems of lack of balance, lack of coordination, and lack of sustainability in China’s development remain prominent" and that the imbalance in the "investment and consumption relationship" poses a challenge to the country’s future growth.120 More pointedly, Premier Wen Jiabao has also described China’s current growth model as "unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." 121 Although some experts have said that reforms can be done in the short term via "administrative fiat," such as "mandatory wage hikes," any rebalancing efforts will be difficult, as "state-backed and private corporate sectors are likely to protest reforms that threaten their margins, as will these sectors’ support bases associated with their interests, such as the commerce ministry and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology." 122

Occupational Safety and Work Conditions

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENTS

The PRC Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002, delineates a set of guidelines to prevent workplace accidents and to keep "their occurrence at a lower level, ensuring the safety of people’s lives and property and promoting the development of the economy." 123 Specifically, the law charges principal leading members of production and business units to educate workers on safety issues and formulate rules of operation; 124 protects workers’ right to have knowledge of, speak up about, and address work safety issues; 125 sets forth trade unions’ rights to pursue workers’ complaints over safety issues; 126 tasks local governments at the county level or above to inspect and handle violations and potential dangers in a timely manner; 127 and lays out the consequences for non-compliance.128

Workers in China, however, continued to face persistent occupational safety issues, especially those working in the mining industry. On November 9, 2010, Zhang Mingqi, the Vice Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, spoke to reporters at the National Mining Industry Health and Safety Experience Exchange Conference and stated that China had 18,128 reported cases of occupational-related illnesses in 2009, which represented a 32 percent increase from the previous year.129 Of the 2009 cases, 14,495—about 80 percent—involved the lung disease pneumoconiosis.130 The People’s Daily has reported that a total of 57,000 Chinese coal miners suffer from pneumoconiosis annually, and more than 6,000 of them die from the disease each year.131 Reportedly, "pneumoconiosis is now responsible for nearly three times as many deaths each year as mine accidents." 132

Miners are limited in their ability to promote safer working conditions in part due to legal obstacles to independent organizing. Collusion between mine operators and local government officials reportedly remains widespread.133 Chinese authorities reportedly closed 1,600 small coal mines with "outdated facilities" during the first 10 months of 2010.134 The State Administration of Work Safety issued a directive in September 2010 requiring mine managers to spend time in the shafts with workers in an effort to focus their attention on safety issues; the directive also laid out specific fines for managers who refused to do so.135 The China Daily, however, reported that some managers skirted the new requirements by handpicking "people to be promoted to ‘assistants to managers’ and to accompany the miners" in their place.136

WORKING CONDITIONS

Workplace abuses and poor working conditions remained a persistent problem this reporting year. Allegations of unsafe working environments, for example, continued to surface at factories operated by Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned company that manufactures electronic products. In July, a worker died after falling from his dormitory at one of Foxconn’s factory complexes in southern China.137 The Commission reported last year that more than 10 employees committed suicide in 2010, reportedly as a result of the harsh working conditions at the company’s production plants.138 Workers often cited low wages, forced overtime, military-style management, and social isolation as some of the major problems that they face.139 Reports also indicated that some workers are also ex-posed to chemicals known to be harmful.140 In May 2011, a blast at Foxconn’s factory in Chengdu city killed 3 people and injured 16 others; the families of the factory’s workers complained at the time that Foxconn management "turned down" their demand for "a list of dead and injured." 141 Poor conditions and other workplace abuses also surfaced at other factories, including "routine excessive overtime" that averaged 120 hours per month, use of harmful chemicals, poor ventilation, arbitrary calculation of wages, and mistreatment by management.142 The Commission also observed one recently published report detailing a past case involving Chinese prisoners who, in addition to doing hard labor during the day, were "forced to play online games" at night "to build up credits that prison guards would then trade for real money." 143

WORKERS COMPENSATION

One major problem facing injured workers or their family members seeking to receive timely compensation is China’s "complicated and incredibly time consuming" work-related injury compensation procedure.144 Some cases reportedly can last for decades.145 It is difficult to determine the total number of cases in part because many cases never are reported due to the complicated nature of the compensation process.146 Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do not routinely recognize some occupational diseases. While traumatic work injuries and deaths have been widely recognized and reported, experts on workers compensation litigation in China report failure to diagnose diseases like silicosis and failure to recognize that the condition may be caused by exposure to chemicals at work.147 As a result, the extent of work-related diseases like silicosis remains difficult to measure and report on and, therefore, in many cases goes largely unrecognized.148

In January 2011, the State Council’s revisions to the Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance (Work Injury Regulations) became effective.149 The revisions made 24 changes to the old Regulations, clarifying the definitions of what constituted "occupational injuries"; 150 adding law firms and accounting firms, among others, to the list of contributors to the occupational injury insurance fund; 151 and stating that in applications where "the facts are clear" and "rights and obligations are apparent," the social insurance administrative department shall render a decision within 15 days of accepting the applications.152

In addition to the aforementioned Work Injury Regulations, the PRC Law on Social Insurance, which went into effect in July 2011, also addressed the topic of work-related injury insurance.153 It clarifies that the "employing unit," not the worker, is responsible for contributing to the work-related injury insurance fund.154 The law states that the contribution rates will be determined by the "risk level" of each industry, as well as the number of workplace injury cases that occur in that industry, and leaves the task of setting the specific rate figures to the State Council.155 Though the law’s language maintains that workers are entitled to receive work-related injury insurance benefits if their injuries or illnesses are certified as work related and that certification of such injuries should be "straight-forward [and] convenient," it does not provide a specific time requirement for the certification process.156 The law does, however, detail the types of expenses that may be paid with money from the insurance fund. These may include, for example, a worker’s medical treatment and rehabilitation fees as well as food and travel allowances if the worker obtains treatment outside of the area where the injury took place.157

At this point, it is not clear to what extent the revisions to the Work Injury Regulations or the new PRC Law on Social Insurance will streamline the complicated and time-consuming compensation processes for injured workers. Central government directives have, in previous years, encouraged local governments to pressure bereaved families into signing compensation agreements and to condition out-of-court compensation settlements on forfeiture by be-reaved families of their rights to seek further compensation through the court system.158 Moreover, there have been reports of local officials preempting class actions by prohibiting contact among members of bereaved families in order to forestall coordination.159

Child Labor

Child labor remained a problem in China during this reporting year.160 As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions on the elimination of child labor.161 The PRC Labor Law and related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under 16 years old.162 Both national and local legal provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate fines for employing children.163 Under the PRC Criminal Law, employers and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for forcing children to work under conditions of extreme danger.164 Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have dulled the effects of these legal measures. The extent of child labor in China is unclear in part because the government does not release data on child labor despite frequent requests by the U.S. Government, other foreign governments, and international organizations. One recent report by a global risks advisory firm, however, suggests that China is rated as "amongst those with the most widespread abuses of child workers" and estimates that there are "between 10 to 20 million underage workers." 165

Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors as well as small workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.166 Many underage laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the education system and labor shortages of adult workers.167 In March 2011, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that authorities in Longgang district, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, rescued 40 children who were found working at a factory that manufactured electronics.168 The children were reportedly between the ages of 12 and 14, holders of "fake identity cards" that apparently demonstrated that they were of legal working age, and had worked there for at least three months for about five yuan (US$0.77) an hour.169 In another case reflective of the child labor problem, Apple acknowledged in February 2011 that, in 2010, it had discovered 91 children under 16 years old working in 10 "Chinese factories owned by its suppliers"; in contrast, in 2009, the company discovered only 11 such cases.170 In the case of one factory that reportedly hired 42 of the children, Apple learned that the "vocational school involved in hiring the underage workers had falsified student IDs and threatened retaliation against students who revealed their ages during [Apple’s] audits." 171

The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,172 permits "work-study" programs and activities that in practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor and are tantamount to official endorsement of it.173 National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that "education practice labor" and vocational skills training labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do not constitute use of child labor when such activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the students.174 The PRC Education Law supports schools that establish work-study and other programs, provided that the programs do not negatively affect normal studies.175 These provisions contravene China’s obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting child labor.176 In 2006, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations "expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under 18 years performing forced labor not only in the framework of re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular work programs at school." 177

Notes to Section II—Worker Rights

1 See, e.g., All-China Federation of Trade Unions, "The Conditions of New Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 Study and Policy Recommendations" [2010 nian qiyexinshengdai nongmingong zhuangkuang diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11; Qian Yanfeng, "Migrant Workers Can Earn Degrees," China Daily, 7 December 10; "Unhappy Rural Workers‘Threaten Social Stability,’ " Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 15 June 11; "Riots Highlight Migrant Rights," Radio Free Asia, 14 June 11; Jeremy Page, "China Stamps OutSouthern Unrest," Wall Street Journal, 15 June 11; Katherine Ryder, "China’s Labor Market: Valuable Asset or Economic Albatross? " Fortune, reprinted in CNN Money, 17 December 10; Li Li, "Battling for Workers: China’s Labor Pool Is Not Running Dry, but Migrant Workers Are Expecting More From Cities," Beijing Review, 8 March 11; "Crimes Committed by Young Migrant Workers Spark Public Concern," Xinhua, 25 February 11.

2 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, "The Conditions of New Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 Study and Policy Recommendations" [2010 nian qiye xinshengdai nongmingong zhuangkuang diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11; Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, "Labor Movement’s Demand for the Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country’s Trajectory" [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli gonghui gaibian guoyun guiji], Asia Week, 13 June 10.

3 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, "The Conditions of New Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 Study and Policy Recommendations" [2010 nian qiye xinshengdai nongmingong zhuangkuang diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 "Agricultural Minister Han Changfu Discusses ‘Post-1990s’ Migrant Workers" [Nongyebu buzhang han changfu tan "90 hou" nongmingong], China Review News, 1 February 10. See also "Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1–2.

9 See, e.g., James Pomfret and Chris Buckley, "Special Report: China Migrant Unrest Exposes Generation Faultline," Reuters, 28 June 11; Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, "Labor Movement’s Demand for the Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country’s Trajectory" [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli gonghui gaibian guoyun guiji], Asia Week, 13 June 10.

10 For more information, see the Web site "China Strikes: Mapping Labor Unrest Across China." According to the site’s founder, Manfred Elfstrom, China Strikes is dedicated to tracking "strikes, protests and other collective actions taken by Chinese workers to defend their rights and interests." News reports of worker actions are regularly uploaded onto the site, and they are classified into different categories, such as apparel and textile, bus and truck drivers, machinery and appliance, mines, etc. Data may also be viewed in a map format, showing the number of worker actions that took place in various regions across China. China Strikes, last visited June 2, 2011.

11 James Pomfret, "Police Stem S. China Riots but Migrant Workers’ Anger Runs Deep," Reuters, reprinted in Yahoo!, 14 June 11. See also "Zengcheng Riot: China Forces Quell Migrant Unrest," BBC, 14 June 11; Jeremy Page, "China Stamps Out Southern Unrest," Wall Street Journal, 15 June 11; "Security Reported Tight in Riot-Torn South China City as Unofficial Curfew Imposed," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 13 June 11.

12 "Workers Occupied Front Gate of Guizhou Liquor Factory; Restructuring Revealed Protests With Tears of Blood" [Guizhou chunjiu chang damen bei gongren zhanling, gaizhi jiekai xuelei kangyi], Workers Forum, 27 April 11.

13 China Labour Bulletin, "Migrant Worker Union Negotiates Pay Deal for Tianjin Cleaners," 1 April 11.

14 James Pomfret, "More Problems for China’s Foxconn Over Workers’ Pay," Reuters, 19 November 10; China Labour Bulletin, "Foxconn Workers in Foshan Strike Over Low Pay," 19 November 10.

15 China Labour Net, "Workers of Guangzhou INPEX Metal Product Company Limited Call for Support From Japanese Trade Union," 13 November 10.

16 "Assembly of Private Teachers in Ten-Some Counties and Municipalities in Hubei Province Calls for Release of Yang Huanqing, Who Was Sent to Reeducation Through Labor" [Hubei shiyu xian shi minshi jihui yaoqiu jiefang bei laogai de yang huanqing], Boxun, 28 March 11.

17 "Labor Lawyer Imprisoned in Xi’an for Organizing Against Corrupt Privatization of State Enterprises," China Labor News Translations, 10 January 11; "Xi’an Rights Defender Zhao Dongmin Detained; Applied for the Establishment of ‘Workers Defense Congress’ " [Shenqing chengli "gongwei hui" xi’an weiquan renshi zhao dongmin bei xingju], Radio Free Asia, 27 August 09; "No Trial for Labor Activist," Radio Free Asia, 8 September 10.

18 "Labor Lawyer Imprisoned in Xi’an for Organizing Against Corrupt Privatization of State Enterprises," China Labor News Translations, 10 January 11; China Study Group, "Zhao Dongmin Sentenced to Three Years," 25 October 10. See also Utopia, "A Discussion With the Compatriots Who Care for and Love Zhao Dongmin" [Yu guanxin he aihu zhao dongmin de tongzhimen shangque], 23 October 10.

19 Utopia, "Sunshine Is the Best Disinfectant and Antiseptic" [Yangguang shi zuihao de shajun fangfuji], 26 October 10.

20 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.

21 Bill Taylor and Qi Li, "Is the ACFTU a Union and Does It Matter? " Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 49, No. 5 (2007), 701–15.

22 PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions, adopted 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08.

23 See, e.g., Qiu Liben, "The Silent Lambs Are No Longer Silent" [Chenmo de gaoyang buzai chenmo], Asiaweek, 13 June 10; Keith Bradsher, "A Labor Movement Stirs in China," New YorkTimes, 10 June 10; Yu Jianrong, "No Social Stability Without Labor Protection," China Media Project, 15 June 10; Mingwei Liu, "Chinese Employment Relations and Trade Unions in Transition," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, January 2009; China Labour Bulletin, "Protecting Workers’ Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China’s Trade Union," March 2009.

24 Han Dongfang, "China’s Main Union Is Yet To Earn Its Job," Guardian, 26 June 11; AnitaChan, "Labor Unrest and Role of Unions," China Daily, 18 June 10; China Labour Bulletin, "Protecting Workers’ Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China’s Trade Union,"March 2009.

25 International Trade Union Confederation, "China," in Asia and the Pacific, an Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2009).

26 Simon Clarke et al., "Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in China," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004), 235, 240.

27 Yang Lin, "Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate the Structure of Labor and Management,Eliminate Contradictions and Hidden Dangers in Labor and Management, and Adjust Policy" [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, tiaozheng laogongzhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09.

28 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, "Chinese Trade Unions Make Progress in 2010," 31January 11.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 76–77.

32 Guangdong Province People’s Congress Standing Committee, "Opinions From the Public Openly Sought for ‘Guangdong Province’s Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management(Third Draft for Public Comment)’ " [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli cao’an xiugai (san gao zhengqiu yijian gao) xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu yijian], 23 August 10, art. 36.

33 Ibid., art. 34.

34 Ibid., art. 32.

35 Ibid.

36 "Guangdong Decides To Delay ‘Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises’ " [Guangdong jue huan shen qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], Wen Wei Po, 18 September 10.

37 Denise Tsang, "Collective Wage Bargaining Plan To Start Next Month," South China Morning Post, 15 January 11.

38 CECC Staff Interview.

39 Qingdao Public Health Bureau, "The Wages of Contract Nurses in Qingdao Can Be Settled Through Collective Consultation" [Qingdao hetongzhi hushi gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 18 April 11;China Labour Bulletin, "The Wages of Health Contract Workers in Qingdao Can Be Settled Through Collective Consultation" [Qingdao weisheng hetonggong gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 22March 11.

40 Ibid.

41 Qingdao Public Health Bureau, "The Wages of Contract Nurses in Qingdao Can Be Settled Through Collective Consultation" [Qingdao hetongzhi hushi gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 18 April 11.

42 "Changde City, Hunan Province’s ‘Spring Contract Action’ on Collective Wage Consultation Commences" [Hunan sheng changde gongzi jiti xieshang chunji yaoyue xingdong qidong],Changde Evening News, 29 March 11; China Labour Bulletin, "Cities Across China Roll Out Collective Wage Initiatives," 25 March 11.

43 Rizhao City People’s Government, " ‘Rizhao City Worker Collective Wage Consultation Trial Methods’ Is Released" ["Rizhao shi zhigong gongzi jiti xieshang shixing banfa" chutai], 9 March11; China Labour Bulletin, "Cities Across China Roll Out Collective Wage Initiatives," 25 March 11.

44 "Qinhuangdao Year of Collective Wage Consultations Hundred-Day Action Commences" [Qinhuangdao gongzi jiti xieshang tuijin nian huodong qidong], Hebei News Net, reprinted inChina Worker Net, 12 April 11; China Labour Bulletin, "Cities Across China Roll Out Collective Wage Initiatives," 25 March 11.

45 China Labour Bulletin, "Lighter Enterprise in Guanhaiwei Town in Cixi Experiments With Collective Consultation" [Cixi guanhaiwei zhen huo ji hangye shixing gongzi jiti xieshang], 24March 11.

46 China Labour Bulletin, "Shenzhen Trade Union Announces Major Push for Collective WageNegotiations," 24 March 11.

47 Stanley Lubman, "Are Strikes the Beginning of a New Challenge? " Wall Street Journal, 25 June 10; Simon Clarke et al., "Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in China," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004), 235, 240.

48 "China’s ‘Floating Population’ Exceeds 221 Million," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 28 February 11.

49 "Migrant Population To Grow to 350 Million: Report," China Daily, 31 May 11; "China’s ‘Floating Population’ Exceeds 221 Million," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 28 February 11.

50 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Topic Paper: China’s Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed To Protect China’s Rural Migrants, 7 October 05. See also China Labour Bulletin, "17 Migrant Workers Die in Fire at Illegally-Built Workshop," 26 April 11; Zhang Yan and Li Jiabao, "17 Perish as Inferno Razes Illegal Plant," China Daily, 26 April 11; Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, "New Ongoing Violations After the Im-plementation of Labor Contract Law in China," 12 June 09; Jeffrey Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International Labor Rights Forum, "The Impact of China’s Labor Contract Law on Workers," 23 February 10, 7–10, 18.

51 For additional information, see, e.g., Kam Wing Chan, "The Chinese Hukou System at 50," Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2009), 197–221.

52 Zhou Pingxiang, "Ten Thugs Brandishing Steel Pipes Beat 100 Migrant Workers Over Wage Dispute; Eight People Were Injured and Hospitalized" [Nongmin gong shangmen taoxin zaojinbairen weiou 8 ren shoushang jin yiyuan], Yunnan Net, 1 February 11.

53 "Migrants ‘Losing Out on Benefits,’ " Shanghai Daily, 28 March 11; Wang Wen, "The Woes of Injury at Work," China Daily, 14 March 11.

54 Liu Conglong, Department of Rural Social Insurances, Ministry of Human Resources andSocial Security, "Latest Developments of the Old-Age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents in China," 11 May 11; State Council, Guiding Opinion Regarding the Initiation ofNew-Type Rural Social Old-Age Insurance Pilots [Guowuyuan guanyu kaizhan xinxing nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian shidian de zhidao yijian], issued 1 September 09, art. 1.

55 State Council Circular Regarding the Interim Method To Transfer and Continue the Old-Age Insurance Relationship of Urban Enterprise Workers [Chengzhen qiye zhigong jibenyanglao baoxian guanxi zhuanyi jiexu zanxing banfa de tongzhi], 28 December 09.

56 "NPC Standing Committee Passes Social Insurance Law by Wide Margin" [Rendachangweihui gaopiao tongguo shehui baoxian fa], Xinhua, 28 October 10.

57 Ibid.

58 PRC Social Insurance Law, enacted 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11; Hong Kong Trade Development Council, "China Enacts Social Insurance Law," 3 May 11; "NPC Standing Committee Passes Social Insurance Law by Wide Margin" [Renda changweihui gaopiao tongguo shehui baoxian fa], Xinhua, 28 October 10; "Social Insurance Law Becomes Effective Next July;May Receive Retirement Benefits in Less Than 15 Years" [Shebao fa mingnian 7 yue shixing buman 15 nian ke bu jiao lingqu yanglao jin], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in Sina, 29 October10; "Social Insurance Law Clearly States That Retirement Insurance and Benefits Will Be Gradually Coordinated Nationwide" [Shebao fa mingque yanglao xian zhubu shixing quanguotongchou], Beijing News, 29 October 10.

59 PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 2.

60 Ibid., arts. 10–22.

61 Ibid., arts. 23–32.

62 Ibid., arts. 33–43.

63 Ibid., arts. 44–52.

64 Ibid., arts. 53–56.

65 Ibid., arts. 10, 23, 44.

66 Ibid., arts. 33, 53.

67 Ibid., art. 58.

68 Ibid., art. 62.

69 Ibid., art. 63.

70 Ibid., art. 3.

71 Ibid., art. 95. For more information, see "China’s Top Legislature Adopts Social InsuranceLaw To Safeguard Social Security Funds," Xinhua, 28 October 10; "NPC Standing Committee Passes Social Insurance Law by Wide Margin" [Renda changweihui gaopiao tongguo shehuibaoxian fa], Xinhua, 28 October 10.

72 PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 19.

73 Ibid.

74 PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 64; Laney Zhang,"China: Law on Social Insurance Passed," Library of Congress, 4 November 10; "Social Insurance Law Clearly States That Retirement Insurance and Benefits Will Be Gradually Coordinated at the National Level" [Shebao fa mingque yanglao xian zhubu shixing quanguo tongchou], Beijing News, 29 October 10.

75 Susan Deng, "Changes Introduced by the New PRC Social Insurance Law," Mayer Brown JSM Legal Update, 1 December 10.

76 Laney Zhang, "China: Law on Social Insurance Passed," Library of Congress, 4 November 10.

77 "Another Round of Minimum Wage Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved to Highest in the Nation" [Zuidi gongzi biaozhun xin yi lun tiaozheng shenzhen tiao zhi quanguo zuigao], ChinaBusiness Network, reprinted in Hexun, 4 March 11.

78 Ibid.

79 Guangdong Province People’s Government, Circular Regarding the Adjustment of Minimum Wage Standards for Guangdong Province’s Enterprise Workers [Guanyu tiaozheng wo shengqiye zhigong zuidi gongzi biaozhun de tongzhi], 18 January 11; "Another Round of Minimum Wage Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved to Highest in the Nation" [Zuidi gongzi biaozhun xin yilun tiaozheng shenzhen diao zhi quanguo zuigao], China Business Network, 4 March 11; Fang Zhenbin, "Pearl River Delta Region Faces Difficulties in Finding and Retaining Workers" [Zhu sanjiao diqu mianlin zhaogong nan he liu gong nan kunrao], Southern Daily, reprinted in CNFOL.com, 23 February 11.

80 "Another Round of Minimum Wage Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved to Highest in the Nation" [Zuidi gongzi biaozhun xin yi lun tiaozheng shenzhen diao zhi quanguo zuigao], China Business Network, 4 March 11.

81 Ibid.

82 Denise Tang, "Guangdong Pay Pledge To Drive Out HK Factories," South China Morning Post, 18 January 11; China Labour Bulletin, "Minimum Wage Set To Increase in Cities Across China," 5 February 10.

83 Zheng Lifei et al., "Zhou Pledges More Tightening as China Raises Reserve Ratios," Bloomberg, 17 April 11; China Labour Bulletin, "Guangdong Raises Minimum Wage as Inflation Hurts Workers," 28 February 11.

84 National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China’s Major Economic Indicators in May," 14 June 11.

85 PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 48.

86 PRC Labor Contract Law, issued 29 June 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 74(5).

87 Ibid., art. 85.

88 Ibid., art. 72.

89 "Over 100 Migrant Workers Kneel in Front of the Zunhua City, Hubei Province, Government Building To Talk Wages" [Bai yu nongmin gong zai hebei zun hua shi zhengfu menkouxia gui tao xin], Sichuan Daily, 13 January 11; Su Dake, "If I Were the Boss I’d Fail To Pay Wages Too" [Ruguo wo shi laoban ye hui qian xin, you qian cai shi ye mei laingxin suan gesha], Southern Daily, 5 January 11; Zhou Pingxiang, "Ten Thugs Brandishing Steel Pipes Beat 100 Migrant Workers Over Wage Dispute; Eight People Were Injured and Hospitalized"[Nongmin gong shangmen tao xin zao jin bairen wei ou 8 ren shoushang jin yuyuan], Yunnan Net, 1 February 11.

90 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 80.

91 "Over 100 Migrant Workers Kneel in Front of the Zunhua City, Hubei Province, Government Building To Talk Wages" [Bai yu nongmin gong zai hebei zun hua shi zhengfu menkou xia gui tao xin], Sichuan Daily, 13 January 11.

92 Suo Han, " ‘Wage Regulations’ Framework Basically Solidified, but Difficult To Roll Out by Year’s End" ["Gongzi tiaoli" kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network,19 November 10.

93 "Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of Monopolized Industries" [Gongzi tiaoli cao’an zaoyu buwei yali bei zhi ganshe longduan qi ye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in People’s Daily,1 September 10.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Suo Han, " ‘Wage Regulations’ Framework Basically Solidified, but Difficult To Roll Out by Year’s End" ["Gongzi tiaoli" kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 19 November 10.

97 Zhao Peng, "Draft of Wage Regulation To Be Reported to State Council; Intended To Publicize Wages of Monopolized Industries" [Gongzi tiaoli cao’an jiang bao guowuyuan ni gongbulongduan hangye gongzi], Beijing Times, reprinted in Sina, 29 July 10.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 " ‘Enterprise Wage Regulations’ Draft Revisions Near End; Industry Insiders Reveal Draft’s Brightest Spot" ["Qiye gongzi tiaoli" cao’an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao’an zuida liang], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Lai Fang, "Will Publicizing Monopolized Industries’ Salaries Bring More Equal Wage Distribution? " [Gongshi longduan hangye gongzi neng fou dailai gongzi de gongping fenpei?], Southern Weekend, 23 November 10; "Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of Monopolized Industries"[Gongzi tiaoli cao’an zaoyu buwei yali pi zhi ganshe longduan qi ye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in People’s Daily, 1 September 10; Chen Chen, China Internet Information Center, "Social Status, Industrial Monopolies Cause Widening Income Gap," 26 May 10; " ‘Enterprise Wage Regulations’ Draft Revisions Near End; Industry Insiders Reveal Draft’s BrightestSpot" ["Qiye gongzi tiaoli" cao’an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao’an zuida liangdian], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.

104 Chen Chen, China Internet Information Center, "Social Status, Industrial Monopolies Cause Widening Income Gap," 26 May 10.

105 " ‘Enterprise Wage Regulations’ Draft Revisions Near End; Industry Insiders Reveal Draft’s Brightest Spot" ["Qiye gongzi tiaoli" cao’an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao’anzuida liangdian], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.

106 Lai Fang, "Will Publicizing Monopolized Industries’ Salaries Bring More Equal Wage Distribution? " [Gongshi longduan hangye gongzi neng fou dai lai gongzi de gongping fenpei?] Southern Weekend, 23 November 10.

107 Ibid.

108 Willy Lam, Jamestown Foundation, "2010 Census Exposes Fault Lines in China’s Demographic Shifts," 6 May 11; Olivia Chung, "China Labor Shortage Spreads," Asia Times, 29 January 11; Jui-te Shih, "Labor Shortages Spread to More Regions, Industries in China," WantChina Times, 17 June 11; Edward Wong, "Chinese Export Regions Face Labor Shortages," New York Times, 29 November 10; Jianmin Li, Jamestown Foundation, "China’s Looming Labor Supply Challenge? " 8 April 11; Ma Jiantang, "National Labor Shortage Looms on Horizon," Global Times, 3 May 11; Mark MacKinnon and Carolynne Wheeler, "China’s Future: Growing Old Before It Grows Rich," Globe and Mail, 28 April 11. For a long-range perspective on wages in China, see Dennis Tao Yang, Vivian Chen, and Ryan Monarch, Institute for the Study of Labor, "Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor Advantage? " Discussion Paper No. 5008, June 2010.

109 "2010 First Quarter Analysis on Economic Conditions and Yearly Outlook" [2010 nian yi jidu jingji xingshi fenshi yu quannian zhanwang], China Economic Net, 28 April 10.

110 Kathrin Hille, "China’s Inner Landscape Changes," Financial Times, 3 March 11.

111 Federation of Hong Kong Industries, "Survey Report on Labour Issues Faced by HK Manufacturing Companies in the PRD," 28 July 10. See also Dennis Tao Yang, Vivian Chen, and Ryan Monarch, The Institute for the Study of Labor, "Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor Advantage? " Discussion Paper No. 5008, June 2010.

112 Andy Xie, "Sweet Spot for China’s Blue-Collar Revolution," Caixin Net, reprinted in Market Watch, 28 June 10.

113 Hou Lei, "Official: Wage Share Decreases 22 Years in a Row," China Daily, 12 May 10.

114 Suo Han, " ‘Wage Regulations’ Framework Basically Solidified, Difficult To Roll Out by Year’s End" ["Gongzi tiaoli" kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 19 November 10; "Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of Monopolized Industries" [Gongzi tiaoli cao’an zaoyubuwei yali bei zhi ganshe longduan qiye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in People’s Daily, 1 September 10.

115 Suo Han, " ‘Wage Regulations’ Framework Basically Solidified, but Difficult To Roll Out by Year’s End" ["Gongzi tiaoli" kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network,19 November 10.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 1.

121 Ray Kwong, "What China’s 12th Five-Year Plan Means to the Average Zhou," 31 August 11.

122 Nicholas Consonery et al., Eurasia Group, "China’s Great Rebalancing," 18 August 11. See also, Ray Kwong "What China’s 12th Five-Year Plan Means to the Average Zhou," 31 August 11.

123 PRC Safe Production Law, issued 29 June 02, effective 1 November 02, arts. 1, 2.

124 Ibid., arts. 17, 21.

125 Ibid., art. 45.

126 Ibid., art. 52.

127 Ibid., art. 53.

128 Ibid., art. 82.

129 Yuan Junbao, "Great Progress in Preventing Pneumoconiosis in China’s Coal Mines; Situation Is Still Grim" [Woguo meikuang chenfei bing fangzhi qude jiao da jinzhan xingshi yiran yanjun], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC People’s Central Government, 9 November 10.

130 Ibid. See also China Labour Bulletin, "Time To Overhaul Coal Mine Safety in China," 19 November 10.

131 "57,000 Chinese Coal Miners Suffer From Lung Disease Annually," People’s Daily, 11 November 10.

132 China Labour Bulletin, "Time To Overhaul Coal Mine Safety in China," 19 November 10.

133 China Labour Bulletin, "Injured Coal Miner Struggles for Compensation," 24 February 11.

134 "Mainland Closes 1,600 Illegal Coal Mines," Associated Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 15 October 10.

135 "Bosses Who Don’t Enter China’s Mines May Be Fined," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 7 October 10.

136 Wang Huazhong, "Mine Leaders To Send Substitutes Underground," China Daily, 21 September 10.

137 "Another Foxconn Worker ‘Falls to Death,’ " South China Morning Post, 20 July 11.

138 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 80; Cary Huang, "Foxconn Worker in ChengduSuicide," South China Morning Post, 27 May 11. See also "Military-Style Management," Global Times, 24 May 11.

139 Chloe Albanesius, "Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? " PC Magazine, 6 May 11; "Military- Style Management," Global Times, 24 May 11.

140 Chloe Albanesius, "Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? " PC Magazine, 6 May 11.

141 Liu Linlin, "Families Say Foxconn Not Cooperating," Global Times, 23 May 11; Tim Culpanand Joshua Fellman, "Foxconn’s Plant in China Has Fire, Killing Two," Bloomberg, 20 May 11.

142 Gethin Chamberlain, "Disney Factory Faces Probe Into Sweatshop Suicide Claims," Guardian, 27 August 11. See also China Labour Bulletin, "Waking From a Ten-Year Dream," 21 February 11; Chloe Albanesius, "Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? " PC Magazine, 6 May 11.

143 Danny Vincent, "China Used Prisoners in Lucrative Internet Gaming Work," Guardian, 25 May 11.

144 Kathleen E. McLaughlin, "Silicon Sweatshops: What’s a Worker Worth? The Cold Calculus of Supply Chain Economics," Global Post, 17 March 10.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 CECC Staff Interview.

148 Ibid.

149 State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to "Regulations on Occupational Injury Insurance" [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai "gongshang baoxian tiaoli" de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11.

150 Ibid., art. 8.

151 State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to "Regulations on Occupational Injury Insurance [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai "gongshang baoxian tiaoli" de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11; PRC State Council, "PRC State Council Notice 586 ‘State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to Regulations on Occupational Injury Insurance’ " [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan ling di 586 hao "guowuyuan guanyu xiugai ‘gongshang baoxian tiaoli’ de jueding"]," 20 December 10, art. 1.

152 State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to "Regulation on Occupational Injury Insurance [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai "gongshang baoxian tiaoli" de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11, art. 9.

153 PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, arts. 33–43.

154 Ibid., art. 33.

155 Ibid., art. 34.

156 Ibid., art. 36.

157 Ibid., arts. 38(1)–38(9).

158 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 52; China Labour Bulletin, "Bone and Blood: The Price of Coal in China," 17 March 08.

159 Ibid.

160 See, e.g., He Huifeng, "40 Children Rescued From Shenzhen Plant," South China Morning Post, 26 March 11; Malcolm Moore, "Apple’s Child Labour Issues Worsen," Telegraph, 15 February 11; William Foreman, "China Factories Break Labor Rules," Associated Press, 20 April 10; National Labor Committee, "China’s Youth Meet Microsoft: KYE Factory in China Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. Companies," 13 April 10.

161 ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.

162 PRC Labor Law, issued 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 15. See also PRC Law on the Protection of Minors, issued 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92, art. 28. See generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02.

163 Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 6. See also "Legal Announcement—Zhejiang Determines Four Circumstances That Define Use of Child Labor" [Fazhi bobao: zhejiang jieding shiyong tonggong si zhong qingxing], China Woman, 26 July 08.

164 This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, issued 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 244.

165 Maplecroft, "Child Labour Most Widespread in the Key Emerging Economies; Climate Change Will Push More Children Into Work," 12 January 10.

166 China Labour Bulletin, "Small Hands: A Survey Report on Child Labor in China," September 2007, 7, 8; He Huifeng, "40 Children Rescued From Shenzhen Plant," South China Morning Post, 26 March 11.

167 "Disney Factory Faces Probe Into Sweatshop Suicide Claims," Guardian, 27 August 11; China Labour Bulletin, "Small Hands: A Survey Report on Child Labor in China," September 2007, 15, 22, 25–32.

168 He Huifeng, "40 Children Rescued From Shenzhen Plant," South China Morning Post, 26 March 11.

169 Ibid.

170 Malcolm Moore, "Apple’s Child Labour Issues Worsen," Telegraph, 15 February 11.

171 Apple, "Apple Supplier Responsibility 2011 Progress Report," 15 February 11, 9.

172 For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns, including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, "Crackdown on Slave Labor Nationwide—State Council Vows To End Enslavement," South China Morning Post, 21 June 07.

173 Ji Beibei, "Students Say Schools Require Them To Do Internships at Foxconn Factory," Global Times, 12 October 10; Ben Blanchard, "China Urged To End ‘Child Labor’ in Schools," Reuters, 3 December 07; Human Rights Watch, "China: End Child Labor in State Schools," 3 December 07.

174 Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13.

175 PRC Education Law, issued 18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, amended 27 August 09, art. 58.

176 ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage minors only where it is an "integral part" of a course of study or training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to eliminate the "worst forms of child labor," including "forced or compulsory labor." ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.

177 ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002) Observation, CEACR 2006/77th Session, International Labour Organization, 2006.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government’s failure to uphold legal protections for criminal suspects and defendants, promote transparency of the judicial process, and implement legal reforms highlighted ongoing problems within the criminal justice system. Chinese public security officials continue to contravene international standards by detaining, interrogating, and investigating criminal suspects without adequate due process protections. Closed trial proceedings and unfair trial procedures continue to contravene Chinese and international legal protections and demonstrate the lack of an independent judiciary.

During the year, the Chinese government signaled its resolve to protect what it deemed to be "social stability" through targeted crackdowns on rights advocates and continued reliance on an array of arbitrary and extrajudicial detention measures. In early 2011, Chinese public security officials implemented a harsh crackdown on government critics and rights advocates, including lawyers, bloggers, writers, and democracy activists. In the months that followed, Chinese authorities employed a range of illegal and arbitrary detention measures—including home confinement and enforced disappearances—to "maintain stability" and silence rights advocates. International human rights groups have called the 2011 crackdown one of the most severe in years.

Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent

During this past year, the Commission observed reports of Chinese law enforcement personnel engaged in a range of abuses targeting human rights advocates, lawyers, writers, and their families.1 These abuses included harassment, assault, detention, kidnappings, and illegal surveillance.2 Reported incidents of abuse increased during periods of heightened official sensitivity. Beginning in February 2011, public security officials and plainclothes security personnel detained, harassed, "disappeared," and placed under illegal surveillance prominent rights defenders. The campaign appeared related to official concern over protests in the Middle East and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called "Jasmine" protests within China.3 By April 18, the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that public security officials had criminally detained 39 rights advocates and that more than 20 individuals remained "disappeared." 4 For example, Chinese police detained Beijing-based lawyer Tang Jitian on February 16 after he attended a meeting to discuss the ongoing "soft detention" of the self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng.5 Beijing police summoned and detained human rights lawyer and university lecturer Teng Biao on February 19 before searching his residence and confiscating property, including two computers, politically themed books, and documentaries.6 In February, the Guardian reported that five domestic security protection officers allegedly beat human rights lawyer Liu Shihui after he attempted to attend a planned protest in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province.7 The Commission also noted increased police abuses against rights defenders and advocates surrounding other politically sensitive events, such as the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in December 2010 and the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2011.8 Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as China’s Constitution and domestic laws.9

Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody

Although the Chinese government formally outlawed torture in 1996 with amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and the PRC Criminal Law,10 torture and abuse by law enforcement officers remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT) stated it "remains deeply concerned about the continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings." 11 Although China objected to the UNCAT report’s findings in its November 2009 followup report, in October 2010, UNCAT submitted a letter to the Chinese government requesting clarification on issues including the legal safeguards to prevent torture, the harassment of lawyers and rights defenders, and the lack of statistical information related to torture.12

During this reporting year, the Commission observed multiple reports in which public security officials allegedly employed various torture measures, including beatings, electric shock, cigarette burnings, and sleep deprivation.13 In January 2011, the Guardian reported on the December 2010 death of local police chief Xie Zhigang in Benxi city, Liaoning province, who reportedly died from a heart attack within a day of his detention. Xie’s wife disputed the police account and claimed Xie died as a result of torture, stating, "There were bruises all over [Xie’s] body, and deep scars on his wrist and ankles. Five of his ribs were broken." 14 In March 2011, human rights lawyer Zhang Kai released a video of Qian Chengyu, a witness to the murder of village leader and petitioner Qian Yunhui. In the February 2011 video, Qian Chengyu described how public security officials beat him for five hours and deprived him of sleep for thirty hours and explained that the injuries prevented him from standing for a month.15

In response to a spate of high-profile suspicious deaths and increased public scrutiny since 2009, Chinese law enforcement agencies reportedly have ordered an overhaul of prisons and detention centers. In 2009 and 2011, Chinese agencies released various guidelines intended to improve oversight responsibilities and enhance supervision of detainees in detention centers.16 In early 2011, the Ministry of Public Security reportedly delivered a draft revision of the Detention Regulations, the first revision since the Detention Regulations were enacted in 1990.17 In February 2011, Xinhua reported that in a nationwide campaign to improve oversight of detention centers, prosecutors found 2,207 detention center "bullies" and prosecuted 123 suspected crimes.18 In a March 2011 China News Weekly interview, Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, said that abnormal deaths in recent years had "exposed problems in prison administration law enforcement" and had resulted in reportedly "thorough" official investigations into prisons and detention centers.19

Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues

ACCESS TO COUNSEL

The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a guaranteed legal right for all defendants in China, even though the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and the PRC Lawyers Law provide guidelines for legal representation in criminal trials.20 Chinese law grants all criminal defendants the right to hire an attorney, but only guarantees legal defense if the defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or mute. Although the Chinese government has increased funding for legal assistance in recent years, most criminal defendants approach the legal system without access to legal assistance. [For more information on developments in China’s legal aid system, see Section III—Access to Justice.] This remains counter to provisions under Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which grant the right to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance.21

Chinese criminal defendants face two primary obstacles—referred to on occasion as the "two lows" (liang di)—in securing criminal defense counsel: The low rate of active representation by lawyers in criminal cases and the low quality of criminal defense.22 Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process without the assistance of an attorney.23 According to a February 2011 Beijing Review article, a professor at China University of Political Science and Law noted that 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in China are unable to hire a lawyer.24 In addition, the higher proportion of risks associated with criminal defense work—as compared with those of civil and commercial work—continues to impact the quality of criminal representation.25 In recent years, lawyers have been illegally detained, criminally punished, beaten, summoned, and disbarred for performing their legal responsibilities.26

Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (commonly referred to as the "lawyer-perjury" statute), a legal provision on evidence fabrication that specifically targets criminal defense attorneys.27 While harassment of lawyers takes many forms in China, from prosecution for corruption to threats and physical violence, a disproportionately high number of such cases involve charges of evidence fabrication.28 Many evidence fabrication cases are brought under Article 306, which makes it a crime for defense attorneys or other defense agents to "destroy or forge evidence, help any parties destroy or forge evidence, or coerce or entice witnesses into changing their testimony in defiance of the facts or giving false testimony." 29 Because of the risks presented by Article 306, most defense attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense: they focus on finding flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors’ evidence rather than actively collecting evidence or conducting their own investigations.30 Chinese criminal defense lawyers acknowledge that the threat of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law—also commonly referred to as "Big Stick 306"—gives prosecutors "unlimited power" to intimidate lawyers and derail criminal defense work.31

Specific cases involving Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law continued to be featured prominently in national Chinese news and in ongoing debates over Article 306. In June 2011, for instance, leading Chinese scholars and lawyers criticized the high profile case against four criminal defense lawyers—Yang Zaixin, Yang Zhonghan, Luo Sifang, and Liang Wucheng—in Beihai city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.32 The four criminal defense attorneys were representing criminal suspect Pei Jinde, accused in a murder trial, when the testimonies of three defense witnesses challenged the prosecution’s case.33 Authorities later detained the four attorneys on suspicion of committing "witness tampering" under Article 306 and arrested the defense witnesses, who were indicted on perjury charges. On June 28, 2011, public security officials formally arrested rights lawyer Yang Zaixin on suspicion of violating Article 306.34 The three remaining criminal defense lawyers were reportedly released on bail pending trial on suspicion of similar charges.35 In July 2011, China University of Political Science and Law Professor Chen Guangzhong told Oriental Outlook Magazine that the formal arrest of Yang Zaixin was "wrongful" and that, based on disclosed information, the four lawyers were fulfilling their professional obligations.36 In July 2011, the Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, reported that more than 30 unidentified persons attacked lawyers from Beijing municipality and Shandong and Yunnan provinces who had travelled to Beihai to represent lawyer Yang Zaixin.37 According to the Global Times article, the assailants reportedly demanded the lawyers not represent client Yang and that they leave immediately.38

Chinese legal scholars this past year continued to urge revision of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which is reportedly on the National People’s Congress agenda, to address the problem of Article 306 and other longstanding issues related to criminal defense counsel. Such longstanding issues include the commonly referred to "three difficulties" (san nan) of criminal defense: Gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors’ case files, and collecting evidence.39 Although authorities amended the 2008 PRC Lawyers Law to address these issues, inconsistencies between the PRC Lawyers Law and the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law remain. In January 2011, several criminal defense lawyers, interviewed by the Legal Weekly, expressed growing frustrations over limitations within criminal defense work. In addition to the widely discussed "three difficulties," prominent Beijing criminal defense lawyer Xu Lantang raised "ten difficulties"—including the difficulty of getting witnesses to appear in court, the difficulty of getting a hearing for trial on appeal, and the difficulty of participating in the death penalty review process.40 According to the article, criminal defense lawyers’ primary obstacle is having innocence claims accepted by people’s courts.41 A January 2011 Legal Daily article said that the challenges to successfully representing criminal defendants have led to a decline in the rate of legal representation of criminal defendants in China.42

FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face numerous obstacles in ensuring the application of the right to a fair trial. Although judicial independence is enshrined in the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese judges regularly receive political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the Communist Party.43 Closed trials, undue political influence, and a lack of transparency in judicial decisionmaking remain commonplace within the justice system. For criminal suspects that reach the trial stage, the likelihood of a guilty verdict is great. According to 2010 official statistics from the Supreme People’s Court, the conviction rate for criminal cases was 98.12 percent.44 Chinese officials routinely sentence defendants in trials that fall far short of fair trial standards set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.45

During this reporting year, the Commission has observed several notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities failed to provide transparency and uphold defendants’ fair trial rights in accordance with domestic and international law. In March 2011, for instance, the Suining Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan province sentenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, a signatory to Charter 08 (a treatise advocating political reform and human rights), to 10 years’ imprisonment for "inciting subversion of state power." 46 Authorities reportedly denied Liu access to a lawyer for months, which appeared to contravene protections in the PRC Lawyers Law.47 [For more information about Liu Xianbin, see Section III— Institutions of Democratic Governance.] In August 2011, the Chaoyang District People’s Court in Beijing city tried rights advocate Wang Lihong for "creating a disturbance" in connection with her role in organizing a protest outside of a Fujian province courthouse on April 16, 2010.48 It was not until March 2011, nearly 12 months after the protest, that Chinese authorities criminally detained Wang.49 At Wang’s own trial in August, Wang’s criminal defense lawyer, Han Yicun, maintained that the trial was "unfair," since the judge interrupted Wang’s final statement and did not permit defense attorney Han to finish his defense statement.50 In addition, the criminal defense attorneys were unable to photocopy court documents or present arguments before the indictment.51 In September, the court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for "creating a disturbance." 52 Additionally, in the past year, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released Opinion No. 15/ 2011, which found that the December 2009 criminal case against prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo "was organized in [a] way which constitutes a breach of fairness." 53

In June 2010, two regulations took effect that prohibit convictions based on illegally obtained evidence.54 According to a November 2010 Oriental Outlook Weekly article, however, fewer than 20 percent of lawyers surveyed had used the regulations, and many alleged that the regulations lacked enforceability.55 In January 2011, a Procuratorial Daily article addressed the reasons behind enforcement obstacles and why the implemented guidelines lack force.56 The article noted that the evidence regulations "possess their own inherent flaws," "easily result in different interpretations," and suffer from the prejudices of judicial officials.57

Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders

Amid a broad crackdown against human rights advocates that began in February 2011, authorities in Beijing municipality and Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, detained at least five prominent human rights lawyers in late February or early March 2011, including Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, and Tang Jingling.58 Chinese officials detained other human rights lawyers, such as Li Fangping and Li Xiongbing, for briefer periods in April and May 2011.59 In at least some instances, authorities required those released to sign "letters of guarantee." 60 According to one unnamed human rights lawyer, the "letters" required that those released guarantee not to commit certain acts, including criticizing the Communist Party, participating in training by overseas organizations, and communicating with overseas organizations.61 As a result, released human rights lawyers declined to speak to the media about their detentions.62

The following are examples from the past year of official mistreatment of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders.

In February 2011, security officials in Shandong province reportedly beat self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing. The reported beatings followed the couple’s covert recording of video footage in which they described the official surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and abuse their family has endured since Chen’s release from prison after serving his full sentence on September 9, 2010.63
In April 2011, Beijing-based human rights lawyer Jin Guanghong disappeared amid a number of apparently politically motivated disappearances.64 After a Beijing psychiatric hospital reportedly released Jin 10 days later, he was in an "extremely weak physical and mental state." 65 Jin alleged he was beaten and vaguely recalled receiving injections while tied to a bed.66 He was unable to fully recall the circumstances surrounding his detention.67 In recent years, Jin had defended a member of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, and had participated on the legal defense team in a high-profile 2010 criminal defamation case in Fujian province.68 [For more information on conditions for Falun Gong practitioners, see Section II—Freedom of Religion—Falun Gong.]
In April 2011, public security officials in Beijing detained housing rights advocate and former lawyer Ni Yulan on suspicion of "creating a disturbance." 69 The criminal detention of Ni and the disappearance of her husband followed months of police harassment, which included surveillance and disruptions in their electricity, water, and Internet services.70 Ni is confined to a wheelchair reportedly due to chronic medical conditions and alleged official torture suffered over the past decade.71

In 2011, Chinese authorities have continued to pressure human rights lawyers who take on sensitive cases by denying annual professional license renewals during the "annual inspection and assessment process" (niandu jiancha kaohe), which justice departments throughout the country completed in July 2011.72 Lawyers that participate in politically "sensitive" cases—including those involving workers’ rights, religious freedom, and political reform— frequently fail to have their professional licenses renewed during the annual assessment.73 As of mid-July 2011, justice departments failed to renew the professional licenses of at least four human rights lawyers, including Liu Xiaoyuan, Cheng Hai, Li Jinglin, and Li Baiguang.74 In July 2011, a Caijing article reported that some lawyers viewed the annual assessment system as a "tool to suppress disobedient lawyers." 75 The article claimed that prominent rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan failed to pass the 2011 "annual inspection and assessment process" as a result of offending officials.76 In a subsequent posting on his personal blog, however, Liu denied offending any individuals prior to failing to have his professional license renewed.77

The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who angered Chinese authorities by exposing human rights abuses and representing marginalized citizens and religious practitioners, remain unknown. Weeks after reportedly reappearing publicly in late March 2010, Gao "disappeared" again in mid-April 2010.78 In January 2011, the Associated Press released information from an April 2010 interview with Gao in which he confirmed being tortured extensively during detention.79 In February 2011, Freedom Now, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that represents individual prisoners of conscience, publicly released a November 2010 statement from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in which the UN agency demanded the Chinese government "proceed to an immediate release of [Gao] and provide for reparation of the harm caused as a result of his situation." 80

Arbitrary Detention

Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues to be widely used by Chinese authorities to quell local petitioners, government critics, and rights advocates. Among the forms of arbitrary extralegal and illegal detention are:

"enforced disappearances";
"soft detention" (ruanjin), a range of extralegal controls under which individuals may be subjected to home confinement, surveillance, restricted movement, and limitations on contact with others;
reeducation through labor, an administrative detention of up to four years for minor offenses;
"black jail" (hei jianyu) detentions; and
forcible detention in psychiatric hospitals for non-medical reasons.

"Shuanggui," another form of extralegal detention, is used by the Communist Party for investigation of Party members, most often in cases of suspected corruption. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be "arbitrary" if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) There is no clear legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave non-compliance with fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.81 In addition, many forms of arbitrary detention also appear to contravene protections within China’s Constitution and domestic laws.82 In this past year, for example, UNWGAD issued two opinions declaring that the Chinese government’s imprisonment of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo and house arrest of his wife Liu Xia contravene the UDHR and amount to arbitrary detentions. The opinions call on Chinese officials to immediately release Liu Xiaobo, immediately end Liu Xia’s house arrest, and provide reparations to both persons.83

ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES

During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed numerous reported cases of Chinese citizens who went "missing" or "disappeared" into official custody with little or no information about their whereabouts or potential charges against them. In an April 8, 2011, press release, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (UNWGEID) expressed "serious concern at the recent wave of enforced disappearances that allegedly took place in China over the last few months," adding that it had received "multiple reports of a number of persons having [been] subject to enforced disappearance . . . ." 84 Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance defines "enforced disappearance" as follows: "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 85 In late May, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that at least 22 prominent Chinese rights advocates—including well-known artist and public advocate Ai Weiwei, petitioner Zhou Li, and writer Gu Chuan—had been subjected to enforced disappearances, some for as long as 70 days.86 In June, UNWGEID issued a press release expressing "serious concern" over all persons subjected to enforced disappearance in China, including the 300 Tibetan monks whom security personnel allegedly removed from Kirti Monastery, Aba county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, on April 21, 2011.87

Draft Amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law

In August 2011, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) reviewed a draft amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which includes 99 amendments to the current CPL.88 Chinese state-run media has reported that any revised draft amendment approved by the NPCSC will likely be deliberated upon and passed by the plenary session of the National People’s Congress in March 2012.89

According to state-run media reports, legal scholars have said the CPL draft revisions "will help improve the protection of criminal suspects’ human rights" 90 and have said the draft amendment complies with international standards.91 The CPL draft amendment includes revisions that would aim to prohibit forced self-incrimination,92 and bar collecting evidence obtained through torture.93 The draft amendment explicitly states that Chinese criminal defense attorneys are not to be monitored when meeting criminal defendants in custody.94

International organizations and news media outlets have raised concerns that specific amendment revisions, however, would legalize the current practice of forcibly "disappearing" rights advocates in violation of international standards.95 The revisions allow Chinese police, in cases involving national security, terrorism, or major instances of bribery, to keep criminal suspects under residential surveillance at a fixed location outside of their homes, with approval from an upper level procuratorate or security organ, for up to six months, if keeping them at their homes would likely "hinder an investigation." 96 The revisions also would permit Chinese police to withhold information about this form of "house arrest" in the case of suspected state security or terrorism cases, if they believed that notifying relatives, as normally required, could "hinder the investigation." 97 Under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, a state commits a crime of enforced disappearance when its agents arrest, detain, abduct, or otherwise deprive a person of liberty and then deny holding the person or conceal the fate or whereabouts of the person.98 Chinese lawyers and media organizations have also criticized these provisions for having the potential to undermine human rights protections.99 In September 2011, for instance, an editorial in the official newspaper China Daily acknowledged potential loopholes: "For one thing, the crime of endangering state security is a vague and sprawling conception. Without proper definition and limitations, it is highly vulnerable to abuse. The impossibility of notification and the possibility of impeding investigations are even harder to define and clarify." 100

"SOFT DETENTION" AND CONTROL

During this reporting year, the Commission noted various reports of law enforcement authorities continuing to use "soft detention" (ruanjin) to control and intimidate Chinese citizens.101 Those under "soft detention" may be subject to various forms of harassment, including home confinement, surveillance, restricted movement, and limited contact with others.102 The "soft detention" that numerous human rights defenders, advocates, and their family members are subjected to has no basis in Chinese law and constitutes arbitrary detention under international human rights standards.

In the period surrounding the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony in late 2010, Chinese authorities used "soft detention" measures on more than 100 prominent human rights advocates and associates of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award recipient Liu Xiaobo.103 The Commission also noted that in 2011, authorities placed many rights defenders under "soft detention" after releasing them from official custody. The following are some notable "soft detention" cases from the past year:

From October 2010 to December 2010, state security officials in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, and Beijing municipality held Ding Zilin, a representative of the Tiananmen Mothers (an advocacy organization of 1989 Tiananmen protest victims’ relatives), and her husband Jiang Peikun under "soft detention" for a period of 74 days. The couple was unable to access all forms of communication and unable to contact relatives, friends, and fellow rights advocates.104
In February 2011, a publicly released homemade video of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng showed Chen and his family under "soft detention" in Dongshigu village, Linyi city, Shandong province.105 Chen and his family have been under "soft detention" since September 2010, when he completed a 51-month sentence for disturbing public order and destroying public property.106
In April 2011, public security officers reportedly placed Jin Tianming, a Protestant pastor, and 500 members of the Shouwang Church in Beijing under "soft detention" after several outdoor worship services organized by the Shouwang Church.107

REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR (RTL)

Public security officers continued to use the reeducation through labor (RTL) system to silence critics and to circumvent the criminal procedure process. RTL is an administrative measure that allows Chinese law enforcement officials to order Chinese citizens, without legal proceedings or due process, to serve a period of administrative detention of up to three years, with the possibility of up to one year extension.108 While the Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration maintains that the RTL system has been established "to maintain public order, to prevent and reduce crime, and to provide compulsory educational reform to minor offenders," 109 authorities frequently use RTL to punish, among others, dissidents, drug addicts, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, and religious practitioners who belong to religious groups not approved by the government.110

During this reporting year, the Commission observed numerous accounts of RTL orders violating the legal rights of Chinese citizens, specifically their right to a fair trial and right to be protected from arbitrary detention. In November 2010, an RTL committee in Henan province ordered rights defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) to serve one year of RTL. Authorities alleged that Cheng "disturbed social order" when, in October 2010, she re-tweeted a Twitter message from her fiance´ regarding anti-Japanese protests following a fishing incident between China and Japan in disputed waters.111 The tweet was reportedly satirical in tone and urged demonstrators to protest at the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.112 In March 2011, Chinese authorities ordered rights advocate Yang Qiuyu to serve two years of RTL for "creating a disturbance." 113 The RTL order claimed that Yang had "incited" petitioners to go to Tiananmen Square, Wangfujing Street, and other locations in Beijing to cause "trouble." 114 In July 2011, Shanghai authorities released Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng after she served 18 months of RTL for "disturbing the social order." 115 According to her husband Wu Xuewei, Mao was subjected to physical and mental torture while serving her RTL order.116 After her release, Wu said that Mao, who arrived home in a wheelchair, was unable to speak and did "not have the strength to walk." 117 Mao was initially released on medical parole in February 2011, but officials detained Mao again two days later for unspecified "illegal activities." 118

Human rights advocates and legal experts in China have been calling for an end to RTL for decades. In August 2010, on the eve of the 53rd anniversary of the establishment of China’s RTL system, a number of Chinese scholars, lawyers, and advocates publicly released a "civil rights advocacy letter" calling on the government to immediately abolish the "Decision of the State Council Regarding the Question of Reeducation Through Labor" and other administrative regulations that form the legal basis for RTL.119 The letter stated that current RTL provisions that permit detention without a judicial trial are unconstitutional and violate Chinese domestic laws and regulations, including the PRC Legislation Law and the PRC Administrative Punishment Law.120 In February 2011, the advocates reportedly planned to send the signed letter, with over 1,000 signatures, to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.121

"BLACK JAILS": SECRET DETENTION FACILITIES

Chinese authorities continued to use "black jails" (hei jianyu)— secret detention sites established by local officials—to detain and punish petitioners who travel to Beijing and provincial capitals to voice complaints and seek redress for injustices.122 Those detained are denied access to legal counsel and often denied contact with family members or associates.123 A December 2010 Human Rights Watch report detailed conditions for prisoners in "black jails": "Once detained, petitioners are subjected to abuses including physical and sexual violence, food and sleep deprivation, denial of medical care, and intimidation." 124 [For more information about China’s petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system, see Section III—Access to Justice.]

In recent years, the Commission has observed reports by international and domestic Chinese media organizations on "black jails," as well as on the network of personnel that intercept and abuse petitioners.125 In one prominent example of domestic reporting, in September 2010, the Southern Metropolitan Daily reported on a private security company, Anyuanding, which was accused of assisting local governments in abducting and detaining petitioners in "black jails." 126 The New York Times reported in late September 2010 that the "system of interceptors and black jails has flourished in recent years," as Chinese petitioners have sought official redress in the face of illegal land grabs, official misconduct, and other injustices.127 In April 2011, the Southern Metropolitan Daily reported on the experiences of Sun Yinxia and two individuals forcibly detained in a "black jail" in Sihong county, Jiangsu province, after refusing to sign an agreement allowing the local government to demolish their houses without adequate compensation.128 Village and township leaders reportedly watched as unidentified guards forcibly detained the "nail household" 129 residents, who reportedly were later "beaten," "sexually harassed," and tortured during their 12 days of detention.130 According to the article, local residents said that local officials had detained nearly 200 people in the "black jail" since it opened in 2006.131 In August 2011, Chinese media reported on a "black jail" in Changping district, Beijing municipality, after a petitioner surnamed Zhou revealed information about her four-day detention.132 According to the Beijing News, several "black jail" "retrievers" forcibly detained Zhou after she visited a local government office in Beijing.133 The "black jail" personnel reportedly held Zhou and more than 50 detainees in tight quarters without beds, depriving the detainees of their mobile phones and beating some who resisted the detention center management. Zhou said that the detainees, from several provinces, had been forcibly detained or lured into detention.134

SHUANGGUI: EXTRALEGAL INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS

During this reporting year, the Commission continued to observe Chinese media reporting on the Communist Party’s use of shuanggui (often translated as "double regulation" or "double designation"), a form of extralegal detention that involves summoning Party members under investigation to appear at a designated place at a designated time.135 Notable cases of high-ranking officials placed under shuanggui included: Liu Xiquan, a deputy head of Beijing’s Chaoyang district; 136 Zhang Wanqing, Shandong Provincial People’s Government Secretary-General; 137 and Zhang Rui, a deputy director at the Department of Exchequer in the Ministry of Finance.138 Shuanggui investigations often precede formal Party disciplinary sanctions or the transfer of suspects to law enforcement agencies if there has been a violation of the criminal law.139 The investigations at undisclosed locations usually last several months, and officials may extend the investigations for over a year.140 Those under investigation are "generally held incommunicado and denied some of the protections to which criminal suspects are entitled at least in principle." 141

Legal Scholar Questions Anti-Crime Campaign’s Excesses

This past year, authorities in Chongqing municipality, Sichuan province, continued a massive, public "anti-crime" sweep (known in Chinese as "striking organized crime and uprooting evil" [dahei chu’e]) of criminal syndicates and corrupt officials that netted thousands of arrests and raised various concerns about judicial independence and procedural rights.142 In an April 2011 public letter, circulated widely, Beijing-based human rights advocate and university professor He Weifang compared the "movement-style" campaign to the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution.143 Of the campaign, He writes, "the Cultural Revolution is being replayed, and the ideal of rule of law is right now being lost." 144 He publicly questioned the lack of independent adjudicative and prosecutorial powers and criticized the public security agencies’ emphasis on order above all.145

Medical Parole

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities denied medical parole and adequate medical treatment to prisoners, particularly human rights advocates. The U.S. State Department observed in its report on China’s human rights situation for 2010 that "[a]dequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment." 146 In January 2011, Zeng Jinyan, a rights advocate and the wife of human rights defender Hu Jia, applied for medical parole on behalf of Hu, who suffers from hepatitis and cholelithiasis.147 As was the case with previous requests, authorities denied the appeal for medical parole, despite Hu’s deteriorating condition.148 The Commission noted at least one case where untimely medical parole release had likely contributed to a decline in a prisoner’s medical condition. In December 2010, rights advocate Zhang Jianhong, who wrote under the pen name Li Hong, died after being released on medical parole on June 5, 2010.149 Authorities had repeatedly denied Zhang medical parole, which resulted in an apparent worsening of his condition.150

In addition, authorities appeared to use medical parole as a measure to silence rights advocates and defenders. In December 2010, authorities released rights advocate Zhao Lianhai, the head of an advocacy group for parents of children sickened by melamine-tainted milk, on medical parole.151 Some supporters, however, feared that Zhao’s release was intended to keep him silent.152 In April 2010, Zhao reportedly broke this public silence to comment on the broad crackdown on rights advocates and to detail the intense pressure he and his family were living under.153 Police reportedly then threatened to rescind Zhao’s medical parole if he continued to comment on the treatment of human rights advocates.154 In February 2011, Shanghai authorities terminated the medical parole release of Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng, two days after her release from a reeducation through labor (RTL) center.155 Although authorities cited "illegal activities inconsistent with [the stipulations of] medical parole" as the rationale, they reportedly did not specify the alleged "illegal activities." 156 Mao reportedly suffered torture and ill treatment throughout her RTL detention.157

Capital Punishment

During this reporting year, the Chinese government maintained its policy of not releasing details on the thousands of prisoners reportedly executed annually and continued to keep information on the death penalty a state secret. Chinese officials also maintained the stated goal of limiting the number of executions. In March 2011, for instance, Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun emphasized the state policy of "strictly controlling and carefully applying the death penalty" and urged "improving the death penalty review process" in his report to the annual session of the National People’s Congress.158 In May 2011, the SPC stated in its annual 2010 work report that courts should suspend death sentences for two years, if the criminal circumstances do not require an "immediate execution." 159 On February 25, 2011, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed the eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which reduced the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty from 68 to 55.160 As the revision was the first time the Chinese legislature reduced the number of crimes subject to capital punishment since enacting the PRC Criminal Law in 1979, the country’s official media heralded the reform as a step "to restructure its penalty system and better protect human rights." 161 In an August 2010 Southern Weekend article on the then proposed amendment, a member of the National People’s Congress Legal Committee pointed out that authorities rarely, if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes under consideration for reclassification as non-capital offenses.162

Notes to Section II—Criminal Justice

1 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Twenty-Two Years After Tiananmen Massacre, Worst Repression in a Generation," 2 June 11; Tania Branigan, "Crackdown in China Spreads TerrorAmong Dissidents," Guardian, 31 March 11.

2 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "U.S. Must Voice Concerns Over China’s Assault onHuman Rights Lawyers During the Upcoming Legal Experts Dialogue With China," 7 June 11; "China Cracking Down on Rights Lawyers: Amnesty," Agence France-Presse, 29 June 11; Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, "China’s Intimidation of Dissidents Said To Persist After Prison," New York Times, 17 February 11.

3 "Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May 11.

4 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " 18 April 11.

5 Tania Branigan, "Fears Grow After Chinese Human Rights Lawyer Detained," Guardian, 18 February 11.

6 Human Rights in China, "Lawyers and Activists Detained, Summoned, and Harassed in ‘Jasmine Rallies’ Crackdown," 23 February 11; "China Releases Detained Activist," New York Times, 29 April 11.

7 Tania Branigan, "Chinese Lawyer Beaten Ahead of Jasmine Revolution Protests," Guardian, 21 February 11.

8 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Chinese Reactions to Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize— From Both Sides," 3 January 11; Human Rights in China, "Lawyers and Activists Detained, Summoned, and Harassed in ‘Jasmine Rallies’ Crackdown," 23 February 11.

9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 3, 5, 9, 19, 20 [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 7, 9(1), 19(1), 19(2), 21, 22(1) [hereinafter ICCPR]; PRC Constitution, enacted and effective 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35 (freedom of speech, press, assembly), 37 (freedom of person), 41 (right to criticize state organ or functionary).

10 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 247, 248; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 43.

11 UN Committee against Torture, 41st Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture—China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11.

12 UN Committee against Torture, "Request for Further Clarification," 29 October 10.

13 See, e.g., "Chinese Dissident Writer, Freed After 5 Years in Jail, Says Treatment Was ‘Beyond Imagination,’ " Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 14 September 11; Peter Foster, "Chinese Dissidents Describe Physical and Mental Torture at Hands of Regime," Telegraph, 14 September 11; "Missing China Dissident Recounted Abuse," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Taipei Times, 12 January 11; Tania Branigan, "Chief’s Widow Alleges Torture After He Dies in Custody," Guardian, 14 January 11; "Benxi City ‘Xie Zhigang Incident’ Interview With the Joint Investigation Team Leader" [Benxi shi "xiezhigang shijian" lianhe diaocha zu fuze ren jieshou jizhe caifang], Northeast News, 13 January 11; Tania Branigan, "Chinese Activists Seized in Human Rights Crackdown Accuse Authorities of Torture," Guardian, 13 September 11; Jiang Li, "State Tax Cadre ‘Commits Suicide’ in Prison; Prison Refuses to Accept Responsibility" [Guoshui ganbu jianyu zhong "bei zisha," jianyu ju bu chengdan zeren], Boxun, 25 January 11.

14 Tania Branigan, "Chief’s Widow Alleges Torture After He Dies in Custody," Guardian, 14 January 11; "Benxi City ‘Xie Zhigang Incident’ Interview With the Joint Investigation Team Leader" [Benxi shi "xie zhigang shijian" lianhe diaocha zu fuze ren jieshou jizhe caifang], Northeast News, 13 January 11.

15 Yan Jianbiao, " ‘Yueqing Case’ Witness Suffers Torture To Extract Confession" ["Yueqing an" zhengren zhi zao xingxun bigong], Caijing, 24 March 11.

16 Wang Quanbao, "SPP Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator General: Do Not Allow Unexpected Deaths in the Detention Centers" [Zuigao jian fu jiancha zhang sun qian: bu yunxu kanshousuo chuxian yiwai siwang], China News Weekly, reprinted in Sina, 10 March 11.

17 Wang Lina, " ‘Detention Regulations’ Draft Revision Submitted: To Respect Prisoners as Human" ["Kanshousuo tiaoli" xiuding cao’an yi shangbao: ba fanren dang ren lai zunzhong], China Youth On line, 9 March 11.

18 "China Pushes Forward Judicial Reform by Enhancing Supervision, Person-Centered Care," Xinhua, 20 February 11.

19 Wang Quanbao, "SPP Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator General: Do Not Allow Unexpected Deaths in the Detention Centers" [Zuigao jian fu jiancha zhang sun qian: bu yunxu kanshousuo chuxian yiwai siwang], China News Weekly, reprinted in Sina, 10 March 11.

20 According to Article 34 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the court "shall designate a lawyer that is obligated to provide legal aid to serve as a defender" if the defendant does not have a lawyer and is blind, deaf, mute, a minor, or facing the possibility of a death sentence. In cases in which the criminal defendant "has not entrusted anyone to be his defender due to financial difficulties or other reasons, the People’s Court may designate a lawyer that is obligated to provide legal aid to serve as a defender." Article 42 of the PRC Law on Lawyers states that lawyers must fulfill their obligations to provide legal aid services. For more information see the texts: PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 34; PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], enacted 15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, revised 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 42.

21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76.

22 Zhang Youyi, "High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems" [Gao fengxian zhishi bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushi mianlin liu nanti], LegalDaily, reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.

23 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.

24 Yuan Yuan, "Aiding in Defense," Beijing Review, 6 February 11.

25 Zhang Youyi, "High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems" [Gao fengxian zhishi bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushi mianlin liu nanti], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.

26 Amnesty International, "Against the Law: Crackdown on China’s Human Rights Lawyers Deepens," June 2011, 3, 24–27, 45–50; Paul Mooney, "Silence of the Chinese Dissidents," South China Morning Post, 4 July 11; Zhang Youyi, "High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems" [Gao fengxian zhishi bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushimianlin liu nanti], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.

27 Patrick Kar-wai Poon, China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, "Rights Defense Lawyers and the Rule of Law in China," 18 May 11. For CECC analysis on Article 306, see, e.g., "Defense Lawyers Turned Defendants: Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of Defense Lawyers in China," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 27 May 03.

28 Yanfei Ran, "When Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Become the Criminals," FordhamInternational Law Journal, Vol. 32, Issue 3 (2008), 988, 1023; " ‘Big Stick 306’ and China’s Contempt for the Law," New York Times, 5 May 11.

29 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01,28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 306.

30 "Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will Actually Contravenes the Will ofthe People" ["Weile qianjiu minyi bugu shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi"], China Youth Daily, 18 June 09. For more information about Article 306, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 90.

31 " ‘Big Stick 306’ and China’s Contempt for the Law," New York Times, 5 May 11.

32 Human Rights in China, "Guangxi Rights Defense Lawyer Yang Zaixin Formally Arrested," 5 July 11.

33 Ibid.; Li Jiayu, "Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense Lawyers," Global Times, 20 July 11.

34 Human Rights in China, "Guangxi Rights Defense Lawyer Yang Zaixin Formally Arrested," 5 July 11.

35 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing June 29–July 6, 2011," 6 July 11; Human Rights in China, "Guangxi Rights Defense Lawyer Yang Zaixin Formally Arrested," 5 July 11.

36 Chen Guangzhong, "I Think Arresting These Four Lawyers Is Wrong" ["Wo renwei zhua zhesi ming lushi shi cuowu de"], Oriental Outlook, July 2011.

37 Li Jiayu, "Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense Lawyers," Global Times, 20 July 11. For more information on the assault, see "Lawyers Group Representing Yang Zaixin Attacked and Unable To Work" [Yang zaixin daibiao lushi tuan zao weigong wufa gongzuo], RadioFree Asia, 19 July 11.

38 Li Jiayu, "Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense Lawyers," Global Times, 20 July11.

39 Sun Jibin, "How ‘Three Difficulties’ of Criminal Defense Became ‘10 Difficulties’ " [Xingshi bianhu "san nan" weihe bian "shi nan"], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11; " ‘Big Stick 306’ and China’s Contempt for the Law," New York Times, 5 May 11.

40 Sun Jibin, "How ‘Three Difficulties’ of Criminal Defense Became ‘10 Difficulties’ " [Xingshi bianhu "san nan" weihe bian "shi nan"], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11; Dui Hua Foundation"Translation: How ‘Three Difficulties’ of Criminal Defense Became ‘10 Difficulties,’ " 2 February 11.

41 Sun Jibin, "How ‘Three Difficulties’ of Criminal Defense Became ‘10 Difficulties’ " [Xingshi bianhu "san nan" weihe bian "shi nan"], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11.

42 Ibid.

43 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2010 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," 8 April 11.

44 Supreme People’s Court,"Table on Circumstances for Accused in 2010 China Court Criminal Case Judgments" [2010 Nian quanguo fayuan shenli xingshi anjian beigao ren panjue shengxiao qingkuang biao], 24 March 11. According to official 2010 criminal adjudication statistics, Chinese authorities approved 999 individual acquittals and 17,957 exemptions from criminal punishment. Chinese authorities imposed criminal penalties on 1,007,419 criminal defendants.

45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76.

46 Andrew Jacobs, "Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Sentenced to 10 Years," New York Times, 25 March 11; Human Rights in China, "Activist Sentenced to Ten Years for Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence," 25 March 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Liu Xianbin Case Trial Oral Judgment Announcement of 10 Years, Family and Lawyers Cannot Visit" [Liu xianbin an fating koutou xuanpan shi nian xingqi, jiaren lushi wufa huijian], 25 March 11; Gillian Wong, "China Sentences Democracy Activist to 10 Years," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 25 March 11.

47 Andrew Jacobs, "Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Sentenced to 10 Years," New York Times, 25 March 11.

48 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing August 10–15, 2011," 16 August 11; Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of RightsActivist Wang Lihong," 13 August 11.

49 Peter Foster, "Chinese Internet-Activist on Trial," Telegraph, 12 August 11; "Chinese Citizens Support Jailed Activist Wang Lihong," New Tang Dynasty Television, 9 August 11.

50 Human Rights in China, "Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced to Nine Months," 9 September 11; Peter Foster, "Chinese Internet-Activist on Trial," Telegraph, 12 August 11; Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist WangLihong," 13 August 11; "Wang Lihong’s ‘Creating a Disturbance’ Lawyer Denounces Unfair Trial" [Wang lihong "zishi an" lushi chi tingshen bugong], BBC, 12 August 11.

51 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing August 10–15, 2011," 16 August 11; Peter Foster, "Chinese Internet-Activist on Trial," Telegraph, 12 August 11; "WangLihong’s ‘Creating a Disturbance’ Lawyer Denounces Unfair Trial" [Wang lihong "zishi an" lushi chi tingshen bugong], BBC, 12 August 11.

52 Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang Lihong," 13 August 11; Human Rights in China, "Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced to Nine Months," 9 September 11.

53 Freedom Now, "UN Declares Detention of Imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and WifeIllegal; Calls for Immediate Release," 1 August 11.

54 Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice Circular Regarding the Issue of "Provisions Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases" and "Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases" [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin jiancha yuan gongan bu guojia anquan bu sifa bu yinfa"guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding" he "guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding" de tongzhi], issued 13 June10; Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective 1July 10, arts. 1, 7; Provisions Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases [Guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti deguiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 18(4), 19, 34; Yang Ming and Zhang Hailin, "Staggered Start to ‘Illegal Evidence Exclusion’ " [Feifa "zhengju paichu" panshan qibu], Oriental Outlook Weekly, November 2011.

55 Yang Ming and Zhang Hailin, "Staggered Start to ‘Illegal Evidence Exclusion’ " [Feifa "zhengju paichu" panshan qibu], Oriental Outlook Weekly, November 2011.

56 Li Guomin, "Why the Illegal Evidence Exclusionary Regulations Cannot Be Strictly Enforced" [Feifa zhengju paichu guize weihe buneng yange zhixing], Procuratorial Daily, 10 January 11.

57 Ibid.

58 Edward Wong, "Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China Intensifies Crackdown," NewYork Times, 11 March 11.

59 "China Frees Rights Lawyer but Another Disappears," Agence France-Presse, reprinted inGoogle, 5 May 11.

60 "Human Rights Lawyers Suppressed in Different Ways" [Weiquan lushi shou butongxingshi daya], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11; "Friend Says Chinese Civil Rights Lawyer Resurfaces," Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 4 May 11; Chris Buckley, "China Dissident Released After U.S. Official’s Visit," Reuters, 29 April 11.

61 "Human Rights Lawyers Suppressed in Different Ways" [Weiquan lushi shou butongxingshi daya], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11.

62 Ibid.; "Friend Says Chinese Civil Rights Lawyer Resurfaces," Associated Press, reprinted inGoogle, 4 May 11; Chris Buckley, "China Dissident Released After U.S. Official’s Visit," Reuters, 29 April 11.

63 ChinaAid, "Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese Citizens Appeal to America," 10 February 11; Ding Xiao, "Blind Activist, Wife Beaten," Radio Free Asia, 11 February 11;ChinaAid, "Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng’s Wife Reveals Details of Torture," 16 June 11. For CECC analysis, see "Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release ofVideo Detailing Official Abuse," 11 March 11.

64 John Zhang, "The Silencing of China’s Human Rights Lawyers," Epoch Times, 3 March 11.

65 Rona Rui, "Beijing Rights Lawyer Suffers Memory Loss After Ten-Day Detention," Epoch Times, 27 April 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Lawyer Jin Guanghong Tortured, Cannot Remember the Facts Surrounding His Disappearance," 23 April 11.

66 Clear Harmony, "Lawyer Jin Guanghong Persecuted and Now Suffering From Partial Amnesia," 21 May 11.

67 Rona Rui, "Beijing Rights Lawyer Suffers Memory Loss After Ten-Day Detention," Epoch Times, 27 April 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Lawyer Jin Guanghong Tortured, Cannot Remember the Facts Surrounding His Disappearance," 23 April 11.

68 "Concern Over Rights Lawyer," Radio Free Asia, 13 April 11.

69 Feng Weimin, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Beijing Human Rights Lawyer Ni Yulan Criminally Detained" [Beijing weiquan lushi ni yulan bei xingshi juliu], 14 April 11.

70 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Activist Ni Yulan Becomes Latest Victim of ‘Jasmine’ Crackdown," 14 April 11.

71 Ibid.

72 For CECC analysis, see "Authorities Deny Human Rights Lawyers Professional License Renewals," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 December 10.

73 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, "Four Human Rights Lawyers Barred From Passing the Annual Assessment," 19 July 11; Aizhixing, "Aizhixing Strongly Concerned That Many Lawyers Still Have Not Passed Annual Assessment for Professional Lawyers" [Ai zhi xing qianglie guanzhu duo ming lushi shangwei tongguo lushi zhiye niandu kaohe], reprinted inBoxun, 28 June 11.

74 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, "Four Human Rights Lawyers Barred FromPassing the Annual Assessment," 19 July 11.

75 Xu Kai, " ‘Chinese Characteristics’ of Lawyers Association" ["Zhongguo tese" de luxie], Caijing Magazine, 18 July 11.

76 Ibid.

77 Liu Xiaoyuan, " ‘Chinese Characteristics’ of Lawyers Association" ["Zhongguo tese" de luxie], Liu Xiaoyuan’s Blog, reprinted in Sina, 19 July 11.

78 "Chinese Human Rights Defender Gao Zhisheng Disappears Again," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.

79 Charles Hutzler, "AP Exclusive: Missing Chinese Lawyer Told of Abuse," Associated Press, reprinted in Bloomberg, 10 January 11.

80 Edward Wong, "U.N. Rights Group Calls on China To Release Lawyer," New York Times, 28 March 11; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 26/2010 (People’s Republic of China), reprinted in Freedom Now, 6 July 10.

81 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27; Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21. The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of an individual’s liberty is permissible only "on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law," and that an individual must be promptly informed of the reasons for his detention and any charges against him or her. See ICCPR, arts. 9(1), 9(2).

82 See, e.g., PRC Constitution, enacted and effective 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35, 37, 41; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 3; PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhian guanli chufa fa], enacted 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 3, 9, 10,16; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], enacted 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 8(v).

83 Freedom Now, "UN Declares Detention of Imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and Wife Illegal; Calls for Immediate Release," 1 August 11; "UN Group Calls for Immediate Release ofLiu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12 August 11.

84 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "China: UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced Disappearances," 8 April 11.

85 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance,adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/61/177 of 20 December 06, entry into force 23 December 10, art. 2.

86 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following Call for ‘Jasmine Revolution,’ " 30 May 11.

87 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, "China: UN Expert Body Seriously Concerned About Tibetan Monks Reportedly Subjected to Enforced Disappearance," 8 June 11.For more information, see "After Monk’s Suicide: Coerced Removal and ‘Education’ for Monks; Possible Murder Charges," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.

88 "China To Amend Criminal Procedural Law," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 24 August 11; National People’s Congress, "Criminal Procedure Law Amendments (Draft): Explanation ofProvisions and Draft" [Xingshi susongfa xiuzheng’an (cao’an) tiaowen ji cao’an shuoming], 30 August 11; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97. For more information on reviews of draft laws, see Article 27 of the PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifafa],issued 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 27.

89 "Procedural Justice," China Daily, 25 August 11.

90 "China To Amend Criminal Procedural Law To Prevent Forced Confessions," Xinhua, 24 August 11.

91 "China’s Draft Law Amendment in Conformity With International Conventions: Experts," Xinhua, 30 August 11.

92 National People’s Congress, "Criminal Procedure Law Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft" [Xingshi susongfa xiuzheng’an (cao’an) tiaowen ji cao’an shuoming], 30 August 11, item 14; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 43.

93 National People’s Congress, "Criminal Procedure Law Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft" [Xingshi susongfa xiuzheng’an (cao’an) tiaowen ji cao’an shuoming], 30 August 11, item 17.

94 Ibid., item 7; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 36.

95 For more information on the international organizations and experts’ criticism of the draft amendment’s treatment of residential surveillance, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, "China: Don’t Legalize Secret Detention," 1 September 11; Michael Wines, "More Chinese Dissidents Appear to Disappear," New York Times, 2 September 11; Jaime FlorCruz, "Proposed Legal Changes in China Cause Jitters," CNN, 3 September 11.

96 National People’s Congress, "Criminal Procedure Law Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft" [Xingshi susongfa xiuzheng’an (cao’an) tiaowen ji cao’an shuoming], 30 August 11, item 30.

97 Ibid.

98 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/61/177 of 12 January 07, entry in force 23 December 10, item 2.

99 See, e.g., Michael Wines, "More Chinese Dissidents Appear To Disappear," New York Times,2 September 11; Jaime FlorCruz, "Proposed Legal Changes in China Cause Jitters," CNN, 3 September 11; "Amend Legal Procedures," China Daily, 1 September 11.

100 "Amend Legal Procedures," China Daily, 1 September 11.

101 Human Rights Watch, "China: Free Unlawfully Detained Legal Activists, Relatives," 22February 11; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, "Out of Jail in China, but Not Free," New York Times, 9 March 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Elections Expert Yao Lifa Abused and Beaten During Soft Detention Period," reprinted in Boxun, 13 December 10.

102 Human Rights Watch, "China: Free Unlawfully Detained Legal Activists, Relatives," 22February 11; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, "Out of Jail in China, but Not Free," New York Times, 9 March 11; "China Nobel Laureate Wife Fears Going ‘Crazy’: Activists," Agence France-Presse,reprinted in Google, 26 February 11.

103 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Chinese Reactions to Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize—From Both Sides," 3 January 11.

104 Human Rights in China, "Prominent Rights Activists Detail Life in 74-Day House Arrest,"30 December 10.

105 Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, "China’s Intimidation of Dissidents Said To Persist After Prison," New York Times, 17 February 11.

106 Michael Wines, "A Chinese Advocate Is Freed, but Stays Under Surveillance," New York Times, 9 September 10; Ian Johnson and Jonathan Ansfield, "Chinese Officials Beat Activist and His Wife, Group Says," New York Times, 17 June 11.

107 Andrew Jacobs, "China Detains Church Members at Easter Services," New York Times, 24 April 11.

108 CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 39–41; Dui Hua Foundation, "Reference Materials on China’s Criminal Justice System, Vol. 2 (June 2009), iv; CECC, 2008 Annual Report,31 October 08, 36–37; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 4.

109 Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration, "A Brief Description of China’s Reeducation Through Labor System" [Zhongguo laodong jiaoyang zhidu jianjie], accessed 14 July 11.

110 Xiaobing Li, Civil Liberties in China, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC–CLIO, 2010), 118;Human Rights in China, "Reeducation Through Labor: A Summary of Regulatory Issues and Concerns," 1 February 01; Jim Yardley, "Issue in China: Many in Jails Without Trial," New York Times, 9 May 05; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue," 4 February 09, 3.

111 "News Update: Rights Advocate Wang Yi (Cheng Jianping) Ordered To Serve One Year of Reeducation Through Labor" [Kuaixun: Weiquan renshi wang yi (cheng jianping) bei laojiao yinian], Boxun, 15 November 10; Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Appeal to Twitter CEO for Help," 9 January 11.

112 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Update: Human Rights Defender Wang Yi Sent to RTL" [Kuaixun: weiquan renshi wang yi zheng yao bei song qu laojiao], reprinted in Boxun, 15November 10.

113 Human Rights in China, "Two Years of Reeducation-Through-Labor for Rights Activist Yang Qiuyu," 14 April 11.

114 Ibid.

115 "China: Mao Hengfeng Released From Prison in a Wheelchair," Asia News, reprinted in Spero News, 30 July 11.

116 Ibid.

117 Human Rights in China, "Petitioner Mao Hengfeng Released From Reeducation-Through-Labor in Serious Condition," 28 July 11.

118 "China: Mao Hengfeng Released From Prison in a Wheelchair," Asia News, reprinted in Spero News, 30 July 11; Human Rights in China, "Petitioner Mao Hengfeng Released From Re-education-Through-Labor in Serious Condition," 28 July 11.

119 Hai Yan, "Thousands of Chinese Citizens Jointly Sign Letter To Abolish Reeducation Through Labor System" [Zhongguo qian gongmin lian shu yaoqiu feichu laojiao zhidu], Voice ofAmerica, 16 February 11.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Liu Chang, "Controversy Over ‘Black Jails’ Continues," Global Times, 4 May 11; "Campaigner Detained in Beijing," Radio Free Asia, 2 February 11; Chris Buckley, "China’s Wen Meets Petitioners in Show of Worry Over Discontent," Reuters, 25 January 11.

123 Human Rights Watch, "An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails,’ " 12 November 09.

124 Human Rights Watch, "Closing China’s Network of Secret Jails," 9 December 10.

125 See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Jilin Petitioner Qu Yanjiang Is Tricked Back Into Black Jail Custody by Retrievers" [Jilin fang min qu yanjiang bei jie fang ren pian hui guan hei jianyu], reprinted in Boxun, 24 October 10; Gan Hao, "Petitioner Reports to Police That He Was ‘Detained and Beaten’ " [Fangmin baojing cheng zao "guanya ouda"], Beijing News, 12 January 11; "Black Jails, Petitioners on Eve of Spring Festival: 13 Big Stories of Beijing Petitioning in 2010" [Hei jianyu, fang min chunwan: 2010 nian zaijing fang min 13 da xinwen], Boxun, 3 January 11; Liu Chang, "Controversy Over ‘Black Jails’ Continues," Global Times, 4 May 11; "After All, Where Is Jiangsu Sihong County’s ‘Petitioner Study Class’? " [Jiangsu si hong xian de "xinfang xuexi ban" jiujing shige shenme difang?], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 28 April 11; Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, "Well-Oiled Security Apparatus in China Stifles Calls for Change," New York Times, 28 February 11; Melinda Liu and Isaac Stone Fish, "Portrait of the Gulag," Newsweek, 26 June 11; "Veterans Protest Over Welfare," Radio Free Asia, 29 June 11.

126 Long Zhi, "Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing’s ‘Black Jails’ To Stop Petitioners" [Anyuanding: beijing jie fang "hei jianyu" diaocha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 September10; "China Police Investigate ‘Black Jails’ for Protesters," BBC, 27 September 10.

127 Andrew Jacobs, "China Investigates Extralegal Petitioner Detentions," New York Times, 27 September 10; Susan Stumme, "China PM First To Meet Petitioners in 60 Years," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 25 January 11.

128 Zhan Caiqiang, " ‘Study Sessions’ Nightmare" ["Xuexi ban" mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11. See also Liu Chang, "Controversy Over ‘Black Jails’ Continues," GlobalTimes, 4 May 11.

129 The term "nail household" (dingzi hu) is commonly used to refer to tenants who refuse toleave their households despite the demolition of structures around them.

130 Zhan Caiqiang, " ‘Study Sessions’ Nightmare" ["Xuexi ban" mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11. See also Liu Chang, "Controversy Over ‘Black Jails’ Continues," Global Times, 4 May 11.

131 Zhan Caiqiang, " ‘Study Sessions’ Nightmare" ["Xuexi ban" mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11; Zhang Xuanchen, "Officials Accused of Opening Illegal ‘Jail,’ " Shanghai Daily, 28 April 11.

132 An Ying and Yi Fangxing, "Woman Detained in Black Jail After Coming to Beijing To Handle Affairs" [Laijing banshi nu bei guan heijianyu], Beijing News, 2 August 11; Wang Huazhong, "Former Inmate Reveals Existence of ‘Black Jail,‘" China Daily, 3 August 11.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 Dui Hua Foundation, "Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui Investigation Facility," 5 July 11.

136 Li Yanhui, "Chaoyang Deputy Director Allegedly Detained for Bribery," Global Times, 2 June 11; Zhang Lu, "Beijing’s Chaoyang District Deputy Mayor Liu Xiquan Investigated," Caijing, 1 June 11.

137 "Shandong Provincial Government Secretary-General Zhang Wanqing Dismissed, Had Been Detained Under Shuanggui" [Shandong sheng zhengfu mishu zhang zhang wanqing beiti qing chezhi ci qian bei shuanggui], People’s Daily, 26 May 11.

138 Zhang Yuzhe, "High-Ranking Ministry of Finance Official Detained," Caixin Net, 18 January 11.

139 "Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China," CECC Hearing, 20 September 06, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.

140 Dui Hua Foundation, "Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui Investigation Facility," 5 July 11.

141 "Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China," CECC Hearing, 20 September 06, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.

142 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 96.

143 He Weifang, "For the Rule of Law, for the Ideal in Our Hearts—A Letter to Chongqing Colleagues" [Weile fazhi, weile women xinzhongde di na yi fen lixiang—zhi chongqing falu jie de yifeng gongkaixin], China Media Project, 12 April 11.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2010 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, HongKong, and Macau)," 8 April 11.

147 "Jailed Activist’s Health Failing," Radio Free Asia, 17 January 11.

148 Ibid.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Zeng Jinyan Once Again Applies for Medical Parole for Hu Jia’s Condition in Prison," 17 January 11.

149 PEN International, "CHINA: Death Announced of Prominent Writer Zhang Jianhong (aka Li Hong)," 12 January 11.

150 Ibid.

151 "China Frees Father Zhao Lianhai Jailed for Milk Protest," Associated Press, reprinted inAustralian, 29 December 10.

152 Ibid.

153 Will Clem and Choi Chi-yuk, "Beijing’s Silence an Ominous Signal," South China Morning Post, 6 April 11; "Milk Activist Told ‘Be Quiet or Go Back to Jail,’ " South China Morning Post, 8 April 11.

154 "Milk Activist Told ‘Be Quiet or Go Back to Jail,’ " South China Morning Post, 8 April 11.

155 Human Rights in China, "Petitioner Recounts Abuses During RTL; Medical Parole Rescinded," 24 February 11.

156 Ibid.

157 "Mao Hengfeng: Amnesty Urgent Action," Guardian, 25 June 11.

158 "Supreme People’s Court Work Report" [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, reprinted in National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 19 March 11.

159 Supreme People’s Court, "2010 Annual Work Report on the People’s Courts" [Renminfayuan gongzuo niandu baogao (2010 nian)], 25 May 11. For more information on the death penalty in the 2010 Annual Work Report, see, e.g., Michael Bristow, "China Orders Suspension of Death Sentences," BBC News, 25 May 11; Wang Qiushi, "SPC Requests Uniform Suitable Standards for the Death Penalty; Try Utmost To Not Immediately Implement the Death Penalty" [Zuigao fa yaoqiu tongyi sixing shiyong biaozhun jinliang bu pan sixing liji zhixing], People’s Daily, 25 May 11.

160 Zhao Yinan, "13 Crimes Removed From Death Penalty List," China Daily, 26 February 11; Robert Saiget, "China Scraps Death Penalty for Some Crimes," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 26 February 11.

161 Zhao Yinan, "13 Crimes Removed From Death Penalty List," China Daily, 26 February 11; "China Mulls Lessening Number of Crimes Punishable by Death," Xinhua, 23 August 10.

162 Zhao Lei, "Greater Steps Can Be Taken To Reduce the Death Penalty" [Jianshao sizui, buzi keyi zai da yixie], Southern Weekend, 26 August 10. For more information, see "Chinese Government Considers Reducing Number of Crimes Punishable by Death," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 23 February 11.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Introduction

The Chinese government continued in the Commission’s 2011 reporting year to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. China’s Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief but limits protections for religious practice to "normal religious activities," 1 a term applied in a manner that falls short of international human rights protections for freedom of religion.2 The government continued to recognize only five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism—and required groups belonging to these religions to register with the government. Registered groups received some legal protection for their religious activities but remained subject to ongoing state controls. Members of both unregistered groups and registered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters for religion faced risk of harassment, detention, and other abuses. Some unregistered groups had space to practice their religions, but this limited tolerance did not amount to official recognition of these groups’ rights. Authorities also shut down the activities of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on other religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong.

Despite the Chinese government’s stated commitment to promoting internationally recognized human rights, it has not committed to promoting religious freedom in line with international human rights standards. The Chinese government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, which was "framed . . . in pursuit of . . . the essentials of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," affirmed the government’s existing framework of control over religion.3 A September 2010 State Council Information Office white paper, which described China’s human rights progress in the previous year, addressed a range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, but made no reference to religion.4 The State Administration for Religious Affairs’ goals for 2011 called for further institutionalizing existing controls and mobilizing religious communities to promote doctrine that advances state-defined notions of "social harmony." 5

The government continued to use law to control religious practice in China rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens, accelerating efforts in the past year to revise or pass new legal measures. The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued measures for the management of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in September 2010, effective in November 2010, that stipulate more extensive controls over these religious venues.6 [See Section V—Tibet for more information.] In January 2011, SARA announced it would issue new legal measures (banfa) and provisions (guiding) during the year on managing the "collective religious activities" of foreigners in China; on certifying teacher qualifications; on granting degrees at religious schools; and on managing religion-related foreign affairs.7 It also described plans to begin drafting measures for the management of religious schools and of Muslims’ pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).8 The planned measures, like others passed in recent years, build on provisions in the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), which took effect in March 2005.9 Recent legal measures have added more clarity to ambiguous provisions in the RRA but also have articulated more detailed levels of control. In addition, while such legal measures, along with the RRA, have provided limited protections for the activities of registered religious communities—such as establishing venues for worship and holding property—they exclude unregistered groups from these benefits, leaving their activities and possessions vulnerable to official abuses.10

Buddhism (Non-Tibetan)

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party maintained a restrictive framework for controlling the doctrine, practices, worship sites, and religious personnel of Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas.11 [For more information on conditions for Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V—Tibet.] State-controlled "patriotic religious organizations" 12 monitor and control the doctrine, practices, property, and personnel of each of China’s five recognized religions, and the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) continued to monitor, control, and restrict the religious activities of Buddhists.

CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

This past reporting year, the government and Party continued to control Buddhist doctrine and practices to conform them to government and Party goals. Local governments and Buddhist associations throughout China continued to call for government and Party controls over Buddhists.13 For example, the Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association reportedly called on Buddhists to recognize Communist Party doctrine, implement the Party’s basic policy on religion, and demonstrate allegiance to China and to socialism, among other goals.14 China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) called for authorities to "lead" Buddhists to hold Buddhist scripture reading events based on the government-dictated theme of "purity and harmony," 15 and local authorities and Buddhist associations held events that echoed this theme.16 Local governments continued to restrict Buddhist practices by calling for the removal of practices that authorities deemed to be "superstitious" or "feudal." 17 Chinese law does not provide clear definitions for these terms,18 giving authorities the flexibility to arbitrarily restrict the religious practices of Buddhists.

CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST SITES OF WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL

The government and Party continued to impose political goals on the management of Buddhist sites of worship and personnel. Government sources continued to call for the construction of "harmonious temples, mosques, and churches," 19 and during a March 2011 interview with the central government news agency Xinhua, BAC head Master Chuanyin said a December 2010 event that focused on this theme "aroused the positive nature of making contributions to economic and social development" for Buddhists.20 The Regulations on Religious Affairs conditions the construction of sites of worship on government oversight,21 and local authorities throughout China continued to call for restrictions on what authorities often refer to as the "indiscriminate construction of temples and excessive construction of open-air religious statues." 22 In addition, local Buddhist associations throughout China continued to exercise control over the appointment of Buddhist monks and nuns.23 For example, the Mount Putuo Buddhist Association, in Zhoushan prefecture, Zhejiang province, convened a meeting in late 2010 in which an official from the Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee "required" the Mount Putuo Buddhist Association to confirm and put on file the qualifications of Buddhist monks and nuns according to guidance from SARA.24

Catholicism

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to interfere in the religious activities of China’s estimated 4 to 12 million Catholics.25 The state-controlled church continued to deny Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to select bishops, and authorities continued to detain and harass some Catholics who practiced their faith outside of state-approved parameters. In addition, authorities forced some bishops to attend a December 2010 national conference of state-controlled church leadership, as well as the ordination ceremonies of two bishops ordained without Holy See approval.

INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES

The government and Party continued to implement a restrictive framework of control over the selection and activities of Catholic religious personnel. Since the 1950s, the government and Party have denied Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to select bishops, and the state-controlled church asserts that it has the authority to approve the ordination of bishops in China.26 Officials have cited the principles of "independence" for Catholics in China and the "autonomous" selection and ordination of bishops as a basis for rejecting the authority of foreign entities (including the Holy See) over the state-controlled church,27 and China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs continued to call for the promotion of these principles in 2011.28 In some cases, the state-controlled church has allowed discreet Holy See approval of bishops who have also received state-controlled church approval, and this practice continued during this reporting year.29 Nevertheless, on November 20, 2010, state-controlled church authorities ordained Guo Jincai of Chengde diocese,30 Hebei province, the first ordination of a Catholic bishop in China without Holy See approval since November 2006. Authorities reportedly forced some bishops to attend the ordination, including Li Liangui of the Cangzhou diocese, Hebei.31 In July 2011, authorities in Shantou city, Guangdong province, took bishops Liang Jiansen, Liao Hongqing, Su Yongda, and Gan Junqiu into custody 32 and reportedly forced them to attend the ordination ceremony of Huang Bingzhang, another bishop ordained without Holy See approval.33

The government continued to interfere in the affairs of some unregistered bishops and their congregations this past year. For example, authorities in Gonghui town, Zhangbei county, Zhangjiakou city, Hebei province, reportedly restricted access to the town after the March 9, 2011, death of unregistered bishop Hao Jinli 34 in order to prevent large numbers of Catholics from traveling there to pay their respects to the bishop.35

Authorities also continued efforts to incorporate political themes into Catholic doctrine and education. In November 2010, the Hebei Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau appointed one of its own officials, Tang Zhaojun, to join the leadership of the Hebei Seminary and teach classes on ideology and politics.36 Students at the seminary demonstrated soon thereafter,37 and the seminary appointed new leadership in January 2011.38 Honorary chairman Liu Bainian 39 of both the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)—which manages the state-controlled church on behalf of the government and Party 40—and the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC)—which approves the selection of bishops in China 41—said in a March 2011 interview that "[w]hat the church needs is talent who love the country and love religion: politically, they should respect the Constitution, respect the law, and fervently love the socialist motherland." 42

HARASSMENT AND DETENTION

The government and Party continued to harass and detain unregistered Catholics who practiced their faith outside of state-approved parameters. At least 40 unregistered Chinese bishops are in detention, home confinement, or surveillance; are in hiding; or have disappeared under suspicious circumstances.43 Some have been missing for years, such as unregistered (or "underground") bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang, whom public security officials took into custody in 1996 and 2001, respectively.44 Authorities targeted other Catholics more recently. For example, on April 8, 2011, public security officials in Beijing municipality reportedly took into custody Beijing-based unregistered priest Chen Hailong in connection with his religious activities.45 Authorities reportedly took him to a guest house in Yanqing county, Beijing, and then took him to an unknown location on April 9.46 Authorities reportedly questioned Chen about the location of unregistered bishop Zhao Kexun and then released Chen on July 23, 2011.47

BISHOPS FORCED TO ATTEND NATIONAL CATHOLIC CONFERENCE

From December 7 to 9, 2010, the state-controlled Catholic church convened the eighth National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives (NCCCR) in Beijing to choose new state-controlled church leaders. Throughout the NCCCR, government and Party leaders emphasized that Catholics in China should practice their religion in conformity with government and Party policies. For example, Jia Qinglin—a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee 48— described to CPA and BCCCC representatives the Party’s efforts to prevent Catholics in China from practicing their faith independent of Party policies: "Religious work is an important component of the work of the Party and the country . . . . [The Party Central Committee] continuously consolidates and develops a patriotic united front between the Party and the religious community." 49

During the time surrounding the NCCCR, the government denied some bishops the choice to abstain from religious activities that contravene the Holy See’s policies. Both the Holy See and some delegates at the NCCCR reportedly alleged that authorities forced some bishops to take part in the NCCCR,50 following reports that authorities instructed local United Front Work Departments and Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureaus throughout China to ensure that enough delegates attend.51 For example, on December 6, 2010, public security officials in Hengshui city, Hebei province, reportedly used force to remove registered bishop Feng Xinmao from the Jing county cathedral in Hengshui to take him to the NCCCR.52 Shortly before the NCCCR, public security authorities attempted to force bishop Li Liangui to participate, but they could not locate him,53 and they reportedly told members of his diocese, the Cangzhou diocese, that they would attempt to find him.54 After Li returned to his diocese on December 17, 2010, authorities reportedly took him to attend a political study session and ordered him to write a letter of apology for his absence.55 As of January 20, 2011, he reportedly was back at the Cangzhou diocese.56

Falun Gong

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Communist Party and Chinese government continued to carry out a cam-paign—lasting more than a decade 57—of extensive, systematic, and in some cases violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their belief in and practice of Falun Gong. The government and Party refer to this process as "transformation through reeducation," or simply "transformation," and they are currently in the second year of a three-year, national campaign to increase efforts to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners. In addition, authorities in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, targeted Falun Gong practitioners during the November 2010 Asian Games, held in Guangzhou. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement based on Chinese meditative exercises called qigong and the teachings of its founder, Li Hongzhi.58 It is difficult to ascertain the number of practitioners in China today, because the movement has been forced underground, but official Chinese sources and Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions of Chinese citizens practiced Falun Gong in the 1990s.59 The Commission tracks information on Falun Gong practitioners detained in connection to their practice of Falun Gong based on public information, which is incomplete, and reports that information in its Political Prisoner Database (PPD). As of September 20, 2011, the PPD contained records of 486 Falun Gong practitioners currently detained, serving prison sentences, or serving reeducation through labor (RTL) terms.60 Of the 376 serving prison sentences and for whom sentence information is available, the average sentence was approximately 7 years and 7 months.61

HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND "TRANSFORMATION"

This past reporting year, government authorities and the 6–10 Office—an extralegal, Party-run security apparatus created in June 1999 to implement the ban against Falun Gong 62—continued to take measures to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners in China,63 primarily through prisons, RTL centers, and specialized facilities known as "transformation through reeducation centers." 64 For example, in September 2010, public security officials detained 11 Falun Gong practitioners 65 in Laishui county, Baoding municipality, Hebei province, under orders from a 6–10 Office in Baoding and reportedly forced them to participate in "transformation" at a "transformation through reeducation center." 66

The government and Party also continued to harass and detain people who attempted to assist Falun Gong practitioners, such as family members and lawyers. For example, on February 24, 2011, public security officials in Shijiazhuang city, Hebei province, took into custody Hu Mingliang after he sought legal redress against the Hebei Women’s RTL Center.67 Public security officials there reportedly had sexually assaulted his daughter Hu Miaomiao, a Falun Gong practitioner.68 The Commission has not observed reports that provide further information on Hu Mingliang’s whereabouts. On February 16, 2011, public security officials in Xuanwu district, Beijing municipality, detained human rights lawyer Tang Jitian,69 whose lawyer’s license had been revoked by the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau in 2010 in connection with his representation of a Falun Gong practitioner in 2009.70 Authorities reportedly placed Tang under a state described as "house arrest" in March 2011, as of which time he reportedly was suffering from tuberculosis.71 [For more information on the detention and disappearance of human rights lawyers, see Section II—Criminal Justice.]

PARTY SPEARHEADS CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE EFFORTS TO "TRANSFORM" FALUN GONG PRACTITIONERS

The government and Party are in the second year of a three-year, national campaign to increase efforts to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners. Documents from local governments, Party organizations, and other sources describe a "2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan," a campaign that calls on governments, Party organizations, businesses, and individuals to increase efforts to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners,72 including allocating more funding to "transformation" work.73 The campaign is divided into three stages, with themes that include the following: 74

SELECTED THEMES OF THE "2010–2012 TRANSFORMATION-THROUGH-REEDUCATION ASSAULT AND CONSOLIDATION OVERALL BATTLE WORK PLAN"

Stage	Selected Themes
Stage 1: 2010	Establishing targets for the campaign Signing "responsibility agreements" to implement "transformation through reeducation"
Stage 2: 2011	Training a professional cadre corps and a civil, volunteer "help and education" corps to participate in "transformation" work "Deeply launching the work of a transformation-through-reeducation assault and consolidation"
Stage 3: 2012	Developing a long-term mechanism for work to "return to society" Falun Gong practitioners who have renounced their belief in and practice of Falun Gong Drawing lessons from the experience of the campaign and "establish[ing] and perfect[ing] long-lasting mechanisms for transformation through reeducation work" Proposing new "transformation through reeducation" duties

The documents indicate that the Party has taken the lead role in initiating and overseeing the campaign. Some cite the October 2007 17th Party Congress as a basis for the campaign,75 and one states specifically that the 17th Party Congress "put forward a new, higher requirement" in "the work of dealing with cults, including transformation through reeducation." 76 Some note that 6– 10 Office authorities at the central, provincial, municipal, and county levels have required local government authorities to participate in the campaign,77 and one describes "transformation" work as "led by the Party committees, with the cooperation of relevant [government] departments . . . ." 78 That document also refers to "transformation" work as a "test of [the] Party’s ability to govern." 79

The documents also call for the establishment of mechanisms to place greater responsibility for "transformation" work on actors at the local level, such as governments, Party organizations, businesses, and individuals. For example, one document calls on 6–10 Office authorities to sign "responsibility agreements" with various businesses and to assess the "transformation" work of those businesses on a regular basis.80 In some cases, local governments have established specific, numerical targets. For example, the General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government established the following targets: To reduce by 50 percent the number of people who had not been "transformed" by the end of 2009, and to keep the proportion of "recidivists" and "unstable people" within 10 percent of "transformed" Falun Gong practitioners.81

The mechanisms to place greater responsibility at the local level include personalized and, in some cases, invasive measures that reach into the workplaces and homes of Falun Gong practitioners. For example, one document calls on authorities to "mobilize and organize basic-level Party organizations and mass organizations, form responsibility help and education small groups, and enter the villages and homes [of Falun Gong practitioners] to conduct an educational assault." 82 One document calls on local authorities to require local businesses to establish "transformation-through-reeducation assault work small groups" and develop an individual plan to "transform" each employee who has not been "transformed." 83 Three of the documents call on authorities to establish databases of information on Falun Gong practitioners.84

ASIAN GAMES

Under the theme of "oppose cults, promote harmony, welcome the Asian Games," 85 authorities used the 2010 Asian Games as a justification to increase security measures targeted at Falun Gong practitioners (the Asian Games were held in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, from November 12 to 27, 2010). For example, on August 18, 2010, public security officials in Haizhu district, Guangzhou, criminally detained lawyer and Falun Gong practitioner Zhu Yubiao on suspicion of "using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law," 86 a crime under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law 87 and a charge commonly used against Falun Gong practitioners. The charges reportedly were related to Falun Gong materials that authorities found in Zhu’s home during a sweep of Falun Gong practitioners and supporters ahead of the Asian Games.88 Zhu was last reported to be held at the Haizhu District Public Security Bureau Detention Center.89 In addition, a November 10, 2010, directive from the Guangzhou Municipal People’s Government instructed local authorities to "prevent cult organizations and law breakers, including ‘Falun Gong,’ from using wireless communications to initiate activities of interference and destruction." 90

Islam

Chinese authorities maintained tight controls over the affairs of Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic Association of China (IAC) continued to regulate the confirmation of religious leaders, content of sermons, and overseas pilgrimages to accord with the Chinese government and Communist Party objectives. In 2011, the IAC marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment of a steering committee to interpret scripture and compile sermons in line with state goals. In an April 2011 speech on the anniversary, Wang Zuo’an, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), praised the scripture interpretation work for raising the "political caliber" of religious leaders and for promoting "positive positions within Islam that suit social progress." He also described the work as beneficial for "rallying the Muslim masses even more tightly around the Party and government" and called for future work to "even better conform to the needs of our country’s social development." 91 In its work plan for 2011, SARA said it would "help" the IAC in its scripture interpretation work and change of leadership.92

SARA announced plans in 2011 to draft legal measures on "the management of Hajj work," 93 building on existing requirements in the national Regulations on Religious Affairs and other documents that regulate pilgrimages.94 The government requires all pilgrimages to take place under the auspices of the IAC.95 Participants are subject to "patriotic education" prior to departure and to restrictions on activities within Mecca in a stated effort to guard against contact with "East Turkistan forces" (groups, according to the Chinese government, that seek Xinjiang’s independence) and other "enemy forces." 96 An official from SARA reported in October 2010 that authorities had strengthened "education and guidance" toward Muslims and "investigated, prosecuted, and curbed" the activities of "illegal organizations" as part of efforts to stop pilgrimages organized independently of state control.97

Local governments maintained bans on Islamic religious activities outside of state-sanctioned parameters. Authorities in multiple localities continued to call for banning "dawa preaching activities"—a term apparently used by officials to refer to religious outreach to fellow Muslims, including by foreign groups—and to stop religious "infiltration." 98 Authorities in a neighborhood in Shizuishan municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for example, reported in September 2010 on an "implementation plan" to address "dawa" activities and on "educating and leading" cadres and religious believers to distance themselves from and stop "dawa" activities and organizations.99 In Taojiang county, Yiyang municipality, Hunan province, local Islamic association officials reported taking steps to stop "infiltration" by outside missionaries, whose sermons were deemed to "violate" the Quran and state policy, and they reported carrying out "ideological work" toward local Muslims after ordering "dawa preachers" to leave the province.100 In Changde municipality, Hunan province, authorities called for "vigorously performing anti-infiltration stability work" following "illegal proselytizing and infiltration activities" by "backbone members" of "Muslim extremist ‘dawa preaching groups’ " and foreign Christian missionaries and reported "appropriately handling" three "infiltration" incidents connected to "dawa" groups.101 In Huangpu district, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, authorities singled out for scrutiny the activities of "Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and members of non-mainstream sects" who came to the locality, as part of steps to guard against "foreign infiltration." 102

ISLAM IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

See Section IV—Xinjiang for information on conditions in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Protestantism

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to implement a restrictive framework for control of the doctrine and practices of China’s estimated 20 million or more registered Protestants,103 who worship in state-sanctioned churches. Unregistered Protestants worship outside state-sanctioned churches; reliable data on the number of unregistered Protestants is difficult to obtain, and estimates vary widely. Many sources estimate that there are between 50 and 70 million unregistered Protestants,104 while other estimates range from approximately 45 million to over 100 million.105 The government and Party continued to harass, detain, and imprison some members of both the registered and unregistered communities who ran afoul of government or Party policy. In addition, cases of harassment and detention since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities intensified toward Protestants who assemble into large groups or across congregations, or who have contact with foreign individuals or organizations.

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY SEEK TO CONTROL PROTESTANT DOCTRINE AND PRACTICES

This past year, the government, Party, and state-controlled Protestant church continued to dictate the terms by which Protestants in China must interpret doctrine and theology. China’s Constitution guarantees "freedom of religious belief," 106 but the government and Party continued to promote "theological reconstruction," the process by which the state-controlled church attempts to eliminate elements of the Christian faith that do not conform to Party goals and ideology.107 The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the China Christian Council (CCC) are the official organizations that manage registered Protestants on behalf of the government and Party,108 and TSPM Secretary General Xu Xiaohong linked Protestant doctrine to political goals when he reportedly said in September 2010 that "[t]here are many Bible teachings that are complementary to the government policy of social harmony. These ethics, if carried out, are a great help to society and, in a way, help consolidate the regime." 109 Officials also continued to link theological reconstruction to economic development 110 and describe it as a "requirement" for the "mutual adaptation" of Protestantism and socialism.111

HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH PLACES OF WORSHIP

The government and Party continued to harass, detain, imprison, and interfere with the religious activities of some Protestants who worship outside of state-approved parameters. In particular, cases since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities intensified toward members of unregistered Protestant congregations ("house churches") who assembled into large groups or across congregations, or who had contact with foreign individuals or organizations. The Commission has not observed official statements that acknowledge a concerted effort to target house church congregations during this period, but a January 2011 document from China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) that outlines SARA’s policies in 2011 called on authorities to "guide" Protestants who "par-ticipate in activities at unauthorized gathering places" (house churches) to worship in state-controlled churches.112 In addition, two April 2011 editorials from the Global Times warned unregistered Protestant congregations not to overstep state-approved parameters in their religious activities.113 The Global Times operates under the People’s Daily,114 the official news media of the Communist Party. During this period, authorities throughout China stopped house church gatherings; took participants into custody; placed unregistered Protestants under "soft detention" (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home confinement; and blocked access to sites of worship. Such measures violate provisions in international law that protect religious practice and peaceful assembly, such as Articles 18 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 115 and Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.116 China’s Regulations on Religious Affairs excludes unregistered religious groups from the limited state protections that it offers,117 leaving members of house church congregations at risk of harassment, detention, and imprisonment by authorities. Selected cases follow: 118

Beginning on April 9, 2011, public security authorities in Beijing repeatedly took into custody and placed under "soft detention" members and leaders of the unregistered Beijing Shouwang Church as they attempted to worship outdoors in Beijing.119 Shouwang reportedly has approximately 1,000 members, one of the largest unregistered congregations in Beijing.120 Shouwang began to organize outdoor worship gatherings every Sunday from April 10 onward after authorities reportedly pressured its landlords to deny it access to indoor sites where it had previously met or planned to meet.121 In one instance, officials reportedly took into custody over 160 church members.122 In total, officials reportedly placed approximately 500 church members and leaders under "soft detention," 123 including pastors Jin Tianming, Yuan Ling, Zhang Xiaofeng, and Li Xiaobai, and lay leaders Sun Yi, You Guanhui, and Liu Guan.124 As of April 29, all seven remained confined to their homes.125
On May 10, 2011, public security officials in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, interrupted a Bible study gathering of members of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA)—which associates with unregistered Protestant congregations in multiple provinces—and took into custody 49 people.126 The 49 included 3 persons who were previously detained in April after having contact with CHCA leaders,127 as well as Korean pastor Jin Yongzhe (pinyin name), and Jin’s wife Li Sha.128 All but Jin and Li were released by the following day; 129 Jin and Li were released on May 15.130 Since late 2010, authorities in various locations have harassed and detained CHCA leadership, including president Zhang Mingxuan 131 and vice president Shi Enhao.132 On June 21, public security officials in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, reportedly detained Shi on suspicion of "using superstition to undermine the implementation of the law," 133 and authorities later ordered him to serve two years of reeducation through labor.134
In December 2010, authorities harassed, detained, or prevented from leaving the country approximately 200 Protestants who received invitations to attend the Third Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization, held in South Africa,135 despite the fact that a January 2011 SARA report lists "proactively launching foreign religious exchanges" as an achievement of SARA in 2010.136 Authorities reportedly warned members of unregistered church communities not to attend because their attendance would "endanger state security," 137 an explanation that, according to Fan Yafeng, anecdotal evidence suggests has been broadly applied to rights defenders and other citizens.138 Fan is a prominent legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house church leader.139 [See Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement for more information.]
Between October and December 2010, authorities in Beijing took Fan Yafeng into custody at least six times in connection with his legal advocacy for unregistered Protestant communities 140 and his contact with foreign media.141 Since November 1, 2010, public security officials have prevented him from leaving his home.142

Other members of unregistered Protestant communities remain in detention or in prison for practicing their religion. For example, Uyghur Protestant Alimjan Yimit remains in the Xinjiang No. 3 Prison in Urumqi city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,143 after the Kashgar Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to 15 years in prison in 2009 for "leaking state secrets." 144 He previously told a U.S. citizen about an interview between himself and local authorities about his own preaching activities; the interview’s contents were later classified as a state secret.145

In a May 2011 letter submitted to the National People’s Congress (NPC),146 22 house church leaders and members called on the NPC to investigate and resolve the Beijing Shouwang Church’s conflict with authorities, examine the constitutionality of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, and pass a law that protects freedom of religious belief.147 Drawing on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the letter argued that freedom of religion includes assembly, association, expression, education, and evangelization.148

Authorities also continued to interfere in the religious practices and worship sites of registered Protestants. For example, in December 2010, public security officials in Bengbu city, Anhui province, pressured three congregations—two unregistered and one registered—to cancel a Christmas service that all three had planned to hold together.149 On November 19, 2010, the registered Chengnan Church, in Tinghu district, Yancheng city, Jiangsu province, was demolished 150 after government officials and real estate developers had unsuccessfully sought to purchase the church’s property to build commercial residential buildings.151

Taoism

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to exercise control over Taoist 152 religious activities in much the same way that they do for other religious communities in China, restricting doctrine, personnel, activities, and sites of worship.

CONTROLS OVER DOCTRINE

The state-controlled Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) continued to dictate the terms by which Taoists must interpret doctrine and continued to call on Taoists to accept government and Party goals. For example, a November 23, 2010, CTA announcement seeking students for a Taoist scripture reading class required candidates to "fervently love the socialist motherland [and] uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." 153 Authorities continued to link Taoist doctrine to patriotism and economic development,154 and in March 2011, China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) urged the CTA to hold an international event on Taoism because it would be significant in "increasing the influence of Taoism, spreading traditional Chinese culture, increasing the country’s soft power, and the great revival of the Chinese nation." 155

CONTROLS OVER PERSONNEL, ACTIVITIES, AND SITES OF WORSHIP

The government requires Taoist groups and religious personnel to register with the CTA to legally perform ritual services and hold Taoist ceremonies.156 Local governments continued to restrict Taoist practices by calling for the removal of practices that authorities deem to be "superstitious" or "feudal." 157 China’s Regulations on Religious Affairs conditions the construction of sites of worship on government oversight,158 and local governments continued to call on officials to monitor and control the "indiscriminate" construction of Taoist temples and statues.159 Central and local authorities also used the November 2010 Asian Games as a justification for imposing political goals on Taoist practices.160 For example, SARA Vice Director Jiang Jianyong told participants at a November 2010 Taoist cultural festival in Huizhou city, Guangdong province, that the festival would be "advantageous for ‘constructing harmonious religion and serving the Asian Games.’ " 161

Other Religious Communities

The Chinese government did not recognize additional religious groups in the past year or remove its framework of recognizing only selected religious communities. In January 2011, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) implemented a technical revision to implementing rules that regulate the activities of foreigners in China.162 The revised rules retain broad restrictions on foreigners’ religious activities in China and interaction with Chinese citizens, barring them from leading religious activities with Chinese citizens in attendance, "cultivating followers from among Chinese citizens," distributing "religious propaganda materials," and carrying out "other missionary activities." 163 Leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported in August 2010 on holding meetings with a high-level Chinese official and said church leaders "established a relationship" that they "expect will lead to regularizing the activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in China." 164 No new developments appeared to take place in this area in the past reporting year. SARA has engaged in talks with officials from the Orthodox Church in recent years,165 but the Orthodox Church continues to lack national-level recognition. A limited number of localities in China recognize the Orthodox church within local legislation.166

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Religion

1 PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.

2 For protections in international law, see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18;International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art.13(3) (requiring States Parties to "ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions"); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC and a signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment on April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China’s top leaders have also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao; in a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law; in statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour; and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly. China affirmed this commitment during the Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record before the UN Human Rights Council. UN GAOR, Hum Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, para. 114(1). In addition, China’s National Human Rights Action Plan affirms the principles in the ICCPR. State Council Information Office, "National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010)," reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction. The "White Paper on Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2009," issued in 2010, also states that the government is "vigorously creating conditions" for ratifying the ICCPR. State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2009" [2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 September 10, sec. VII.

3 State Council Information Office, "National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 2010)," reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction, sec. II(4).

4 State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2009" [2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 September 10.

5 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. See analysis in "State Administration for Religious Affairs Outlines Restrictive Religious Practices for 2011," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12 April 11.

6 Measures on the Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], issued 30 September 10, effective 1 November 10. The measures come as most Tibetan autonomous prefectures in China have drafted or implemented their own legal measures to regulate "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs." See Section V—Tibet for additional information.

7 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Our Country To Further Draft and Revise Accompanying Measures to ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’ " [Woguo jiang jinyibu zhiding he xiuding "zongjiao shiwu tiaoli" peitao banfa], 10 January 11.

8 Ibid.

9 Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05.

10 For information and analysis on previous legal measures, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 73–75; "New Measures Regulate Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3; and "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11. The Regulations on Religious Affairs condition protections on religious groups registering as organizations and registering their venues with the government. Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 12–15.

11 This section pertains to what official sources refer to as "Buddhism in the Han tradition," an inaccurate umbrella term that encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from the Tibetan tradition. "Buddhism in the Han tradition" (hanchuan fojiao) is inaccurate in religious terms. Buddhists divide themselves according to a number of traditions, ritual practices, and schools of thought, but not in purely ethnic terms. It is also worth noting that with the possible exception of the Chan school of Buddhism, there is arguably no true "Han tradition" of Buddhism. All non-Chan schools of Buddhism in China can be clearly traced to Indian sources. In addition, there are Chinese citizens belonging to officially recognized "ethnic minority" groups, such as the Dai, that practice Theravada Buddhism—a branch of Buddhism completely outside of what Chinese officials mean by the "Han tradition" (non-esoteric Mahayana Buddhism as practiced by non-Tibetans).

12 See, e.g., "Top Leaders Praise the Work of China’s ‘Patriotic Religious Organizations,’ " CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.

13 See, e.g., "Jiangsu Provincial Buddhist Association Conference Celebrating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party and Second Leadership Meeting Convenes" [Jiangsu sheng foxie qingzhu jian dang 90 zhounian zuotan hui ji di er ci huizhang bangong hui zhaokai], Buddhism Online, 27 June 11; "Jincheng Municipal Buddhist Association, Shanxi, Holds Art Exhibition for the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party" [Shanxi jincheng shi fojiao xiehui juxing jian dang 90 zhounian wenyi huiyan], Buddhism Online, 20 June 11; "Nationwide Religious Communities Hold Conference To Celebrate the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party" [Quanguo zongjiao jie qingzhu zhongguo gongchandang chengli 90 zhounian zuotan hui juxing], Buddhism Online, 25 June 11; "Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association Confirms 2011 Work Points" [Shanxi sheng fojiao xiehui queding 2011nian gongzuo yaodian], Buddhism Online, 25 January 11; Yi Ming, Buddhist Academy of China, "Welcoming the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, Buddhist Academy of China Holds Party Knowledge Conference" [Yingjie zhongguo gongchan dang chengli 90 zhounian, wo yuan juxing dang de zhishi jiangzuo], 20 May 11; "Xingtai City, Hebei, Convenes Religious Words and Harmony Conference" [Hebei xingtai shi zhaokai zongjiao jie hua hexie yantao hui], China Religion, reprinted in Buddhism Online, 31 May 11; Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Second Jiangsu Province Buddhist Temple Abbots (Persons in Charge) Training Session Held" [Di er qi jiangsu sheng fojiao siyuan zhuchi (fuze ren)peixun ban juban], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 15 March 11; "Gaotang Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Firmly Grasps ‘Three Educations’ To Raise the Quality of Religious Personnel"[Gaotang minzong ju henzhua ‘san ge jiaoyu’ tisheng zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan suzhi], Buddhism Online, 11 April 11.

14 "Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association Confirms 2011 Work Points" [Shanxi sheng fojiao xiehui queding 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], Buddhism Online, 25 January 11.

15 State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. A SARA document summarizing SARA’s work in 2010 reported that authorities "supported" Buddhist scripture reading events; it did not use the word "lead." State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Report on the Situation of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2010 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2010 nian gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 24 January 11.

16 See, e.g., "Han Buddhist Scripture Reading Conference Scripture Reading Monk Representatives Touring Event Held in Shaanxi" [Hanchuan fojiao jiangjing jiaoliu hui jiangjing fashidaibiao xunjiang huodong zai shaanxi juxing], Shaanxi Buddhism Net, reprinted in Buddhism Online, 2 April 11; Zhenjiang Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Purity, Harmony—Jiangsu Provincial Buddhist Association Scripture Reading Group Does Scripture Reading Tour in Zhenjiang" [Qingjing hexie—jiangsu sheng fojiao xiehui jiangjing tuan zai zhenjiangxunhui jiangjing], 6 April 11.

17 See, e.g., Gongan County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Proactively Lead, ManageAccording to Law" [Jiji yindao, yi fa guanli], 11 May 11; Xu Yun, Suzhou Municipal Local Records Office, "The Situation of I-Kuan Tao in Suzhou" [Yidaoguan zai suzhou de qingkuang],6 December 10.

18 The Commission has not observed official definitions of the terms "feudal" or "superstitious"in reference to Buddhist religious practices. For example, the 1993 Measures for the Management of Nationwide Han Buddhist Temples uses the term "superstitious activities" but does not elaborate on the meaning of the term. Buddhist Association of China, Measures for the Management of Han Buddhist Temples Nationwide [Quanguo hanchuan fojiao siyuan guanli banfa],adopted 21 October 93, art. 8. In addition, in at least some cases, authorities have asserted a link between what they deem to be "feudal" or "superstitious" religious activities and what theydeem to be "cult" activities. See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, "The Genesis of and Defense Against Cults" [Xiejiao de chansheng yu fangfan], 28 October 05. Authorities have invoked the term "cult" as a basis for restrictions on the freedom of religion of members of a variety of religious groups in China, including Falun Gong, groups of Protestant origin, andgroups of Buddhist and Taoist origin. See, e.g., ChinaAid, "Henan Police Unlawfully Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps," 9 April 10; Ministry of Public Security, "The Situation of Organizations Already Recognized as Cults" [Xianyi rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 February 07; Verna Yu, "Christians Held To Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer,"South China Morning Post, 29 June 10; "Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through Labor," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9November 10, 3; "National Conferences Highlight Restrictions on Buddhist and Taoist Doctrine," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.

19 See, e.g., "Exclusive Interview With Buddhist Association of China Head Master Chuanyin: Religious Figures Should Improve Self-Construction" [Zhuanfang zhongfoxie huizhang chuanyinzhanglao: zongjiao jie yao jiaqiang zishen jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in Buddhism Online, 2 March 11; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Serve the General Situation and Write Brilliant Works—Review of Religious Work at the Time of the 11th Five-Year Plan" [Fuwu daju xie huazhang—"shi yi wu" shiqi zongjiao gongzuo saomiao], 29 October 10.

20 "Exclusive Interview With Buddhist Association of China Head Master Chuanyin: Religious Figures Should Improve Self-Construction" [Zhuanfang zhongfoxie huizhang chuanyin zhanglao: zongjiao jie yao jiaqiang zishen jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in Buddhism Online, 2 March 11.

21 Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 13–14, 24–25, 44.

22 See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Summary of the Fifth Five-Year Plan Awareness Promotion Work of the Nationwide Religious Work System" [Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo xitong "wu wu" pufa gongzuo zongjie], 22 March 11. For other examples, see Ding Cai’an, Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau, "Humble Remarks on the Current Situation of the Management of Folk Beliefs and Methods of Improvement" [Minjian xinyang guanli xianzhuang yu gaijin fangfa de chuyi], 4 January 11; Guang’an Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Guangan, Sichuan, Improves Work of Governing and Inspecting the Indiscriminate Construction of Temples and Excessive Construction of Open-Air Religious Statues" [Sichuan guang’an jiaqiang luan jian miaoyu lan su lutian zongjiao zaoxiang zhili diaoyan gongzuo], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 7 April 11; Tongan County Party Committee, "Tongan District Convenes Special Work Meeting on Stopping the Indiscriminate Construction of Temples and Open-Air Religious Statues" [Tongan qu zhaokai zhizhi luan jian simiao he lutian zongjiao zaoxiang zhuanxiang gongzuo huiyi], 11 April 11.

23 See, e.g., "Nanjing City Convenes Meeting for ‘Confirming and Putting Religious Personnel on File’ Pilot Work" [Nanjing shi "zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan rending ji bei’an" shidian gongzuohuiyi zhaokai], Buddhism Online, 28 August 10; Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, "Putuoshan Buddhist Association Convenes Work Mobilization Meeting for Confirming and Putting on File Qualifications of Religious Personnel" [Putuoshan foxie zhaokai jiaozhi renyuan zige rending bei’an gongzuo dongyuan hui], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 30November 10; Guangdong Provincial Buddhist Association, "Special Meeting on the Work of Confirming and Verifying the Credentials of Guangdong Provincial Buddhist Religious Personnel Convenes" [Guangdong sheng fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending shenhe gongzuo zhuanxiang huiyi zhaokai], 30 March 11.

24 Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, "Putuoshan Buddhist Association Convenes Work Mobilization Meeting for Confirming and Putting on File Qualifications ofReligious Personnel" [Putuoshan foxie zhaokai jiaozhi renyuan zige rending bei’an gongzuo dongyuan hui], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 30 November 10.

25 Estimates of the size of China’s Catholic community vary widely, and there are large discrepancies between Chinese government estimates and international media estimates. For example, senior Communist Party leader Jia Qinglin has estimated the Catholic population at 4 million, although it is unclear whether or not his estimate applies to both registered and unregistered Catholics. Bao Daozu, "Religion ‘Can Promote Harmony,’ " China Daily, 4 March 08. International media estimates range from 8 to over 12 million. See, e.g., Ambrose Leung, "Tsang Had Audience With Pope but Cancelled," South China Morning Post, 26 March 10; "Cardinal for China," Wall Street Journal, 16 April 09; James Pomfret, "New Hong Kong Bishop PressuresChina on Religious Freedom," Reuters, 17 April 09.

26 According to the Charter of the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China(BCCCC), the BCCCC has the authority to approve the ordination of bishops in China. Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China, Charter of the Bishops’ Conference of the CatholicChurch in China [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan zhangcheng], adopted 9 July 04, art. 6(2).

27 See, e.g., "State Administration for Religious Affairs Issues Statement Regarding Vatican’sCriticism of National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives" [Guojia zongjiao ju jiu fandigang zhize zhongguo tianzhujiao daibiao huiyi fabiao tanhua], Xinhua, 22 December 10.

28 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.

29 See, e.g., "China Appoints New Bishop With Vatican Approval Following Souring of Relations Last Year," Associated Press, 11 April 11; Jian Mei, "New Bishop of Yanzhou Ordained With Holy See Approval," AsiaNews, 20 May 11.

30 The Chinese government established the Chengde diocese in May 2010, and the Holy See does not recognize it. See, e.g., Zhen Yuan, "Chengde: Illicit Episcopal Ordination, the First inFour Years," AsiaNews, 19 November 10.

31 Bernardo Cervellera, "The Return of the Cultural Revolution: Chinese Bishops Imprisonedor Hunted Like Criminals," AsiaNews, 6 December 10; W. Zhicheng and Z. Yuan, "Chinese Bishops Deported To Attend Patriotic Assembly," AsiaNews, 7 December 10; Zhen Yuan,"Chengde: Illicit Episcopal Ordination, the First in Four Years," AsiaNews, 19 November 10.

32 Jian Mei and W. Zhicheng, "Officials Kidnap Bishops of Guangdong To Force Them To TakePart in Illicit Shantou Ordination," AsiaNews, 11 July 11.

33 Jian Mei, "Eight Bishops in Communion With the Pope Forced To Take Part in Illegitimate Ordination in Shantou," AsiaNews, 14 July 11; "Bishops Attend Unapproved Ordination," Union of Catholic Asian News, 14 July 11.

34 " ‘Underground’ Xiwanzi Bishop Dies," Union of Catholic Asian News, 10 March 11; "Police Isolate Hebei Village After Death of an Underground Bishop," AsiaNews, 12 March 11.

35 "Police Isolate Hebei Village After Death of an Underground Bishop," AsiaNews, 12 March 11. Yao Liang, the auxiliary bishop of the same diocese, died in 2009, and authorities implemented restrictions on his funeral. For more information, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 102.

36 Ambrose Leung, "Catholic Seminarians Mount Rare Protest," South China Morning Post, 3 December 10; "China’s Hebei Seminary Strikes, Demands Revocation of Political Appointment"[Zhongguo hebei xiuyuan ba ke yaoqiu chehui zhengzhi renming], CathNews China, 24 November 10; Hebei Seminary, "Provincial Department Leaders Come to Our Seminary To Express Greetings" [Sheng ting lingdao lai wo yuan weiwen], 11 November 10.

37 Ambrose Leung, "Catholic Seminarians Mount Rare Protest," South China Morning Post, 3 December 10; "China’s Hebei Seminary Strikes, Demands Revocation of Political Appointment" [Zhongguo hebei xiuyuan ba ke yaoqiu chehui zhengzhi renming], CathNews China, 24 November 10.

38 "Shijiazhuang: Hebei Catholic Seminary Board of Directors Convenes Meeting" [Shijiazhuang: hebei tianzhujiao shenzhexue yuan dongshi hui zhaokai huiyi], Faith Press, 14 January 11; Zhen Yuan, "Hebei Seminarians Welcome New Rector," AsiaNews, 15 January 11.

39 Liu Bainian was previously the vice chairman of the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA). At the Eighth National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives, he was chosen to be honorary chairman of the CPA and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China. See, e.g., "Exclusive Interview With Catholic Patriotic Association and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China Honorary Chairman Liu Bainian" [Zhuanfang zhongguo tianzhujiao "yi hui yi tuan" mingyu zhuxi liu bainian], China Religion, 30 March 11.

40 The charter of the Catholic Patriotic Association lists among its duties: "Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s government, to fervently love socialism and the motherland; to unite all the country’s Catholic clergy and church members; to respect the country’s constitution, laws, regulations, and policies; to exhibit Catholicism’s own strengths; to contribute strength to comprehensively establishing a prosperous society; to be the light and the salt, the glory of God." Catholic Patriotic Association, Charter of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association [Zhongguo tianzhujiao aiguo hui zhangcheng], adopted 9 July 04, art. 6.

41 The charter of the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) does not explicitly formalize the BCCCC’s relationship with the government or the Party. It does, however, formalize its relationship with the CPA. Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China, Charter of the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan zhangcheng], adopted 9 July 04, art. 1.

42 "Exclusive Interview With Catholic Patriotic Association and Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China Honorary Chairman Liu Bainian" [Zhuanfang zhongguo tianzhujiao "yi hui yi tuan" mingyu zhuxi liu bainian], China Religion, 30 March 11.

43 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "2010 Annual Report," May 2010, 110.

44 Bernardo Cervellera, "In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association," AsiaNews, 29 October 09.

45 "Priests Not Spared in China’s Crackdown," Union of Catholic Asian News, 13 April 11; "Three Priests in Hebei Province Detained or Whereabouts Unknown" [Hebei sheng san ming shenfu bei juliu huo xialuo bu ming], CathNews China, 13 April 11.

46 Ibid.

47 "Officials Free ‘Underground’ Priest," Union of Catholic Asian News, 4 August 11.

48 Jia is also head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The CPPCC Web site lists among the functions of the CPPCC "political consultation," "democratic oversight," and "participation in the deliberation and administration of state affairs," and it contains representatives from religious communities. Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, "The Main Functions of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference" [Zhongguo zhengxie de zhuyao zhineng], 29 June 10.

49 "Jia Qinglin Meets With Representatives From Eighth National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives" [Jia qinglin huijian zhongguo tianzhu jiao di ba ci daibiao huiyi daibiao], Xinhua, 9 December 10.

50 See, e.g., "Chinese Catholics Mull Post-Congress Future," Union of Catholic Asian News, 17 December 10. In a communique from the Press Office of the Holy See, the Holy See alleged that "many Bishops and priests were forced to take part in the [National Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives]." The full text of the communique is reprinted in "Vatican ‘Sorrow’ Over China Catholic Congress," Union of Catholic Asian News, 17 December 10.

51 "Three Days in China’s Catholic Congress," Union of Catholic Asian News, 16 December 10.

52 Keith B. Richburg, "China Defies Vatican on Bishop Conclave," Washington Post, 8 December 10.

53 Bernardo Cervellera, "The Return of the Cultural Revolution: Chinese Bishops Imprisoned or Hunted Like Criminals," AsiaNews, 6 December 10; W. Zhicheng and Z. Yuan, "Chinese Bishops Deported To Attend Patriotic Assembly," AsiaNews, 7 December 10.

54 Ibid.

55 "Bishop Voted Chinese Catholic of 2010," Union of Catholic Asian News, 20 January 11.

56 Ibid.

57 The campaign began after the Communist Party designated Falun Gong an illegal "cult organization" in 1999, following a peaceful demonstration held by its practitioners near the Party leadership compound in Beijing.

58 For more information on the teachings and practices of Falun Gong, see David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

59 Official estimates placed the number of adherents inside China at 30 million prior to the crackdown. Falun Gong sources estimate that there was twice that number. Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 2. In April 2009, Han Zhiguang, a Chinese attorney who has defended Falun Gong clients, reported that there remain "huge numbers" of practitioners in China and that the movement is "expanding." Malcolm Moore, "Falun Gong ‘Growing’ in China Despite 10-Year Ban," Telegraph, 24 April 09.

60 Based on data in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database as of September 20, 2011.

61 Ibid.

62 For more information on the background and activities of the 6–10 Office, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 105; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 121–23.

63 "Transformation through reeducation" can also apply to non-Falun Gong groups that authorities have designated as "cult" organizations. For example, a government document from a town in Weng’an county, Qiannan Buyi and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Guizhou province, calls on authorities to "transform" followers of the Disciples Sect (Mentuhui), an indigenous Chinese sect that appears on a list of Chinese government and Party-designated "cults" issued by the Ministry of Public Security in 2000. Ministry of Public Security, "The Situation of Organizations Already Recognized as Cults" [Xianyi rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 February 07; Tianwen Town People’s Government, "Tianwen Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan," reprinted in Weng’an County People’s Government, 5 May 10. For a recent example of the "cult" designation applied to non-Falun Gong practitioners, see ChinaAid, "Henan Police Unlawfully Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps," 9 April 10; Verna Yu, "Christians Held To Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer," South China Morning Post, 29 June 10; ChinaAid, "Christians in Shangqiu, Henan, Including Gao Jianli, Bring Suit Against RTL Committee, Rejected" [Henan shangqiu jidu tu gao jianli deng su laojiao wei bei bohui], 3 August 10; "Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through Labor," CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 2010, 3.

64 The China Anti-Cult Association has identified these three kinds of facilities as the "main front" in the effort to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners. Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, "Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jibensikao], 5 August 10.

65 The 11 Falun Gong practitioners detained are Xin Xiumin, Ning Shumei, Gao Shuxian,Wang Xiling, Bao Zhenjiang, Luo Lingmei, Zhu Fengqi, Zhang Yulan, Shen Hai, Gao Cun, and Fang Xiuying.

66 "Twenty-Four Falun Gong Practitioners From Laishui County, Hebei Province, Have Been Taken to CCP Brainwashing Centers" [Hebei laishui xian 24 ming falungong xueyuan beibangru dangxiao xinao], Clear Wisdom, 24 September 10; "Twenty-Four Falun Gong Practitioners From Laishui County, Hebei Province, Have Been Taken to CCP Brainwashing Centers,"Clear Wisdom, 30 September 10. Some sources use the term "brainwashing" to refer to "transformation through reeducation."

67 "Having Accused Those Responsible for Violating His Daughter, the Father of Hu Miaomiao Is Kidnapped" [Konggao qinhai nu’er de zuifan, hu miaomiao fuqin bei jiechi], Clear Wisdom,1 March 11; "Mr. Hu Mingliang Arrested After Suing the Labor Camp Where His Daughter Ms. Hu Miaomiao Was Sexually Abused," Clear Wisdom, 4 March 11; "Seeking Justice for HisDaughter, Hu Miaomiao’s Father Is Illegally Detained" [Wei nu’er tao gongdao, hu miaomiao fuqin bei feifa guanya], Clear Wisdom, 14 March 11.

68 "Having Suffered Sexual Assault in Reeducation Through Labor Center, Girl Cannot Stand Upright or Walk" [Zao laojiao suo xing cuican, nuhai bu neng zhili xingzou], Clear Wisdom, 4November 10; Falun Dafa Information Center, "Urgent Appeal: 25-Year-Old Woman Unable To Walk From Sexual Abuse in Hebei Labor Camp," 14 November 10.

69 Tania Branigan, "Fears Grow After Chinese Human Rights Lawyer Detained," Guardian, 18 February 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "CHRD Condemns Preemptive StrikesAgainst Protests," 21 February 11.

70 "Human Rights Lawyers Threatened and Jailed," AsiaNews, 31 December 10; Ye Bing, "Beijing Rights Defense Lawyers Tang Jitian and Liu Wei Faced With Losing Their Licenses" [Weiquan lushi tang jitian liu wei mianlin diaoxiao zhizhao chufa], Voice of America, 14 April 10.

71 "Concern Over Rights Lawyer," Radio Free Asia, 13 April 11; Verna Yu, "Rights LawyersFree After Being Held in Crackdown," South China Morning Post, 21 April 11.

72 General Office of the Ningdu County People’s Government, "Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gongguzhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ningdu County People’s Government, 18 March 10; "Yang Sisong Attends City-Wide Mobilization and Deployment Meeting on Work To Defend Against and Handle Cults and the Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Yang sisong canjia quanshi fangfan he chuli xiejiao gongzuo ji jiaoyuzhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang dongyuan bushu dahui], Hefei Daily, reprinted in Hefei Municipal People’s Government, 1 April 10; Longbu Town Party Committee, "LongbuTown 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Longbu zhen 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengtizhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Anyuan County People’s Government, 2 April 10; Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "Regarding Launching the 2010–2012 Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work" [Quansheng laojiao xitong jiaoyu zhuanhua "xin san nian gongjian gonggu zhengtizhang" dongyuan bushu hui zai sheng nu suo zhaokai], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People’s Government, 6 April 10; Binhu Township Party and Government General Office, "Binhu Township 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Binhu xiang 2010–2012 jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhanggongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Changji Municipal People’s Government, 13 April 10; Chengxi Town Party Committee, "Chengxi Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan" [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu fang’an], reprinted in Guoyang County People’s Government, 13 April 10; General Officeof the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, "Hongxia Township 2010–2012 Trans-formation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Hongxiaxiang 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, 26 April 10; Tianwen Town People’s Government, "Tianwen Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Tianwen zhen 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Weng’an County People’s Government, 5 May 10; Jiangxi Provincial Reeducation Through Labor Administration Bureau, "Provincial Reeducation Through Labor System Mobilization and Deployment Meeting on Transformation-Through-Reeducation ‘New Three-Year Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle’ Convenes at Provincial Women’s Reeducation Through Labor Center" [Quansheng laojiao xitong jiaoyu zhuanhua "xin san nian gongjian gonggu zhengti zhang" dongyuan bushu hui zai sheng nu suo zhaokai], 13 June 10; Gulou District People’s Government, "Kaiyuan Community 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Implementation Plan" [Kaiyuan shequ 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo shishi fang’an], 27 June 10; Longnan County Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "County Industry and Information Bureau Establishing, Synthesizing, and Maintaining Stability Work Summary for the First Half of 2010" [Xian gongxin ju 2010 nian shang ban nian chuangjian, zongzhi, weiwen gongzuo zongjie], reprinted in Longnan County People’s Government, 30 June 10; Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, "Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; China Anti-Cult Association, "Suxian District, Chenzhou City, Hunan Province, Implements Shingle-Hanging Transformation as Shining Tactic in Three-Year Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Hunan sheng chenzhou shi suxian qu shishi guapai zhuanhua wei san nian gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang liang shizhao], 6 August 10; Hepu County Water Bureau, "Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee’s 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], last visited 23 November 10. For more information on the campaign, see "Communist Party Calls for Increased Efforts To ‘Transform’ Falun Gong Practitioners as Part of Three-Year Campaign," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.

73 Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010–2012 Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assaultand Consolidation Overall Battle Work" [Guanyu kaizhan 2010–2012 nian jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo shishi fang’an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People’s Government, 6 April 10; Binhu Township Party and Government General Office, "Binhu Township 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and ConsolidationOverall Battle Work Plan" [Binhu xiang 2010–2012 jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Changji Municipal People’s Government, 13 April 10;Chengxi Town Party Committee, "Chengxi Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan" [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhuagongjian yu gonggu fang’an], reprinted in Guoyang County People’s Government, 13 April 10; Hepu County Water Bureau, "Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee’s 2010–2012 Trans-formation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yugonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], last visited 23 November 10.

74 See, e.g., Chengxi Town Party Committee, "Chengxi Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan" [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu fang’an], reprinted in Guoyang County People’s Government, 13 April 10; General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, "Hongxia Township 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Hongxia xiang 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, 26 April 10.

75 Longnan County Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "County Industry and Information Bureau Establishing, Synthesizing, and Maintaining Stability Work Summary for the First Half of 2010" [Xian gongxin ju 2010 nian shang ban nian chuangjian, zongzhi, weiwen gongzuo zongjie], reprinted in Longnan County People’s Government, 30 June 10; Xiang Yang,China Anti-Cult Association, "Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengtizhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; Hepu County Water Bureau, "Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee’s 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and ConsolidationOverall Battle Work Plan" [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], last visited 23 November 10.

76 Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, "Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhuagongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10.

77 General Office of the Ningdu County People’s Government, "Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gongguzhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ningdu County People’s Government, 18 March 10; Longbu Town Party Committee, "Longbu Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Longbu zhen 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an de tongzhi], reprinted inAnyuan County People’s Government, 2 April 10; Chengxi Town Party Committee, "Chengxi Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan" [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu fang’an], reprinted in Guoyang County People’s Government, 13 April 10.

78 Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, "Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle" [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhuagongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10.

79 Ibid.

80 Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010–2012 Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work" [Guanyu kaizhan 2010–2012 nian jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo shishi fang’an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People’s Government, 6 April 10.

81 General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, "Hongxia Township 2010– 2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Hongxia xiang 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People’s Government, 26 April 10.

82 Tianwen Town People’s Government, "Tianwen Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Tianwen zhen 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Weng’an County People’s Government, 5 May 10.

83 Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, "Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010–2012 Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work" [Guanyu kaizhan 2010–2012 nian jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo shishi fang’an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People’s Government, 6 April 10.

84 General Office of the Ningdu County People’s Government, "Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010–2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Ningdu County People’s Government, 18 March10; Longbu Town Party Committee, "Longbu Town 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Longbu zhen 2010–2012 nianjiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Anyuan County People’s Government, 2 April 10; Binhu Township Party and Government General Office, "Binhu Township 2010–2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan" [Binhu xiang 2010–2012 jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gongguzhengti zhang gongzuo fang’an], reprinted in Changji Municipal People’s Government, 13 April 10.

85 See, e.g., Panyu District Judicial Bureau, "Donghuan Street Law Promulgation Office Holds ‘Oppose Cults, Promote Harmony, Welcome the Asian Games, Prohibit Drugs, Protect Minors’Knowledge Competition" [Donghuan jie pufa ban juxing ‘fan xiejiao, cu hexie, ying yayun, jin du, baohu weichengnian ren’ zhishi jingsai], 1 November 10; Tianshan District Bureau ofScience and Technology, " ‘Oppose Cults, Promote Harmony, Welcome the Asian Games’ Propaganda Education, Propaganda Education Topic Number One: What Is a Cult? " ["Fan xiejiao, cu hexie, ying yayun" xuanchuan jiaoyu xuanchuan jiaoyu zhuanti zhi yi: shenme shi xiejiao?], 28 September 10.

86 "Guangzhou Lawyer Zhu Yubiao Framed for Using Cult To Undermine Implementation of the Law" [Guangzhou zhu yubiao lushi bei gouxian liyong xiejiao pohuai falu shishi], Canyu,reprinted in Boxun, 10 September 10; "Defense Lawyer for Falun Gong Jailed for Second Offense, Raids Performed in Anticipation of Guangzhou’s Asian Games" [Wei falun gong bianhulushi er jin gong, guangzhou yayun qingchang shangmen soubu], Radio Free Asia, 5 October 10.

87 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01,28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 300.

88 "Defense Lawyer for Falun Gong Jailed for Second Offense, Raids Performed in Anticipation of Guangzhou’s Asian Games" [Wei falun gong bianhu lushi er jin gong, guangzhou yayun qingchang shangmen soubu], Radio Free Asia, 5 October 10.

89 "Materials Framing [Zhu] Having Been Rejected, Zhu Yubiao Is Still Kidnapped" [Gouxian cailiao bei tuihui, zhu yubiao lushi reng bei jiechi], Clear Wisdom, 7 March 11.

90 Guangzhou Municipal People’s Government, "Proactively Launch Management of the Electromagnetic Environment, Ensure Free Flow and Safety for Information During Asian Games"[Jiji kaizhan dianci huanjing zhili, quebao yayun xinxi changtong he anquan], 10 November 10.

91 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Bureau Head Wang Zuo’an Attends SummaryMeeting for 10th-Year Anniversary of Islamic Scripture Interpretation Work and Gives Speech" [Wang zuo’an juzhang chuxi yisilanjiao jiejing gongzuo shi zhou nian zongjie dahui bingjianghua], 4 May 11.

92 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.

93 "Our Country To Further Draft and Revise Accompanying Measures to ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’ " [Woguo jiang jinyibu zhiding he xiuding "zongjiao shiwu tiaoli" peitao banfa], Xinhua, reprinted in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 10 January 11.

94 Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective1 March 05, arts. 11, 43; Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Signing Up To Go Abroad on Pilgrimages (Trial Measures) [Zhongguo musilin chuguo chaojin baoming paidui banfa (shixing)], issued 16 June 05; Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce], (Ningxia: Ningxia People’sPress, 2005).

95 Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective1 March 05, art. 11.

96 Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage Handbook for Chinese Muslims[Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce], (Ningxia: Ningxia People’s Press, 2005), 106–7, 120–21.

97 Islamic Association of China, "2010 Training Class for Hajj Leader Personnel and Imams Opens in Lanzhou" [2010 niandu chaojin daidui renyuan, daidui yimamu peixunban zai lanzhoujuxing], 10 October 10.

98 See examples that follow as well as, e.g., Lan Congshan, Shaoyang City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, "Discussion on Problems and Countermeasures in Extant Problems in Managing Religious Affairs in Accordance With Law" [Qianlun yifa guanli zongjiao shiwu zhong cunzai de wenti yu duice], reprinted in Hunan Religious Affairs Bureau, 22 October 10; Tongxin County People’s Political Consultative Conference Office, "People’s Political Consultative Conference Work Report" [Zhengxie gongzuo baogao], reprinted in Tongxin County People’s Government, 6 January 11.

99 Xiao Hong, Dawukou District People’s Government, "Changcheng Neighborhood Committee Office News on Ethnicity and Religion" [Changcheng jiedao banshichu minzu zongjiao xinxi], 19 September 10.

100 Taojiang County Islamic Association, "Carry Out Activities in Accordance With Laws and Stipulations, Strive To Create Harmonious Model Mosques" [Yifa yigui kaizhan huodong nuli chuangjian hexie mofan qingzhensi], reprinted in Hunan Religious Affairs Bureau, 11 November 10.

101 Changde City People’s Government, "City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau: Create Satisfied Mechanisms, Adhere to Service, Promote Development, Demand Stability" [Shi minzu zongjiao shiwuju: chuang manyi jiguan yi fuwu cu fazhan qiu wending], 22 December 10.

102 Huangpu District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Summary of 2010 Emergency Work and 2011 Work Plan" [Minzongju 2010 nian yingjigongzuo zongjie 2011 nian gongzuo jihua], reprinted in Huangpu District People’s Government, 25 November 10.

103 The 2010 Blue Book of Religions, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, estimates that there are over 23 million Protestants in China and 55,000 sites of worship, including approximately 24,000 churches and 31,000 "gathering sites" (juhui dian). " ‘Annual Report on China’s Religiions (2010),’ Report on China’s Census of Protestants" ["Zhongguo zongjiaobaogao 2010" zhongguo jidu jiao ruhu wenjuan diaocha baogao], in Blue Book of Religions: Annual Report on China’s Religions (2010), Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of SocialSciences (August 2010), article reprinted in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 18 August 10; Li Guang, "Religion White Paper Announces Over 55,000 Churches" [Zongjiao baipishugongbu you 55000 yu tangdian], Phoenix Weekly, 15 October 10, 50. Estimates from official Chinese sources often do not include Protestants who worship outside of the state-controlled church,and the 23 million figure likely does not reflect the size of China’s unregistered Protestant community. In an interview with the BBC, Wang Zuo’an, director of China’s State Administrationfor Religious Affairs, reportedly told a journalist that at least 20 million Protestants worship in China’s state-controlled church. Christopher Landau, "China Invests in Confident Christians,"BBC, 23 August 10.

104 Many of the estimates that fall in the 50–70 million range appear to stem from numberspublished by the Pew Research Center. See, e.g., Brian Grim, Pew Research Center, "Religion in China on the Eve of the 2008 Beijing Olympics," 7 May 08; Michael Gerson, "A FoundingDocument for a New China," Washington Post, 12 May 11; Stephanie Samuel, "Chinese House Churches Petition for Religious Freedom," Christian Post, 9 May 11. Some other sources appearto have arrived at these numbers independently. See, e.g., Rodney Stark et al., "Counting China’s Christians," First Things, 1 May 11; Verna Yu, "Test of Faith," South China Morning Post,8 May 11.

105 For example, Yu Jianrong of the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences estimates that there are between 45 and 60 million unregistered Protestants in China. Yu Jianrong, China Institute of Strategy and Management, "Yu Jianrong: Research onthe Legalization of China’s Protestant House Churches" [Yu jianrong: zhongguo jidu jiao jiating jiaohui hefahua yanjiu], 2010. Based on information collected among Christians in China, a 2010study by Asia Harvest—an inter-denominational Christian ministry that works in various countries throughout Asia—estimates that there are approximately 103 million Christians in China,although this figure likely includes both Protestants and Catholics. [See Catholicism in this section for more information on the size of China’s Catholic community.] Paul Hattaway and JoyHattaway, Asia Harvest, "Answering the Question: How Many Christians Are in China Today? " Asia Harvest Newsletter, No. 106, October 2010. The South China Morning Post estimates thatthe number of unregistered Protestants could be as high as 120 million. Nicola Davidson, "Suspension of Disbelief," South China Morning Post, 7 November 10.

106 PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.

107 The term in Chinese is shenxue sixiang jianshe. See, e.g., Du Qinglin, "Du Qinglin: Remarks at the Chinese Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement’s 60th Anniversary Celebration"[Du qinglin: zai zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong 60 zhounian qingzhu dahui shang de jiang hua], China Religion, 8 November 10; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends Amity Foundation’s 25th Anniversary and Speaks at the Ceremony To Celebrate the Printing of 80 Million Bibles" [Jiang jiangyong fu juzhang chuxi aidejijinhui chengli ershiwu zhounian qingdian bing zai yinshua shengjing baqianwan ce qingdian yishi shang zhici], 10 November 10; Yang Xuelian, China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement, "Hebei Provincial China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Hold ‘Harmonious Outlook’ Theological Reconstruction Conference" [Hebei sheng jidu jiao lianghui juban "hexie guan" shenxue sixiang jianshe yantaohui], 9 December 10; Qingdao Municipal Three-Self Patriotic Movement and Qingdao Municipal China Christian Council, "Qingdao Municipal Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Hold Theological Reconstruction Conference" [Qingdao shi jidu jiao liang hui juxing shenxue sixiang jianshe yantaohui], reprinted in China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement, 15 December 10. For more information on theological reconstruction, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09,132–35; "Official Protestant Church Politicizes Pastoral Training, ‘Reconstructs’ Theology," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.

108 The charters of the TSPM and CCC list among each organization’s duties: "Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Government, to unite all the country’s Protestants; to fervently love socialism and the motherland; to respect the country’s Constitution, laws, regulations, and policies; [and] to proactively participate in the construction of a socialist society with Chinese characteristics." Three-Self Patriotic Movement, Charter of the Na-tional Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China [Zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong weiyuanhui zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 6(1); China Christian Council, Charter of the China Christian Council [Zhongguo jidu jiao xiehui zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 7(1).

109 Nicola Davison, "Suspension of Disbelief," South China Morning Post, 7 November 10.

110 See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends Amity Foundation’s 25th Anniversary and Speaks at the Ceremony To Celebrate the Printing of 80 Million Bibles" [Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi aide jijinhui chengli ershiwu zhounian qingdian bing zai yinshua shengjing baqianwan ce qingdian yishi shang zhici], 10 November 10.

111 See, e.g., Du Qinglin, "Du Qinglin: Remarks at the Chinese Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement’s 60th Anniversary Celebration" [Du qinglin: zai zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong 60 zhounian qingzhu dahui shang de jiang hua], China Religion, 8 November 10. The phrase that Du used is "jidu jiao jin yi bu yu shehuizhuyi shehui xiang shiying."

112 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. A 2010 article in China Religion, an official SARA publication, that summarizes the content of a meeting to discuss SARA’s work in 2010 did not mention this policy, although a January24, 2011, SARA report states that authorities did make efforts to "guide" unregistered Protestants to worship in state-controlled churches in 2010. "Meeting on National Religious Work Held in Beijing" [Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi zai jing juxing], China Religion, Issue 1, No. 122, 2010; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Report on the Situation of the State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2010 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2010 nian gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 24 January 11.

113 "House Churches Cannot Politicize Religion," Global Times, 11 April 11; "Editorial: Individual Churches Should Avoid Letting Themselves [Become] Politicized" [Sheping: gebie jiaohuiyao bimian rang ziji zhengzhihua], Global Times, 26 April 11.

114 "English Edition of Global Times Launched," China Daily, 20 April 09.

115 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 18, 20.

116 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 18, 21.

117 See the RRA generally for provisions defining the scope of state control over various internal affairs of religious groups. For detailed analysis of specific articles, see, e.g., "Zhejiang andOther Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10.

118 For other examples, see "Beijing Police Oppress Congregation, Targeted at He Depu" [Zhendui he depu beijing jingfang daya jiaoyou juhui], Radio Free Asia, 31 January 11;ChinaAid, "Anhui and Shandong Oppress House Church and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Church" [Anhui shandong shengdan qijian bipo jiating jiaohui he sanzi jiaohui], 29 December 10; ChinaAid, "Beijing Church Blocked by Police, Christians Taken Away" [Beijing yi jiaohui bei jingcha zuzhi jidu tu bei daizou], 30 January 11; ChinaAid, "More Reports of Christmas Persecutions of House Church Christians," 30 December 10; ChinaAid, "Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor Bike and Wife Under Informal House Arrest," 23 April 11; "Jiangsu Pastor Placed Under Soft Detention, Money Stolen, Beaten; Head of House Church Forced To Travel" [Jiangsu mushi zao ruanjin qiang qian ji ouda, jiating jiaohui huizhang bei qiangzhi luyou],10 March 11; "Yancheng Church, Jiangsu, Attacked While Worshiping, Officials Close Off Church" [Jiangsu yancheng jiaohui chongbai zao chongji, guanfang fengsuo jiaotang], Radio Free Asia, 1 February 11; "Government Interferes With Activities of House Church Networks in Late 2010 and 2011," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

119 See, e.g., "Persecution Mounts Against the Church of Shouwang," AsiaNews, 16 May 11; "Beijing Police Disperse House Church Easter Gathering" [Beijing jingfang qusan shouwangjiaohui fuhuojie juhui], BBC, 24 April 11; Alexa Olesen, "Beijing Police Halt Unapproved Church Service," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 April 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Announcement of Beijing Shouwang Church Regarding the May 29 Outdoor Worship Service," reprinted in ChinaAid, 1 June 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Shouwang Church Announcement on May 15th Outdoor Worship Service," reprinted in ChinaAid, 18 May 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Shouwang Church May 22 Outdoor Worship Bulletin" [Beijingshouwang jiaohui 5 yue 22 ri huwai jingbai tongbao], reprinted in ChinaAid, 24 May 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Shouwang Church May 29 Outdoor Worship Bulletin" [Beijingshouwang jiaohui 5 yue 29 ri huwai jingbai tongbao], reprinted in ChinaAid, 30 May 11; ChinaAid, "500 Shouwang Church Christians Under House Arrest in Beijing on Easter Sunday,More Than 30 in Police Custody," 24 April 11; ChinaAid, "At Least 31 Members of Shouwang Church Taken Away This Morning" [Jintian zaochen zhishao 31 ming shouwang jiaohuichengyuan bei zhuazou], 1 May 11; ChinaAid, "Beijing Police Release Nearly All Shouwang Church Detainees, Pastor and Two Others Still in Custody," 11 April 11; ChinaAid, "Latest Update—3: Beijing Shouwang Church May 8, 2011, Outdoor Worship Gathering Continues To Suffer Oppression" [Zuixin dongtai—3: beijing shouwang jiaohui 2011 nian 5 yue 8 ri de huwaijuhui jixu zaoshou bipo], 10 May 11; ChinaAid, "Persecution of Shouwang Church Members Continues for Fifth Sunday," 8 May 11; ChinaAid, "Week 6: Police Detain 20 Shouwang ChurchMembers, Put 100 Under House Arrest," 15 May 11; "China Detains Protestant Shouwang Devotees," BBC, 24 April 11; Alexa Olesen, "Underground Beijing Church Members Detained," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 17 April 11; "Fears of New Crackdown as 160 Christians Held," South China Morning Post, 11 April 11; Jo Ling Kent, "Church Officials: Chinese Au-thorities Block Easter Service in Beijing," CNN, 24 April 11; Li Ya, "Under Pressure, Beijing Shouwang Church Faces a Crisis" [Zhong ya zhi xia, beijing shouwang jiaohui mianlin xin weiji], Voice of America, 6 June 11; Louisa Lim, "China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor Service," National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Nicola Davidson, "Chinese Christianity Will Not Be Crushed," Guardian, 24 May 11; P. Simpson, "Several Hundred Chinese Protestants Under Home Confinement on Easter, 40 People Detained" [Shu bai zhongguo jidu tu fuhuojie zao ruanjin 40 ren bei ju], Voice of America, 24 April 11; Verna Yu, "Four Leaders Go in Church Split," South China Morning Post, 6 June 11; Verna Yu, "Police Round Up 27 Christians," South China Morning Post, 23 May 11; Verna Yu, "Police Round Up Pastors, Christians for a Second Time," South China Morning Post, 18 April 11; Yan Yan, "Beijing Police Take Away Over 100 Underground Church Believers" [Beijing jingfang daizou 100 duo ming dixia jiaohui xintu], Deutsche Welle, 11 April 11; Wang Zhicheng, "More Arrests, More Persecution for Shouwang Underground Christians," AsiaNews, 9 May 11; Zhang Nan, "Beijing Shouwang Church Members Detained Again" [Beijing shouwang jiaohui chengyuan zai zao kouya], Voice of America, 1 May 11; "Beijing Authorities Harass, Detain, and Restrict the Freedom of Movement of Shouwang Church Members," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

120 Chris Buckley and Sui-Lee Wee, "Beijing Church Faces Eviction in Tense Times," Reuters, 3 April 11.

121 Beijing Shouwang Church, "An Explanation of the Issue of Worshiping Outside" [Huwai jingbai wenti jieda], 4 April 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Shouwang Church March2011 Open Letter to Congregation" [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 11 nian 3 yue gao huizhong shu], 27 March 11; Chris Buckley and Sui-Lee Wee, "Beijing Church Faces Eviction in Tense Times,"Reuters, 3 April 11; Verna Yu, "Fears of More Pressure on Underground Churches," South China Morning Post, 1 April 11.

122 "Beijing Police Halt Unapproved Church Service," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 April 11; ChinaAid, "Beijing Police Release Nearly All Shouwang Church Detainees, Pastorand Two Others Still in Custody," 11 April 11; "Fears of New Crackdown as 160 Christians Held," South China Morning Post, 11 April 11; Louisa Lim, "China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor Service," National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Yan Yan, "Beijing Police Take Away Over 100 Underground Church Believers" [Beijing jingfang daizou 100 duo ming dixia jiaohuixintu], Deutsche Welle, 11 April 11.

123 "36 Detained at Shouwang Church Outdoor Worship" [Shouwang jiaohui huwai jingbai 36ren bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 25 April 11; Brian Spegele, "Beijing Police Detain Group of Christians," Wall Street Journal, 25 April 11; Jo Ling Kent, "Church Officials: Chinese AuthoritiesBlock Easter Service in Beijing," CNN, 24 April 11; Michael Foust, "4th Week: China Arrests 30 Church Members," Baptist Press, 2 May 11; U.S. Commission on International ReligiousFreedom, "Easter Detentions Show Need for Religious Freedom Priority in U.S.-China Relations," 27 April 11.

124 Alexa Olesen, "Beijing Police Halt Unapproved Church Service," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 April 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Shouwang Church April 24 Easter Outdoor Worship Bulletin" [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 4 yue 24 ri fuhuo jie huwai jingbai tongbao], 25 April 11; Liu Jianghe, "Pastor Li Xiaobai of the Beijing Shouwang Church and HisWife Released, Still No Place To Go for Worship" [Shouwang jiaohui li xiaobai mushi shifang, jingbai changsuo yiran wu zhuoluo], China Free Press, 13 April 11.

125 Beijing Shouwang Church, "Beijing Pastors’ Joint Prayer Meeting Prays for Beijing Shouwang Church (4)" [Beijing jiaomu liandao hui wei beijing shouwang jiao hui daidao (4)],reprinted in ChinaAid, 29 April 11.

126 "49 Detained in Raid on China Underground Church," Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 11 May 11; ChinaAid, "During the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Chinese House Church Alliance Bible Study Attacked, 49 Detained" [Zhongmei jingji zhanlueduihua qijian, zhonguo jiating jiaohui lianhe hui de shengjing peixun zao chongji, 49 bei zhuabu], 11 May 11; "Korean Bible Instructor Held Following Raid on Underground ChineseChurch Gathering," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 11 May 11; "Multiple Members of Underground Church in Henan Detained at Once" [Henan duo ming dixia jiaohuichengyuan yidu bei jubu], Deutsche Welle, 11 May 11; "Zhengzhou Public Security Attacks Church, Detains 49, Three Korean Pastors and Two People Pursued and Detained" [Zhengzhougong’an chongji jiaohui ju 49 ren, hanguo san mushi liang ren zao zhuyi juliu], Radio Free Asia, 11 May 11.

127 ChinaAid, "Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor Bike and Wife Under Informal House Arrest," 23 April 11; ChinaAid, "Police Surround a Shandong House Church, Detain Seven," 17 April 11; ChinaAid, "Zaozhuang, Shandong House Church Leader Taken Into Custody" [Shandong zaozhuang jiating jiaohui lingxiu bei zhua], 16 April 11; ChinaAid, "Zaozhuang,Shandong Province, House Church Oppressed (Update), Cangshan County Also Detaining Believers" [Shandong sheng zaozhuang jiating jiaohui zaoshou bipo (gengxin), cangshan xian yezai zhua xintu], 17 April 11; "Seven Followers in Shandong, Even Car, Are Detained, Shaanxi Police Block Medical Treatment for Pastor After Beating Him" [Shandong jiaotu qi ren lian chezao kouya, shaan jing da mushi hou geng zu jiuzhi], Radio Free Asia, 21 April 11.

128 "49 Detained in Raid on China Underground Church," Associated Press, reprinted inYahoo!, 11 May 11; ChinaAid, "During the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Chinese House Church Alliance Bible Study Attacked, 49 Detained" [Zhongmei jingji zhanlueduihua qijian, zhonguo jiating jiaohui lianhe hui de shengjing peixun zao chongji, 49 bei zhuabu], 11 May 11; "Korean Bible Instructor Held Following Raid on Underground Chinese Church Gathering," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 11 May 11; "Multiple Members of Underground Church in Henan Detained at Once" [Henan duo ming dixia jiaohuichengyuan yidu bei jubu], Deutsche Welle, 11 May 11; "Zhengzhou Public Security Attacks Church, Detains 49, Three Korean Pastors and Two People Pursued and Detained" [Zhengzhougong’an chongji jiaohui ju 49 ren, hanguo san jiaoshi liang ren zao zhuyi juliu], Radio Free Asia, 11 May 11.

129 ChinaAid, "Update: 49 House Church Leaders Released," 11 May 11.

130 ChinaAid, "All Believers Detained in the May 10 Zhengzhou Church Incident and May 22 Hubei Oppression Incident Released" [5–10 zhengzhou jiao an he 5–22 hubei bipo an bei guanya xintu quanbu huoshi], 26 May 11.

131 ChinaAid, "Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor Bike and Wife Under Informal House Arrest," 23 April 11; "Jiangsu Pastor Placed Under Home Confinement, Money Stolen, Beaten; Head of House Church Forced To Travel" [Jiangsu mushi zao ruanjin qiang qian ji ouda, jiating jiaohui huizhang bei qiangzhi luyou], Radio Free Asia, 10 March 11.

132 ChinaAid, "Christians Persecuted in Henan and Jiangsu," 7 March 11; "Jiangsu Pastor Placed Under Home Confinement, Money Stolen, Beaten; Head of House Church Forced To Travel" [Jiangsu mushi zao ruanjin qiang qian ji ouda, jiating jiaohui huizhang bei qiangzhi luyou], Radio Free Asia, 10 March 11.

133 ChinaAid, "Persecution of House Churches Continues, Pastor Shi Enhao Criminally Detained" [Bipo jiating jiaohui jixu jinxing, shi enhao mushi zao xingshi juliu], 5 July 11. "Using superstition to undermine the implementation of the law" is similar to the language of Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law. Article 300 also contains language about "using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law," a charge commonly used against Falun Gong practitioners. PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 300.

134 "Pastor Sent to Labor Camp," Radio Free Asia, 26 July 11.

135 ChinaAid, "ChinaAid Pays Attention to the Chinese Representatives to the Lausanne Congress Being Oppressed" [Duihua yuanzhu xiehui guanzhu luosang huiyi zhongguo jiaohui daibiao shoudao daya], 11 October 10; "Underground Churches Banned From Attending Overseas Gospel Conference, Authorities Allege Conference Is Anti-China, Five Taken Into Custody at Beijing Airport" [Dixia jiaohui jin fu haiwai fuyin hui, dangju zhi dahui she fanhua, beijing jichang kou 5 ren], Ming Pao, 11 October 10. For more information, see also "Chinese Authorities Prevent Protestants From Attending International Evangelization Conference," CECCChina Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 2.

136 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Main Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs’ 2011 Work" [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.

137 Louisa Lim, "Beijing Blocks Travelers to Christian Conference," National Public Radio, 14 October 10.

138 "Chinese Authorities Prohibit Many Human Rights Defenders From Leaving Country" [Duo ming weiquan gongmin bei zhongguo dangju jinzhi chujing], Radio Free Asia, 3 August10; "Travel Bans for Activists," Radio Free Asia, 5 August 10.

139 Fan is also a former researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). In November 2009, the Party secretary at CASS reportedly told Fan he would not be permitted to continue working at CASS after Fan attempted to provide legal aid to the Linfen-Fushan Church. See, e.g., ChinaAid, "Prominent Chinese Legal Researcher Abruptly Dismissed for ‘Political Reasons,’ " 3 November 09; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 109–110.

140 ChinaAid, "Beijing Police Zero In on Holy Mountain Institute," 15 December 10; "Chinese Authorities’ Suppression of Civil Rights Activists Continues To Increase" [Zhongguo dangju duiweiquan renshi daya buduan shengji], Radio Free Asia, 12 October 10. Fan reportedly has played an important role in promoting legal activism among members of house church congregations throughout China. See, e.g., ChinaAid, "2010 Annual Report," 31 March 11, 3.

141 "Chinese Authorities’ Suppression of Civil Rights Activists Continues To Increase"[Zhongguo dangju dui weiquan renshi daya buduan shengji], Radio Free Asia, 12 October 10.

142 "Fan Yafeng, a Christian, Is Arrested, He Signed Charter 08," AsiaNews, 26 November 10;ChinaAid, "Detained Human Rights Lawyer Fan Yafeng Returns Home! " 18 December 10; Verna Yu, "Police Take Christian Leader, Family From Home," South China Morning Post, 26November 11.

143 ChinaAid, "Decision of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court: Rejects Christian Alimjan’s Request for Reconsideration" [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhi qu gaoji renmin fayuan de caiding shu: bohui jidu tu alimujiang de shensu], 3 March 11.

144 ChinaAid, "Seminar on Alimujiang’s Case and Governance of the Law on Guarding State Secrets," 18 November 10.

145 Ibid.

146 Andrew Jacobs, "Chinese Christians Rally Around Underground Church," New YorkTimes, 12 May 11.

147 Xie Moshan and Li Tianen, "We Are [Doing This] for Faith: A Citizen Petition Letter tothe National People’s Congress With Respect to the Political Conflict" [Women shi weile xinyang: wei zhengzhi chongtu zhi quanguo renda de gongmin qingyuan shu], reprinted inChinaAid, 12 May 11.

148 Ibid.

149 ChinaAid, "More Reports of Christmas Persecutions of House Church Christians," 30 December 10.

150 ChinaAid, "Even Government Churches Face Official Persecution: Local Authorities Demolish TSPM Church," 22 November 10.

151 ChinaAid, "Registered Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished, Christians Beaten," 22 December 08. For more information, see "State-Sanctioned Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 20 January 11.

152 The word "Taoism" and its derivatives are also often spelled with a "D" instead of a "T,"e.g., "Daoism" or "Daoist."

153 Chinese Taoist Association, "Basic Rules on First Chinese Taoist College Scripture StudyClass Seeking Students" [Zhongguo daojiao xueyuan shou jie jingdian jiangxi ban zhao sheng jianzhang], 23 November 10. The document lists this requirement first, ahead of "upholding thestandards of Taoism."

154 See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Congratulatory Letter to All Taoists in the Country" [Zhi quanguo daojiao jie de hexin], 19 March 11.

155 Chinese Taoist Association, "Chinese Taoist Association Leadership Meeting Convenes in Beijing" [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui huizhang huiyi zai jing zhaokai], 14 March 11.

156 Article 4 of the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) Constitution says that the State Administration for Religious Affairs is the "administrative unit in charge of" the CTA. Constitution of the Chinese Taoist Association [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhangcheng], passed 22 June 10, art. 4.

157 See, e.g., Gongan County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, "Proactively Lead, Manage According to Law" [Jiji yindao, yi fa guanli], 11 May 11; Xu Yun, Suzhou Municipal Local Records Office, "The Situation of I-Kuan Tao in Suzhou" [Yidaoguan zai suzhou de qingkuang], 6 December 10. The Commission has not observed official definitions of the terms "feudal" or "superstitious" in reference to Taoist religious practices. For example, the 1998 Measures Regarding the Management of Taoist Temples uses the term "feudal, superstitious activities" but does not elaborate on the meaning of the term. Chinese Taoist Association, Measures Regarding the Management of Taoist Temples [Guanyu daojiao gongguan guanli banfa], adopted 24 August 98, effective September 98, arts. 6(6), 7(3). In addition, in at least some cases, authorities have asserted a link between what they deem to be "feudal" or "superstitious" religious activities and what they deem to be "cult" activities. See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, "The Genesis of and Defense Against Cults" [Xiejiao de chansheng yu fangfan], 28 October 05. Authorities have invoked the term "cult" as a basis for restrictions on the freedom of religion of members of a variety of religious groups in China, including Falun Gong, groups of Protestant origin, and groups of Buddhist and Taoist origin. See, e.g., ChinaAid, "Henan Police Unlawfully Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps," 9 April 10; Ministry of Public Security, "The Situation of Organizations Currently Recognized as Cults" [Xian yi rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 February 07; Verna Yu, "Christians Held To Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer," South China Morning Post, 29 June 10; "Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through Labor," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 3; "National Conferences Highlight Restrictions on Buddhist and Taoist Doctrine," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.

158 Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 13–14, 24–25, 44.

159 See, e.g., Ding Cai’an, Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau, "Humble Remarks on the Current Situation of the Management of Folk Beliefs and Methods of Improvement" [Minjian xinyang guanli xianzhuang yu gaijin fangfa de chuyi], 4 January 11; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Summary of the Fifth Five-Year Plan Awareness Promotion Work of the Nationwide Religious Work System" [Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo xitong "wu wu" pufa gongzuo zongjie], 22 March 11; Tongan County Party Committee, "Tongan District Convenes Special Work Meeting on Stopping the Indiscriminate Construction of Temples and Open-Air Religious Statues" [Tongan qu zhaokai zhizhi luan jian simiao he lutian zongjiao zaoxiang zhuanxiang gongzuo huiyi], 11 April 11.

160 See, e.g., Chinese Taoist Association, "Luofushan, Guangdong To Hold Taoist Cutlural Festival, Pray for a Prosperous Asian Games in Guangzhou" [Guangdong luofushan jiang juban daojiao wenhua jie, qifu guangzhou yayun], 17 October 10; Chinese Taoist Association, "Three Hundred Volunteers To Serve at 2010 Guangdong Inaugural Taoist Festival" [300 zhiyuanzhe jiang fuwu 2010 guangdong shou jie daojiao wenhua jie], 29 October 10; Chinese Taoist Association, "Guangdong Taoist Cultural Festival Opens on November 2 in Luofushan, Huizhou City" [Guangdong daojiao wenhua jie 11 yue 2 ri zai huizhou shi luofushan kaimu], 2 November 10; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends 2010 Guangdong Taoist Festival Opening Ceremony and Religious Assembly for Praying for Fortune for the Asian Games" [Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi 2010 guangdong daojiao wenhua jie kaimushi ji qifu yayun da fahui], 4 November 10.

161 State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends 2010 Guangdong Taoist Festival Opening Ceremony and Religious Assembly for Praying for Fortune for the Asian Games" [Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi 2010 guangdong daojiao wenhua jie kaimushi ji qifu yayun da fahui], 4 November 10.

162 The revision removes a layer of approval and reporting previously required for religious schools to host foreign exchange students, bringing the regulation up to date with a 2004 directive that reduced administrative oversight in a variety of regulatory documents. State Administration for Religious Affairs Decree No. 9 [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju ling di 9 hao], issued 29 November 10, effective 1 January 11, citing State Council Decision Concerning Third Group of Items for Abolishing and Adjusting Administrative Examination and Approval [Guowuyuan guanyu di san pi quxiao he tiaozheng xingzheng shenpi xiangmu de jueding], issued 19 May 04; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 11 August 00, art. 14.

163 Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 11 August 00, art. 17(2), (5), (7), (8).

164 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, "Statement From the First Presidency," 30 August 10; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, "Church in Talks To ‘Regularize’ Activities in China," 30 August 10.

165 See, e.g., Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, "Talks on Russian-Chinese Relations in Religious Sphere Held in Beijing," 17 November 09; State Administration for Religious Affairs, "Vice-Director Jiang Jianyong Sees Delegation From the Presidential Council for Cooperation With Religious Organization" [Jiang jianyong fujuzhang huijian eluosi zongtong zhishu de zongjiao tuanti hezuo weiyuanhui daibiaotuan yixing], 18 November 09; "Beijing Visit of Moscow Patriarch May Revive Russian Orthodox Church in PRC," South China Morning Post, 7 July 06 (Open Source Center, 7 July 06).

166 At the provincial level, see Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Heilongjiang sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 12 June 97, effective 1 July 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 2.

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Introduction | State Minority Policy | Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia | Political Prisoners

Introduction

In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities in China continued to face unique challenges in upholding their rights, as defined in both Chinese and international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities within a state "shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language." 1 China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law stipulates some protections for minority rights and provides for a system of regional autonomy in designated areas.2 Limits in the substance and implementation of state laws and policies, however, prevented minorities from fully enjoying their rights in line with international standards and from exercising meaningful autonomy in practice. The government continued to recognize 55 groups as minority "nationalities" or "ethnicities" (shaoshu minzu 3) and exerted tightest control over groups deemed to challenge state authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See Section IV—Xinjiang and Section V—Tibet for more information on these areas. See text below for information on broader government policies toward ethnic minorities and on conditions in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.]

State Minority Policy

Government steps to address ethnic minorities’ grievances remained limited in the 2011 reporting year. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) reported in December 2010 on exploring and "perfecting" "new mechanisms and forms" for improving the regional ethnic autonomy system, but throughout the year SEAC also affirmed the basic parameters of the state’s minority policies.4 In a June 2011 report, SEAC called for "persisting on the correct path of [using] Chinese characteristics [zhongguo tese] to solve ethnic problems." 5 In August, SEAC issued a five-year plan on the construction of an "ethnic legal system," outlining measures to promote continued legislation and research related to ethnic issues.6 The plan perpetuates the state’s existing legal framework for ethnic minorities, though it also calls for research on ethnic minority-related legislation in other countries and on protections for ethnic minorities in international human rights conventions.7 The Chinese government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) outlined measures to promote legislation on regional autonomy and on some aspects of ethnic minority rights,8 but the HRAP appeared to have limited impact in spurring improvements, especially for civil and political rights.9 The Chinese government continued to implement top-down development policies that have undercut the promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cultures, languages, and livelihoods, while bringing a degree of economic improvement to minority areas.10 During the past reporting year authorities promoted a second 10-year phase of the Great Western Development Project, which has accelerated development efforts in a number of provinces and regions with large populations of non-Han ethnic groups.11 The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development called for expanding aid for development efforts in ethnic minority areas.12

Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia

The government bolstered longstanding grasslands policies that have imposed grazing bans and required some herders to resettle from grasslands and to abandon pastoral livelihoods, a development that affects Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups in China.13 At a State Council meeting in April 2011, authorities called for "more forceful policy measures" for "speeding up development of pastoral areas, ensuring the state’s ecological security, and promoting ethnic unity and border stability," along with "a more vigorous employment policy" for "encouraging herders to change [modes of] production and occupations." 14 In August, the government publicized a State Council opinion issued in June on the development of grasslands.15 The opinion reinforces grazing bans, calls for resettling nomadic pastoralists by 2015, and promotes herders’ change of occupation.16 Scholars have questioned the efficacy of state grasslands policies in meeting the declared goal of ameliorating grasslands degradation,17 while communities affected have reported forced resettlement, inadequate compensation, minimal recourse for grievances, and poor living conditions, along with challenges in upholding traditional pastoral livelihoods and preserving their cultures.18

Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) held a series of protests in May 2011, after mining workers in Xilingol League, IMAR, killed a Mongol herder protesting mining operations on grasslands and, in a separate incident, a mining worker killed a resident protesting other mining operations.19 Demonstrators called for authorities to address the case of the murdered herder and protested government policy toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol culture.20 Authorities reportedly took some protesters into detention, as well as others believed to be connected to the protests.21 In the aftermath, security in the region reportedly remained tight, with curbs on the Internet and other communication tools.22 Authorities and official media acknowledged some of the protesters’ concerns but did not address broader grievances over official curbs on Mongol culture, and cast blame on groups with alleged "ulterior motives" for organizing the protests.23 In June, the Xilingol Intermediate People’s Court sentenced two people to death for the murders in May.24 Mongols in the IMAR also held other protests connected to grasslands use and mining later in the summer.25

Political Prisoners

In addition to detentions associated with the May protests in the IMAR, officials punished other ethnic Mongols who aimed to protect their rights or preserve Mongol culture. New developments occurred in the following cases:

Hada. The 15-year prison sentence of Mongol rights advocate Hada expired on December 10, 2010, but authorities have continued to hold him in custody.26 Hada’s prison sentence stemmed from charges of "splittism" and "espionage" after he organized a peaceful protest for Mongol rights in Hohhot, the IMAR capital, in 1995.27 Before Hada’s scheduled release, authorities also detained Hada’s wife and son, Xinna and Uiles— later formally arresting them both 28—and placed under home confinement people who had planned to mark Hada’s homecoming, including rights advocate Govruud Huuchinhuu, whose whereabouts later became unknown.29
Batzangaa. On January 15, 2011, the Dongsheng District People’s Court, Ordos municipality, IMAR, tried Batzangaa, the head of a traditional Mongolian medicine school, on charges connected to "diverting a special fund" and sentenced him on January 27, 2011, to three years’ imprisonment with a four-year reprieve.30 Batzangaa had come under official scrutiny earlier because of his school’s activities promoting cooperation between Mongols and Tibetans and because of a land dispute with local authorities.31 Chinese security officials initially detained Batzangaa and his family in October 2009 outside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees office in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, where Batzangaa had applied for asylum.32
Erden-uul (pen name Unaga). In December 2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into custody in apparent connection to a book he authored that reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from China. Authorities described the book’s publication as "illegal publishing" and "illegal operation of a business." The most recent report on his status from mid-January 2011 indicated that he remained in detention.33
Sodmongol. Following the April 2010 detention of Mongol rights advocate Sodmongol while he was in Beijing, en route to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York, the Chinese government reported in September 2010 that he was being tried in connection to "counterfeiting book registration numbers and illegally publishing and selling books." 34 [See Section II—Freedom of Expression for more information about government controls over the publishing industry.]

Notes to Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights

1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 27.

2 See generally Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01.

3 Some scholars writing in English choose to leave the term minzu untranslated. See, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent," East-West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 49 (endnote 4); Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xx–xxv. This section uses "ethnic minorities" both to refer to the status of such groups as defined in international human rights instruments and in reference to PRC categorizations of shaoshu minzu. While recognizing the problems associated with rendering the term minzu into English, this paper follows the PRC government’s and media’s current use of "ethnicity" when referring to minzu in English-language publications and in the official name of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui).

4 See, e.g., State Ethnic Affairs Commission, "Ethnic Policies, Laws, and Regulations Continuously Gain New Developments" [Minzu zhengce fagui gongzuo buduan qude xin fazhan], 28 December 10; State Ethnic Affairs Commission, "Do Well in Summing Up, Persisting in, and Developing the 90 Years of Successful Experiences of Our Party’s Ethnic Work" [Zongjie hao, jianchi hao, fazhan hao women dang minzu gongzuo 90 nian de chenggong jingyan], Seeking Truth, 16 June 11.

5 State Ethnic Affairs Commission, "Do Well in Summing Up, Persisting in, and Developing the 90 Years of Successful Experiences of Our Party’s Ethnic Work" [Zongjie hao, jianchi hao, fazhan hao women dang minzu gongzuo 90 nian de chenggong jingyan], Seeking Truth, 16 June 11.

6 State Ethnic Affairs Commission, "Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) on the Construction of a System of Ethnic Legal Institutions" [Minzu fazhi tixi jianshe shi er wu guihua (2011–2015 nian)], 11 August 11.

7 Ibid., item 2(5).

8 State Council Information Office, "National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 2010)," reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, III(1).

9 For reviews of developments in the area of ethnic minority rights during periods that the National Human Rights Action Plan was applicable, see, e.g., Yu Xiaojie, "Uphold a People-Centered Approach and Revel in the Light of Human Rights—Roundup at the Midpoint of the ‘National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010),’ " Xinhua, 4 December 09 (Open Source Center, 13 December 09); State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2009" [2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 September 10, sec. V; State Council Information Office, "Assessment Report on the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010)," Xinhua, 14 July 11, IV(1); Human Rights Watch, "Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan," January 2011, 47–50.

10 For more information on development projects in past years, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263–64, 282–88; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207–208, 222–24.

11 See, e.g., "Published Excerpts of Main Points of ‘Central Committee of the Communist Party and State Council Opinions on Deepening Implementation of the Great Western Development Strategy’ " ["Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenru shishi xibu da kaifa zhanlue de ruogan yijian" yaodian zhaideng], Zhongwei Daily, reprinted in Zhongwei People’s Government, 23 August 10; "Chinese Leaders Call for More Efforts To Develop West," Xinhua, 6 July 10; "China’s Western Region Development Plan a Dual Strategy," Xinhua, 8 July 10.

12 National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 18, sec. 5.

13 For information on grasslands policy in earlier years, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 148–149, 194. See this section for information on the impact of these policies on minority groups that practice pastoralism.

14 "State Council Researches and Deploys Policies and Measures To Promote Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas" [Guowuyuan yanjiu bushu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de zhengce cuoshi], Xinhua, 6 April 11.

15 State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas [Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11. For additional information, see also "National Conference on Work Regarding Pastoral Areas Is Convened in Hulunbuir" [Quanguo muqu gongzuo huiyi zai hulunbei’er zhaokai], Inner Mongolia Daily, reprinted in Inner Mongolia News Net, 13 August 11.

16 State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas [Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11, items 6, 7, 11, 19, 21.

17 Gregory Veeck and Charles Emerson, "Develop the West Assessed: Economic and Environmental Change in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China 2000–2005," Asian Geographer, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 and 2 (2006), 61 (based on information on page 13 of pre-publication article on file with the Commission); China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University; Dee Mack Williams, Beyond Great Walls (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 40–60; Qiu Lin, "Scholars Urge Improving Grassland Policies," Xinhua, 31 July 09.

18 See generally Human Rights Watch, " ‘No One Has the Liberty to Refuse’: Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region," June 2007; Human Rights in China, "China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions," 2007, 14; Henry Sanderson, "Traditions Fade as China Settles Nomads in Towns," Associated Press, reprinted in Seattle Times, 4 October 09.

19 See information that follows and, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Herders Take to the Streets, Four Arrested," 23 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, "Anger Over Protesters’ Deaths Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians," New York Times, 30 May 11; "Clampdown in Inner Mongolia," Radio Free Asia, 27 May 11; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Public Security Department, "Public Security Department Holds News Conference, Shares Information on Situations Regarding Xilingol ‘5.11’ and ‘5.15’ Incidents and Public Security Organs Cracking the Cases" [Gonganting juxing xinwen fabuhui tongbao xilingguolei meng "5.11," "5.15" anjian qingkuang he gongan jiguan zhenpo qingkuang], 29 May 11. See analysis in "Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

20 See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protests Spread in Southern Mongolia, Thousands More Take to the Streets," 26 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, "Anger Over Protesters’ Deaths Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians," New York Times, 30 May 11.

21 See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Many Detained, Some Fled After Protests in Southern Mongolia," 17 June 11; "Clampdown in Inner Mongolia," Radio Free Asia, 27 May 11.

22 See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Many Detained, Some Fled After Protests in Southern Mongolia," 17 June 11; Christopher Bodeen, "China’s Response to Latest Unrest Follows Pattern," Associated Press, reprinted in ABC News, 1 June 11.

23 See, e.g., "China Says Foreigners Stir Inner Mongolia Unrest," BBC, 31 May 11; Dan Martin, "China Clamps Down on Inner Mongolia To Quash Demos," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo!, 30 May 11; "Putting Mongolian Protests Into Context," Global Times, 31 May 11. See additional information in "Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.

24 "Driver Sentenced to Death for Killing Mongol Herder," Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 8 June 11; "Forklift Driver Sentenced to Death Over Murder," Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 21 June 11.

25 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "New Round of Herders’ Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia," 29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Fresh Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized," 23 July 11.

26 See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Hada Is Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally Arrested," 5 May 11; Amnesty International, "China: Fear of Disappearance of Activist and Family: Hada," 7 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Detention of Mongolian Dissident Hada and Family Reaches New Level of Human Rights Violation," 27 December 10; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Official Met with Relative, but Dissident’s Whereabouts Undisclosed," 14 December 10; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Release Date Passed and Ethnic Mongolian Political Prisoner’s Status Unclear While Wife and Son Remain Under Detention," 11 December 10.

27 See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for additional information.

28 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Hada Is Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally Arrested," 5 May 11.

29 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Mongolian Dissident Writer Huuchinhuu Gone Missing," 8 February 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Hada’s Wife and Son Detained as Scheduled Release Approaches," 4 December 10; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Southern Mongolian Dissident Detained and Put under House Arrest," 16 November 10.

30 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Deported United Nations Refugee Applicant Batzangaa Tried in China," 17 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Batzangaa, a UN Refugee Status Applicant, Sentenced to 3-Year Jail Term in China," 30 January 11.

31 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Principal of Mongol-Tibetan Medical School Arrested in Mongolia by Chinese Police," 19 October 09; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Interview With Batzangaa: Striking Details on How Mongolia and China Cooperate to Deport a Southern (Inner) Mongolian Exile Back to China," 30 January 11.

32 Ibid.

33 "Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for Publishing New Book" [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi daibu], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; "Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly Arrested in Inner Mongolia" [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki mongghulda mexpiy tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer, Author of ‘Forefront of Independence’ Arrested and Detained," 23 January 11.

34 James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, "Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009–July 2010)," A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 15 September 10.

POPULATION PLANNING

Introduction

China’s population planning policies in both their nature and implementation violate international standards. During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, central and local authorities continued to implement population planning policies in a manner that interferes with and controls the reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, especially women. Population planning policies limit most women in urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting slightly more than half of Chinese women—located in many rural areas—to bear a second child if their first child is female.1 The Commission notes continued debate in the Chinese media about possible reform of these policies, but has not observed government action to introduce national reform measures.

Local officials continue to monitor the reproductive cycles of Chinese women in order to prevent unauthorized births. The Chinese government requires married couples to obtain a birth permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces them to employ contraceptive methods at other times. Although Chinese law prohibits officials from infringing upon the rights and interests of citizens while promoting compliance with population planning policies, reports during this reporting year indicate that abuses continue. Mandatory abortion, which is often referred to as a "remedial measure" (bujiu cuoshi) in government reports, is endorsed explicitly as an official policy instrument in the regulations of at least 18 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions.2 This past year, the Commission found that local officials continued to coerce women with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo abortions in both urban and rural areas across China.

International Standards

China’s population planning policies in both their nature and implementation constitute human rights violations according to international standards. The 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development provide for the freedom to make reproductive decisions.3 The PRC Population and Family Planning Law and provincial implementing guidelines, however, limit couples’ freedom of reproductive choice by stipulating if, when, and how often they may bear children.4 Other domestic policies coerce compliance with population planning targets through heavy fines.5 Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families and additional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against "out-of-plan" children, violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,6 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.8 China is a state party to these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms.

Coercive Implementation

Chinese law prohibits certain types of official behavior in the implementation of population planning policies. For example, Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states that officials "shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens." 9 Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal or administrative punishment if he "infringes on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests" or "abuses his power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices for personal gain" in the implementation of population planning policies.10 Despite these provisions, the Commission has noted continued abuses in the 2011 reporting year, as illustrated by the examples of official campaigns and individual cases of abuse below.

OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS

During the 2011 reporting year, authorities in some areas implemented population planning enforcement campaigns—in some cases dubbed "spring family planning service activities" (chunji jisheng fuwu xingdong)—that employed coercive measures to prevent or terminate "out-of-plan" pregnancies.11 For example, in March 2011, the Yangchun city government in Guangdong province reported that one such campaign had commenced and that the "focal points" of the campaign were the sterilization of mothers with two daughters and the implementation of "remedial measures" for out-of-plan pregnancies.12 Yangchun family planning officials were directed to adopt "man-on-man military tactics," "launch meticulous ideological work," and "storm the fortifications of ‘nail households’ (dingzi hu) 13 and ‘flight households’ (waitao hu) 14 in a targeted manner." 15

The Commission noted that this year, in official speeches and government reports from a wide range of localities, authorities also used the phrase "spare no efforts" (quanli yifu) to signify intensified enforcement measures and less restraint on officials who oversee coercive population planning implementation measures. Between November 2010 and June 2011, county and township governments in at least eight provincial-level jurisdictions (Shandong,16 Anhui,17 Gansu,18 Guangdong,19 Hunan,20 Guangxi,21 Hubei,22 and Jiangxi 23) urged officials to "spare no efforts" in implementing family planning campaigns including, in some cases, the "two inspections and four procedures" (liangjian sishu)—or intrauterine device (IUD) inspections and pregnancy inspections (the two inspections), IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization (the four procedures).24

Reports surfaced in May 2011 regarding official implementation of population planning policies which resulted in the illegal abduction and sale of children by local officials. From 2000 to 2005 in Hunan province,25 family planning officials reportedly took at least 16 children—allegedly born in violation of population planning policies—from their families and sold them to local orphanages.26 In many of the reported cases, officials took the children because their families could not pay the steep fines levied against them for violating population planning regulations.27

INDIVIDUAL CASES OF VIOLENT COERCION

Numerous reports emerged this past year illustrating family planning officials’ use from 2009 to 2011 of violence to coerce sterilizations, abortions, or payment of fines. The following are representative cases that occurred in eight different provinces.

Hunan. In February 2009, local family planning officials reportedly kidnapped Liu Dan, 39 weeks pregnant with her first child, and forced her to undergo an abortion because she had not yet reached the age at which she could be legally married to the child’s father. Liu and the child reportedly died during the procedure.28
Anhui. In July 2010, local family planning officials reportedly kidnapped 23-year-old Li Hongmei and forced her to undergo a sterilization procedure. She later filed a lawsuit, which the local county people’s court did not accept on the grounds that the case was "unclear." 29
Yunnan. In September 2010, officials reportedly destroyed a man’s home, harassed his family, and reportedly beat his 67-year-old mother because the man did not return home to pay family planning fines and undergo a mandatory sterilization procedure.30
Shandong. In September 2010, local family planning officials reportedly forced a woman surnamed Xie to undergo an abortion when she was six months pregnant because her husband had been three months younger than the legal marriage age at the time the child was conceived.31
Fujian. In October 2010, local family planning officials reportedly kidnapped a woman who was eight months pregnant and detained her for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her with a substance which aborted the fetus. During this time, the woman’s husband was reportedly not permitted to see her.32
Henan. In November 2010, local family planning officials reportedly kidnapped a man in order to force him to pay the remainder of a fine for having a second child. The same day, the village head notified his family that he was in the hospital. When the family went to see him, they reportedly found him dead under unknown circumstances.33
Guizhou. In May 2011, local family planning officials reportedly beat Zhang Xuequn and her husband and forced her to undergo surgical implantation of an intrauterine device, despite the fact that she showed them her valid marriage license and birth permits and that she was technically accountable to the government in her home province of Zhejiang.34
Jiangxi. In May 2011, local officials reportedly beat Zhang Julan and forced her to undergo tubal ligation surgery after she and 10 other villagers went to the town government to discuss officials’ illegal requisition of land. Zhang remained in the hospital for at least one month following the procedure due to injuries she sustained while in official custody.35

Punishments and Rewards

Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of punishment and reward to manage citizens’ compliance with population planning policies. For example, in accordance with national policy,36 local governments continued to direct officials to levy fines, termed "social compensation fees" (shehui fuyang fei), against couples who give birth to an unauthorized child.37 These fines force many couples to choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring financial hardship.38 Often with court approval, family planning officials are permitted to take "forcible" action against families who are unwilling or unable to pay the fines.39 These "forcible" actions are in violation of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law and include the confiscation of family belongings and the destruction of violators’ homes.40

In some cases officials not only levy fines against violators but also threaten or impose other punitive measures, including job loss, demotion, denial of promotion, expulsion from the Communist Party, destruction of personal property, arbitrary detention, and, in some cases, violence.41 Some children may go without household registration (hukou) in China because they are born "out-of-plan" and their parents do not pay the necessary fines.42 According to sources cited in a December 2010 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report, family planning officials in some cases also reportedly withhold a hukou from an otherwise eligible child whose mother refuses to undergo sterilization or IUD insertion after the child’s birth.43 Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including government-subsidized healthcare and public education.44 [For additional discussion of China’s hukou system, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.]

Some local governments offer rewards to informants who report population planning violations. Local government reports during the 2011 reporting year mentioned rewards for informants in amounts ranging from 100 yuan (US$15) to 6,000 yuan (US$926) per case for verified information on violations by either citizens or officials, including concealment of out-of-plan births, false reports of medical procedures, and falsified family planning documents.45 Conversely, authorities in one neighborhood in Chifeng city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, offered a reward of up to 20,000 yuan (US$3,085) for information regarding non-medically necessary prenatal sex determination examinations or performance of a sex-selective abortion.46

Local governments similarly incentivized family planning officials to ensure strict implementation of population planning policies. For example, in March 2011, the Maojing township government in Qingyang city, Gansu province, issued a report on the "outstanding results" of the government’s "rectification activities." 47 The report calls for officials to "spare no efforts" (quanli yifu) in implementing population policies and notes that village cadres face a penalty of 1,500 yuan (US$230) for each woman with two daughters whom they fail to sterilize. Conversely, they are promised a reward of 500 yuan (US$77) for each tubal ligation that they see through to completion.48 A March 2011 directive from the Yangchun city government in Guangdong province indicated a goal of fostering "friendly one-upmanship" and "keen competition" among family planning cadres, calling for daily progress reports and participation in "information sharing meetings" in which they are publicly praised or criticized based on their reports.49 [See Official Campaigns above.]

Targeting Migrant Workers

As in prior years, the Commission observed during its 2011 reporting year a number of reports indicating that some local governments continue to target migrant workers specifically for implementation, in some cases coercively, of family planning policies. For example, in April 2011, the Sucheng township government in Zuoquan county, Jinzhong municipality, Shanxi province, called for a one-month "superior services, superior management" campaign targeting migrant worker women "who had given birth, were pregnant, or may become pregnant again." As part of the "superior management" efforts, Sucheng officials were directed to "adopt remedial measures"—a term often used to refer to mandatory abortion—for out-of-plan pregnancies and "levy social compensation fees in accordance with the law" for out-of-plan births.50 In November 2010, the Tangshan city government in Hebei province reprinted a China Population Report article on the "Six Rights and Six Obligations of the Migrant Population." Obligations 5 and 6 directed that migrant workers whose contraceptive measures "fail" should "promptly adopt remedial measures" and that migrant workers who violate family planning laws and regulations should pay the appropriate "social compensation fees." 51 The Commission also noted directives from local governments in several provinces, including Jiangsu,52 Guangdong,53 Shandong,54 and Zhejiang,55 instructing local officials to take advantage of the spring festival timeframe—a period when many migrant workers return home to be with family—to target the migrant population for family planning policy implementation and services. [For additional information on official treatment of migrant workers, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement and Section II—Worker Rights.]

Prospects for Policy Reform

September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of the beginning of China’s current family planning policies,56 and following this anniversary, the Commission observed increased public discussion of the prospects for family planning policy reform.57 According to a March 2011 Xinhua report, officials in five provinces will introduce relaxed population planning trial measures in 2011, allowing a second child for some couples in which both persons are only children.58 The same "loosened" measures are already in effect in major municipalities including Shanghai,59 Beijing,60 and Tianjin.61 While census data released in 2011 may have also sparked new debate among Chinese leaders regarding family planning policies,62 top Communist Party and government leaders continue to publicly defend the policy and rule out its cancellation in the near term.63

Demographic Consequences

The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, including an aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio. Affected in recent decades by government restrictions on the number of births per couple, China’s total fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births per woman in 1949 64 to an estimated 1.5 births per woman in 2011,65 resulting in the rapid growth of China’s aging population and decline in the working-age population. In the 2011 reporting year, officials continued to express concern about China’s aging population and its present and anticipated strain on the country’s social services.66 Several reports also have emerged projecting that the recent decline in China’s working-age population may result in significant labor shortages by as soon as 2013.67 [For additional information on China’s projected labor shortage, see Section II—Worker Rights.]

In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese parents continue the practice of sex-selective abortion,68 contributing to a severely skewed sex ratio—the highest sex ratio in the world.69 In August 2011, Chinese state media noted that China’s sex ratio at birth "is increasing," citing the remarks of a senior Chinese health official at a press conference.70 Some social and political scientists argue that large numbers of "surplus males" could create social conditions that the Chinese government may choose to address by expanding military enlistment.71 Reports in the 2011 reporting year have also suggested a possible linkage between China’s large number of "surplus males" and an increase in the trafficking of women and children for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.72 In August 2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Children (2011–2020), which urged officials to "step up efforts against the use of ultrasound and other [forms of technology] to engage in non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abortion." 73

Case Update: Chen Guangcheng

Public security officials continue to hold prominent rights advocate Chen Guangcheng and his family under "soft detention," or home confinement, following his release from prison on September 9, 2010, after serving his full sentence.74 Authorities reportedly beat Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing in their home on February 8 75 and February 18, 2011.76 The beatings are believed to be in connection with the couple’s recording of video footage, released on ChinaAid’s Web site on February 9, in which Chen and Yuan spoke of the official abuse and restrictive control the family has faced since Chen’s release.77 Officials reportedly did not permit Chen and Yuan to seek medical care for their injuries sustained in the beatings.78 Foreign journalists and a "netizen" who attempted to visit Chen’s village following the release of this video reported encountering "groups of violent, plainclothes thugs." 79 Police also reportedly detained several lawyers and rights defenders in Beijing in February after they met to discuss Chen’s case.80

Chen is a self-trained legal advocate who drew international news media attention to population planning abuses, particularly forced abortions and forced sterilizations, in Linyi city, Shandong province, in 2005.81 The Yinan County People’s Court tried and sentenced Chen in August 2006 to four years and three months in prison for "intentional destruction of property" and "organizing a group of people to disturb traffic order." 82 Chen’s trial, retrial, and treatment in prison prompted repeated criticism for criminal procedure violations and infringement of the rights of Chen and his family.83 Chen reportedly remains under "soft detention" with his family, and his six-year-old daughter reportedly has not been permitted to leave the house to attend school.84

Notes to Section II—Population Planning

1 The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, canonized as a "fundamental state policy" in 1982, and codified as national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions—accounting for 53.6 percent of China’s population—allow rural dwellers to have a second child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang et al, "China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century," 33 Population and Development Review 133, 138 (2007). Other exceptions to the one-child rule vary by provincial-level jurisdiction, and include some exceptions for ethnic minorities. See "The Origin of China’s Current Birth Policy" [Zhongguo xianxing shengyu zhengce youlai], China Net, 18 April 08; ChineseHuman Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 6. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "In 1984, the Central Committee issued a document outlining its ‘current family planning policy,’ which stated that rural residents with one daughter could have a second child, while ethnic minorities could have between two and four children. Since then, even more exceptions to the original ‘one-child’ rule have been added by local governments. These exceptions are numerous, detailed and differ across the country. For example, the Shandong Provincial Population and Family Planning Regulations lists 14 circumstances in which couples are permitted to have more than one child."

2 This number is based on Commission analysis of population planning measures. These jurisdictions include Tianjin, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, Hebei, Hubei, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guangxi, Anhui, Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. For two specific examples, see "Revised ‘Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning Regulations’ Published" [Xiuding hou de "guangdong sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli" gongbu], Guangzhou Beiyun District Zhongloutian Public Information Net, 29 June 09; "Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning Regulations" [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], Jiangxi News Net, 11 April 09; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," 25 February 09, 6. The Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the link between the term "remedial measures" and abortion: "early term abortion refers to the use of surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation, it is a remedial measure taken after the failure of contraception." See Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, "Early Term Abortion" [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 09.

3 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), para. 17. The Beijing declaration states, "The explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment." Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, para. 7.2. The Cairo International Conference on Population and Development states, "Reproductive health . . . implies . . . that people are able to have . . . the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice . . . ." On the concept of "illegal pregnancy" and its use in practice, see Elina Hemminki et al., "Illegal Births and Legal Abortions—The Case of China," Reproductive Health, Vol. 2, No. 5 (2005).

4 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 18. According to Article 18, "The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be made." Implementing regulations in different provinces vary on the ages at which couples may give birth and the number of children they are permitted to have. See Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 6–7.

5 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 18–19. See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, "Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection Work" [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10; Zhu Xiulin, Xiushui County Government, "[Xiushui] County Plans To Deploy 2011 New Year Spring Family Planning Service Activities" [Wo xian anpai bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian jihua shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County Government, "Fengping Town Strengthens Family Planning Work" [Fengping xiang jiaqiang jisheng gongzuo lidu], 5 May 11; Taihe County Open Government Information Platform, "Chengjiang Township Launches Population Planning Concentrated Fortification Campaign" [Chengjiang zhen kaizhan jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 14 April 11.

6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, China signed 17 July 80, ratified 4 November 80, arts. 2–3, 16(1)(e).

7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, China signed 29 August 90, ratified 2 March 92, arts. 2–4, 6, 26.

8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, China signed 27 October 97, ratified 27 March 01, art. 10(3).

9 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], enacted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 4.

10 Ibid., art. 39.

11 See, for example, Maonan District Population and Family Planning Bureau, "Leaders Pay Attention, Responsibilities Fulfilled, Real Action Taken, Maonan District Spring Family Planning Concentrated Services Campaign [Achieves] Outstanding Results" [Lingdao zhongshi, zeren luoshi, zhenzhua shigan, maonanqu chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong chengxiao xianzhu], 13 May 11; Chenzhou City People’s Government, "(Shijiao Town) Early Planning, Early Activities To Soundly Launch Spring Family Planning Centralized Services Campaign" [(Shijia xiang) zao mouhua, zao xingdong zhashi kaizhan chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong], 21 February 11; Yangchun City People’s Government, "Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start" [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.

12 Yangchun City People’s Government, "Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start" [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.

13 "Nail households" is used in this context to refer to families who resist government population planning efforts.

14 "Flight households" is used in this context to refer to families who have left their homes to evade official reprisal for noncompliance with population planning policies.

15 Yangchun City People’s Government, "Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start" [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.

16 Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, "Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection Work" [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10.

17 Population and Family Planning Commission of Huoqiu County, "[Huoqiu] County Convenes County-wide Second Quarter Family Planning Focused Services Work Meeting" [Woxian zhaokai quanxian di’er jidu jihua shengyu jizhong fuwu gongzuohui], 25 January 11; Mingguang City Open Government Information Net, "Longshan Community Spares No Efforts in Carrying Out Family Planning Special Clean-Up Work" [Longshan shequ quanli yifu zuohao jihua shengyu zhuanxiang qingli gongzuo], 1 April 11.

18 Shandan County Population and Family Planning Commission, "Weiqi Town 2011 Population and Family Planning Work Plan" [Weiqi zhen 2011 nian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo anpai], 28 February 11; Population and Family Planning Commission of Gansu, "Shenchuan Town Proposes Four Measures and Launches Spring Family Planning Superior Services Activity" [Shenchuan xiang sicuo bingju kaizhan chunji jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong], 28 March 11.

19 Su Xianchao, Yangchun City People’s Government, "Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start" [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.

20 Tang Zhenghai and Gong Ren, "Luxi Spares No Efforts in Contending To Become the Province-wide Model County in Population and Family Planning Work" [Luxi quanli yifu zheng chuang quansheng renkou jisheng gongzuo mofan xian], Unity Newspaper, reprinted in Xiangxi Tujia Autonomous Prefecture Official Web site, 21 March 11.

21 People’s Government of Tengxian Guangxi, "Pingfu Town Proposes Many Measures and Launches Spring Family Planning Superior Services Activities" [Pingfu xiang duo cuo bingju kaizhan chunji jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong], 12 April 11.

22 Population and Family Planning Commission of Gong’an County, "Maojiagang Town 2011 Annual First-Half-of-the-Year Population and Family Planning Work Situation" [Maojianggang zhen 2011 niandu shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang], 25 May 11.

23 Fengcheng City People’s Government, "Hutang Town Population and Family Planning Action Month-Long Exercise Achieves Three Clear Results" [Hutang xiang jihua shengyu xingdong yue huodong qude sange mingxian chengxiao], 2 June 11.

24 For one such example in which the two examinations and four procedures are clearly enumerated, see Population and Family Planning Commission of Gong’an County, "Maojiagang Town 2011 Annual First-Half-of-the-Year Population and Family Planning Work Situation" [Maojianggang zhen 2011 niandu shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang], 25 May 11. Some government reports refer to "three examinations," instead of two. The third examination in these references is an examination for the presence of a gynecological disease or illness. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 10.

25 The original source, Caixin, reported that the abductions happened between 2000 and 2005. The New York Times reported that the abductions occurred between 1999 and 2006. Shangguan Jiaoming, "In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder," Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon LaFraniere, "Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say," New York Times, 4 August 11.

26 Shangguan Jiaoming, "In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder," Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon LaFraniere, "Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say," New York Times, 4 August 11; Zhao Hejuan, "Hunan Officials Launch Inquiry Over Sale of Children," Caixin Net, 16 May 11.

27 Shangguan Jiaoming, "In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder," Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon LaFraniere, "Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say," New York Times, 4 August 11.

28 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 12.

29 "Anhui Young Married Woman Undergoes Forced Sterilization, Lawsuit Rejected by Courts" [Anhui shaofu bei qiangzhi jueyu, xiang fayuan ti qisu zaoju], Radio Free Asia, 17 November 10.

30 "Zhaotong, Yunnan Villagers Accused of Exceeding Birth Limits, Town Officials Destroy New House and Accuse Entire Family" [Yunnan zhaotong cunmin bei zhi chaosheng, zao xiangguan daohui xinfang zhulian quanjia], Radio Free Asia, 29 October 10.

31 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 12. For another example of violence during family planning implementation in Shandong,see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Another Bloody Family Planning Case Erupts in Chen Guangcheng’s Hometown Linyi, 22 Year Old Youth Cruelly Killed" [Chen guangcheng laojia linyi zai bao jisheng xue’an, 22 sui qingnian canzao shahai], 27 March 11. According to this report, in March 2011, local family planning officials and hired personnel entered the home of Xu Shuaishuai in order to take away his sister for an unnamed birth control surgery. In an argument that ensued between his father and the personnel, Xu came to his father’s defense andreportedly was fatally stabbed by one of the personnel.

32 "Xiamen Woman Eight Months Pregnant Forced To Abort, Also Kidnapped and Beaten"[Xiamen huaiyun bageyue funu bei qiangzhi yinchan, bing ceng canzao bangjia ji ouda], Radio Free Asia, 13 October 10. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 10.

33 "Henan Villager Beaten to Death for Exceeding Birth Limit, Thousand People Carry Coffinand Protest at Town Government" [Henan cunmin yin chaosheng bei dasi, qianren tai guancai zhenzhengfu kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 19 November 10.

34 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Hangzhou Woman Forcibly Subjected to Birth Control Surgery in Guizhou Province" [Hangzhou nuzi zai guizhou bei qiangxing zuo jieyu shoushu], 22 May 11. For an additional case of coercive implementation in Guizhou, see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Another Violent Family Planning Incident Outside of Guiyang" [Guiyangchengjiao zaici fasheng baoli jihua shengyu shijian], 30 May 11.

35 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Xinyu Village, Jiangxi Woman Undergoes Forced Tubal Ligation for Exposing Illegal Land Requisition" [Jiangxi xinyu cunfu yin jielu weigui zhengdi bei qiangzhi jieza], 19 June 11.

36 PRC Measures for Collection of Social Compensation Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa], issued 2 August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7.

37 See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, "Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome InspectionWork" [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10; Zhu Xiulin, Xiushui County Government, "[Xiushui] County Plans To Deploy 2011 New Year Spring Festival Family Planning Service Activities" [Wo xian anpai bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian jihua shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County People’s Government, "Fengping Town Strengthens Family Planning Work" [Fengping xiang jiaqiang jisheng gongzuo lidu], 5 May 11; Taihe County Open Government Information Platform, "Chengjiang Township Launches Population Planning Campaign Focused on Storming the Fortifications" [Chengjiang zhen kaizhan jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 24 December 10.

38 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 18.

39 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2010, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," 8April 11, 54. For more information on the role of courts in family planning implementation, see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December10, 27.

40 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihuashengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 39. According to Article 39, officials are to be punished either criminally or administratively for the following acts: "(1)infringing on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights or other legitimate rights and interests; (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for personal gain; (3) demanding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing, misappropriating or embezzling funds for family planning or social maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistic data on population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or refusing to provide such data."

41 See, e.g., Pingdu Government Affairs Net, "Are Village Officials Relieved From Their Post if They Violate Population Planning Policies During Their Term of Office? " [Cunguan renqinei weifan jihua shengyu falu fagui zhongzhi zhiwu ma?], 16 February 11; "Hunan Officials Launch Inquiry Over Sale of Children," Caixin Net, 16 May 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "IDon’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 19–23. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 97.

42 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 13, 26. According to the report, "The management of the hukou system is the domain of the Ministry of Public Security and it refuses to issue hukous to children without birth permits, children of unmarried parents, and children whose parents for some reason have not completed the required procedures. Without a hukou, a child cannot apply for an ID card and thus does not have a legal identity, is not a citizen and consequently is deprived of the rights accorded to other Chinese citizens." Zhang Hui, "City Cuts Fines on Second Child," Global Times, 23 August 10. According to one expert quoted in this report, "Children born outside State scrutiny will enjoy equal rights as the first child only after the family pays the fine and registers them."

43 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 15–16.

44 Yan Hao and Li Yanan, "Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant Workers Face Dilemma," Xinhua, 10 March 10; Tao Ran, "Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way To Reform," China Daily, 22 March 10.

45 See, e.g., Jishan County People’s Government, "Jishan County Population and Family Planning Report Reward System and Report Telephone Number" [Jishan xian renkou yu jihua shengyu youjiang jubao zhidu he jubao dianhua], 27 April 11; Tai’an City People’s Government, "Family Planning Report Reward Measures" [Jihua shengyu youjiang jubao banfa], 20 November 04; Chengguan Town People’s Government, "Fengtai County Chengguan Town Family Planning Report Reward Implementation Program" [Fengtai xian chengguan zhen jihua shengyu youjiang jubao shishi fang’an], 17 March 11; Yulong Neighborhood Web site, "Family Planning Report Reward System" [Jihua shengyu youjiang jubao zhidu], 12 June 11. See also ChineseHuman Rights Defenders, "I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body," 21 December 10, 15–16.

46 Yulong Neighborhood Web site, "Family Planning Report Reward System" [Jihua shengyuyoujiang jubao zhidu], 12 June 11.

47 Li Haixi, Population and Family Planning Commission of Qingyang, "Effectiveness ofMaojing Township Family Planning Concentrated Remediation Activities Significant" [Maojing xiang jihua shengyu jizhong zhengzhi huodong chengxiao xianzhu], 28 March 11.

48 Ibid.

49 Yangchun City People’s Government, "Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family PlanningServices Activities Off to a Good Start" [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.

50 "Zuoquan County Sucheng Township Launches ‘Two Superiors’ Family Planning Activities for Migrant Worker Population" [Zuoquan xian sucheng xiang kaizhan liudong renkou jihuashengyu ‘shuang you’ huodong], China Net Focus on Shanxi, 4 April 11.

51 "The Six Rights and Six Obligations of the Migrant Population" [Liudong renkou de liuxiangquanli he liuxiang yiwu], China Population Report, reprinted in Tangshan City People’s Government, 23 November 10.

52 Qidong City People’s Government, "Circular Regarding Soundly Completing 2011 Springtime Population and Family Planning Services Management Work for Migrant Populations"[Guanyu zhashi zuohao 2011 nian chunjie qijian liudong renkou jihua shengyu fuwu guanli gongzuo de tongzhi], 19 January 11.

53 Fengyang Neighborhood Web site, "Fengyang Street Actively Launches Migrant Population Investigation, Cleanup and Services Management Work" [Fengyang jie jiji kaizhan liudongrenkou qingcha qingli he fuwu guanli gongzuo], 10 March 11.

54 Dongying City People’s Government, "Circular Regarding Completing Migrant Population Family Planning Management Services Work During the Spring Festival" [Guanyu zuohao chunjie qijian liudong renkou jihua shengyu guanli fuwu gongzuo de tongzhi], 25 January 11.

55 Shaoxing City Yuecheng District People’s Government, "Jishan Street Launches Spring Festival Migrant Population Services Promotion Event" [Jishan jiedao kaizhan chunjie qijianliudong renkou xuanchuan fuwu huodong], 26 January 11.

56 Feng Wang and Cai Yong, The Brookings Institution, "China’s One Child Policy at 30," 24September 10.

57 The Commission observed an increase in reports from domestic academic observers as wellas state-controlled media outlets discussing family planning policy reform in late 2010 and surrounding the 2011 annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Several reports highlighted debate among officials and experts. See, for example, Zuo Xuejin, "Time To Drop the One-Child Policy," Chinadialogue, 15 September 10; "Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning Committee Director Zhang Feng: There Is Hope for Two Child Policy in 2033" [Guangdong sheng jishengwei zhuren zhangfeng: 2033 nian you wang fangkai sheng er tai], Sina, 24 September 10; "China May Expand Two-Child Policy to Urban Areas," People’s Daily, 7 March 11; Jeremy Page, "On Beijing TopicList: One-Child Policy’s Future," Wall Street Journal, 9 March 11; "Li Yining Discusses Adjusting Family Planning Policy: Relaxation Is Not Unrestricted" [Li yining tan tiaozheng jihuashengyu zhengce: fangkai bushi wu xianzhi], People’s Daily, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 10 March 11; "Delegates Debate Easing of China’s One-Child Policy," Xinhua, 12 March 11; Mu Guangzong, "Debate: Family Planning," China Daily, 21 March 11; Josh Noble, "End of the One-Child Policy Coming? " Financial Times, 8 March 11.

58 "Two-Child Policy May Be Tried in Some Areas, Difficult To Implement Nationwide in the Short-Term" [Fangkai sheng ertai zhengce keneng shidian duanqi nanyi quanmian shishi],Xinhua, 12 October 10. See also Mimi Lau, "Get Ready for an Easing of the One-Child Policy in 2033," South China Morning Post, 26 September 10.

59 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, "Shanghai Municipality Population and Family Planning Commission: Urban Residents Who Meet One of 12 Criteria May Have a Second Child" [Shanghai shi renkou jisheng wei: shimin fu 12 zhong tiaojian zhiyi ke sheng ertai], 28 July 09.

60 Beijing Municipal Commission of Population and Family Planning, "Beijing Municipal Commission of Population and Family Planning Publishes Circular on the Provisions on Examination and Approval for the Birth of a Second Child" [Beijing shi renkou he jihua shengyu weiyuanhui yinfa "guanyu shenpi shengyu di’er ge zinu de guiding" de tongzhi], reprinted in Beijing Language and Culture University, 14 April 04.

61 Tianjin Beichen District Commission on Population and Family Planning, "Tianjin Municipality Current Policy on Giving Birth to a Second Child" [Tianjin shi xianxing shengyu ertai zhengce], 15 July 10.

62 "China Census Shows Population Aging Rapidly," Associated Press, reprinted in USA Today, 28 April 11; "Population Census Data Shows That It Is Appropriate To Do a Pragmatic Readjustment of Population Policy" [Renkou pucha shuju xianshi dui renkou zhengce yi zuo wushi tiaozheng], Study Times, reprinted in Hexun, 17 May 11; "Challenges and Countermeasures," Beijing Review, 26 May 11.

63 "President Hu Pledges To Keep China’s Birth Rate Low To Ensure Economic Growth," Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 27 April 11. In a March 5 work report, Premier Wen Jiabao stated, "We will adhere to the basic state policy on family planning and progressively improve it." Wen Jiabao, "Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government," Xinhua, 15 March 11.

64 "Total Population, CBR, CDR, NIR and TFR in China (1949–2000)," China Daily, 20 August 10.

65 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," accessed 14 June 11. While China’s National Bureau of Statistics estimated China’s fertility rate at 1.8 in 2007, in May 2011 a group of Chinese academics publicly refuted the number, stating that it had been "grossly overestimated." These academics estimate that China’s total fertility rate more accurately standsanywhere from 1.63 to below 1.5. See "China’s Total Fertility Rate Grossly Overestimated: Academic," Caijing, 17 May 11.

66 "China’s Aging Population Big Challenge to Pension System: Minister," Xinhua, 8 March 11; "Vast ‘Empty Nests,’ Disabled Aging Population Challenging China’s Social Network,"Xinhua, 2 March 11. Of particular concern are China’s pension and healthcare systems. For more information on China’s limited capacity to support its aging population, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re Center for Global Dialogue, "The Demographic Risks to China’s Long-Term Economic Outlook," 24 January 11, 7.

67 "National Labor Shortage Looms on Horizon," Global Times, 3 May 11; Jui-te Shih and Staff Reporter, "Labor Shortages Spread to More Regions, Industries in China," Want China Times, 17 June 11; Jianmin Li, Jamestown Foundation, "China’s Looming Labor Supply Challenge? " 8 April 11; Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re Center for Global Dialogue, "The Demographic Risks to China’s Long-Term Economic Outlook," 24 January 11, 3.

68 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihuashengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 22. According to Article 22, "Discrimination against, maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited." State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry of Health, State Food and Drug Administration, Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of Non-medically Necessary Gender Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy" [Guanyu jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai’er xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding],issued 29 November 02, effective 1 January 03. For discussion of these regulations, see "China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion," Xinhua, reprinted in China Net, 22 March 03.

69 According to United Nations Population Division statistics, China’s sex ratio at birth (SRB) in 2010 was the highest in the world at 120 males per females born. The next highest was Azerbaijan at 117, followed by Armenia at 115, Federated States of Micronesia at 111, and the Republic of Korea at 110. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, "World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision," 31 August 11. According to one demographer’s analysis, "ordinary human populations regularly and predictably report [SRBs of] 103 to 105." Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re Center for Global Dialogue, "The Demographic Risks to China’s Long-Term Economic Outlook," 24 January 11, 7. For recentstatistics regarding sex-selective abortion in China see, Wei Xing Zhu, Li Lu, and Therese Hesketh, "China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of DataFrom 2005 National Intercensus Survey," British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4–5. For one observer’s analysis of these statistics, see "A Study of Sex-Selective Abortion," China YouRen blog,13 May 10.

70 "China Faces Increasing Gender Ratio," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 9 August 11.

71 See Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches: Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).

72 See "China Gender Gap Fuelling Human Trafficking: Report," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China Post, 22 September 10. See also, World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children’s Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, "Preventing Gender-Biased Sex Selection," 14 June 11, 5; Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, "Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China," 32 Fordham International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Therese Hesketh et al., "The Effect of China’s One-Child Policy After 25 Years," New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353, No. 11 (2005), 1173; Nicholas Eberstadt, "A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-Selective Abortion Becomes a Worldwide Practice," Handbook of Gender Medicine, reprinted in All Girls Allowed, 1 May 11. According to this report, "Some economists have hypothesized that mass feticide, in making women scarce, will only increase their ‘value’—but in settings where the legal and personal rights ofthe individual are not secure and inviolable, the ‘rising value of women’ can have perverse and unexpected consequences, including increased demand for prostitution and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women (as is now reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in Asia)[.]"

73 PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women [Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11.

74 ChinaAid, "Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng’s Wife Reveals Details of Torture," 17 June 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Activist Chen Guangcheng Released After Serving Full Sentence," 9 September 10.

75 ChinaAid, "Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese Citizens Appeal to America," 10 February 11.

76 ChinaAid, "Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng’s Wife Reveals Details of Torture," 17 June 11. See also, "Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.

77 ChinaAid, "Exclusive Video Shows Ill Treatment & Illegal Detention of Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng," 9 February 11.

78 ChinaAid, "Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng’s Wife Reveals Details of Torture," 17 June 11.

79 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, "Warning: Reporting on Chen Guangcheng," 17 February 11; ChinaAid, "Government Retaliation Continues, Foreign Journalists Mistreated in Wake of Smuggled Video by Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng," 15 February 11.

80 Human Rights in China, "Lawyers Beaten, Detained After Meeting Regarding Chen Guangcheng," 16 February 11. See also, "Chen Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.

81 Philip P. Pan, "Who Controls the Family? " Washington Post, 27 August 05; Hannah Beech, "Enemies of the State? " Time, 12 September 05; Michael Sheridan, "China Shamed by Forced Abortions," Times of London, 18 September 05. See also, "Population Planning Official Confirms Abuses in Linyi City, Shandong Province," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 October 05.

82 "Blind Mob Organizer Sentenced to Imprisonment," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 25 August 06. In April 2008, Chen filed a lawsuit alleging that Linyi officials had "trumped up charges" against him in retaliation for his efforts to expose their misdeeds. Chen also wrote a detailed letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate to protest his imprisonment and petition for release. Li Jinsong, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, Liu Jie, and Other Officials for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation" [Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao’an konggao han], 5 April 08. See also "Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His Defense Team Into Custody," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 November 06.

83 "Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His Defense Team Into Custody," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 November 06; "Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed Retrial," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 December 06; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "CRD Protests Ill-Treatment of Chen Guangcheng in Prison," 21 June 07.

84 ChinaAid, "Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng’s Wife Reveals Details of Torture," 16 June 11; Chi-chi Zhang, "Activist: Child of Chinese Lawyer Denied Education," Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 5 September 11. According to He Peirong, a human rights advocate quoted in the Associated Press report, "I was told by local officials . . . that the girl has a right to an education and they would give us an answer by Sept. 1 as to whether she will go to school. . . . Now that school has started, it is obvious she has not been able to attend."

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Freedom of Residence | Freedom of Movement

Freedom of Residence

The Chinese government continued to enforce the household registration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s.1 Hukou regulations place limitations on the right of Chinese citizens to formally establish their permanent place of residence. Initially used to control migration of the rural population to China’s cities, the hukou system today has developed into "one of the most important mechanisms determining entitlement to public welfare, urban services and, more broadly, full citizenship." 2 The hukou regulations classify Chinese citizens as either rural or urban hukou holders, and local governments restrict access to some social services based on the classification. The implementation of these regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas by imposing significant constraints on rural hukou holders’ ability to obtain healthcare benefits, education, and other social services in urban locations where they reside but lack legal residency status. The hukou regulations appear to contravene the freedoms guaranteed in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 12 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which include "the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose [one’s] residence." 3

During this reporting period, many local governments have continued to relax certain hukou restrictions, consistent with earlier reform efforts. While details vary by location, the key provisions of these reforms allow some rural residents to transfer their hukou status from rural to urban status based on certain criteria, which usually include income, education, and specialized skill sets. For example, the coastal province of Guangdong implemented a point-based system that allowed some rural hukou holders to become urban hukou holders. However, only a relatively small number of migrant workers, 60,000 4 out of 23 million 5 according to data available in October 2010, had been affected by the reform.

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, authorities implemented new experimental hukou reform policies. Unlike earlier hukou reforms that have allowed some rural residents to obtain urban hukou based on criteria such as income and education, the latest reforms seek to include all residents who already hold a local hukou irrespective of other criteria such as income and education. For example, Chengdu municipality initiated hukou reforms that allowed all local hukou holders to register under a unified registration system for purposes of concentrated community relocation, marriage and population control, employment taxes, creditworthiness, and social benefits.6 The implications of the latest hukou reforms are unclear.

It has become increasingly apparent that one of the driving forces behind the latest hukou reforms is the need for more land for urbanization. According to Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, "the ultimate goal of reform, is to engineer a smooth and advanced urbanization process"—meaning more rural land must be made available for economic and industrial development.7 At the same time, authorities have provided some safeguards for rural residents against potential adverse consequences resulting from the reforms. For example, a key feature of the latest hukou reform allows local rural hukou holders to temporarily retain their contracted land.8 According to official government statements, the land retention provision is meant to ease the rural-to-urban transition: "It is clear that the current hukou reform does not call for rural residents to give up their land and rural property. As soon as they settle down into urban areas, their land and properties will need to be dealt with sooner or later." 9 The long-term implications for rural residents, especially after the land seizure, remain unclear.

Under the rubric of hukou reform, there appears to be increasing tension between some local governments and rural residents. The tension results from the clash between some rural residents’ desire to remain on rural land and some local authorities’ inclination to convert rural land to urban land.10 The conversion allows the local government to sell some of the rural land rights to developers after relocating rural residents to urban areas. According to one Chinese source, "officials are eager to move farmers off the land, because land sales make up about half of local government revenue and, in some areas, as much as 80 percent. The governments earn huge profits by compensating farmers very little . . . . [T]his scheme has become a new source of land supply for many local governments." 11 [For a discussion of the requisition and conversion of rural land, see Section III—Property—Urban Land and Collectively Owned— or Rural—Land.]

In connection with the latest hukou and land reforms, corruption at the local level and mistreatment of rural residents emerged as prominent issues during this reporting period. Some local governments forcibly seized rural land and relocated rural residents to urban areas, often at a compensation level that is deemed unfair based on market values.12 For example, in one case, authorities withheld 70 percent of the money owed to rural residents after the residents moved into apartments.13 In another example, the local government removed 11,000 villagers from rural lands located outside of Wuxi city, Jiangxi province, and sold the underlying land to developers for 30 times the amount it paid in compensation to the rural residents.14

The current hukou reforms face many challenges. In addition to local-level corruption and abuse, it is unclear how rural residents will adapt after relocation to urban areas, or to what extent their host municipalities can bear the cost of providing social benefits equivalent to those available to the existing urban residents. In addition, the issue of how to deal with rural residents who insist on staying on rural land remains a key concern to the Commission.

Freedom of Movement

The majority of Chinese citizens enjoy increasing freedom of movement to travel within China and internationally. However, authorities restrict freedom of movement to penalize citizens who express views that authorities deem objectionable. During this reporting period, the Chinese government placed restrictions on freedom of movement that are inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.15

Chinese authorities increasingly prevented rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving China under the color of law. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for preventing rights defenders from traveling (see examples below). To the extent the authorities provided an explanation for the prohibition on travel, they frequently cited Article 8(5) of the Law, which prohibits the departure from China of "persons whose exit from the country . . . in the opinion of the competent department of the State Council, [would] be harmful to state security or cause a major loss to national interests." 16 However, the meaning and scope of "harmful to state security" and "cause a major loss to national interests" are undefined. In addition, there appear to be no effective remedial provisions for appealing a decision preventing one’s freedom to travel.

The Commission particularly notes official efforts to block some human rights advocates’ ability to travel internationally, especially during the period close to the Nobel Prize award ceremony. To the extent the authorities gave any justification at all, they predominantly cited the activists’ travel as harmful to "national security." Examples include the following:

Authorities prevented Nobel Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo’s lawyer, Mo Shaoping, and his colleague, He Weifang, from traveling to London to attend a legal conference hosted by the International Bar Association on November 9, 2010; 17 prevented economist Mao Yushi from traveling to Singapore on December 1, citing concerns for "national security"; 18 prevented artist Ai Weiwei from boarding a flight to Seoul on December 2, also citing concerns for "national security" at the boarding gate; 19 prevented human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong from boarding flights to the United States on October 30, 2010, again citing concerns for "national security"; 20 and prevented professor and religious scholar He Guanghu from boarding a plane to Singapore to attend a conference on November 20, 2010, explaining that his trip "would pose a threat to national security." 21 Authorities also turned down retired professor Sun Wenguang’s passport application after he openly stated his desire to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony.22
Chinese authorities prevented poet, writer, and musician Liao Yiwu from traveling to the United States in March to promote his books,23 from attending the PEN World Voices Festival of International Literature in New York City in April,24 and from attending a literary festival in Australia in May.25 Liao had been imprisoned for four years for reciting his poem "Massacre" about the Tiananmen protests.26 In July 2011, with help from his friends, Liao fled to Germany through Vietnam and Poland so that he could "speak freely and publish freely." 27

HOME CONFINEMENT, SURVEILLANCE, AND HARASSMENT OF CHINESE CITIZENS

The Chinese government placed restrictions on liberty of movement to punish and control political dissidents and human rights advocates in contravention of international legal standards 28 and Article 37 of China’s Constitution, which prohibits unlawful detention, and deprivation or restriction of personal freedom of citizens by unlawful means.

As in previous years, authorities continued to employ a range of measures to restrict liberty of movement, including stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders,29 forcing rights defenders to take so-called "vacations" to remote areas 30 or to "drink tea" with security personnel,31 removing them to unknown locations,32 and imprisoning them.33 In apparent sensitivity to recent protests in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as an online call for "Jasmine" protests within China, authorities detained, "forcibly disappeared," or put under extralegal home confinement several dozen human rights defenders, including human rights lawyers Jiang Tianyong, Li Tiantian, Liu Anjun, and Teng Biao, among others.34

In October 2010, in apparent connection with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, authorities restricted approximately three dozen human rights defenders’ freedom of movement. For example, authorities stationed police personnel, sometimes around-the-clock, outside of the homes of writer Yu Jie and democracy advocate Hu Shigen,35 lawyer Li Fangping and activist Li Zhiying,36 and Christian house church leader Xu Yonghai.37 Authorities also placed Ding Zilin, the organizer of the Tiananmen Mothers, under extralegal house arrest for 74 days; 38 and close associates of Liu Xia, wife of the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, have not been able to reach her.39

The Commission notes that, during this reporting period, authorities employed particularly forceful techniques to intimidate and control the family members of human rights defenders and activists. For example, authorities continued to confine, harass, and abuse legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his family after his official prison release date in September 2010.40 [See Case Update: Chen Guangcheng in Section II—Population Planning.] Officials have also kept Liu Xia under extralegal house arrest since October 2010.41 In addition, authorities detained Xinna and Uiles, the wife and son of Mongol rights advocate Hada, on apparent charges of "illegal business operations" and "drug possession." 42

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement

1 PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.

2 Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, "Is China Abolishing the Hukou System? " China Quarterly, Vol. 195 (2008), 582, 587.

3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26.

4 Ke Xuedong, "Sixty Thousand Migrant Workers Settle in Guangdong" [Yu 6 wan yue wailaigong jifen ruhu], Guangzhou Daily, 17 November 10.

5 Jiang Yuefei et al., "11.4 Million Migrant Workers in Guangzhou Will Enjoy Low-Threshold Health Insurance" [Guangzhou 1140 wan nongmingong jiang xiangshou dimenkan yibao], Guangzhou Daily, 21 January 08.

6 Chengdu Municipal Party Committee and Chengdu Municipal People’s Government, Opinion Regarding the Unification of Chengdu Urban and Rural Hukou To Achieve Freedom of Movement [Quanyu chengdu chengxiang tongyi huji shixian ziyou qianxi yijian], issued 9 November 10, art. 1.

7 Shen Weihuang, "Cautious Steps to Land Reform," Global Times, 16 February 11.

8 Zhang Tingting et al., "Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government Announce Opinion Regarding the Unification of Hukou by 2012" [Shiwei shizhengfu chutai yijian 2012 nian tongyi chengxiang huji], Chengdu Daily, reprinted in Chengdu Municipal People’s Government, 17 November 10.

9 Xie Liangbing, "Turn Freedom of Movement Into a Real Possibility: Central Government Investigates Chengdu Hukou Reform" [Dang ziyou qianxi chengwei keneng: buwei diaoyan chengdu hugai], Economic Observer, 3 December 10.

10 Gillian Wong, "Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land Grab," Associated Press, 8 March 11; Sherry Tao Kong, "China’s Migrant Problem: The Need for Hukou Reform," East Asia Forum, 29 January 10.

11 Gillian Wong, "Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land Grab," Associated Press, 8 March 11.

12 Ibid.; Wang Junxiu and Zhang Lei, "Government Cannot Only Think About Taking Land From the Rural Residents" [Zhengfu buneng zhixiangzhe na nongminde tudi], China Youth Daily, 13 January 11; Mitch Moxley, "China’s City Workers Prefer Rural Roots," Asia Times, 1 December 10; Rob Schmitz, "A Land Grab in the Chinese Countryside," Market Place, 13 December 10.

13 Gillian Wong, "Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land Grab," Associated Press, 8 March 11.

14 Rob Schmitz, "A Land Grab in the Chinese Countryside," Market Place, 13 December 10. In one instance, the city scheduled one resident’s house for demolition and offered her an apartment in the city, if the resident paid the equivalent of US$15,000, an amount far beyond her means. When she traveled to Beijing to appeal her case, authorities detained her for 26 days after her return.

15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12.

16 PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongmin chujing rujing guanli fa], issued 22 November 85, effective 1 February 86.

17 Peter Simpson, "China Bans Rights Lawyers From Travel China [sic]," Voice of America, 9 November 10; Dan Martin, "Nobel Winner’s Lawyer Says Barred From Leaving China," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in France 24, 9 November 10.

18 Cara Anna, "China Blocks Famous Artist, Economist From Flights," Associated Press, 3 December 10.

19 Ibid.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Prominent Artist and Activist Ai Weiwei Prevented From Leaving Country En Route to South Korea," 2 December 10.

20 Cara Anna, "Lawyers: China Blocked US Visit, Citing ‘Security,’ " Associated Press, 30 October 10.

21 ChinaAid, "China Blocks Well-Known Religion Scholar From Leaving Country To Attend Conference," 20 November 10.

22 "Anger Over Nobel Exit Ban," Radio Free Asia, 2 December 10.

23 "Sichuan Advocate Liao Yiwu Again Barred From Leaving the Country" [Sichuan yiyi renshi liao yiwu zaici bei jinzhi chuguo], Radio Free Asia, 7 April 11.

24 Philip Gourevitch, "Liao Yiwu: Grounded in China," New Yorker, 30 March 11.

25 Keith Bradsher, "China Bars Prominent Writer From Overseas Travel," New York Times, 9 May 11.

26 Philip Gourevitch, "Liao Yiwu’s Persistent Voice," New Yorker, 2 March 10.

27 Andrew Jacobs, "Dissident Chinese Writer Flees to Germany," New York Times, 12 July 11; Gillian Wong, "Writer Liao Yiwu Threatened by Chinese Government, Leaves for Germany," Associated Press, 8 July 11. For an extended interview with Liao Yiwu since he fled to Germany, see Ian Johnson, " ‘I’m Not Interested in Them; I Wish They Weren’t Interested in Me’: An Interview With Liao Yiwu," New York Review of Books, 15 August 11.

28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1).

29 "Tang Jitian Sent Home to House Arrest, Suspected To Encounter Disaster, What’s the Crime in a Happy Reunion? " [Tang jitian qian xiang ruanjin yi ceng zao nue, weixiao juhui he zui xu hui bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11; Minnie Chan, "Security Even Tighter After ‘Jasmine’ Call," South China Morning Post, 2 March 11; "Human Rights Defenders Assail Xu Shuiliang, Beijing, for Vilifying Liu Xiaobo," Boxun, 9 November 10.

30 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing Weekly December 8–13, 2010," 15 December 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "As Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony Nears, Chinese Government Increases Surveillance, Restrictions on Dissidents," 8 December 10.

31 "Mainland Student in Hong Kong Asked To ‘Drink Tea’ by Mainland Liaison Office After Participating in Rights Defense Activities" [Zai gang neidisheng weiquan zhong lianban "qing yincha"], Sina, 1 June 11; "Caijing Magazine Journalist Zhang Jialong Missing After Being Asked To ‘Have Tea,’ May Be Related to Ai Weiwei Case" [Caijing zazhi jizhe zhang jialong bei "hecha" shizong huo yu ai weiwei an you guan], Radio France Internationale, 2 May 11; "The Chinese Government Charges Three Internet Dissidents With the Crime of ‘Incitement To Subvert State Authority’ " [Zhongguo zhengfu dui sanming wanluo yiyirenshi kong yi ‘shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan’ zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 3 April 11.

32 John Yang, "The Silencing of China’s Human Rights Lawyers," Epoch Times, 2 May 11; Gillian Wong, "China Cracks Down, Many Activists Missing," Associated Press, 21 March 11.

33 "China Charges Two Amid ‘Jasmine’ Crackdown," Agence France-Presse, 29 March 11; Andrew Jacobs, "Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Sentenced to 10 Years," New York Times, 25 March 11.

34 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Escalating Crackdown Following Call for Jasmine Revolution in China," 31 March 11.

35 Human Rights in China, "Dozens Put Under House Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize Announcement," 28 October 10; Chris Buckley, "China Dissidents Under Lockdown as Nobel Tensions Linger," Reuters, 29 October 10.

36 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Beijing Activists Li Fangping, Li Zhiying Placed Under Soft Detention" [Beijing weiquan renshi li fangping, li zhiying zao ruanjin], 26 October 10.

37 Human Rights in China, "Clampdown on Individuals Following Nobel Announcement," 12 October 10.

38 Tania Branigan, "Chinese Activists Praise Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize Despite Crackdown," 12 January 11.

39 Human Rights in China, "Dozens Put Under House Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize Announcement," 28 October 10.

40 ChinaAid, "A Video Shows Blind Christian Activist Perseveres Under House Arrest," 9 February 11; Rachel Beitarie, "Guilty by Association," Foreign Policy, 19 May 11; "Activist Lawyer Beaten Over Leaked Video," Associated Press, 1 February 11.

41 Christopher Bodeen, "Wife of Chinese Nobel Prize Winner Still Under House Arrest, Brother Denied Prison Visit," Canadian Press, 19 October 10; "US Urges China To Let Nobel Winner’s Wife Move Freely," Reuters, 12 October 10; Human Rights in China, "Dozens Put Under House Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize Announcement," 28 October 10; Rachel Beitarie, "Gulty by Assocation," Foreign Policy, 17 May 11.

42 Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, "Hada Is Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally Arrested," 5 May 11.

STATUS OF WOMEN

Introduction | Gender Equality | Employment Discrimination | Violence Against Women | Population Planning and Gender Equality

Introduction

Chinese officials continue to actively promote the protection of women’s rights and interests in accordance with international human rights norms; however, due in part to ambiguity and a lack of clearly outlined responsibilities in China’s national-level legislation, women still encounter gender inequality, discrimination, and other abuses in the community, in the workplace, and at home. Women’s representation in leadership positions at all levels of gov-ernment still falls short of international norms and, according to the most recent available statistics, appears to have made little significant progress for at least four decades. Chinese women continued to face gender-based employment discrimination during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, including lower average wages than their male counterparts, gender bias in recruitment, and compulsory retirement at an age set 5 to 10 years younger than that of men. Domestic violence and sexual harassment reportedly affect a majority of Chinese women, yet ambiguity in China’s existing national-level legislation on these issues limits preventative measures and makes it difficult for women to seek recourse when they encounter abusive treatment. Officials reportedly completed draft domestic violence legislation that addresses longstanding concerns regarding issues such as domestic violence among cohabitating couples, psychological abuse, and physical violence, but it is unclear when and if such legislation will be placed on the legislative agenda. Sex-selective abortion continues, despite Chinese government regulations prohibiting the practice, and exacerbates China’s severely imbalanced sex ratio. Observers have raised concerns this year that China’s skewed sex ratio may lead to an uptick in the trafficking of women for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.

Gender Equality

In its domestic laws 1 and policy initiatives 2 and through its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),3 the Chinese government has committed to ensuring female representation in government. However, at the highest levels of the central government, as well as in the Communist Party, female representation remains low. Only one woman currently holds a position in the Party’s top-ranking 25-person Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee,4 and women hold only four positions in China’s 35-person State Council.5 Official statistics on female political participation in the country’s legislature do not appear to be available for years more recent than 2008,6 at which time China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that women made up approximately 21 percent of delegates to the National People’s Congress. This figure has shown little growth since the early 1970s 7 and remains short of the 30 percent standard set by the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1990.8 Song Xiuyan, Vice Chair of the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council, reported in August 2011 that female leadership has increased in the provincial, municipal, and county levels of government since 2000. When asked about the lack of women’s political participation at higher levels, she stated, "[W]e still have a lot of work to do to raise social awareness and guarantee gender equality through legal means." 9 In August 2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Women (2011–2020), which, among other goals, calls for "local governments at the county level and above to have at least one female leader" by the end of 2020.10

Against a backdrop of reportedly limited female representation at the village level,11 authorities revised national-level legislation this year, changing the language on female quotas in village committees and village representative assemblies. With limited decisionmaking power in village committees, women face challenges in protecting their rights and interests.12 The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees in October 2010, changing the stipulation that village committees should have "an appropriate number of women" 13 to the stipulation that village committees "should have female members." 14 The revised law also includes a new stipulation requiring that "female village representatives should make up one-third or more of the village representative assembly," a separate decisionmaking body made up of village committee members and village representatives.15 According to one Peking University law professor, "The Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees is not directly aimed at furthering women’s rights, however, it is of great significance in protecting women’s rights, for it is related to women’s right to vote, which is vital in upholding and furthering women’s rights and gender equality." 16 The impact that these revisions will have on female representation at the village level in the future is unclear, but some domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step.17 An increase in women’s decisionmaking power at the village level may lead to greater protection of women’s property rights,18 an issue that plagues rural women who lose their land when they marry out of their village.19 [For additional information on the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, see Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.]

Employment Discrimination

Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to issues such as wages, recruitment, and retirement age remains widespread in China, despite government efforts to eliminate it and promote women’s employment. The Chinese government has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and has committed under Article 7 to ensuring "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable con-ditions of work," including "equal pay for equal work," and "equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence." 20 Several domestic laws also prohibit gender discrimination and promote gender equality in the workplace,21 but according to an analysis in a February 2010 Women’s Watch-China report, these laws do not provide guidance for an enforcement mechanism. For example, if a female encounters discrimination in recruitment or on the job, she has no legal basis for filing a lawsuit against the discriminatory behavior; she can only request labor arbitration.22

A number of domestic reports and surveys from the 2011 reporting year highlighted challenges that women continue to face in employment due to their gender:

Difficulty securing employment. According to a January 2011 Shaanxi Provincial Women’s Federation survey, 70 percent of those surveyed believed that males have an easier time finding a job than females. In addition, 44 percent of females surveyed reported that they had encountered discrimination based on their marital or childbearing status, compared to 13.9 percent of their male counterparts. In addition, 19 percent of females surveyed reported that their height and physical appearance were obstacles in their job search, compared to 10.9 percent of their male counterparts.23
Wage disparity. A survey released in February 2011 by the educational consulting firm MyCOS reported that the income gap between male and female graduates increased with their level of education. For example, on a monthly basis, males with vocational school degrees reportedly earned an average of 169 yuan (US$26) more than females, males with undergraduate degrees reportedly earned an average of 330 yuan (US$51) more than females, and males with graduate degrees earned an average of 815 yuan (US$126) more than females.24
Unequal treatment. A study released in March 2011 by the non-profit research group Center for Work-Life Policy reported that, in a survey on the female talent pool in China, 35 percent of those surveyed believed that women faced unfair treatment at work. The study also found that 48 percent of women choose to "disengage, scale back their ambitions or consider quitting [their jobs]" due to "problems of bias." 25
Forced early retirement. Mandatory retirement ages for women in China continue to be five years earlier than those for men.26 Public discussion on retirement age burgeoned in the 2011 reporting year surrounding the publication of a white paper on the state of China’s human resources in September 2010,27 the issuance of new social security regulations in Shanghai municipality in September 2010,28 passage of the PRC Law on Social Insurance in October 2010,29 proposals at the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress in March 2011,30 and the release of the 2010 Census results in April.31 The gender discrepancy in retirement age may obstruct some women’s career advancement and impact their economic rights and interests.32 In the past, the lower retirement age for women has also reportedly contributed to hiring discrimination, as employers in some cases preferred to hire women younger than 40 years of age.33

In May 2011, the Shenzhen Municipal Women’s Federation passed draft regulations on gender equality.34 If adopted, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regulations would be the first legislation of their kind in China to specifically focus on gender equality.35 The draft has reportedly been placed on the 2011 legislative agenda.36

Violence Against Women

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI) and amended PRC Marriage Law prohibit domestic violence,37 and the crime of domestic violence is punishable under the PRC Criminal Law.38 The problem of domestic violence remains widespread, reportedly affecting more than one-third of Chinese families.39 Current national-level legal provisions regarding domestic violence leave many victims unprotected, as they simply prohibit domestic violence without defining the term or clarifying specific responsibilities of government departments in prevention, punishment, and treatment.40 During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese advocates continued to express concern regarding the nationwide problem of domestic violence and called for clear national-level legislation on domestic violence.41 According to state-run media sources, officials announced in March 2011 the completion of draft domestic violence legislation.42 Highlights reportedly include attention given to cohabitating couples, as well as to cases that involve "psychological violence." 43

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, yet those who encounter sexual harassment remain largely unprotected under Chinese law and face difficulties in defending their rights. An April 2011 article published by a Chinese business investigation group reported that 84 percent of women in China had experienced some form of sexual harassment and that 50 percent of this harassment had occurred in the workplace.44 A Women’s Watch-China (WWC) survey released in May 2011 interviewed both men and women and found that 19.8 percent of those surveyed had experienced sexual harassment, and of those, 55.1 percent were women.45 The Chinese government has committed under Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to taking "all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment," 46 and it introduced the concept of sexual harassment into legislation with the 2005 amendment to the LPWRI.47 The amended LPWRI prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for victims through either administrative punishment for offenders or civil action in the court system, but it does not provide a clear definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment.48 While most people who face sexual harassment choose to remain silent about it,49 those who decide to take legal action risk losing their lawsuits due to the challenge of supplying adequate evidence.50

As reported in the Commission’s 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports, in February 2009, a study group led by three Chinese researchers submitted a draft proposal to the National People’s Congress for a law aimed at preventing sexual harassment in the workplace.51 The proposed law would hold the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security responsible for prevention and punishment of sexual harassment in the workplace, while also holding the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation responsible for providing aid to those who experience sexual harassment.52 The Commission has not found indicators of progress on this or similar national-level legislation during the 2011 reporting year.

Population Planning and Gender Equality

According to reports during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, sex-selective abortion continues, despite the government’s legislative and policy efforts to deter such practices. In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, some Chinese parents choose to engage in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples whose first child is a girl.53 The Chinese government issued national regulations in 2003 banning prenatal gender determination and sex-selective abortion.54 Statistics and analysis from studies published in 2008,55 2009,56 and 2010 57 regarding China’s significantly skewed sex ratio show that sex-selective abortion remains prevalent, especially in rural areas, suggesting that implementation of the ban on sex-selective abortion remains uneven. In August 2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Children (2011–2020), which urged officials to "step up efforts against the use of ultrasound and other [forms of technology] to engage in non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abortion." 58 Some observers, including Chinese state media, have linked China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio with an increase in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms of human trafficking.59 [For more information regarding China’s skewed sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.]

Notes to Section II—Status of Women

1 The PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the PRC Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses stipulate that an "appropriate number" of female deputies should serve at all levels of people’s congresses. PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhangfa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses [Zhonghua renmingongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 6.

2 PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women [Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11.

3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 7. China signed the convention on 17 July 80 and ratified it on 4 November 80.

4 State Councilor Liu Yandong is reportedly the only woman who holds a position in the Politburo. Jen-Kai Liu, "The Main National Leadership of the PRC," China Data Supplement, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3; "Liu Yandong," China Vitae, accessed 13 April 11.

5 Jen-Kai Liu, "The Main National Leadership of the PRC," China Data Supplement, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3; Michael Forsythe and Yidi Zhao, "Women Knowing China Men Rule Prove Mao’s Half the Sky Remains Unfulfilled," Bloomberg News, 23 June 11.

6 "Number of Deputies to All Previous National People’s Congresses" [Lijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China Statistical Yearbook 2010, 26 September 10, Table 22–1.

7 Ibid.

8 The target of 30 percent female representation in leadership positions by 1995 was set by the UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th session in 1990. "Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by 1995—United Nations Commission on the Status of Women," United Nations Publications, reprinted in Bnet, June 1990.

9 "87.1 Pct of China’s Provincial Regions Have Female Vice Governors," Xinhua, 9 August 11.

10 PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women [Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; He Dan and Cang Wei, "Women Seek Larger Role," China Daily, 10 August 11.

11 According to All-China Women’s Federation Deputy Chair Hong Tianhui, cited in a November 2010 People’s Daily report, women hold approximately 3 percent of village committee director positions. "Official: China’s Sex Ratio Lacks Proportion," People’s Daily, 17 November 10. For statistics on village representation from the 2010 reporting year, see "Chen Zhili: All-China Women’s Federation Actively Promotes Female Political Participation" [Chen zhili biaoshi fulian jiang jiji tuidong funu canzheng yizheng], China Radio International, 6 March 10.

12 Women’s Watch-China, "Annual Report 2008," 23 October 09, 19. According to this report, "Women’s participation in grassroots decision-making bodies is comparatively low. They have a disadvantaged position in political affairs. Moreover, as women had been kept away from the decision-making power of the village, they had low awareness of or enthusiasm for getting involved in village self-governance and safeguarding their rights and interests. Consequently, they were not able to unite themselves into a powerful interest group and to fight for their own rights and interests. As a result, they could not challenge the powerful and dominant male decision-making groups."

13 PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], enacted 4 November 98, art. 9.

14 PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], enacted 4 November 98, amended 28 October 10, art. 6.

15 Ibid., art. 25.

16 Wang Lei, Women’s Watch-China, "A Perspective on the Amendment of the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees Concerning the Protection of Women’s Rights," 15 March 10.

17 Women’s Watch-China, "Women’s Organizations Discuss Draft of Revised Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, Each Anticipate Increased Level of Village Female Political Participation" [Funu jie tan cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa xiuding cao’an-yiyi qidai nongcun funu canzheng shuiping jinyibu tigao], 2 February 10.

18 Women’s Watch-China, "Annual Report 2008," 23 October 09, 19–20, 27.

19 Women’s Watch-China, "20 Percent of Rural-to-Urban Female Migrant Workers Lose Land" [20% jincheng wugong nongcun nuxing shiqu tudi], 12 February 11; Women’s Watch-China, "The E-Newsletter 69 of WW-China," 16 June 11, 4–8. For information on one city’s revision of village rules and regulations to safeguard women’s rights and interests, see "Revision of Village Regulations Is a Starting Point Opportunity for Village Women’s Rights Defense" [Cungui minyue xiuding shi jihui cun tun funu weiquan you zhuashou], Heilongjiang Daily, 4 November 10.

20 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7. China signed the covenant on 27 October 97 and ratified it on 27 March 01. See also PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3.

21 PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, arts. 12, 13. PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 22–27; PRC Employment Promotion Law[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3.

22 Women’s Watch-China, "The E-Newsletter 54 of WW-China," February 2010, 10.

23 "19 Percent of Women Face Discrimination Based on Appearance When Seeking Jobs, 44 Percent of Women Have Faced Discrimination Based on Childbearing Status" [19% nuxing qiuzhi cunzai rongmao qishi, 44% nuxing zao hunyun qishi], Xi’an Evening News, 13 January 11.

24 "Analysis of October Results From the ‘2011 University Graduate Follow-Up Survey Monthly Report,’ " MyCOS HR Digital Information Co., Ltd., 2011; Women’s Watch-China, "Income Gap Is Large Between Male and Female University Students" [Nannu daxuesheng shouru chajuda], 3 March 11.

25 Center for Work-Life Policy, "New Study Finds the Solution to China’s Talent Crunch Isin the Hidden Talent Pool of Educated Chinese Women," 22 March 11.

26 Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and Party officials are 60 and55, respectively, while retirement ages for male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively. "China’s Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged for Violating Constitution" [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding beitiqing weixian shencha], China Law Education, 16 March 06. For information on the current debate about raising the retirement age, see "Retirement Age Will Be Pushed Back: Minister," China Daily, reprinted in Sina, 22 March 10.

27 PRC State Council Information Office, "China’s Human Resources Situation" [Zhongguo de renli ziyuan zhuangkuang], reprinted in PRC Central Government Web Portal, 10 September 10. For discussion following this white paper on retirement age, see, e.g., Kit Gillet, "White Paper on Retirement Age Prompts Fresh Debate," South China Morning Post, 22 September 10.

28 Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security, Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security Trial Opinion Regarding [Shanghai’s] Enterprise TalentPool of All Kinds and Flexible Deferment of the Pension Application Process [Shi renli ziyuan shehui baozhang ju guanyu benshi qiye gelei rencai rouxing yanchi banli shenling jibenyanglaojin shouxu de shixing yijian], issued 6 September 10, effective 1 October 10; Huang Anqi, "Relevant Person in Charge at Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security Analyzes Shanghai’s ‘Trial Opinions’ To Defer Application for Pension" [Shanghai shi renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang ju youguan fuzeren jiedu shanghai yanchi shenling yanglaojin"shixing yijian"], Xinhua, 5 October 10; Duan Yan, "Age-Old Problem Looms for Families," China Daily, 14 October 10.

29 PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui baoxian fa], enacted 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11. For examples of reports discussing the possibility of and need forraising the retirement age, see Chen Xin, "Experts Warn Pension Fund Under Pressure," China Daily, 30 October 10.

30 Li Dong et al., "Respect Women’s Choice" [Zunzhong nuxing ziji xuanze], Guangzhou Daily, 8 March 11; Zhao Yinan, "Women’s Retirement May Be Delayed," China Daily, 1 March 11;Wang Chunxia, All-China Women’s Federation, "Gender Equal Retirement Age Imminent but Gradual," 15 March 11.

31 National Bureau of Statistics, "Report on the Main Data From the 2010 Sixth National Population Census (No. 1)" [2010 nian diliuci quanguo renkou pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao (di 1hao)], 28 April 11; National Bureau of Statistics, "Report on the Main Data From the 2010 Sixth National Population Census (No. 2)" [2010 nian diliuci quanguo renkou pucha zhuyao shujugongbao (di 2 hao)], 29 April 11; Feng Han, "Flexible Retirement System Under Discussion in China," Global Times, 25 May 11.

32 Gao Zhuyuan, "Same Retirement Age for All," China Daily, 24 March 11. According to one observer cited in this report, the earlier compulsory retirement age for women is "outdated,causes huge financial loss to women and blocks their career path."

33 "China’s Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged for Violating Constitution" [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding bei tiqing weixian shencha], China Law Education, 16 March 06; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 170.

34 All-China Women’s Federation, "Shenzhen First To Enforce Rules on Gender Equality," 1 June 11.

35 For a brief analysis of highlights in the draft regulations, see Women’s Watch-China, "Preparing To Draft Gender Equality Promotion Regulations, Shenzhen Leads the Way" [Yunniangzhiding xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli, shenzhen xianxing], 3 March 11. See also CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 131–132.

36 All-China Women’s Federation, "Shenzhen First To Enforce Rules on Gender Equality," 1 June 11; " ‘Gender Equality Promotion Regulations’ on Shenzhen’s Legislative Agenda This Year" ["Xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli" lieru shenzhen jinnian lifa xiangmu], China Women’s News, reprinted in All-China Women’s Federation, 22 March 11.

37 PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], enacted 10 September 80, effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3.

38 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 234, 236, 260.

39 Cheng Yingqi, "Call for Legislation To Curb Domestic Violence," China Daily, 26 November 10.

40 PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], enacted 10 September 80, effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3. For Chinese experts’ discussion of the shortcomings of current national-level legislation, see "All-China Women’s Federation Strongly Promotes Anti-Domestic Violence Law" [Quanguo fulian litui fan jiating baoli fa], People’s Representative News, 31 December 09; Women’s Watch-China, "Proposal for Law on Prevention and Curbing of Domestic Violence Comes Out" [Yufang he zhizhi jiating baoli fa jianyi gao chulu],28 November 09; He Ping, "China Scholars Call for Attention on ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation’ " [Zhongguo xuezhe huyu guanzhu "fan jiating baoli" lifa], Radio Free Asia, 13 January 10. See also "All-China Women’s Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for Draft Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2 February 10.

41 "All-China Women’s Federation Vice-Chair: Anti-Domestic Violence Should Be Entered Into Legislative Agenda" [Quanguo fulian fu zhuxi: fan jiating baoli ying lieru lifa], Jinghua Times,reprinted in Huanqiu Net, 8 March 11; Cheng Yingqi, "Call for Legislation To Curb Domestic Violence," China Daily, 26 November 10.

42 Chen Bin, "Draft of First Anti-Domestic Violence Law Reportedly Already Complete" [Jucheng shoubu fan jiating baoli fa cao’an yi qicao wancheng], Legal Weekly, reprinted in Sina,18 March 11; "Draft of ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Law’ Complete" ["Fan jiating baoli fa" cao’an qicao wancheng], Xinhua, 20 March 11.

43 "Draft of ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Law’ Complete" ["Fan jiating baoli fa" cao’an qicao wancheng], Xinhua, 20 March 11.

44 Guangdong Bonthe Business Investigation Co., "Female University Graduate Survey" [Nu daxuesheng diaocha], 21 April 11.

45 Women’s Watch-China, "Survey Report on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace" [Zhichang xing saorao diaocha baogao], 16 May 11, 3.

46 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11. China signed the convention on 17 July 80 and ratified it on 4 November 80.

47 Women’s Watch-China, "Annual Report 2008," 23 October 09, 30; PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa],enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 40, 58.

48 Ibid.

49 Tang Yu, "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, What Difficulties Exist in Defending One’s Rights" [Zhichang xing saorao weiquan heqi nan], China Worker Net, 7 January 11; Women’sWatch-China, "Survey Report on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace" [Zhichang xing saorao diaocha baogao], 16 May 11, 5.

50 Tang Yu, "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, What Difficulties Exist in Defending One’s Rights" [Zhichang xing saorao weiquan heqi nan], China Worker Net, 7 January 11; GaoZhuyuan, "The Evil of Sexual Harassment," China Daily, 2 June 11.

51 Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Beijing, "Law on Prevention of SexualHarassment in the Workplace Submitted to the National People’s Congress (Draft Proposal)" [Xiang quanguo renda tijiao "gongzuo changsuo xing saorao fangzhifa" (jianyi gao) yi an], 17March 09; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 133.

52 Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Beijing, "Law on Prevention of SexualHarassment in the Workplace Submitted to the National People’s Congress (Draft Proposal)" [Xiang quanguo renda tijiao "gongzuo changsuo xing saorao fangzhifa" (jianyi gao) yi an], 17March 09.

53 See, e.g., Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing, "The Consequences of Son Preference and Sex-Selective Abortion in China and Other Asian Countries," Canadian Medical Journal, 14 March 11, 1–2; Mikhail Lipatov, Shuzhuo Li, and Marcus W. Feldman, "Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 105, No. 49 (2008), 19171. According to this study, "The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference." See also Chu Junhong, "Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion inRural Central China," Population and Development Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2001), 260; Joseph Chamie, "The Global Abortion Bind: A Woman’s Right To Choose Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances," Yale Global, 29 May 08.

54 State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry of Health, State Food andDrug Administration, PRC Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of Non-Medically Necessary Gender Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy [Guanyujinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai’er xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, effective 1 January 03. For a discussion of these regulations, see "China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion," Xinhua, reprinted in China Net, 22 March 03.

55 Mikhail Lipatov et al., "Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 105, No. 49 (2008), 19171. According to this study, "The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference."

56 Wei Xing Zhu et al., "China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 National Intercensus Survey," British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4–5.

57 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch" [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10. According to the January 2010 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences study, by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.

58 PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women [Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11.

59 "China Gender Gap Fuelling Human Trafficking: Report," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China Post, 22 September 10. See also World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children’s Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, "Preventing Gender-Biased Sex Selection," 14 June 11, 5; Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, "Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China," Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), 752; Therese Hesketh et al., "The Effect of China’s One-Child Policy After 25 Years," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 353, No. 11 (2005), 1173; Nicholas Eberstadt, "A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-Selective Abortion Becomes A Worldwide Practice," Handbook of Gender Medicine, reprinted in All Girls Allowed, 1 May 11. According to Eberstadt’s report, "Some economists have hypothesized that mass feticide, in making women scarce, will only increase their ‘value’—but in settings where the legal and personal rights of the individual are not secure and inviolable, the ‘rising value of women’ can have perverse and unexpected consequences, including increased demand for prostitution and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women (as is now reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in Asia)[.]"

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Introduction | Anti-Trafficking Challenges | Prevalence | Driving Factors | Anti-Trafficking Efforts

Introduction

The Chinese government took steps to combat human trafficking during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, but challenges remain. Multiple factors shape the context of the ongoing human trafficking problem in China, including the government’s population planning policies and their exacerbation of China’s skewed sex ratio; migrant mobility; uneven enforcement of anti-trafficking laws; lack of anti-trafficking training, education, and resources; and government corruption. In addition, officials in the past year continued to focus on the abduction and sale of women and children,1 while giving proportionally less attention to other forms of trafficking. The government’s limited capacity restricts the number of trafficking victims that can access official protection, services, and care. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed amendments to the PRC Criminal Law in February 2011, including new language which, if implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of forced labor cases. Authorities reported taking action to combat trafficking in the 2011 reporting year. Gaps between domestic legislation and international standards remain and continue to limit the scope and effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts.

Anti-Trafficking Challenges

The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in December 2009,2 but it has not revised current domestic legislation to come into full compliance. The PRC Criminal Law prohibits the trafficking of persons, which it defines as "abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim." 3 The law does not provide definitions for these concepts. The PRC Criminal Law separately prohibits forced prostitution,4 but it does not make clear whether minors under 18 years of age who are engaged in prostitution may be considered victims of trafficking, regardless of the use of force. Chinese law does not clearly prohibit non-physical forms of coercion-including debt bondage and threats-or the recruitment, provision, or attainment of persons for forced prostitution,5 which are covered under Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol.6 The Chinese government’s differing definition of human trafficking has negative implications for anti-trafficking work in China, including limiting the Chinese government’s prosecution efforts, protection of victims, and victim services.7 It is unclear whether the Chinese government’s definition of human trafficking also has negative implications for program funding, as fiscal information on programs is not publicly available.

Chinese officials continue to conflate human trafficking with human smuggling and therefore treat some victims of trafficking as criminals, although recent law enforcement efforts have sought to reduce this.8 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the main international body responsible for implementing the Palermo Protocol, human trafficking and migrant smuggling differ with respect to consent, exploitation, transnationality, and source of profit.9 Commonly, human trafficking involves the exploitation of an individual (either domestically or across borders) for forced labor or prostitution without the individual’s consent, whereas migrant smuggling involves the cross-border transport of an individual with the individual’s consent and for direct or indirect profit resulting from the transport.10 In conflating the two, Chinese officials may consider an individual’s illegal entry into China to be a crime of "human smuggling" and punish the individual accordingly, while giving less consideration to the role exploitation may have played in the border crossing.11 The Chinese government continues to deport all undocumented North Koreans as illegal "economic migrants" and does not provide legal alternatives to repatriation for identified foreign victims of trafficking.12 [For more information, see Section II—North Korean Refugees in China.] Reports from the 2011 reporting year indicate that official corruption and lack of resources in some areas also continue to deter or limit anti-trafficking efforts and exacerbate the trafficking problem.13

Prevalence

China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and children.14 The majority of trafficking cases are domestic; 15 however, human traffickers continue to traffic Chinese women and children from China to countries around the world.16 Women and girls from countries across Asia, as well as some countries in Europe and Africa, are also trafficked into China and forced into marriages, employment, and sexual exploitation.17 Forced labor continues, and certain cases gained widespread media attention during this reporting year; 18 however, the full extent of the forced labor problem in China is unclear.19 [See Section II—Worker Rights for more information on child labor.] According to the Palermo Protocol, forced labor of any person under 18 years of age constitutes "trafficking in persons." 20

Driving Factors

Experts link the reported growth 21 of the trafficking market in China to several political, demographic, economic, and social factors. Reports indicate that China’s skewed sex ratio,22 which is increasing against the backdrop of China’s population planning policies and Chinese families’ preference for sons,23 has increased the demand for trafficking for forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.24 In recent years, domestic and international observers have also linked the growing trafficking market with the lack of awareness and education on trafficking prevention for vulnerable women and parents 25 and conditions in bordering countries such as instability in Burma and poverty in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.26 [For additional information on China’s skewed sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.]

Representative Human Trafficking Cases From the 2011 Reporting Year

In December 2010, authorities detained an official from a government-funded homeless shelter for his alleged involvement in a forced labor scheme.27 The official allegedly sold 11 workers, 8 of whom reportedly had disabilities, to a building materials factory in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where they were held and forced to work for at least three years without pay or protective gear.28
Also in December, authorities detained a brick kiln employer in Shaanxi province on charges of forced labor after he brought people in who were mentally ill, deaf, mute, disabled, or otherwise vulnerable to exploitation.29 Authorities reportedly rescued 18 workers from the brick kiln.30
Despite a 2008 XUAR Department of Education circular stating that students enrolled in elementary and junior high school would no longer participate in work-study activities to pick cotton, a number of Chinese media and government reports from the 2011 reporting year indicate that authorities in the XUAR continued to implement work-study programs in 2009 and 2010 that required school-age students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor.31 [See Section IV—Xinjiang for more information on these programs.]
Individuals continued to force children to work in exploitative conditions as child beggars.32 In one incident reported in February 2011, a man in Henan province "rented out" his daughter for 5,000 yuan (US$774) to an "acrobatic troupe" and discovered three years later that the eight-year-old had been made to beg and was physically abused.33 In another incident reported in August, a man in the XUAR sold his 12-year-old daughter to a group who trained her to pickpocket. When she was "rescued and sent back home," the man reportedly sold her again to a different pickpocketing group.34
Authorities in the XUAR announced plans in April 2011 for a nationwide campaign to locate and retrieve children from the XUAR who are "strays" and in some cases "steal or beg for a living." 35

Anti-Trafficking Efforts

The Chinese government, non-governmental organizations, and individuals continued efforts to combat human trafficking during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. As reported in the Commission’s 2010 Annual Report, in December 2009, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved China’s accession to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol).36 On February 25, 2011, the NPCSC revised the PRC Criminal Law, making amendments to provisions on forced labor 37—a crime that constitutes human trafficking under the Palermo Protocol.38 The revised legislation broadens the scope of activity considered punishable for forced labor and strengthens punishments for "serious" crimes of forced labor; however, the legislation still does not clearly define what constitutes forced labor.39 [See box titled Strengthened Legislation on Forced Labor below.] The Commission did not observe changes to other areas in which China’s domestic legislation does not comply with the Palermo Protocol during the 2011 reporting year.40

Strengthened Legislation on Forced Labor

The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed amendments to the PRC Criminal Law in February 2011, which included additions to provisions on trafficking in Article 244.41 The revised provisions, if properly implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of forced labor cases:

Widened scope of punishable persons. The new provision expands the scope of responsibility from "employer" to "whoever forces another to work . . . ." In addition, the new provision adds language that provides a basis for punishing anyone who is "aware of a person committing the crime . . . and recruits or transports personnel for him, or otherwise aids forced labor." 42 This added language, if implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of middlemen, transporters, and recruiters.
Lengthened prison sentences. The revised provision provides for a maximum three-year imprisonment for forced labor situations that are not considered "serious." This period of time was unclear prior to revisions. The new provision also provides for longer prison sentences (three to seven years, an increase from the former maximum of three years) for forced labor crimes that are considered "serious." 43 While the term "serious" is not clearly defined, this revised language, if implemented, may result in harsher punishments for those convicted of forced labor crimes.

Chinese authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations and international organizations, took steps to improve protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking but continued to focus such efforts only on women and children identified as victims through the government’s definition of trafficking. The International Organization on Migration and the Ministry of Civil Affairs conducted two training sessions during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year that reportedly addressed issues including victim identification, protection, and assistance.44 According to the U.S. State Department, the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) is in the process of starting a network of shelters for women. At these shelters, women reportedly may access referrals for legal aid, report human trafficking violations, and seek assistance from social workers.45 In addition, in September 2010, Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu and Vietnamese Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh signed a cooperative agreement to work together on trafficking prevention and control.46

The Chinese government continued outreach and education campaigns in concert with the ACWF and international organizations. The government continued trafficking education campaigns in areas with high numbers of migrant workers, including train and bus stations, and through television, cell phones, and the Internet, informing workers of their rights.47 Chinese authorities established nationwide and local hotlines for reporting suspected trafficking cases,48 although there appears to be limited public data on their use.

As the Chinese government continues to conflate human smuggling, illegal adoption, and child abduction with human trafficking, accurate statistics on the number of trafficking cases the government investigated and prosecuted during the past reporting year are not available.49 Using the definition of human trafficking under Chinese law, the Supreme People’s Court reportedly convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking cases in 2010,50 up from 2,413 in 2009,51 and of those convicted, authorities reportedly handed down 2,216 prison sentences for terms of five years or more.52 In addition, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate prosecuted 4,422 individuals for trafficking offenses,53 up from 4,017 in 2009.54

The U.S. State Department placed China on its Tier 2 Watch List for the seventh consecutive year in 2011,55 listing several areas in which anti-trafficking efforts were insufficient, including that the Chinese government "does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking" and "did not demonstrate evidence of significant efforts to address all forms of trafficking or effectively protect victims." 56

CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS

Individual citizens have also been active in the effort to combat human trafficking. One individual’s anti-trafficking efforts on an Internet blog launched during the 2011 reporting year have received widespread attention.57 While the combined efforts of the individual, the blog’s photograph contributors, and a number of government agencies have resulted in the "rescue" of at least six abducted children,58 the online campaign has also raised concerns regarding the privacy of the children being photographed,59 potential for publicly misidentifying children as abducted,60 and the risk that traffickers might inflict further harm on their victims if they find pictures of them posted publicly.61

Notes to Section II—Human Trafficking

1 The specific phrase used to describe the concept of trafficking in Chinese government documents, including the National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012), as well as related regulations, circulars, and opinions, is guaimai funu ertong, which literally means "the abduction and sale of women and children." See, for example, State Council General Office, "Circular on the State Council General Office’s Issuance of China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)" [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu yinfa zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian) de tongzhi], 13 December 07; See also Ministry of Public Security, "Qinghai Province Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)" [Qinghai sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008–2012 nian)], 22 December 09; Ministry of Public Security, Zhuzhou Municipal People’s Government, "Zhuzhou Municipal People’s Government Office Circular Regarding the Issuance of Zhuzhou Municipality’s Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children" [Zhuzhou shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu yinfa zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua de tongzhi], 31 December 09; Bazhong Municipal People’s Government, "Opinion of Bazhong Municipal People’s Government Office Regarding the Implementation of the China National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008– 2012)" [Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche guowuyuan "zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)" de shishi yijian], 30 September 09.

2 "China’s Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort Law," Xinhua, 26 December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03. This protocol is commonly referred to as the Palermo Protocol because it was adopted in Palermo, Italy, in 2000.

3 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 240.

4 Ibid., art. 358.

5 See also Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 122.

6 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Protocol), adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol states: " ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs."

7 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 122. According to this report, "Male victims of trafficking and victims of forced labor—either male or female—did not receive regular protection services, but some were sent to hospitals for treatment of their medical needs and at least two victims received legal aid to gain financial compensation." CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175.

8 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 124. According to this report, "The Ministry of Public Security issued orders to police departments to treat all women arrested for prostitution as victims of trafficking. It was not clear during the reporting period to what extent local police units complied with the order."

9 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Human Trafficking FAQs," last visited 28 June 11.

10 Ibid.

11 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 122.

12 Ibid., 124. Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2011—North Korea," 24 January 11.

13 "Supreme People’s Court Procuratorate Requests In-Depth Investigation of the Abduction and Sale of Children and Corruption" [Zuigaojian yaoqiu shenjiu she guaimai ertong duzhi fubai], China Net, reprinted in China Daily, 4 June 11; Zhang Yan and He Dan, "Trafficking of Chinese Women on the Rise," China Daily, 24 January 11. An official cited in this article reported that insufficient finances and manpower restrict police capacity to fight trafficking. For specific examples of official corruption reported during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, see "Official Detained in ‘Slavery’ Scandal," Shanghai Daily, reprinted in China Information Center, 23 December 10; "Ringleaders in Anhui Ordered To Surrender," South China Morning Post, 10 February 11.

14 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 118. As documented and defined internationally, major forms of human trafficking include forced labor, bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, child soldiers, forced prostitution, children exploited for commercial sex, child sex tourism, and debt bondage and involuntary servitude among migrant laborers. Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2008—Major Forms of Trafficking in Persons," 4 June 08, 19–25.

15 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 121.

16 Zhang Yan and He Dan, "Trafficking of Chinese Women on the Rise," China Daily, 24 January 11; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 121. See also, for example, Mandy Zuo, "Gang Busted for Trafficking Women to Congo," South China Morning Post, 4 December 10; U.S. Department of Justice, "California Woman Sentenced to More Than Three Years in Prison for Human Trafficking Charges," 17 November 10.

17 See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 121. See also, for example, "Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China," Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11; Palaung Women’s Organization, "Stolen Lives: Human Trafficking From Palaung Areas of Burma to China," 9 June 11.

18 See, e.g., "Mentally Disabled Individuals Sold by Orphanage as ‘Indentured Laborers,’ Ate From the Same Bowls as Dogs" [Zhizhangzhe bei shouyangsuo maiwei "baoshengong" yu gou tong shi yiguo mian], China Economic Net, reprinted in QQ News, 13 December 10; Zhang Xuanchen, "Former Homeless Shelter Official Detained on Human Trafficking Allegations," Shanghai Daily, 22 December 10; Du Guangli, "Mentally Disabled Workers in Shaanxi Illicit Brick Kiln Face Aid Puzzle" [Shanxi hei zhuanyao zhizhang gong mianlin jiuzhu miju], Phoenix Net, 28 January 11.

19 See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 123. According to this report, "[T]he Chinese government did not release statistics related to forced labor of men."

20 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3.

21 Zhang Yan and He Dan, "Trafficking of Chinese Women on the Rise," China Daily, 24 January 11.

22 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch" [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 10. According to the January 2010 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences study, by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.

23 Mikhail Lipatov et al., "Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 105, No. 49 (December 2008), 19171. According to this study, "The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference." Wei Xing Zhu et al., "China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 National Intercensus Survey," British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4–5.

24 Kathleen E. McLaughlin, "Borderland: Sex Trafficking on the China-Myanmar Border," Global Post, 26 October 10; "China’s Gender Imbalance," World Press, 11 January 11; "China Gender Gap Fuelling Human Trafficking: Report," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China Post, 22 September 10; Elizabeth Lee, "Rights Activists Say China’s Gender Ratio Contributes to Human Trafficking," Voice of America, 24 January 11; "Police Rescue Hundreds of Women, Children Kidnapped in SW China," People’s Daily, 22 December 10.

25 "Chinese Women Taught To Avoid People-Traffickers," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 8 March 10.

26 Kathleen E. McLaughlin, "Borderland: Sex Trafficking on the China-Myanmar Border," Global Post, 26 October 10; "Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China," Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11.

27 Zhang Xuanchen, "Former Homeless Shelter Official Detained on Human Trafficking Allegations," Shanghai Daily, 22 December 10.

28 "Sweatshop Allegedly Abuses Mentally Ill," Global Times, 14 December 10. "Mentally Disabled Individuals Sold by Orphanage as Indentured Laborers" [Zhizhangzhe bei shouyangsuo maiwei "baoshengong" yu gou tong shi yiguo mian], China Economic Net, 13 December 10.

29 Du Guangli, "Mentally Disabled Workers in Shaanxi Illicit Brick Kiln Face Aid Puzzle" [Shanxi hei zhuanyao zhizhang gong mianlin jiuzhu miju], Phoenix Net, 28 January 11.

30 Ibid.

31 "Response to: ‘Students With 9 Years of Compulsory Education Still Pick Cotton? ’ " [Huifu neirong: "jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai shi mianhua ma? "], Xinhe (Toqsu) County Message Board, reprinted in Xinhe (Toqsu) County People’s Government, 18 September 10; "Second Agricultural Division 29th Regiment’s Legal Office Strengthens Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton" [Nong er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian qijian fazhi anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10; Xu Jiang, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, "Wusu, Xinjiang No. 5 Central School Students Help Pick Cotton at 134 Regiment" [Wusushi wu zhong xuesheng dao yisansi tuan zhiyuan shi hua], 2 October 10. For recent Commission analyses on Xinjiang’s work-study programs, see "Underage Students Continue To Pick Cotton in Xinjiang Work-Study Program," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 December 10.

32 Cui Jia et al., "Saving Kidnapped Kids From Streets of Crime," China Daily, 26 May 11; "Parents Blamed for Begging, Performing," Asia One News, 15 February 11; China Internet Information Center, "Gov’t Campaign Against Child Begging," 9 March 11; "Blog Fights Child Trafficking," Xinhua, 9 February 11.

33 "Child Rented Out by Parents To Beg Was Forced To Eat Faeces," Asia One News, 27 February 11; Hu Zhanfen and Yang Jiang, "The Real Situation of China’s Child Beggars: 10,000 Yuan To Resolve Unforeseen Circumstances" [Zhongguo tonggai zhenxiang: chu shenme yiwai dou 1 wan yuan jiejue], Xinmin Weekly, reprinted in QQ News, 23 February 11.

34 "Region Sentences Eight for Felonies," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 17 August 11.

35 Shao Wei, "China’s Xinjiang Region Aims To Get Stray Kids Back Home," China Daily, 23 April 11.

36 "China’s Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort Law," Xinhua, 26 December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a).

37 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 244; Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfaxiuzheng’an (ba)], issued 25 February 11, provision 38.

38 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women andChildren, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a).

39 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, effective 1 October 97, art. 244; PRC Criminal Law, passed 1 July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 244.

40 Topics that need to be addressed in domestic legislation to bring it into compliance with the Palermo Protocol, include protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking (see Palermo Protocol art. 6.3), non-physical forms of coercion into the legal definition of trafficking (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(a)), commercial sexual exploitation of minors (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(cand d)), and trafficking of men (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(a)). See UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Protocol), adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 122.

41 PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11. The previous language for Article 244 appeared in the 2002 amendment and stated, "Where an employer, in violation of the laws and regulations on labour administration, compels its employees to work by restricting their personal freedom, if the circumstances are serious, the persons who are directly responsible for the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three yearsor criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined." The revised language of Art. 244 states, "Whoever forces another to work by violence, threats or restriction of personal freedom shall be sentenced to not more than three years fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention, and shall also, or shall only, be fined. If the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to not less than three years and not more than seven years fixed-term imprisonment and shall also be fined. Whoever is aware of a person committing the crime in the previous paragraph and recruits or transports personnel for him, or otherwise aids forced labour shall be punished according to the preceding paragraph. Where a unit commits the crimes in the two preceding paragraphs, it shall be fined, and the persons who are directly responsible for the crime shall be punished according to provisions in paragraph one."

42 Ibid., art. 240.

43 Ibid., art 244.

44 International Organization for Migration, "IOM, China Improve Support to Victims of Human Trafficking," 10 December 10; International Organization for Migration, "IOM andChina Work To Protect, Assist Victims of Trafficking," 15 March 11.

45 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 124.

46 "Vietnam and China Sign Pack [sic] on Human Trafficking," Viet Nam News, 16 September 10.

47 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 125.

48 Ibid., 121,124.

49 Ibid., 122.

50 Ibid.

51 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2010—China," 14 June 10, 113.

52 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 122.

53 "Highlights of Work Report of China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate," Xinhua, 11 March 11.

54 "Highlights of Work Report of China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate," Xinhua, 11 March 10.

55 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 121. For information on the significance of the tier placements see, Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—Tier Placements," 27 June 11. According to the U.S. Department of State, countries placed on the Tier 2 Watch List are "countries whose governments do not fully comply with the [Trafficking Victim Protection Act’s] minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND: a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year."

56 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2011—China," 27 June 11, 121.

57 Huang Jingjing, "Blog Fights Child Trafficking," Global Times, 9 February 11.

58 Xu Chi, "Six Children Rescued in Beggar Campaign," Shanghai Daily, 10 February 11; "Microblogs Save Abducted Children," China Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 15 February 11. According to the China Daily report, "Various government agencies have gotten involved. The police went on the micro blog, followed the campaign and rescued the six children. Civil affairs authorities arranged children’s DNA tests to aid in identification. Several non-governmental organizations have also launched projects to help begging children."

59 Ng Tze-wei, "Beggar Children Rescued in Net Drive, Online Campaign Raises Privacy Issues," South China Morning Post, 10 February 11; "Yu Jianrong’s Anti-trafficking Stirs Debate—The People Call for Public Clarification" [Yu jianrong daguai yin zhengyi, minzhong yuqing gongkai chengqing], Radio Free Asia, 9 February 11.

60 "Child Beggar Raid Raises Doubts About Campaign," Shanghai Daily, 8 February 11.

61 Ibid.; "Online Effort To Save China’s Kidnapped Children Is Flawed," CNN, 14 February 11; "Six Children Rescued in Beggar Campaign," Shanghai Daily, 10 February 11.

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Introduction | Unlawful Repatriation | Punishment in the DPRK | Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government persisted in detaining and repatriating North Korean refugees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite the harsh punishments refugees face once they have returned to the DPRK.1 In 2011, the Chinese government reportedly increased the presence of public security officials in northeastern China and erected new border barricades along the China-DPRK border. The Chinese government classifies all North Korean refugees in China as "illegal" economic migrants and not refugees (nanmin) and continues its policy of repatriating them.2 China’s repatriation of North Korean refugees, including those who leave the DPRK for fear of persecution, contravenes obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol), to which China has acceded.3 In addition, the North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture of repatriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in China refugees "sur place," or those who fear persecution upon return to their country of origin.4 Under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Chinese government is obligated to refrain from repatriating refugees "sur place." 5

Unlawful Repatriation

During the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government appeared to take new measures to stem streams of North Korean refugees.6 In September 2010, one overseas news organization reported that Chinese public security authorities were cooperating with North Korean police agents to repatriate North Korean refugees throughout China—including in regions such as Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region—in organized "manhunts." 7 Chinese officials reportedly have deployed hundreds of People’s Armed Police and law enforcement officials to work with 100 North Korean state security officials throughout China. In some instances, North Korean agents reportedly pose as North Korean defectors to target refugees in migrant communities.8

Media reports indicated that Chinese officials continue to enforce a system of rewards to facilitate the capture of North Korean refugees and members of their support network. Chinese authorities offer bounties to Chinese citizens who turn in North Koreans and fine,9 detain,10 or imprison 11 those who provide the refugees with humanitarian assistance. Chinese authorities reportedly offer rewards of up to 3,000 yuan (US$456) to Chinese nationals and Chinese nationals of Korean descent (Sino-Koreans, or chaoxianzu) who provide information on North Koreans.12 As a result, many North Koreans living throughout China are now settling farther from the China-DPRK border.13

China’s public security bureau agencies hold all detained North Korean refugees in detention centers that are not subject to independent monitoring.14 Refugees cannot challenge their detention in court.15 The Chinese government continued to deny the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permission to operate along its northeastern border with the DPRK.16

Punishment in the DPRK

During the 2011 reporting year, the DPRK appeared to increase surveillance camera systems and reinforce barbed wire in areas along the Chinese-North Korean border in order to crack down on North Korean refugees to China.17 North Koreans repatriated by the Chinese government face the threat of imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in the DPRK.18 Under the 2004 revised North Korean Penal Code, border crossers can receive sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment in a "labor-training center." 19 North Korean authorities assign harsher punishment, including long sentences and public execution, to repatriated North Koreans deemed to have committed "political" crimes, which include attempted defection; conversion to Christianity; and having had extensive contact with religious groups, South Koreans, or Americans.20 A significant number of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian workers assisting North Koreans in China and helping them seek asylum are Christian, South Korean, or American.21

In May 2011, Amnesty International (AI) released new information demonstrating that North Korean political prison camps, which hold an estimated 200,000 people, have "expanded significantly." 22 It is unclear, based on the reports, how many of those detained were forcibly repatriated from China. Based on AI inter-views with former detainees at one political prison camp, prisoners in some cases are reportedly forced to work in inhumane conditions and "are frequently subjected to torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment." 23 The North Korean Human Rights Archives organization claims that there are at least 480 prisons and detention facilities throughout the DPRK.24

Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education

The Chinese government’s policy of repatriating North Korean refugees and denying them legal status increases their vulnerability to trafficking, mistreatment, and exploitation in China. North Korean women, in particular, often fall victim to inhumane treatment and indentured servitude.25 NGOs and researchers estimate that as many as 70 percent of the tens of thousands of North Korean refugees in China are women.26 In March 2011, an NGO worker estimated that 9 out of every 10 North Korean women in China are trafficked.27 Traffickers, many of whom operate in organized networks, use false promises to lure North Korean women into China and abduct those entering China on their own.28 Traffickers reportedly blackmail North Korean women in China by warning them that if they do not obey, they will be reported to Chinese authorities who will forcibly repatriate them.29 Chinese authorities reportedly took steps to investigate and crack down on criminal syndicates trafficking North Korean women. In June 2011, for instance, public security officials in Hailun city, Heilongjiang province, detained traffickers but also detained three trafficked North Korean women with them.30

The trafficking of North Korean women has created a black market in which refugees are "moved and traded like merchandise, with many sold as ‘brides,’ kept in confinement, and sexually assaulted." 31 In a March 2011 Radio Free Asia article, a North Korean defector living in Yanji city, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, described how Chinese middlemen "appraise" and sell trafficked women based on certain criteria.32 He said, "North Korean women in their 40s are sold for 3,000 yuan (US$457), those in their 30s for 5,000 yuan (US$761), and those in their 20s for about 7,000 yuan (US$1,066)." 33 There is a high demand for wives in northeastern China where severe sex ratio imbalances have spurred the Chinese market for trafficked North Korean brides, and where poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty finding wives.34 [See Section II—Population Planning for more information on sex ratio imbalance in China.] In other cases, North Korean women have been trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation and forced to work as prostitutes or in Internet sex operations.35 Some women reportedly have been sold and resold multiple times,36 and trafficked North Korean women have testified to beatings, sexual abuse, and being locked up to prevent escape.37

The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, and the Chinese government is obligated under Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) to "consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors." 38 The Chinese government’s failure to prevent trafficking of North Korean women and protect them from revictimization also contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.39 Although the central government has taken limited steps to combat trafficking and protect trafficking victims,40 traffickers continue to traffic an estimated 90 percent of the North Korean women in China,41 and the Chinese government refuses to provide these victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.42 [For more information on the central government’s efforts to combat trafficking, see Section II—Human Trafficking.]

Another problem that reportedly stems from China’s unlawful repatriation policy is the denial of education and other public goods for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. The scope of this problem, however, is unclear based on limited public information. The PRC Nationality Law guarantees citizenship and, by extension, household registration (hukou) to all children born in China to at least one parent of Chinese nationality.43 The PRC Compulsory Education Law, moreover, provides that all children age six years and older with Chinese citizenship shall receive nine years of free and compulsory education, regardless of race or ethnicity.44 Some local governments refuse to register Chinese-North Korean children without seeing documentation that the mother is a citizen, has been repatriated, or has run away.45 Local authorities contravene the PRC Nationality Law, the PRC Compulsory Education Law, and the Chinese government’s commitments under international conventions when they refuse these children the hukou required to access public education and obtain healthcare.46 Denial of hukou forces these children to live in a stateless limbo. Estimates for the number of such stateless children in China range from several thousand to several tens of thousands.47 Moreover, when their North Korean mothers are repatriated, a significant number of these children also are abandoned, as their fathers are unwilling or unable to take care of them.48 According to one non-governmental organization, China may have as many as 100,000 of these "orphans." 49 [See Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.]

Notes to Section II—North Korean Refugees in China

1 "Chinese Crackdown Spurs N.Korean Defectors’ Move to South," Chosun Daily, 5 July 11; "N.Korea, China Intensify Crackdown on Defectors," Arirang News, reprinted in Chosun Daily,17 June 11.

2 The Commission observed numerous reports describing China’s longstanding policy position that North Korean refugees are illegal economic migrants. See, e.g., Tania Branigan, "South Korea Reports Huge Rise in Defectors From the North," Guardian, 15 November 10; Kim Young-jin, "Problem of Forgotten NK Children in China Grows," Korea Times, 12 June 11.

3 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, arts. 1, 33; UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/2198 of 16 December 66, entry into force 4 October 67. Article 1 of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . . . ." Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." The Chinese government acceded to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in September 1982, but has not adopted legislation to implement the treaties.

4 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea," 21 February 11, para. 65.

5 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," January 1992, sec. (b), paras. 94–105; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea," 21 February 11, para. 65.

6 Carla Freeman and Drew Thompson, Center for the National Interest, "China on the Edge: China’s Border Provinces and Chinese Security Policy," 8 April 11.

7 Daisuke Nishimura, "China Working With N. Korea To Hunt Down People Fleeing," Asahi Shimbun, 28 September 10.

8 Ibid.

9 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, "Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China," March 2009, 18–19.

10 Lee Sung Jin, "Current Situation on Refugees in China," Daily NK, 10 May 09.

11 "Korean-Chinese Who Helped North Defectors Granted Refugee Status," Yonhap, 20 February 11.

12 "North Korean Defectors Would Return," Radio Free Asia, 3 March 11.

13 Ibid.

14 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "World Refugee Survey 2009: China," 2010.

15 Ibid.

16 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2010, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," 8 April 11.

17 "N.Korea in New Crackdown on Refugees: Report," Agence France-Presse, 16 August 11.

18 Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, "Survival Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK," September 2009, 24–31; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea," 21 February 11, para. 65; Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for International Economics, "Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China," March 2008, 10.

19 Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, East-West Center, "Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison Camp Experiences," 5 October 09, 11–12.

20 Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for International Economics, "Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China," March 2008, 6; Tom O’Neill, "Escape From North Korea," National Geographic, 1 February 09; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea," March 2008, 28.

21 Tom O’Neill, "Escape From North Korea," National Geographic, 1 February 09; John M. Glionna, "Aiding North Korea Defectors: A High-Stakes Spy Mission," Los Angeles Times, 25 November 09.

22 "Political Prison Camps Expand," Radio Free Asia, 4 May 11.

23 Amnesty International, "Images Reveal Scale of North Korean Political Prison Camps," 3 May 11.

24 "N.Korea ‘Has Far More Prisons Than Previously Believed,’ " Chosun Daily, 27 April 11.

25 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, "Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China," March 2009, 46–49; Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for International Economics, "Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China," March 2008, 13.

26 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report—Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of," 27 June 11.

27 "Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China," Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11.

28 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, "Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China," March 2009, 28–33; "North Korean Trafficked Brides," Radio Free Asia, 30 April 09.

29 Escaping North Korea: The Plight of the Defectors, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 23 September 10, Testimony of Su Jin Kang.

30 "Hailun Police Break Up a Human Trafficking Criminal Group," Suihua Evening News, 13 June 11.

31 "Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China," Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, "Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China," March 2009, 20–21; Lee Tae-hoon, "Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500," Korea Times, 5 May 10.

35 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report—Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of," 27 June 11, 198–199; Jason Strother, "Christian Missionaries Go Online To Help North Korean Refugees in China," Voice of America, 27 December 10.

36 Nam You-Sun, "N.Korean Women Up for Sale in China: Activist," Agence France-Presse, 12 May 10; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum Foundation.

37 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, "Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China," March 2009, 33–36; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum Foundation.

38 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/ 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 29 September 03, art. 7.

39 Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol provides that "State Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from revictimization." Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000, entry into force 29 September 03, art. 9. Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women." Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 6.

40 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report—China," 27 June 11.

41 Lee Tae-hoon, "Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500," Korea Times, 5 May 10.

42 Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report—China," 27 June 11.

43 PRC Nationality Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoji fa], effective 10 September 80, art. 4; Every citizen in China is registered under the household registration (hukou) system. See also Human Rights Watch, "Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China," April 2008, 3.

44 PRC Compulsory Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa], issued 12 April 86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, arts. 4, 5, 9, 11.

45 Human Rights Watch, "Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China," April 2008, 3, 9–12; Lina Yoon, "Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China," Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09; "Korean Children Left in China," Radio Free Asia, 12 February 10.

46 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 49 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 22; PRC Nationality Law, [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa] effective 10 September 80, art. 4; PRC Compulsory Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa], issued 12 April 86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, art. 5; Lina Yoon, "Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China," Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09.

47 Lina Yoon, "Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China," Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09.

48 Human Rights Watch, "Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China," April 2008, 8; Lee Tae-hoon, "Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500," Korea Times, 5 May 10; Lina Yoon, "Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China," Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09; "Korean Children Left in China," Radio Free Asia, 12 February 10.

49 Kirsty Taylor, "Helping Hands Needed for N.K. Kids," Korea Herald, 15 June 11.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Public Health Advocacy | Health-Based Discrimination | Mental Health

Public Health Advocacy

Despite official recognition of the positive role non-governmental actors have played in raising awareness about health concerns, combating stigma, and promoting prevention of diseases,1 many Chinese citizens involved in public health advocacy continued to face government harassment and interference in the past year. In addition to restrictions on registration and funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that remain in effect and have been used to monitor and control NGO activities,2 government pressure on some public health advocates continued during this reporting year, as illustrated by the following cases.

Tian Xi. On February 11, 2011, the Xincai County People’s Court in Zhumadian municipality, Henan province, sentenced public health advocate Tian Xi to one year’s imprisonment for "intentional destruction of property." 3 Tian Xi reportedly was infected with HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through a hospital blood transfusion in 1996.4 Since learning of his diseases, he has persistently petitioned for resolution of his case and the cases of others who have been infected through transfusions.5 Although Tian Xi’s sentence was reportedly related to his destruction of office supplies during a dispute with a hospital official over his case,6 government and Communist Party official documents from Gulu township, Xincai county, indicate that officials had planned to take action against Tian Xi before the hospital dispute.7 Issued prior to the hospital dispute, the documents called for public security officials to take "security and stability control measures against Tian Xi" and to "intervene, prepare documentation, [and] strike." 8 Tian Xi’s family, as well as international observers, expressed concern regarding his health while in prison.9 Authorities released Tian Xi on August 18, 2011, upon the completion of his sentence.10
Aizhixing. Authorities continued to harass and interfere with the operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, a Beijing-based public health advocacy NGO. In December 2010, Beijing tax officials and public security personnel entered the organization’s office and confiscated documents as part of an investigation into Aizhixing’s compliance with tax regulations.11 On March 11, 2011, Beijing officials demanded that Aizhixing remove from its Web site an open letter alleging that two central government officials were involved in a blood transfusion scandal which led to an HIV/AIDS epidemic in Henan province in the 1990s.12 The letter noted that former Henan provincial officials (not named in the letter, but later identified as Li Changchun and Li Keqiang) 13 never faced legal action and instead were appointed to positions in China’s top policymaking organ.14 On March 15, without providing a reason, Beijing municipal press and publications officials notified Aizhixing that the organization’s Web site had been shut down.15
Chang Kun. On April 4, 2011, authorities in Linquan county, Fuyang municipality, Anhui province, physically injured public health advocate Chang Kun as he presided over an annual meeting of the AIBO Youth Center, a public health education NGO that he founded.16 Unidentified "thugs" reportedly entered the room while Chang was speaking and "beat him se-verely," leaving Chang unconscious for several hours.17 That morning, authorities had also destroyed his video camera.18 The same local authorities who injured Chang reportedly had visited his organization a few days before the conference and destroyed several signs outside his office.19
Hu Jia and Zeng Jinyan. Authorities released prominent HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia from prison on June 26, 2011, upon completion of his three-and-a-half-year sentence for "inciting subversion." On her Twitter page, Hu’s wife, Zeng Jinyan, reported that the couple would not be able to receive visitors,20 indicating that numerous security vehicles were stationed outside their home in Beijing.21 Zeng said that she had returned to Beijing on June 19 22 after her landlord, citing unidentified pressure, served her a notice of eviction from her apartment in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.23 According to Zeng, eight security officers escorted her from the airport upon her arrival in Beijing.24

Health-Based Discrimination

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

China’s domestic legislation explicitly forbids discriminatory practices in employment.25 Nevertheless, health-based discrimination, including "mandatory testing of workers [including for infectious diseases], denial of job opportunities, forced resignations[,] and restricted access to health insurance," reportedly remains widespread.26 Those who experience such discrimination also continue to face challenges in seeking legal recourse,27 as highlighted by health-based discrimination lawsuits this past year in Hebei,28 Anhui,29 and Sichuan 30 provinces.

DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTHCARE

Individuals living with infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS continue to face difficulties accessing medical care. Reports emerged during this past year indicating that people living with HIV/AIDS are, in some cases, refused medical treatment at "mainstream hospitals" 31 and instead forced to seek treatment at separate infectious disease facilities referred to as "HIV/AIDS hospitals." 32 A joint study published in May 2011 by the International Labour Organization and the STD and AIDS Prevention and Control Center of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention found that underlying reasons for the denial of treatment included perceived risks to other patients, lack of resources, potential loss of profit, and "poor feasibility of policies and mechanisms." 33

Mental Health

In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in doing so committed itself to ensuring "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." 34 As the Commission reported in its 2010 Annual Report, cases of mental illness are prevalent in China, and the burden these cases place on the country’s under-resourced mental healthcare system is significant.35 The rate of treatment is low,36 and officials reportedly continue to abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and medical professionals by using them as "tools for detaining people deemed a threat to social stability." 37 Against the backdrop of these concerns, in October 2010, a court in Shandong province ordered compensation for the plaintiff in China’s first case of misdiagnosed mental illness and compulsory psychiatric treatment,38 and in June 2011, the central government took steps that could improve the legislative framework for regulating the mental healthcare system.

Draft Mental Health Law Released for Public Comment

On June 10, 2011, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office announced the release of a draft Mental Health Law for public comment.39 Officials and experts have reportedly been working on the draft for 26 years.40 Individuals and organizations across a range of civil society sectors reportedly participated in the 30-day public comment period, including some individuals 41 who have experienced being "misidentified as mentally ill" (bei jingshenbing)—a strategy that Chinese officials often use to extralegally detain "troublemakers" in psychiatric institutions.42 In March 2011, top government officials announced plans to enact the Mental Health Law by the end of the year.43 A list of selected highlights from the draft, as well as observers’ expressed concerns regarding the draft, follows.

Highlights:

Article 3 provides for an integrated approach to prevention, treatment, and recovery of those who live with mental illness, placing "prevention as the priority." It also provides for the establishment of a mechanism for implementing this approach, calling for the participation of both government and civil society actors.44
Article 4 prohibits infringement on a mentally ill individual’s human dignity and personal safety and calls for the legal protection of the individual’s rights to education, work, medical treatment, privacy, and help from the state and society.45
The legislation outlines procedures for diagnosis and admittance for psychiatric treatment, including requirements that standards for diagnosis and treatment be determined by the State Council health administration department (Article 22); 46 that diagnosis be performed by a practicing psychiatrist (Article 25); 47 and that, in cases of involuntary admittance, two or more psychiatrists should diagnose the individual, provide a written copy of the diagnosis within 72 hours, and notify the individual and the party who brought the individual in for diagnosis, which in some cases may include public security personnel (Article 26).48
Article 27 requires that admittance for psychiatric treatment be voluntary, but includes exceptions for cases in which the individual is incapable of recognizing or controlling his own conduct or is in danger of harming himself, endangering public safety or the safety of others, or disrupting public order.49

Concerns:

Aizhixing, a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization, raised the following concerns regarding the draft Mental Health Law.50

The draft does not clearly state protections for certain basic rights of individuals who live with mental illness, particularly the rights to legally marry, pursue a divorce, and raise children. Reporting and supervision requirements in Articles 12 and 63 also may conflict with the protection of an individual’s privacy and human dignity.51
There are remaining questions regarding the protections provided for persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution. For example, there does not appear to be an upper limit for the amount of time a person may be involuntarily institutionalized.52
There are remaining questions regarding how an individual or guardian can seek legal recourse against a judicial determination of a medical diagnosis. The draft also does not make clear whether an individual may obtain legal representation to dispute a diagnosis in court.53
The draft calls for increased surveillance as part of a "mental health monitoring network" and reporting system (Article 20) to prevent major violent outbreaks by persons with mental illness. However, the draft does not appear to protect citizens from infringement on citizens’ rights to privacy and human dignity.54

Notes to Section II—Public Health

1 "Worldview: NGOs a Paradox in Today’s China," Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 May 10. According to Minister of Health Chen Zhu, quoted in this article, "NGOs have an indispensable role in health care . . . [t]he participation of NGOs has played an active role in raising social awareness and ending stigma and in prevention measures."

2 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 147; State Administration of Foreign Exchange Circular on Issues Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guojia waihui guanli ju guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10. See also Verna Yu, "Beijing Tightens Rules on Foreign Funding of NGOs," South China Morning Post, 15 March 10; Cara Anna, "NGOs in China Say Threatened by New Donor Rules," Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 12 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Prominent NGO Raise [sic] Concern Over New Regulations on Receiving Foreign Funding," 16 March 10.

3 "AIDS Activist Tian Xi Sentenced to One Year in Prison" [Aizibing weiquan renshi tian xi bei panxing yi nian], Boxun, 12 February 11.

4 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "Henan Rights Defender Living With HIV Tian Xi Criminally Detained" [Henan aizibing ganran weiquan renshi tian xi bei xingshi juliu], reprinted in Boxun, 23 August 10.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 "Government Documents Make Clear, Capture of AIDS Transfusion Victim Tian Xi Was Premeditated" [Zhengfu wenjian xianshi, zhua shuxue ran aizi de tian xi zao you yumou], Boxun, 18 August 10.

8 Ibid.

9 "AIDS Sufferer Tian Xi’s Health Worthy of Concern, Rights Defender Denied Visit to Wang Yi" [Aizibing huanzhe tian xi jiankang kanyou weiquan renshi tanwang wangyi zaoju], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 11; Asia Catalyst, "120 International Groups and Experts Call for Tian Xi’s Release," 9 March 11.

10 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing August 16–18, 2011," 19 August 11.

11 "Public Security and Tax Officials Forcibly Removed Documents From Beijing-Based Aizhixing" [Beijing aizhixing ziliao zao gongan ji shuiwu guanyuan qiangzhi dai li], Radio Free Asia, 22 December 10.

12 Chen Bingzhong, "An Open Letter to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President Hu Jintao" [Zhi zhonggong zhongyang zong shuji guojia zhuxi hu jintao de gongkaixin], reprinted in Aizhixing, 28 November 10; "Aizhixing Web Site Shut Down on March 15 for Publishing Retired Health Official’s Letter to Hu Jintao Exposing Henan AIDS and Blood Transfusion Incident" [Yin fabu tuixiu weisheng guanyuan chen bingzhong zhixin hu jintao jielu henan aizibing xue huo zeren guanyuan, aizhixing wangzhan 3 yue 15 ri bei guanbi], Aizhixing Google Buzz site, 16 March 11.

13 Marianne Barriaux, "Ex-Official Implicates China Leaders in AIDS," Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 30 November 10.

14 Chen Bingzhong, "An Open Letter to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President Hu Jintao" [Zhi zhonggong zhongyang zong shuji guojia zhuxi hu jintao de gongkaixin], reprinted in Aizhixing, 28 November 10; "China Closes AIDS Website," Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11.

15 "China Closes AIDS Website," Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11; Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, "Beijing Aizhixing Research Institute Web Site Closed" [Beijing aizhixing yanjiu suo wangzhan bei guanbi], 16 March 11.

16 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing March 31–April 5, 2011," 5 April 11; Kate Krauss, "China’s Brutal Repression," Washington Post, 27 April 11.

17 Kate Krauss, "China’s Brutal Repression," Washington Post, 27 April 11; Beijing Yirenping Center, "Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports to the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun" [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.

18 Beijing Yirenping Center, "Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports to the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun" [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.

19 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, "China Human Rights Briefing, March 31–April 5, 2011," 5 April 11; Beijing Yirenping Center, "Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports to the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun" [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.

20 @zengjinyan, Web log post, Twitter.com, 27 June 11.

21 Ibid., 28 June 11.

22 Ibid., 20 June 11.

23 Ibid., 7 June 11.

24 Ibid., 20 June 11.

25 PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], issued 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 29, 30; PRC Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons [Zhonghua renmin gongeheguo canjiren baozhang fa], issued 28 December 90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 25, 30-–40; PRC Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chuanranbing fangzhi fa], issued 21 February 1989, amended 28 August 04, art. 16. See also Ministry of Education, "Circular Regarding Further Standardizing Physical Examinations [Prior to] School Enrollment or Employment To Protect the Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen Carriers to School Enrollment or Employment" [Guanyu jinyibu guifan ruxue he jiuye tijian xiangmu weihu yigan biaomian kangyuan xiedaizhe ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], 10 February 10.

26 Shan Juan and Cang Wei, "HIV-Positive Still Face Job Discrimination," China Daily, 2 December 10. See also Yirenping, "2010 State-Owned Enterprise Hepatitis B Discrimination Investigative Report" [2010 guoqi yigan qishi diaocha baogao], February 2011. For an example of one such case in Guangdong province, see Claire Wang, "Hep B Testing Exposed in Guangzhou," Shanghai Daily, reprinted in Life of Guangzhou, 26 January 11.

27 "New Hepatitis B Employment Discrimination Case" [Yigan jiuye qishi puxin anli], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11. According to Lu Jun, public health advocate and founder of anti-discrimination non-governmental organization Yirenping, "A root reason for [the difficulty of implementing anti-discrimination policies] is that the cost for an enterprise to violate the law is too low, and the cost for a worker to protect [his or her] rights is too high. Research has found that after these organizations have behaved in violation of the law, the legal penalty is next to nothing. [An organization] need not pay a price for behaving in violation of the law, while a worker must first hire a lawyer to defend [his or her] rights; in addition, [he or she] must spend the time. In the end, the worker may not necessarily win the lawsuit."

28 "New Hepatitis B Employment Discrimination Case" [Yigan jiuye qishi puxin anli], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11.

29 "HIV-Infected Man Appeals Ruling," Radio Free Asia, 27 April 11; "Courts Hear China’s First HIV/AIDS Employment Discrimination Cases," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.

30 "Experts Call for Amendments to Civil Servant Physical Examination Standards, Do Away With AIDS Employment Discrimination" [Zhuanjia huyu xiugai gongwuyuan tijian biaozhun xiaochu aizi jiuye qishi], Worker Daily, reprinted in Sichuan Online, 6 July 11.

31 Shan Juan and Li Yao, "HIV/AIDS Sufferers Rejected by Hospitals," China Daily, 18 May 11.

32 Zhang Hailin, "People Living With HIV/AIDS Go ‘Underground’ for Medical Treatment" [Aizibing ren "dixia" jiuzhen xianzhuang], Outlook Weekly, 15 March 11.

33 STD and AIDS Prevention and Control Center of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention and International Labour Organization, "Discrimination Against People Living With HIV Within Healthcare Settings in China," 17 May 11.

34 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12(1). China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001.

35 Malcolm Moore, "China Has 100 Million People With Mental Illness," Telegraph, 28 April 10; "Psychiatric Institutions in China," Lancet, Vol. 376, No. 9734 (2010), 2; According to this study, "The average number of qualified psychiatrists worldwide is four per 100 000 individuals: in China, it is about 1.26." See also CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 146.

36 Mitch Moxley, "China Tackles Mental Health Woes," Inter Press Service, reprinted in Asia Times, 9 July 10.

37 Dai Lian et al., "Touch of Insanity Sullies Mental Health Care," Caixin, 22 July 11.

38 "China’s First Case of ‘Being Misidentified as Mentally Ill’ Obtains Compensation" [Zhongguo shoulie "bei jingshenbing" huo peichang], Radio Free Asia, 18 October 10.

39 "State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes ‘Mental Health Law (Draft)’ Full Text," China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 10 June 11; Li Qiumeng, "Public Comment [Period] on Mental Health Law Ends, Raises Concerns Over Misuse" [Jingshen weisheng fa zheng yijian jieshu yinfa lanyong danyou], Jinghua Times, reprinted in QQ News, 11 July 11; Li Zezhao, "Let the Light of the Judiciary Look After the Spirits in the Dim Corners" [Rang sifa zhi guang guanzhao you’an jiaoluo li de linghun], ChinaRights2 Blog, 10 July 11.

40 Li Qiumeng, "Public Comment [Period] on Mental Health Law Ends, Raises Concerns Over Misuse" [Jingshen weisheng fa zheng yijian jieshu yinfa lanyong danyou], Jinghua Times, reprinted in QQ News, 11 July 11;

41 Li Zezhao, "Let the Light of the Judiciary Look After the Spirits in the Dim Corners" [Rang sifa zhi guang guanzhao you’an jiaoluo li de linghun], ChinaRights2 Blog, 10 July 11.

42 See, e.g., Dai Lian et al., "Touch of Insanity Sullies Mental Health Care," Caixin, 22 July 11; "Xinhua Review: What’s Behind the Frequent Cases of ‘Being Mentally-Illed’ " [Xinhua zongheng: "bei jingshenbing" shijian pinfa beihou], Xinhua, 12 June 11; Chen Yong and Zhu Changjun, "Lao He Is Sick: A Side Note on ‘Being Mentally-Illed’ " [Lao he bing le: "bei jingshenbing" pangzhu], Economic Observer, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 22 July 11; Yang Jianshun et al., "Need a Combination of Law and Relief To Put a Stop to ‘Being Misdiagnosed as Mentally Ill’ " [Dujue "bei jingshenbing" xu falu yu jiuji jiehe], Legal Daily, 13 June 11.

43 "Chen Zhu: Mental Health Law Expected To Come Out Within the Year" [Chen zhu: jingshen weisheng fa niannei youwang chutai], Number One Caijing Daily, reprinted in QQ News, 11 March 11.

44 "State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes ‘Mental Health Law (Draft)’ Full Text," China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 10 June 11, art. 3; Yang Jianshun et al., "Need a Combination of Law and Relief To Put a Stop to ‘Being Misdiagnosed as Mentally Ill’ " [Dujue "bei jingshenbing" xu falu yu jiuji jiehe], Legal Daily, 13 June 11.

45 "State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes ‘Mental Health Law (Draft)’ Full Text," China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 10 June 11, art. 4.

46 Ibid., art. 22.

47 Ibid., art. 4.

48 Ibid., art. 26.

49 Ibid., art. 27.

50 Aizhixing, "Letter of Recommendations Addressed to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the Draft Mental Health Law" [Jiu "jingshen weisheng fa (cao’an)" zhi guowuyuan fazhi bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights Google group, 24 June 11.

51 "State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes ‘Mental Health Law (Draft)’ Full Text," China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 10 June 11, arts. 12, 63; Aizhixing, "Letter of Recommendations Addressed to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the Draft Mental Health Law" [Jiu "jingshen weisheng fa (cao’an)" zhi guowuyuan fazhi bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights Google group, 24 June 11, arts. 12, 63.

52 Aizhixing, "Letter of Recommendations Addressed to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the Draft Mental Health Law" [Jiu "jingshen weisheng fa (cao’an)" zhi guowuyuan fazhi bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights Google group, 24 June 11, question 5.

53 Ibid., question 6.

54 Ibid., question 4.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Introduction | Serious Environmental Challenges: Focus on Rural and Heavy Metal Pollution | Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment | Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and Safety Controversies | Environmental Transparency and Public Participation | Challenges of Enforcement, Compliance, and Official Corruption | Climate Change: Rule of Law and Public Participation | Data Reliability and Transparency: Climate Change

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government continued to strengthen regulatory efforts to address China’s serious environmental problems. Inadequate access to information, unreliable access to legal remedies, an underdeveloped compensation system for individuals and groups harmed by pollution, uneven enforcement and lax compliance, corruption, and other issues, however, have contributed to the continuation of these serious environmental problems and to the potential for the infringement of citizens’ rights. Chinese authorities have taken some steps to improve collection of environmental data and to expand "open environmental information," but significant challenges remain, especially in relation to obtaining information on industrial pollution sources. Access to legal remedies also remains a challenge, and channels available to citizens to express environmental grievances are not always open, contributing to the rise of citizen anti-pollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities continued to selectively stifle environmental activism and environmental grievances or suppress people who were involved in or organized collective action to halt perceived environmental harms. During this reporting year, citizen grievances regarding hydroelectric dam construction, lead pollution, chemical plants, and waste incinerator and landfill operations were prominently covered in Chinese and foreign media.

Serious Environmental Challenges: Focus on Rural and Heavy Metal Pollution

China’s environmental problems reportedly remain severe, despite some regulatory advances and isolated reductions in a limited number of pollutants.1 Examples highlight the seriousness of these problems and the legal challenges they pose. In October 2010, a Chinese research institute completed a "Green GDP" report on the economic impacts of environmental pollution in China, which asserts that the economic costs of environmental pollution and ecological damage have risen 74.8 percent over a five-year period from 2004 to 2008, equaling about 3 percent of GDP.2 In February 2011, a Chinese scholarly report revealed that 10 percent of the rice in markets in many cities contained cadmium levels above standard; soil pollution is seen as the culprit.3 In August, it came to light that the Luliang Chemicals Company dumped over 140 truckloads, totaling over 5,200 tons, of hexavalent chromium slag in Yunnan province, where it could wash into the Pearl River via its tributaries.4 The chromium reportedly killed fish and livestock and threatens drinking water sources.5 The dumping case underscores the lack of official transparency and reportedly may have involved official complicity, highlighting governance problems.6 An employee of the plant reportedly admitted that the company had dumped or buried over 288 thousand tons of chromium dregs between 1989 and 2003.7 Across 12 provinces, there reportedly may be 1 to 1.3 million tons of chromium waste (from a variety of sources) not disposed of properly, with some dumped in water sources and densely populated areas.8

During this reporting year, authorities continued to develop regulatory instruments to manage these pollution problems. Chinese officials currently have reduction targets for only two pollutants but have announced plans to expand this to four in the next five-year period (2011–2015).9 Environmental officials reportedly discussed revisions to the Environmental Protection Law, circulated a draft for comment of a technical guideline for public participation in environmental impact assessment processes, issued the Opinions Regarding Initiation of Environmental Pollution Damage Assessment Work, which outlines the initial steps toward an environmental compensation system, and issued several other relevant laws, policies, and measures on environmental issues.10

Over the past year, officials focused on growing rural pollution problems, which highlight ongoing challenges in applying the laws evenly and in protecting citizens’ health, especially the health of children and the rural poor. Authorities reportedly acknowledged environmental conditions in many villages are still severe, partially due to the increasing movement of polluting enterprises from urban to village areas.11 In June 2011, a top environmental official stated that environmental protection efforts in rural areas lag far behind those in urban areas, the foundation for rural environmental management is weak, regulatory standards are incomplete, and the ability to monitor problems is insufficient.12 These problems put the health of rural populations at risk. In January 2011, central government officials announced long-term plans to address rural pollution challenges, primarily relying on the policy of "using rewards to promote control." 13 In June 2011, Chinese news reports further described the steps officials said they would take during the next five-year period.14 The Minister of Environmental Protection stated that China would "work hard" to make initial improvements in rural village environmental quality by 2015 and to control prominent environmental problems in key villages and townships across the country by 2020.15

Environmental protection officials also prioritized heavy metal pollution problems, including lead pollution that is linked to cases of lead poisoning involving thousands of children in several provinces in 2009 and 2010.16 Some of these cases involve the violation of citizens’ rights.17 [See Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment in this section for more information on these cases.] In response to the series of lead poisoning cases, authorities reportedly released a circular in May 2011 that outlined steps to address heavy metal pollution, including better management and disposal of pollutants, punishment of violators, and enhanced transparency.18 However, the circular does not have the power of a legally binding regulation.19 In June 2011, environmental authorities launched a special campaign to try to reduce heavy metal pollution and asserted that they would use their authority to suspend approval of new projects in areas where heavy metal pollution cases have occurred.20 In August, the Ministry of Environmental Protection reportedly suspended production at 1,015 lead battery manufacturing, assembly, and recycling plants and made public the names of these plants. Authorities shut down 583 of the plants, but the news agency reporting the story did not indicate how many of the plants moved production facilities to other locations.21

Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment

Environmental problems, including heavy metal pollution, continued to trigger citizen grievances and demands for better environmental quality. In June 2011, nearly 1,000 citizens blocked a road protesting pollution from a battery plant in Heyan city, Guangdong province; one citizen reported that 10 people were injured in the ensuing conflict between citizens and police and that police killed one person.22 In August, more than 10,000 citizens peacefully protested a chemical plant that manufactures paraxylene (PX) in Dalian city, Liaoning province, by "taking a stroll," after a typhoon damaged an ocean wall protecting the plant, triggering citizen concerns about a chemical leak.23 Prior to the storm, factory workers, reportedly ordered by plant bosses, stopped and beat reporters who wanted to investigate possible impacts of a storm on chemical storage tanks.24 The story of this event reportedly was pulled from TV coverage.25 Local Communist Party and government leaders quickly responded to the protest and reportedly put the "relocation of the plant on the government work agenda." 26 One international press report noted that the government was considering closing down the plant prior to the protests. It also noted that the plant had been approved during the term of a previous Party Secretary, speculating that the current cohort of authorities may have had political motives for allowing such a large demonstration.27 Nevertheless, the Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, stated that citizens taking to the streets to express their views "should not be advocated in China" and that "Chinese society objected" to the street protests as evidenced by the fact that "[r]eports on this incident have not gained much ground in China’s mainstream media . . . ." 28

Access to legal remedies remains unreliable, contributing to citizen protests, despite a growing number of specialized environmental courts. In 2010, regular Chinese courts completed 12,018 environmental pollution compensation cases, an increase of 2.83 percent over the previous year.29 However, notably, a study by a Peking University professor reportedly found that courts often refuse to take cases in the name of "social stability." 30 One expert with an international environmental organization noted that Chinese lawyers said they believe it is more difficult to have an environmental damages case accepted by the courts now than in the past.31 The same expert noted that public supervision via the courts has been constrained in recent years, emphasizing that while litigation in some cases has driven legal reform or compelled a local government to act, it has not been as effective in stopping pollution problems or for compelling pollution cleanup.32 In some cases, the expert noted, litigation has led to compensation for citizens, but he pointed out that compensation is sometimes difficult to obtain due to evidentiary burdens and problems in proving causality.33 In some cases, it can be difficult to obtain compensation even when a party has been ordered to pay it.34 One former environmental protection official told a reporter that "[w]ith limited fines and low compensation, breaking the law is often cheaper than following it . . . ." 35 Specialized environmental courts may still benefit environmental litigation, although critics reportedly believe they have not resolved the challenges of local protectionism or judicial independence.36 Some of these courts, which are growing in number, set local rules providing for public interest litigation cases brought by procuratorates, environmental agencies, non-government organizations, and individuals.37 In January 2011, the Kunming Intermediate People’s Court in Yunnan province awarded approximately 4 million yuan (US$626,300) compensation for citizens whose drinking water had been contaminated in a public interest case brought by the Kunming City Environmental Protection Bureau and supported by the city procuratorate.38 The Commission’s 2010 Annual Report noted a couple of these courts have accepted a few cases brought by the All-China Environment Federation (ACEF), an environmental group that is overseen by the Ministry of Environmental Protection; 39 the ACEF demonstration cases appear to have been the only quasi-NGO or NGO public interest cases accepted by the courts.

In some cases, officials suppressed citizen demands for a cleaner environment. The study by the Peking University professor reportedly found that criminal liability for pollution is rarely enforced and that in many cases, citizens exposed to environmental harms have little access to legal remedies and may resort to violence to pressure the polluter to act.40 Further, the study pointed out that those who use violence to protest pollution are often prosecuted.41 Some recent incidents of official suppression of largely peaceful citizen demands for a cleaner environment include the following:

According to a June 2011 Human Rights Watch Report, local officials in four provinces—Henan, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Yunnan—in recent years "imposed arbitrary limits on access to blood lead testing; refused appropriate treatment to children and adults with critically high lead levels; withheld and failed to explain test results showing unaccountable improvements in lead levels; and denied the scope and severity of lead poisoning." 42 Other sources provide additional information on cases in Hunan and Shaanxi.43 Parents reportedly stated that local police threatened some people who tried to obtain information and detained or arrested individuals protesting against polluting factories or seeking help for their sick children.44 In addition, journalists, including one foreign reporter, indicated they had been harassed when they tried to report on some of the lead poisoning cases.45
In October 2010, over 1,000 citizens in Pingnan county, Ningde city, Fujian province, signed a collective petition complaining about pollution from a local landfill facility 46 following a protest that resulted in the detention of four citizens.47 After receiving no response from local government officials, five village representatives took the collective petition to the provincial government office of letters and visits.48 County officials intercepted and detained the representatives on suspicion of "disrupting social order." 49 Their detention triggered a protest by village residents.50 News reports do not provide additional information on those detained.
In late 2010, authorities allegedly beat and detained 17 persons who participated in protests or who petitioned against proposed mining operations in Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).51 Also in late 2010, authorities detained over 20 Tibetans, some briefly, for their protest or petitioning activities against a construction team said to have a mining permit.52 In August 2010, officials reportedly fired upon a group of 100 Tibetans and possibly killed one to four citizens. They were protesting gold-mining operations in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, because of the harmful environmental effects. Authorities also reportedly detained 35 Tibetans in this case.53 In July 2011, authorities in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, reportedly detained about 50 Tibetans because they protested mining activities.54 Authorities reportedly warned citizens that protest activities would be considered "politically motivated." Officials detained the "village officials" who traveled to Lhasa, the TAR capital, to "protest" the mining and the other detentions, as well as the alleged protest "ringleaders." 55 [See Section V—Tibet for more information on these incidents.]
In May 2011, citizens and police clashed in a large-scale conflict involving as many as 10,000 56 residents in a village in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, after residents gathered to protest the operation of a waste incinerator that they have opposed since 2007 because they claim to have been tricked into accepting it.57 Authorities reportedly injured several citizens and took a few residents into custody,58 although reports do not provide further information on those detained.
In June 2011, Mongol herders in Bayannuur city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, shut down the water pump to a lead mine, which had expanded into grazing land, after "repeatedly petitioning the government." 59 Some protesters set up traditional tents outside of government offices for nearly two weeks.60 The herders believed the mine was polluting the environment and endangering their health.61 The local government sent more than 50 riot police to the scene, and they reportedly beat and detained many of the protesters.62 A group of 600 herders reportedly sought compensation for pollution linked to the mine.63 The mine reportedly agreed to compensate the group with 1.2 million yuan (US$188,000), and the herders ended their protest.64 News stories do not provide further details regarding the herders detained by police. The demonstration followed herder protests in May linked to the death of a herder at the hands of a mine worker.65 [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights for more information on the May protests.]

Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and Safety Controversies

Increasing reliance on renewable energy and reducing China’s carbon dioxide and other air pollutant emissions are among the reasons Chinese authorities cite for escalating the construction of hydroelectric dams.66 Some of these projects reportedly continue to raise safety concerns and include forcible relocation practices. To date, China has constructed 25,800 large dams, and the associated land requisition projects reportedly have led to the relocation of more than 10 million people.67 Central-level authorities announced in early 2011 that development of hydropower, including the controversial series of dams along the Nu River (Salween River), is a "must." 68 Local officials rapidly built many smaller hydroelectric projects along the Nu River that did not need State Council approval over the past two years, some of which are in areas of relative geological instability, leading to heightened concerns among experts and citizens.69 In May 2011, Xinhua reported that the State Council had recognized "urgent" problems associated with the Three Gorges Dam.70 During the same month, the State Council Standing Committee passed a plan to address these issues.71 Estimates of the number of people resettled because of the Three Gorges Dam so far range from 1.4 million to 4 million.72 There have been numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations affected by the Three Gorges Dam, including an attack on activist Fu Xiancai that left him paralyzed.73 Additional areas with reports of forced resettlement practices include Fujian, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces.74 In some cases, these resettlement practices triggered citizen protests. For example, in March 2011, as many as 2,000 to 3,000 citizens reportedly blocked roads to protest compensation levels for their homes and farmland in Suijiang county, Zhaotong prefecture, Yunnan province, to make way for the Xiangjiaba Dam along the Yangtze River.75 Authorities reportedly administratively detained several men for two weeks in what appeared to be punishment for participating in the demonstrations.76 Central authorities acknowledged problems with compensation schemes, and the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) notes intended reforms to the land requisition system, including shrinking "the scope of requisitioned land, and increas[ing] the compensation standard for requisitioned land." 77

The relocation of some of the 330,000 people relocated in Hubei and Henan provinces to make way for the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, which is slated for completion in 2014 and will divert water from China’s southern regions to dryer northern regions,78 so far reportedly has involved less forcible practices. The relocation projects, however, have already triggered a protest and citizen grievances. According to an international non-governmental organization report released in August 2010, authorities utilized persuasion rather than physical force in some citizen relocation projects in Danjiangkou city, Hubei province, which the report described as an improvement from the practices employed in Three Gorges Dam relocations. The government employees who were responsible for persuading people to relocate, however, reportedly were required to live among the villagers and were not permitted to return home until the villagers all agreed to relocate.79 News reports indicate the project has already triggered a multi-day villager protest in Qianjiang city, Hubei province; 80 led to complaints by relocated farmers about inadequate compensation,81 poor job prospects, and unprofitable land; 82 and triggered at least one instance in which officials threatened citizens who took their grievances to higher levels.83 In addition, the central route of the relocation project reportedly generated claims of dishonest officials and corruption, as well as additional citizen hardships.84

Environmental Transparency and Public Participation

Central and some local Chinese environmental protection officials have taken steps to improve environmental transparency, but regular disclosure of information remains a problem. Central authorities took a positive step when they reportedly acknowledged the link between pollution in the Huai River basin and the high number of cancerous tumors found in residents along the river.85 According to its 2010 annual work report, the Ministry of Environmental Protection received 226 requests for information in 2010, an increase of 205 percent.86 The report does not indicate how many requests were granted or denied, only that the ministry responded to every request, except one which was still in process.87 The ministry received 25 requests for administrative reconsideration.88 A joint Chinese-international study released in December 2010 found that there had been some improvement in awareness of the need for transparency on the part of government officials but that more efforts are necessary to translate this awareness into regular disclosure of information.89 The study also found that the types of information hardest for researchers to obtain included "list(s) of polluting enterprises whose pollutant discharge exceeds national or local standards, list(s) of enterprises with major or serious environmental pollution accidents or incidents, and list(s) of enterprises refusing to carry out effective environmental administrative penalties." 90 The results of a second joint study by Chinese and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on open environmental information in 113 cities released in December 2010 noted overall improvement in information disclosure from 2009 to 2010 but also noted that some cities’ disclosure performance declined.91 Eleven cities (9.73 percent) earned "passing" scores of 60 or above in 2009–2010, an increase from four cities (3.54 percent) in 2008.92 The study noted that "many facilities in violation of emissions and clean production standards failed to publicly disclose emissions data as required by law." 93

During this reporting period, environmental groups have utilized environmental open government information procedures to obtain information, although barriers to transparency continue. A December 2010 article by a Chinese author noted that at least 35 organizations joined an ongoing campaign promoting green consumption and that these NGOs had requested information on polluting factories.94 Over 300 enterprises reportedly responded to the requests by explaining the reasons for the pollution problems, and 50 of those companies consented to "third-party audits" by NGOs.95 Administrative provisions, however, remain a major obstacle to transparency as environmental protection authorities use them as the basis for restricting information disclosure.96 Authorities refused to grant information in two recent environmental information disclosure cases discussed in the Chinese media. In the first case, the Ministry of Agriculture refused a 2011 request for information about the downsizing of a national nature reserve along the Yangtze River because it involved "procedural information." 97 In the second case, local environmental officials in Hai’an county, Nantong prefecture, Jiangsu province, denied a 2011 request regarding a waste incinerator, reportedly responding that they had "already approved an environmental impact assessment" for the project. The lawyer who submitted the request on behalf of an environmental group reportedly noted that "this answer was unrelated to the information requested." 98 In May, the lawyer filed an administrative reconsideration request to the environmental protection bureau at the next highest level.99

Chinese citizens and experts have expressed concern over the perceived lack of transparency and the potential risks associated with the rapid development of nuclear power projects. The nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese citizens and experts to speak out about safety concerns.100 For example, a noted Chinese scientist stated that China is "seriously unprepared, especially on the safety front," for speedy development of nuclear plants.101 The disaster also prompted Chinese officials to conduct a safety review of currently operating and planned nuclear power plants.102 In June, a Ministry of Environmental Protection vice minister announced that officials had found all of China’s 13 operating nuclear reactors were safe.103 The Chinese government reportedly will adhere to its current medium- and long-term plans for nuclear power development.104 Chinese authorities are reportedly considering a new nuclear energy law 105 that one researcher notes could spur transparency in China’s nuclear power industry.106

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES

Environmental protection remains a sector in which central authorities state a need for greater public participation but within the confines of state control. In December 2010, the Ministry of Environmental Protection passed a guiding opinion, which states that China needs to further expand efforts to cultivate and guide environmental social organizations, as well as further strengthen relations and cooperation between the government and social organizations.107 The opinion requires environmental social organizations that want to engage in cooperative projects with foreign non-governmental entities to report to foreign affairs departments for "examination and approval." 108 In addition, the opinion also stipulates that various levels of environmental departments must "strengthen political thought construction" (sixiang zhengzhi jianshe) of environmental social organizations.109

This past year, authorities’ responsiveness to citizen environmental grievances varied across the country. One case that highlights the influence of environmental groups involves the shuttering and relocation of a polluting chemical plant in Qiugang village, Bengbu municipality, Anhui province.110 Residents unsuccessfully utilized the court system over a period of years to find relief from pollution associated with nearby chemical plants but then worked with an environmental group to utilize alternative ways to bring pressure on officials to act.111 Local officials relocated one of the main polluting plants, although the site still requires a large cleanup effort.112 Another case involves a waste incineration plant in Beijing municipality. A Chinese newspaper reported in February 2011 that authorities in Haidian district, Beijing, cancelled construction of the incinerator reportedly because of its environmental impacts, citizen protests, and its close proximity to "high-end residential complexes." 113 In addition, authorities in Dalian municipality, Liaoning province, responded quickly to the more than 10,000 people who protested a paraxylene (PX) plant in the city.114 In contrast, in May, in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, 5,000 citizens signed a petition to voice opposition to five incinerators. Authorities, however, counted the petition only as "one opposition vote" because the citizens did not provide their addresses and phone numbers on the petition.115 [See Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment in this section for more examples of less responsive authorities in pollution cases.]

Challenges of Enforcement, Compliance, and Official Corruption

Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, along with non-compliance and corruption, remain significant challenges for the development of rule of law in the environmental sector, including in relation to environmental impact assessments. In September 2010, a study done by a Peking University professor reportedly noted that officials face difficulties in enforcing legal sanctions, that environmental criminal law remains weak, and that often a law’s overall objectives contradict the articles within the law.116 In addition, news reports indicated high levels of bribery and corruption among officials in ecological and environmental protection during the first six months of 2010.117 A 2010 international study found that enforcement of pollution standards varied across time and location in China for a variety of reasons, including the level of support from central authorities, public pressure, the level of commitment of local government officials, enforcement capacity, the characteristics of businesses, and the economic context.118 In August 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) announced at least two special programs to "supervise" seven sewage plants across China because they turned off their systems "without good reason" and eight power plants across China for fabricating emissions monitoring data.119 In June, five non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sent a letter to the MEP noting that the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences (CAMS) had given a "grade A environmental impact assessment" to a waste incineration plant and reportedly had "falsified public feedback." The letter urged officials to reject the environmental impact assessment (EIA), investigate and fine CAMS, and reform the EIA system.120 The Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau had previously revoked a different CAMS EIA in May for "fabricated public feedback." 121 One report suggests that of the 68 hydropower projects approved by local authorities in Zhouqu (Drugchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 67 had not undergone an EIA or geological assessment.122 In August, one Chinese newspaper article outlined several alleged problems with the current EIA system, including low penalties for construction companies that break the law, EIA organizations’ lack of integrity, difficulties in getting public information on EIAs, and the symbolic nature of public participation.123 One Chinese expert notes that "it is more common in China for the public wish to participate in environmental impact assessments to be thwarted." 124 An international NGO noted that a Chinese scholar reported that there are times when local government officials will protect polluting businesses.125 A December 2010 joint Chinese and international report noted that from 2009 to 2010, "[l]ocal environmental protection bureaus often failed to impose any fines or take other actions in response as required by law." 126 For example, in Shaanxi province, local environmental protection bureau personnel on several occasions reportedly agreed to an electric power company’s requests for a delay in execution of penalties for commencing regular operations without first gaining environmental approvals.127

Climate Change: Rule of Law and Public Participation

China’s efforts to address climate change relate to the development of the rule of law in China, the incorporation of public participation in policy processes, and cases of rights infringement. China surpassed the United States to become the world’s top emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007 128 and reportedly may become responsible for one-third to one-half of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions by 2030.129 Top officials reportedly consider China to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 130 and during this reporting year undertook a variety of actions 131 and laid out plans 132 to address the issue, including engaging in cooperative programs with the United States.133 Chinese leaders signed the UN Cancun Agreements in December 2010,134 but as a developing country, China is not bound to reduce greenhouse gases under relevant international climate change agreements.135 Nevertheless, domestically, Chinese leaders included a carbon dioxide intensity reduction target of 17 percent in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development.136 In addition, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reportedly established a working group to draft a climate change law,137 for which officials sought public comments between March and September 2011.138 Despite the call for public input, the lack of transparency hinders public participation in climate change policy processes.139 While in general, participation in policy processes is minimal,140 citizens do engage in some activities addressing climate change. For example, 60 NGOs reportedly organized 20 events surrounding the NGO side event at the UN Climate Change Conference in Tianjin municipality and published a position paper on Chinese NGOs’ response to climate change, among other projects.141 In recent years, citizen protests reportedly took place in Shanxi and Liaoning provinces, as well as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, because of the lack of public input and the land requisition practices associated with experimental carbon capture projects to help mitigate carbon dioxide emissions in industrial processes.142 [For additional cases of policies to promote use of renewable energy sources to address climate change that can be linked to cases of rights infringement, see Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and Safety Controversies in this section.]

Data Reliability and Transparency: Climate Change

Chinese leaders have pledged to improve data reliability and transparency related to energy and climate change. Nevertheless, they reportedly face significant challenges, such as obtaining from provinces comprehensive statistics on coal, transportation energy, coal-bed methane, biomass, and clean energy sectors.143 China is reportedly still developing the institutions and capacity to evaluate energy figures provided by provincial governments, some of which may have incentives to provide false information.144 Authorities specified in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development the intention to establish a greenhouse gas emissions statistical accounting system,145 which could improve data collection if implemented. In October 2010, a high-level NDRC official stated that China would begin greenhouse gas inventory pilot projects in provinces and cities and develop a publicly available greenhouse gas inventory database.146 Chinese leaders have indicated they would continue to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of China’s greenhouse gas emissions and reduction data in relation to projects using domestic financing and technology.147 They reportedly stated their willingness to share this information with the international community 148 and to do their utmost to improve transparency.149

Notes to Section II—The Environment

1 Wu Jingjing, "Vigorously Explore New Paths for Environmental Protection in China—Interview With Ministry of Environmental Protection Minister Zhou Shengxian" [Jiji tansuozhongguo huanjing baohu xin daolu-huanjing baohubu buzhang zhou shengxian fangtan], Xinhua, 25 December 10. Zhou describes regulatory and institutional improvements and notesthat carbon oxygen demand dropped 9.66 percent and sulfur dioxide emissions dropped 13.4 percent between 2006 and 2009. He also notes that pollution problems remain severe. Ian Johnson,"China Faces ‘Very Grave’ Environmental Situation, Officials Say," New York Times, 3 June 11.

2 Guangdong Municipal Environmental Protection Science Research Institute, "Five Years ofEconomic Development in China Gives Rise to Environmental Pollution Costs Nearing One Trillion Yuan" [Woguo 5 nian jingji fazhan zaocheng de huanjing wuran chengben jin wanyi], reprinted in Greenlaw, 14 January 11. The original report title is: "Zhongguo Huanjing Jingji Hesuan Yanjiu Baogao" and it asserts that economic losses due to pollution and ecological damage total nearly a trillion yuan (US$157 million) for the five-year period.

3 Gong Jing, "Cadmium Rice Killing Machine" [Gemi shaji], New Century, reprinted in Caixin Net, 14 February 11.

4 Yu Dawei, "Yunnan Circulates Notice Chromium Dregs Reason for Pearl River Pollution, for the Moment, Water Quality Has Not Appeared Abnormal" [Yunnan tongbao gezha wuran yuanyin zhujiang shuizhi zhan weijian yichang], Caixin Net, 15 August 11; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "On Yunnan’s Chromium Trail," 30 August 11.

5 Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "On Yunnan’s Chromium Trail," 30 August 11; "Experts To Probe Toxic Dumping," South China Morning Post, 15 August 11.

6 Zhang Yanling, "Scholar Urges Third Party Institution Investigate Yunnan Chromium Pollution" [Xuezhe huyu disanfang jigou diaocha yunnan gezha wuran], Caixin, 16 August 11; An Baijie, "Watchdog Suspected Over Toxic Waste," China Daily, 25 August 11; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "On Yunnan’s Chromium Trail," 30 August 11. Yunnan officials reportedly did not inform downstream provinces of the problem in a timely manner.

7 Fiona Tam, "Yunnan Plant Dumped Toxins for 20 Years," South China Morning Post, 17 August 11.

8 Zhou Wenting, "Huge Stockpile of Toxic Waste in 12 Provinces," China Daily, 31 August 11.

9 National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 3(5). Authorities plan to reduce carbon oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur dioxide by 8 percent by 2015, as well as reduce by 10 percent the amounts of two new pollutants, ammonia nitrogen and nitrogen oxide.

10 "Scholar Calls the Content of the Environmental Protection Law Out of Touch With Reality" [Xuezhe cheng "huanjing baohu fa" neirong yu xianshi tuojie], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 10; Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Circular Letter Regarding Soliciting Comments on Environmental Protection Standard (Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guidelines Public Participation) (Draft for Comment)" [Guanyu zhengqiu guojia huanjing baohu biaozhun "huanjing yingxiang pingjia jishu daoze gongzhong canyu" (zhengqiu yijiangao) yijian de han], 30 January 11; State Council Standing Committee, Hazardous Chemicals Safety Management Regulations, issued 26 January 02, amended 16 February 11; Yang Zhanghuai, "Hubei Dazhi Formally Establishes ‘Environmental Police’ " [Hubei dazhi zujian "huanbao jingcha"], Southern Metropolis Weekend, 13 May 11; "Legal Aid in Environmental Pollution Cases Just in Time" [Falu yuanzhu huanjing wuran an zhengdang qishi], Beijing News, 8 October 10. According to the above Beijing News article, Beijing included air pollution cases among the cases eligible for legal aid in the city. "China Will Write Legislation Regarding Genetically Modified Organisms Safety, Ministry of Environmental Protection To Draft Bill" [Zhongguo jiang dui zhuan jiyin shengwu anquan lifa huanbaobu qicao fa’an], People’s Daily, 7 January 11; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, PRC Water and Soil Conservation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shuitu baochifa], issued 29 June 91, amended 25 December 10; "Our Suggestions for Air Pollution Law Revision" [Wo wei daqifa xiuding jianyan], China Environment News, 9 December 10; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "Seeking Damages," 21 July 11.

11 "Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution Emissions Account for Half of the Country’s Pollution" [Huanbaobu: nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo "banbi jiangshan"], China Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily article, environmental protection Vice Minister Li Ganjie stated that environmental pollution in rural areas is serious. Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Zhou Shengxian Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing Committee Meeting" [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu changwu huiyi], 31 December 10; Ian Johnson, "China Faces ‘Very Grave’ Environmental Situation, Officials Say," New York Times, 03 June 11.

12 "Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution Emissions Account for Half of the Country’s Pollution" [Huanbaobu: nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo "banbi jiangshan"], China Youth Daily, 3 June 11.

13 Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Zhou Shengxian Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing Committee Meeting" [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu changwu huiyi], 31 December 10. In conjunction with the basic policy approach, authorities plan to strengthen planning leadership, expand financial investment, strengthen the evaluation of targets, spread technology, and promote "coordinated action."

14 "Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution Emissions Account for Half of the Country’s Pollution" [Huanbaobu: nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo "banbi jiangshan"], China Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily article, at a press conference, environmental protection Vice Minister Li Ganjie noted the steps in the strategy to tackle rural pollution. The first step is to design environmental protection plans; the second step is to pass livestock and poultry waste and soil pollution prevention legislation; the third step is to organize environmental monitoring, enforcement, and education activities in villages and establish environmental teams to extend supervision coverage to villages; the fourth step includes using "rewards to promote control" demonstration projects and official environmental comprehensive control target responsibility system assessments; the fifth step concentrates on making advances in drinking water safety, trash management, and soil protection, as well as preventing and controlling livestock, poultry, and farm pollution. National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11. The plan also notes efforts will be made to protect drinking water, control fertilizer and pesticide pollution, speed up the handling of solid waste management, and strictly prohibit urban and industrial pollution from spreading to rural areas, among other goals.

15 Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Zhou Shengxian Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing Committee Meeting" [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu changwu huiyi], 31 December 10.

16 Elaine Kurtenbach, "Arrests and Closures in Lead Poison Crackdown," Shanghai Daily, 31 May 11; "Ministry Allocates Fund To Inspect Environmental Emergencies," Xinhua, 13 June 11. In 2010, 14 major pollution cases involving heavy metals occurred and there had already been 7 cases in 2011 as of the end of May.

17 "Ministry Allocates Fund To Inspect Environmental Emergencies," Xinhua, 13 June 11.

18 "China Intensifies Regulation on Battery Industries After Lead Poisoning Case," Xinhua, 19 May 11.

19 Mimi Lau, "Crackdown on Cities With Major Lead Pollution," South China Morning Post, 20 May 11.

20 "Chinese Environment Minister Warns of Project Approval Suspension Amid Crackdown on Heavy Metal Pollution," Xinhua, 1 June 11.

21 "China Shuts Down 583 Plants in Lead Battery Plant Overhaul," Xinhua, 2 August 11.

22 "Heyuan Conflict Erupts, Villager Says Police Beat Someone to Death" [Heyuan bao chongtu, cunmin cheng jingcha dasi ren], Bingbao, reprinted in Sina, 20 June 11.

23 "Dalian PX Project Triggers Concerns, Thousands of Citizens Gather in Protest" [Dalian PX xiangmu yinqi danyou shuwan minzong shi zhizheng jihui kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 14 August 11.

24 Christina Larson, "The New Epicenter of China’s Discontent," Foreign Policy, 23 August 11.

25 Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "PX Factory in Typhoon," 11 August 11.

26 "Dalian PX Project Stopped and Will Be Moved" [Dalian PX xiangmu tingchan daiban], Southern Metropolis Daily, 15 August 11.

27 "Dalian’s People—and Power," Wall Street Journal, 15 August 11.

28 "Dalian Incident Shows More Adaptable Government," Global Times, 15 August 11.

29 "Highlights of Work Report of Supreme People’s Court," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 11 March 11.

30 Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, "China’s Green Laws Are Useless," 23 September 10. A survey of 12,000 judicial employees revealed that 50 percent of them believed environmental lawsuits were regularly being refused by courts.

31 Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, "Green Litigation in China Today," 18 July 11.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Meng Si, Chinadialogue, "Seeking Damages," 21 July 11.

36 Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, "Green Litigation in China Today," 18 July 11.

37 Ibid. The author counts 39 environmental courts, which is an increase from a handful of courts noted in the CECC 2009 Annual Report. CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 191, 195. CECC staff interviews found that other estimates of the number of environmental courts run from 50 to 100.

38 "Kunming’s First Environmental Public Interest Case Announces Judgment, 4 Million in Compensation" [Kunming shouli huanjing gongyi susong anjian xuanpan peichang 400 wan], Jinghua News, reprinted in NetEase, 30 January 11.

39 CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 156. Also see Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, "Green Litigation in China Today," 18 July 11.

40 Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, "China’s Green Laws Are Useless," 23 September 10.

41 Ibid.

42 Human Rights Watch, " ‘My Children Have Been Poisoned’: A Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces," 15 June 11, 25–31.

43 For more information about one of the cases in Hunan (Wugang city), see Michael Wines, "Lead Sickens 1,300 Children in China," New York Times, 20 August 09; "Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental Accountability," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2. For more information about the Shaanxi (Fengxiang county) lead poisoning case, see Tu Chonghang, "Shaanxi Lead Poisoning Incident From Start to Finish" [Shaanxi fengxiang qian zhongdu shijianshiwei], Beijing News, reprinted in China Law Information Net, 21 August 09; "Lead Poisoning Incident in Shaanxi Leads to Protests, Rights Infringements Reported," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 8.

44 Human Rights Watch, " ‘My Children Have Been Poisoned’: A Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces," 15 June 11. Police in Shaanxi detained citizens demonstrating in front of a lead-processing facility and police in Hunan reportedly arrested seven people seeking assistance with their sick children.

45 Ibid. Authorities in Shaanxi forced a journalist who tried to report on the lead poisoning cases to leave the area.

46 "Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian Province," [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.

47 "Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel in Supplication for Detained Villagers’ Release" [Fujian pingnan jin bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.

48 "Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian Province" [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.

49 Ibid.; "Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel in Supplication for Detained Villagers’ Release" [Fujian pingnan jin bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.

50 "Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel in Supplication for Detained Villagers’ Release" [Fujian pingnan jin bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.

51 Voice of Tibet, "Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Detained by Authorities for Opposing Mine" [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda he jubu], reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on December 18); "15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests in Shigatse," Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.

52 "Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained," Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases. "Villagers Block Work on Dam," Radio Free Asia, 30 September 10 (the mountain’s name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba). According to the news report, workers claimed "their permit to mine in the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary of the TAR." The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR Party official may have signified agreement.

53 Kalsang Rinchen, "Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans in Palyul County," Phayul, 24 August 10; "Police Fire on Mine Protesters," Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10; Phurbu Thinley, "China Says Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest," Phayul, 1 September 10; "Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With Police," Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 30 August 10.

54 "Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained," Radio Free Asia, 5 August 11.

55 Ibid.

56 "Wuxi Huangtutang Trash Incinerator Mass Incident, More Than 10,000 Gather" [Wuxi huangtutang laji ranxiao qunti shijian yiwan duo ren juji], Boxun, 9 April 11.

57 "Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation of Incinerator" [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan], Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11; Feng Yongfeng, "Jiangsu, Wuxi ‘Grandfather Gallery’ Morphs Into ‘Waste Incinerator’ " [Jiangsu, wuxi "huangtutang" bianshen "laji fenshaochang"], Wohua Media Net, reprinted in QQ News, 31 May 11. The village secretary reportedly convinced 77 percent of the villagers in the area to sign over their land to build a "Grandfather Gallery," but then proceeded to build an incinerator instead.

58 "Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation of Incinerator" [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan], Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11.

59 "Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights Group," Reuters, 30 June 11; "Herders in China’s Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt," Washington Post, 30 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "New Round of Herders’ Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia," 29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Fresh Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized," 23 July 11.

60 "Herders in China’s Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt," Washington Post, 30 June 11.

61 "Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights Group," Reuters, 30 June 11.

62 Ibid.; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "New Round of Herders’ Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia," 29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Fresh Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized," 23 July 11.

63 "Herders in China’s Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt," Washington Post, 30 June 11.

64 Ibid.

65 See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, "Protests Spread in Southern Mongolia, Thousands More Take to the Streets," 26 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, "Anger Over Protesters’ Deaths Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians," New York Times, 30 May 11.

66 Wenran Jiang and Zining Liu, Jamestown Foundation, "Energy Security in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan," China Brief, Vol. 11, No. 11, 17 June 11; National Human Rights Action Plan and China National Development and Reform Commission, "Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version)," China Net, September 2007, secs. 3.2, 4, 4.1. See the following articles for examples of reasons given by Chinese officials as to why dams are built, which include increasing reliance on renewable energy, flood control, transportation, establishing a reliable reservoir of water for irrigation or drinking, stimulating economic development, and generating local government revenues. "Massive Chinese Hydro Project Moves Ahead," Breakbulk Online, 27 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng, "Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower," Global Times, 24 November 11; "China Daily: China Pledges Water Will Still Flow," China Daily, 19 November 11; S. Anuradha, International Rivers Network, "China’s Sinohydro Says Hydropower Growth Likely To Fall in Asia on Growing Resistance," 11 November 10; Christina Larson, "Where the River Ends," Foreign Policy, 2 June 11; "Lessons To Be Learned," China Daily, 8 August 11.

67 Xu Donghuan, "Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom," Global Times, 10 February 11.

68 "Is Hydropower Exploitation of the Nu River in China a Must? " Guardian blog, 10 February 11; Jonathan Watts, "China’s Big Hydro Wins Permission for 21.3GW Dam in World Heritage Site," Guardian, 1 February 11; "National Energy Bureau Responsible Person Declares for First Time: Nujiang Will Be Developed" [Guojia nengyuanju fuzeren shouci biaotai: nujiang yiding hui kaifa], China National Radio, reprinted in People’s Daily, 31 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng, "Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower," Global Times, 24 November 10.

69 Xu Donghuan, "Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom," Global Times, 10 February 11. According to the Global Times report, a Beijing-based river expert stated that "[t]hese sub-standard small hydroelectric stations can trigger landslides and are a great threat to the local ecological system." Authorities have dammed 60 tributaries to the Nu River, with 42 projects completed and 88 slated to be completed. A top official noted that a number of national studies show the Nu River valley in Yunnan province is subject to geological and seismological disasters, and she prepared a proposal calling on the central government to "pay attention to the special and complex geological and seismological conditions in the Nu River valley and take caution in making decisions about hydraulic power development there." Li Xing and Wang Huazhong, "Earthquake Casts Doubt on Hydropower," China Daily, 12 March 11; "Lessons To Be Learned," China Daily, 8 August 11.

70 "Wen Jiabao Opens State Council Meeting, Discusses and Passes ‘Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan’ " [Wen jiabao kai guowuyuan hui taolun tongguo "sanxia houxu gongzuo guihua" deng], Xinhua, 18 May 11. These problems include the "stability" and livelihood of resettled populations and the prevention of geological disasters. Leaders also acknowledged that the dam had affected the "transportation in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, irrigation, and the supply of water," among other problems.

71 Ibid. The plans include the "Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan" and the "Yangtze Middle and Lower Reaches Watershed Water Pollution Prevention and Control Plan." According to Xinhua, the Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan’s objectives include bringing the standard of living of those relocated because of the dam up to a level equal to that of residents in Hubei province and Chongqing municipality.

72 Dai Qing, Probe International, "On the Completion of the Three Gorges Project," 22 January 11. Some estimates are higher because they include people who the government said were resettled for "urbanization" or "employment" programs. Dai Qing reports the official number of people relocated to make way for the Three Gorges dam to be 1.4 million. Probe International estimates that 3.7 million people have been relocated and Dai Qing estimates the number is higher at 4 million.

73 These reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard compensation, suppression of advocates, and government corruption during resettlement processes, as well as documented the threat of severe hardships that may be faced by relocated citizens, including homelessness, unemployment, conflicts between resettled citizens and existing populations, and poverty among resettled migrants. See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick, "Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China," in Water Brief 3, The World’s Water 2008–2009 (Oakland, CA: Pacific Institute, 2009), 145–46; Jim Yardley, "Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human Costs, Choking on Growth, Part IV," New York Times, 19 November 07. For information on activist Xie Fulin, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 103; "Three Gorges Resettlement Activist Paralyzed After Assault," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 10–11; Stacy Mosher, Human Rights in China, "The Case of Fu Xiancai," China Rights Forum, No. 3, 2006, 48–51. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on Fu Xiancai.

74 International Rivers, "Resettlement in Action," 25 August 10.

75 Choi Chi-yu, "2,000 Battle Police in Yunnan," South China Morning Post, 31 March 11.

76 Rachel Beitarie, "Burst of New Dams in Southwest China Produces Power and Public Ire," Circle of Blue, 22 March 11.

77 National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 8(2).

78 International Rivers, "Resettlement in Action," 25 August 10, 1; "More Resettled for S-N Water Diversion Project," Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 20 September 10.

79 International Rivers, "Resettlement in Action," 25 August 10, 8.

80 "Migrants Hold Large Protest at Median Line of South-to-North Water Diversion Project, Vice Governor Assumes Command, Moves Armed Police To Disperse With Force" [Nanshui beidiao zhongxian yimin da kangyi fushengzhang zuozhen tiao wujing qiang qusan], Radio Free Asia, 26 November 10; Carla Freeman, China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, "Quenching the Dragon’s Thirst, the South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China? " last visited 9 February 11, 6.

81 Jamil Anderlini, "China: A Blast From the Past," Financial Times, 14 December 09.

82 Chris Buckley, "China To Move Tens of Thousands for Huge Water Scheme," Reuters, 29 June 10. According to Reuters, some farmers relocated for the Danjiangkou Dam have complained they are being relocated to less arable land and have sparse job prospects. The dam’s reservoir will provide water for the diversion project. Carla Freeman, China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, "Quenching the Dragon’s Thirst, the South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China? " last visited 9 February 11, 6. In 2009, villagers near the Danjiangkou Dam construction site "verbally attacked village officials and threatened resistance over plans to resettle them elsewhere in central China." Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work Department, and Nanyang City Petition Bureau, "Several Points To Ponder in Addressing South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route Project Danjiangkou Reservoir Migrant Petitions" [Dui nanshui beidiao zhongxian gongcheng danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13 October 10; Michael Bristow, "China Villagers Moved To Quench the Urban Thirst," BBC, 3 March 10. The above report provides some information about the nature of citizen complaints related to the Danjiangkou Dam relocation project.

83 "Officials Lure Villagers, Force Them To Accept Place To Settle, Threaten Petitioners" [Ganbu youdao cunmin qiangzhi jieshou anzhidian konghe shangfang zhe], China JournalistSurvey Net, reprinted in Bangkaow.com, 3 September 10.

84 Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work Department, and NanyangCity Petition Bureau, "Several Points To Ponder in Addressing South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route Project Danjiangkou Reservoir Migrant Petitions" [Dui nanshui beidiao zhongxiangongcheng danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13 October 10; Michael Bristow, "China Villagers Moved To Quench the Urban Thirst," BBC, 3 March 10.

85 Xu Chao, "The Relationship Between Huai River Basin Pollution and Cancer Basically Established" [Huaihe liuyu wuran yu aizheng guanxi jiben zhengshi], Caijing, 27 December 10.

86 Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Ministry of Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2010 Annual Report" [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo2010 niandu baogao], 14 March 11.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Article 19 and Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, "Access to EnvironmentalInformation in China: Evaluation of Local Compliance," December 2010.

90 Ibid.

91 Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, "Environmental Open Information: Between Advance & Retreat—The 2009–2010 Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 113 Chinese Cities," 28 December 10, 3. According to the study’s results, out of 100 possiblepoints, the average score of the cities examined increased from 31 points in 2008 to 36 points in 2009–2010 (p. 3).

92 Ibid.

93 Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, "Environmental Open Information: Between Advance & Retreat—The 2009–2010 Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in113 Chinese Cities," 28 December 10, 4.

94 Ma Jun, Chinadialogue, "Advancing Energy Conservation and Reducing Pollution With Environmental Open Information" [Yi huanjing xinxi gongkai cujin jieneng jianpai], 13 December 10.

95 Ibid.

96 For example, one online response to an open environmental information request on the Anhui Government Open Government Information Net Web site listed a provision and its appendix as the basis for not releasing some of the information requested. Anhui Province People’s Government Open Government Information Net, "Description of Needed Information Contents, Yangtze River, Anchuang Section, Wuwei Section and Chaohu Lake Region Related Water Quality Raw Data from 2007–2010" [Suo xu xinxi de neirong miaoshu, changjiang anqing duan, wuwei duan he chaohu huqu zi 2007–2010 de xiangguan shuizhi yuanshi shuju], 20 October 10.According to the response posted on the Anhui Province government Web site, the response to the environmental information request cites provisions that environmental protection authorities apparently issued in 2004, i.e., "Provisions on the Scope of State Secrets in Environmental Protection Work" (Provisions). Based on the response to the open environmental information request cited above, the Provisions appear to have an appendix that stipulates environmental protection work secrets, i.e., the "Environmental Protection Work State Secrets Catalog" [Huanjingbaohu gongzuo guoji mimi mulu]. Based on a review of the Catalog of National Environmental Departmental Normative Documents Remaining in Force cited below, the Provisions were inforce as of September 2010, but Commission staff could not locate a copy of them on the Internet. Hubei Environmental Protection Portal, "Appendix: Catalog of National Environmental Departmental Normative Documents Remaining in Force" [Fujian: jixu youxiao de guojia huanbao bumen guifanxing wenjian mulu], 30 September 10.

97 Xi Jianrong, "Environmental Protection Organization Seeks Investigation Into Legality of ‘Procedural Information’ " [Huanbao zuzhi tiqing "guochengxing xinxi" hefaxing shencha], Legal Daily, 25 March 11; Zhang Ke, "Environmental NGO Petitions State Council To Question Whether Fish Reserve Restructuring Serves Power Station" [Huanbao zuzhi shangshuguowuyuan zhiyi yulei baohuqu wei dianzhan tiaozheng], Number One Caijing Daily, reprinted in China Transparency, 8 June 11. For more complete information about the case, see XiJianrong, "NGO Requests Publication of Information on Nature Reserve Restructuring" [Minjian zuzhi jiu ziran baohuqu tiaozheng shenqing xinxi gongkai], Legal Daily, 20 January 11; Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Ministry of Environmental Protection: Announcement on Applications for Promotion and Restructuring of National Level Nature Reserves" [Huanjing baohubu gonggao: dui shenqing jinsheng he tiaozheng de guojia ji ziranbaohuqu jinxing gong shi], 4 January 11; Xi Jianrong, "Scholars Request Hearing on National Level Nature Reserve Restructuring" [Xuezhe qingqiu jiu changjiang shangyou guojia ji ziranbaohuqu tiaozheng tingzheng], Legal Daily, 1 March 11; Beijing Impact Law Firm, "Upper Yangtze National Level Rare Fish Nature Reserve To Be Downsized" [Changjiang shangyou zhenxi teyou yulei guojia ji ziranbaohuqu mianji bei suojian], 24 March 11.

98 Han Lewu, "Application for Publication of Environmental Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental NGO Seeks Administrative Review" [Shenqing gongkai laji fenshaochang huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi], Legal Daily, 8 June 11. According to the Legal Daily article, the Darwin Nature Knowledge Society submitted open government information requests to the Hai’an County Environmental Protection Bureau among other environmental departments asking for the environmental impact assessment reports for a waste incineration power plant and related waste management projects, as well as requesting information about the power plant’s emissions data. Xi Jianrong, "Environmental Organization Requests Environmental Impact Assessment of Beijing Sujiatuo Incineration Plant" [Huanbao zuzhi shenqing gongkai beijing sujiatuo fenshaochang huanping xinxi], Legal Daily, reprintedin China Transparency, 16 June 11.

99 Han Lewu, "Application for Publication of Environmental Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental Protection NGO Seeks Administrative Review" [Shenqing gongkai laji fenshaochang huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi], Legal Daily,8 June 11.

100 Malcolm Moore, "Leading Physicist Calls China’s Nuclear Programme ‘Rash and Unsafe,’ " Telegraph, 1 June 11; "Minister Recommends China Have Independent Nuclear Safety Regulator in Wake of Japan Crisis," Associated Press, 3 June 11. Other Chinese experts and topinternational nuclear authorities also expressed the need to increase oversight of nuclear power plants. Keith Bradsher, "Nuclear Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns," New York Times,15 December 09. An International Atomic Energy Agency official noted there was some concern that China might not have enough nuclear inspectors with sufficient training to manage therapid growth of nuclear power. Choi Chi-yuk, "Nuclear Threat From Mountain of Spent Fuel," South China Morning Post, 1 April 11. One Chinese nuclear engineer was quoted as saying". . . previously produced waste has yet to be properly dealt with, . . ." "It will pose a tremendous safety threat to the public as a result of the piling up of more and more nuclear fuel, year after year."

101 Malcolm Moore, "Leading Physicist Calls China’s Nuclear Programme ‘Rash and Unsafe,’ " Telegraph, 1 June 11.

102 Liu Yiyu, "New Nuclear Power Plants ‘Set To Be Approved,’ " China Daily, 22 April 11. Chinese authorities reportedly suspended approvals for new nuclear power projects and inspected plants in operation and under construction.

103 Brian Spegele, "Beijing Says Its Reactors Are Safe," Wall Street Journal, 16 June 11.

104 Liu Yiyu, "New Nuclear Power Plants ‘Set To Be Approved,’ " China Daily, 22 April 11; "China Says Its Nuclear Reactors Passed Inspections," Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 15 June 11. China reportedly plans to have more than 100 plants in operation by 2020.

105 Wang Huazhong, "Japan Nuclear Crisis Prompts ‘Urgent’ Drafting of New Law," China Daily, 26 Apr

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2011 Annual Report

Congressional-Executive Commission on China

2011 ANNUAL REPORT

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