The Chinese Government has made economic development a priority, and lifted millions of people out of poverty, but Chinese Government policies and practices continue to violate the rights of Chinese citizens, and fall far short of meeting international standards. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which formally was established in 2000 by the legislation that granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) as China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), is mandated by law to monitor human rights, worker rights, and the development of the rule of law in China, as well as to maintain a database of information on Chinese political prisoners—individuals who have been imprisoned for exercising their civil and political rights protected under China’s Constitution and laws or under China’s international human rights obligations.

When China entered the WTO in 2001, the Chinese Government made commitments that were important not only for China’s commercial development in the international marketplace, but also for the development of the rule of law at home. These commitments require that the Chinese Government ensure nondiscrimination in the administration of measures that are trade related, and publish promptly all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings relating to trade. WTO accession and the Chinese Government’s years of preparation for accession provided the impetus for many changes to China’s legal system over the past two decades. Those changes, some of which have been significant, still have not produced a national legal system that is consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. The Communist Party rejects the notion that the imperative to uphold the rule of law should preempt the Party’s role in guiding the functions of the state. As this report shows, the Chinese Government’s repressive tendencies at home undermine the credibility of its stated international commitments to create a more open society that provides greater respect for human rights, worker rights, transparency, and the rule of law.

The development of a stable China firmly committed to the rule of law and citizens’ fundamental rights is in the national interest of the United States. Those rights include the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, religion, and other rights protected under China’s Constitution and laws or under China’s international human rights obligations. To ensure a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship, China’s leaders must demonstrate genuine commitment, not just in words but in deeds, to promoting the development of the rule of law, human rights, and transparency in no less measure than they have prioritized economic development.

The imperative to uphold the rule of law, human rights, and transparency could not be more relevant than it is with respect to planned expansion of bilateral cooperation on climate change recently announced by the United States and China. The United States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on July 28 that elevates cooperation on climate change in the relationship between the two countries and expands bilateral cooperation to accelerate the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon global economy. In the pursuit of such a goal, the integrity of scientific data and technical information must be preserved, free from censorship or manipulation for political or other purposes. Researchers, engineers, and scientists engaged in international collaborative projects must be free from concern about whether the information they share with a research partner today will be declared a state secret tomorrow, and whether they will face prosecution as criminals as a result. To maximize the potential for progress on climate change, Chinese officials must engage as allies, and not repress, environmental whistleblowers, a vigilant press, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights lawyers. Recently announced goals for U.S.-China cooperation and top-level business collaboration on clean technology can only be achieved if accompanied by reliable and consistent enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.

This report documents, in each of its sections, the challenges and opportunities that exist for China to create a more open society with greater respect for human rights, transparency, and the rule of law. The report also demonstrates the importance of the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, a unique, powerful, and publicly available resource on which the Commission relies for advocacy and research work, including the preparation of this Annual Report. The human rights issues underlying political imprisonment and detention are numerous. Instances of human rights violations and resulting imprisonment form a pattern of systematic repression—the Chinese Government should demonstrate its commitment to international standards by reversing this pattern.

The Commission intends that the detailed contents of this report may serve as a roadmap for progress. By documenting human rights violations in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database, by advocating in meetings with Chinese officials on behalf of political prisoners, by raising public awareness of human rights and rule of law issues, and by placing these issues on the agendas of bilateral and multilateral meetings, the United States Government establishes a baseline for measuring progress. Some of those who supported establishing permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China in 2000 believed that PNTR would improve the prospects that the Chinese Government would fulfill its commitments to international human rights standards—but the Chinese Government has yet to live up to those commitments. Holding the Chinese Government accountable to its international commitments and to its own laws, when those laws meet international standards, is an essential element of the roadmap for progress.

As the United States and China engage in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, the Commission urges Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials to monitor carefully Chinese Government positions and actions on issues critical to developing the rule of law, promoting transparency, and protecting human rights. The Chinese Government, for example, issued a National Human Rights Action Plan in 2009 that uses the language of human rights to cast an ambitious program for promoting the rights of its citizens. In meetings with Chinese officials, Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should inquire about the Chinese Government’s progress in translating words into action and securing genuine improvements for its citizens as set forth in the plan. To that end, this Annual Report and the information available on the Commission’s Web site, www.cecc.gov, provide an abundance of resources.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

The Commission observed continuing human rights abuses and stalled development of the rule of law in China during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year (October 2008 to October 2009). The level of repression increased in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibetan areas of China, as did the level of harassment of human rights lawyers and advocates, and restrictions on Chinese reporters. Repression of religious adherents continued. Across the areas the Commission monitors, these general themes emerged:

Chinese leaders’ increasing preoccupation with maintaining what they deem to be "social stability";
more pronounced deficiencies in checks on state power, and in some cases the government’s undoing of existing checks;
the reversal of some trends toward greater transparency of and predictability in the legal system; and
greater Chinese Government and Communist Party sophistication in co-opting the language of human rights and the rule of law to shape perceptions of China’s record on these issues.

Maintaining Stability

The frequency of mass protests in China during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year attracted attention throughout China and worldwide. Party leaders considered 2009 to be a sensitive year and set an even greater priority on maintaining social stability. As a result, central and local governments increased public security budgets and expanded mechanisms charged with "stability maintenance work." Offices charged with "stability maintenance" focused on developing "early warning systems" for social instability and expanding networks of "informants" at local levels.

Many protests were triggered when workers, farmers and other rural residents, or urban residents turned to laws and regulations to defend their interests against those of businesses, allegedly corrupt government officials, or both. Many such disputes resulted, for example, from complaints against industrial pollution, worker grievances, property disputes, uneven development, and wealth inequality. Citizens’ appeals often included calls for fair and just government mediation. In some instances, more powerful and well-funded economic players took measures to cause the harassment and intimidation of local protesters. Local government officials in many cases justified taking police action against protesters by asserting that doing so helped to promote "economic development" and "defend social order." Police action against protesters in the name of maintaining order and "stability above all else" came to international attention in the past year as authorities forcefully suppressed a demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5, a day which also marked the start of violent clashes and attacks in the city.

The lack of adequate rule of law at the local level contributed to channeling social pressures toward administrative and Party officials for management or resolution, instead of through the judicial system. When economic disputes became protests, protesters often called on government officials to intervene on their behalf. The performance evaluation of officials, however, in part is based on the successful preemption or suppression of mass protests and petitioning as well as on achieving economic development targets. Such measures of government performance work against addressing the root causes of citizens’ protests and against resolving disputes in a fair manner. Even though empowering the courts to fulfill their constitutional and lawful purpose would serve citizens’ interests, officials fail to empower the courts. Government and Party officials are reluctant to bend to the rule of law, and the leadership fears that full implementation of the rule of law could unleash social forces that are beyond the capacity of the courts to control.

Checks on State Power

Deficiencies in institutional and legal restraints on state power became more pronounced during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. Serious abuses of fundamental human rights resulted in part from the weakness or absence of basic protections available to citizens through legal process. Even when procedural protections exist on paper, insufficient safeguards are in place to guarantee their implementation. For example, China’s lower courts frequently seek instructions from higher courts before issuing decisions. This system of "instruction on request" undermines the fundamental purpose of the appellate process, and serves as an impediment to the development of administrative and judicial decisions supported by statements of legal reasoning. That, in turn, negatively impacts the public’s faith in the integrity of legal institutions. During the 2009 annual session of the National People’s Congress, delegates introduced a bill aimed at abolishing "instruction on request." The shortcoming, therefore, is not that officials have failed to identify the problem, or that a viable solution is out of reach. Rather, officials do not empower lower courts for the reasons noted above: the Party’s unwillingness to bend to the rule of law, and the fear of unleashing social forces that are beyond the capacity of courts to control.

Even when laws on the books are well crafted, abuses arise. The presumption of guilt permitted under Chinese criminal law—especially in "politically sensitive" cases—confounds defense attorneys’ attempts to present evidence of innocence, to provide evidence that a defendant committed a lesser crime, or otherwise to mount an effective defense. To uphold the Chinese Government’s domestic and international commitments to adhere to legal procedure, China needs a community of legal scholars and lawyers well trained in procedural law to represent citizens—even in "sensitive" cases. This report documents that China has such lawyers, but local judicial bureaus and lawyers associations have denied a number of them renewal of their professional licenses. Absent adequate legal and institutional constraints on state power, government authorities and unofficial personnel continued during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year to monitor unlawfully and subject to periodic illegal home confinement social activists, dissidents, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family members. Such unlawful activity increased during sensitive periods, such as during the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests.

Predictability of the Legal System

The impetus for much of China’s legal reform in the past two decades was its preparation for accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. Those changes, while significant, have not produced a national legal system that is consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. The Communist Party rejects the notion that upholding the rule of law should preempt the Party’s role in guiding the functions of the state.

The "crime" of disclosing state secrets exemplifies the limitations on the rule of law. Broad categories of information may be classified as state secrets, including information related to "economic and social development." Officials use this discretion to punish citizens for attempting to expose official abuse of power. For example, in 2005 officials sentenced Shi Tao, a journalist, to serve 10 years in prison for exposing a directive from propaganda officials concerning restrictions on media coverage of the 15th anniversary of the June 1989 Tiananmen protests. Officials had designated the directive "top secret." Individuals charged with illegally disclosing state secrets may mount a defense against the charge, but they cannot legally challenge the decision that classified the information as a state secret. A draft revision of the Law on Guarding State Secrets that the National People’s Congress published for public comment earlier this year leaves broad criteria for classifying information as a "state secret" intact.

Even in the domain of commercial law, developments over the past year have shown how business disputes and commercial issues may have real consequences for human rights when the Chinese Government or Party perceives its interests to be threatened. The case of Rio Tinto, an Australian mining corporation whose employees Chinese authorities reportedly detained initially on allegations of possible violations of state secrets laws, and later on accusations of violating laws on commercial secrecy, is an example.

Extralegal detention remains a serious problem that endangers the legitimacy and predictability of the legal system, and violates a number of basic human rights. Chinese citizens, including petitioners, peaceful protesters, and individuals deemed "undesirable" by authorities, remain subject to arbitrary detention in extralegal detention facilities such as secret jails and "law education classes." Some are held for nonmedical reasons in psychiatric hospitals. Authorities’ use of unlawful detention varies periodically—it increases prior to significant events and anniversaries—and from area to area.

Shaping Perceptions

Chinese Government and Party officials displayed during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year greater sophistication in co-opting the language of human rights and the rule of law to shape perceptions of China’s record on these issues. The soaring influence of China’s Internet and a greater focus on competing with international media in reporting on China have shaped the Party’s strategy of control. The Chinese Government and Communist Party’s official media expedite reporting on some events in order to influence mass media coverage. At the same time, the government increases censorship of unofficial information channels, such as the Internet. International journalists working in China face fewer restrictions than their domestic Chinese counterparts, but they continue to meet with harassment and their ability to function as an effective alternative to official "spin" sometimes is limited.

The Chinese Government continued to soften some rhetoric toward religion by articulating a "positive role" that religious communities in China should fulfill, but the government’s language casts for religion the duty to build support for state economic and social goals. Officials and central government directives continued to warn against foreign groups "using religion" to "interfere" in China’s "internal" affairs and to "sabotage" the country. The government continued to use legal measures to restrict rather than protect the religious freedom of Chinese citizens. Parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right to pass on religious education to children, and children remain subject to restrictions on their right to exercise the freedom of religion. The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts. The government permitted and, in some cases, sponsored the social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but in the past year, authorities also took steps to block some social welfare activities by unregistered religious groups.

The government has in the past year used institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations. Chinese officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy have resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.

In an apparent effort to shift attention from policy shortcomings in China, and to appeal to international support, authorities blamed a demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5 and strife in the region starting that day on the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Authorities also accused U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer of orchestrating events on July 5—a charge she denied— and launched a media campaign to portray family members denouncing her.

China’s global reach and expanding economy provide the government an array of international levers to penalize governments and organizations that criticize the Chinese Government’s human rights record, as well as channels to reward international entities that support the government’s positions, or who choose to remain silent. China’s actions related to Darfur and Sudan, and China’s reported surveillance and intimidation of non-governmental organizations, religious and spiritual adherents, and international activists may be understood, at least in part, in this context.

I. Executive Summary and Recommendations

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of findings follows below for each area that the Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with the Commission’s mandate, submits a set of recommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.