China Monitor #2

Friday, January 30, 2026
China Monitor

A publication to keep Members of Congress and the public informed about critical human rights and legal developments in China

January 30, 2026

Contents:

Party Watch:

Politburo Meeting on Internet Governance On November 28, 2025, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) convened a study session on “strengthening governance of the online ecosystem,” underscoring Beijing’s intent to tighten political control over the digital information space, while selectively harnessing emerging technologies, including AI and big data—to do so more effectively. The official readout noted remarks from CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping who emphasized that online governance must adhere to CCP policies and “promote socialist core values,” and he singled out “online platforms, self-media, and multi-channel network organizations” (third-party agencies that manage social media influencers), calling for “strengthen[ed] guidance” to ensure that they “responsibly become disseminators of positive energy.” Sinocism, a newsletter on China, notes that this aligns with a broader effort to ensure ideological discipline and political alignment across the online content supply chain—from individuals to platforms and organizations. Notably, multi-channel network organizations were already targeted in Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) proposed legislation earlier in 2025, which required them to “adhere to correct political direction,” indicating that the Party is building a clearer regulatory and enforcement architecture around these actors.

Xi further called for a crackdown on “online chaos” which he said “pollutes the social atmosphere,” and to address systemic problems in online ecosystem governance. Taken together, the readout portrays an Internet governance strategy that is: embracing advanced technologies where they strengthen state capacity, while demanding stricter ideological conformity and compliance from platforms, creators, and the organizations that manage them.

Cyberspace Administration of China Issues Negative Behaviors List After the study session, on December 25,  the Cyberspace Administration of China issued to province-level internet platform oversight offices a circular containing a list of behaviors by influential or celebrity online accounts deemed to have a “negative influence.” The list of such behaviors—the scope of which is not clearly defined and is left to Party officials to decide—includes:: “spreading bad thoughts,” such as “lying flat” (躺平), that “violate core socialist values”; “mocking and ridiculing mainstream [Party-approved] values”; “distorting the interpretation” of major national policies, regulations, and public events; the preaching of religion without credentials (which is grouped along with other unapproved activities such as offering investment recommendations and conducting news interviews); and causing “social discord and antagonism” by sharing information related to “territory, ethnicity, sex, and occupation.”

Party Watch will cover the recent purge of Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission in our next edition.

Report on China’s Efforts to Undermine Work of U.N. Human Rights Bodies

An October 2025 report released by International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) revealed China’s coordinated efforts with Russia to utilize their influence in budget negotiations to obstruct human rights bodies and investigations. ISHR’s report utilizes extensive interviews with 37 diplomats, U.N. officials, and experts, as well as an analysis of official U.N. documents and budget data from 2019 to 2024, to reveal how coordinated obstruction by certain States led by China and Russia, are critically undermining the U.N.’s ability to fund and implement its human rights mandates. The report documents how China, Russia, and other States have actively sought to cut funding for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and defund Human Rights Council (HRC) mandates. China does this by proposing extreme measures that would disproportionately reduce human rights budgets under the guise of “efficiency.” China’s proposals include “eliminating resources and staff posts for country-specific human rights investigations,” defunding civil and political rights mandates, and reducing access for civil society. Though China asserts that these moves are cost-saving, ISHR argues that “China’s negotiation position is motivated by an effort to structurally weaken OHCHR’s ability to carry out its full mandate.” 

The report also noted that a member of the Board of Auditors (BoA)—the U.N.’s independent budgetary auditing office—appointed by China used his position to request access to sensitive information that the U.N. Secretariat has deemed beyond the scope of BoA audits, such as “the names and nationalities of whistleblowers” and information on “every Chinese national employed at the U.N.,” leading interviewees to believe that the BoA member was working in the interests of the Chinese government. China’s BoA member has also requested a reshuffling of portfolios to allow China to lead the audit of OHCHR. 

Joint Statement on China’s Human Rights Abuse

On November 21, the United States, alongside 14 other countries, issued a joint statement decrying China’s serious and systemic human rights abuses. The statement cited “the persistent use of arbitrary detention, forced labor, unlawful or arbitrary uses of mass surveillance, and restrictions on religious and cultural expression in China.” The 15 countries called on China to release those unjustly detained and comply with international law and urged U.N. member states to hold China accountable for its human rights violations. 

Legal Developments

Two Updated Laws Take Effect As of January 1, 2026, two newly updated laws have taken effect in the PRC: the revised PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law (PSAPL, unofficial translation here) and the amended PRC Cybersecurity Law (CSL, amendments). 

In June 2025, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) revised the PSAPL, which was first passed in August 2005 and had previously been amended in October 2012. The PSAPL provides penalties for offenses which do not reach the level of “crimes”—which are covered by the PRC Criminal Law—and allows police to detain violators for up to 20 days, among other penalties, without going through the criminal justice system. The revised PSAPL responds to some critiques of the law’s previous versions: it provides more clarity and for more circumstances under which a review hearing might be requested (art. 117) and it seals the records of all PSAPL offenses, potentially preventing employers from using a record of such offenses to refuse employment (art. 136), although this revision has prompted some public backlash.

However, the revised PSAPL also provides for several additional offenses not previously included. These new offenses include facilitating cheating on official exams (art. 27), organizing pyramid schemes (art. 34), and physically menacing operators of public transport (art. 40), among others. Revisions in two articles in particular have drawn concern from observers: Article 31, which newly prohibits “illegal religious activities” and may be used to further restrict freedom of religion or belief, such as expanding state control over unregistered “house” churches; and Article 35, which lists various new offenses related to disrespecting China’s “heroes and martyrs,” potentially leading to more restrictions on freedom of speech and academic freedoms.

In October 2025, the NPCSC amended the PRC Cybersecurity Law (CSL), which was first passed in November 2016. In addition to providing broader support for artificial intelligence research (art. 20), the amended CSL also increases penalties for failure to address the spread of “prohibited information.” Under the previous CSL, Articles 68 and 69 provided for a 50,000 to 500,000 yuan (US$7,100 to $71,000) fine to be given to network operators who refuse correction by relevant government departments for failing to stop the transmission of prohibited information, in addition to potential suspension of business, closure of website, or license revocation. Under the amended CSL, this fine may be increased to 500,000 to 2 million yuan (US$71,000 to $290,000) if the network operator “refuses to rectify [the violation] or if the circumstances are serious,” and where “there are particularly serious effects or consequences,” operators may be fined 2 million to 10 million yuan (US$290,000 to $1,400,000).

Furthermore, article 64 of the amended CSL, which governs penalties for network operators who did not require users to register with their real identity, clarifies that these penalties apply not only to websites, but also to app-based services. This clarification comes on the tail of recent measures passed by the Ministry of Public Security and approved by five other national agencies, which took effect in July 2025 and which create a “web ID” (国家网络身份认证) system that consolidates users’ real identities across all online activity. Although the web ID is still not mandatory for users, over 80 Chinese apps and platforms had already implemented the system on a trial basis as of August 2024.

Fire in Hong Kong Exposes Governance Failures and Prompts Securitized Response

A humanitarian disaster in Hong Kong exposed governance failures and demonstrated the government’s readiness to suppress civic engagement and speech. On November 26, 2025, a major fire broke out in a residential complex called the Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po district, Hong Kong, which resulted in at least 161 deaths and 79 injuries, making it the third deadliest fire in the city’s history.

The fire underscored a range of governance failures. For example, although Wang Fuk residents repeatedly contacted different government departments previously to raise safety concerns, the project was allowed to continue after the government had conducted 16 inspections and issued multiple warnings. Fragmented intergovernmental response created gaps in oversight due to overlapping but poorly coordinated areas of responsibilities. Moreover, despite official knowledge of bid rigging in similar construction projects, the government failed to prevent alleged corrupt practices in the Wang Fuk Court project. As of January 2026, no government officials have been held accountable. 

Authorities arrested at least 21 individuals connected to the renovation project on manslaughter, fraud, and corruption charges, including engineering consultants, subcontractors, and the current and former chairs of the owners’ board who oversaw the bidding process. The government also established an “independent committee” to investigate the Wang Fuk fire and more broadly the maintenance and renovation work in other large-scale buildings, but its neutrality and effectiveness has been questioned. 

Shortly after the fire, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the PRC government in Hong Kong issued a statement warning that citizens’ reaction to the fire could pose a national security threat, a position echoed by Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu. The Hong Kong government exerted narrative control by making arrests on national security grounds and by pressuring journalists and other citizens who tried to document the incident. For example, university student Miles Kwan Ching-fung (關靖豐) was arrested for “sedition” for starting an online petition calling for an investigation and government accountability. Authorities also arrested political commentator Wong On-yin (王岸然, né Wong Kwok-ngon, 黃覺岸) and former district councilor Kenneth Cheung Kam-hung (張錦雄) in connection with their public remarks and social media posts about the fire. 

As noted by a scholar, the Wang Fuk fire illustrates several trends in Hong Kong, including the continued suppression of civil society activities and speech even in non-political domains and the entrenchment of the national security regime as a permanent and central feature of governance. 

Near Record Low Turnout in Hong Kong Election Suggests Voter Disengagement

The Legislative Council (LegCo) election did not effectively boost voter turnout after the election system has been rendered largely non-competitive. A general election for the LegCo was held on December 7, 2025. It was the second LegCo election after the electoral system was overhauled in 2021. Under the new system, candidates are required to be screened for “patriotism,” and the number of popularly elected seats was reduced to 22 percent from 57 percent. A total of 161 candidates signed up for the December election, about 30 percent of whom had business or institutional ties to mainland China, representing a 50 percent increase compared to the previous election in 2021.

Ahead of the election, Secretary for Justice Paul Lam Ting-kwok urged voters to participate, arguing that a low turnout rate could undermine the PRC government’s confidence in the people of Hong Kong. Consistent with this assessment, the Hong Kong government allocated HK$177 million (approximately US$22 million) to promote the election, a 77 percent increase compared to the previous election.

The government’s wide-ranging mobilization campaign, however, failed to meaningfully boost voter turnout, which was at 31.90 percent, trailing the record-low turnout of 30.20 percent in the 2021 election (the turnout rate in the 2016 election was 58.28 percent). Despite the slight uptake in rate, the number of votes dropped by nearly 33,000 due to a decrease in the overall number of registered voters. Some analysts linked the low turnout to the loss of credibility and competitiveness under the new election system. 

Meanwhile, authorities invoked an offense created in 2021 to suppress activists who urged others to boycott the election, including by non-participation or by casting an invalid ballot. As of December 2025, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) had arrested 11 individuals and listed three others as the subjects of arrest warrants based on their political speech. Among those wanted by authorities was Tong Wai-hung (湯偉雄), an exiled Hong Konger who had resettled in Taiwan. He reported that his business establishment was vandalized by one or more perpetrators four days after he had spoken out against the election.

Forced Censorship and Transnational Repression in the Arts

Two cases of transnational repression in recent months have highlighted the nexus of the PRC’s attempts to control narratives in arts and entertainment both domestically and abroad. 

In August 2025, the Bangkok Arts and Cultural Center removed and changed multiple works of art by exiled artists, reportedly due to pressure by PRC authorities. Three days after the exhibition opened, Chinese embassy staff and Bangkok city officials demanded the gallery shut down the show and warned that it could cause “diplomatic tensions” for Thailand and China. Gallery staff then obscured the names of Hong Kong, Tibetan, and Uyghur artists, and removed a multimedia piece by a Tibetan artist. The exhibition, titled “Constellation of Complicity: Visualizing the Global Machinery of Authoritarian Solidary,” focused on authoritarian governments and featured artists from Myanmar, Iran, Russia, Syria, and China. However, only artists from Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang were censored, paralleling the intense control the PRC has sought to maintain over these groups’ narratives domestically as well.

Only a few months later, an independent film festival set to take place in New York City was cancelled due to what observers called a “transnational pressure campaign” by Chinese authorities. The inaugural IndieChina Film Festival, scheduled for November 8-15, 2025, was to be the first independent Chinese film festival in New York, highlighting more than 40 films and documentaries from around the world. Days before the film festival began, though, director Zhu Rikun began receiving pressure from various angles. His family and friends in China were harassed, participating directors in China and European countries informed him they could no longer attend, and others asked Zhu not to screen their films. On November 6, Zhu issued a statement cancelling the festival, hoping to “stop certain unknown forces from harassing all directors, guests, former staff, and volunteers.” Although Zhu called the decision to cancel the festival “painful,” it was not his first encounter with PRC authorities in the entertainment industry. Zhu founded two film festivals in China over a decade ago, but both were shut down by authorities – including the Beijing Independent Film Festival, the largest of its kind in China, which was shut down on its opening day in 2014. Independent film festivals and filmmakers in China more broadly have faced crackdowns in the past decade, as the PRC tightens control over the arts and entertainment industries.

Religious Freedom

Crackdown on Protestant “House” Churches Intensifies. In October 2025, the Chinese government conducted a coordinated raid on Zion Church, an unregistered protestant “house” church, detaining over 20 members, 18 of which were later formally arrested. As Grace Jin Drexel, the daughter of arrested Zion Church Pastor Mingri “Ezra” Jin (金明日), reported in a November CECC hearing, “a new wave of religious persecution is emerging across China.” The end of 2025 and beginning of 2026 saw the continuation of this wave.
 
Between December 13 and 18, 2025, approximately 100 members of Yayang Church, a protestant church in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, were reportedly taken away, with two dozen remaining in detention as of early January 2026. On January 5, Chinese authorities deployed heavy machinery around the Yayang Church building, and AFP later reported that the cross on top of the building has been removed. On January 6, authorities from Deyang municipality, Sichuan province detained eight members of “house” church Early Rain Covenant Church, including the church’s current leader, Li Yingqiang (李英强), who was taken on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power.” Authorities have previously targeted Early Rain several times, detaining Pastor Wang Yi (王怡) in 2018 and later sentencing him to 9 years in prison on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power.” 

Highlighted Political Prisoner Case—Gonpo Tsering (མགོན་པོ་ཚེ་རིང་)
 

CECC Political Prisoner Database record number 2025-00073

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In February 2024, authorities in Dege county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, detained Tibetan Buddhist monk Gonpo Tsering amid protests by thousands of Tibetan Buddhist monks and local laypeople. The protests came after officials announced plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) river that would flood six monasteries and two villages in the area. The protests began on February 14 and continued until People’s Armed Police units deployed to the area and detained hundreds of protesters.

 In June 2025, information emerged that authorities had sentenced two senior monks from one of the threatened monasteries, Yena Monastery: Gonpo Tsering, who received a three-year prison sentence, and Sherab (also reported as Jamyang Legshe), who was sentenced to four years in prison. Information on official proceedings against them was unavailable, including the exact charges against them, the dates of their trials or sentencing hearings, and the court or courts that sentenced them. Authorities reportedly severely tortured Gonpo Tsering in custody, causing him brain injuries and leaving him unable to see, speak, or swallow, and leading to his hospitalization in intensive care in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan.

Gonpo Tsering’s detention, imprisonment, and torture are emblematic of the severity with which PRC authorities treat Tibetan community leaders who oppose Chinese Communist Party or state policies. While authorities have long regarded religious institutions in Tibet as serious threats to Party rule, local advocacy and organizing around environmental and development issues are also a cause for concern, as Tibetans express opposition to economic decisions made without any meaningful input from local residents. For example, Anya Sengdra, a Tibetan anti-corruption advocate, was detained in 2018 and sentenced in 2019 to 7 years in prison for his involvement in local environmental protection efforts countering mining and poaching and for running anti-corruption WeChat discussion groups. Despite his seriously deteriorated health, prison officials reportedly extended Anya Sengdra’s sentence by several months; he may be scheduled for release in February 2026.

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) is mandated to monitor human rights and the rule of law in China. This newsletter contains the views of professional Commission staff and does not necessarily imply endorsement by any individual CECC Commissioner, or any Commissioners’ professional staff.